EWP2.5. Song China - Notes

Is the Song Empire better considered fragile or resilient?
Resilient
- Periodic stability & prosperity
(post-Shanyuan decades as a reference point?) - becoming increasingly disordered
and fragile
The Song can be said to have been characterized by a high level of economic activity and
prosperity. Expansion into South China stimulated surpluses in food production and
advances in rice agriculture, which broke the cycle of agrarian self-sufficiency and
allowed producers to specialize in market-oriented crops and handicrafts. As
landowners and peasants throughout China were drawn into a network of trade in daily
necessities as well as luxury goods for the rich, trade itself spilled beyond the confined
of regulated urban markets into an articulated hierarchy of periodic rural markets,
1
intermediate towns, and great urban centers of distribution and consumption.
Impressive advances in military technology during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
including the development of a permanently stationed navy and the use of incendiary
2
devices and projectiles employing gunpowder.
- Territorial: irredentism to diplomacy, peace
The Shanyuan Treaty of 1005, in which the Song agreed to make annual payments to the
Khitan and repudiate claims to the Yanyun region, constituted a recognition by the
Song court that the territorial, ritual and financial costs of diplomatic parity and a
purchased peace were far less onerous than the social and political costs of mobilizing
the country for protracted irredentist war. The diplomatic equilibrium that
accompanied Song suspension of its irredentist aspirations ushered in a concomitant
period of political stability that lasted another half century. The Shanyuan settlement
coincided with the transition from battle-hardened dynastic founders to court-nurtured
1
P. J. Smith, ‘Eurasian Transformations of the Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries: The View from Song China,
960-1279’, Medieval Encounters 10:1-3 (2004), p.280.
2
H. De Weerdt, Information, Territory, and Networks: The Crisis and Maintenance of Empire in Song China
(2020), p.301.
successors, precipitating a shift in political power from an absolutist throne to an
3
increasingly complex and self-confident bureaucracy.
Successive generations had tried to recapture the equilibrium of the post-Shanyuan
decades. This not only entailed creating a safe haven for the regime in the rebellious and
war-torn south, but also meant suppressing widespread demands for a reconquest of
4
the north in favor of gaining peace through rapprochement with the Jin conquerors.
- Bureaucracy: educated & exam-chosen courtiers; absolutism vs. checked arbitrary
authority; decentralized authority?
(North?) Increasingly effective assertion of centralized political authority. During the
latter half of the Tang, the court had been obliged to cede political power to the military
governors and increasingly autonomous generals of north China. The challenge facing
successive would-be dynasts was how to recentralize power from the military governors
while rebuilding the apparatus of the centralized, bureaucratic state. Taizu peacefully
demobilized his general staff, severing the personalized links between commanders and
their troops that had made ‘praetorian’ coups - such as the one that brought Taizu to
power - so common in the post-Tang era, and subordinating the military to bureaucratic
control under the absolute authority of an unchallenged emperor. The Song founder was
able to neutralize the power-brokering role of the great generals, and, with his
successor, he irradiated the military governors as a ruling elite, dismantling their
territorial jurisdictions and replacing them with civilian officials under direct control of
the capital. In other areas of civil administration Taizu adapted Tang and Five Dynasties
precedents to recreate a network of county, prefectural and circuit officials that
implanted imperial authority throughout the empire through a growing bureaucratic
apparatus increasingly staffed by graduates of an expanded examination system. The
system gave rise to a new, literocentric political elite that, because they possessed little
of the independent wealth or hereditary official status of their Tang aristocratic
3
(2020), pp.291-3.
4
predecessors, posed less of a challenge to the absolutist inclinations of the Song
5
emperors and (later in the dynasty) their chief councilors.
In the decades that followed the Shanyuan settlement the shidafu bureaucratic elite was
still relatively small and cohesive and the still-evolving bureaucratic apparatus relatively
robust. As a result, the arbitrary exercise of state power was restrained by the
constitutional division of authority over civil affairs under the Secretariat-Chancellery,
military matters under the Bureau of Military Affairs, and economic administration
under the Finance Commission, while an institutionally embedded system of checks and
balances prevented a single chief councilor from dominating the Council of State and
subjected all the state councilors to independent oversight by a fully-developed system
of policy critics and censors. At the same time, governance was characterized by a
relatively conciliar approach to decision-making, exemplified most graphically by the
reliance on broadly staffed interagency ad hoc committees to advise the emperor on
6
important policy issues.
In the late nineteenth century, political reformer Kang Youwei advanced the proposition
that the Song bureaucracy had been the most effective in China’s history. One reason he
gave was that ‘prefectures were small’. Like other regimes that developed great
ambitions of power over people, places, and commodities, Song rulers systematically
surveyed, mapped, and bounded their territory while making administrative decisions
with explicit reference to spatial organization. Place making was constantly reiterated
within specific but variable institutional limits as the regime reorganized revenue
collection, census taking, administration, services, and war according to the
organization of territories deemed appropriate and politically viable. Song organized the
realm into discrete, contiguous and observable jurisdictions that formed the basis for
7
governance.
- Moral/political culture: observance of the Ancestors’ Instructions; loyalism
5
6
960-1279’, Medieval Encounters 10:1-3 (2004), pp.292-3.
7
R. Mostern, Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern": The Spatial Organization of the Song State (960-1276 CE)
(2011), p.6.
Restraints on the power of the emperor: ‘Ancestors’ Family Instructions’, models of
behavior norms, teachings of the ancestors and principles of governing that the
emperors could not ignore… The Song is widely considered the beginning of autocratic
government in China. Doubtlessly many Song policies led to the centralization of the
administration, which was dominated by literati primarily recruited through the civil
service examinations. The Song is often depicted as turning away from the ancient
aristocratic and military order toward a new bureaucratic order dominated by the
emperor. The emperor was charged with respecting the dynastic patrimony, and the
legitimacy and power of the Song bureaucracy was grounded in its ability to hold the
8
emperor accountable. In 976, Taizong declared, ‘the previous emperor launched an
enterprise for almost twenty years: he took preventive measures for every wrongdoing.
Once the basic principles and codes were fixed, every being was put on a firm basis. We
must make efforts to respect this legacy without any transgression.’ This willingness to
strictly and fully apply the previous regulations was likewise present in the texts of
many literati, who frequently lamented the lack of family rules, who explained that ‘to
9
serve one’s sovereign with loyalty is to serve one’s parents with filial piety’.
In the early 1030s, some high officials supported the young emperor Renzong’s position
and castigated the activities of those who ‘undermined’ the Family Instructions. In other
words, the reference to the ‘Ancestors’ Instructions’ appeared when the sovereign and
his ministers perceived abuses they wished to eradicate. In search of some general
principles of good governance, they considered the ‘Ancestors’ Instructions’ to be a
means for resolving problems within the court and the administration. They were
considered the way to avoid plots and missteps. For example, Renzong once criticized
the premier, Li Di, for his appointment of censors: ‘The Ancestors’ Instructions’ cannot
be violated. If the premier could himself appoint censors, no one would dare to speak of
his faults.’ Similarly, after the military’s defeat in Shaanxi at the hands of the Xia in the
northwest, the emperor Shenzong ordered the execution of the responsible officer. But
8
D. Xiaonan and C. Lamouroux, ‘The Ancestors' Family Instructions: Authority and Sovereignty in Song
China’, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 35 (2005): 79-97., pp.79-81.
9
China’, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 35 (2005): 79-97., p.89.
the premier and his colleagues refused to obey, giving as their reason: ‘since ancestral
times, there has not yet been a punishment like the execution of a literati-official. Let us
10
not begin with Your Majesty.’
- Political communication re-enhanced loyalty to state unity, etc. - localities /
provincialization of elites; ideals of loyalty between individuals and dynasty?
The meaning of loyalty had already undergone a major shift in the first century of Song
rule. Switching allegiance between courts and serving multiple rulers was usual practice
until the mid-tenth century. The emergence of two major powers (Liao and Song) in the
late tenth century resulted in a hardening of attitudes against those who valued personal
loyalties over loyalty to one court or one emperor. This new model of loyalty was
justified not only in philosophical discourse but also in critical histories of
tenth-century courts and biographies of political and military elites. We could interpret
the painter Hu Quan’s assertion that suicide was preferable to the acceptance of Jurchen
demands as an example of the impact of the eleventh-century redefinition of loyalty. His
letters, however, suggest that loyalty was determined by other overarching values.
Loyalty was due to an emperor and a court that defended Song sovereignty over the
realm and all its territories. The Song emperor therefore had to insist at all cost on
governing ‘the realm’ (tianxia) rather than ‘the area south of the Yangzi River’. An
emperor’s failure to do so required that officials and commoners alike demonstrated
11
loyal protest even to the point of self-sacrifice.
Wang Mingqing shared the sense of an anonymous source that the actions of men who
had proven their loyalty in action ought to be commemorated. They recommended that
the recognition for loyalism consist of an entire package: a conferral of honorary names,
a burial equivalent to that accorded to those of the highest ranking at the court, the
erection of shrines with real-life images, the engraving of the events in which they had
proven their worth on stone steles, the transcription of these narratives in Song dynas-
tic history, and the bestowing of appropriate tokens of honor to their descendants. In
10
China’, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 35 (2005): 79-97., pp.92-3.
11
(2020), pp.419-20.
sum, Wang Mingqing’s notes rejected the kind of loyalty that Qin Gui had shown
Emperor Gaozong and commemorated instances of radical commitment to the defense
12
and restoration of Song sovereignty.
Communication enhanced state unity:
I would propose “tacit complicity” as a framework for analyzing the behaviors of
different parties in the Song political communication system. I use the term “tacit
complicity” to describe a situation in which one party, in pursuit of its own agenda and
without explicit coordination, knowingly assists another party by taking a particular
course of action that serves the interests of both. Despite their vastly different stances
on the incident, both Liu Guangzu and Li Xinchuan interpreted the behavior of
interested parties through this lens. In the eyes of Liu, the accusations against Zhao
Ruyu were motivated by tacit complicity between local informants in Sichuan, whose
interests had been hurt by Zhao’s plan to build a permanent levee, and court officials
such as Wang Wo and Chen Gu, who seized the opportunity to attack Zhao to avenge
their personal grudges. In spite of their different agendas, the interests of the
Sichuanese informants and the court officials coincided on attempting to bring down
13
Zhao, and, in effect, they cooperated to achieve this common goal.
The experience of the Sichuan tea monopoly demonstrates that by interweaving the
private and career interests of a region's native population into the fiscal interests of the
state it is possible to mobilize native elites into taxing their own region for the state. By
building on the gradual integration of Sichuanese into the larger political culture, the
New Policies merger of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and native office-holding
embedded bureaucratic power deeply into Sichuanese society and facilitated
government exploitation of the region’s economic resources on an unprecedented scale,
without requiring a significant expansion of the state’s police presence… On a
region-wide scale, the New Policies and its attendant ‘laws for distant offices’ initiated a
dynasty-long trend that put Sichuanese in the majority of posts at most echelons of local
12
(2020), pp.423-4.
13
S. Chen, ‘“Short Scrolls” and “Slanderous Reports”: Political Communication and Political Culture in
the Early Southern Song’, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 47:1 (2017), p.180.
and regional government, yet kept them dependent on the state for their professional
and material advancement. Thus, instead of promoting separatism and autonomy, the
combination of elite bureaucratization and native service in Sichuan allowed the state to
apply the lessons of the tea monopoly to the entire region. This enhanced taxing power
of the state was put to the test during the Southern Song, when the tea, salt, wine,
textile, and mining industries and regional grain supply were all forced to support the
militarization of the Qinlingshan frontier and horse procurement in southwestern and
northwestern Sichuan. Despite the obvious and crushing burden that defense taxation
placed on the regional economy, Sichuanese elites embraced centrally defined goals and
stayed loyal to the center. The proof of their loyalty came in 1206, when Sichuanese were
quick to suppress the separatist rebellion led by a scion of the militarist Wu clan, Wu
14
Xi.
Fragile - reconsider terminology?

- External
- Conquest (relate to military - internal; aftermath of Tang period,
geographical fractionalization)
Brief mention of the aftermath of Tang and Five Dynasties period
*The Song faced the rise of great steppe polities including the Khitan Liao, Tangut Xi
Xia, the Jurchen Jin, and later the Mongol Empire of the Yuan. This meant that any
policy agenda was bound to prioritize geopolitical imperatives and frontier concerns. It
also directly influenced the development of the socio-political elite, shaping the
contexts within which elite families formed their sense of corporate identity and
15
calibrated their commitment to the court.
In 979 Taizong launched an invasion of Northern Han that Liao forces were unable to
repel, bringing the break-away Shansi region back under centralized control for the first
time since 951. But this was as far as the Song could get towards restoring control over
14
P. J. Smith, Taxing Heaven’s Storehouse: Horses, Bureaucrats and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry
1074-1224 (1991), pp.306-7.
15
P. J. Smith, ‘Eurasian Transformations of the Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries: The View from Song
China, 960-1279’, Medieval Encounters 10:1-3 (2004), pp.280-7.
16
north China. For the entire duration of the northern dynasty the Song were unable to
recover the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun, a region that was previously a crucial
natural barricade against peoples further north and without it the Song dynasty was
exposed and vulnerable to attack.
State building on the steppe:
The disruption of traditional, semi-egalitarian political relations was characterized by ‘a
replacement of the clan nobility with a much more powerful, hieratic, and autocratic
form of authority where collegial decisions were restricted to a small group of people.
Political authority was in turn supported by the increased militarization of society into
permanent fighting units placed under the direct control of the khan. But this
conjoining of permanent militarization and political centralization within an
aristocratic class required far greater economic resources than pastoral society could
provide, stimulating the demand for invasions of wealthier sedentary regions to secure
17
predictable supplies of external resources.
The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries
allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian
China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, thereby blocking Song from assuming a
position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order and relegating it
18
to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East Asian system.
- Internal [factionalism, foreign conquest, arbitrary government]
- Policy failures
- Examination-based court system
The very primacy of the examination-based civil service put indirect pressure on
frontier stability by producing a surfeit of potential officials. By the 1060s this glut of
officials had begun to demoralize the entire civil service, with far more candidates than
16
(2020), pp.371.
17
China, 960-1279’, Medieval Encounters 10:1-3 (2004), p.289.
18
the system could absorb clamoring for posts, sponsors, and promotion from junior to
19
senior status.
- Xin fa (last half-decade of Northern Song): irredentist adventurism
(?) State radicalism
An increasingly activist Northern Song state staffed by an exam-mobilized elite
dedicated to multigenerational service in government as their principal source of
20
political power and social prestige.
The New Policies advocated by Wang Anshi represented the epitome of state activism
in the imperial era, and dominated the political agenda for the last half-century of the
Northern Song. Under the banner of enriching the state without emisserating the
people, Wang recruited young, ambitious ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’ to staff a bevy of
21
new, reform-specific agencies.
- Leading to: Factionalism

The bureaucracy was staffed by men from different parts of the empire, with potentially
conflicting political views, interests and affiliations; it drew on a pool of examination
graduates that grew faster than the number of available posts, even as entry into
government became the most prized avenue of social mobility. Irreconcilable policy
differences and intense competition for office would eventually fracture the solidarity of
the bureaucratic elite under the weight of factionalism and the concentration of power
22
in increasingly hegemonic ministerial regimes.
Dissent against the New Policies remained silenced for the duration of Shenzong’s
reign. After the enthronement of Zhezong, despite the transfer of power to prudent,
conservative men, political culture had been too thoroughly transformed by the heated
19
20
21
22
(2020), pp.419-20.
partisanship of Shenzong’s reign to permit a return to the relative collegiality of the
post-Shanyuan decades. Thus while Wang Anshi’s erstwhile foes moved to reverse his
policies, they enthusiastically emulated Wang’s political techniques of capturing the
23
Council of State and monopolizing the censorate and remonstrance offices.
In particular, the Yuanyou partisans (so named for the Restoration reign period from
1086 to 1094) suppressed opponents with a counter-purge of New Policies adherents
more sweeping than anything in the dynasty thus far, only to find themselves ousted
from office in 1094, when the now mature Zhezong reinstated his father’s reform
measures and proponents. From this point on, Northern Song political culture was
engulfed in a virulent factionalism that reached its peak around 1102, when Zhezong’s
brother and successor Huizong authorized his chief councilor Cai Jing (1047-1126) to
proscribe all members of the “Yuanyou party”—whether dead or alive—and extirpate
their political and literary legacies. Indeed, as Huizong asserted in 1108, it was Cai Jing’s
suppression of policy opponents that enabled the emperor to fulfill his father’s goal of
annexing the Tibetan domains centered on Qingtang (modern Xining, Qinghai
province), intended to be the first step in Shenzong’s irredentist war with the Tanguts:
‘If he had not banished the doubting multitudes then how could we have fully realized
our forebear’s ambition to spread our majesty among the caitiffs beyond the borders?’
Through the reigns of Shenzong and his sons, then, irredentist ambition and imperial
support for the chief councilors and statist policies that could help bring that ambition
to pass had irreversibly undermined the constitutional division of authority that
checked the arbitrary exercise of state power. The Song political system from the New
Policies through the very end of the Southern Song saw a growing consolidation of
executive authority in the inner court comprised above all of the sovereign and his
long-reigning chief councilors. At the same time purges, suppressions and
irreconcilable policy differences had fractured the tenuous and inherently unstable
solidarity of the bureaucratic elite, pitting insiders and outsiders against one another
23
and eventually driving a wedge between the inner court and the ministerial political
24
machines that dominated it the bureaucracy as a whole.
Monarchical autocracy gave way once more to ministerial domination when Xiaozong’s
abdication in 1189 deprived the Southern Song of its last effective sovereign. Yet the
onset of a protracted era of weak emperors did nothing to reconstitute the relatively
conciliar, professionalized governance that had evolved under the passive rule of the
post-Shanyuan rulers. Instead, the vacuum created by imperial withdrawal was quickly
filled by palace favorites and powerful chief councilors, who either muzzled their civil
service critics through heavy-handed purges or neutralized tem through more cunning
25
tactics of manipulation and cooptation.
- Bureaucratization: connected to military impotence?
- Military impotence & irredentism; failure of defense (New Policies); later
hesitancy in regard to frontier operation; Mongols
- Economic: as a result of irredentism, taxation, etc.
Military impotence:
Song reluctance to extend appropriate diplomatic recognition to the new Xia emperor
instigated a four-year war (1038-1042) that highlighted Song deficiencies in strategic
planning, tactical execution, and troop battle-fitness, forcing the court to sign a treaty in
26
1044 that brought the same kind of indemnified peace with which it placated the Liao.
The Song court had systematically excluded the military’s (experts? Hereditary military
families) contribution to strategic decision making, replaced regular troop and effective
generals with local militia, and transferred military authority and even outright field
command from the generals to top-ranking civilian officials. Although the general staff
was not dismantled, it was transformed into a bureaucratized and subordinate
24
25
26
27
appendage of the civilian-dominated state. (expansion of scope of government activity
to accommodate surplus of available personnel)
Cavalry, horses - mention here
Even with the aforementioned advances in technology, the effective deployment of these
sophisticated technologies was impeded by the baleful effects of arbitrary governance,
which undermined the court’s ability to reach broad-based, well-considered decisions
about issues of war and peace and paralyzed the Song policy-making apparatus at the
very moment that the dynasty confronted its greatest threat. As Peterson has shown,
Song frontier policy from roughly 1200 on was timid and indecisive, with the court too
fearful of provoking even a deteriorating Jin regime into war to give support to
anti-Jurchen rebels in Shandong or even to undertake military preparations of its own.
From 1217 to 1224 Song forces fared well against a series of attacks launched by Jurchen
armies made desperate by Mongol assaults further north; but the court’s ambivalence
towards the Shandong rebels eventually pushed the most powerful of them into the
hands of the Mongols in 1226, quite possibly depriving the Song of “a golden
opportunity to strengthen its position in the northeast and even to lay the basis for the
28
occupation of parts of [Henan, Jiangsu, and Shandong]”.
New Policies:
Its aim to strengthen the nation’s defense had almost completely failed. Historian Wang
Zengyu argued that of all the New Policies military reforms and strategic initiatives only
one, Wang Shao’s preemptive invasion of the three easternmost prefectures of Xihe, was
successful. Follow-up campaigns in the 1080s and the first two decades of the 1100s,
however, led to either outright disaster or costly stalemates, without ever unseating the
Tanguts from their commanding position in the Ordos. From the perspective of the
horse trade Wang Shao's accomplishments in Xihe were critical, for they opened up
supply lines to the major Qinghai pastures and provided a safe haven for the horse
markets, enabling the Tea and Horse Agency to wield its bureaucratic authority to
27
28
supply Song armies with their greatest bounty of horses. But the inability of Song
generals and their massive but ineffective armies to capitalize on the first reliable
supply of horses to stabilize the frontier eventually doomed the tea and horse trade.
Once the Jin conquered North China in 1126 and severed the dynasty's access to the last
good Asian pastures, there was little a bureaucratic procurement agency could do to
keep the cavalry supplied with mounts. There was nothing the Southern Song state
could offer that would have attracted an adequate supply of good foreign horses to its
markets. The government compensated for its irreversible shortage of horses by
creating a powerful navy, tolerating the existence in the Qinlingshan frontier of a strong
but autonomous and hereditary army, and strengthening its fortified city walls; and
these systems of passive defense kept the Song dynasty alive for a century and a half
beyond the fall of North China. But without cavalry horses there was no way to project
power outward beyond the barrier of rivers, mountains, and city walls that protected
South China from the north, and hence no way to recreate a new environment for the
successful mix of bureaucratic power and marketing capacity. Though the tea and horse
trade issued from the New Policies' only strategic success, its eventual failure a half
century later reflected the inadequacy of New Policies achievements in the field of
29
military reform.
Economic failure:
While the activist economic policies of Wang and his successors generated huge cash
reserves for the state, the redistributive rationale that animated the reform economic
measures was quickly subverted by the court’s inexhaustible hunger for revenues to be
stockpiled in preparation for its irredentist wars. In short order the New Policies fiscal
reforms were transformed from a collective effort to liberate the productive resources of
peasants, small merchants, middling landowners, and consumers into an interlinked set
of new taxes and fees, all collected by agents of the state energized by an action-ori-
ented incentive system that rewarded the most draconian fulfillment of their tasks.
Wang Anshi’s experiment in economic activism degenerated into confiscatory taxation,
29
1074-1224 (1991), pp.305-6.
creating a legacy of levies and extractive mechanisms that turned the late-Northern and
30
Southern Song states into economic predators.
- Authority: (Southern Song) centralization of executive authority in
increasingly narrow circles at court; arbitrary governance
- Fiscal decentralization, localism
- Neo-Confucian learning: morality of literati (could actually be a
positive argument)
The rise of the local gentry is associated with a paradigmatic shift from the centralized
bureaucratic state to local voluntaristic communities as the focus of elite concern in the
Southern Song. Though Southern Song intellectuals might still look to the emperor for
solutions to pressing social and economic problems, they rarely looked to the
bureaucracy. The increasing ratio of degree-holders to government positions made
entry into the civil service progressively remote and turned the examination system into
as much a mechanism for acquiring status and connections as a ladder to official
success. Thus, although official position probably remained the quickest route to power
and fortune throughout the late-imperial era, for any given lineage the downward slide
out of the civil service was far more predictable than entry into it. Under the
circumstances, elite mobility strategies gradually clustered around the control of land,
commerce, and credit, supplemented by the widespread pursuit of the social and
cultural rather than the official rewards of education. As elites came to focus on
mobility strategies that were independent of the state, the autonomous state of the
eleventh century gave way to the autonomous elite of the late-imperial era… The
growing localism and independence from government service of the gentry as a class
fostered a preference for minimalist, non-interventionist, provisioning economic
policies on the part of individual gentrymen when they did serve as members of the
government. Also, when under the impetus of dynastic crisis the late-Ming and
30
late-Qing states did attempt to expand their power in the economy, these efforts were
31
easily repelled by a powerful and independent elite.
31
1074-1224 (1991), pp.317-8.

EWP2.5. Song China - Notes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

EWP2.5. Song China - Notes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Is the Song Empire better considered fragile or resilient?

Fragile - reconsider terminology?

- Leading to: Factionalism

You might also like