Research brief for the JOINT CRISIS COMMITTEE

Letter from the EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Participants

It is our pleasure to preside over this JOINT CRISIS COMMITTEE at TAG MUNC-2019.
Usually delegates ask us what are the expectations of the Moderators for a committee, and to
that we would like to say that at the least we expect everyone to take the issues under review
seriously.
We expect that while you have fun during research or deliberations upon the issue, but you
do not undermine their relevance, that you debate them because they affect you as a citizen as
well.

This guide has been prepared with the idea that it will brief you about the issues at
hand, give you a good starting point for further research.

So we request you to not see it as an end in itself in terms of preparation. Going beyond
the scope of this guide during preparation is not only suggested, but is a necessity if you
wish to perform well.

Good Luck! Hoping to see you all of you soon.

Regards,

PARITOSH RAWAT
LOCATION:-
China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches
by Nepal, Sikkim (then an Indian protectorate), and Bhutan, which follows
the Himalayas between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of
disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai
Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese
autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an
autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan,
comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North
East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962
conflict.
Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a desert of
salt flats around 5,000 metres (16,000 feet) above sea level, and Arunachal
Pradesh is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7,000 metres (23,000
feet). The Chinese Army had possession of one of the highest ridges in the
regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also caused logistical and
welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian
Campaign of World War I) harsh conditions have caused more casualties than
have enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on
both sides dying in the freezing cold.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT:-

The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely
separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin,
claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang,
contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and
Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the
conflict.

AKSAI CHIN
THE MACMOHAN LINE
In 1826, British India gained a common border with China after the British
wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First
Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the
North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four
monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary
settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang
Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that
the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was
confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating
that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards
along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border." A
1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the
Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international
boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas
foothill alignment. In 1913, representatives of the UK, China and Tibet attended
a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British
India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later
objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner
Tibet, and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not
revealed to China at the time. The foreign secretary of the British Indian
government, Henry McMahon, who had drawn up the proposal, decided to
bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the
border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet. According to later Indian
claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of
the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally
Indian. The McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims. India's
government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of
the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of
India, while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area
in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since
ancient times.
Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the
McMahon Line. T. O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North
East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the
McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that
there was no Chinese influence in the area. The British-run Government of
India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to
negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese
government". The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint
consent in 1921. It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the
McMahon Line on official maps of the region.
China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been
allowed to make such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule. For
its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the
demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under
British-Indian jurisdiction. Up until World War II, Tibetan officials were
allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased
threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian
troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border.
In the 1950s, India began patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple
locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line. Given
India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the
two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India
extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as
compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did
not explicitly state this intention.

THE FIRST STEPS

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China
flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the Indian Air
Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as
being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian
troops. In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The
Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along
the border which could be a precursor to war. During June–July 1962, Indian
military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and
accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines.
According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:

1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.

2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-
Indian war.
3. Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had
deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.
On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Chushul
(north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via
loudspeaker. On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian
troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed
territory. Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-
defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon
 Chinese forces if threatened. In August, the Chinese military improved its
combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition,
weapons and fuel.

THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF COEXISTENCE

The fact that Beijing chose to celebrate this anniversary with the pomp and
circumstance of a state visit with two international leaders underscores the
importance it continues to ascribe to the Five Principles. The Five Principles, as
stated by the Panchsheel Treaty, signed on April 29, 1954, are:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.

IMPORTANT POINTERS

 With the independence of the Republic of India and the formation of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in the year 1949, one of the policies for the
Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China
 When China announced that it would be occupying Tibet, India sent a
letter of protest proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue. China was even more
active in deploying troops on the Aksai Chin border than any other Indian
republic was
 India was so concerned about its relations with China that it did not even
attend a conference for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan because
China was not invited. India even strove to become China's representative in
matters related to world since China had been isolated from many issues
 In 1954, China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, under which, India acknowledged Chinese rule in Tibet. It was at
this time when former Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the
slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai"
 In July 1954, Nehru wrote a memo directing a revision in the maps of
India to show definite boundaries on all frontiers; however, Chinese maps
showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian territory as Chinese. On
being questioned, Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of People's Republic of China,
responded that there were errors in the maps
 Top People's Republic of China leader, Mao Zedong felt humiliated by
the reception Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled there in March 1959.
 Tensions increased between the two nations when Mao stated that the Lhasa
rebellion in Tibet was caused by Indians
 China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet became one of
the most prominent reasons for the Sino-Indian War
 In October 1959, India realised that it was not ready for war after a clash
between the two armies at Kongka Pass, in which nine Indian policemen were
killed; the country assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols
from disputed areas