Abstract

The Sino-Indian War - 1962 taught India significant lessons about foreign policy, military strategy, and
the need of creating reliable alliances to maintain a definite hold in the region. The conflict highlighted
India's military vulnerabilities and the need for a more focused and resilient army. One of the most
important lessons was the value of strong international alliances to fend off possible threats. Both
diplomatic efforts and military action were essential to win the war. This conflict highlighted the
intricate political and military dynamics of the area, requiring a multilateral and cooperative strategy to
solve security issues and maintain the balance of power in the region. After the war India adopted a
more pragmatist foreign policy, emphasizing collaboration based on mutual trust and mutual benefit.
India's assertive foreign policy helped it become a regional power signing the LEMO, COMCASA, and
ISA agreements. Indian foreign policy continued to develop with a narrative of national interest while
focusing on a striking balance in its interactions with powerful nations. Neo-realism and nationalism
offer insights into how nation-states act in armed conflict. Neo-realism places a strong emphasis on how
the structure of the international system affects the results of international politics. On the other side,
nationalism influences public opinion and shapes military and political strategies, spurring both nations
to defend their territorial integrity and honor. The study examines the unsuccessful military strategies
that led to India's defeat as well as the failed foreign policy decisions that caused the Sino-Indian
conflict. Ultimately, the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict had a significant impact on India's foreign policy,
military stratagies, and regional dynamics.

Literature Review:

This literature review focuses on the lessons learned during the Sino-Indian conflict - in 1962,
highlighting the need for a far more focused and tenacious army. It emphasizes China's military tactics
that brought it a victory and India's military strategies that contributed to its failure. It also examines
both sides' failings in terms of foreign policy. Neo-realism and nationalism theories will serve as the
foundation for this examination, which offer an understanding of how nation-states behave in times of
war.

Theoretical Framework

Neo-realism
In comparison to Hans Morgenthau's literature on classical realism, neorealism represents an ideological
shift. The working of international politics was initially characterized by classical realism as being
founded on human nature and hence vulnerable to the ego and emotion of global leaders. Neo-realism is
sometimes referred to as "structural realism," which symbolizes that the theory focuses largely on how
the international system's structure affects the outcomes in international politics. It alludes to how the
anarchic system affects our geopolitical strategies, how it has forced China and India to prioritize
security, affected their motivations, and how the threat of losing geopolitical clout, territorial integrity,
and regional balance affected their decisions.

Nationalism

Political nationalism is a philosophy. It is the idea that countries ought to be self-governing. Nationalism
promoted the idea those individuals who identified as nations should have the freedom to find their
sovereign states. China and India both battled valiantly and with the fullest dedication to preserve their
territorial integrity. With the aid of this theory, it will be possible to access how the public's attitudes
affected leaders' actions and how they raised military morale across the board.

Research Questions: this article will address the following study questions:

1 What were the foreign policy failures that resulted in the 1962 Sino-Indian war?

2 What are the military and foreign policy strategies adopted by India after the Sino-Indian war?

Introduction:

The Cuban Missile Crisis overshadowed the violent clash between India and China. A month-long
conflict, triggered by a territorial dispute, exposed both nations' foreign policy objectives and military
capabilities. It ended with a resounding Chinese victory and a humiliating defeat for India.

Background

The origins of this conflict may be traced to the period of British colonial rule. This conflict began with
disagreements between the British Empire and China's Qing Dynasty over the boundaries of their
respective dominions. It was challenging to get a consensus since the boundary was situated in the
exceedingly difficult-to-access Himalayan Mountains. However, the Qing accepted the borders for many
years even though Tibet, not China proper, bordered British India and Tibet while De Facto
independence was a Chinese vassal. The British would impose their border, known as the Johnson Line,
on the Tibetans without consulting the Qing. Everything stayed the same till the late 1800s. The British
chose to establish a new line. The Aksai Chin area would be ruled by the Qing under the Macartney-
MacDonald Line. The offer would be made to Qing by the British. However, the Qing would not reply
to it. Similar events occurred in the East when the British once more imposed the McMahon line on the
Tibetans while excluding the Chinese. This deadlock lasted until India attained independence. (Johnsen,
China's War Against India, 1962 | Animated History 2023)i. However, on closer scrutiny, it becomes
clear that there has never been a definite boundary line acceptable to various political actors—Tibetan
and Kashmiri states, British, Russian, and Chinese (Qing) empires—in this part of the world. (Anand
2012)ii

The Johnson line was used by the British to define India's border in their 1856 survey. In this survey,
Kashmir was deemed to make up 1/3 of Aksai Chin. Johnson's line was chosen as the border without
consulting Chinese officials. In 1878, China acquired Xinjiang, and in 1892, the Karakoram Pass
became the country's border. British citizens suggested the "Macartney-McDonald" boundary in 1899,
but China didn't reply. As a result of the region's benefits, namely the cold desert and seasonal
commerce, the British and China claimed two separate boundaries. The end of the Qing dynasty in 1911
was significant for China, which was at war with itself. Before the British entered World War I, they
negotiated the Shimla Agreement with Tibet in 1914 without informing China. (Singh 2022)iii

While Pakistan and India never enjoyed good relations the same could not be said for India and China.
Jawaharlal Nehru, desired excellent relations with China to forge an Asian axis that would serve as a
counterweight to the American and Soviet blocs. Conflict, however, was unavoidable since Nehru was
unwilling to cede to China what it claimed to be its territory. The Chinese regarded the McDonald line
as the boundary in the West, while the Indians recognized the Johnson line. In addition, the Chinese
rejected the McMahon line in the East, claiming most of the land. The Chinese asserted that such a pact,
which rejected Tibet's claims of autonomous governance, should not have been permitted to be made by
the Tibetan administration. While Pakistan and India never enjoyed good relations the same could not be
said for India and China. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India and a key figure in the non-
aligned movement during the Cold War, desired excellent relations with China to forge an Asian axis
that would serve as a counterweight to the American and Soviet blocs. Conflict, however, was
unavoidable since Nehru was unwilling to cede to China what it claimed to be its territory. Following
then, things soon became worse. The fictitious buffer state between them was eliminated when China
seized Tibet. China built a road across Aksai Chin between 1956 and 1957 that connected Xinjiang and
Tibet and in several places crossed the Johnson line to the south. When the Indians found out this, the
road had already been finished, and Nehru was furious. Things were not as steady as they seemed at
home while China was posing abroad. Guerrillas in Tibet persisted in resisting their government, and the
CIA soon began to assist them. Eventually, this movement culminated in the momentous rebellion of
1959, which was the state of Arunachal Pradesh in India. The Chinese said that the Tibetan government
should not have been permitted to draw a pact that rejected Tibet's aspirations for autonomous
sovereignty. After then, things quickly became worse. The Chinese conquered Tibet, destroying the
fictitious buffer state that existed between the two. China built a road across Aksai Chin between 1956
and 1957 linking Xinjiang and Tibet, which in several places ran south of the Johnson line. Until the
road was finished and Nehru was furious, the Indians were unaware of this. The situation was not as
steady as it was at home while China was making moves overseas. As they persisted in challenging their
control, Tibetan rebels soon received assistance from the CIA. The huge rebellion in 1959 that
ultimately brought a stop to this movement the Chinese violently put down but Dalai Lama managed to
escape being offered asylum in India. This offer of asylums led to a series of violent border skirmishes
between India and China but both nations kept proposing diplomatic settlements from 1960 to 1962. To
fight the Chinese, the Indians started to approach the West for military assistance. Since the US believed
that the Indians were too soft on communism, the request was turned down. This prompted the Soviets,
which had lately gotten to assist India. The Chinese decided that diplomacy would not offer a solution,
therefore they prepared for war. (Johnsen 2023)iv

The War

Although the two countries shared a historical experience of colonialism and the struggle against it, they
chose to establish different socio-economic and political systems in the late 1940s. (LÜTHI 2016) v.
However, Nehru never sought to have hostile relations with China. Evident of which would be India and
China signing the 1954- Panchsheel Accords (Five Principles of Peace Coexistence under which India
acknowledged China's sovereignty in Tibet). (Kilhor 2016) .Another significant event highlighting
India's shift towards China would be India not attending the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951
because China not being invited. As mentioned by Sarvepalli Gopal in his book Jawaharlal Nehru: A
Political Biography Gopal mentions Nehru made the decision not to attend the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in the 16th chapter of his book, "The Cold War and the Commonwealth". Gopal wrote that
"Nehru was not happy about the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the San Francisco
Conference. And later mentioned, "Nehru decided not to attend the conference in protest of the PRC's
exclusion."

However, Nehru's rejection of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai's 1960s proposal of status Quo (which
included Aksai Chin in China and NEFA in India) and of both countries' militaries to stay 20 km inside
the McMahon Line, Continuous Skirmishes of border patrols in 1959-61, India's forward policy, and
asylum of Dalai Lama triggered the Chinese government into going on an all-out war. (Kilhor 2016) vi

The Armed Conflict

To cut off Indian defences, an army unit crept up behind Indian lines. In the meanwhile, the Chinese
entered the remaining portions of NEFA from a position of overwhelming power. The Indian forces
were forced to leave their positions by a series of tactical maneuvers across the McMahon line. Chinese
soldiers crossed the Bum La pass and launched a three-pronged assault on Tawang. The Chinese were
now in control of the land they had always believed to exist thanks to Tawang. Both forces engaged in
combat at Wolong La, but India was unable to send in reinforcements in time to stop the flow. A perfect
supply network had been established by the Chinese army. Due to China's invasion, they were helpless.
The Chinese seized Brig John Parish Arundathi, commander of the seventh brigade. Two days later,
Chinese soldiers captured Brig. Dalvi. The first stage of the conflict ended abruptly. In three days, the
NEFA was gone, and the Chinese had total power. The East was simply one side of this dreadful
conflict, which came as a major shock to India's political leadership, which was already bewildered by
complete loss. On October 4th, China had held Indian Territory with an overwhelming army for 4 days
and was now in a dominant position. Zhou Inlay, the Premier of China, ordered his troops to stand in
their position and not advance. In a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, the Chinese Premier proposed
four points for a negotiation settlement, including a Chinese withdrawal from the NAFA's northern
region and a commitment from China and India to respect existing border controls in the Ladakh Aksai
Chin district. However, Nehru objected. The National Assembly promptly passed a resolution to expel
the aggressors after announcing a state of emergency. Nehru told Zhou Enlai that an agreement would
be reached on November 14. Only a few hours later, violence flared up again in NEFA and Ladakh. The
tactical situation in Ladakh and Aksai Chin was far worse than that in the East. It was already mostly
under Chinese authority, notwithstanding disputes. Chinese soldiers started to advance toward the east.
The iconic Pangong Lake and the chip-chop Valley gull 1 were left with scars from their combat in the
northern section. The Chinese launched many attacks throughout the Western sector, causing a
significant loss to the Indian Army. The strike on October 20th permanently silenced the location. The
Indian Army battled valiantly in the Ladakh Sushil Valley's southern approach. The biggest battle to
finish the conflict was fought at Razeng La. The Charlie Company of the 13th Kumar Regiment was
assigned with protecting the entrance to a valley with a critical airport at 16000 feet from extremely
hostile Chinese forces. The Charlie Company's leader, Major Shaitan Singh, and his soldiers retaliated.
Major Shaitan eventually stayed in a fighting position, his combat in the northern sector left its mark on
the renowned Pangong Lake and the chip-chop Valley gull 1. As the Chinese launched many attacks
throughout the Western sector, the Indian Army sustained significant casualties. The position was quiet
for all time following the strike on October 20. There were 26 samurai bullet wounds in NEFA at the
time when the war broke out. There were two infantry brigades, the 5th and 7th brigades against 3
Chinese Divisions. In just a while, the Indians were completely outnumbered. In the end, Rezang la was
overrun, an estimate suggests that as many as 500 Chinese troops were felled by the KEMAL regiments.
Nehru decided not to call in the Air Force to bomb Chinese positions, an act that some military
historians believe was the cause of the war. (A painful Remembrance: 1962 Sino-India war and Lessons
India learned 2012)vii

Chinese made their foray into India, starting on 20 October 1962. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)
came in on two separate flanks – in the west in Ladakh, and the east across the McMahon Line in the
then North-East Frontier Agency (Arunachal Pradesh). China had successfully occupied Aksai Chin - a
strategic corridor linking Tibet to western China - the NEFA area and had almost reached the plains of
Assam. In the war in these treacherous terrains, 722 PLA soldiers were killed and around 1,400
wounded, while the Indian death toll stood at 1,383, and 1,047 were wounded. Besides, 1,696 Indians
went missing, and over 400 were taken as prisoners of war. Although Beijing caught most by surprise by
calling a unilateral ceasefire and retreating from India's northeast while retaining Aksai Chin, the defeat
at the hands of the Chinese is something Indians will find hard to accept. This episode is seen as a key
reason affecting bilateral relations between the two neighbors. (Hussain 2014)viii

Foreign Policy Failures for India

An ideal foreign policy was adopted in the early years of India's independence. This strategy was
founded on ideas like non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. This approach disregarded India's
regional problems, such as the increasing Chinese threat. India suffered a humiliating defeat in the Sino-
Indian War of 1962 as a result of their lack of preparation. In particular, Ganguly contends that a
"tension between idealism and pragmatism" best describes India's foreign policy in the 1960s. He
contends that while India's leaders were dedicated to the idealistic tenets of non-alignment and peaceful
coexistence, they were also conscious of regional limitations that India would be subjected to, such as
the mounting danger from China. Consequently, India's Foreign policy frequently contradicted itself,
and as a result, its objectives were not met. (Ganguly (2009))ix

India also failed to forge strong relationships with other nations, which may have served to petrify China
from striking. This was caused by India's non-alignment policy in part, but it was also a result of India's
conceit and feeling of independence. Similarly India fell short in its efforts to modernize its armed
forces in the years preceding the Sino-Indian War. Several things contributed to this, including
budgetary limitations and a lack of political will. As a result, India's military struggled to compete with
the Chinese forces and lost the war handily.

Military failures for India

The Forward Policy: In the early 1960s, India adopted the Forward Policy as a military strategy. Indian
troops were sent into contested regions along the Sino-Indian border as part of this strategy. The Chinese
viewed this stance as aggressive, which led to an increase in hostilities between the two nations. In his
1966 book Sino-Indian Relationsx: The Nehru Years, Baldev Raj Naya discussed the Forward Policy.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was lost by the Indian military in large part due to the Forward Policy. He
claims that as a result of the Chinese perception of the Forward Policy as aggressiveness, tensions
between the two countries grew.

In particular, Cohen contends that India's military defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 was brought on
by a variety of causes, such as the pursuit of an idealistic foreign policy, the inability to form solid
alliances, and the failure to modernize the armed forces. He contends that these mistakes eventually led
to India's terrible loss in the conflict. The 2001 book The Indian Army: Hindu Nationalism, Secularism,
and the Making of a Military Power. By Stephen P. Cohen.xi During the Sino-Indian War, the
coordination between the Indian army and the air force was poor, making it challenging for them to
support one another. Indian soldiers in the conflict lacked adequate mountain warfare training, and the
Chinese force prevailed

India's subsequent foreign policy was significantly influenced by the military and foreign policy
disasters in the early years of its independence. India started to forge deeper partnerships with other
nations as its foreign policy evolved to become more practical and realistic. India strengthened its
position as a regional power by modernizing its military as well.xii

Chinese foreign policy failure:

Lack of diplomatic resolution: The Chinese government's decision not to attempt to mediate the border
issues with India on a diplomatic level increased tensions and, eventually, started the war.

China neglected to effectively engage with India through diplomatic channels to resolve the concerns,
which resulted in China winning the 1962 Sino-Indian War thanks in part to flaws in India's foreign and
military strategies. The struggle also revealed India's weaknesses and forced a review of its post-war
military and foreign policy plans.

Lessons Learnt:

India and China both suffered substantial military and foreign policy repercussions from the Sino-Indian
War of 1962. Here are some of the most important things that both nations learned from the conflict:

Lessons for India

Military Readiness: The conflict highlighted India's lack of readiness and its weak military capabilities.
It emphasized the necessity for its military forces' modernization, education, and improved gear.India
understood the value of creating a strong border infrastructure in remote and challenging terrain to
increase its capacity to protect its territorial integrity.

Realism in Foreign Affairs: Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's idealistic approach to
foreign affairs was shattered by the war. It forced India to acknowledge the need for a more practical
and balanced foreign strategy that would consider the shifting geopolitical circumstances.

Diversification of Alliances: India discovered the value of broadening its coalitions and looking for
trustworthy allies to counter future threats. To increase its security, it sought stronger connections with
nations like the United States and the Soviet Union. (Ganguly, "India's Lessons Learned from the Sino-
Indian War" 2000)xiii

At the defence level, India has signed all the foundational agreements with the US. (LEMOA,2016),
(COMCASA,2018), (ISA 2019), (BECA,2020). India has also managed to become a part of QUAD and
also welcomes the US Indo-Pacific policy that is aimed at confining China with the US by using its
regional alliances.

Even the border standoffs between India and China have become fiercer due to technical reasons such as
the improvement of the frontier, infrastructure, increasing logistics capability, and deployment of
advanced monitoring equipment. India now tends to weaponize economic cooperation for its
geopolitical agenda.

Economic Development: India also started to depend on its economics The Chinese strategic community
is concerned that under the changing circumstances, India has become less interested in economic
cooperation with China. Instead, India will compete with China and eventually replace China as a
Global manufacturing hub. (Liao (1980))xiv

Lessons for China

Validation of China's military capabilities: The conflict aimed to show off China's military proficiency
and to support its attempts to modernize its armed forces. It increased China's faith in its military.

Despite China's military victory, it was met with worldwide censure and diplomatic isolation. It caused
China to realize how crucial it is to strike a balance between aggressiveness and diplomacy to prevent
pointless conflict.

Border management: The conflict made it clear that China has to make improvements in this area to
prevent border disputes from developing into full-fledged wars.

Approach to territory Disputes: China discovered that settling territory disputes may not always be as
simple as relying exclusively on historical claims. It pushed China to deal with border disputes with its
neighbors in a more sophisticated manner.
Perception of Neighbouring Nations: China's neighbours’ perceptions of its emergence as a regional
power were impacted by the conflict. Some nations were increasingly wary of China's forceful and
expansionist intentions as a result. (Cohen, 2001)xv

Overall, both India and China's foreign policy changed as a result of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. It
influenced their military strategies, regional dynamics, and methods for resolving territorial conflicts and
managing international relations. Their policies now are still influenced by the lessons they learned from
this struggle.

Conclusion

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 had important lessons about foreign policy, military readiness, and the
need of creating trustworthy partnerships. The confrontation highlighted the drawbacks of adopting a
foreign policy that was openly ideational, disregarded institutional limitations, and entirely relied on
non-alignment. India's lack of readiness to deal with the significant security threat posed by China
emerged, revealing gaps in its military capabilities. One of the most important lessons was the value of
establishing solid international alliances to fend off possible threats. The potential Indo-American-
British coalition during the battle brought to light the importance of geopolitical alliances in determining
the course of events. Both military force and diplomacy were crucial, highlighting the need for defence
readiness and financial support for military infrastructure. The conflict also highlighted the intricate
political and military dynamics in the area, highlighting the need for a global effort to resolve security
issues. India's resilience and power have become key components in preserving the regional balance of
power and successfully fending off China's expansionist plans. India adopted a more pragmatist foreign
policy in the years following the war, emphasizing collaboration for mutual trust and gain. India's
foreign policy has continued to develop with a narrative that places the country's interests first while
attempting to maintain a balance with diverse powerful nations.

References
i
(Johnsen, China's War Against India, 1962 | Animated History 2023)
ii
(Anand 2012)
iii
(Singh 2022)
iv
(Johnsen, China's War Against India, 1962 | Animated History 2023)
v
(LÜTHI 2016)
vi
(Kilhor 2016)
vii
(A painful remembrance: 1962 Sino-India war and lessons India learnt 2012)
viii
(Hussain 2014)
ix
(Ganguly (2009))
x
The Sino-Indian Relations by Baldev Raj Naya
xi
The 2001 book The Indian Army: Hindu Nationalism, Secularism, and the Making of a Military Power. By Stephen P.
Cohen
xii
(Ganguly (2009))
xiii
(Ganguly (2009))
xiv
(Liao (1980)
xv
The 2001 book The Indian Army: Hindu Nationalism, Secularism, and the Making of a Military Power. By Stephen P.
Cohen