Luca Castaldo Notes on Models of (Partial)

Kripke–Feferman Truth

Abstract. This article investigates models of axiomatizations related to the semantic

conception of truth presented by Kripke (J Philos 72(19):690–716, 1975), the so-called
fixed-point semantics. Among the various proof systems devised as a proof-theoretic char-
acterization of the fixed-point semantics, in recent years two alternatives have received
particular attention: classical systems (i.e., systems based on classical logic) and nonclas-
sical systems (i.e., systems based on some nonclassical logic). The present article, building
on Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Log 47(2):227–257, 2018), shows that there is a sense in
which classical and nonclassical theories (in suitable variants) have the same models.
Keywords: Theories of truth, Fixed-point semantics, Nonstandard models, Classical and
nonclassical logic, KF and PKF.

1. Introduction

Formal theories of truth can be divided into two main categories: semantic
theories and axiomatic theories. These two types of approaches to truth are
intimately intertwined. In fact, many axiomatic theories have been obtained
in the attempt to characterize proof-theoretically certain semantic concep-
tions of truth, and—from the opposite direction—investigating models of
axiomatic theories sheds light on their conceptual aspects.1 This article in-
vestigates models of axiomatic theories related to [19]. The semantic concep-
tion of truth presented by Kripke is still the most popular semantic theory
of type-free truth.
As it is well known, Kripke describes an inductive procedure for obtaining
a class of models for a language LT containing a self-applicable, monadic
truth predicate T. These models are called fixed-point models. Since the
1980s, a number of proof systems have been suggested as axiomatizations of
fixed-point models (e.g., [1,7,12,16,18,20,30]). In recent years, two alterna-
tives have received particular attention. On the one hand, there are classical

1
See e.g. [14] for some systematic and historical observations on the interplay between
axiomatic and semantic truth theories.

Presented by Francesco Paoli; Received December 3, 2021

Studia Logica (2023) 111: 83–111

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-022-10016-3 c The Author(s) 2022

84 L. Castaldo

systems (i.e., systems based on classical logic); on the other hand, there
are nonclassical systems (i.e., systems based on some nonclassical logic).
The standard classical systems are variants of the theory known as Kripke-
Feferman (KF), devised by Feferman [12],2 and they will be referred to as
KF-like systems (or just KF-systems, or KF-theories). The standard nonclas-
sical systems are variants of the theory known as Partial-Kripke-Feferman
(PKF), developed by Halbach and Horsten [16],3 and they will be referred
to as PKF-like systems (or just PKF-systems, or PKF-theories).
There is an ongoing debate on whether classical and nonclassical sys-
tems do an equally good job in axiomatizing the fixed-point semantics, and
especially in the last few years, researchers have been interested not only
in KF- and PKF-systems per se. Rather, they have been interested in how
they are related to each other, and in how they are related to the partial
conception of truth developed by [19]. In this respect, a number of interest-
ing facts have been discovered, and it is now known that there are several
senses in which classical and nonclassical theories can be taken to be on
a par (e.g., [8,9,17,22,25]).4 These results also bear an important contri-
bution to questions concerning the so-called classical recapture, that is, the
idea that within nonclassical systems we can restore classical reasoning in
most circumstances (see e.g., [4,21,31]).
The present article is a technical contribution to the just mentioned de-
bates, as it focuses on the relationship between classical and nonclassical
systems. In particular, we are interested in comparing their models. More
specifically, since KF and PKF (and variants thereof) have both been de-
vised as a proof-theoretic characterization of the fixed-point semantics, it
seems natural to ask whether there is a sense in which they can be taken to
have the “same” models. Of course, since they are formulated over different
base logics, there is an obvious sense in which KF and PKF do not have the
same models: models of classical theories satisfy the laws of classical logic,
but models of nonclassical theories do not satisfy every such law. However,

2
KF was developed by Feferman in the late seventies and in the beginning of the
eighties, although it appeared in print for the first time in [30] and [7]. Both Reinhardt
and Cantini credit the system to Feferman, who published his version of the theory only
in 1991, under the label Ref(PA) [12]. As we shall see in more details below, the version
of the theory presented by Cantini and Reinhardt contains an extra axiom, namely the
axiom of consistency, which was not part of Feferman’s theory.
3
A system in partial logic was suggested much earlier by Micheal Kremer [18] (see also
[1]).
4
The labels KF and PKF are not used uniformly in the literature, and they denote
different theories. Our definition of the theories will be made precise in Section 3.
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 85

the disparity between the underlying logics of KF and PKF does not prevent
one from investigating and comparing their models in a sensible way. In fact,
one can still ask, for instance, whether models of classical and nonclassical
theories are such that they satisfy the same sentences to be true. That is,
one can still ask whether a sentence of the form Tϕ—where the expression
ϕ is a name of the sentence ϕ—is satisfied in a model of KF iff the same
sentence is satisfied in a model of PKF. More in general, one can still ask
whether a given structure M can serve as a model for both KF and PKF.
Some facts concerning models of KF- and PKF-systems are already
known. In particular, we know that KF and PKF have the “same standard
models”. What this means exactly will be clarified below. Roughly, though,
letting a standard model be a structure (N, E) expanding the standard model
of arithmetic N by an interpretation E for T, it can be shown that (N, E)
is a model of KF iff (N, E) is a model of PKF. Additionally, Halbach and
Nicolai [17] have recently moved the first steps towards investigating non-
standard models of KF and PKF, i.e., structures whose arithmetical reduct
is a possibly nonstandard model of Peano arithmetic. In particular, in [17]
it is shown that, if one considers the variants of KF and PKF restricting
the schema of induction to formulae not containing T, call them KF− and
PKF− , then any model of PKF− is also a model of KF− .
In what follows, building up on [17], we study further the relationship
between nonstandard models of KF- and PKF-theories. The main result
to come extends the observation by Halbach and Nicolai in several ways,
thereby showing that the connection between models of classical and non-
classical systems can be fairly strong. Specifically, it will be shown that:5
(1) the KF-variants and the PKF-variants with restricted induction have
the same models,
(2) the KF-variants with internal induction and the PKF-variants with full
induction have the same models,
(3) the KF-variants with internal induction for determinate predicates and
the PKF-variants with induction for determinate predicates have the
same models,
(4) every model of KF with full induction is a model of PKF with additional
transfinite induction up to < ε0 .

5
For a precise definition of the different induction schemata, see Sect. 3.
86 L. Castaldo

Whether the converse of (4) holds, i.e., whether models of PKF-variants

with additional transfinite induction up to < ε0 are models of KF with full
induction, is a question that will remain open.
In the next section we fix language and notation, introducing the base
logics underlying the various KF- and PKF-systems. Section 3 then defines
the truth-systems, specifying their truth-theoretic principles, and the differ-
ent induction schemata. Section 4 contains the main results of the present
paper: it starts by recalling some known facts about standard models of
KF and PKF, and it then proceeds with the analysis of their nonstandard
models.

2. Language and Logic

2.1. Language and Notation

Let LT be the language LPA ∪ {T}, where LPA is the language of arith-
metic specified by the signature {0, S, +, ×}, and where T is a unary truth-
predicate. Terms and formulae are generated in the usual way via ¬, ∧, ∀.
We use u, v, x, y, . . . for variables, . . . r, s, t for arbitrary terms—all possi-
bly with indices. Greek letters ϕ, ψ, ξ, . . . range over formulae of LT . By an
LT -expression we mean a term or a formula of L− T . The numeral

 .
S . . S 0
n

corresponding to the number n ∈ ω is denoted by n. We fix a canonical Gödel

numbering of LT -expressions and a primitive recursive (p.r.) formalization of
syntactic notions and operations. If e is an LT -expression, the Gödel number
of e is denoted by #e and e is the term representing #e in LT . The sets of
terms, closed terms, variables, formulae, and sentences of LT are p.r., and
can be represented in LT . In practice, we take the following LT -predicates to
abbreviate the equations for the (p.r.) characteristic function for such sets:
Term(x) (Ct(x)) := x is the gn of a (closed) term;
Var(x) := x is the gn of variable;
FmlnLT (x) (StT (x)) := x is the gn of a formula with at most n (0)
free distinct variables.
For each of the above syntactic predicates P (x), we let P denote the set of
codes of P ’s. That is, for instance, StT is the set of codes of LT -sentences.
For simplicity, we take LT additionally to contain function symbols for the
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 87

following primitive recursive operations on Gödel numbers:

Operation Function symbol
#t, #s → #(t = s) =.
#ϕ → #(¬ϕ) ¬.
#ϕ, #ψ → #(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧.
#vk , #ϕ → #(∀vk ϕ) ∀.
n → #n num
#e, #t, #vk → #e[t/vk ] sb
The expression e[t/vk ] is the result of replacing, in the expression e, each free
occurrence of vk by the term t. We also assume to have a valuation function
val(x) (which is PA-definable) such that val(t) = t for closed terms t. We
will make use of the following abbreviations:
t=. s := =. (t, s) t ∧. s := ∧. (t, s) ∀. t.s := ∀. (t, s)
t(ż) := sb(t, num(z), s) ϕ(ẋ) := sb(ϕ(v), num(x), v) t◦ := val(t)
We often write sb(t, num(z)) for sb(t, num(z), s). The expression ϕ(v) de-
notes a formula ϕ with at most the variable v free. Similarly, the expression
t(x) denotes a term t with at most the variable x free. We adopt the ab-
breviation e(v ) := e(v1 , . . . , vk ), where e(v1 , . . . , vk ) denotes an expression
e whose free variables are among v1 , . . . , vk . Sometimes we write ϕ(t) for
ϕ[t/v], when it is clear from the context that t is a term with which a
designated free variable of ϕ has been replaced.

2.2. Sequent Calculi

We present KF- and PKF-system as Gentzen calculi for sets of formulae (i.e.,
we let a sequent be an expression of the form Γ ⇒ Δ, for Γ and Δ finite sets of
LT -formulae), making use of standard notions to be found, e.g., in [34]. Given
a set of formulae Θ, we let ¬Θ := {¬θ | θ ∈ Θ} and TΘ := {Tθ | θ ∈ Θ}.
 
Moreover, we let Θ ( Θ) denote the iterated conjunction θ1 ∧ . . . ∧ θn
(disjunction θ1 ∨ . . . ∨ θn ) of elements of Θ := {θ1 , . . . , θn }. We begin by
introducing the various logics underlying the systems of truth employed in
the paper. The basic nonclassical logic we will be interested in is the four-
valued Belnap-Dunn Logic ([5,11]), also known as First Degree Entailment
(FDE). In the next definition we introduce a two-sided sequent calculus
for FDE with classical equality, i.e., with the identity relation = behaving
classically.6

6
Similar calculi for the propositional fragment can be found e.g. in [3]. An Hilbert-style
axiomatization of FDE was obtained independently by [29] and [15]. Priest defines both a
88 L. Castaldo

Definition 2.1. (FDE= ) The system FDE= consists of the following axioms
and rules.
Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ
Ax ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ Cut
Γ⇒Δ
ϕ, ψ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ
∧L ∧R
ϕ ∧ ψ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ[t/v], Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ[u/v]
∀L ∀R
∀xϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ∀xϕ
ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ
¬¬L ¬¬R
¬¬ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬¬ϕ
¬ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ ¬ψ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬ϕ, ¬ψ
¬∧L ¬∧R
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
¬ϕ[u/v], Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬ϕ[t/v]
¬∀L ¬∀R
¬∀xϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬∀xϕ
Ref Γ ⇒ Δ, t = t Rep ϕ(t), t = s, Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ(s)
Γ ⇒ Δ, s = t s = t, Γ ⇒ Δ
=¬L =¬R
¬(s = t), Γ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬(s = t)
Conditions of application: u eigenvariable.

FDE= is the base logic of the system PKF. Semantically, as we shall see
shortly (§2.3), models of this logic admit sentences which are both true and
false (truth-value gluts) as well as sentences which are neither true nor false
(truth-value gaps). Other PKF-variants are based on extensions of FDE= .
These are introduced in the following

Definition 2.2. (Extensions of FDE= )

• Strong Kleene, SK= , is the system obtained from FDE= by replacing the
rule =¬L with the stronger rule
Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ
¬L
¬ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ
• Logic of Paradox, LP= , is the system obtained from FDE= by replacing
the rule =¬R with the stronger rule
ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ
¬R
Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬ϕ

tableaux system [28] and a system of natural deduction [27] (on natural deduction see also
[24]). For a survey of various semantics and proof systems for FDE and some expansion
thereof, see [23].
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 89

• Kleene’s Symmetric Logic, KS= , is the system obtained by adding to FDE

the initial sequents7
ϕ, ¬ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ, ψ, ¬ψ (GG)

Semantically, the rule ¬L (¬R) restricts the class of models to those in

which there is no glut (gap), while GG (which stands for “gaps or gluts”)
excludes the simultaneous occurrence of gaps and gluts.

2.3. Semantics
Next we present a semantics for the calculi just introduced.
Definition 2.3. A four-valued model for LT is a structure M := N , (E, A)
endowed with a variable assignment σ such that N is a model for LPA and
(E, A) ∈ ℘(|N |)2 is a pair of subsets of |N | (the domain of N ). A four-valued
model is called
• consistent, if E ∩ A = ∅,
• complete, if E ∪ A = |N |,
• symmetric, if it is either consistent or complete.
σ
We now define a relation fde between four-valued models and LT -
formulae. We let the assignment σ[vi : a] be just like σ except that it maps
vi to a ∈ |N |. Variable assignments can be recursively extended, in the usual
way, to provide a value for all terms t. For notational simplicity, we do not
distinguish between a variable assignment σ and its recursive extension. In
particular, for any term t (including variables), we let tN
σ denote the value
of t in M := N , (E, A) under σ.
Definition 2.4. For M := N , (E, A) a four-valued model,
σ
M fde
t=s iff tN N
σ = sσ
σ
M fde
¬(t = s) iff tN N
σ = sσ
σ
M fde
T(t) iff tN
σ ∈E
σ
M fde
¬T(t) iff tN
σ ∈A
σ σ
M fde
¬¬ϕ iff M fde
ϕ
σ σ σ
M fde
ϕ∧ψ iff M fde
ϕ and M fde
ψ

7
For similar calculi defining the same logic see, for instance, [32] and [6].
90 L. Castaldo

σ σ
M fde
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M fde
¬ϕ or M fde
¬ψ
σ σ[v:a]
M fde
∀vϕ iff for all a ∈ |N |, M fde
ϕ
σ σ[v:a]
M fde
¬∀vϕ iff for some a ∈ |N |, M fde
¬ϕ
Remark 2.5. Note that
(i) since identity statements behave classically, by induction on the posi-
tive complexity of formulae, one can show that every formula ϕ ∈ LPA
behaves classically as well,8
(ii) if a four-valued model M is consistent (complete), then for no (all) ϕ
σ
holds M fde ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
σ
We now extend the relation fde
to sequents as follows:
σ
Definition 2.6. For M := N , (E, A) a four-valued model, M fde
Γ⇒Δ
iff,
σ σ
if M fde
γ for all γ ∈ Γ, then M fde
δ for some δ ∈ Δ.
σ
It may be worth noticing that our definition of M fde Γ ⇒ Δ differs
from that of [16,17,22], where the following clause was added:
σ σ
if M fde
¬δ for all δ ∈ Δ, then M fde
¬γ for some γ ∈ Γ.
However, the two versions give rise to the same notion of fde-logical con-
sequence, as shown in the next proposition. The reason for working with
Df. 2.6—besides it being simpler—is that we will be considering classes of
consistent, respectively complete four-valued models, in which contraposi-
tion fails.
σ σ
Proposition 2.7. If M fde
Γ ⇒ Δ for all M and σ, then M fde
¬Δ ⇒
¬Γ for all M and σ.
σ
Proof Idea. By contraposition, assume M fde
¬Δ ⇒ ¬Γ for some M and
σ. Then:
σ σ
M fde
¬δ for all δ ∈ Δ & M fde
¬γ for all γ ∈ Γ (†)
From M, we construct a dual model M+ satisfying
M+ fde
γ for all γ ∈ Γ & M+ fde
δ for all δ ∈ Δ (*)

8
See Picollo [25] for an alternative account.
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 91

To obtain M+ , convert the gluts (gaps) of M into gaps (glut) as follows:

first define M− from M by:
E − := E \ {a ∈ |M| | a ∈ E ∩ A},
A− := A \ {a ∈ |M| | a ∈ E ∩ A}.
That is, E − and A− contain, respectively, everything which is only true and
only false in M. Then define:
E + := E − ∪ (|M| \ E ∪ A),
A+ := A− ∪ (|M| \ E ∪ A).
That is, E + and A+ contain, respectively, everything which is only true
and only false in M, and additionally both E + and A+ contain all gaps of
M. Using (†), verify that M+ satisfies (*).9
Lemma 2.8. (Soundness and completeness)
(i) FDE=  Γ ⇒ Δ iff, for all four-valued models M and for all variable
σ
assignments σ, M fde Γ ⇒ Δ.
(ii) SK=  Γ ⇒ Δ iff, for all consistent models M and for all variable
σ
assignments σ, M fde Γ ⇒ Δ.
(iii) LP=  Γ ⇒ Δ iff, for all complete models M and for all variable
σ
assignments σ, M fde Γ ⇒ Δ.
(iv) KS=  Γ ⇒ Δ iff, for all symmetric models M and for all variable
σ
assignments σ, M fde Γ ⇒ Δ.
There are several completeness proofs for calculi equivalent to ours. We
refer the reader to [6] and [17], whose arguments can be adapted to the
present setting.

3. KF-Like and PKF-Like Theories

This section introduces the truth-theoretic principles (defined in Table 1)

and the various induction schemata (defined in Table 2) of the KF-like and
PKF-like theories whose models we are going to investigate. In order to
introduce schemata of transfinite induction, we fix a standard notation sys-
tem of ordinals up to Γ0 .10 We use a, b, c . . . to denote the code of our

9
A proof of the same result can be found in [15]. See in particular Propositions 2.2,
2.3.
10
See for instance [26].
92 L. Castaldo

notation system whose value is α, β, γ · · · ∈ On (with the exception of ω-

and ε-numbers, for which we use the symbols ‘ω’ and ‘ε’ themselves), and
we use ≺ to denote a standard primitive recursive ordering defined on codes
of ordinals. Moreover, we let

D(t) := Fml1LT (t) ∧ ∀x T(t(ẋ)) ∨ T(¬. t(ẋ)) ∧ ¬ T(t(ẋ)) ∧ T(¬. t(ẋ)) .

Here D(t) means that t is determinate, that is either true or false, and not
both. This predicate was defined by Feferman [12].11
Definition 3.1. (KF) KF is the system obtained from classical logic (with
equality) by adding: initial sequents Γ ⇒ Δ for Γ ⇒ Δ an initial sequent of
PA (see, e.g., [33]); defining axioms for additional function symbols; truth-
theoretic initial sequents of Table 1 except the initial sequents T¬, Cons,
Comp, Sym; the rule IND.
Variants of KF are obtained (i) by adding one of the axioms of
consistency, completeness, symmetry, and/or (ii) by modifying the induc-
tion schema. More precisely:
Definition 3.2. (KF-variants) Variants of KF are defined as follows:
(i) KFcs is obtained from KF by adding the initial sequent Cons.
(ii) KFcp is obtained from KF by adding the initial sequent Comp.
(iii) KFS is obtained from KF by adding the initial sequent Sym.
For KF ∈ {KF, KFcs , KFcp , KFS },
(iv) KF−
 is obtained from KF by replacing IND with INDLPA .
(v) KFint int
 is obtained from KF by replacing IND with IND .
(vi) KFD int
 is obtained from KF by replacing IND with INDD .

Definition 3.3. (PKF) PKF is the system obtained from FDE= by adding:
initial sequents Γ ⇒ Δ for Γ ⇒ Δ an initial sequent of PA; defining axioms
for additional function symbols; truth-theoretic initial sequents of Table 1
except Cons, Comp, Sym; the rule IND.
Variants of PKF are obtained (i) by modifying the base logic and/or (ii)
by modifying the induction schema. More precisely:
Definition 3.4. (PKF-variants) Variants of PKF are defined as follows:
(i) PKFcs is obtained from PKF by adding the rule ¬L.

11
See also Feferman [13].
 Table 1. Truth-theoretic initial sequents

Equalities T= Ct(t), Ct(s), t◦ = s◦ , Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t = . s)

◦
Ct(t), Ct(s), T(t = . s), Γ ⇒ Δ, t = s◦
T¬= Ct(t), Ct(s), ¬(t◦ = s◦ ), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. (t = . s))
◦
Ct(t), Ct(s), T(¬. (t = . s)), Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬(t = s◦ )
Truth TT T(t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(sb(T(v0 ), num(t)))
T(sb(T(v0 ), num(t))), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t)
T¬T T(¬. t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(sb(¬. T(v0 ), num(t)))
T(sb(¬. T(v0 ), num(t))), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. t)
TStLT T(t), Γ ⇒ Δ, StT (t)
¬StT (t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬T(t)
¬StT (t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(sb(¬. T(v0 ), num(t)))
Reg Fml1LT (r), Ct(t), Ct(s), t◦ = s◦ , T sb(r, t)Γ ⇒ Δ, T sb(r, s)
Connectives T¬ StT (t), ¬T(t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. t)
StT (t), T(¬. t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬T(t)
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth

T¬¬ StT (t), T(t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. ¬. t)

StT (t), T(¬. ¬. t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t)
T∧ StT (t), StT (s), T(t ∧. s), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t) ∧ T(s)
StT (t), StT (s), T(t) ∧ T(s), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t ∧. s)
T¬∧ StT (t), StT (s), T(¬. (t ∧. s)), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. t) ∨ T(¬. s)
StT (t), StT (s), T(¬. t) ∨ T(¬. s), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. (t ∧. s))
Quantifiers T∀ StT (∀. v.t), T(∀. v.t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ∀xT(t(ẋ))
StT (∀. v.t), ∀xT(t(ẋ)), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(∀. v.t)
T¬∀ StT (∀. v.t), T(¬. ∀. v.t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ∃xT(¬. t(ẋ))
93
 94

Table 1. continued

StT (∀. v.t), ∃xT(¬. t(ẋ)), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(¬. ∀. v.t)

Consistency Cons StT (t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬T(t), ¬T(¬. t)
Completeness Comp StT (t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t), T(¬. t)
Symmetry Sym StT (t), StT (s), T(t), T(¬. t), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(s), T(¬. s)
L. Castaldo
 Table 2. Induction Schemata, for L ∈ {LPA , LT }

∀z ≺ u ϕ(z), Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ(u)
Transfinite induction for Lup to
α TI≺ [L, α] Γ ⇒ Δ, ∀x ≺ a ϕ(x)
for ϕ ∈ L, u eigenvariable.
∀z ≺ u ϕ(z), Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ(u)
Transfinite induction for Lup to
< α TI≺ [L, < α] Γ ⇒ Δ, ∀x ≺ b ϕ(x)
for ϕ ∈ L, u eigenvariable, and β < α.
ϕ(u), Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ(u + 1)
Induction for L INDL
ϕ(0), Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ(s)
for ϕ ∈ L and u eigenvariable.
Determinate induction INDD Determinate Induction is the ternary
rule obtained by adding the following
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth

premises to INDLT : Γ ⇒ Δ, ∀x(ϕ(x)∨

¬ϕ(x)) ∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x)), Γ ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ Δ, Fml1LT (t) ˙ 1))
T(t(u̇)), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t(u +
Internal induction INDint
T(t(0)),
˙ Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t(ż))
Γ ⇒ Δ, D(t) T(t(u̇)), Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t(u + ˙ 1))
Internal determinate induction
INDint
D T(t(0)),
˙ Γ ⇒ Δ, T(t(ż))
95
96 L. Castaldo

(ii) PKFcp is obtained from PKF by adding the rule ¬R.

(iii) PKFS is obtained from PKF by adding the initial sequent GG.
For PKF ∈ {PKF, PKFcs , PKFcp , PKFS },
(iv) PKF−
 is obtained from PKF by replacing IND with INDLPA .
(v) PKFD D
 is obtained from PKF by replacing IND with IND .
(vi) PKF+  is obtained from PKF by adding TI[LT , < ε0 ] and TI[LT , <
ε0 ](C), where TI[LT , < ε0 ](C) denotes the counterpositive of TI[LT , <
ε0 ], that is:12
¬ϕ(u), Γ ⇒ Δ, ∃z ≺ u ¬ϕ(u)
∃x¬ϕ(x), Γ ⇒ Δ

A remark on the theories KFD D int

 and PKF is in order. The rule INDD is
a variant of the rule of total induction, which is obtained by replacing D(t)
with tot(t) in the leftmost premise of INDint
D

tot(t) := Fml1LT (t) ∧ ∀x T(t(ẋ)) ∨ T(¬. t(x)) .

Total induction was used by Cantini [7] to define a variant of KF, called
KFt . However, Cantini formulates KF with the consistency axiom, which
excludes in general the possibility of inconsistent predicates. This means
that Cantini’s tot(t) was de facto defining t to be a classical predicate. Since
here we also study variants of KF with no axiom concerning the consistency
and/or the completeness of T, we use the rule INDint D to restrict inductive
reasoning on classical predicates. (Of course, in presence of Cons or Comp,
INDint D
D is partly redundant.) As for the rule IND used in theories PKF ,
D
int
it is a straightforward counterpart of INDD . As far as I know, the theories
PKFD  have not been studied in the literature so far.
13

4. Models of KF- and PKF-systems

This final section investigates models of KF- and PKF-systems, and it con-
tains the main contribution of the present article.

12
Unlike [22], we do not have contraposition as a primitive rule, which is why we need
to add the counterpositive of transfinite induction as an additional principle. For the other
induction schemata, the counterpositive can be shown to be admissible. See [9] for details.
13
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting us to define a PKF counterpart of
Cantini’s KFt .
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 97

4.1. Standard Models

As already mentioned in the introduction, KF- and PKF-systems were de-
vised as a proof-theoretic characterization of models of [19], and we also
mentioned that KF- and PKF-systems have the same standard models. Let
us begin by making this claim precise. To this end, we introduce the so-
called Kripke Jump, i.e., a monotone operator yielding so-called fixed-point
models.14
Definition 4.1. (Kripke Jump) The Kripke Jump is a function
Φ : ℘(ω)2 −→ ℘(ω)2 on pairs of subsets of natural numbers defined as
Φ(E, A) = {#ϕ ∈ StT | N, (E, A) fde
ϕ},
{#ϕ ∈ StT | N, (E, A) fde
¬ϕ} ∪ ω − StT .
Let (E, A) ≤ (E  , A ) be defined as E ⊆ E  and A ⊆ A . The Kripke Jump
is a monotone operator, in the sense that Φ(E, A) ≤ Φ(E  , A ) whenever
(E, A) ≤ (E  , A ). By Tarski-Knaster theorem, Φ has fixed-points, that is,
pairs (E, A) such that Φ(E, A) = (E, A).
Definition 4.2. A fixed-point model for LT is a structure N, (E, A) where
(E, A) = Φ(E, A). A fixed-point model is called
• consistent, if E ∩ A = ∅,
• complete, if E ∪ A = ω,
• symmetric, if it is either consistent or complete.
The following lemmata give formal expression to the claim that KF- and
PKF-theories are a proof-theoretic characterization of fixed-point models.
In fact, it is known they are N-categorical axiomatizations of these models,
in the sense of [14].15
Lemma 4.3. (essentially, [12,16])
(i) (N, E) KF iff E is the extension of an arbitrary fixed-point (E, A) =
Φ(E, A) iff N, (E, A) fde PKF.
(ii) (N, E) KFcs iff E is the extension of a consistent fixed-point (E, A) =
Φ(E, A) iff N, (E, A) fde PKFcs .

14
When working with expansions of the standard model N, we avoid mentioning a
variable assignment, since every element n of the domain ω is denoted by a closed term.
15
Some variants are N-categorical+ , in the sense of [8].
98 L. Castaldo

(iii) (N, E) KFcp iff E is the extension of a complete fixed-point (E, A) =

Φ(E, A) iff N, (E, A) fde PKFcp .
(iv) (N, E) KFS iff E is the extension of a symmetric fixed-point (E, A) =
Φ(E, A) iff N, (E, A) fde PKFS .
One consequence of this observation is that classical and nonclassical
systems have the same standard models, in the sense that
– if the structure (N, E) is a model of KF, then the structure N, (E, A) is
a model of PKF, where A is the anti-extension of the fixed-point (E, A) =
Φ(E, A), and
– if the structure N, (E, A) is a model of PKF, then (N, E) is a model of
KF.
Similarly for other KF- and PKF-variants.

4.2. Nonstandard Models

Having clarified in what sense KF- and PKF-theories can be taken to have
the same standard models, we now move on to the analysis of their nonstan-
dard models. As already mentioned, a contribution in this analysis has been
provided by [17]: they have shown that any model of PKF− , including those
whose arithmetical reduct is a nonstandard model of PA, is also model of
KF− . More precisely:
Lemma 4.4. ([17]) For N arbitrary model of PA, for any variable assign-
ment σ, the following jointly hold:16
σ σ
If N , (E, A) fde
PKF− , then (N , E) KF− .
σ σ
If N , (E, A) fde
PKF−
S , then (N , E) KF−
S.

In the rest of the paper, Lemma 4.4 will be sharpened. Here’s is an outline
of what we shall see:
(1) It will be proven that the converse direction of Lemma 4.4 holds. That
is, given a model (N , E) of KF− , it can be shown that the structure
N , (E, A) is a model of PKF− , where A is defined via E as the set of
sentences (in the sense of N ) such that their negation is in E, plus all
elements which do not code a sentence.

16
[17]’s Lemma 6 only considers PKF− and KF− , but their proof can be easily extended
to the case PKF− −
S -KFS .
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 99

(2) It will be shown that the same result holds for the pairs KFint -PKF and
KFD -PKFD . That is, it will be shown that the structure (N , E) is a
model of KFint (KFD ) iff the structure N , (E, A) is a model of PKF
(PKFD ), for A defined as in (1).
(3) We shall see that these results are stable under extensions of the ba-
sic theories. That is, we shall see that KF− − −
S (KFcs , KFcp ) and PKFS
−
− − int
(PKFcs , PKFcp ) have the same models. Similarly, we shall see that KFS
(KFint int D D D
cs , KFcp ) and PKFS (PKFcs , PKFcp ), as well as KFS (KFcs , KFcp )
and PKFD D D
S (PKFcs , PKFcp ), have the same models.
(4) It will be shown that given a model (N , E) of KF, the structure
N , (E, A) is a model of PKF+ , for A defined as above.
Before proving (1)-(4), let me introduce some notation.

Notation 4.5.
σ
(i) If ϕ(x) is a formula with at most x free, we often write M (fde)
ϕ[a]
σ[x:a] σ
instead of M (fde) ϕ. In other words, M (fde) ϕ[a] means that ϕ(x)
is (fde-)satisfied in M under the mapping x → a.
σ
(ii) for N a model of PA, put StN := {a ∈ |N | | N StT [a]} and NStN =
N N
|N | − St . That is, St is the set of sentences in the sense of N .17
(iii) For N a model of PA and StN ⊇ X ⊆ |N |, put Xˆ := {a ∈ StN |
σ
(N , X) T(¬. [a])} ∪ NStN . That is, given a set X of sentences (in the
sense of N ), the set Xˆ is given by every sentence whose negation is in
X, plus every element not coding a sentence.
(iv) For T ∈ {KF− , KFD , KFint , KF, PKF− , PKFD , PKF, PKF+ ), let T ∈
{Tcs , Tcp , TS }.

We begin with an auxiliary lemma, showing that Tϕ(ẋ) is classically

satisfied in a model (N , E) of a KF-system iff ϕ(x) is fde-satisfied in the
structure N , (E, Eˆ) .18

17 σ
We write StN , instead of StN
σ , because {a ∈ |N | | N StT [a]} does not depend on
σ σ[x:a]
σ. In fact, by (i), N StT [a] is just N StT (x). Hence, since the only free variable
in StT (x) is x, the set StN does not depend on a specific σ.
18
A similar result is proven by Cieśliński [10, Lemma 6.0.24].
100 L. Castaldo

Lemma 4.6. Let: KF◦ be an arbitrary KF-like theory, (N , E) and σ be such

σ
that (N , E) KF◦ , and ϕ(x) an LT -formula with at most x free.19 Then
σ σ
(N , E) Tϕ(ẋ) iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(x).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the positive complexity of ϕ. We show
the crucial cases of truth ascriptions. Let ϕ(x) ≡ T t(x), for t(x) a term with
at most x free. Then,
σ σ
(N , E) T(T t(ẋ)), iff, since (N , E) KF−
σ
(N , E) T t(x), iff
t(x)N
σ ∈ E, iff
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
T t(x).
For ϕ(x) ≡ ¬T t(x), we reason as follows:
σ σ
(N , E) T(¬T t(ẋ)), iff, since (N , E) KF− ,
σ
(N , E) T ¬. t(x) ∨ ¬StT (t(x)), iff, by definition of NStN
σ N
(N , E) T ¬. t(x) or t(x)N
σ ∈ NSt , iff, by definition of Eˆ
t(x)N
σ ∈ Eˆ, iff
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
¬T t(x).

As it will become clear below, this Lemma plays a crucial role, as it

allows us to move in and out the scope of the truth predicate when we
move between classical and nonclassical satisfaction relations. This will be
particularly important for proving the equivalence between the classical sat-
isfability of the rules of internal induction and the nonclassical satisfability
of the corresponding induction schemata.
Let us now begin by proving part of the converse of Lemma 4.4.
σ σ
Lemma 4.7. If (N , E) KF− , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF− .
σ
Proof. For (N , E) KF− , we want to show that N , (E, Eˆ) is a model
of PKF− , that is to say, we want to show that
σ
if PKF−  Γ ⇒ Δ, then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
Γ ⇒ Δ.

19
We concentrate on formulae with at most one free variable for simplicity. The ex-
tension to the multivariable case is unproblematic.
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 101

We first show that each initial sequent of PKF− is satisfied in N , (E, Eˆ) ,
and then we show that every rule of inference is sound. PKF− ’s initial se-
quents are either of the form ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ, or they are truth-theoretic initial
sequents. The former kind of sequent are satisfied simply by definition of the
σ
relation fde . As for the truth-theoretic initial sequents, we consider three ex-
amples.

• T=. We want to show (omitting contexts for readability)

σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
Ct(t), Ct(s), t◦ = s◦ ⇒ T(t =
. s),
σ ◦ ◦
N , (E, Eˆ) fde . s) ⇒ t = s .
Ct(t), Ct(s), T(t =
σ
That is, for N Ct(t) ∧ Ct(s), we want to show
σ σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
t◦ = s◦ iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde . s).
T(t =
σ σ σ
Clearly, N , (E, Eˆ) fde
t◦ = s◦ iff (N , E) t◦ = s◦ . Since (N , E)
σ
KF− , this is the case precisely if (N , E) . s), iff (t =
T(t = N
. s)σ ∈ E iff
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde T(t =. s).
N
• T¬. For tN
σ ∈ Stσ , we want to show
σ σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
¬T(t) iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde
T(¬. t)
σ
By definition, N , (E, Eˆ) fde
¬T(t) iff tN
σ ∈ Eˆ. By definition of
N σ
Eˆ, since tNσ ∈ Stσ , this is the case precisely if (N , E) T(¬. t) iff
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde T(¬. t).
N
• T∀. For (∀. v.t)N
σ ∈ St , we want to show
σ σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
T(∀. v.t) iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∀xT(t(ẋ)).
This follows rather immediately by property of (N , E):
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
T(∀. v.t) iff
σ
(N , E) T(∀. v.t) iff, since (N , E) |= KF− ,
σ
(N , E) ∀xT(t(ẋ)) iff
σ[x:a]
for all a ∈ |N |, (N , E) T(t(ẋ)) iff
σ[x:a]
for all a ∈ |N |, N , (E, Eˆ) fde
T(t(ẋ)) iff
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∀xT(t(ẋ)).
102 L. Castaldo

σ
The soundness of logical rules follows by definition of fde . The rule of
restricted induction INDLPA is unproblematic, since for ϕ ∈ LPA we
σ σ
have (N , E) ϕ iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde ϕ.

Remark 4.8. It may be worth noticing that, given a model N , (E, A) of

a PKF-theory, the set A is definable via E as in point (iii) of Notation 4.5
above, that is, as the set of sentences (in the sense of N ) whose negation
is in E, along with elements not coding any sentence. This is so due to the
PKF initial sequents TStLT and T¬. This means that Eˆ is the unique A
such that N , (E, A) is a model of PKF− if (N , E) is a model of KF− .
Similar remarks apply below.20
We now show, with lemmata 4.9–4.10, that the same result holds for the
pair (KFint -PKF).
σ σ
Lemma 4.9. If (N , E) KFint , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF.
Proof. Let (N , E) be an arbitrary model of KFint . Due to Lemma 4.7, it
suffices to verify the fde-soundness of PKF’s induction schema in N , (E, Eˆ) .
This amounts to showing that, for all ϕ ∈ LT , if the following two conditions
hold
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(u) ⇒ ϕ(u + 1),
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(0),
then, for all terms t,
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(t).
σ
From N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(u) ⇒ ϕ(u + 1), by Lemma 4.6, we get
σ ˙ 1).
(N , E) Tϕ(u̇) ⇒ Tϕ(u +
σ
Since (N , E) KFint , we get
σ
(N , E) T sb(ϕ(v), num(0)) ⇒ T sb(ϕ(v), num(t))
for t arbitrary. Again by Lemma 4.6, this yields
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(0) ⇒ ϕ(t),
σ
which together with N , (E, A) fde
ϕ(0) implies the desired conclusion.

20
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting us to make this point explicit.
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 103

σ σ
Lemma 4.10. If N , (E, A) fde
PKF, then (N , E) KFint .
Proof. We check the soundness of INDint in (N , E). Suppose the following
jointly hold
σ ˙ 1)),
(N , E) T(s(u̇)) ⇒ T(s(u +
σ
(N , E) T sb(s, num(0)) .
We want to show
σ
(N , E) T(sb(s, num(t))), (*)
σ
for t arbitrary. From (N , E) T sb(s, num(0)) , we get
σ
N , (E, A) fde
T sb(s, num(0)) , (1)
σ ˙ 1)), we derive
and from (N , E) T(s(u̇)) ⇒ T(s(u +
σ σ ˙ 1)).
either (N , E) T(s(u̇)), or (N , E) T(s(u + (2)
Either disjunct of (2) implies
σ ˙ 1)).
N , (E, A) fde
T(s(u̇)) ⇒ T(s(u +
Since N , (E, A) is a model of PKF, by IND we obtain
σ
N , (E, A) fde
T sb(s, num(0)) ⇒ T sb(s, num(t))
for t arbitrary. Together with (1), this yields (∗).
The argument of Lemmata 4.9 and 4.10 can be adjusted to the pair
(KFD -PKFD ), as it will be shown next.
σ σ
Lemma 4.11. If (N , E) KFD , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKFD .
Proof. We verify the fde-soundness of INDD in N , (E, Eˆ) , for (N , E) a
model of KFD . This amounts to showing that, for all ϕ ∈ LT , if the following
four conditions hold (we omit context for readability)
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∀x(ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)),
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x)) ⇒,
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(u) ⇒ ϕ(u + 1),
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(0),
then, for all terms t,
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ(t).
104 L. Castaldo

The verification is similar to that of Lemma 4.9. Using Lemma 4.6 and
commutation of T with quantifiers and connectives (which we have since
σ
(N , E) KFD ), we derive
σ
(N , E) ∀x(Tϕ(ẋ) ∨ T¬ϕ(ẋ)),
σ
(N , E) ∃x(Tϕ(ẋ) ∧ T¬ϕ(ẋ)) ⇒, which is equivalent to
σ
(N , E) ∀x(¬Tϕ(ẋ) ∨ ¬T¬ϕ(ẋ)),
σ ˙ 1)), and
(N , E) Tϕ(u̇) ⇒ Tϕ(u +
σ
(N , E) Tϕ(0).
The desired conclusion follows by INDint
D and Lemma 4.6.
σ σ
Lemma 4.12. If N , (E, A) fde
PKFD , then (N , E) KFD .
Proof. Once again, the verification is similar to that of Lemma 4.10. Sup-
pose that the following jointly hold, for some t such that N |= Fml1LT (t):
σ
(N , E) ∀x T(t(ẋ)) ∨ T(¬. t(ẋ)) , (3)
σ
(N , E) ∀x ¬T(t(ẋ)) ∨ ¬T(¬. t(ẋ)) . (4)
From (3) we obtain
σ
N , (E, A) fde
∀x T(t(ẋ)) ∨ T(¬. t(ẋ)) ,
and from (4), which yields:
t(ẋ)N / E or ¬. t(ẋ)N
σ ∈ σ ∈
/ E,
we get
σ
N , (E, A) fde
∃x T(t(ẋ)) ∧ T(¬. t(ẋ)) ⇒
The conclusion follows by INDD and Lemma 4.6.
From lemmata 4.4, 4.7, 4.9, and 4.10 we obtain the following
Corollary 4.13. For (KF◦ , PKF◦ ) one of the pairs (KF− , PKF− ),
(KFint , PKF), or (KFD , PKFD ), for N an arbitrary model of PA, the fol-
lowing jointly hold:
σ σ
If (N , E) KF◦ , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF◦ .
σ σ
If N , (E, A) fde
PKF◦ , then (N , E) KF◦ .
We next show that the results are stable under addition of truth-theoretic
principles. That is:
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 105

Corollary 4.14. For (KF◦ , PKF◦ )as in Corollary 4.13, and  ∈{S, cs, cp},
σ σ
If (N , E) KF◦ , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF◦ .
σ σ
If N , (E, A) fde
PKF◦ , then (N , E) KF◦ .
Proof. We consider (KFcs , PKFcs ).21 In order to show that models of KFcs
expanded by the anti-extension Eˆ are models of PKFcs , we need to show
that the additional rule ¬L of PKFcs is fde-sound in these models. Recall
that ¬L is the rule
Γ ⇒ Δ, ϕ
¬L
¬ϕ, Γ ⇒ Δ
Assuming the fde-validity of the premise, suppose
σ 
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
¬ϕ ∧ Γ,
We have to show that N , (E, Eˆ) fde-satisfies some sentence in Δ. To begin
σ 
with, by assumption on the premise of ¬L, from N , (E, Eˆ) fde Γ we
get
σ 
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ∨ Δ,
We now show that
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
ϕ. (*)
σ σ
By Lemma 4.6, from N , (E, Eˆ) fde ¬ϕ we get (N , E) T¬ϕ.22 Since
(N , E) is a model of the initial sequent Cons, which recall is
StT (t), Γ ⇒ Δ, ¬T(t), ¬T(¬. t), (Cons)
we derive
σ
(N , E) ¬Tϕ,
σ
and hence #ϕ ∈ / E. But then N , (E, Eˆ) fde ϕ, as otherwise by Lemma 4.6
we would get #ϕ ∈ E. Hence we obtain (*), and we conclude that some
sentence in Δ is fde-satisfied in N , (E, Eˆ) .
Conversely, in order to show that the truth-theoretic initial sequent Cons
of KFcs is classically satisfied in (N , E), we first notice that
σ
N , (E, A) fde
StT (t), T(¬. t), T(t) ⇒ ∅.

21
We avoid mentioning the induction schema employed in the theories, tacitly assuming
that the pairing is as stated in the Corollary.
22
We omit free variables for readability.
106 L. Castaldo

Now assume (omitting context for readability)

σ
(N , E) StT (t) ∧ T(¬. t), which is the case iff
σ
N , (E, A) fde
StT (t) ∧ T(¬. t).
It follows that
σ
N , (E, A) fde
T(t), which is the case iff
σ
(N , E) T(t), iff
σ
(N , E) ¬T(t).
The arguments for the pairs (KFcp , PKFcp ) and (KFS , PKFS ) are analogous.

In order to complete the above picture, we are left with showing that
KF-systems with full induction and PKF-systems with additional transfinite
induction up to < ε0 have the same models. In the next Lemma, it is shown
that every model of KF is indeed a model of PKF+ . However, the question
whether every model of PKF+ classically satisfies the induction schema IND
will be left open for future research.
σ σ
Lemma 4.15. If (N , E) KF, then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF+ .

Proof. We check that N , (E, Eˆ) is an fde-model for TI≺ [LT , < ε0 ] and
TI≺ [LT , < ε0 ](C). Suppose ϕ is fde-progressive in N , (E, Eˆ) , i.e., suppose
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∀z ≺ u ϕ(z) ⇒ ϕ(u).
σ
By Lemma 4.6 and commutation of ∀ with T (which we have since (N , E)
KF), we get
(N , E) |= ∀z ≺ u Tϕ(ż) ⇒ Tϕ(u̇).
σ
Since (N , E) TI≺ [LT , < ε0 ], for γ < ε0 we have (recall that c is (the
numeral of) the code of γ in our notation system)
σ
(N , E) ∀x ≺ c Tϕ(ẋ),
and therefore
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∀x ≺ c ϕ(x)
by Lemma 4.6, which is what we wanted to show.
For TI≺ [LT , < ε0 ](C), suppose
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
¬ϕ(u) ⇒ ∃z ≺ u ¬ϕ(z).
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 107

We can then reason as follows (exploiting Lemma 4.6 and commutation of

∀ with T):
(N , E) |= T¬ϕ(ẋ) ⇒ ∃z ≺ x T¬ϕ(ż), iff, by contraposition
(N , E) |= ∀z ≺ x ¬T¬ϕ(ż) ⇒ ¬T¬ϕ(ẋ), hence, by
σ
(N , E) TI≺ [LT , < ε0 ]
(N , E) |= ∀z ≺ c ¬T¬ϕ(ż), iff, by contraposition
(N , E) |= ∃z ≺ c T¬ϕ(ż) ⇒, hence, by Lemma 4.6
σ
N , (E, Eˆ) fde
∃z ≺ c ¬ϕ(ż) ⇒ .

Observe that the argument for Lemma 4.15 can be generalized so to

establish a more robust characterization of the relationship between bounded
induction in KF-systems and transfinite induction in PKF-systems. To see
this, given a formula ϕ ∈ LT , let
Prog≺ (ϕ) := ∀x(∀y ≺ x ϕ(y) → ϕ(x)),
TI≺ [ϕ, α] := Prog≺ (ϕ) → ∀x ≺ a(ϕ(x)).
Now consider the theory obtained from KFint by replacing INDint with Σn -
induction for LT , and call it KFn . Since it is known that IΣn formulated in
LT proves TI≺ [T, < ωn+1 ],23 we immediately obtain a lower bound for the
σ
derivability of transfinite induction within KFn . Let now (N , E) KFn .
With essentially the same argument as above, one can show that N , (E, Eˆ)
is a structure fde-satisfying TI≺ [LT , < ωn+1 ] and TI≺ [LT , < ωn+1 ](C). But
then N , (E, Eˆ) is a model of a PKF-theory obtained by extending PKF
with TI≺ [LT , < ωn+1 ] and TI≺ [LT , < ωn+1 ](C).24
These observations give rise to the following

Open Question 4.16. Does the converse of Lemma 4.15 hold? That is, given
a model N , (E, A) of PKF+ , is the structure (N , E) a model of KF? More
in general, given a model N , (E, A) of a theory PKFα  obtained by ex-
tending PKF with TI≺ [LT , α], can we determine what type of induction is
satisfied in (N , E)?

23
See [2, §4]. Here ω0 (α) = α and ωn+1 (α) = ω ωn (α) and ωn is short for ωn (1).
24
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising a question that led to this observation.
108 L. Castaldo

5. Summary and Consequences of the Above Results

Let us summarize the above results in the following Theorem, implicitly

relying on Remark 4.8:

Theorem 5.1. (Main theorem) For N arbitrary model of PA,

σ σ
(1) If (N , E) KF−
() iff N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF−
() .
σ σ
(2) (N , E) () iff N , (E, Eˆ)
KFint fde
PKF() .
σ σ
(3) (N , E) () iff N , (E, Eˆ)
KFD fde
PKFD
() .
σ σ
(4) If (N , E) KF() , then N , (E, Eˆ) fde
PKF+
() .

This theorem provides a sense in which KF- and PKF-systems (in suitable
variants) can be taken to have the same models. Informally, this sense can be
expressed by saying that models of classical and nonclassical systems agree
on what is true.
Semantic investigations of the kind undertaken above not only help shed-
ding light on some of the conceptual aspects relating the axiomatic systems
under consideration. Additionally, they can be used to deepen our under-
standing of how they are related from a proof-theoretic perspective. Indeed,
it can be observed that Theorem 5.1 subsumes some other know facts about
KF- and PKF-systems, provided by [16,17,22], and [9]:

Corollary 5.2.
(i) KF− x˙ ) ⇒ TΔ(y˙ ) iff PKF−
()  TΓ( ()  Γ(
x) ⇒ Δ(y ).
x˙ ) ⇒ TΔ(y˙ ) iff PKF()  Γ(x) ⇒ Δ(y ).
()  TΓ(
(ii) KFint
(iii) KFD x˙ ) ⇒ TΔ(y˙ ) iff PKFD
()  TΓ( ()  Γ(
x) ⇒ Δ(y ).
(iv) KF()  TΓ(x˙ ) ⇒ TΔ(y˙ ), if PKF+
()  Γ(
x) ⇒ Δ(y ).

Proof. Let KF◦ -PKF◦ be one of the pairs (KF− − int

() -PKF() ), (KF() -PKF() ),
(KFD D +
() -PKF() ), (KF() -PKF() ). We begin by showing (omitting free vari-
ables for the sake of readability) that if PKF◦  Γ ⇒ Δ, then KF◦  TΓ ⇒
TΔ.
Put Γ := {γ1 , . . . , γn } and Δ := {δ1 , . . . , δm }, and suppose that PKF◦ 
σ
Γ ⇒ Δ. This is the case precisely if, for all N , (E, A) fde PKF◦ ,
σ  σ 
either N , (E, A) fde
Γ or N , (E, A) fde
Δ.
Notes on Models of (Partial) Kripke–Feferman Truth 109

By transparency of T in PKF◦ , this is equivalent to

either #γi ∈
/ E for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or #δj ∈ E for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (5)
Now let (N , E) be an arbitrary model of KF◦ . By Theorem 5.1, E is the
extension of a model of PKF◦ . Hence, by (5),
σ
(N , E) TΓ ⇒ TΔ.
By completeness, it follows that KF◦  TΓ ⇒ TΔ.
For the converse direction, let KF◦ -PKF◦ be one of the above pairs ex-
◦
cept KF() -PKF+() . Suppose that KF  TΓ ⇒ TΔ. This is the case
σ
precisely if, for an arbitrary model (N , E) of KF◦ , (N , E) TΓ ⇒ TΔ,
which is in turn the case precisely if
either #γi ∈
/ E for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or #δj ∈ E for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m.(6)
Let N , (E, A) be an arbitrary model of PKF◦ . By Theorem 5.1, (N , E) is
a model of KF◦ , and hence, by (6),
σ
N , (E, A) fde
TΓ ⇒ TΔ.
By completeness, we obtain PKF◦  TΓ ⇒ TΔ, which yields the desired
conclusion by transparency of T.

Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Martin Fischer, Carlo Nicolai,

and Johannes Stern for very helpful discussions on the topic of this arti-
cle, and two anonymous referee for their valuable comments. This work has
been supported partly by the AHRC South, West and Wales Doctoral Train-
ing Partnership (SWW DTP), Grant No. AH/L503939/1-DTP1 and partly
by the DAAD–Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst–German Academic
Exchange Service, Grant No. 57552337.

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L. Castaldo
Department of Philosophy
University of Warsaw
Warsaw
Poland
castaldluca@gmail.com