India – China Relations

1949 – India became the first non-communist country to recognise

1950 – India did not support US led
resolution blaming China as aggressor in Korean Crisis.

1954 – Panchsheel Agreement.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Treaty.

Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and India in
1954 — the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet
Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 28 April 1954.

The Five Principles, as stated in the Sino–Indian Agreement 1954, are listed as:

 mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

 mutual non-aggression,
 mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
 equality and mutual benefit, and
 peaceful co-existing.

1959 – Dalai Lama escaped to India

1957 – Karakoram Highway across Aksai Chin.

Aksai Chin
Aksai Chin is almost the size of Bhutan and little
smaller than Switzerland. Most of it is in
occupation of China, which captured the region
during 1950s and consolidated its military grip over
the area during the 1962 India-China war, rejecting
all Indian attempts to settle border disputes
peacefully.
A major Sino-Indian bilateral negotiation for a friendly and permanent settlement of all
outstanding issues, including the border dispute, was initiated in Delhi in December 1953.
It is argued that "Aksai Chin is like a Damocles sword hanging over India's head" in addition
to being a gateway to Central Asia and an easy route to "easily run over New Delhi, the
Indian capital city. This explains why China was expressly keen in seizing Aksai Chin

Tibet :The Core Issue In China-India Relations

Following a brief military conflict between

China and Tibet at the start of the 20th
century, Tibet declared itself as an
independent nation in 1912. It functioned as
an autonomous region until 1950. In 1949,
the Communists under Mao Zedong’s
leadership gained power and in 1950 seized
control of Tibet. In 1951, the Dalai Lama’s
representatives signed a seventeen-point
agreement that granted China sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The Chinese
claim that this document is proof of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while Tibet says
that it was coerced into signing this document.
 The current Dalai Lama claims that he wants only autonomy for Tibet, because it
would ensure the preservation of Tibet’s unique culture, language and customs. The
Dalai Lama in 1959 fled Tibet to India after a failed uprising. The Chinese have little
trust in the Dalai Lama and claim that his intentions are not sincere. Further China
claims that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since the thirteenth century
under the Yuan Dynasty.
 The Chinese blame the British for causing confusion in Tibet refusing to be bound by
any treaties signed between Tibet and Britain during the early 20th century. This
includes the 1914 Shimla convention where the British recognized Tibet as an
autonomous area under the suzerainty of China. There is also differing contentions
about what includes political Tibet in modern times. For the Chinese, this includes the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which are the western and central areas. This was
directly ruled by Tibet when the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950.
 Following the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent the Chinese army to Tibet after they
refused to accept the conditions which the Chinese authorities wanted to impose..
Mao’s Cultural Revolution in Tibet continued until 1976. After Deng Xiaoping took
over in 1978, he reached out to the Dalai Lama in a quest to foster a reconciliatory
economic and cultural policy towards Tibet.
 Pro-independence protests in Tibet started in 1987 and this led to a clampdown by
the Chinese authorities on religious and cultural freedom in Tibet. Simultaneously, a
 rapid economic development programme was formulated leading to large
immigration of Hans Chinese into Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s exile in Dharamsala in
Northern India in 1959 put India squarely at the centre of this China-Tibet dispute.
India is currently home to around 120,000 Tibetan
Some Chinese officials claim they are just waiting for the Dalai Lama’s expiry for the Tibetan
movement’s intensity to subside.'

1961 – Aggressive border patrolling by China ; Nehru’s Forward Policy

1962 – Massive attack on Eastern and Western Front, Unilateral ceasefire

Why India and China went to war in 1962 ?

56 years ago, China attacked India over multiple points across the border, leading to a
month-long standoff between 10,000 to 20,000 Indian soldiers and 80,000 Chinese troops.
Unprepared for the offensive, India lost nearly 4,000 soldiers in the war and suffered its most
humiliating defeat.

The causes of war

The leading cause for the 1962 war was China’s perception that India was meddling in its
internal affairs in Tibet. After Independence, India largely maintained cordial relations with
China. It did, briefly, protest Chinese occupation in Tibet. However, in March 1959, when the
Dalai Lama fled Tibet and found asylum in India, People’s Republic of China leader Mao
Zedong did not take it lightly. He claimed that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was fuelled by
India. China felt that the political asylum to the Dalai Lama amounted to interference by
India in China’s internal affairs.

Invasion

 Smaller conflicts between the two countries increased in 1962. On 10 July, over 350
Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul, Leh. Using loudspeakers, they
told the Gurkha regiment to not fight for India.
 And on 20 October the People’s Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, northern
Uttarakhand and across the McMahon Line in the then North-East Frontier Agency
(now Arunachal Pradesh), catching India completely off guard. The attack began
simultaneously in all sectors of the border at the same time — 5 am — synchronised
as per Beijing time. Convinced that there would not be a war, India didn’t deploy
enough soldiers, while China launched a full frontal attack.
 A panicked India reportedly sought US assistance to control the Chinese aggression.
Nehru wrote to then US President John F. Kennedy to provide “air transport and jet
fighters” to India. But US largely stayed away.
 Meanwhile, China proposed that Ayub Khan, then Pakistan President, should attack
India. Pakistan chose not to. Because the Soviets were engaged in their own high-
stakes gamble in Cuba, Moscow did not discourage the Chinese, despite Khrushchev’s
close relationship with Nehru, “At the same time defeating India would answer the
question Kennedy had raised in his 1959 speech in the Senate about which country,
democratic India or communist China, was poised to win the race for great power
status in Asia. For Mao, the conflict with India provided a surrogate for his rivalry
with Moscow and with Washington,”

The lessons

 The war officially ended on 20 November, 1962, after China finally announced a
ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border, even as some minor conflicts continued
in NEFA and Aksai Chin.
 The Sino-Indian War put the spotlight on India’s unpreparedness in a war situation
and underlined the need to modernise its armed forces.
  It also highlighted the crucial strategic mistakes India committed, including not using
the Indian Air Force.
 On the 50th anniversary of the war, former Indian ambassador to Iraq R.S. Kalha
wrote that then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi told the Sri Lankan leader Felix
Bandaranaike after the war that the conflict was “to demolish India’s arrogance and
illusions of grandeur”.The main objective of Mao Zedong, founding father of the
People’s Republic of China, to attack India in 1962 was to “humiliate” Nehru who was
emerging as a leader of the third world,
 India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a
‘humiliating defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-
alignment which, with massive military and economic aid from both the American
and (then) Soviet blocs, had India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a
blessing in disguise.

1979 – Vajpayee visited Beijing as Foreign Minster

1987 – China Condemned the establishment of

Arunachal Pradesh as a state; standoff in Sum do rong
chhu valley .
1988 – Rajiv Gandhi’s visit Joint Working Group on
Boundary Issue .

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 broke the ice

The relations between India and China - deep-frozen for the last 26
years - finally seemed to thaw with the formation of a joint task
force to solve the thorny border issue. Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi's visit to China marked a new beginning in bilateral
relations.
The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to
restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel. India and
the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while
seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The communiqué also
expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and reiterated that
anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi
signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air
links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic
consultations between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific
co-operation, and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be
led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affair.
1993 – Peace and Tranquillity agreement on Border

The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and

Tranquility contains the following key provisions

 The two countries will resolve the border issue through peaceful and friendly
consultations. The two sides will ‘‘strictly respect and observe’’ the LAC, pending an
ultimate solution.
 The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with
the agreed requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security ceilings.
 The two sides will work out effective confidence-building measures (CBM) along the
LAC.
 The high point of this period of relative Sino-Indian rapprochement was the historic
visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to New Delhi in late 1996. The two sides signed
the Agreement on CBM in the Military Field along the LAC, according to which their
governments pledged:
 To limit the number of field-army troops, border-defense forces, paramilitary forces,
and major categories of armaments along the LAC;
 To avoid holding large-scale military exercises near the LAC and to notify the other
side of exercises involving one brigade group (that is, 5,000 troops);
 Not to discharge firearms, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, set off
explosives, or hunt with firearms within two kilometers of the LAC;
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.

1998 – India points at China for operation Shakti

Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests.
Before conducting its first nuclear test in 1974, India’s nuclear policy was directed toward
the perceived threat from China
sisted in identifying China as India’s most formidable threat.27 ‘‘China is potential threat
number one,’’ George Fernandes, defense minister, said in May 1998: ‘‘The potential threat
from China is greater than that from Pakistan and any person who is concerned about
India’s security must agree with that.’’

2003 – Vajpayee’s visit Strategic Partnership. China

recognises Sikkim as India’s territory .

China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim 2003

An agreement on the boundary with China could set the tone for a final settlement of the
Kashmir question with Pakistan. GOOD FENCES make good neighbours. The absence of a
settled boundary with China, let alone fences, has been at the heart of New Delhi's troubled
relationship with Beijing for more than four decades. The biggest political outcome from the
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China has been the decision by the two sides to
explore a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

Nathu La pass reopens for trade after 44 years

Marking a historic occasion, Nathu La, the famous Himalayan
pass at 14,500 feet on the Sino-India border here reopened after
44 years. Once part of the historic 'Silk Route', Nathu La became
India's third point after Shipkila in Himachal and Lipulekh in
Uttaranchal for border trade with China.

The reopening of the pass came a little over a year after China
accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. The route had been
closed since the Indo-China war of 1962.

2004 – Special Representative Mechanism : Guiding Principles and Political parameters

The resolution and
final solution of the
boundary question
will promote positive
relations between
India and China, "in
accordance with the
Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence"
and "principle of
mutual and equal security".
In attainment of the solution the two sides will consider "historical evidence, national
sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and
the actual state of border areas"; the boundary should be along "well-defined geographical
features"; interests of "settled populations in the border areas" to be considered; and
"delineation of the boundary to be done through modern and joint means.
Pending final solution, all dispute resolution mechanism bodies will continue to function as
per their objectives.
2005 - SAARC Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status
China has an observer status in SAARC, .It was in the 18th summit, which was held in
Kathmandu in November 2014, that Beijing expressed its interest in joining the organisation.
However, this was not endorsed by India for geopolitical reasons. The Charter of SAARC
requires consensus among all members for admitting a new member. If China is to be
admitted it must get the support of all the members.
Three realities exist as far as China’s admission as a full member of SAARC is concerned.

 Firstly, the perception that China is not a South Asian country as it doesn’t share a
history and culture with the people of South Asia. China has borders with five of the
eight South Asian countries and is located in the proximity of Bangladesh, yet, China
is not a mainstream South Asian country
 Secondly, China in view of its wide-ranging trade, economic and commercial relations
with almost all the South Asian countries and geographical contiguity with South Asia
is qualified to be a full member of SAARC.
 Thirdly, almost half of SAARC members support China’s admission to the organisation
as a full member. Indeed, it is not only Pakistan which vehemently supports China’s
full admission but also members like Sri Lanka,
For India, China’s admission as a full member may lead to an anti-Indian Sino-Pakistani
alliance which other smaller members of SAARC may also join. It is the fear of China
neutralizing India’s domination in South Asia which has led to New Delhi’s constant
opposition to China’s membership. In order to pre-empt China’s admission India has tried to
use its influence with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Chinese President Xi Jinping in his official visit to India urged the Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi to change his country’s policy on opposing China’s membership in the
SAARC. He also stated that China would support India’s full membership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and he requested that the Indian Prime Minister should
reciprocate this gesture by backing China’s SAARC ambitions.

2009 – BRIC
2013 – BDCA
2013 Depsang standoff

On April 15, an Indian patrol found that a

Chinese platoon had established a camp in
what was clearly the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control. On the evening of May 5, after
weeks of consultations and flag meetings, the
Chinese and Indian sides agreed to restore
status quo ante in the area, which essentially
meant that the Chinese removed the five tents they had set up on April 15.
The fact that their move was clearly non-threatening, yet high visibility, suggests that Beijing
was sending some kind of a signal.

Signalling what ?
The Chinese action can be seen at two levels- one as a straightforward land grab, and two
instances of signalling. The first is an established pattern where the PLA keeps nibbling at
Indian territory to create new "facts on the ground" or a "new normal" in relation to their
claimed LAC. They do this, as they have done in the past– occupy an area, then assert that it
has always been part of their territory and offer to negotiate. In this very sector, Chinese
claim lines have been varying since 1956. At that time, for example, the entire Chip Chap and
Galwan river valleys were accepted by China as being Indian territory. But in 1960 China
insisted that these areas were within their claim line and they occupied them following the
1962 war.
The fact that the border is neither demarcated
nor inhabited, and there is no agreement on
the alignment of the LAC in many areas, aids
this process, China could be signalling its
unhappiness over the Indian military build up
on the Sino-Indian border. In the last five years,
India has activated forward airfields in the
Ladakh sector, completed important road
building projects in the Chumar sector, begun
work on the road to link DBO with Leh, and
moved high-performance fighter aircraft to bases proximate to Tibet.
2017 – India in SCO

2017 Doklam
Doklam Conflict

Doklam, or Donglang in Chinese, is an area

spread over less than a 100 sq km comprising a
plateau and a valley at the trijunction between
India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the
Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and
Sikkim.
Despite several rounds of engagement between
China and Bhutan, the dispute between the two
over Doklam has not been resolved. It flared up in 2017 when the Chinese were trying to
construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, in aid of their Bhutanese counterparts,
objected to it, resulting in the stand-off. Doklam is strategically located close to the Siliguri
Corridor, which connects mainland India with its north-eastern region. The corridor, also
called Chicken’s Neck, is a vulnerable point for India.
Why does it matter?
While India-Tibet trade flourished along the Siliguri corridor and Chumbi Valley, Doklam had
very little significance. Even during British rule, Doklam did not command much attention. In
recent years however, China has been beefing up its military presence in the Chumbi Valley,
where the Chinese are at a great disadvantage militarily. Both Indian and Bhutanese troops
are on a higher ground around the Valley.
This is also the reason, the Indian security establishment suspect, why the Chinese have a
deep interest in Doklam, which would give them a commanding view of and an easy access
to both the Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri Corridor.
The Bhutanese government told China that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese
territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the
boundary between our two countries.”The Ministry of External Affairs said: “Such
construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security
implications for India.” The Chinese government released a map to accuse India of
trespassing into its territory, and in a detailed statement in the first week of August, it said
“India has no right to interfere in or impede the boundary talks between China and Bhutan.”

What were India’s concerns?

India’s concerns emanated from Chinese action to change the status quo on the ground by
building a road in violation of China’s existing understanding with both India and Bhutan.

What arguments did India put forth in these negotiations?

One, India contested the Chinese claims of sovereignty over this region as it is part of
Bhutan.
Two, India argued that the Chinese attempt to alter the status quo amounted to a unilateral
determination of the tri-junction of the three countries.
Three, China was violating the 2012 written common understanding between the two
countries that the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with all concerned countries.
Continuation of the faceoff was not in the mutual interest of India and China and prolonging
it would only give others an opportunity to take advantage. Finally, India reminded the
Chinese side of the Astana Consensus wherein both sides had agreed that differences should
not become disputes.

What led to a breakthrough?

Both sides were conscious of the importance of ending the face-off before the BRICS Summit
in Xiamen, scheduled that September. India also said that on its part, as a gesture of
goodwill, it was willing to take the first step to break the impasse.
After six weeks of diplomatic persuasion, India got the Chinese side to reach an agreement
to resolve the situation with the disengagement of border personnel at the site on August
28, 2017. The Chinese removed troops, equipment and tents by 150 m from the site, while
Indian troops returned to their original positions. This addressed the challenge of the Chinese
building a road and concerns about them pushing the tri-junction point southwards. But it
did not bring the Chinese troops back to the status quo as before June 16, 2017 as they
remained deployed in northern Doklam where they were earlier absent.

2018 – Wuhan Informal Talks

2019 – Mamallapuram Talks

2020 – Galwan clashes  Disengagement

India-China Galwan faceoff

This is the first time after the 1962 War that soldiers have died in clashes on the India-
China border in Ladakh. Even otherwise, the last deaths on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
were an ambush of an Assam Rifles patrol in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese in 1975. But
the last real military engagement between the two armies was at Nathu La in Sikkim in
1967, in which 88 Indian soldiers lost their lives, and more than 300 Chinese soldiers were
killed.

But all these incidents were prior to the two countries signing, starting from 1993, various
agreements for maintaining peace and tranquility on the border.
Moreover, at least 20 soldiers including a Commanding Officer lost their lives on a single day
in Galwan
What exactly happened in the Galwan Valley ?
Tensions had been running high in the area for the past few weeks, with a large number of
soldiers and military equipment deployed along the LAC by both sides. Even though the LAC
in Galwan Valley was never disputed by the two sides, the Chinese had moved into the Indian
side of the LAC. After the meeting at the level of Corps Commanders on June 6, negotiations
had been conducted between local military commanders of both the armies for a mutually
agreed disengagement process.
As part of that process, a buffer zone had been agreed to be created between the LAC and
the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers to avoid any faceoff between the two armies.
The two armies were to move back by a kilometre each in that area as a first step.
When Colonel B Santosh Babu, who was monitoring this process, noticed that a Chinese
camp was still existing in the area, he went to get it removed. This soon led to fisticuffs and
blows being exchanged, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Were the Indian soldiers not carrying weapons?
No, this is as per the drill followed by both sides in the border areas to avoid inadvertent
escalation by opening fire.
This is in tune with the 1996 agreement between the two countries on Confidence Building
Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border
Areas, which imposed a lot of restrictions on military equipment, exercises, blasts, and
aircraft in the vicinity of the LAC.
China's intentions
The deaths of 20 soldiers in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese forces
are facing off, is the first such incident in 45 years. According to Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury,
Congress leader in Lok Sabha, this escalation “underlines the scale of the problem and the
challenge ahead” for New Delhi in its dealings with Beijing. Chowdhury argues in The Indian
Express that “China has clearly twisted the crisis into a strategic opportunity by taking
advantage of the geo-political distraction”.
That China is becoming more belligerent across strategic theatres, challenging the status
quo, is supported by multiple examples from the South China Sea. For the Government of
India, this is a moment to guard against complacency, fostered by decades of nimble
diplomacy that led to equilibrium, however precarious, on the border issue with China. It was
complacency, fostered by the 1999 bus ride to Lahore, that perhaps led to the Kargil conflict.

More worryingly, Beijing may have concluded that heightened aggression along the LAC
will invariably bring India to the negotiating table—that India will grant China greater
political concessions, market access or economic bargains as the price for “peace and
tranquillity” .China is also using this moment to send a message to its other neighbours in
the East and South China Sea.
China is demonstrating to the world the limitations of decaying American power without
having to actually confront it.
EXAMPLE - sum total of Beijing’s behaviour during the ‘Made in China’ pandemic: The
acceleration of territorial revisionism in the South China Sea; the subjugation of Hong Kong
through the stoutly contested national security law; repeated violations of Taiwanese
airspace; heightened naval aggression around Japan’s Senkaku Islands; and its most recent
encroachment in Nepal.
China’s dilemma with India originates from asymmetry between China and India in their
security priorities. India sees China as its primary threat, while China sees India as a
secondary challenge as its national security
priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Because India is not China’s primary threat
and South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and
minimize military and strategic resources on India.
The essence of strategy lies in China’s confidence that it has the financial resources, military
capacity and domestic political consensus to sustain and prevail in a protracted standoff (or
war) of attrition
vis-à-vis India. China’s 1962 war with India and the 1979 war with Vietnam both
demonstrates the central position and essence of “self-defense war” concept in China’s
playbook.
In a long-term and strategic perspective, China’s most desired option to settle the disputes
and relations with India is winning without fighting.
The logic of this option lies in the belief that the power gap between China and India will only
grow with China’s rise, and there will be a day that the power imbalance becomes so large
that India will recognize the
impracticality and impossibility of its desired endgame This diplomacy-based approach put a
Band-Aid on the most dividing and disturbing issue between two great powers in the region.
And its utility and effectiveness have come under more and more questioning as both sides
try to defend their military positions on the frontline.

GALWAN CLASH REASONS

China remains a significantly more powerful entity and its infrastructure is still in much
better shape. But Indian infrastructure development has reached a critical point, Chinese
opposition to the 255 km-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road has been so
vehement.
Connecting Leh to the
Karakoram Pass, this
all-weather road is
India’s frontal challenge
to China’s expansionist
designs in the region.
Despite Chinese
objections, India has
continued to pursue this
project given its
strategic importance.
China raising the
temperature on the
border is a preemptive
move to dissuade India from moving ahead.

China’s recent behaviour cannot be delinked from the global situation where Beijing has
come under pressure and is facing a global backlash for its aggression.
M Taylor Fravel - the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for
China. Its principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific.
The domestic motivations of Beijing’s LAC aggression Covid-19 has generated a backlash
against the Chinese regime led by Xi. This has rendered his hold on power under stress,
Having secured an indefinite extension of his reign following the 19th Party Congress by
effectively shelving the term limits set by Deng Xiaoping, the denouement induced by the
pandemic has in all likelihood compelled him to keep select internal constituencies
sufficiently placated and mollified. Beijing’s outrage or pique over New Delhi assigning two
Members of Parliament (MPs) to attend Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s virtual
swearing-in ceremony any appearance of weakness in Xi at home in the face of what China
perceives to be a regional and global multi-directional assault on both its ambitions and rise
as a great power could imperil his domestic grip on authority.
In the ongoing round of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing, the latter has pretty much
followed the Pakistani playbook— level a baseless charge against India, that it is trying to
make territorial gains, in order to justify its own aggression. Finally, the source of this
Chinese aggression, can be attributed to nationalism. China is picking fights with multiple
actors simultaneously amid an ongoing health pandemic precisely because of what it sees as
a nationalist imperative.
How the Galwan tragedy has clarified India’s vision?
Tragedies often lead to a clarity of vision, a vision that was clouded by the misplaced sense
of our ability to manage China. New Delhi should also lose its innocence when it comes to
China. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi has underlined that India wants peace but “will
give a befitting reply” if provoked the first Indian casualties on the disputed India-China
boundary since 1975 should be occasion to reconsider several long-held beliefs and methods
of dealing with the relationship that successive governments in New Delhi have adopted over
the years. Foreign policymaking in India cannot be an open, public or democratic exercise
and that ‘quiet diplomacy’ is the way to go in dealing with China. In its attempt to
unilaterally define the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Beijing has disregarded the central tenets
of all pacts it has signed with India since 1993 to keep the border peaceful.

EARLIER New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the dangers of BRI at a time
when almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing’s narrative. Today, India’s
framing of the BRI problems is widely accepted by most major global powers. India has also
managed to shape the global discourse on the Indo-Pacific and is now working closely with
likeminded regional players into giving it operational heft. Despite China’s continued
objections to the term, IndoPacific maritime geography is now widely accepted.
And so in its wisdom, China decided to wield the blunt instrumentality of force, hoping that
this would “teach India a lesson”. The reality is Chinese actions will produce exactly the
opposite effect of what they probably intended to do. Indian public opinion, which was
already negative about China, will now become even more strongly anti-Chinese.
The challenge in Sino-Indian ties is fundamentally structural. China is interested in shaping
an alternative global order commensurate to its growing economic and military power. And
India is a nation on China’s periphery whose rise it seeks to scuttle to secure its interests. In
New Delhi, there is now a more realistic appraisal of China. Indian foreign policy has evolved
in directions that demands reciprocity from Beijing.

China is both India’s most important neighbour, and its most significant foreign policy
challenge. India cannot ignore China, and it needs to be cognisant of the growing power
differential between the two.

The events of June 15 should set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. India’s approach, since the
1962 War, of hedging and buck- passing can be ill afforded against Xi Jinping’s China and its
“wolf-warrior diplomacy”.
India must “punish” rather than “deny” Chinese adventurism—a significant revision of the
rules of engagement .

WHY China is foolish to make an enemy of India?

With a spiral of escalation building, a conflict so far limited to the Line of Actual Control with
China could see other theatres open up, including one in the Indian Ocean.
Unlike on the land border, where China has a relative advantage of terrain, military
infrastructure and troop strength, India is better placed at sea. In the Eastern Indian Ocean
through which most of China’s cargo and energy shipments pass, the Indian Navy is the
dominant force.
From India’s point of view, China has been nothing but trouble. It remains the main
international backer of the Pakistani military establishment, a perpetual threat to regional
stability.
Years of such behavior have worn down India’s cherished commitment to non-alignment —
or “strategic autonomy,” as we are supposed to call it in the post-Cold War era.
One would think the Chinese leadership, which has made such a fetish of their nation’s
supposed “century of humiliation,” China’s leaders may feel that that the U.S. has
mismanaged their nation’s emergence on the global
stage. But they have no one else to blame for their inept handling of India’s rise.

Strengths of India and its preparedness

Since the mid 2000s, for instance ,India has added to its Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) for
rapid counter offensive operations in Tibet (“Him Vijay” exercises are already being held by
them in Arunachal Pradesh—the Western sector of the LAC), improved its roads and
logistical infrastructure, augmented its firepower with the acquisition of the 145 M-777
ultra-light Howitzers from the US in 2016, deployed the Brahmos cruise missile system .
India can also exploit China’s frailties in the Indian Ocean Region and seek to interdict vital
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), particularly those passing through the strait of Malacca.
To bolster its counter-offensive capacity, the Indian Navy has already taken on lease a
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) from Russia— the INS Chakra and recruited the
aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in 2012.
India must take a more vocal stand on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to
ensure that China’s military resources are over-extended, and cannot be concentrated in its
Western theatre.
India’s commitment to the Quad and a deepening of its strategic partnership with the US,
should either be leveraged to exact concessions on the border, or used to rapidly upgrade
domestic military capacity.
Tsinghua University professor Xu Zhangrun laments the consequences of Beijing’s global
assertiveness: “Instead of embracing a [global] community,” he writes, “China is increasingly
isolating itself from it.
What is the new disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh?
In the first major breakthrough in talks to resolve the nine-month military standoff along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, China’s Defence Ministry announced Wednesday that
Chinese and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began
“synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between
Corps Commanders when they last met on January 24.

What does this disengagement process entail?

According to the statement made by Rajnath Singh in Rajya Sabha, “both sides will remove
the forward deployment in a phased, coordinated and verified manner”.
“China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8. Similarly, India will
also position its forces at its permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa post near Finger 3.
Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.”
Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-
patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and
diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake
since April 2020 will be removed.

Why is this area important?

The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive
regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020. What makes the
areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked
the beginning of the standoff; it is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come
around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according
to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.
Why has this taken so long?
Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank
of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub- sector. However, India has been demanding that any
disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their
April 2020 positions.
However, it seems that for now both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong
Tso area only.
Singh mentioned on Thursday that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since
last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three
principles:
1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.
2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.
Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward
deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the
armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”
Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?
That’s a clear no. Even Singh said in his statement that “there are still some outstanding
issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC” and mentioned that “our
attention will be on these in further discussions”.
What are the hurdles?
Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no
clarity on intent.

Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines
from all friction points, then de-escalation that will entail sending the troops from the depth
areas to their original bases. Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with
additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.
As the standoff progressed in the months of May, June and July, there was a mirrored
military build-up from both sides. A resolution has to include sending these troops and
military equipment where they came from on both sides.
But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military
strength, as it does not trust the other side. Sources in the military establishment have
reiterated multiple times that what was China’s intent for diverting its troops last May from
their traditional exercise in the region to the LAC, which led to the standoff is not known.
Further, this is not the first disengagement attempt even for this standoff.
Analysis
India must be pleased. This outcome means that it was able to force Chinese troops out of
what New Delhi believes is its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides the two
countries. India, in short, has repeated the military success it achieved during the Doklam
crisis in 2017, when the two faced off over China’s attempt to build a road and both sides
eventually withdrew their troops. The latest showdown originated in May 2020, when the
Chinese army prevented Indian soldiers from patrolling up to their claim lines and
established permanent structures on its own side. Both in terms of geography and numbers,
China’s intrusion was neither local nor limited.
If China had aimed to coerce India into accepting its territorial claims along the LAC, the
massacre at Galwan Valley emboldened New Delhi’s resolve to fight back. What followed
was a concerted effort to use all of the economic, diplomatic, and military power at India’s
disposal to push China to return to the status quo—what it called a “strategy of hurt.” This
strategy communicated a simple dictum to Beijing: China should remove its soldiers and its
bases, or India would inflict economic, diplomatic, and military costs.
India’s opening gambit was economic sanctions against Chinese firms operating in the
country. India may be dependent on trade with China for the import of raw materials and
finished goods, but China also has large stakes in Indian markets—especially when it comes
to technology. So it made sense that, as the border crisis with China escalated, India moved
to ban Chinese apps and disallowed Chinese state-owned companies from investing in
infrastructure projects. The threat of economic decoupling, including a prospective ban on
Huawei from India’s 5G infrastructure, followed.

Diplomatically, too, India embraced the West more firmly, signing an agreement that
furthers military cooperation between the United States and India and inviting Australia to
participate in joint naval exercises. It also sent an Indian destroyer to the South China Sea to
signal its decision to side with the West on disputes there.
Militarily, India built up a local preponderance of forces and materiel to deter any further
Chinese activities. The effort marked the biggest mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces in
recent decades.
Military deterrence and economic and diplomatic maneuvering could not have altered
China’s cost-benefit calculus on their own. After all, even with its show of strength, India’s
military is still leagues behind China’s in terms of size and equipment, and China’s vastly
larger economy could absorb any economic costs from India’s disengagement

So why did Beijing ultimately agree to a reinstatement of the status quo?

To alter Beijing’s cost-benefit matrix, India needed not military deterrence but to change the
tactical military reality on the border. Its increased military presence provided options for
employing limited but innovative force to buy leverage at the negotiating table. In the
mountains, that meant occupying the higher ground. For example, in a late August
preemptive move, the Indian Army captured the dominant features of the Kailash mountain
range overseeing China’s positions in both the north and the south bank of the Pangong Tso
lake.
Indian forces also captured the dominant heights on the north bank of the lake. This tactical
maneuver surprised the Chinese troops that remained ensconced on the lower ridges. India’s
military actions had increased the costs for China to hold on to the territory it had grabbed.
That gave India the tactical advantage so long as the conflict remained limited to the LAC.
The limited disengagement in the Pangong Tso lake region should not, however, distract
from the systemic obstacles in Sino-Indian relations. China’s growing power and its
constant use of the border dispute to coerce India will remain New Delhi’s primary strategic
challenge. India is now facing a hostile great power that not only eyes its territory but also
detests its rise in the global order.

The first concerns India’s military reorientation toward its northern borders. After almost
half a century of a Pakistan-centric military posture, the Indian military—on land, air, and
sea—will now be oriented toward China. Major reconfiguration in force positioning of the
Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy is already underway.
Second, the process of India’s economic decoupling with China—which started with New
Delhi’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free
trade agreement that includes China—will continue apace. India may relent on a few
matters, but the larger trajectory of Sino-Indian economic relations is now set. Members of
the Quad—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—are increasingly realizing that
Chinese power depends on the country’s economic interdependence with the liberal
economies. Constraining China militarily will necessitate its economic isolation. India and the
other Quad countries will feel the hurt in the near to midterm, but in the long term,
marginalizing China will hurt Beijing more.

Finally, New Delhi will not stray from its increasing alignment with the West. If earlier India
was band wagoning with the United States for material and status gain, today its
requirement now is more existential: It needs the United States and the Quad members to
provide the country with technology, money, and arms to internally balance China.
Disengagement from Pangong Tso is just the beginning of the Sino-Indian military de-
escalation. However, it will not resolve the fundamental problems of their bilateral relations.
China’s military rise and its penchant for territorial aggrandizement will continue to push
Sino-Indian relations through cycles of violence.
ISSUES IN INDIA CHINA RELATIONS
Border Issues:

 Dispute is in three sectors:

 Eastern sector - 91,000 square miles – Dispute on McMohan line .
 Middle Sector- Least disputed
 Western Sector – 38,000 square miles under Chinese occupation Johnson line and
McDonald line.
India China Boundary Dispute

The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated.

The boundary dispute is divided into three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern.

 The boundary dispute in the Western Sector (Ladakh) pertains to the Johnson Line
proposed by the British in the 1860s that extended up to the Kunlun Mountains and
put Aksai Chin in the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
 India used the Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as its own. China, however, do
not recognise it and instead accepts McDonald Line which puts Aksai Chin under its
control.
 In the Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), the dispute is a minor
one.
 Here border is the least controversial except for the precise alignment to be followed
in the Barahoti plains. India and China have exchanged maps on which they broadly
agree.
  The disputed boundary in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) is over
the McMahon Line (in Arunachal Pradesh) decided in 1914 in a meeting of
Representatives of China, India, and Tibet in Shimla.
 Though the Chinese representatives at the meeting initiated the agreement, they
subsequently refused to accept it .The Tawang tract claimed by China was taken over
by India in 1951.
Understanding Sino-Indian border issues
The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated throughout. India, following
Independence, believed it had inherited firm boundaries from the British, but this was
contrary to China’s view. China felt the British had left behind a disputed legacy on the
boundary between the two newly formed republics.
Nearly six decades have passed since then, but the border issue remains unresolved. It has
turned into one of the most protracted border disputes in the world. Since 1981, when the
first round of border talks was held, officials from India and China have met a number of
times to find a solution to the issue. The two countries are also engaged in Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) on the border with bilateral agreements signed in 1993,
1996,2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013. By the beginning of the 21st century, the two sides had
agreed not to let the border dispute affect bilateral engagements. During Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, the two sides agreed on the appointment of
special representatives for consultations aimed at arriving at a framework for a boundary
settlement that would provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the border.
This has resulted into Political parameters and guiding principles for resolution of dispute.

Despite two decades of CBMs and the thaw in bilateral relations, incidents on the border,
known as “incursions”, “intrusions” or “violations” continue to be reported in the Indian
media .
The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) signed by the two countries in 2013
was aimed at preventing incidents involving tailing of patrols, and generally streamlining
channels of communication in case of a faceoff. A five-layer mechanism for communication
between the two sides was agreed upon: first, flag meetings between border personnel on
the LAC; second, meetings between senior officers of China’s Military Regions and India’s
Army Commands; third, periodic meetings at the ministry level; fourth, meetings of the
Working Mechanism (set up in 2013); and fifth, the apex India-China Annual Defence
Dialogue.
Conclusion

Given China’s push for the Belt and Road Initiative, and given that its China Pakistan
Economic Corridor project has already affected India’s sovereignty claims in certain parts of
Kashmir, it is incumbent upon India to bring the settlement of the India- China border issue
to the forefront of its relationship with China.

 High Trade Deficit

India's trade deficit with China is $45.91 billion.
Indian economy is deeply intertwined with Chinese exports

China’s share in Indian imports for intermediate goods, capital goods, and final consumer
goods is 12%, 30%, and 26% respectively. India depends on China in many key industries
from electrical machinery and appliances to pharmaceutical drug API. In recent years, there
have been certain mobile companies shifting their assembly lines to India, which is a step in
the right direction but still, all the key high-end manufacturing components like the display,
chipset, and memory are being imported from China.
Cost is a vital reason why Chinese products dominate markets across sectors. Products such
as fertilisers are 76% cheaper, electronic circuits 23%, and data processing units around 10%
cheaper if made in China. It will be hard to substitute or compete with those prices. Since the
pandemic, there are calls to diversify the supply chain. The Indo-American Chamber of
Commerce said that around 1,000 firms were planning to leave China but only 300 of them
were serious about investing in India.

The current trade scenario suggests that the nationalistic notions of bringing China to its
knees by boycotting Chinese goods has been a flop. The simple example that even a good as
small as LEDs are still cheaper than Indian alternatives by almost 50% despite a 40% hike in
prices of the Chinese goods is indicative of that. This indicates that India needs to undertake
a series of reforms like land and labour reforms to foster growth and investment. India also
needs to scale up domestic production in key sectors including electrical machinery and
pharmaceuticals to replace those imports. Without any of these key reforms, the Prime
Minister’s call for ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat’ will remain a mere slogan as it currently appears
to be now and that is why we see a booming trade relationship between India and China
after the Galwan Valley incident and will continue to see a significant dependence on China
for the foreseeable future.
India-China economic ties: Impact of Galwan

In recent years, the India-China bilateral relationship has been characterised by historical
animosities and border disputes. Nevertheless, the economic ties have grown since the early
2000s and have been at the forefront of this relationship. Trade and investment have
provided a cushion to this otherwise tricky relationship.

The bilateral trade that stood at US$ 3 billion in the year 2000 grew to US$ 92.68 billion in
2019. China was India’s second-largest trading partner in 2019 and emerged as the largest
trading partner in the first half of FY 20-21. The bilateral trade declined by only 15%
compared to a 32.46% decline in overall trade in 2020-21. China accounted for 5% of India’s
exports and 14 % of India’s imports in 2019. This had led to a very high trade deficit of US$
56.77 billion in 2019. Attempts have been made to reduce the India-China trade deficit
through bilateral talks. The issue, for instance, was raised at the bilateral informal summit in
Mahabalipuram, and both sides agreed to set up a new high level economic and trade
dialogue mechanism to address this issue.
China forms an integral part of the global supply chain, and India too is heavily dependent
on Chinese imports, ranging from a variety of raw materials to critical components.
According to data from 2019, a staggering 70% of electronic components, 45% of consumer
durables, 70% of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), and 40% of leather goods come
from China. According to a response to a query in Rajya Sabha, India has the world’s third-
largest pharmaceutical industry for which 2/3rds of its key ingredients come from China.
Meanwhile, the Galwan Valley incident in mid-June led to calls for boycotting of Chinese
goods. According to a survey conducted by Local Circles, 87% of Indian consumers were
willing to boycott Chinese goods. One of the prime campaigns was to boycott Chinese goods
for Diwali and it was seen that even in the Prime Minister’s home state of Gujarat in
Ahmedabad, 80% of the decorative lights and LEDs sold in shops were still ‘Made in China.’

Effect of the Galwan Valley incident

There has also been an effort to reduce India’s dependence on Chinese goods.

The Indian Railways, for instance, cancelled an INR 471 Crore deal with a Chinese firm.
Similarly, state-owned telecom firm BSNL was instructed not to use gear from Chinese firm
Huawei for a network upgrade.
The government has mandated all products to have the Country of Origin tag for products on
the Government e-Marketplace in an effort to identify Chinese-origin goods. In early July
2020, the Ministry of Power restricted power supply systems and networks import from
China citing cyber and security threats, which constitute about 30% of the total imports from
China. In the last 10 years, 12,540 MW out of 22,420 MW of the supercritical power plants
were built using Chinese equipment. India also extended safeguard taxes on imports of solar
cells and modules as well as imposed anti-dumping duty on several goods.
In July, India placed colour television sets imports under the restricted category, thus
requiring a licence to import; and air conditioners under the prohibited category.

Water issues
 China plans to build a major dam on Brahmaputra,a run-of-the-
river dams on Yarlung Zangbo.
The Tibetan plateau is often called the “Third Pole”, owing to its
glacial expanses and vast reserves of freshwater. It is a source of
seven of the South Asia’s largest rivers- the Indus, Ganges,
Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Yangtze and Mekong.
Current status of India-China water relationship
Trans-border rivers flowing from China to India fall into two main
groups

• The Brahmaputra River System on the Eastern side consisting river Siang
(mainstream of river Brahmaputra) and its tributaries i.e., Subansiri and Lohit

• The Indus River System on the Western side consists of river Indus and the river Sutlej.
There is no institutionalized mechanism on water
cooperation between India and China, both countries
have signed only .
MoU for Hydrological Information of the River
Brahmaputra in 2002.
2010 MoU on Hydrological Data Sharing on River Sutlej /
Langqen Zangbo (renewed in 2015)
ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) to cooperate in emergency management (e.g., flood), trans-
border Rivers issues etc. in 2006.
Besides these continuous diplomatic engagement plays a key role in sustained
communication for data sharing and other developments in the river systems.
Concerns that India has regarding the recent developments on Brahmaputra?
Volume and quality of water: Experts have highlighted that even Run-of-the-river projects
will significantly reduce the availability of water in the North-Eastern region.
Creation of hydroelectric projects would alter the flow of water and potentially increase the
siltation levels, thus affecting the quality of water in the lower riparian states.
Absence of transparency in developments: Chinese infrastructural developments in the
Tibetan region have not been transparent. E.g.- Road developments near the India-Tibet
border etc.
Lack of trust on China: China’s past record of strong-arming Southeast Asian countries in
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework
Potential use as political leverage in border disputes: For example, China stopped sharing
of hydrological data on Brahmaputra during the Doklam standoff. (But it was sharing the
same with Bangladesh.)

National Security implication: Availability of water can directly affects the existence of a
large section of people.Poor water availability in the Eastern region can trigger a fresh influx
of refugees from Bangladesh
Environmental Impact: Increased pollution (Siang- Brahmaputra’s main artery recently
turned blackish grey as it entered India), potential impact on climate change, threat to
biodiversity in the region and altering the monsoonal patterns of the region.
Increased disaster vulnerability: Artificially controlling and consequent sudden releases of
the flow of water increases the probability of floods especially in lower riparian . Also, China
plans to build this infrastructure by using small nuclear explosions, this will not only impact
the seismic balance of the region but also will have a radioactive fallout (affecting
agriculture and water quality).
Course of action for India?
Experts have suggested to go beyond monitoring to secure its interests. Following steps can
be taken by India
Strengthening its hydrological capacity: Increase the monitoring capacity. + satellite-based
monitoring for activity and infrastructural developments
Building international consensus against Chinese activities: Persuade other lower riparian
states like Bangladesh, ASEAN countries
Efforts can also be made to draw out a consensus of a collective of democracies in pursuance
of International law of ‘Prior Appropriation’. In accordance with the law, India being the first
user has rights to use same quantity of water for hydropower projects on Brahmaputra
against China.
Drawing clear red lines and communicate the same to China.
Geographically, India and China share a water system and that fact will not change in the
foreseeable future. As a result, pressure and counter pressure tactics can only be a solution
in the short-term. In the long-term, strained water relations between countries will hinder
the development on both sides. In the light of this, India could make an effort to further
strengthen cooperation through diplomatic channels available like the Expert Level
Mechanism and using other diplomatic means like the Himalayan Charter and Himalayan
Council for the future of the Himalayas among others.
Why India is opposed to joining Belt and Road Initiative?
China’s Belt and Road Forum, hosted with great
fanfare, signals the priority of this flagship connectivity
initiative while also underlining its credentials as the
new “shaper” of global trends and norms. Exhorting all
countries to participate, Chinese President Xi Jinping
suggested that “what we hope to create is a big family
of harmonious co-existence.”

The policy initiative aims to enhance China’s centrality in the global economic unilateral
approach in how the project is conceived and implemented so far belies the rhetoric of
multilateralism emanating from Beijing.
Taking inspiration from the ancient Silk Road trading route, China’s One Belt One Road
initiative, or OBOR, hopes to link more than 65 countries, encompassing up to 40 percent of
global GDP. Xi’s signature foreign paradigm – linking China to Asia, Europe and Africa via an
ambitious network of ports, roads, rail and other infrastructure projects. Beginning in China’s
Fujian province, the projected Maritime Silk Route passes through the Malacca Strait to the
Indian Ocean, moving along the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, ending in Venice.
The scale and scope of OBOR is huge, with at least $1 trillion in investments. China,
desperate to deflect criticism that OBOR is primarily an instrument for Chinese expansionism,
managed to convince heads of 29 states and governments to participate in the summit.
The West views this as a Chinese bilateral project being touted a multilateral venture. The
outgoing president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China complains that the OBOR has
“been hijacked by Chinese companies, which have used it as an excuse to evade capital
controls, smuggling money out of the country by disguising it as international investments
and partnerships.”
The rest of the world is more receptive. Lavishing praise on China for the OBOR initiative
while targeting the US, Putin warned at the summit that “protectionism is becoming the new
normal,” adding that the “ideas of openness and free trade are increasingly often being
rejected (even) by those who until very recently expounded them.”
India refused to participate, maintaining opposition to China’s investment in the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
India, boycotting the event, announced in an official statement: “No country can accept a
project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Indian Foreign
Secretary S Jaishankar articulated this position at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue: “China is very
sensitive about its sovereignty. The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory, an
area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that
such a project has been initiated without consulting us.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi
reinforced this point, asserting that “connectivity in itself cannot override or undermine the
sovereignty of other nations.”
The advantages for India of joining China’s multibillion dollar OBOR initiative are apparent,
and the economic logic is compelling. With bilateral trade of $70.08 billion in 2016, China
remains India’s largest trading partner. Last year also saw record Chinese investments into
India reaching close to $1 billion. Compared to this, China’s economic ties with Pakistan
remain underwhelming with bilateral trade volume reaching $13.77 last year.
Yet against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, India cannot feasibly join the
OBOR project without challenging the very foundations of its foreign policy. The $55 billion
CPEC would link China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang Province to the Gwadar deep-sea port in
Pakistan. Despite the rhetoric, Beijing’s priority in pumping huge sums into a highly volatile
Pakistani territory is not to provide economic relief for Pakistan’s struggling economy or to
promote regional economic cooperation.
The long-term strategic consequences of OBOR for India could also allow China to
consolidate its presence in the Indian Ocean at India’s expense. Indian critics contend that
China may use its economic power to increase its geopolitical leverage and, in doing so,
intensify security concerns for India. CPEC gives China a foothold in the western Indian Ocean
with the Gwadar port, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where Chinese warships
and a submarine have surfaced. Access here allows China greater potential to control
maritime trade in that part of the world – a vulnerable point for India, which sources more
than 60 percent of its oil supplies from the Middle East. What’s more, if CPEC does resolve
China’s “Malacca dilemma” – its over-reliance on the Malacca Straits for the transport of its
energy resources – this gives Asia’s largest economy greater operational space to pursue
unilateral interests in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and trade-
energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including India.
More generally, the Maritime Silk Road reinforces New Delhi’s concerns about encirclement.
Beijing’s port development projects in the Indian Ocean open the possibility of dual-use
facilities, complicating India’s security calculus. The Belt and Road Initiative is a highly
ambitious undertaking in line with China’s aspirations to emerge as the central economic
power at a time when the United States makes plans to step back from global affairs.
Why India is opposed to CPEC Project ?
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
China’s ambitious project for
increasing connectivity and economic
cooperation within Eurasia. Since its
announcement in 2013, the BRI has
been positively received by many
countries covered within its ambit.
New Delhi sent a clear message to
Beijing that it doesn’t support CPEC.
India registered its protest by
boycotting the high-profile Belt and
Road Forum organised by China. Its
principal objection was that CPEC
passed through Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (PoK).
The Ministry’s statement read: “Our
position on OBOR/BRI is clear and
there is no change. The so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. No country can accept a project that ignores its core
concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
India’s position will undoubtedly have a larger impact on China-India relations. PoK is
considered a contested territory by the international community. Nevertheless, for India, PoK
remains an emotional and sensitive issue. It is little wonder that China’s insistence on
establishing the CPEC project through PoK is seen by India as a deliberate disregard of its
territorial claims.
At a broader level, if China invests heavily in the region, it risks becoming party to what has
been a troubling bilateral dispute between nuclear-armed rivals. If CPEC gets operationalised
and fortifies the emergence of a fully functional China-Pakistan axis, this would hamper
India’s larger interests in the South Asian region and force astrategic rethink in South Block.
The incentives for this would be even stronger if CPEC’s potential success renders PoK more
industrially developed, thus granting Pakistan greater legitimacy over the region Whether
India has any road map to take the conversation on PoK forward is a different debate but no
nation can be expected to wilfully forsake its territorial claims. Had India not registered its
protest, that would have been perceived as a weakness, and would have been a setback for
India’s emerging power status in the international system.

China's reaction to India's concerns

India’s concerns over sovereignty relating to the USD 46-billion China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) is “unwarranted,”asking New Delhi to take an “objective and more
pragmatic” view of China’s ambitious Silk Road project.
India’s concerns were “unwarranted.” “China respects India’s sovereignty concerns. Taking a
strong stand on territorial issues is important, but it’s hoped India could adopt an objective
and more pragmatic attitude towards the One Belt, One Road proposal.”
New Delhi fears that the CPEC, passing through the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, would
serve the purpose of granting legitimacy to Pakistan’s control over the region, and by
promoting the construction of the corridor, China intends to meddle in the Kashmir dispute.
These concerns are unwarranted.”
“China has no intention of interfering in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan.
China has long believed that the two neighbours should solve their dispute through dialogue
and consultations, and it has repeatedly emphasised that the construction of the CPEC would
not affect its stance on the issue,”. India’s official position : minister of external afaairs in
rajya sabha

“Government’s concerns arise in part from the fact that the inclusion of the so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly
impinges on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. This so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the Union Territories of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh which are under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Government
has conveyed its concerns to the Chinese side about their activities in areas illegally occupied
by Pakistan in the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh and has asked them to
cease such activities.
Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on
universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness,
transparency and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects
sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of other nations.

S Jaishankar at 2017 Raisina Dialogue : “The economic corridor passes through an illegal
territory, an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the
fact that such a project has been initiated without consulting us.”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi too asserted that “connectivity in itself cannot override or
undermine the sovereignty of other nations”.

China & Kashmir

Article 370 abrogation
On 5 August 2019, the Government of India (GoI) announced the abrogation of Article 370 of
the Constitution and the bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two union
territories. This triggered an unprecedented international response.
Soon after the announcement, India embarked on a massive diplomatic outreach to assuage
the concerns of the global community.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
While India struggled with Pakistan over Kashmir, it was also engaged in a dispute with
Beijing over Aksai Chin—an isolated, inhospitable plain, west of the Karakoram range. In the
1950s, China began the construction of a road in this region, to connect Xinjiang with Tibet,
both of which it had recently annexed then. The road ran through Aksai Chin, with China
taking effective control over the area. After the 1962 Sino-India war, China retained control
of a large part of the territory, despite India’s rightful claim over it being a part of Ladakh.
During this time, China and Pakistan’s friendship deepened, and Pakistan gifted a part of
Kashmir called “Shaksgam Valley” to China in 1963. An article of the Sino-Pakistan Border
Agreement, which ceded the land, states, “[T]he two Parties have agreed that after the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority
concerned will re-open negotiations with the Government of China … so as to sign a
Boundary Treaty to replace the present agreement.”[8] This effectively made China’s claim
over the Shaksgam Valley contingent on the settlement of the Kashmir issue between India
and Pakistan.
While it was favourably received by both India and Pakistan, the agreement was ignored in
most other countries.
China' response
China’s response to the changes in Kashmir focused on its concern over Ladakh becoming a
Union Territory. It called the move “unacceptable,” claiming that it would directly “impede
China’s sovereignty. China’s statements suggest that its opposition to the removal of Article
370 is driven by a fear that it would further complicate its boundary issue with India, in light
of the 740-km LoC in J&K.
However, China soon revised its statement, stating that the Kashmir issue should be resolved
bilaterally in a peaceful manner and that both sides must avoid any action that could
escalate tensions in the region. During a China–Pakistan meeting in Beijing, the Chinese
foreign minister said the solution should be in accordance with the UN Charter and relevant
UNSC resolutions. On Pakistan’s insistence, China called for a private meeting to discuss
Kashmir at the UNSC.

Over the last few decades, China’s policy on J&K has vacillated, with Beijing choosing to call
it a solely India–Pakistan issue whenever it suited its interests. ern borders.
Over the years, China has come to refer to J&K as a “disputed territory” or as “India-
controlled Kashmir,” lending further legitimacy to Pakistan’s cause. In 2010, China started
issuing stapled visas to the residents of J&K, manifesting its desire to cement its pro-Pakistan
stance.
Beijing’s interests in Jammu and Kashmir are both strategic and economic. The crown head
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs
through parts of POK. The sovereignty of this part is disputed, as India has repeatedly
claimed the territory as its own. Recent statements from top ministers of the GoI have made
it clear that the government will make efforts take control of POK, which directly impinges
upon China’s interests in the region. The latter’s US$19- billion investment in CPEC is directly
linked to the Indo-Pak territorial dispute over J&K, which will be affected by the balance of
power shifting towards India.
China’s desire to undermine India’s legitimate claim over J&K is fuelled by its hegemonic
ambitions in the subcontinent. In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that
“Beijing could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’, J&K, and Pakistan ‘to keep India in
low-level equilibrium’. Thus, China’s economic and military support for Pakistan is designed
in a manner that does not necessarily strengthen Islamabad but hopes to offset the growing
power differential it has with New Delhi. The CPEC allows Beijing quicker access to the
Arabian Sea, and a network of transportation infrastructure allows for the encirclement of
India.

For now, China seems to have taken a restrained position on the J&K matter. This is partly
because the August 2019 decision does not change the status quo along the Line of Actual
Control (LAC).
Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will
have to work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once
again, whether it is in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The
Trump administration’s handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is
unwilling or unable to play a significant role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic
handling of the Covid pandemic has only deepened this worry.
The administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority
region. The Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the
National Security Council which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership
levels.
Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation
with PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to
‘continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a
‘stronger regional architecture through the Quad.’
Revival of the Middle Kingdom-A post-pandemic world order
Since World War II, however, it has incorporated
several strains of ideological and enduring
civilisational beliefs.
Take the case of China, for example, which is
attempting to upstage, or at least match, the U.S.
as the principal global hegemon. Realising that
mere ideology was not enough to propel it to that
position, Mao Zedong’s successors have drawn on two civilisational markers from Chinese
history that have troubled the Chinese people for centuries: the ‘Middle Kingdom’ syndrome
and ‘the Century of Humiliation’. While the first marker builds on the glory of the Ming
Dynasty (late 14th century to mid-17th century) and the centrality of the Han people in a
world order that saw China as the most prosperous nation in the world, it also reminds the
Chinese people of the dangers that lurk around its periphery. Chinese leaders often draw
attention to the Mongol rule (late 13th century to mid-14th century) and over two centuries
of misrule by the Manchus and the Qing Dynasty (mid-17th century to early 20th century) as
examples of this.
The second marker draws on the stripping of China of its honour and resources by multiple
colonial powers during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ from the mid-19th century to the time of
the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. These markers from Chinese history
have gradually become dogma and seen as a blot on Chinese history that need resolution.
Realising in the 1980s that Maoist ideology no longer
appealed to the Chinese people, Deng reintroduced
Confucianism as a much-needed intellectual and ethical prop
to China’s push for ‘great power’ status. Sun Tzu re-emerged
as China’s answer to Clausewitz and for a few decades it
appeared that these would soften traditional Chinese
dogma. It also raised hopes that China would largely play by
the existing rules and bide its time.
Xi Jinping, however, has been a leader in a hurry. In the process, he has perpetuated the
deepened hurt of the Chinese people to an extent that it has become embedded dogma. He
has abandoned Confucianism and the ethical pursuit of power, and fallen back on hard-core
communist ideology. Hard power and muscular nationalism coupled with a neo-colonial and
mercantilist attitude towards vulnerable nations seems to be the new strategy to compete
with the U.S. While this strategy seemed to be working at a time when the U.S. appeared to
be looking inwards and showing signs of strategic fatigue, President Xi’s ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative demonstrated an overreach that had the potential to backfire as it created a
sense of fear of, rather than respect for China.
Demonstration of flexibility
India is neither afflicted by unreasonable expectations of power, ideological dogma, or
haunted by accentuated perceptions of historical hurt. Despite its own centuries of conquest
and exploitation by invaders and colonial powers, it has demonstrated resilience, learnt to
let go and embraced the good that emerged from the centuries of darkness.
South China Sea – should India worry?
Importance of South China Sea
The SCS is an important junction for navigation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It
connects with the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the southwest, and commands
access to the East China Sea to the northeast. The sea lane running between the Paracel and
Spratly Islands is used by oil tankers moving from the Persian Gulf to Japan as well as by
warships en route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Security in the SCS is a concern both
for regional countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, as well as the extra-
regional countries, including India, due to their strategic and economic interests in this
region. Any conflict in the SCS will pose a threat to regional and international security.

Territorial sovereignty, contention on energy, significance of the geographic location, threat

to maritime security and overlapping maritime claims are at the core of the SCS dispute The
SCS, an integrated ecosystem, is one of the richest seas in the world in terms of marine flora
and fauna, coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds, fish and plants. The sea accounts for
approximately 10 per cent of the annual global fisheries catchment, making it extremely
viable for the fishing industries of nearby countries.
Furthermore, value-added production (canning, filleting, fresh, frozen and chilled processing)
has translated into valuable foreign exchange earnings and job opportunities for countries in
the region. However, China has been imposing fishing rules to operate in the disputed
waters, resulting in serious maritime security concerns and objections from other claimant
states. Recently, China’s new fishing rules which came into effect on January 1, 2014 raised
questions about its efforts to exercise jurisdiction over all fishing activities in the disputed
waters.

Furthermore, the region richly laden in both oil and natural gas has led to speculation that
the disputed territories could hold potentially significant energy resources. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the SCS contains 11 billion barrels of
oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.

Most notably, the SCS occupies a significant geostrategic position in terms of international
shipping as a majority of energy shipments and raw materials have to pass through it.

Undoubtedly, the SCS is a critical corridor between the Pacific and Indian Ocean for
commercial and naval shipping China’s ordered an administrative reorganisation of its
South China Sea territories, injecting new discord in an already tense region. Beijing
instituted two new municipal districts, carving up the governance of the Paracel and Spratly
island groups, earlier managed by the local administration of Sansha — China’s
southernmost city of Hainan province – between two sub-authorities. Xisha and Nansha
(Chinese names for the Paracel and Spratly Islands) will now function as separate
administrative units with jurisdiction over their respective island chains.
China’s neighbours may well have anticipated the gambit. Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia
have in recent months sought to offer pushback to Chinese aggression in their near-seas,
employing administrative, legal and operational means. In December last year, Malaysia
approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming waters
beyond the 200-kilometre limit of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern part of
the South China Sea – a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around the
Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters off
the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coastguard ships.
Earlier this month, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting the
PRC’s sweeping assertions in the South China Sea, after a Chinese ship rammed and sunk a
Vietnamese fishing boat.
An irked China has doubled down on its territorial claims, sending in more militia and coast
guard vessels into disputed regions. The Chinese vessel and its coast guard escorts have been
accused of harassing an exploration vessel operated by

Malaysia’s state oil company. The United States has rushed to respond, ordering the USS
America – an amphibious assault ship – and guided missile warships USS Bunker Hill and USS
Barry in the region.

Three aspects of the drama unfolding in the South China Sea are relevant for India.
First, Chinese militia operations
have focused on the region’s
Western end close to the Indian
Ocean Region, targeting
countries that India has a close
political and military
relationship with.
Second, the developments in
the South China Sea coincide
with a rise in Chinese activity in
the Eastern Indian Ocean,
particularly Chinese research
and survey vessel presence to
add to India’s discomfort,
China’s mining operations in
the Southern Indian Ocean
have expanded considerably, as also the presence of Chinese fishing boats areas close to
India’s territorial waters.
A third factor for Indian analysts to consider has been the growing instances of Chinese
intelligence ship sightings in the IOR. Chinese Dongdiao class intelligence-gathering ships –
known earlier to stalk US, Australian and Japanese warships in the Western Pacific – now
operate in the waters of the Eastern Indian Ocean, keeping an eye on the Indian naval
movements. One such Chinese spy ship was spotted close to the eastern sea border near the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands late last year causing some disquiet in India’s security
establishment. Regional observers are troubled by Beijing’s attempts to take advantage of a
fluid geopolitical situation following COVID-19. With many Southeast Asia leaders sick or in
self-imposed quarantine and Washington distracted by the pandemic at home, Chinese
militias have upped the tempo of operations in critical regional hotspots.
How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for India 's security and well-
being?
In the first place, the South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.

Second, it has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and
passage has been unimpeded over the centuries.

Third, Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical
and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to
Quanzhou in China.

Fourth, nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of
our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Fifth, we have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who
reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly
countries, are essential for our economic well being.

In short, the South China Sea is our business. We have historical rights established by
practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.

In return, we too have to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations. While strategic

partnerships and high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-
ins by India in their future. They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in
Indo-Pacific affairs.
India’s position on the South China Sea disputes has so far been neutral. A tendency to
view the region through a prism of geopolitics and “balance of power” makes Indian
decision makers wary of taking a stand on China’s aggressive posturing. Yet the costs of
saying and doing nothing are rising. To many in New Delhi, it is clear that China’s firming
grip over disputed territories in the South China Sea portends greater power projection in
the Eastern Indian Ocean.
Even so, New Delhi has not abandoned its policy of non intervention in the security affairs of
Southeast Asia. India’s policy elite believe that their country is not party to the maritime
territorial disputes in the region and must refrain from meddling in a matter that does not
directly concern it. Indian decision-makers also know that Beijing operates from a position of
strength in the South China Sea, where it has physical control over critical islands. Possession
of these features gives Beijing the ability to exert strategic authority over the disputed
territory, regardless of the rights and interests of other regional states.

It continues to hope that Beijing will respect India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean in
the same way that New Delhi respects China’s in Southeast Asia. Even if Beijing has not
acted in good faith recently, the Indian government is unwilling to violate their goodwill
pact.

New Delhi is not impervious either to the threat China poses to trade flows in the region or to
its significant challenges to Indian energy and strategic interests. Access to the major
waterways in Southeast Asia is an important consideration for Indian policymakers, as is the
need to build capacity in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Both are central to New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision. Yet, when it comes to security
issues in the South China Sea, India is wary of provoking China. Notwithstanding the security
establishment’s deep misgivings about Chinese expansionism in littoral Asia—including in
the eastern Indian Ocean—Indian diplomats and spokespeople almost never make public
their reservations about China’s maritime assertiveness.
By contrast, India is relatively open about its disagreements with the United States in the
interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in a coastal
state’s EEZ. Indian officials do not concur with U.S. claims that warships have a right to
uninterrupted passage in coastal zones without prior notification and approval of the coastal
state.
Events of past weeks have shown that the imperative for India is to display solidarity with
partners in Southeast Asia. It must do so by publicly stating its discomfiture with Chinese
assertiveness and by strengthening its strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan,
and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, Indian officials must initiate a
dialogue with China and ASEAN on a rules-based order in Asia, setting the terms of
engagement between maritime forces
The imperative for India then is to come out on the side of maritime principle in the South
China Sea. New Delhi must display solidarity with Southeast Asia partners by publically
stating Indian discomfiture with Chinese assertiveness.
India’s maritime gateway to the Pacific is South China Sea
Being one of the most important seas of the world, geopolitically, economically and
strategically, the South China Sea (SCS) attracts considerable attention in the strategic
community in India. It continues to be seen as one of the most difficult regional conflicts in
the Asia-Pacific and an “arena of escalating contention.” India has vital maritime interests in
the SCS. Around 55 per cent of India’s trade in the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS
region. In fact, in recent times, New Delhi has become more active in expressing its interest
in the freedom of navigation in the SCS and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes
between Beijing and its maritime neighbours.

China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects

China on indicated it was opposed to India engaging in oil and gas exploration projects in
the disputed South China Sea, and warned Indian companies against entering into any
agreements with Vietnam "Our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country
engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's
jurisdiction," as China enjoyed "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea and its
islands.

Role played by Asian Nations

Malaysia approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming
waters beyond the 200-kilometer limit of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the northern
part of the South China Sea—a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around
the Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters
off the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coast guard
ships. In April, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting Beijing’s
expanding assertions in the South China Sea following an incident in which a Chinese ship
rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat. Unfortunately, these actions have not helped
moderate Chinese behavior. With Covid-19 sweeping through Southeast Asia, civilian and
military leaders have been preoccupied with fighting the pandemic. Regional states,
moreover, are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and medical aid, and many are
reluctant to openly criticize China’s assertive actions in their near seas. As some see it,
China’s recent moves are part of a long-standing “salami-slicing” strategy at sea: the slow
accumulation of small and stealthy actions, none of which justify a major tactical escalation
by other countries but that over time add up to a major strategic shift. China, however, has
been astute in denying neighbors the space to mount an effective response in the littoral.
Southeast Asian leaders said a 1982 UN oceans treaty should be the basis of sovereign rights
and entitlements in the South China Sea, in one of their strongest remarks opposing China’s
claim to virtually the entire disputed waters on historical grounds.
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the position in a statement
issued by Vietnam on Saturday on behalf of the 10-nation bloc.
“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones,” the ASEAN
statement said.
The leaders were referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1982
international agreement that defines the rights of nations to the world’s oceans.
Three Southeast Asian diplomats told that it marked a significant strengthening of the
regional bloc’s assertion of the rule of law in a disputed region that has long been regarded
as an Asian flashpoint. While it has criticised aggressive behaviour in the disputed waters,
ASEAN has never castigated China by name in its post-summit communiques.
The Philippines invoked the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013 to test the legality of China’s ‘nine-dash line’ regarding the
disputed Spratlys. In response, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague
decreed in its July 12, 2016 judgment that the line had “no legal basis.” China dismissed the
judgment as “null and void.”

The PCA award undermined the Chinese claim. It held that none of the features of the
Spratlys qualified them as islands, and there was no legal basis for China to claim historic
rights and to the resources within the ‘nine-dash line’. The UNCLOS provides that islands
must sustain habitation and the capacity for non-extractive economic activity. Reefs and
shoals that are unable to do so are considered low-tide elevations.
The award implied that China violated the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It
noted that China had aggravated the situation by undertaking land reclamation and
construction, and had harmed the environment and violated its obligation to preserve the
ecosystem. China dismissed the award as “a political farce under the pretext of law.”
U.S. rejects China's claims in South China Sea
The United States on rejected China's disputed claims to offshore resources in most of the
South China Sea, China has offered no coherent legal basis for its ambitions in the South
China Sea and for years has been using intimidation against other Southeast Asian coastal
states, “We are making clear: Beijings claims to offshore resources across most of the South
China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” said
Pompeo. The U.S. has long opposed China's expansive territorial claims on the South China
Sea, sending warships regularly through the strategic waterway to demonstrate freedom of
navigation there. Monday's comments reflect a harsher tone. “The world will not allow
Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire,

Regional analysts said it would be vital to see whether other nations adopt the U.S. stance
and what, if anything, Washington might do to reinforce its position and prevent Beijing
from creating “facts on the water” to buttress its claims.
The relationship between the United States and China has grown increasingly tense over the
past six months over Beijing's handling of the coronavirus pandemic, its tightened grip on
Hong Kong and its crackdown on China's Uighur Muslim community. China claims 90% of the
potentially energy-rich South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam also lay claim to parts of it, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes each
year. Beijing has built bases atop atolls in the region but says its intentions are peaceful.
Beijing routinely outlines the scope of its claims with reference to the so-called nine-dashed
line that encompasses about nine- tenths of the 3.5-million-square-kilometer South China
Sea on Chinese maps.

China’s growing threat via debt trap diplomacy

China has been using the financial tool of debt to gain influence across the world and grab
considerable power in India’s neighbouring countries, thereby increasing the amount of
political and security threats the nation is exposed to. Mint takes a deep dive.
How does China’s debt trap diplomacy work?

In a push to gain rapid political and economic ascendency across the globe, China is
dispensing billions of dollars in the form of concessional loans to developing countries,
mostly for their large-scale infrastructure projects. Often, developing nations are lured by
China’s offer of cheap loans for transformative infra projects, which involve a substantial
investment. These developing nations, which are primarily low- or middle-income countries,
are unable to keep up with the repayments, and Beijing
then gets a chance to demand concessions or
advantages in exchange for debt relief.
India’s former biggest trading partner, Bangladesh, has
found a new global partner in China. In the most recent
exchange between Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, it was
established that the economic development of
Bangladesh will be bolstered through BRI funding. They
share the opinion that the BRI establishes a model of
international cooperation for all the participants and proffers new opportunities for regional
connectivity. Beijing may seek to leverage BRI development of Payra, a power hub, to obtain
port access in the future. Bhutan is looking at potentially partnering with China to diversify
their economy. However, reports suggest that they are likely to skip out the upcoming BRI
forum as they did in 2017, despite Chinese attempts to press for their attendance.
China’s soft power investments have attained success extending beyond BRI measures. For
instance, Sri Lanka requires technical assistance to contain the spread of the coronavirus and
a model to follow; China seems to offer both. A concessionary loan of $500 million to propel
its efforts to combat the pandemic in Sri Lanka has been granted. Ambassador Hu Wei
earlier presented Sri Lankan Minister of Health Pavithra Wanniarachchi a document that
details lessons learned in China’s handling of Covid-19. In early April, the Chinese
government and companies that are involved in major projects in Sri Lanka donated several
masks, PPE, and test kits. America’s absence and India’s inaction here have magnified
China’s goodwill.

China’s strategic commitments include the

CPEC with Islamabad to leverage Chinese
capital, production capacity, and build a
“mechanism for sustainable economic
growth.” In return, Beijing gains a
connection to the Arabian Sea, a trade route
to the vital Malacca Strait. Plans with
Bangladesh to construct a parallel pipeline
connecting Kunming and Chittagong are underway. This is also a strategic backup point in
the event of the US and India acting as adversaries of China and blocking the choke-points of
Malacca and the Indian Ocean region.
Despite the infrastructural void that Chinese investments fill, western analysts deem the
practice a version of debt-diplomacy — hence when the indebted economies fail to service
their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China’s geostrategic interests. Most of
South Asia either did not take serious note of this earlier and are already in too deep now, or
believe that they are gaining greater advantages imbibing this bilateral diplomacy. Soft
power in South Asia has ushered a fear of retaliation; negative impacts such as debt traps
appear less threatening to these countries than turning into China’s enemy.
What concessions are demanded by China?
There are several advantages or concessions that China asks for in exchange for debt relief.
Sri Lanka, for instance, was forced to hand over control of the Hambantota port project to
China for 99 years, after it found itself under massive debt owed to Beijing. This allowed
China control over a key port positioned at the doorstep of its regional rival India, and a
strategic foothold along a key commercial and military waterway. Similarly, in exchange for
relief, China constructed its first military base in Djibouti.
Whereas Angola is replaying multibillion-dollar debt to China with crude oil, creating major
problems for its economy. What are these concessional loans granted by China?
These are loans extended to low- and middle-income countries on terms that are
significantly more generous than market loans. The ‘concessionality’ factor is achieved either
by offering interest rates that are below the market rates or leniency in the grace period, and
often with a combination of both. These loans generally have long grace periods.

Has India taken any loans from China?

India has not entered into any loan agreement directly with China. However, it has been the
top borrower of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral bank wherein
China is the largest shareholder (26.6% voting rights) and India the second (7.6% voting
rights) among other countries. China’s vote share allows it veto power over decisions
requiring super-majority. Loans provided to India could also pave the way for Chinese firms
to enter and gain experience in the promising Indian infra market.

How is the debt trap affecting India, then?

Most of India’s neighbours have fallen prey to China’s debt trap, and ceded to China’s $8 tn
project – One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) which seeks to improve connectivity among
countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The initiative requires India to accept that the Kashmir-
controlled Pakistan region, is Pakistan, because that’s where some of the projects are. China
through OBOR can hence increase India’s political cost of dealing with its neighbours.

Covid19: Made in China pandemic

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan and China’s domestic and international
response to this pandemic has forced the world to confront the grim realities of Chinese
leadership.
Research indicates that had China taken proactive measures to contain and suppress the
pandemic earlier in December 2019, the number of #Covid19 cases could have been
mitigated by up to 95 per cent. We now know that the opposite happened: local authorities
in China suppressed information about the outbreak, even destroying proof of the virus
sometime in December. Official censors scrubbed social media posts from medical
professionals warning of a new “SARS-like” disease. And as late as mid-January, Chinese
authorities denied evidence of any community transmission, allowing the lunar new year
celebrations to proceed despite having known about it for at least a month.

 China delayed notifying the WHO and in permitting it to inspect the situation in
Wuhan; released vital genetic information to the international community a full week
after it was isolated; and allowed millions of individuals from Wuhan to leave the city
unscreened, many of whom then travelled the world
 On cue, China’s international response changed gears. The prevailing theme that now
dominates Beijing’s state-controlled media is one of China “buying time” for the
international community to react—a claim that attempts to deflect attention from
the CPC’s and the Chinese State’s failings. Laughably, Chinese officials now appear to
be engaged in an authorized and concerted misinformation campaign, with several
diplomats and even the MFA spokesperson ludicrously claiming that the US Army was
responsible for smuggling the ‘Virus’ into Wuhan.
 Beijing’s industrial prowess and control over critical supply chains, including medical
supplies, have also added a geo- economic element to the pandemic. It has raced to
be seen as providing public goods when other powers are faltering. the international
community is now confronted by a prolonged public health emergency whose
contours and impact are not even vaguely known at the moment. An equally
paralysing and fearful consequence is the global economic slowdown as a direct
result of China’s irresponsible domestic and international behaviour. A less than
inspiring response to the outbreak in the US and much of Europe will likely whitewash
China’s offences against the international community in the short term, but the long
term implications will last.

WHY WUHAN?
The industrial and transportation hub on the Yangtze River is the first place the coronavirus
surfaced in the world. It’s possible that the virus came to Wuhan undetected from elsewhere,
but the city of 11 million is a logical place for the mission to start.
People began falling ill in December 2019, many with links to a sprawling food market that
dealt in live animals. The growing number of patients triggered alarms that prompted
China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention to send a team to investigate.

WHY THE SECRECY?

China has firmly rejected calls for an independent outside investigation. The head of the
WHO recently expressed impatience with how long China took to make necessary
arrangements for the expert team’s visit.
The ruling Communist Party keeps a tight hold on information and is particularly concerned
about possible revelations about its handling of the virus that could open it up to
international criticism and financial demands.
China stifled independent reports about the outbreak and has published little information on
its search for the origins of the virus.

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy

There was a time when China banked on diplomacy of deceit with its leaders saying one
thing and the government doing something different. This is how China got India's Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confused about Chinese intentions before the 1962 war. Now,
China has adopted a "wolf warrior" diplomacy. China is confrontational and conspiratorial
with anybody or any country that attempts to call the Chinese bluff in post-Covid-19 world.
This is a new form of warfare fought by China on social media, particularly Twitter, a social
media platform that is banned within China.
A recent social media post by one of its "wolf warrior" diplomats, Zhao Lijian to target
Australia is a leaf out of China's book of new diplomacy theory. Zhao Lijian earlier this week
posted a digitally manipulated image on Twitter apparently showing an Australian soldier
threatening to slit the throat of a girl. The caption of the image read: "Shocked by the
murder of Afghan civilians & prisoners by Australian soldiers."
This came against the backdrop of a report indicting Australian soldiers -- part of the
international force in Afghanistan -- for the killing of 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners. When
Australia objected to the Twitter "slur" by the official handle of the Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Zhao Lijian, China rebuffed the objection. Australian Prime Minister Scott
Morrison called it "outrageous", "unjustified" and sought an apology from China. The
Chinese foreign ministry refused to take down the post and called the Australian anger as
"over-reaction".
HOW DID IT BEGIN?
The term "wolf warrior diplomacy" came into vogue during the Covid-19 pandemic. The term
drew from a jingoistic Chinese film franchise, "Wolf Warrior". The second film of the series
came in 2017 with a tagline, "Though far away, anyone who affronts China will pay".
This is exactly what China has been trying to do during the Covid-19 pandemic to a range of
countries -- Australia, the US, Europe, Taiwan or India -- on social media and in bilateral
relations.
However, the "wolf warrior" diplomacy has its roots in the "strategy of nationalism" that
China adopted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
China launched the Patriotic Education Campaign and manufactured a narrative of "Century
of Humiliation" aimed at a makeover of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from a
revolutionary force to a nationalist expression.
The nationalism campaign adopted an aggressive outlook under Xi Jinping. The Chinese state
became more and more assertive as Xi Jinping strengthened his position in China through
elimination of his rivals in the name of fighting corruption. The first sign of wolf warrior
diplomacy emerged in 2017 -- the year of the release of Wolf Warrior-2 -- when Europe
found Chinese diplomats trying to bully it.

DURING COVID-19
China was never more cornered internationally than when it found itself cornered over
mismanagement of Covid-19 and the subsequent attempt to cover it up. China has been in a
tight spot diplomatically since January this year. Incidentally, its diplomatic Twitter presence
has phenomenally increased during this period.
China's diplomatic adoption of Twitter is surprising because it does not allow its citizens to
use Twitter, whose Chinese version Weibo is a big hit in the country. But since the world
listens to this microblogging platform, China converted it into a weapon for "wolf warrior"
diplomats, whose tweets are popularised using an army of bots.
Chinese diplomats have used "provocation" as a tool to get international attention on
Twitter.
The Chinese attempt has since been to blame any other country but itself for Covid-19. China
has been trying to build a narrative that it was an "efficient" and "vigilant" China that
discovered a pandemic and warned the world of the underlying dangers. In its latest
attempt, China has tried to pin the blame on India for the Covid-19 outbreak.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) only recently said it would be "highly speculative" to
say that coronavirus outbreak did not take place in China.
WHAT SUSTAINS "WOLF WARRIOR" DIPLOMACY?
That "wolf warrior" diplomacy is part of China's state policy is confirmed from reports that Xi
Jinping administration has more than doubled the budget for diplomacy and that the
performance appraisals of the foreign office staffers are linked to "public relations"
activities. The second is a big incentive for the government employees.
The fiercer they prove themselves as "wolf warrior" diplomat, the bigger would be their
appraisal and higher the career growth. Zhao Lijian saw his career take a flight after he took
on the American government over human rights abuse issue in 2019 -- from a counsellor in
the Chinese embassy in Pakistan, where for about two years he prefixed "Muhammad" to his
name to becoming one of the three formidable spokespersons in the Chinese foreign
ministry.
China has adopted a ‘wolf-warrior’ mentality because an increasing sense of insecurity and
defensiveness is causing it to become aggressive,
China has been creating trouble in Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and other neighbouring
countries like Vietnam and Indonesia.
At a press conference in Beijing last Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said that
China’s new policy is to push back against “deliberate insults”.

“We never pick a fight or bully others. But we have principles and guts. We will push back
against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honour and dignity, and we will
refute all groundless slander with facts, India, NSG, and the Chinese roadblock Diplomats
invested in on-going consultations at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on India’s
membership application have suggested that more member-countries now support India’s
inclusion in the Group that lays out guidelines for exports of nuclear and related sensitive
items. Yet, China’s apparent unwavered opposition to India’s entry to the NSG, that runs on
consensus, continues to hurt New Delhi’s prospects.
Why does India want to join the NSG?
New Delhi submitted its membership application to the NSG in May 2016, a month before
the Seoul plenary of the Group. This membership application follows over a decade of
cooperation between India and the NSG. New Delhi seeks to join the Group under its larger
goal of integrating completely into the global non-proliferation architecture. The first stage
of this integration was completed in 2008 when it received the waiver from the NSG to the
condition of implementing full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in order to engage in global nuclear commerce for peaceful purposes – a condition
applicable on all non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
nuclear weapons (NPT).
What stands between India and the NSG?
India’s membership application to the NSG, however, hit a road-block when China expressed
its strong opposition to India’s inclusion, citing implications on NPT as the reason since India
has not signed the Treaty. Non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that inclusion of
India into the NSG would affirm its status as a nuclear weapon state and since NPT, the
framework that holds the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, allows only five nuclear
weapon states, India’s admission in the NSG would undermine the NPT. Though Beijing has
used this argument to substantiate its position, its push for India’s admission to be linked
with Pakistan’s entry to the Group showcases how its political imperatives have a larger role
to play in its opposition. While a majority of the 48 NSG members share the understanding
that India’s entry to the Group will be beneficial, there remain a few, along with China, that
have not yet joined the consensus.
However, China – and some other nations – did not budge. Their objections revolved under
questions of having a process – that rather than taking up applications one by one, a set of
‘criteria’ should be drawn up for non-NPT members. Since decision in the NSG taken on the
basis of consensus, objection raised by even one country acts as a veto.
A criteria-based approach would effectively put New Delhi on the same platform as
Islamabad. This would be galling for India as it considers itself to be a “responsible” nuclear
power, as opposed to the proliferation record of Pakistan, with its chronicled links to nuclear
programs of China, North Korea, Iran and Libya.
Beijing’s unusually public opposition to India’s NSG membership drive had been among the
reasons that led to a widening strain in relations with New Delhi.
“China’s position on NSG expansion is consistent and clear. We believe all countries need to
follow NSG rules, uphold the authority and solemnity of the NPT and seek a non-
discriminatory solution acceptable to all based on full consultation,” said spokesperson Lu
Kang at the daily briefing in Beijing on Friday.
Lu noted that a “non-discriminatory” plan had to be acceptable to “all the NPT-non parties”,
that is, both India and Pakistan. Denying that China was thwarting India, he argued that the
plenary meeting would not be discussing the entry of any specific “NPT non-party” applicant,
before reaching a “non-discriminatory plan”. “So, there is no blocking of India,” he asserted.

Do NSG members share a common vision on the Group’s future?

The lack of consensus within the NSG brings to fore questions regarding whether or not the
current members share a common vision and understanding on the objectives of the NSG
and on the path the Group would take in fulfilling them. In assessing various objectives of
the Group, two feature prominently. First is that the Group should include all states that
could supply nuclear and related items, controlling exports of which fall under the mandate
of the NSG. This will allow the NSG to spread and universalise norms of export control and
nuclear non-proliferation, thus enhancing its credibility. Second, given the fact that NSG
functions on consensus, the Group must only include those countries that are seriously
committed to the goal of nuclear non- proliferation, barring which NSG could become
defunct.

Would NSG gain a “like-minded” partner in India?

In including nuclear exporters, NSG also needs to ensure that it takes in only those states
that are equally committed to non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. The challenge for NSG
members is in assessing “like-mindedness” of a membership applicant. Being a signatory to
the NPT has been referred to as the litmus test, but does it really capture a country’s
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation? Cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea present a
different picture. While these countries have been at times referred to as rogue states by the
nuclear order, how would one weigh the violation of NSG guidelines by China, a de jure
nuclear weapon state under the NPT, in supplying additional reactors to Pakistan, plans of
which were not disclosed by China at the time of joining the NSG even though that was a
requirement

Can China really encircle India with its String of Pearls? The great game of Asia ?
Those having slightest of interest in India-China relationship are familiar with the String of
Pearls theory. The phrase seems to have been in use even before but publication of Energy
Futures in Asia: Final Report in 2004 made it popular.
The report said that China was working on a strategy to expand its influence in the Indian
Ocean to extract maximum benefit from it and contain Indian hold in the region. China was
expected to raise civilian and military infrastructure at chosen points on the islands or ports -
metaphorically called pearls - surrounding India.
String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
the Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in
Chinese strategy

STRAIT OF MALACCA
The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean with Malaysia and
Singapore on one side while Indonesia on the other side. It is not very far from the Nicobar
Islands.
The Strait of Malacca is key for China's energy requirements. About 80 per cent of its fuel
from the Middle East passes through this. Wary of India's stronghold in the Indian Ocean,
China has been consistently working to develop friendly and cooperative relations with the
countries in the region.
In 1971, when China gave feelers about aligning with Pakistan during the Liberation War for
Bangladesh, India had threatened to block the Strait of Malacca. Later in 1999 during Kargil
war, India choked supply to Pakistan - practically blocking Karachi port - using its dominance
in the Indian Ocean. China is on a mission to turn the tide against India.

MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH

China has developed assets in Myanmar. It has built a gas pipeline of about 2,400 km from
Myanmar to China. It is also reported to have a military base in Coco Island of Myanmar.
China is said to have developed a naval base near Strait of Malacca on Cocos Keeling Island,
which is a distant part of Australia. Further north in the Bay of Bengal, China developed the
port of Chittagong in Bangladesh. It has given China a foothold and stake in the Bay of
Bengal. Significant part of Chinese trade passes through this port.
China had been pushing Bangladesh to allow it to develop a small naval base near
Chittagong. SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka has been a trusted friend of India for decades but the years between 2012 and
2014 saw increased Chinese presence in the island country.
China developed a port at Hambantola on the southeastern part of Sri Lanka. A Chinese
company built the port and gained control to manage it.
China was in the process of developing it into a naval base, when in January 2015, the
Rajapakshe government was voted out in Sri Lanka

PAKISTAN
China has Gwadar port and the CPEC to protect in Pakistan. The Gwadar port has gained
further significance as China joined what was originally conceived as the Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline.

India withdrew from the project as it was not assured of the security of the pipeline in
certain stretches in Pakistan. The project is now called Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline. It
touches Gwadar on its route to China.

The CPEC is developing into a vital geo-strategic and trade asset of China. At present, it
carries only two per cent of its trade with Pakistan. But, China expects the volume to
increase as it plans to route much of its trade with the Middle East and Africa through
Gwadar port and the CPEC.
China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain

Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India’s Andaman and
Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of
Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian
Ocean, which is debatable.
In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to the similarities of nationalism,
between the rise of modern China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Newsweek’s Fareed
Zakaria, says that “like Germany in the late 19th century, China is growing rapidly but
uncertainly, into a global system (including the Indian Ocean) in which it feels it deserves
more attention and honor.

The 19th century strategic thinker Mahan had prophesised that the future of the world in the
21st century would be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean and in this, India’s
expansion of its maritime power and Navy, and inroads in to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
is very much on China’s radar, which deserves introspection.
It is less publicised or talked about, but in the last two decades India has stealthily straddled
its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim, which includes the islan ..

India’s maritime military strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued by the
Indian Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navy’s responsibility to ensure stability in the
IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and
energy. Chi Haotin had said, ‘It is Indian Ocean not India’s Ocean
India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum island state
because of its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxation treaty that
makes it India’s largest offshore investor

When it comes to the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is hedging its bets against an assertive China.
India and France recently signed a strategic pact opening up their naval bases to each
other’s warships across the Indian Ocean. This comes two years after a similar deal with the
United States and signifies a web of strategic trust to thwart Beijing’s expansion into India’s
traditional area of influence.In recent years, Beijing’s push to contain India has become more
frenetic, including signing agreements with Myanmar, Sri Lanka , the Maldives and Pakistan
.

India’s deal with France is therefore an escalation of New Delhi’s capacity to project power.
It grants the Indian navy access to strategically important French ports – including one in
Djibouti , home to China’s single overseas military base and a focal point of strategic
competition for the Indian Ocean. The installation can host over 10,000 troops and serves as
a springboard for Chinese navy operations across the Indian Ocean.

China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions
overseas

Indian PM Narendra Modi signed the India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy
Cooperation in 2018 which allows Indian Navy ships logistical support, including refuelling at
Singapore’s Changi naval base located near the disputed South China Sea. Changi Naval
Base forms a strategic point in the ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ that India is creating to counter
China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ comprises Changi Naval Base
in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran, the Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and Duqm Port in
Oman. In addition to this, India is creating strong naval ties with Vietnam, Japan, France,
Australia and the United States.
However, China’s investment in its ‘String of Pearls’ is greater than India in its ‘Necklace of
Diamonds’. China has invested US$60 billion in Africa under its String of Pearls strategy,
whereas India’s largest investment for its Necklace of Diamonds amounts to $8 billion, in
Chabahar Port in Iran.
India opposes re-joining RCEP over China concerns
15 countries solidified their participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). Even as India opted to stay out after walking out of discussions last year,
the new trading bloc has made it clear that the door will remain open for India to return to
the negotiating table.
What is RCEP?
Described as the “largest” regional trading agreement to this day, RCEP was originally being
negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and countries with which they have
free trade agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and
India.
The purpose of RCEP was to make it easier for products and services of each of these
countries to be available across this region. Negotiations to chart out this deal had been on
since 2013, and India was expected to be a signatory until its decision last November.
Why did India walk out?
On November 4, 2019,
India decided to exit
discussions over
“significant outstanding
issues”. According to a
government official, India
had been “consistently”
raising “fundamental
issues” and concerns
throughout the
negotiations and was prompted to take
this stand as they had not been resolved
by the deadline to commit to signing the
deal. Its decision was to safeguard the
interests of industries like agriculture
and dairy and to give an advantage to
the country’s services sector. According
to officials, the current structure of
RCEP still does not address these issues and concerns.
How far is China’s presence a factor?
 Escalating tensions with China are a major
reason for India’s decision. While China’s
participation in the deal had already been
proving difficult for India due to various
economic threats, the clash at Galwan Valley
has soured relations between the two countries.
The various measures India has taken to reduce
its exposure to China would have sat
uncomfortably with its commitments under
RCEP.
Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP
negotiations were related to the exposure that
India would have to China. This included India’s
fears that there were “inadequate” protections
against surges in imports. It felt there could also be a possible circumvention of rules of
origin— the criteria used to determine the national source of a product — in the absence of
which some countries could dump their products by routing them through other countries
that enjoyed lower tariffs.
India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs
on products when their imports crossed a certain threshold. It also wanted RCEP to exclude
most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations from the investment chapter, as it did not want to
hand out, especially to countries with which it has border disputes, the benefits it was giving
to strategic allies or for geopolitical reasons. India felt the agreement would force it to
extend benefits given to other countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP
members.
India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India
has been unable to leverage its existing bilateral free trade agreements with several RCEP
members to increase exports.

India must guard against Chinese tech intrusion

The recent border standoff between China and India at Ladakh confirms two political
realities that must not be ignored. First, India must not allow the intrusion of Chinese firms
into its telecommunications network. If societies will be digital, China should not be
permitted to encode India’s public sphere. New Delhi must not license Huawei or ZTE to
provide equipment for its 5G rollout. And second, India must not allow any Chinese-origin
firm into its critical infrastructure in much the same manner that it was kept away from
certain industrial projects in the past.
An authoritarian regime that has given Xi Jinping absolute power has now become predatory
in its external engagements and is a caricature of an insecure bully. The courtesies of
diplomatic speak have been dispensed with as it referred to Australia as a “giant kangaroo
that serves as a dog of the US”. The middle kingdom now has a medieval mindset that only
seeks territory and markets for its benefit. That it continues on this course during the
COVID19 pandemic reveals much about its naked ambitions.
This is China’s approach to India and each nation must make its own choice. For India’s
national interest, the choice is clear. There is no more room to accommodate China’s
economic affections while being scorched by the Dragon’s fire.The criticality of 5G
technology is based not only on its speed but also on its all pervasiveness. The real power of
5G lies in its ability to be a network of networks — to simultaneously serve several verticals
including governance, business, smart cities, education, mobility, and in the post-COVID19
world, healthcare through telemedicine along with most other human interactions.
This makes the way we negotiate 5G technology a vital matter for national security.
Allowing Huawei or ZTE to be a 5G equipment provider to Indian telecommunications firms
will be like asking the Chinese Communist Party to run our general elections. As we repulse
China at the borders, we must ensure that we do not surrender our cities, homes and minds
to that ideology. In fact, one major lapse on the part of India has been that it has allowed
the creeping acquisition of India Tech by the Digital BRI, even as the country has opposed the
Belt and Road in its physical manifestation.

The risk China Tech poses to Indian interests is real. Considering they are backed by an
authoritarian regime that’s weaponising everything in its armoury, from trade and
technology to medical equipment and humanitarian aid, the provisions by state- controlled
Chinese firms are a global concern. Australia and the US have discovered it, Europe is in the
process of finding out, and smaller nations will awaken to the consequences too late.
As a $3 trillion economy that has set its eyes on becoming a $10 trillion one in the 2030s,
India cannot ignore the perils of the noxious interplay of Chinese Communist Party objectives
and the capitalist façade represented by Huawei.
National security is not a choice. It is a primary assumption and the first responsibility of
statecraft. A country that uses its military power to threaten other nations and its economic
power to pervert free trade and steal technologies, will not think twice before using its
technological influence to advance its strategic ambitions and lust for territory. These
networks are India’s lifelines of growth and highways of aspirations. These will support
economic growth, governance, innovations, and be the critical infrastructure that can cart
India towards a $10,000 per capita income future. These must not be implicated by an
erroneous choice in partners.
For India to allow Huawei even in its 5G trials displays an act that’s not very different from
India rooting for China as a member of the United Nations Security Council against its own
interests in 1950. Seven decades later, allowing Huawei into India mirrors the same
sentiment — it is a signal that India is giving in to China’s bullying.
China & South Asia

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that
“China will deepen relations with its neighbors in accordance with the principle of amity,
sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and
partnership with its neighbors.”] As neighbours of China, South Asian countries—including
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have
increasingly come into contact with Beijing in the diplomatic, economic, and security
domains. These interactions demonstrate that China is not simply appealing to the better
angels of South Asian neighbours. Rather, Beijing has crafted a geostrategic approach to the
region that assiduously seeks to secure its own national interests.

Pakistan
Pakistan rarely criticises China’s harsh treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. Beijing reciprocates
by protecting Islamabad in international organisations. For instance, Beijing has wielded its
veto power at the UN Security Council multiple times to prevent the sanctioning of Masood
Azhar, the leader of a Pakistan-based militant group called Jaish-e-Mohammed, until finally
relenting last year. As the rotational president of the Financial Action Task Force, Beijing also
likely played a key role in 2019 in helping Pakistan avoid sanctions for terrorism financing.
China also holds up its partnership with Pakistan as an important demonstration of benign
intentions to develop the rest of the world through BRI. Indeed, BRI’s flagship project, CPEC,
runs through territory under de facto Pakistani control, but disputed by India. Following Xi
and Khan’s last meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC, stating their
“determination to speedily execute CPEC so that its growth potential can be fully realized
making it a high-quality demonstration project of BRI.”
On Afghanistan, Chinese leaders believe that Pakistan serves as a useful partner to achieve
security in order to eventually benefit from economic development there. The joint
statement following the Xi-Khan meeting in September indicates that “the Chinese side
appreciated Pakistan’s efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
Both sides maintained that an inclusive, and Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process
would be key to bringing peace and stability in the country.
China almost certainly assesses Pakistan to be a valuable asset toward better understanding
the situation in Afghanistan and in communicating with different actors in the country, to
include the Taliban, who China believes must be a part of any future government.
Afghanistan

China seeks Afghan reconciliation, to include Taliban integration, in a future government.

Most recently in September, Beijing noted that Afghanistan “should have broad
representation and inclusiveness in order to make all factions and ethnic groups equally
involve[d] in the political life so as to build a united political foundation.”
As noted earlier, Beijing further seeks to incorporate Afghanistan into BRI. According to a
readout of Xi’s meeting with Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in June 2019,
Beijing seeks to “steadily promote practical cooperation in economy and trade [via BRI]. In
April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s interest in helping Afghanistan
through BRI, stating “China is willing to work with Afghanistan to deepen joint construction
of the Belt and Road and advance bilateral cooperation in various fields in order to jointly
benefit the two countries and peoples.
China looks to Afghanistan to support counter-terrorism operations to prevent instability
from spilling over into bordering Xinjiang province. Xi has pledged to “continue to help
Afghanistan build its capacity in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability.” Xi further
“called on the Afghan side to continue to firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist
force of East Turkistan Islamic Movement.
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

In July, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and
the two leaders focused much of their discussion on the need for the economic development
of Bangladesh via BRI funding

China and Bangladesh pledged to deepen defense cooperation, especially in the areas of
“defense industry and trade, training, equipment and technology, mutual visits of navy ships,
and the UN peacekeeping operations.” The Chinese navy in 2016 made its first port visit (and
again in 2017) to Chittagong, perhaps signaling Beijing’s belief that the largest port in
Bangladesh holds geostrategic value.
China is also the largest arms supplier of the Bangladeshi military, providing 71.8 percent of
weapons from 2008 to 2018, suggesting that Beijing seeks to further ingratiate itself with
Dhaka through these sales.
Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with China, and so there is much less interaction
than with other South Asian countries. However, in the last meeting held in February 2019
between visiting Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, and Bhutanese Prime Minister
Lotay Tshering, Beijing emphasised the need to continue working together with Bhutan on
resolving the border issue. This is likely in reference to the Doklam region in which a China-
India dispute occurred in 2017. Either way, the last round of China-Bhutan border talks were
held in 2016.
China’s relationship with the Maldives is near-exclusively focused on leveraging BRI to
develop Maldives as well as to raise Chinese influence there to counter India. Beijing’s
preferred Maldivian President, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, was defeated in elections in
2018, and the current leader, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, is more amenable to India’s wishes.
Bilateral ties, however, remain positive, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang as recently as
July 2019 noting his appreciation for continued Maldivian support of BRI. Beijing has touted
the completion of the “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge” as a tangible example of what
positive bilateral relations can create to benefit average Maldivians
Chinese President Xi went directly to Nepal in what was the first visit by a Chinese head of
state in 23 years. While on the ground, Xi signed 20 agreements through BRI to better enable
China to develop and connect with Nepal. The two sides “will accelerate the building of the
Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network through connectivity projects
including ports, highways, railways, aviation, and communications, and have announced the
launch of a feasibility study of the China-Nepal cross-border railway. Beijing was further
pleased to see Kathmandu acknowledge that “Tibet affairs are China’s internal affairs, and
the determination [of Nepal] on not allowing any anti-China activities on its soil.
Finally, on Sri Lanka, the Chinese focus is mainly on developing the island and likely currying
influence there for future geostrategic aspirations. During a meeting between Chinese
Premier Li and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena in May 2019, the two leaders
expressed an interest in progressing with BRI projects, consistent with the last joint
statement issued in 2016.
In exchange for paying down Colombo’s BRI debt, the Chinese got Sri Lanka in December
2017 to hand over Hambantota port on a 99-year lease; Hambantota is geostrategically
located on the Indian Ocean, potentially bolstering Beijing’s String of Pearls.

Conclusion
As detailed in this brief, Chinese interests in South Asia stretch far beyond simply maintaining
amicable relations in the region. Rather, China is dissatisfied at the LAC with India and is
trying to improve the situation to its liking. Beijing is also frustrated with New Delhi’s
persistent support of the Dalai Lama and rejection of BRI. As a result, China seeks to
undermine India by aligning closely with archrival Pakistan.
Chinese warfare strategy

Trusions and coercion around its borders through military means. These include but are not
restricted to Bhutan, Japan, nations in the South China Sea and India.

Second, psychological intrusions through information warfare in democracies, using the

tools that serve communications, transparency and accountability in democracies. Their
public sphere and institutions are seen
as handy sharp instruments serving China’s designs Third, technological
intrusion through its corporate arms such as Huawei and ZTE, which by
the virtue of being incorporated, designed and operating under the
National Intelligence Law collect intelligence and information for the
benefit of the Communist Party of China from the countries in which they
operate And fourth, controlling multilateral arenas through capture of
international institutions such as WHO as the Made in China pandemic so clearly brought
out.
After successfully weaponising trade in WTO, health in WHO, investments along the Belt and
Road Initiative, debt through its debt trap diplomacy, narratives through information
intrusions, China is now on way towards weaponising data, using companies like Huawei
and ZTE as the tip of its digital spear.
Chinese apps banned by India

When the Narendra Modi government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
banned 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, it did so through the
powers of one law. The government said that these apps were banned under Section 69A of
the Information Technology Act, 2000 because “they are engaged in activities which are
prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public
order.”

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was introduced by an amendment to
the Act in 2008. It gives the Central government the power to block public access to any
information online — whether on websites or mobile apps.

Under Section 69A, if a website threatens India’s defence, its sovereignty and integrity,
friendly relations with foreign countries and public order, the government can ban it, after
following due procedure.

A feature of Section 69A is that it includes terms such as “security of the state, emergency
nature, sovereignty and integrity of India and public order”, which are common for national
security determinations across Indian laws. The Section mandates strict confidentiality about
complaints and action taken. Due to the presence of this clause, Right to Information (RTI)
queries are not applicable to the law. Moreover, the committees to examine requests and
review appeals comprise entirely members from the executive.
India rolls the dice on Hong Kong

Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a controversial national security law that gave Beijing
unprecedented powers to shape the future of Hong Kong.
It dramatically reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy and gives Beijing the ability to crackdown
against dissent under the garb of tackling crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and
collusion with foreign forces.
ISSUE
For most Hong Kongers, it is clear that it cuts at the very heart
of their freedom of expression and organisation, effectively
repudiating the so-called “one country, two systems” principle
on which the relationship between
Hong Kong and mainland China has been premised since 1997.
Hong Kong has been rocked by anti-Beijing protests since June
2019 and the new law is effectively Xi Jinping’s revenge on Hong Kongers for making him
withdraw the controversial extradition bill of last year. Since then a
broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement has been gathering momentum in Hong
Kong which Beijing is now determined to demolish with this new law.

INDIA'S APPROACH

New Delhi chose the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva to react where it argued
last week that India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong
given the presence of a large Indian community there.
New Delhi had in the past been reluctant to talk about the Hong Kong issue but recent
violent clashes in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh last month, perhaps, made it imperative for
India to change its approach
In the past India has been reluctant to even give visas to pro-democracy activists of Hong
Kong and along with Indonesia was the only other member state of the G-20 last year which
refused to even meet pro-democracy activists. India also maintained a studied silence over
China’s ill-treatment of its Muslim minority in Xinjiang. The border crisis this year has
challenged the very foundations of India’s China policy and all aspects are being recalibrated
by New Delhi – from trade and technological engagement to China’s domestic political
imperatives. Major powers like the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan have all spoken
out against the new Chinese law.
Hong Kong is also important for India for economic reasons. For global investors, it has
always
been an attractive destination, leading to its emergence as one of Asia’s most powerful
financial centres.
WAY AHEAD
As a mature democracy, we should be able to articulate and defend our positions to our
global stakeholders. It is what makes India different from China and a more reassuring
global presence
China has never hesitated to meddle in Indian domestic matters in the past. India’s past
diffidence in challenging China on its ‘internal’ matters has not really paid New Delhi any
significant dividends.

India’s Hong Kong move has been noticed the world over

Calls for India to play the Taiwan card grow louder

•Possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge

China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance
India’s relations with Taiwan. Indian Express, wrote in May
that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of
Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: The
decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or
fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the
issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical
issues involved.
 •The Times of India, asked the government to “not shy away
from supporting Taiwan.” that this should remain an important
aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It
also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to
Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests
in the UN and other multilateral organizations. India should step
up its cooperation with Taiwan. it was strange that India has
shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and
Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

•Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and
Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets
activated every time there is tension in Sino Indian ties.
•Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India,
former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations
with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key
sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s
reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries
•Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military
and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also
fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus
on India.