Exercise 1. Find all pure equilibria of all games in the first set of slides.

Solution 1
L R
T 1, 1 5, 0 The pure equilibrium is pT, Lq.
B 0, 5 4, 4
L R
T 10, 10 14, 0 The pure equilibrium is pT, Lq.
B 0, 14 4, 4
V2 S2
V1 10, 4 1, 1 The pure equilibrium is pV1 , V2 q.
S1 0, 0 4, 10
S2 H2
S1 4, 4 0, 2 The pure equilibria are pS1 , S2 q and pH1 , H2 q.
H1 2, 0 2, 2
L2 N2
L1
1, 1 1,
1 There are not pure equilibrium.
N1 1,
1
1, 1
ˆ Take pL1 , L2 q then P 1 from L1 Ñ N1

ˆ Take pN1 , L2 q then P 2 from L2 Ñ N2

ˆ Take pN1 , N2 q then P 1 from N1 Ñ L1

ˆ Take pL1 , N2 q then P 2 from N2 Ñ L2

R2 S2 P2
R1 0, 0 1 ,
1
1, 1
S1
1, 1 0, 0 1 ,
1
P1 1 ,
1
1, 1 0, 0
where  is the payoff of the best response of the row player to the strategy of the column
player and is the payoff of the best response of the column player to the strategy of the
row player.
S2 K2
S1 0, 0
1, 1 The pure equilibria are pK1 , S2 q and pS1 , K2 q.
K1 1,
1
1000,
1000
L C R
T 8, 8 2, 7 4, 10 The strategy M is strictly dominated by the strategy T , then
M 7, 2 0, 4 3, 0
B 5, 3 3, 9 10, 4
L C R
T 8, 8 2, 7 4, 10 In the new game the strategy L is strictly dominated by the strategy
B 5, 3 3, 9 10, 4
R, then

1
 C R
T 2, 7 4, 10 The strategy T is strictly dominated by the strategy B, then
B 3, 9 10, 4
C R The Nash equilibrium is pB, C q.
B 3, 9 10, 4

L R L R
T 1, 1, 1 6, 0, 1 T 9, 8, 0 7, 3, 8 The Nash equilibrium is pT, L, lq
B 0, 4, 8 7, 3, 9 B 3, 4, 6 6, 8, 7
ℓ r
ˆ Take pT, L, rq then P 3 from r Ñl

ˆ Take pT, R, lq then P 1 from T ÑB

ˆ Take pT, R, rq then P 2 from R Ñ L

ˆ Take pB, L, lq then P 1 from B ÑT

ˆ Take pB, L, rq then P 3 from r Ñl

ˆ Take pB, R, lq then P 2 from R Ñ L

ˆ Take pB, R, rq then P 3 from r Ñl

Exercise 2. Two smart students form a study group in some math class where homework
is handed in jointly by each group. In the last homework of the semester, each of the two
students can choose to either work (W) or party (P). If at least one of them solves the
homework that week (chooses W), then they will both receive 10 points. But solving the
homework incurs a substantial effort, worth
7 points for a student doing it alone, and an
effort worth
2 points for each student, if both students work together. Partying involves
no effort, and if both students party, they both receive 0 points. Assume that the students
do not communicate prior to deciding whether they will work or party. Write this situation
as a matrix game and determine all pure Nash equilibria.

Solution 2
W2 P2
W1 8, 8 3, 10 There are two Nash equilibria pP1 , W2 q and pW1 , P 2q.
P1 10, 3 0, 0

2
Exercise 3. Two cheetahs each chase one of three antelopes. If they catch the same one,
they have to share. The antelopes are Large, Small, and Tiny, and their values to the
cheetahs are ℓ, s and t. Write the 3  3 matrix for this game. Assume that t s ℓ 2s
and that  
ℓ 2ℓ
s 2s
ℓ
s t.
2 s ℓ s ℓ
Find the pure equilibria.

Solution 3
L2 S2 T2
L1 2l , 2l l, s l, t
The Nash equilibrium is pL1 , T2 q because s ¡ l
and l ¡ s2. By
S1 s, l 2s , 2s s, t 2

T1 t, l t, s 2t , 2t
symmetry also pT2 , L1 q is a Nash equilibrium.