BITE SIZE DOCTRINES FOR DIRECT BAR ANSWERS 10.
10. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a State
Doctrines from January 2022 Sandoval Notes
Read at your own risk. Arranged by Ellis.
1. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under the
doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any provision of the Constitution, such law or
contract is null and void. (Manila Hotel vs. GSIS)
2. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
presumption is that all the provisions of the Constitution
are self-executing. (Manila Hotel vs. GSIS)
3. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
People's initiative on the Constitution is limited only to
proposing amendments to the Constitution, not the
revision thereof. (Santiago vs. COMELEC)
4. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a legislative
or executive act that is declared void for being
unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or
obligation. (Araullo vs. Aquino)
5. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
doctrine of operative fact nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. (Araullo vs. Aquino)
6. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption
and implementation of the DAP in view of equity and fair
play. (Araullo vs. Aquino)
7. It has been held by the Supreme Court that UNCLOS III
has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory.
It is a multilateral treating regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones, and continental shelves.
(Magallona vs. Ermita)
8. It has been held by the Supreme Court that States
acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulation of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. (Magallona vs.
Ermita)
9. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
doctrine of State Immunity only extends to acts Jure
Imperii, that is acts in pursuit of a sovereign and
Governmental function. (US vs. Ruiz)
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts not in the exercise of its sovereign functions.
(DA vs. NLRC)
11. It has been held by the Supreme court that the
doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to
complaints filed against public officials for acts done in
the performance of their duties. (Lansang vs. CA)
12. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Doctrine of State Immunity does not apply where the
public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.
(Lansang vs. CA)
13. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Doctrine of State Immunity does not apply where the
public official is clearly being sued not in his official
capacity but in his personal capacity. (Lansang vs. CA)
14. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
waiver of immunity from suit of the US under the Visiting
Forces Agreement applies only to a waiver from criminal
jurisdiction, so that if an American soldier commits an
offense in the Philippines, he shall be tried by Philippine
Courts under Philippine laws. (Arigo vs. Swift)
15. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the funds
of the UP are Government funds in character and thus
may not be subject to garnishment. (UP vs. Dizon)
16. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law throuh
legislation. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)
17. It has been held by the Supreme Court that generally
accepted principles of international law form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
stipulations. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)
18. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
International Customary Rules are accepted as binding as
a result from the combination of two elements:
a. The established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and
b. A psychological element known as opinion as to
law or necessity.
Page 1 of 25

19. It has been held that the right to self-determination
of peoples has been elevated into the status of a
generally accepted principle of international law.
(Province of North Cotabato vs. GRPPP)
20. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Yogyakarta Principles do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. (Ang LADLAD LGBT Party
vs. COMELEC)
21. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Constitutional provision upholding the Filipino First
Policy is self-executing. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS)
22. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the term
Capital as provided for by the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of officers.
(Gamboa vs. Teves)
NOTE: See Roy vs. Herbosa. It has been held by the
Supreme Court that both the beneficial interest and
controlling interest must be taken into account when
determining the compliance of a Corporation with the
Constitution.
23. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Constitution shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the ealiest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. (Imbong
vs. Ochoa)
24. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible. (Imbong vs. Ochoa)
25. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Precautionary Principle applies where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation. (ISAAA vs. Greenpeace)
26. It has been held by the Supreme Court that although
the Precautionary Principle allows lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a connection between the
serious or irreversible harm and the human activity,
scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective
policy choices under the precautionary principle.
(Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers)
27. In a similar case decided by the Supreme Court, it
held that whether the marine mammals have locus
standi to file the petition had been eliminated because
the Rules for the Enforcement of Environmental Laws
allows any citizen to file a petition for the enforcement
of environmental laws and, in their petition, these
marine mammals were jonied by human beings as
"stewards of nature." (Resident Marine Mammals vs.
Reyes)
28. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Service
Contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution,
and the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, are in fact service contracts.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes)
29. It has been held by the Supreme Court that for
Service Contracts to be valid, it must, among others, be
in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniformity in provisions to avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the Country. (Resident Marine
Mammals vs. Reyes)
30. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in order
for a Service Contract to be valid, the President shall be
the signatory of the Government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at
different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
31. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in order
for a Service Contract to be valid, the President shall
report it to Congress to give that branch of the
Government an opportunity to look over the agreement
and interpose timely objections
32. It has been held that the exploitation and utilization
of indigenous oil resources in the present may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress since Tanon Strait
is a NIPAS (National Protected Area System) area.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes)
33. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under the
Alter Ego Principle:
a. All executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department;
Page 2 of 25
 b. The heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive;
and
c. The acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the
Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals vs.
Reyes)
34. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Alter
Ego Principle does not apply in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally. (Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes)
35. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" include the freedom to determine the
following:
a. Who may teach;
b. What may be taught;
c. How it shall be taught;
d. Who may be admitted to study. (Isabelo, Jr. vs.
Perpetual Help College)
36. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Federal Paramountcy is a Constitutional doctrine
followed in federal states, and its application to the
Philippines is legally inconceivable because the
Philippines has not adopted a federal form of
Government. (Republic vs. Provincial Government of
Palawan)
37. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Supreme Court of the United States of America, applying
the Federal Paramountcy Doctrine, consistently ruled on
the fundamental right of the national government over
the national wealth in maritime areas, to the exclusion of
the coastal state. (Republic vs. Provincial Government of
Palawan)
38. It has been held by the Supreme Court that In order
to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice)
39. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Bicameral Conference Committee is a mechanism for
compromising the differences between the Senate and
the House of Representatives. (PJA vs. Secretary Prado)
40. It has been held by the Supreme Court that what is
really required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives is not the law, but only the bill, and that
Senate has the power to propose or concur with
amendments. (Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance)
41. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Political
Parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections.
42. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Political
Parties that field candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. (Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC)
43. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. (Atong
Paglaum vs. COMELEC)
44. It has been held by the Supreme Court that nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. (Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC)
45. It has been held by the Supreme Court that National,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified. (Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC)
NOTE: Although, as a rule, Political Parties may not
participate in party-list elections if they field candidates
in district elections, however, by way of an exception,
they may still participate through their sectoral wing,
Page 3 of 25
provided that the sectoral wing is registered separately
as a political party in the COMELEC and is linked to the
dominant political party through a coalition. (Atong
Paglaum vs. COMELEC)
46. It has been held by the Supreme Court that what is
prohibited is the registration of a religious sect as a
political party, and that there is no prohibition against a
priest running as a candidate. (Ang Bagong Bayani vs.
COMELEC)
47. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under the
non-establishment clause of freedom of religion, the
COMELEC, as an agency of the Government, is not
supposed to use religious standards in its decisions and
actions. (Ang LADLAD Party vs. COMELEC)
NOTE: The act of the COMELEC of not allowing the
registration of Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party as a political party
to participate in party-list elections on the ground that its
members are “immoral,” citing verses from the Bible and
the Koran, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it
violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of
religion and, therefore, should be nullified. (Ang Ladlad-
LGBT Party v. COMELEC)
48. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in the
computation of the number of seats allocated to party-
list representatives, fractional representation is not
allowed is it will exceed the twenty (20) allocated seats
for party-list representatives and, therefore, will violate
the Constitution. In such a case, what should be done is
simply to disregard the fraction. (Veterans Federation
Party vs. COMELEC)
49. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives, and is therefore
unconstitutional. (BANAT vs. COMELEC)
50. It has been held by the Supreme Court that once
elected, both the district representatives and the party-
list representatives are treated in like manner. (Abayon
vs. HRET)
51. It has been held by the Supreme Court that from the
regulation of fund releases, the implementation of
payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the
funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel.
(LAM vs. Secretary of Budget and Management)
52. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the "Pork
Barrel" System is unconstitutional for the following
reasons:
a. Principle of Separation of Powers - insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution;
b. Principle of Non-Delegability of Legislative Powers
- insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; and insofar as it conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds
intended by law for energy-related purposes only
to purposes as he may deem fit.
c. Disregard of Prescribed Procedure of Presentment
- insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill.
d. Denial of the President's power to veto items -
insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill.
e. Impairment of Public Accountability - insofar as it
has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs
of budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize.
f. Subversion of Local Autonomy - Insofar as it has
authorized legislators to intervene in affairs of
purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions. (Belgica vs. Ochoa)
53. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under the
Constitution, must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
a. There is a law authorizing the President, Senate
President, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice, and
the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
(PreS.SpeaCH) to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated
from the appropriations of their respective offices;
and
Page 4 of 25
 c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item
in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Araullo vs. Aquino)
54. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself to
Congress by the Constitution is the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, for Congress may not be
expected to enact good laws if it will be denied the power
investigate. (Arnault v. Nazareno)
55. It has been held by the Supreme Court that power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation of each House of
Congress is subject to the following limitations:
a. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;
b. It must be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure of a House of
Congress conducting such inquiry; and
c. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiry shall be respected. (Bengzon, Jr. v.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
56. It has been held by the Supreme Court that since the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute, it follows that such is subject to judicial review
especially in view of the expanded power of the Court to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee)
57. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under the
Presidential Communications Privilege, the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers,
by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings. (Neri vs. Senate Committee)
58. It has been held by the Supreme Court that when
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. (Senate v.
Ermita)
59. It has been held by the Supreme Court that only the
President, on whom executive power is vested, may be
exempted from the power to conduct inquiries by
Congress. (Senate v. Ermita)
60. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has
Jurisdiction over Election Contests involving Party-List
Representatives. (Abayon vs. HRET)
61. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualification ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. (Abayon vs. HRET)
62. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is only
the President, as Chief Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers provided under it. (Kulayan vs. Tan)
61. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
faithful execution clause is an obligation imposed on the
President, and not a separate grant of power. (Saguisag
vs. Ochoa)
62. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under the
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the establishment
of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are presumably the acts of
the Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals vs.
Reyes)
NOTE: The exception to this rule is in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally. (Resident Marine Mammals vs.
Reyes)
NOTE: Another exception is when such actions of agents
are disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes)
Page 5 of 25
63. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
doctrine of qualified political agency may not be validly
invoked if it is the Constitution itself that provides that
the act should be performed by the President no less,
especially since what are involved are natural resources.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes)
64. It has been held by the Supreme Court that only
presidential appointees belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. (Manalo vs. Sistosza)
NOTE: The first group includes the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
(Manalo v. Sistoza)
65. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. (Matibag vs. Benipayo)
66. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution
is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra
vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of the
Local Government Code. (Kulayan vs. Tan)
67. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
President’s power to call out the armed forces as their
Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom, and is only subject to
judicial review based upon the presence of grave abuse
of discretion. (IBP vs. Zamora)
68. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Former
President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public office. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
(Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC)
69. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be interfered with by Congress or
the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits
provided for by the Constitution. (Risos-Vidal vs.
COMELEC)
70. It has been held by the Supreme Court that whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of
the statute. (Llamado vs. CA)
71. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the role
of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the
Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give
paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation,
the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of
the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination.
(Saguisag vs. Ochoa)
72. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the power
to ratify treaties is vested in the President, and the role
of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (BAYAN vs.
Zamora)
73. It has been held by the Supreme Court that all treaties
or international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
(BAYAN vs. Zamora)
74. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in
statutory construction that a special provision or law
prevails over a general one. (BAYAN vs. Zamora)
75. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
President's ability in instances involving the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities is limited by the
Constitution. The initial limitation is found in Section 21
of the provisions on the Executive Department. The
specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa)
76. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the power
of the President to enter into binding executive
agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-
established in this jurisdiction. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa)
77. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
International law continues to make no distinction
between treaties and executive agreements in that they
Page 6 of 25
are equally binding obligations upon nations. (BAYAN vs.
Zamora)
78. It has been held by the Supreme Court that political
questions are questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the Government. (Vinuya vs. Romulo)
NOTE: Political questions are those concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular measure. (Vinuya vs. Romulo)
NOTE: The issue presented being a political question and
petitioners having failed to show that President Duterte
committed grave abuse of discretion when he allowed
the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
“Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).” - Dismissed. (Ocampo
vs. Enriquez)
79. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it cannot
compel the President to take up the cause of petitioners
against Japan since that will violate the doctrine of
separation of powers for that is a political question.
(Vinuya vs. Romulo)
NOTE: Above doctrine refers to the plight of comfort
women during World War II against Japan.
80. It has been held by the Supreme Court that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
a. There must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power;
b. The person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance;
c. The question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. (Belgica vs. Ochoa)
81. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
absence of the first two requisites which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez)
NOTE: Lack of actual case or controversy and locus
standi, renders the discussion of the last two requisites
superfluous. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez)
82. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an “actual
case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. (Ocampo
vs Enriquez)
83. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an actual
case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. (Republic
Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago)
84. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. (Imbong vs. Ochoa)
85. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an action
is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issued involved have
become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled
to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties (Santiago v. Court of
Appeals).
NOTE: Courts have refrained from even expressing an
opinion in a case where the issues have become moot
and academic, there being no more justiciable
controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof
would be of no practical use or value (Barbieto v. CA)
86. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot,
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
c. When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. (Belgica vs. Ochoa)
87. It has been held by the Supreme Court that unless a
person has sustained or is in imminent danger of
Page 7 of 25
sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of,
such party has no legal standing. (Ocampo vs. Enriquez)
88. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the rule
on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of
the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010)
89. It has been held by the Supreme Court that taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. (Ocampo vs Enriquez)
90. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in suits
filed as concerned citizens, petitioners are required to
substantiate that the issues are of transcendental
significance, or of paramount public interest. In cases
involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence. (Ocampo vs Enriquez)
91. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in suits
filed by Members of Congress, in the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or the
institution to which they belong, their standing as
members of the Congress cannot be upheld. (Ocampo vs
Enriquez)
92. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa,
insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn,
is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a
citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature.” (Arigo vs. Swift)
93. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a facial
challenge is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also
all other rights which include:
a. Religious freedom;
b. Freedom of the press; and
c. The right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. (Imbong vs. Ochoa)
94. It has been held by the Supreme Court that when a
penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a
facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is acceptable. (Disini vs SoJ)
95. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in an "as
applied" challenged the petitioner who claims a violation
of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional
ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack
of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness.
Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. (Disini vs
SoJ)
NOTE: It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing. (Disini vs SoJ)
96. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a statute
or act is void for vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.)
97. It has been held by the supreme Court that the
overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, et al.)
98. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities. (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, et al.)
Page 8 of 25
99. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in
overbreadth analysis, challenges are permitted to raise
the rights of third parties, and the court invalidates the
entire statute “on its fact,” not merely “as applied for” so
that the overbreadth law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al.
v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.)
100. It has been held by the Supreme Court that only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no
case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.)
101. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al.
v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.)
102. It has been held by the Supreme court that the
provision in the Charter of the GSIS which exempts it
from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of
legal fees since Congress does not possess the rule
making power of the Constitution. (GSIS vs. Caballero)
NOTE: This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987
Constitution removed this power from Congress. (GSIS
vs. Caballero)
103. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there
are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
“possessory” taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A
“regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr.)
104. It has been held by the Supreme Court that taking
only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the
owner of the beneficial use of its property. (City of
Manila vs. Laguio, Jr.)
105. In has been held by the Supreme Court that
landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the
taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically
beneficial or productive uses of the land. (Mosqueda vs.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et
al.)
106. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in order
to fall within the aegis of the due process clause, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. (Corona v. United
Harbor Pilots Association
107. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in
essence, procedural due process “refers to the method
or manner by which the law is enforced,” while
substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” (Corona v. United
Harbor Pilots Association)
108. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of
notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion)
109. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
instances when prior notice or hearing may be dispensed
with in the following instances:
a. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for
immediate action like:
i. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se
(Article 704, Civil Code);
ii. Preventive suspension of a public servant
facing administrative charges
b. (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337)
i. Padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments
which are immediate threats to public health
and decency; and
ii. Cancellation of a passport of a person sought
for criminal prosecution.
c. Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected such as:
Page 9 of 25
 i. Summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer; and
ii. Replacement of a temporary appointee;
d. Where the twin rights have previously been
offered but the right to exercise them had not
been claimed. (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)
110. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a law
should be declared void if it is vague, that is it lacks
comprehensible standards so that men of ordinary
intelligence will probably have to guess as to its meaning
and differ in its application. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino
Banana Growers)
NOTE: Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: one, it violates due process as it fails to
afford persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and;
second, it gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out provisions and, therefore, in effect, it
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s
muscle. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers)
NOTE: However, for this to be validly invoked, the act or
law must be utterly vague on its face that it cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by statutory
construction. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers)
111. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an
Ordinance enacted by the City of Davao prohibiting aerial
spraying in all agricultural entities in that City and
requiring affected parties to shift to other modes of
pesticide application within a three-month period under
pain of penalty was declared unconstitutional as it
violates due process for being oppressive. (Mosqueda, et
al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers)
112. It has been held that during the initial evaluation
stage at the Department of Justice of an extradition
proceeding, an extraditee is not yet entitled to the
documents he was requesting so that he may be able to
prepare for his defense. He may be given copies of such
documents once the petition for his extradition is filed in
the RTC. (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)
NOTE: That is because an extradition is “sui generis;” it is
not similar to a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all of the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. Hence an extraditee is not entitled to
the documents that he may request for his defense
before the petition for extradition is filed in the RTC.
(Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)
113. It has been held by the Supreme Court that if the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. (Mosqueda, et al. v.
Pilipino Banana Growers)
114. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a valid
classification must be: (BENG)
a. Based on substantial distinctions;
b. Equally applicable to all members of the class;
c. Not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. Germane to the purposes of the law. (Mosqueda,
et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers)
115. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
rational basis scrutiny demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational
basis test often applies in cases involving economics or
social welfare, or to any other case not involving a
suspect class. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers)
116. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives
intermediate scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny,
the justification for the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad generalizations.
(Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers)
117. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the strict
scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries
the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et
al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers)
118. It has been held by the Supreme Court, by applying
the rational basis test, that the ordinance of Davao City
prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural entities
therein as the practice produces pesticide drift causing
harm to the residents and the environment, violates the
equal protection clause, and hence should be declared
unconstitutional. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers)
Page 10 of 25
119. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing
the criminal information in court is an executive function.
It is a function that belongs to the prosecutor, an officer
under the Department of Justice, a department under
the executive branch. (Abdula v. Guiani)
120. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest, or even that of a search
warrant, is a judicial function, because under the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, only a judge may issue a
warrant of arrest or of a search warrant. (Abdula v.
Guiani)
121. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
judge is not bound by the determination of probable
cause by the prosecutor. In fact, he should not rely solely
on the finding of probable cause by the prosecutor
because he is mandated by the Constitution to personally
determine probable cause. (Abdula v. Guiani)
122. It has been held by the Supreme Court that prior
notice or hearing is not required before a judge issues a
warrant of arrest of an extraditee once the petition for
extradition is filed in court on two (2) basis, that is
statutory (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 1069); and constitutional (Sec.
2, Art. III of the Bill of Rights). (Government of the USA v.
Judge Purganan)
123. It has been held by the Supreme Court that P.D. No.
1069 or Extradition Law provides that the moment the
petition for extradition is filed in the RTC, the judge shall
cause the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered “immediate.” (Government of the USA v.
Judge Purganan)
124. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Constitution does not require notice or hearing before a
judge issues a warrant of arrest. On the contrary, what
the Constitution provides is “after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.” (Government of the USA v. Judge
Purganan)
125. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a search
incidental to a lawful arrest must comply with the
following requisites:
a. The arrest always precedes the search; the process
cannot be reversed;
b. The precedent arrest must always be lawful
because, if the precedent arrest is unlawful, the
subsequent search, although it may have yielded
positive results, may never validate the unlawful
arrest that preceded it; and
c. The search must be limited or confined only to the
immediate vicinity of the place of the arrest. It may
not be extended beyond that. (Section 13, Rule
126, Rules of Court)
126. It has been held by the Supreme Court that for
searches at checkpoints to be valid, the following must
be observed
a. The checkpoint must be pre-announced;
b. It must be stationary; and
c. The search at checkpoint must be limited to visual
search only. An intrusive search is not allowed
(Valmonte v. De Villa)
127. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Mandatory Drug Testing under the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act does not constitute unreasonable
search prohibited by the Constitution. It falls under the
category of an administrative search. In administrative
searches, the strict probable cause requirement is not
applied. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board)
128. It has been held by the Supreme Court that when
one is at the nation’s airport and wanted to travel by air,
he has no reasonable expectation of privacy and can be
subject to warrantless search. This is in view of increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism. (People v.
Leila Johnson)
NOTE: In the later case of People v. Susan Canton, the SC
held that this is now another instance of valid
warrantless search – warrantless searches at airports.
129. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
requisites for the “plain view” doctrine to be validly
invoked are:
a. The law enforcement officer must have a valid
justification for an intrusion, or is in a position
where he can view a particular area;
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view must
be inadvertent; and
c. It is immediately apparent to him that the thing he
sees is object of a crime, contraband, or subject to
seizure. (People v. Doria)
Page 11 of 25
NOTE: It is clear that if the object is inside a closed
container, “plain view” may not be invoked. However,
even if it inside a closed container but if due to the
configuration of the container, or due to its
transparency, it can still be seen from the outside what is
inside, “plain view” may still be invoked. (People v. Doria)
130. It has been held by the Supreme Court that zones of
privacy are recognized and protected in our laws, and
two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
privacy:
a. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let
alone, and
b. The right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. (Disini vs. SoJ)
131. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in
assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion. (Disini vs. SoJ)
132. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Content-
based restrictions are imposed because of the content of
the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-
present danger test. (Sanidad v. Comelec)
133. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the rule
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers
from campaigning either for or against an issue in a
plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or
it will not pass under strict scrutiny. These restrictions
are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. (Sanidad v.
Comelec)
134. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the test
for this difference in the level of justification for the
restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions
distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are
usually imposed because of fear of how people will react
to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-
neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880,
the Public Assembly Act of 1985. (Osmena v. COMELEC)
135. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified:
a. If it is within the constitutional power of the
government;
b. If it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
c. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
d. If the incidental restriction on alleged freedoms of
speech, expression and press is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
(Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Comelec)
NOTE: This is known as the O'brien test.
136. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under
the O'brien test, even if a law furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is “not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless
be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question. (Social Weather Stations, Inc. v.
Comelec)
137. It has been held by the Supreme Court that freedom
from prior restraint is freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the
executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
government. (Chavez v. Gonzales)
138. It has been held by the Supreme Court that freedom
from prior restraint precludes governmental acts that
require approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or
permits as prerequisites to publication including the
payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and
even injunctions against publication. (Chavez v.
Gonzales)
139. It has been held by the Supreme Court that even the
closure of the business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their
printing and publication, are deemed as previous
restraint or censorship. (Chavez v. Gonzales)
140. It has been held by the Supreme Court that any law
or official that requires some form of permission to be
had before publication can be made, commits an
infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can
be had at the courts. (Chavez v. Gonzales)
Page 12 of 25

141. It has been held by the Supreme Court that locus
standi is not required when the action was filed to
prevent a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to
freedom of expression and overbreadth. (Chavez vs.
Gonzales)
142. It has been held by the Supreme Court that personal
opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by
the COMELEC Resolution defining “political
advertisement” or “election propaganda” over which
COMELEC has the power to regulate. (Diocese of Bacolod
vs. COMELEC)
NOTE: The Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution
is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not
a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides
space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in
the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the
acts of others.
143. It has been held by the Supreme Court that even as
early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has
recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These
are
a. Freedom from prior restraint;
b. Freedom from punishment subsequent to
publication;
c. Freedom of access to information; and
d. Freedom of circulation. (Chavez vs. Gonzales)
144. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, are rights that enjoy
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For
these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected. (BAYAN vs.
Ermita)
145. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there is
grave abuse of discretion when a Mayor outright
modifies a rally permit without informing the applicant
who should have been heard first on the matter of the
danger that may warrant the modification of the permit.
(IBP vs. Mayor Atienza)
146. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Public Assembly Act is merely a "content-neutral"
regulation since it mearly regulates the time, place, and
manner of the assemblies. (BAYAN vs. Ermita)
147. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) Policy adopted
by the Arroyo Administration in dealing with public
assemblies insofar as it would purport to differ from or
be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is void and respondents
are enjoined to refrain from using it and to strictly
observe the requirements of maximum tolerance.
(BAYAN vs. Ermita)
NOTE: The rule of calibrated preemptive response is a
policy practiced by the Arroyo administration in which
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent
are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and
inciting them into actions that are inimical to public
order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of
law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a
vigilant and proactive government.
NOTE: While CPR was admitted to be the same as
maximum tolerance. The Supreme Court struck it down
insofar that its practice is not in accordance with the
meaning of maximum tolerance.
148. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there is
grave violation of the non-establishment clause when
the COMELEC used of the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad Party in the party-list
elections. (Ang LADLAD vs. COMELEC)
149. It has been held by the Supreme court that an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
church and its members and relate to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle
are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and
other activities with attached religious significance.
(Austria v. NLRC)
150. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under
the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion,
when it comes to religious differences, neutrality alone is
its fixed and immovable stance. (Inglesia Ni Cristo vs. CA)
151. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
Page 13 of 25
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of
a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life
of a reality already on ground. (Inglesia Ni Cristo vs. CA)
152. It has been held by the Supreme court that
prohibiting placing of campaign decals on private cars is
overbroad, and thus invalid prohibition. (Adiong v.
COMELEC)
NOTE: The questioned prohibition premised on the
statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. The Court defined the overbreadth
doctrine via American jurisprudence.
153. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the “Not
Intended Clause” is void for vagueness as it has a chilling
effect on the average person. Before the protester can
speak, he must first guess whether his speech would be
interpreted as a terrorist act under Secton 4 and whether
he might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it.
They will have to contend whether the few hours they
would spend on the streets to redress their grievances
against the government is worth the propsect of being
indefinitely incarcerated, considering that terrorism
under Section 4 would be an unbailable offense as per
Section 7 Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
(Calleja vs. Exec Sec.)
153. It has been held by the Supreme Court that R.A.
10354 or the RH Law is not unconstitutional, except with
respect to the following provisions:
a. Section 7 and the corresponding provision in RH-
IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities And non-maternity specialty hospitals
and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act no. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage
access to modern methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;
b. Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
c. Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
d. Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures;
e. Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another
health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
f. Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs
or shall do any act that hinders the full
g. implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
h. Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono
reproductive health service in so far as they affect
the conscientious objector in securing Philhealth
accreditation; and
i. Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. (Imbong vs. Ochoa)
154. It has been held by the Court that Section 6, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s
right to travel provided that such restriction is in the
interest of national security, public safety or public
health as may be provided by law. (Office of
Administrative Services–Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine)
155. It has been held by the Court that OCA Circular No.
49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court
personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad.
Page 14 of 25
(Office of Administrative Services–Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine)
NOTE: Thus, for traveling abroad without having been
officially allowed by the Court, Judge Macarine is guilty
of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
156. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the DOJ
has no authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which
effectively restricts the right to travel through the
issuance of Watchlist Orders (WLOs) and Hold Departure
Orders (HDOs). There are only three considerations that
may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national
security, public safety or public health. Further, there
must be an explicit provision of statutory law or Rules of
Court providing for the impairment. (Genuino vs. De
Lima)
157. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, whether perfected or not.
(Chavez vs. PCGG)
NOTE: The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth
assumes a public character which refers to assets and
properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
Pres. Marcos, his family and relatives through or as a
result of improper of illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of
their public office; or their use of powers or influences
resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino People and the
Republic of the Philippines. (Chavez vs. PCGG)
158. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there
are recognized restrictions to the right of the people to
information on Matters of public concern. The following
are such exceptions:
a. National security matters and intelligence
information;
b. Trade or industrial secrets and banking
transactions;
c. Criminal matters;
d. Other confidential information. (Chavez vs. PCGG)
NOTE: Other acknowledged limitations to information
access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house
of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
159. It has been held by the Supreme Court that while
public officers in the custody or control of public records
have the discretion to regulate the manner in which
records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it
the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination,
or copying of the records. After all, public office is a
public trust. (Chavez vs. PCGG)
160. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is the
mandatory duty of the Judge to conduct a hearing
despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
(Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz)
161. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. (Lavides vs. CA)
162. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an
extraditee may be allowed to post bail during the
pendency of an extradition proceeding. However, for him
to be allowed to post bail, still he must prove that:
a. Once granted bail he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and
b. That there exists special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances that will justify the grant
of bail to him, by a clear and convincing evidence.
(Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Judge Olalia)
163. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Enrile’s
poor health justifies his admission to bail. It has been
held by the Supreme Court that an accused should be
granted bail if it is shown that:
a. The detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and
b. There exist special, humanitarian, and compelling
circumstances. (Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan)
NOTE: The SC further explained that bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged should be allowed independently of the merits
charged, provided his continued incarceration is
injurious to his health and endanger his life. (Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan)
164. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
substances emitted from the body of the accused may be
received as evidence in prosecution for acts of
Page 15 of 25
lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of
the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
(People vs. Rondero)
165. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the hair
samples forcibly taken from the accused and submitted
to the NBI for forensic investigation may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative
in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
(People vs. Rondero)
166. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the right
against self-incrimination extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.
(Secretary of Justice v. Lantion)
NOTE: An example given by the case is that of an
administrative investigation of a licensed physician who
is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss
of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The
Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan, pointed
out that the revocation of one’s license as a medical
practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
167. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the right
against self-incrimination be validly invoked during
inquiries in aid of legislation since a congressional
committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action, including the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
168. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there
are two types of statutory immunity granted to a
witness. They are the transactional immunity and the
use-and-derivative-use immunity. (Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan)
NOTE: By the grant of a transactional immunity, a
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In
contrast, by the grant of use-and derivative-use
immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her
particular testimony and evidence derived from it will
not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan)
169. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the grant
of immunity to an accused willing to testify for the
government is a special privilege, and that laws that tend
to erode the force of these preeminent rights such as the
right against self-incrimination and right to be silent must
necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of
the individual. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan)
170. It has been held by the Supreme Court that our Bill
of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy.
a. The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1(now Sec.
21), Article III of the Constitution ordains that “no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.”
b. The second sentence of said clause provides that
“if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.” (People v. Quijada)
171. It has been held by the Supreme Court that so long
as jeopardy has been attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense may be
availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case. (People v. Quijada)
172. It has been held by the Supreme Court that to
substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following
must be proven:
a. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second;
b. The first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated;
c. The second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or is a frustration thereof. (Cuison v. CA)
173. It has been held by the Supreme Court that legal
jeopardy attaches only:
a. Upon a valid indictment;
b. Before a competent court;
c. After arraignment;
d. When a valid plea has been entered; and
e. The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
(Cuison v. CA)
174. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a bill of
attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
Page 16 of 25
individuals or members of a particular group without a
judicial trial. (Misolas v. Panga)
175. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is
essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the
lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of
court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the
most essential. (Misolas v. Panga)
176. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an Ex
post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
penal laws. R.A. 8249 or the act further defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not a penal law. Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. (Lacson
vs. Exec. Sec.)
177. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth. (Valles vs. COMELEC)
178. In general, there are only two (2) kinds of Filipino
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. There is no
third category. If one did not have to undergo the
cumbersome process of naturalization, it means that he
is natural-born. (Bengson III vs. HRET)
179. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
domestic law, international law, and international
conventions points that a foundling is presumed to have
been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found, and is correspondingly a citizen of such State.
(Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC)
180. It has been held by the Supreme Court that dual
citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. (Mercado vs. Manzano)
181. It has been held by the Supreme Court that Dual
allegiance refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
(Mercado vs. Manzano)
182. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in the Local Government Code must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” (Mercado
vs. Manzano)
183. It has been held by the Supreme Court that by
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. (Mercado vs. Manzano)
184. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
following are the instances where dual citizenship
occurs:
a. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
b. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their father’s
country such children are citizens of that country;
c. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship. (Mercado
v. Manzano)
NOTE: RA 9225 applies to: (1) former natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have already become
citizens of a foreign country through naturalization; and
(2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who may wish
to become a citizen of a foreign country through
naturalization. In both cases, they are given the
opportunity to either reacquire (reacquisition) or retain
(retention) their Philippine citizenship. Thus, in effect,
they will possess dual citizenship.
185. It has been held by the Supreme Court that while
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for
a local elective position. (Maquiling vs. COMELEC)
Page 17 of 25

185. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time
of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
186. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing
him or her with the privileges of a citizen. (So v. Republic)
187. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there
are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen
by naturalization:
a. Administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139;
b. Judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as
amended; and
c. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law
enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien. (So vs. Republic)
188. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
administrative naturalization may be availed of only by
native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to the customs and traditions of the Filipino
people. (So vs. Republic)
189. It has been held by the Supreme Court that before
there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there
must first be a showing that the delegation of power is
itself valid. (Genuino vs. De Lima)
190. It has been held by the Supreme Court the an
administrative issuance is valid only if there is a law that
a. Is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and
b. Fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. (Genuino vs. De Lima)
191. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. (Ocampo vs.
Enriquez)
192. It had been held by the Supreme Court that the
concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times,
as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s
administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he
was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post. (Carpio-Morales vs. CA)
193. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
proviso in R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development
Act) which states, “Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority,” violates the Constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials
to other government posts. (Flores vs. Drilon)
NOTE: It is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and
no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment
of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly
valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one
is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative. (Flores
vs. Drilon)
NOTE: The Ombudsman has administrative disciplinary
authority over all public officers and employees except
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment
or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Sec. 21,
R.A. No. 6770)
NOTE: No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court
to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
*UNCONSTITUTIONAL* No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law. (Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6770)
194. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770
Page 18 of 25
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against
the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts
other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the
first paragraph of the said provision is declared
INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued therefor. (Carpio-Morales vs. CA)
195. UNCONSTITUTIONAL - In all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
It had been held by the Supreme Court that the above
provision is unconstitutional as it contravened the
Constitution. In effect the provision increased the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
consent under that provision. Henceforth, decisions of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be filed
with the Court of Appeals under that ruling. (Fabian vs.
Disierto)
196. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under
the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an
appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following:
a. appointing authority;
b. recommending authority;
c. chief of the bureau or office; and
d. person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy)
197. It has been held by the Supreme Court that when
the appointment is made by the Chief of a bureau or
office or a person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing
authority to constitute nepotism. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy)
NOTE: The following are exempted from the operation of
the rules on nepotism:
a. Persons employed in a confidential capacity;
b. Teachers,
c. Physicians, and
d. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
(E.O. No. 292)
NOTE: The rules on nepotism shall likewise not be
applicable to the case of a member of any family who,
after his or her appointment to any position in an office
or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed. (E.O. No. 292)
198. It has been held by the Supreme Court that
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. (Quimbo v.
Gervacio)
NOTE: If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of
acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is
suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
(Quimbo v. Gervacio)
199. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Doctrine of Condonation was abandoned by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
(Conchita-Morales vs. CA)
200. It had been held by the Supreme Court that the
biometrics requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right
to reasonably regulate. (Kabataan Party-List vs.
COMELEC)
201. It had been held by the Supreme Court that unless
it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the
level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the
Constitution – that is, one which propagates a socio-
economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis
to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
Page 19 of 25
further the public good – the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional. (Kabataan Party-List vs.
COMELEC)
202. It had been held by the Supreme Court that the
assailed biometrics regulation on the right to suffrage
was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive
means in promoting that interest. (Kabataan Party-List
vs. COMELEC)
203. It had been held by the Supreme Court that an
exception to the residence qualification of a voter under
Section 1, Article V on Suffrage of the Constitution, and
that is, with respect to overseas Filipinos, permanent
residents of a foreign country under the Absentee Voters
Act of 2003. (Makalintal vs. COMELEC)
NOTE: There is a clear intent on the part of the framers
of our Constitution to enfranchise as many of our
overseas countrymen in recognition of their tremendous
contributions to the national economy in terms of dollar
remittances.
204. It had been held by the Supreme Court that the
purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of
candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to
enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the
regular election, the candidates among whom they are
to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.
(Miranda v. Abaya)
205. It had been held by the Supreme Court that a
disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had
a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because,
if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was
not a candidate at all and cannot be substituted.
(Miranda vs. Abaya)
206. It had been held by the Supreme Court that an
ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of
votes is a wrongful winner. the votes cast in favor of the
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. (Maquiling vs.
COMELEC)
207. It had been held by the Supreme Court that when
there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in
rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications
nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates. (Maquiling vs. COMELEC)
NOTE: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Section
10, Article X, 1987 Constitution)
208. It has been held by the Supreme Court that there
are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area
must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the
creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers,
as provided by the LGC. (Navarro vs. Ermita)
209. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. (Navarro vs. Ermita)
NOTE: Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or
may it be implied that when a province is composed of
two or more islands, or when the territory of a province
is separated by a chartered city or cities, such province
need not comply with the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in
paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 of LGC. Where the law is
clear, there is no room for interpretation, and there can
only be application.
210. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Malampaya oil resources are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan, since the
territorial jurisdiction of local governments is limited only
to their land area as provided in their respective charters,
including the 15-kilometer municipal waters from their
land area. It appears that the Malampaya oil reservoir
lies 80 kilometers from the land area of Palawan,
therefore, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Province of Palawan. (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Provincial Government of Palawan)
Page 20 of 25

211. It has been held by the Supreme Court that although
the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature,
congressional lawmaking remains subject to the
limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. (Maquiling v.
COMELEC)
212. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
phrase "national internal revenue taxes" in Section 284
is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term "national
taxes" written in Section 6 of the Constitution. As such,
Congress has actually departed from the letter of the
1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be
the base from which the just share of the LGU comes.
Such departure is impermissible. (Maquiling v.
COMELEC)
213. It has been held by the Supreme Court that to be
considered as a valid police power, an ordinance must
pass a two-pronged test:
a. The Formal - Whether the ordinance is enacted
within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law;
and
b. The Substantive - Involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy. (Mosqueda vs.
Pilipino Banana Growers)
214. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in
accordance with the provisions of the Local Government
Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit that are designed to ensure the health
and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced
and healthful ecology are well within the corporate
powers vested in the local government unit. (Mosqueda
vs. Pilipino Banana Growers)
215. It has been held by the Supreme Court that A valid
ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government and passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law. (Mosqueda vs. Pilipino
Banana Growers)
NOTE: In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely:
a. It must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
b. It must be fair, not oppressive;
c. It must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. It must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
f. It must not be unreasonable. (Mosqueda vs.
Pilipino Banana Growers)
216. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a local
government unit is considered to have properly
exercised its police power only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit:
a. The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and
b. The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
(Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers)
NOTE: The first requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution, the second, to the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution. (Mosqueda vs.
Pilipino Banana Growers)
217. It has been held by the Supreme Court that so long
as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public
purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly
oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordnances
must survive a due process challenge. (Mosqueda vs.
Pilipino Banana Growers)
NOTE: It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted
boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and
financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As such, the
conversion could not be completed within the short time
frame of three months. Requiring the respondents and
other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period
under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
(Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers)
218. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a
resolution duly approved by the municipal council does
Page 21 of 25
not have the same force and effect of an ordinance
insofar as filing a complaint for expropriation is
concerned. (Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation)
NOTE: The Local Government Code expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or
opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice.
(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation)
219. It has been held by the Supreme Court that in case
of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan
created by the cessation in office of a member who does
not belong to any political party, the Governor shall
appoint qualified person recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan. (Farinas v. Barba)
220. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the term
limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected
to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. (Borja, Jr. v.
COMELEC)
221. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification
provision are: (1) that the local official concerned has
been elected three consecutive times for the same
position; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. Absent one or both of these two
conditions, the disqualification may not yet apply. (Borja,
Jr. v. COMELEC)
222. It has been held by the Supreme Court that what is
prohibited by the Constitution is after serving three (3)
consecutive terms to the same position a local elective
official shall run for immediate reelection. Any
subsequent reelection, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the provision, for as long as it is not an
immediate reelection after serving the three (3)
consecutive terms. (Socrates v. COMELEC)
223. It has been held by the Supreme Court that service
of the recall term, since it is less than three (3) years, is
not to be considered as one full term for purposes of
applying the disqualification under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. (Mendoza v. COMELEC)
224. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
“interruption” of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less
than the involuntary loss of title to office. (Aldovino, Jr.
v. COMELEC)
225. It has been held that in all cases of preventive
suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not
receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and
lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
(Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC)
NOTE: Recall is a mode of removing a local elective
official from his post even before the end of his term on
the ground of loss of confidence.
226. It has been held by the Supreme Court that loss of
confidence as a ground for recall is a political question
and therefore, not subject to judicial review. (Evardone
v. COMELEC)
227. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a
petition signed by just one person is in violation of the
minimum statutory requirement of initiating recall.
(Angubung v. COMELEC)
NOTE: Under current and existing laws, there is only one
way of initiating recall and that is, through a petition to
be signed by the registered voters of the local
government unit concerned because of the enactment
by Congress of R.A. No. 9244 (Abolishing the Preparatory
Recall Assembly as a Mode of Initiating Recall) on
February 18, 2004.
228. Under International law, Just cogens literally means
“compelling law.” As defined, it means a peremptory
(mandatory) norm of general international law which is
recognized and accepted by the international community
of States as a norm that does not permit of any
derogation and which can be replaced or modified only
by a subsequent norm of the same character.
229. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a treaty that violates a jus cogens norm will
have to be invalidated.
230. Under International law, Erga omnes literally means
“in relation to the whole.” An erga omnes refers to an
Page 22 of 25
obligation of a State towards the international
community of States as a whole.
231. Under International law, Between an erga omnes
obligation and an obligation of a State towards another
State pursuant to a treaty, an erga omnes is superior.
232. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the right
to self-determination of peoples has gone beyond mere
treaty or convention. In fact, it has now been elevated
into the status of a generally accepted of international
law.
233. It has been held by the Supreme Court that this right
to self-determination of peoples may be understood in
two senses, that are:
a. The Right to Internal Self-determination - That is a
people’s pursuit of its own political, economic,
social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing State; and
b. The Right to External Self-determination - That
which consists of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession. (Province of North Cotabato
v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel)
234. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the right
to external self-determination, may be invoked only in
extreme cases which are the following: In case of people
under colonial rule; in case of people under foreign
domination; or exploitation outside of a colonial context.
(Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel)
NOTE: In this case, the Bangsa Moro was not under the
exceptional cases in which the right to self-
determination can arise, therefore, Bangsa Moros does
not have the right to invoke secession from the
Philippines. (Province of North Cotabato v. Government
of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel)
235. It has been held by the Supreme Court that an
association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,
one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. (Province
of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel)
236. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Concept of “Association” is not recognized under the
1987 Philippine Constitution. In international law
practice, an associated state arrangement as been
usually used by former colonies on their way to full
independence. It is not recognized under the 1987
Constitution because it implies powers that goes beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any regional
or local government. (Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel)
237. It has been held by the Supreme Court that while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and
all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to the limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines as a member of the family of nations. (Tanada
v. Angara)
238. It has been held by the Supreme Court that state
which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations. (Tanada v. Angara)
239. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very
nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. (Tanada v.
Angara)
240. It has been held by the Supreme Court that UNCLOS
III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or, diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. (Magallona vs.
Ermita)
241. It has been held by the Supreme Court that under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. (Liang v. People)
Page 23 of 25

NOTE: As already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty. (Liang v. People)
242. A refugee is a person:
a. Who, owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or
b. Who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, is
unable or, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 Ed., p. 287)
243. The Principle of Non-refoulement - The right of a
refugee not to be expelled or returned “in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.” The prohibition of such
expulsion or return becomes an obligation of States
parties to the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 Ed., p. 289)
244. It has been held by the Supreme Court that by the
very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, it
is not a treaty but an executive agreement – a class of
agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section
25 restriction. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa)
NOTE: Executive agreements may dispense with the
requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal
mandate with which they are concluded. (Saguisag vs.
Ochoa)
NOTE: Treaties are, by their very nature, considered
superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products
of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike
executive agreements, which are solely executive
actions. Because of legislative participation through the
Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as
a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law
or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive
agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a
treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of
international agreement are nevertheless subject to the
supremacy of the Constitution. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa)
245. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
process of treaty making: negotiation, signature,
ratification, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary)
NOTE: Petitioner’s arguments equate the signing of the
treaty by the Phil. representative with ratification.
However, it should be noted that signature and
ratification is two separate steps. Signature is for
authentication, on the other hand, ratification is the
formal act of acceptance. The latter is generally an
executive act undertaken by the head of the state.
(Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary)
246. The Doctrine of State Responsibility to Aliens - An
important premise for this doctrine to be validly invoked
is that a State is under no legal obligation in international
law to admit an alien in its territory. However, the
moment it admits an alien, it is duty-bound to provide
protection to that alien so that once the State is remiss
in the performance of this duty and the alien dies, or
suffers injury or loss, this could lead to liability on the
part of the State.
NOTE: Requisites for this doctrine to apply:
a. An act or omission in violation of international law;
b. Attributable to the State;
c. Causing damage or injury to a third State directly,
or indirectly, to a national of the third State.
NOTE: Conditions for the enforcement of claims under
this doctrine:
a. The nationality of the claim;
b. Exhaustion of local remedies;
c. No waiver;
d. No unreasonable delay in filing the claim; and
e. No improper conduct on the part of the injured
alien.
247. International humanitarian law is the branch of
public international law which governs armed conflicts to
the end that the use of violence is limited and that
human suffering is mitigated or reduced by regulating or
limiting the means of military operations and by
protecting persons who do not or no longer participate
in the hostilities. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 ed., p. 291)
Page 24 of 25

248. The Principle of Distinction - An important principle
to be observed under IHL is the Principle of Distinction.
Under this principle, persons directly engaged in armed
conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians
and combatants; between civilian objects and military
objectives, so that only combatants and military
objectives may be subject of attack.
249. Categories of Armed Conflicts
a. International Armed Conflicts
b. Internal or Non-international Armed Conflicts
c. War of National Liberation
250. War of National Liberation - An armed conflict may
be of such nature in which “peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.
251. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from
treaties which are bona fide deemed contrary to the
Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with
the national policy adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
(Pangilinan vs. Cayetano)
252. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
President cannot unilaterally withdraw from treaties that
were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent
manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed by
succeeding laws. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano)
253. It has been held by the Supreme Court that treaties,
where Senate concurrence for accession is expressly
premised on the same concurrence for withdrawal
cannot be the subject of unilateral withdrawal.
(Pangilinan vs. Cayetano)
NOTE: The Philippines’ withdrawal of its membership
from the ICC took effect on March 17, 2019 (one year
after the date of receipt of the notification). The
Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal.
This was all consistent and in compliance with what the
Rome Statute plainly requires. xxx Further, the ICC
acknowledged the Philippines’ action soon after it had
withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of
affairs correctible by this Court’s finite jurisdiction. The
Petitions were, therefore, moot when they were filed
(Pangilinan vs. Cayetano).
254. The international law of the sea is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans.” (Merlin M. Magallona,
A Primer on the Law of the Sea, 1997, p. 1)
255. It has been held by the Supreme Court that insofar
as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned,
the Coastal States exercises sovereignty, subject to the
UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such
sovereignty extends to the air apace over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil (Art. 2, UNCLOS).
(Arigo vs. Swift)
256. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a multilateral
treaty that recognized modern biotechnology has great
potential for human well-being if developed and used
with adequate safety measures for the environment and
human health. (International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-biotech Applications vs. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia)
NOTE: Its main objectives, as spelled out in Article I, are
the “conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable
use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources.” (International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-biotech Applications vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia)
257. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
Cartagena Protocol aims to contribute to ensuring an
adequate level of the safe transfer, handling and use of
living modified organisms resulting from modern
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,
taking into account risks to human health, and
specifically focusing on transboundary movements.
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech
Applications vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia)
258. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
provide for the Precautionary Principle which states that
where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.
Page 25 of 25