The Formation of the Central Aristocracy in Early Koryŏ

John B. Duncan

Korean Studies, Volume 12, 1988, pp. 39-61 (Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.1988.0003

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/397730/summary

Access provided at 8 Jan 2020 16:18 GMT from The University Of Texas at Austin, General Libraries
 The Formation of the Central
Aristocracy in Early Koryo
John B. Duncan

I. Introduction
The twelfth century was a time of severe political instability in
Korea. The Yi Cha-üi debacle of 1095 shattered the calm of the eleventh
century and inaugurated a series of political explosions that rocked
the Koryö dynasty, including the Yi Cha-gyöm revolt of 1126, the
Myoch'öng insurrection of 1135, and the purges of the 1150s. The
turmoil culminated in the military coup of 1170, the event that brought
the early Koryö period to a close.
The conventional explanations of these individual events reveal
some of the historical forces at work during this period. Aristocratic
power struggles characterize the Yi Cha-üi and Yi Cha-gyöm affairs,
regional rivalries and conflict between Confucian and Buddhist ideas lay
behind the Myoch'öng affair, and gross imbalance between the civil and
military branches of government was one of the causes of the 1170 coup.
Illuminating as these themes may be for particular events, they do not
constitute comprehensive explanations of the overall political instability
of the twelfth century.
Historians almost universally subscribe to the view that these
events took place within the general context of a decadent aristocratic
sociopolitical order whose distinguishing feature was the domination of
the kingdom by the families of royal consorts, most notably the Kyöng-
wön Yi clan of Yi Cha-üi and Yi Cha-gyöm.1 This is a valid characteriza-
tion, but it does little to explain the political unrest of the twelfth
century, since aristocracy and domination by royal in-laws were also
prominent features of the eleventh century, as seen in such clans as the
Tongju Kim of Kim Ch'i-yang, the Ansan Kim of Kim Ün-bu, and the
Ch'öngju Yi of Yi (Wang) Ka-do. Furthermore there were no major
shifts in economy, thought, or the international situation during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries that would explain why Korean politics
grew so turbulent. The agrarian economy saw no major changes in
40DUNCAN

either means or mode of production; Buddhism and Han-T'ang Con-

fucianism continued to dominate philosophical and political thinking;2
and northeastern Asia was still under the control of a state of Manchu-
rian origins that separated Koryö from Sung China.3
To what then can we attribute the onset of political instability at
the end of the eleventh century? I propose that the primary cause was a
subtle change in the social makeup of the central officialdom that inten-
sified competition for political power. This change came about neither
as part of some organic cycle of growth and decay nor as a departure
from some presumably "proper" process of historical development. It
was the result of the Koryö dynasty's continuing drive toward centraliza-
tion.

II. The Early Koryö Aristocratic Structure

The early Koryö political system appears to have been a central-
ized power structure modelled after T'ang China. In this case, however,
appearances are deceiving. Koryö's central government was much
weaker than its Chinese prototype and the dynasty faced intractable
problems in its effort to extend central authority over the whole king-
dom. The causes of this fundamental weakness lay in the origins of the
Koryö dynasty.
After the collapse of the Silla dynasty's control over the provinces
in the ninth century, local aristocrats began to assemble private military
forces throughout the Korean peninsula. These men, often referred to
as lords of walled towns [söngju] or generals [changgun], frequently
joined forces with other local aristocrats as they sought to bolster their
power and increase the land areas under their control. The alliances
they formed coalesced by the early tenth century into two entities cap-
able of challenging Silla: Later Paekche, headed by Kyön Hwön, and
Koryö, headed by Wang Kön.
The ultimate victor, Wang Kön, used more than military strategy
and raw force to reunify the country. He pursued an active policy of
winning over and establishing alliances with as many local aristocrats as
possible, entering into marriage with no fewer than twenty-nine women,
nearly all daughters of powerful local aristocrats. The Wang family itself
does not seem to have been that strong: the sources mention no relatives
other than two cousins (Ha 1974a:53). This contrasts with the size of
some of the more powerful families in his confederation, such as the
Kangnüng Kim, who had several members in political and military
circles.4 Wang Kön's success in reunifying the country was not the result
of overwhelming family power but rather the consequence of his ability
to put together a confederation of powerful aristocrats.
The local aristocrats of the ninth century had been more than just
provincial strongmen. There were men of Silla aristocratic status, both
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY41

True Bone and Sixth Head Rank, in Wang Kön's confederation. Many
of these men, such as the Kangnüng Kims, were the descendents of
aristocrats who had relocated to the provinces from the Silla capital
after Silla unified the peninsula in the seventh century. These aristocrats
settled permanently in their new locales, where they were able to use
their Bone Rank status to establish themselves as dominant families,
eventually even developing private military forces (Yi 1958:43-64). As
the Silla government began to come apart in the late ninth century,
many of these aristocrats emerged, along with men of apparently less
illustrious origins, as autonomous heads of local governments whose of-
ficials were given the same ranks and titles as officials of the Silla central
government and whose organs included tax and military bureaus. In the
face of such entrenched local power, the best the new dynasty could do
to control local areas was to appoint powerful aristocrats as supervisory
officials [Sasim-gwan] of their home districts, while bringing their sons
into the capital as guarantors of good behavior (Hatada 1972:105-139).
This strong local autonomy resulted in a unique prefecture-county
[kun-hyön] regional administrative system. According to the T'ang
model, the prefecture-county system formed a regular hierarchy in
which multiple counties reported to a single prefecture, which in turn
reported on up to the central government. The Koryö system, however,
featured a highly irregular pattern in which subordinate [sok] prefec-
tures reported to control [yöng] prefectures and subordinate counties to
control counties. The leading aristocrats of the control prefectures and
counties held the top offices in their local governments and collected
taxes and corvée not only from their own villages but also from sub-
ordinate prefectures and counties, through the lesser aristocrats who
controlled the villages there. Thus the early Koryö prefecture-county
system formed a hierarchy of regional administration based on local
aristocratic status.5
The rise of men of Sixth Head Rank and lesser origins signaled the
end of the Bone Rank caste system, whose distinguishing structural
characteristic had been the layering of the whole society in broad here-
ditary strata, identifiable by surname (for example, Kim and Pak for
True Bone Rank, Ch'oe and Sol for Sixth Head Rank, and so on). What
arose in early Koryö to replace the Bone Rank system was the clan seat
[pon'gwan] system, which identified clans by geographic place of origin.
The generally accepted interpretation of the origin of this system holds
that by the end of the Silla dynasty, the families who had settled in
specific areas and dominated the local government there began to iden-
tify themselves by their locales.6 Thus, for example, the Kim family that
controlled the Kangnüng area referred to itself as the Kangnüng Kim
clan, and the Kwön family that dominated Andong became the Andong
Kwön clan.
42DUNCAN

The clan seat system offered benefits to both the local aristocracy
and the new dynasty. The aristocrats gained a means to distinguish
themselves from the general population and official sanction of their
privileged local position. At the same time, the designation of certain
aristocratic clans for each locality gave the dynastic government assur-
ances of continuity among the local officials with whom it had to deal
and a readily identifiable locus of responsibility for each area. Together
with the irregular prefecture-county hierarchy, the clan seat system en-
abled the early Koryö to establish a measure of stability in the country-
side. But at the same time the two systems also formed a well-integrated
local sociopolitical order that presented a formidable impediment to
strong central rule.
III. Koryö Centralization Policy
A variety of circumstances lay behind the early Koryö drive to
build a stronger, more centralized system of government. The interna-
tional situation in northeast Asia in the tenth century was unsettled.
Order had given way to chaos in China with the fall of the T'ang in 907 ,
and Koryö's immediate neighbor to the north, Parhae (Pohai), came to
an abrupt end at the hands of the Khitan, who then threatened Koryö
from across the border. Another important influence was the Chinese
model of centralized rule: the Koreans under King Söngjong (981-997)
created a virtual replica of the T'ang central government. The single
most significant factor, however, behind the Koryö drive for a central-
ized polity may have been the contradictory legacy of Siila: a tradition of
unified rule confounded by a strong tendency toward local particular-
ities.
Because the new dynasty was dependent on the cooperation of the
local aristocracy, it had no choice except to pursue a gradual policy of
centralization. The first stage entailed the solidification of the royal
family's control over the central government. The second stage involved
enhancing the prestige and authority of the central government. The
third stage comprised the extension of direct central authority over the
countryside.
The initial task for the throne in establishing its primacy at the
center of the government was to deal with the members of the con-
federation who had entrenched themselves at the capital. This process
began under King Chöngjong (945-949), with the destruction of Pak
Sur-hüi and the Kwangju Wang (Yang) family (Kang 1977:411-428),
but it was King Kwangjong (949-975) who completed it. He carried
out a bloody purge that brought an end to the era of the confederation
and established firm royal control over the central government (Kang
1964:115-122).
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY43

This controversial monarch also opened the second stage, intro-

ducing institutional reforms that greatly enhanced the authority and
prestige of the central government. He created a large military force
personally loyal to the throne by recruiting from the provinces fresh
blood free of ties with the aristocrats at the capital (Ha 1974b: 146).
He implemented the government service examination system in 958,
establishing for the first time the principle that merit, as well as heredity,
was a qualification for positions of power. His measures to enhance the
prestige of the dynastic government included outfitting his officials in
colored court robes, styling himself Emperor, and calling the Kaegyong
the Imperial Capital.
King Kwangjong's successor, King Kyöngjong (975-981), took
another major step to strengthen the central government with the pro-
mulgation of the Field and Woodland Rank [Chönsi kwa] system. This
was a system of government finance under which income from fixed
areas of land was granted to men belonging to the various classes that
provided services to the state. This prebend system asserted, for the first
time, the state's right and duty to provide for the economic sustenance
of its officials, while also making service in official state capacities more
attractive.
The capping achievement of the effort to transform the early
Koryö aristocratic confederation into a central bureaucracy of officials
recruited by and loyal to the throne was Söngjong's reorganization in
983 of the central government into a virtual replica of the T'ang three
department-six ministry [samsöng yukpu] system.7 The three depart-
ments were the secretariat [chungsö-söng] , which was responsible for
drafting policy, the chancellory [munha-söng], which was charged with
reviewing policy, and the executive [sangsö-söng], which was respon-
sible for implementing policy through its subordinate ministries: per-
sonnel, war, revenue, rites, punishments, and civil works. The three
department-six ministry system was consolidated as soon as it was in-
troduced. The secretariat and the chancellory formed a combined
secretariat-chancellory [chungsö munha-söng] under the leadership of
the junior first-grade supreme chancellor [munha sijung], the highest-
ranking official in the government. The top posts in the executive were
left vacant or filled only as honorary appointments, while the six minis-
tries were directly subordinated to the secretariat-chancellory, whose
top-ranking officials held concurrent appointments as heads of the six
ministries [yukpu]. The eight first- and second-grade officials of the
secretariat-chancellory, known collectively as the chaesin, or chaesang,
formed an elite group within the central bureaucracy (Pyön 1971:56-
67). The only other organ whose power could rival the secretariat-
chancellory was the royal secretariat [chungch'uwon], which was re-
44DUNCAN

sponsible for military affairs and for transmitting royal orders. The top-
ranking officials of the royal secretariat, five junior second-grade men,
formed a less exalted, but still elite, group known as the ch'usin.
The military branch of the Koryö central government held a de-
cidedly inferior positon vis-à-vis the civil branch. The top military post
was the grand general [sang changgun], whose senior third-grade rank
was lower than the second-grade rank of the elite groups of the civil
branch. Furthermore after the midtenth century it was common practice
to give supreme miliary command to high-ranking civil officials in times
of war or other emergencies. The civil branch of the dynasty govern-
ment was where power resided in the early Koryö.
The Koryö kings next directed their attention to the problem of
the countryside. The first steps toward setting up the apparatus for cen-
tral control over the regions came under King Sönjong. In 983 Sönjong
dispatched twelve administrators [moksa] to major regional centers
throughout the country. It is not clear just exactly what the duties and
powers of these administrators were, but the fact that they were posted
in the same year that the king replaced the old system of local office
titles, which had symbolized local autonomy, with a new system de-
signed to reflect subordination to the central government, suggests that
the administrators did exercise some degree of control over local aris-
tocrat officials (Kang 1964:172-174). The next several decades saw a
number of other measures designed to weaken local autonomy and in-
crease the central government's control over localities, including a 987
order for the collection of weapons from local authorities (Koryö-sa
choryö, hereafter KRSC 2:41a), a 996 decree which limited the number
of local superintendents in each region (Koryö-sa, hereafter KRS
75:42b), and a 1051 enactment establishing standard procedures for the
appointment and promotion of local officials (KRS 75:47a).
While this series of measures suggests steady progress, the real test
of the dynasty's centralization policy lay in its ability to place permanent
central officials in the prefectures and counties. According to the Mono-
graph on Geography [Chiri-ji] in the Koryö-sa, the total number of
prefectures and counties in Koryö was 464. Although the number
undoubtedly fluctuated somewhat throughout the dynasty, the Sejong
Veritable Records of the early Chosön dynasty lists a total of 444, in-
dicating that the number of Koryö prefectures and counties probably
hovered around 450. The first dispatch of centrally appointed officials to
the prefecture and county level did not occur until 1005, when a small
number of county magistrates, probably ten, were established in control
counties (KRSC 2:64a). Another posting occurred in 1018, when King
Hyönjong appointed fifty-six prefects and an additional twenty magis-
trates (KRSC 3:31a). The next sizeable dispatch of centrally appointed
officials did not occur until 1108, when King Yejong established forty-
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY45

one lesser magistrates [kammu] in subordinate prefectures and counties

(KRSC 7:13a). The final major posting prior to the military coup came
in 1143 when King Injong posted fourteen magistrates and lesser magis-
trates (Yi Su-gön 1984:369-370). This means that two hundred years
after Wang Kön reunified the Korean peninsula, the dynastic govern-
ment had been able to establish direct control over roughly one-third of
the country's prefectures and counties.
The slow progress of the effort to bring the whole country under
direct control testifies to the strength of the early Koryö local order. At
the same time, however, the arrival of centrally appointed officials
meant the diminution of the local aristocrats' power, especially where
lesser magistrates were posted in subordinate prefectures and counties.
Considered along with the other measures taken by the dynastic govern-
ment, the gradual extension of direct central control over the country-
side indicates substantial erosion of the power and prestige of the local
aristocracy during the first two hundred years of Koryö rule.
IV. The Influx of Local Aristocrats
The growth in central power and the diminution of the local aris-
tocrats' authority combined to make service in the dynastic government
an attractive option for men of ambition. The consequence was a con-
tinuing influx of local aristocrats that resulted in intense competition for
power. The dynasty's methods of recruiting new officials made ample
provision for the local aristocrats. The government service examination
provided for qualifying examinations to be held in the countryside as
well as in the capital. Only the sons of holders of the top two local
offices, the hereditary headman, and assistant headman posts were eligi-
ble to sit for the local examinations (Ho 1980:352). The sons of local
officials were also guaranteed access to central clerk [söri] positions, a
common entry route into the ranks of the regular bureaucracy (Kim
Kwang-gyu 1969:21-25).
One of the dynasty's primary motives in giving the local aristocra-
cy regular institutional means of advancement into the central official-
dom was to assuage concern over the diminution of local autonomy. At
the same time, however, the dynasty also used its methods of recruit-
ment to enhance the stature of its central officials. Higher-ranking cen-
tral officials enjoyed the protection privilege [urn], which allowed them
to have their children, grandchildren, or other relatives appointed to
posts in the central government. Also entrance into the government
schools that prepared students for the examinations was restricted to the
children of incumbent officials (Pyön 1971:307). These advantages,
along with other perquisites such as the honors and titles bestowed on
high officials and the economic rewards of the Field and Woodland
Rank system, made the central officials an elite within the aristocracy.
46DUNCAN

The rewards of central office holding that attracted men from the
countryside also enticed them to settle permanently in the capital. One
well-documented example of a capital-based line of descent is the Suju
Ch'oe. A 1160 tombstone for Ch'oe Ham states that his eighth-genera-
tion forebear was the Suju headman Ch'oe Sö-chön and that Sö-ch'ön
had two sons, the younger of which, Ch'oe Hanyong "entered the ser-
vice of the court, reached the rank of Supreme Chancellor and first re-
sided at the capital; his descendants have all been men of the capital"
(Han'guk Kümsök chönmun [Complete Korean Epigraphy], here-
after HGKS, 2:502). Another example is provided by the 1181 tomb-
stone of Yi Mun-t'aek. Mun-t'aek's grandfather and great-grandfather
were both local officials, but his father, who died young, was an exam-
ination graduate. Mun-t'aek entered the capital at age 17 to stay with
his stepmother, who was from an "original capital family." He passed
the examination in 1146, had a successful career and, judging from
the offices held and marriages made by his children, succeeded in
establishing his line in the capital (HGKS 3:854-856). Other cases also
present circumstantial evidence that strongly suggests the relocation of
local aristocrats to the capital. One is the famed scholar and official
Ch'oe Ch'ung. Ch'oe, the son of a Haeju local official, was an early
eleventh-century examination graduate whose sons, grandsons, and
great-grandsons held high offices in the central government. These cases
show that local aristocrats continued to move in from the countryside to
the capital throughout the early Koryö.
Once in the capital, men such as Ch'oe Han-yong and Ch'oe
Ch'ung used the privileges accorded dynastic officials, such as protection
appointments, to establish capital-based lines of descent that produced
generation after generation of central officials. These men enjoyed here-
ditary access to power and other privileges that marked them as aristo-
crats. At the same time they served the dynastic government and were
thus dependent, to some degree at least, on their status as officials for
their prestige and sustenance, traits of the bureaucrat.8 Furthermore,
although the protection privilege was very important in ensuring the
perpetuation of these capital-based lines of descent, there is evidence
that the government service examination system also played a more im-
portant role than is generally recognized in the formation and main-
tenance of the Koryö central officialdom.
James Palais, in an article on the bureaucratic aristocracy of the
Chosön dynasty, has noted that reliance on the examination system to
maintain clan fortunes lent a strong bureaucratic tinge to the Chosön
yangban (Palais 1984:427-468). Similarly, Kim Yöng-mo's research into
the means of entry into the bureaucracy of the men who held the top
posts in the Chosön government, shows that during the 1392-1469
period, sixty-one men received appointments to the three senior first-
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY47

grade posts in the state council [Üijöng-bu]. Forty (65 percent) were
examination graduates, while fourteen (23 percent) were protection
appointees. My own compilation of data from the dynastic histories of
the 1070-1146 period in Koryö shows a total of fifty-seven men known
to have held the supreme chancellor and associate chancellor posts, the
Koryö offices most analogous to the Chosön state council posts. Using
the Koryö-sa biographies, tombstone inscriptions, and the Koryö-sa
Monograph on Recruitment [Sön'gö chi], I have been able to determine
that twenty-four (42 percent) of the fifty-seven men were examination
graduates, five (9 percent) were protection beneficiaries, another five
were from military, clerical, or palace backgrounds, and twenty-three
had unknown means of entry into the bureaucracy. Ten of the twenty-
three men of unknown origins had served as examiners [chigong-go]
or associate examiners [tong chigong-go] of the government service
examinations, a duty they probably would not have been given if they
had not been examination graduates themselves. This data shows that
the examination system was the primary means of entry into the bureau-
cracy for the top officials of the 1070-1146 period, and indicates a sur-
prisingly strong bureaucratic tendency for the early Koryö central
aristocracy.
Even though we are able to perceive the basic bureaucratic-
aristocratic nature of the early Koryö central officialdom, there are
many questions that remain unanswered. Who were these central
bureaucratic aristocrats of eleventh- and twelfth-century Koryö? What
kind of power structure did they form and to what extent were they able
to dominate the dynastic government? What was the relationship
between the formation of this central bureaucratic aristocracy and the
political instability of the twelfth century?
The answers to these questions require study of the actual com-
position and structure of the central aristocracy. To that end, I have
compiled data on the careers of all men known to have held office in the
central government from the reign of King Söngjong (981-997), when
the dynasty adopted the T'ang system of government, through the reign
of King Injong (1122-1146), which ended in the midtwelfth century.
Claims of office holding for various individuals can be found in such
sources as genealogies and local gazetteers, but I limited my considera-
tion only to appointments that are recorded in the dynastic histories, the
Koryö-sa and the Koryö-sa chöryo, in order to ensure the greatest possi-
ble reliability. I have also compiled data on the family backgrounds of
all the officials for whom such information could be found, using the
biographical information in the dynastic histories, genealogies, tomb-
stone inscriptions, and other sources such as local gazetteers. While the
data for the early Koryö period is skimpy compared to that which can be
found in the Veritable Records and genealogies of the Chosön dynasty,
48DUNCAN

there is enough to allow us to draw some conclusions about the early

Koryö central aristocracy.
A total of 1140 men appear in the dynastic histories as officials of
the central government during the 981-1146 period, including 959 civil
and 181 military officials. Two hundred and thirty-one of these men are
known to have held first- or second-grade posts in the secretariat-
chancellory or the royal secretariat. Clan origins were identified for 257
(23 percent) of the 1140 men, including 245 civil and 12 military officials.
These 257 men of known origins were spread out among a total
of eighty-seven separate clans. However, the distribution of officials
among those 87 clans was highly skewed. The bottom fifty-seven clans
accounted for only one or two officials each, while the top eighteen
accounted for 12 percent of all officials and over 53 percent of officials
with known clan ties. This indicates that a small number of clans en-
joyed a disproportionate share of political power.
Table 1 examines the leading clans of the early Koryö period, a
leading clan defined as one that produced four or more known officials
or placed two or more of its members in the elite first- and second-grade
posts. This table reveals a number of interesting aspects of the social
compositon and structure of the early Koryö central aristocracy. One is
that the clans of Silla True Bone background, such as the Kyöngju
Kims, Kangnüng Kims, and P'yöngsan Paks, were important members
of the Koryö officialdom.9 This belies the conventional notion that the
early Koryö central aristocracy was composed of the descendants of
Sixth Bone Rank officials and nonaristocratic warlords (Yi Ki-baek
1984:134).
Another interesting feature is that the leading clans came from
throughout the entire peninsula, from Kangnüng on the eastern coast,
to Ch'ogye and Yöngch'ön in the southeastern corner, and Kwangyang,
Namp'yöng, Yönggwang, and Okku in the southwest. This rebuts the
argument that the early Koryö was dominated by clans from the north-
central region and that outlying areas did not gain significant representa-
tion until the late Koryö period (Yi Su-gön 1984:225). Given the dynas-
ty's need to win the support of the local aristocrats in each area, it is not
surprising that the geographic distribution of leading clans covered the
whole country.
Table 1 also shows that the leading clans were drawn not only from
such major regional centers as Kyöngju and P'yöngsan, but also from
prefectures and counties such as Kwangyang, P'ap'yöng, Ch'ogye,
Yangch'ön, Chöngan, Namp'yöng, Ich'ön, and Yönggwang. Such a pat-
tern runs counter to the assertion that the dominant clans of the early
Koryö came from the major regional centers and that clans from the
smaller prefectures and counties did not appear in significant numbers
until the second half of the dynasty (Yi Su-gön 1984:229-230). This,
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY 49

Table 1. Leading Clans of the Central Bureaucracy, 981-1146.

surname clan seat total officials first-, second-
grade officials
Yi Kyöngwön 27 12
Kim Kyöngju 14 10
Ch'oe Haeju 13 8
Ch'oe Kyöngju 9 6
Kim Kangnüng 9 5
Han Tanju 7 2
Yu P'yöngsan 7 2
Kim Kwangyang 6 5
Pak P'yöngsan 5 2
Wang Kaegyöng 5 2
Ch'oe Suju 5 2
Yun P'ap'yöng 5 2
Chi Pongju 5 2
Ho Yangch'ön 4 2
Im Chöngan 4 4
Kwak Ch'öngju 4 2
Min Hwangnyö 4 1
Mun Namp'yöng 4 3
So Ich'ön 3 3
Chöng Ch'ogye 3 2
Im Okku 3 2
Kim Yönggwang 3 2
Yi Ch'öngju 3 2
Yi Suju 3 2
Yu Ch'ungju 3 2
Hwangbo Yöngch'ön 3 2
Kim Ansan 2 2
Yu Ch'öngju 2 2
TOTAL 28 clans 165 94

too, is no surprise, since the participation of prefecture- and county-

level aristocrats in the central government undoubtedly undercut the
ability of the leading clans of the major regional centers to rally the
lesser aristocrats of their regions for breakaway attempts.
The most important aspect of the data in Table 1 is the degree to
which these leading clans dominated the central bureaucracy. The
Kyöngwön Yi clan, of course, towered above all others, but in the
aggregate these 28 clans accounted for nearly 15 percent (165 of 1140) of
all officials and over 40 percent (94 of 231) of first- and second-grade
officials between 981 and 1146. It is impossible to know for certain how
many aristocratic clans existed during the early Koryö. Yi Su-gön puts it
at over two thousand (1984:5). But even if we used the conservative
50DUNCAN

estimate that there was only one aristocratic clan for each of the 450-
some prefectures and counties and disregarded the fact that such major
regional centers as Andong, Kyöngju, and P'yöng-san had multiple aris-
tocratic clans, the data in Table 1 would indicate that only 6 percent (28
of 450) of the kingdom's aristocratic clans accounted for over 40 percent
of its first- and second-grade officials.
Table 1 however does not provide insight into why the political
calm of the eleventh century gave way to such severe turbulence in the
twelfth. My examination of the leading clans, however, shows that a
significant change in their pattern of office-holding occurred in the late
eleventh century.
Some of the leading clans, including the Kyöngju Kim and the
Suju Ch'oe had officeholders distributed evenly throughout the 981—
1146 period. Other clans, such as the Kyöngju Ch'oe, placed most of
their known officials during the late tenth and eleventh centuries, while
several clans, including the Chöngan Im and the Namp'yöng Mun, did
not become active until the late eleventh or twelfth centuries. These
clans display three basic patterns of office holding. One was a simple
father-to-son succession of one official per generation, as seen in the
Ich'ön So and the Ch'öngju Kwak.10 A second pattern involved multiple
officials from different lines of descent within a clan holding central
offices at the same time: this pattern can be found in the Kyöngju Ch'oe
and Kyöngju Kim clans.11 The third pattern, where several brothers
are confirmed by the dynastic histories as holding high offices, existed
among the Kyöngwön Yi, Haeju Ch'oe, Chöngan, and other clans.12
The significant thing about these patterns of office holding is that the
leading clans of the late tenth and early to mideleventh centuries all
followed the first two patterns. The third did not apppear until late in
Kim Munjong's reign (1046-1083).
There are some indications that capital-based lines of descent were
able to place more than one son in office prior to King Munjong's ascen-
sion. The tombstone of Ch'oe Sa-wi, a Suju Ch'oe who was a leading
official under King Hyöngjong (1109-1131), states that all six of his sons
held posts in the central government. However, appointment to office
can be confirmed for only one, a midlevel Censorate official named
Ch'oe Ch'ung-gong (Chosen kinsekibun soran [Compilation of Korean
epigraphy], hereafter CKS 1:379-380; and Han'guk kümsökmun ch'ubo
[Korean epigraphy supplement], hereafter HGKC, p. 113). The absence
of the other five brothers from the dynastic histories is not surprising.
The histories routinely record the appointments and activities of high-
ranking officials, but rarely mention low-ranking men except in unusual
circumstances. It seems probable that Ch'ung-gong's brothers never
rose above the lower ranks. In this regard, it is worth noting that the first
verifiable cases of brothers holding offices, the Kyöngwön Yi and the
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY 51

Table 2. Clans with Two or More Sons in Office, 1070-1146.

clan father's name rank/year sons name rank/year
Chöngan Im Ui 2 1109 Wön-gae 2a 1134
Wön-jun 2a 1137
Wön-suk 3a 1141
Haeju Ch'oe Ch'ung Ib Yu-sön Ib 1073
Yu-gil Ib 1077
Yu-gil Ib Sa-ryang 2b 1087
Sa-ch'u Ib 1103
Sa-je 2a Yak 3a 1105
Yong 2b 1105
Kangnüng Kim Sang-gi 2a In-jon Ib 1126
Ko 2a 1123
Kwangyang Yang-gam 2a Üi-wön 2b 1126
Kim Yag-on 2a 1123
Kyöngju Kim Kun 3b Pu-ch'öl 2b 1126
Pu-il 2a 1127
Pu-p'il 5a 1102
Pu-sik Ib 1136
Kyöngwön Yi Cha-yön Ib Chöng Ib 1076
Chon 2b+ 1046
Sök 4a 1075
Üi 2b+ 1081
Ho 5a 1046
Chöng Ib Cha-in 3a 1088
Cha-üi 2b 1094
Cha-hyön 5a 1084
Ho 5a Cha-ryang 2a 1123
Cha-gyöm Ib 1124
Cha-gyöm Ib Chi-mi 2b 1124
Chi-ön 4a 1124
Chi-bo 5a 1124
Chi-yun 6b 1124
Chi-wön 7a 1124
Cha-sang 2a* Ye 2b 1095
Hye 2a 1103
Namp'yöng Mun Ik 3a Kong-mi 2b 1131
Kong-yu 2b 1136
Kong-wön 5a 1136
P'ap'yöng YunKwan Ib Ön-i 2b 1146
Ön-min 6a 1146
Ön-sik 4a 1136
P'yöngsan Pak Il-lyang 2b Kyöng-in 2b 1117
Kyöng-baek 5a 1107
Kyöng-san 4a 1134
Suju YiChöng-gong Ib Suk 2b 1128
Wi Ib 1116
Tanju HanKyu 4a An-in 2a 1123
An-jung 3a 1124
Tongnae ChongMok 2a* Ch'am 5b 1132
T'aek 4b 1134
Hang 3a 1135

* honorary appointments
52DUNCAN

Haeju Ch'oe in the 1070s, were instances where the men were holding
first- and second-grade posts.13 The absence of verifiable cases of
brothers holding offices in the 981-1069 period indicates that whatever
office holding by two of more brothers occurred before 1070 was prob-
ably limited to low-ranking posts. What was new after 1070 was the
presence of brothers in high offices.
How widespread was this practice during the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries? Some sense of its extent can be gained from Table 2,
which lists the clans known to have placed two or more siblings in office
during the 1070-1146 period.14 Table 2 illuminates several aspects of the
central bureaucratic aristocracy during the 1070-1143 period. It shows
that the pattern of two or more brothers holding office was widespread,
appearing in twelve clans and accounting for a total of fifty-one office-
holders. It also reveals that the men involved in this pattern tended to be
high-ranking officials, with 55 percent (twenty-eight) attaining first- or
second-grade posts. Additionally, it indicates that with time the trend
toward simultaneous officeholding among brothers accentuated, with
over 60 percent (thirty-one) of the known instances occurring during the
1123-1146 period.
Some indication of the impact of this change in the pattern of office
holding can be seen in Table 3, which compares the aggregate power of
the leading clans of the 981-1069 period with that of the leading clans of
the 1070-1146 period. The data in Table 3 indicate that the first- and
second-grade posts, where real power resided in the Koryö central gov-
ernment, came under increasing domination by the leading clans during
the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. During the 981-1069
period, the leading clans accounted for 18 percent of all clans known to
have members in central offices; this proportion saw a modest 22 per-
cent increase during the 1070-1146 period. A similarly modest increase
of 20 percent occurred in the proportion of all known officials accounted
for by the leading clans. However, the proportion of the elite first- and
second-grade officials accounted for by the leading clans jumped nearly
80 percent in the years after 1070, from 24 percent in the 981-1069
period to 43 percent in the later period. Eleven of the seventeen clans
listed for the 1070-1146 period in Table 3 are also among the twelve
clans with two or more brothers in office, shown in Table 2. It is thus
clear that the practice of placing multiple sons in office enabled the lead-
ing clans to achieve a dominant positon in the Koryö central officialdom
during the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Even while these lines of descent were rapidly expanding their
presence in the dynastic government, there was no let up in the
influx of aristocrats from the countryside. In fact, two of the lines
of descent contained in Table 2 were themselves late eleventh or early
twelfth century arrivals. Han Kyu was a product of the provincial
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY 53

Table 3. Comparison of Clan Power, 981-1069 and 1070-1146.

981-1069 1070-1146

number of ranks numbers of ranks

clan name officials 1-2 clan name officials 1-2

Kyöngju Ch'oe Kyöngwön Yi 24 11

Kyöngju Kim Haeju Ch'oe 12 7
P'yöngsan Yu Kyöngju Kim 9 6
Kaegyöng Wang Kangnüng Kim 7 5
Yöngch'ön Hwangbo Kwangyang Kim 5 3
Ich'ön So P'yöngsan Pak 5 2
Ch'ungju Yu P'ap'yöng Yun 5 2
Kwangyang Kim Tanju Han 5 1
Ansan Kim Namp'yöng Mun 4 3
Haeju Ch'oe Chöngam Im 4 3
Suju Yi 3 3
Ch'ogye Chöng 3 2
Suju Ch'oe 3 2
Yönggwang Kim 2 2
Yangch'ön Hö 2 2
Chöngju Yu 2 2
TOTALS

leading clans* 36 23 98 58
all officials 352 97 788 134
percentage 10 24 12 43

* Leading clans totaled 10 out of 56 during the 981-1069 period, or 18 percent, and 17 out
of 75 during the 1070-1146 period, or 12 percent.

qualifying examinations (KRS 97:1b), and Chöng Mok was the son
of a Tongnae headman (HGKS 2:611). Other twelfth-century new
arrivals included Ch'oe Yu from Kangnüng (KRS 98:40b), Chang Il
from Indong (HGKC p. 269), Ch'oe Ch'ok-kyöng from Chönju (KRS
99:25a), and Yi Chun-yang, also from Chönju (KRS 17:19b). Because
of the limited number of first- and second-grade posts (eight in the
secretariat-chancellory and five in the royal secretariat), the combina-
tion of proliferating central lines of descent and continuously arriving
new blood created tremendous competitive pressures.
V. Power Sharing After 1070
The primary effect of this increasing competition for power on the
bureaucratic power structure was a broader sharing of authority at the
top levels. This sharing of power took three forms. One of those forms
was an increase in the number of high-ranking posts. Although the
Monograph on Officials [Paekkwan chi] in the Koryö-sa mentions no
54DUNCAN

increase in the number of allotted official positions during the late

eleventh or twelfth centuries, there is strong evidence that de facto ex-
pansion of the upper ranks took place. The Monograph on Officials calls
for only one junior second-grade state councillor [Ch'amji chöngsa], but
on several occasions, such as in the fifth month of 1093 (KRSC 6:16b)
and the third month of 1122 (KRSC 8:34a), simultaneous multiple
appointments were made to the state councillor post. Other evidence of
this trend can be found in the junior second-grade royal undersecretary
[Chi chungch'u-wön sa] and associate royal undersecretary [Tong chi
chungch'u-wön sa] posts, also specified as single slots by the mono-
graph. In 1117 two men were simultaneously appointed royal under-
secretaries, while in 1102 and 1125 simultaneous multiple appointments
were made to the associate royal undersecretary post (KRSC 8:24,
6:41a, 9:9b). It is impossible to gauge the extent of this de facto expan-
sion of the upper ranks, although it does appear to be confined to the
junior second-grades. There is only one known instance of the appoint-
ment of more than one man to a single slot post in the pre-1070 period,15
indicating that this expansion in the junior second-grade ranks of the
central bureaucracy was basically a phenomenon of the 1070-1146
period.
Another form in which the sharing of power was broadened was
the delegation of greater authority to junior second-grade officials. The
first- and second-grade chaesin of the secretariat-chancellory formed, as
mentioned in section III, a special elite within the bureaucracy. There
were three major sources of the chaesin's power. One was their control,
as the top officials of the secretariat-chancellory, of the crucial functions
of policy formulation and review. Another was a system of concurrent
office holding that placed chaesin at the head of a variety of other agen-
cies such as the six ministries, the finance commission [Samsa sa], and
the Hanlin Academy [Hallim-wön]. The third source of their power
was the practice whereby the king regularly consulted with them on
important issues. The junior first-grade supreme chancellor and the
four senior second-grade associate chancellors [chungsö/munha sirang,
chungsölmunha sirang p'yöngjang-sa] formed an upper stratum within
the chaesin during the 981-1069 period. Not only did they enjoy higher
rank than their junior second-grade colleagues, but they also enjoyed a
monopoly over appointments to the important six ministry superinten-
dent [yukpu p'ansa] and finance commission superintendent [p'an
samsa-sa sa] posts. However, as Table 4 shows, during the 1070-1146
period, the junior second-grade officials gained a greater share of the
power exercised through concurrent appointments. The figures in Table
4 show that the junior second-grade officials of both the secretariat-
chancellory and the royal secretariat received concurrent appointments
to posts that had been monopolized by the junior first-grade and senior
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY55

Table 4. Concurrent Appointment Patterns, 981-1069 and 1070-1146.

concurrent post (rank) appointees' rank981-10691070-1146
six ministry lb4 9
superintendent (lb) 2a1226
2bs1 24
2br— —
finance commission lb1 —
superintendent (lb) 2a2 1
2bs— 3
2br— 10
Hanlin academylb
superintendent(lb)2a
2bs2 6
2br— 1
six ministrylb
minister(3a)2a
2bs1917
2br7 30

second-grade officials before 1070. The trend began in 1081 with the
appointment of a state councilor to be superintendent of the ministry of
war [pyöngbup'an sa]16 and grew more pronounced as time passed, with
80 percent of the junior second-grade appointments to six ministry su-
perintendent posts coming after 1123. The junior second-grade chaesin
of the secretariat-chancellory were not the only beneficiaries of this
shift. The ch'usin (all junior second-grade) of the royal secretariat, who
had not held any of the concurrent superintendent posts shown in the
table during the 981-1069 period, accounted for 10 of 14 known concur-
rent appointments to the finance commision superintendent post, along
with one appointment as Hanlin Academy superintendent.17 Also the
ch'usin gained greater involvement in the regular adminstration of gov-
ernment through increased appointments to six ministry minister (yuk-
pu sangsö) posts. Not only was the number of junior second-grade posts
increased, greater authority was delegated to the men who filled those
posts.
The greater authority given to the ch'usin in their concurrent
offices was closely related to the third form taken by the broader sharing
of power. This was the inclusion of the ch'usin in chaesin consultations
with the king. Throughout the Koryö dynasty, the top officials of the
secretariat-chancellory and the royal secretariat were known collectively
as the yangbu (literally, Two Departments) or the chaech'u (an abbre-
viation of chaesin and ch'usin). During the years prior to 1070, these
terms were rarely used except in conjunction with ceremonial occasions,
56DUNCAN

such as in the eleventh month of 1048 when King Munjong feasted the
high officials of the yangbu and the middle-ranking officials of all agen-
cies (KRSC 4:45a). However, during the 1070-1146 period, these terms
appear with increasing frequency in connection with important issues of
the type that had once been the sole preserve of the chaesin. For exam-
ple, in 1105 the king called the chaech'u together to discuss border
affairs at a time of high tension between Koryö and the lurched (KRS
12:18b). In 1109 the king consulted with the chaech'u on the critical
question of amnesty for Yun Kwan and other officials who had been
punished for their conduct of the lurched campaign (KRS 13:4a). In
1122 the king, on his deathbed, summoned the chaech'u to discuss the
crown prince's succession to the throne (KRS 14:41a), and in 1130 the
chaech'u discussed political affairs with the king late into the night
(KRSC 9:46b). These examples make it clear that participation in
what was perhaps the most important and prestigious function of the
bureaucracy, deliberations with the king on important matters, was
broadened to include the ch'usin of the royal secretariat in the twelfth
century.
VI. Power Struggle in the Central Aristocracy
The policy of political centralization pursued by the new Koryö
dynasty in order to consolidate its control over the Korean peninsula
resulted in the formation of a powerful central bureaucratic aristocracy.
The new central aristocracy continued to grow throughout the early
Koryö, creating a situation of intense competition for power that
formed the backdrop for the political turmoil of the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries.
The Yi Cha-üi affair of 1095 was the first major challenge to the
throne by the capital-based aristocracy. Relying on his family's power
and close marital ties to the royal family, Yi Cha-üi attempted to de-
throne the young and unwell King Höngjong (1094-1095) in favor of
Lord Hansan, a son of King Sönjong by Cha-üi's sister Princess Wön-
sin. Prince Hüi (King Sukchong) defeated Cha-üi by allying himself with
less prominent elements of the officialdom, notably associate chancellor
So T'ae-bo and grand general Wang Kuk-mo.18 This defeat did not,
however, mean the destruction of the Kyöngwön Yi clan (King Suk-
chong himself was the son of a Kyöngwön Yi woman, Queen Inye),
much less break the back of the central aristocratic power.
The second major challenge by the central aristocracy came with
the Yi Cha-gyöm revolt of 1127. This time the challenge to the royal
family was more direct. Cha-gyöm, who had reestablished the Kyöng-
wön Yi clan during the reign of King Yejong (1105-1122) and had car-
ried out a major purge of his opponents during the early years of King
Injong's reign (1122-1146), tried to depose the king and take the throne
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY57

himself, before he was stripped of power and sent into exile in 1126.
Once again the throne allied itself with elements of less illustrious
origin, in this case Ch'ök Chun-gyöng, to beat back the aristocratic
challenge. The Yi Cha-gyöm affair, however, involved more than the
struggle between aristocratic and royal power. A recent study has
shown that the forces opposed to Yi Cha-gyöm were composed pri-
marily of newer arrivals from the countryside, led by Han An-in of
Tanju (Shultz 1983:99-100). The competition between established lines
of descent and recent arrivals now manifested itself in open strug-
gles for power.
The conventional description of the Myoch'öng revolt is that of a
struggle between the Confucianized central aristocracy, now led by the
Kyöngju Kim and Chöngan Im clans, and anti-Confucian regional
forces from the P'yongyang area. While this description is certainly
valid, it should be kept in mind that when Myoch'öng was brought into
the capital and made political advisor to the king in 1128, he encoun-
tered strong opposition from associate chancellor Kim Pu-sik (Kyöngju
Kim), state councilor Im Wön-gae (Chöngan Im) and royal transmitter
(Süngsön, senior third-grade post in the royal secretariat), Yi Chi-jö
(Kyöngwön Yi) (KRS 127:27b). The powerful central aristocratic clan
affiliations of the men who stepped forth to oppose Myoch'öng's
appointment suggests that Myoch'öng and his P'yongyang group were
brought in as a counterbalance to the powerful central aristocrats. This
likelihood is strengthened by the fact Myoch'öng almost immediately
promulgated a fifteen-point restoration rescript [yusin chigyo] calling
for austerity and urging measures to restrict official exploitation of the
peasantry (KRS 15:23a). The Kaegyöng-based central aristocracy's re-
sistance to the reform efforts of the Myoch'öng group appears to have
been one of the main initial motives behind the movement to relocate
the capital to P'yongyang (Yi Pyöng-do pp. 429-430) Thus the forma-
tion of a powerful central aristocracy and the resulting competition
between central and local forces were important background factors
for Myoch'öng's revolt as well as the Yi Cha-üi and Yi Cha-gyöm
affairs.
The factional strife born of excessive competition seems also to
have been closely related to the trend toward broader sharing of power
at the top of the bureaucracy. This is seen most clearly in the appoint-
ments of more than one man to offices specified as single slots. For ex-
ample, the 1093 appointment of So Chöng, Kim Sang-gi, and Yu Sök to
the state councilor post came at a time when pressures were building
between Yi Cha-üi's group and Prince Hüi. Although there is no sub-
sequent record of So Chöng, both Kim Sang-gi and Yu Sök were pro-
moted and given honorary titles shortly after Prince Hüi took the throne,
apparent rewards for their roles in the struggle between Prince Hüi and
58DUNCAN

Yi Cha-üi (KRS 11:3a, 92:11a). The timing of these appointments and

the men involved suggest that competition-induced factional politics was
a major contributing factor to the de facto expansion in the number of
top political offices.
The twelfth-century course of events, ultimately leading to the
military coup of 1170, indicates that the political system's response was
inadequate to contain the competitive pressures of the burgeoning cen-
tral aristocracy. To the contrary, the broader sharing of power at the top
levels of government may have exacerbated the situation by further
whetting aristocratic appetites for power while postponing meaningful
reform.
The twelfth-century sociopolitical order seems remarkably similar
to that of fourteenth-century Koryö. The later Koryö featured a power-
ful capital-based aristocracy that deliberated on political issues in the
privy council (todang, or to p'yöngüi-sa sa), whose membership had
grown to include over seventy chaech'u officials. The trend towards
the expansion of the upper ranks of the bureaucracy, although greatly
accelerated in the later Koryö, is common to both periods. The Koryö-
sa clearly states that the chaesin and ch'usin did not form a joint de-
liberative council until the Mongol era, but the increased participation
of the ch'usin in consultation with the king indicates that the trend to-
ward chaech'u joint decision-making was already established in the
twelfth century. These similarities suggest that historical inquiry into
the time between the military coup of 1170 and the collapse of Mongol
power in the 1350s should focus not only on how Koryö society and
politics changed, but also on how the aristocratic order resisted
change.

NOTES
1.Yi Pyöng-do (1966:420-421), for example, says, "I call this period the 'era of
conflict.' This is because the various inconsistencies and elements of conflict that had
existed in institutions and in the sloth and corruption of the civil aristocrats during the
previous period exploded successively during this period, causing all sorts of discord." The
definitive studies of the early Koryö aristocracy include Fujita Ryosaku's (1934, 1935)
work on the Kyöngwön Yi clan and its marriage partners; and Hugh Kang's (1964) study
of the origins of the Koryö aristocracy.
2.Recent studies of early Koryo intellectual history have emphasized the contem-
poraneous development of Neo-Confucian concepts in eleventh century Korea and Sung
China. The evidence for this, however, is indirect and sparse. Furthermore, even if such a
trend did exist, its failure to persist beyond 1170 indicates that it was shallowly rooted and
of minimal historical significance. See Mun Ch'ör-yong (1982:99-105).
3.The lurched Chin did displace the Khitan Liao in 1114, but this change of dynas-
ties in Manchuria/Northern China had little effect on Koryö's diplomatic situation or
domestic politics.
4.Members of the Kangnüng Kim clan who participated in the founding of the
THE CENTRAL ARISTOCRACY59

Koryö include Kim (Wang) Sun-sik, Kim (Wang) Ye, and Kim Kyöng. See the Koryö-sa
(hereafter KRS) 88:6b.
5.Kim Yong-dök (1977) presents a concise description of the status-based
prefecture-county system. The original work in this area was done by Hatada Takashi
(1972:3-40).
6.A more recent interpretation (Kim Su-t'ae. 1981:41-64), argues that the clan
seat system was imposed from above by the throne. This view holds that there was much
wandering among the people of late Silla and early Koryö, and that the settling of these
people was a major problem for the new dynasty. The establishment of the clan seat
system as a means for registering the whole population and tying them to specific locations
was the new dynasty's response to this problem; this was accomplished before the end of
Kwangjong's reign. According to this line of argument, while there are numerous exam-
ples of Wang Kön granting surnames and clan seats, there are no materials showing fami-
lies assuming clan seats for themselves. There are some problems with this argument.
First, it is difficult to imagine how the dynasty could have registered and bound the whole
population to specific locations by the midtenth century when it was not even able to post
its first centrally appointed officials to local offices until late in the tenth century. Further-
more, there is evidence that powerful local families were identifying themselves by their
locale. The Mansöng taedong-bo, among other sources, shows how Kim Chu-wön, the
founder of the Kangnüng Kim clan, migrated to Kangnüng in the late eighth century
where he styled hmself the "king of Myöngju (Kangnüng) County," and how Kim Hüng-
gwang, the third son of Silla's King Hön'gang, migrated to Kwangsan, where he became
"lord of Kwangsan" [Kwangsan puwon-gun] and the founder of the Kim family. Another
example can be found in the P'yöngsan Pak family. According to the twelfth-century
tombstones of members of the P'yöngsan Pak family, one Pak Chig-yun, son of the Lord
of Ch'alsan Ch'aek-ko, relocated to P'yöngju (P'yöngsan), where he took up residence,
built a number of fortresses, and took control of the area; since that time the family was
known as the P'yöngsan Pak. This is presented in Hö Hüng-sik (1984) (hereafter HGKS),
vol. 2, pp, 563, 751. These examples not only show that powerful local families identified
themselves with their localities, they also suggest how Bone Rank prestige may have been
passed on through the clan seat system.
7.At the beginning of the dynasty, the Koryö central government was essentially a
continuation of the Silla system, with the secretariat [kwangp'yöng-söng] providing the
same kind of forum the hwabaek council, and later the chöngsa-dang, provided the Silla
True Bones, and the chancellory [naebong-söng] fulfilling the administrative role of the
executive bureau [chipsa-bu]. The early Koryö government did display one feature differ-
ent from Silla: the military coordinating council [sun'gun-bu], where the confederation
aristocrats coordinated the activities of their military forces. See Yi Ki-baek (1981:8-21).
The first significant changes to this system became evident under Kwangjong with the
disappearance of the military coordinating council and the emergence of a new chancel-
lory, the naeüi-söng, an organ staffed with Confucian-trained officials whose job was to
advise the king on policy matters. See Pyön T'ae-söp (1971:3-5). The appearance of this
organ was significant as a bureaucratic counterbalance to the aristocratic secretariat and as
a precursor of future bureaucratic organization.
8.An earlier explanation of the mixed bureaucratic-aristocratic nature of the
Koryö central officialdom is presented in Kim Ui-gyu (1973:61-76).
9.Yi Su-gön (1984:196-198), presents a good discussion of the Kyöngju Kim clan
in the early Koryö. Note 6 provides evidence for the true bone origins of the Kangnüng
Kim and P'yöngsan Pak clans.
10.So P'il held the first-grade chancellor post under King Kyöngjong (975-981);
P'il's son Hüi rose to be supreme chancellor under King Söngjong (981-967); and Hüi's
son Nul also served as supreme chancellor under kings Tökchong (1031-1034) and Chöng-
jong (1034-1046) (KRS 94:6a-b). There is some indication that the Ich'ön So developed
two lines of descent in the mid-eleventh century. See Yi Su-gön (1984:172-173). How-
ever, P'il, Hüi, and Nul constitute a prime example of simple father-to-son succession
during the tenth and early eleventh centuries. Kwak Won was a second-grade state
councilor during the reigns of Mokch'öng (997-1009); his son Chung held an unspecified
position under King Tökchong; Chung's son Sang served as state councilor during the
60DUNCAN

reigns of Sönjong (1084-1094) and Sukchong (1095-1105). The sources mention two sons
for Sang, Yo and Tan. Whether Tan held office is not known, but Yo passed the govern-
ment service examinations and held lower-ranking posts (KRS 94:32b-33a, and 97:8a-10a) .
11.One line of father-to-son succession in the Kyöngju Ch'oe clan was that of
Ch'oe Süng-no, the great supreme chancellor under King Söngjong. Süng-no's son Suk
rose to a senior third-grade post in the royal secretariat under King Hyönjong (1009-
1031); Suk's son Che-an was supreme chancellor in 1046; Che-an's son Kye-hun, the
last of this line known to have held office, received an eighth-grade post at the time of
his father's death. See KRS 93:2a, 93:22b, and the Chösen sötokufu (1919) vol. 1,
p. 242. Another line of descent was the descendents of Ch'oe Ön-wi, who was an impor-
tant scholar official during the first few reigns of the Koryö: one of Ön-wi's sons, Kwang-
yun, went to China, but the other Kwang-wön, held office under King Kwangjong;
Kwang-wön's son Hang served as associate chancellor under King Hyöngjong. Hang had
two sons, but only one, Yu-bu, is known to have held high office with his appointment as
superintendent of the ministry of punishment in 1071; the other son, Yöng-bu, appears
only as a local official. See KRS 93:31a, and note 9 for information on the Kyöngju Kims.
12.The details of officeholding by brothers in these lines of descent are shown in
Table 2. See Fujita (1934, 1935) for information on the Kyöngwön Yi and other clans that
produced large numbers of officials during the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.
13.Two of Yi Cha-yön's sons can be verified as first- or second-grade officials in
the dynastic histories: Chöng (associate chancellor in 1075), and Koe (royal undersecret-
ary in 1091) (KRSC 5:31b, KRS 9:33b). Two of Ch'oe Ch'ung's sons also can be verified as
first- or second-grade officials in the dynastic histories: Yu-sön (died as supreme chancellor
in 1073) and Yu-gil (junior first-grade finance commission superintendent in 1077) (KRS
9:12b, 9:17b).
14.The rank column of Table 2 shows the highest ranks held, and the year column
indicates the year or reign when the highest rank was achieved. Most of the men for whom
a reign, rather than a specific year, is indicated are cases where the office held was
mentioned in the biographies rather than in the annals.
15.Two men were appointed to the state councilor post in the first month of 1028
(KRS 5:7b).
16.KRSC 5:38b. Yi Cha-yön's tombstone indicated that he held a six-ministry
superintendent post as a junior second-grade official during the 981-1069 period. This may
have been a precursor of the later trend.
17.The ch'usin did hold other concurrent posts during the 981-1069 period in both
the censurate and the middle-ranking nangsa posts of the secretariat-chancellory. This
pattern continued in the 1070-1146 period.
18.Yi Pyöng-do (1966: 222-225).

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AUTHOR'S NOTE. The author would like to acknowledge his debt to Professor
Hugh Kang of the University of Hawaii for his invaluable assistance in conducting the
research for this paper.