Received: 2 June 2016 | Revised: 15 December 2016 | Accepted: 19 December 2016

DOI 10.1111/beer.12147

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

When organizations are too good: Applying Aristotle’s doctrine

of the mean to the corporate ethical virtues model

Muel Kaptein

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus

University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Correspondence
Muel Kaptein, Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University, Room
T11-52, P.O. Box 1730, 3000 DR
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: mkaptein@rsm.nl
Abstract
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean states that a virtue is the mean state between two vices: a defi-
cient and an excessive one. The Corporate Ethical Virtues (CEV) Model defines the mean and the
corresponding deficient vice for each of its seven virtues. This paper defines for each of these vir-
tues the corresponding excessive vice and explores why organizations characterized by these
excessive vices increase the likelihood that their employees will behave unethically. The excessive
vices are patronization, pompousness, lavishness, zealotry, overexposure, talkativeness, and
oppressiveness.

1 | INTRODUCTION
Virtue ethics is a prominent approach in normative ethics and many
scholars have called for its further development and application to
business (Ferrero & Sison, 2014; Hartman, 2013; Koehn, 1995).
According to Solomon (1992), one of the founders of virtue-based
business ethics, virtue ethics does not impose prohibitive principles or
rules that obstruct business behavior; instead, virtue ethics fosters an
intrinsic motivation that drives successful business behavior. Virtue
ethics shifts the focus on what counts as good from act to agent, from
doing to being, and from conduct and consequences to character.
The call to develop virtue ethics for business has resulted in a
number of virtues being proposed for managers and employees. For
example, Shanahan and Hyman (2003) emphasize the virtues of empa-
thy, the protestant work ethic, piety, reliability, respect, and incorrupti-
bility; Morales-S
anchez and Cabello-Medina (2015) recommend, based
on a thorough examination of current literature, a list of 16 virtues,
including amiability, generosity, and transcendence. Researchers also
propose different kinds of virtues for the organization. Solomon (1992)
argues that business should display the virtues of community, role
identity, excellence, integrity, judgment, and holism. Moore (2015) pro-
poses eight corporate virtues, such as temperance, courage, and zeal.
The Corporate Ethical Virtues (CEV) Model (Kaptein, 1998) presents
one of the most elaborately developed sets of virtues for business. The
CEV Model is derived from an analysis of 150 practices of unethical
behavior. This analysis was the basis for seven relevant ethical virtues
that were defined and subsequently tested (DeBode, Armenakis, Feild,
& Walker, 2013; Kangas, Feldt, Huhtala, & Rantanen, 2014; Kaptein,
2008, 2011a), and applied (De Vries & van Gelder, 2015; Huhtala &
Feldt, 2016; Huhtala, Feldt, Lämsä, Mauno, & Kinnunen, 2011;
Huhtala, Kangas, Lämsä, & Feldt, 2013; Huhtala, Kaptein, & Feldt,
2016; Huhtala, Tolvanen, Mauno, & Feldt, 2014; Kangas, Muotka, Huh-
tala, Mäkikangas, & Feldt, 2017; Kaptein, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2011c;
Riivari, Lämsä, Kujala, and Heiskanen, 2012; Ruiz-Palomino &
~as, 2014).
Martínez-Can
The CEV Model proceeds from the assumption that the stronger
the presence of the virtues, the better they are because they should
lead to less unethical behavior and to more ethical behavior. The father
of virtue ethics, the philosopher Aristotle, argues in his two ethical trea-
tises, Eudemian Ethics (2012) and Nicomachean Ethics (1908), that a vir-
tue is a mean between two vices. Unethical behavior is not only more
likely to occur when there is deficiency but also when there is excess
of a particular characteristic. Aristotle suggests that if courage is a vir-
tue, then cowardice (deficiency) and rashness (excess) are the vices.
Given this assumption, this paper is specifically interested in exploring
what the corresponding excesses (as opposed to deficiencies) are of the
virtues advocated by the CEV Model, how to define these excessive
vices, and why they increase the likelihood of unethical behavior by
employees. Approaching business ethics from this perspective will help
us understand the occurrence of unethical behavior within organiza-
tions that are too good in the moral sense.
To address the objective of this paper, we will first present Aristo-
tle’s doctrine of the mean: what it is, what it is not, and what its contri-
bution is to our study of the CEV Model. We will then give a
description of the CEV Model, followed by a discussion of whether and
how we can apply Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean to the CEV Model.
For each of the seven proposed virtues of the CEV Model, we will
explore whether there is a corresponding excess, what this excess is,

Business Ethics: A Eur Rev 2017; 1–12 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/beer V

C 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd | 1
2 |
how we can label it, and why this excess increases the likelihood of
unethical behavior.
2 | ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN
The classical Greek philosophers were the first in the West to examine
virtues and Aristotle is the most closely associated with virtue ethics.
His ethical treatises are a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the
good human life. For Aristotle, being virtuous is a state of character or
a disposition that is conducive to happiness or well-being (eudaimonia).
As Aristotle puts it, “the virtue of man also will be the state of character
which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well”
(NE, II.6). He classified virtues into two types: intellectual (deliberative
excellence and contemplative wisdom) and moral (courage, temperate-
ness, liberality, and justice). The doctrine of the mean is a central con-
cept in Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
The Nichomachean Ethics (NE) discusses the doctrine of the mean
with reference to becoming good through consistent practice. To
become good, we must examine the nature of actions and what pro-
duces and destroys virtue. Aristotle posits that the nature of things can
be destroyed by deficiency as well as by excess. He illustrates this by
means of a medical analogy: people destroy their physical strength not
only by exercising too little but also by exercising too much. Similarly,
when people eat too little or too much, they destroy their health. How-
ever, proportionate exercising and eating produce, increase, and pre-
serve health. The same holds for moral virtues: they are destroyed by
deficiency and excess, and preserved by the mean. Therefore, “virtue is
a kind of mean, since [. . .] it aims at what is intermediate” (NE, II.6).
2.1 | How to define Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean
To understand Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, we have to look at
how he developed it. Aristotle starts his treatise on the doctrine of the
mean with the claim that moral passions and actions are “continuous
and divisible” (NE, II.6). Moral passions—which Aristotle describes as
feelings, such as fear and confidence, that are accompanied by pleasure
and pain—and actions—which is how people respond to these passions
(Arjoon, 2000)—are gradual in the sense that they can be more or less
present. For example, people feel more or less afraid, or they have
more or less confidence.
As moral passions and actions are continuous and divisible, there is
the possibility of deficiency and excess in terms of our possessing them.
Moral passions and actions can be too little or too much. As Aristotle
puts it, “For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger
and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much
and too little” (NE, II.6).
In their ultimate expressions, these deficiencies and excesses are
extremes. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses the term “extreme” fre-
quently, 26 times to be precise, to illustrate what absolute deficiency
and absolute excess imply. For example, he discusses anger as having
both excessive and deficient forms (NE, II.7). The person at the excess
extreme is irascible and the person at the deficiency extreme is
inirascible.
KAPTEIN
These extremes are diametrically opposed to each other. For Aris-
totle, “the extreme states are contrary to each other” (NE, II.8): the
great is opposed to the small, and the small is opposed to the great.
These extremes “show the greatest unlikeness to each other; now con-
traries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so
that things that are further apart are more contrary” (NE, II.8). There-
fore, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other.
These extremes of moral passions and actions are vices. For Aris-
totle, “excess and defect are characteristic of vice” (NE, II.6) because
they represent the two ways of failing to be right or good. They are
vices because they “fall short of or exceed what is right in both pas-
sions and actions” (NE, II.6). They destroy goodness and are therefore
bad, objectionable, and should thus be avoided.
There is a mean between these two vices, an intermediate (mesos)
between deficiency and excess. This follows from Aristotle’s assumption
of the divisibility and continuity of the passions, which entails that “in
everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more,
less, or an equal amount” (NE, II.6). This “equal amount” of deficiency
and excess, the mean, is “neither too much nor too little” (NE, II.6).
This mean is thus a virtue, according to Aristotle. The mean is the
most desirable because “it maximizes the avoidance of the two unde-
sirable extremes” (Hadreas, 2002, p. 362). It preserves goodness in that
adding or taking anything away would destroy goodness. Therefore,
the intermediate is praised as a form of success or excellence (NE, II.6).
This mean is relative to us. For Aristotle, the mean is “not in the
object” but “relative to us” (NE, II.6). By “the mean in the object,” Aris-
totle means “what is equally distant from either extreme, which is one
and the same for everyone” (NE, II.6); by “the mean relative to us,” he
means that the mean depends on the situation. To explain this, Aris-
totle uses the example of the desirable amount of food for athletes
(NE, II.6). If ten pounds of food is a large portion for someone but two
pounds too small, it does not follow that six pounds would be desirable
for an athlete. This amount is perhaps too much for a beginner but too
little for an experienced athlete. So “the mean relative to us” implies
that the mean is “not one, nor the same for all” (NE, II.6).
2.2 | What Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is not
There are various interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean.
As Urmson (1988, p. 28) puts it, “few philosophical theories have been
more frequently and more grossly misunderstood [. . .] than the doc-
trine of the mean.” The diversity of interpretations may be explained
by the ambiguity of Aristotle’s account. Aristotle himself acknowledges
that his account is true but “by no means clear” (NE, VI.1). To interpret
his doctrine correctly, we should also be clear about what it is not.
The mean is not the middle—in the sense of the deficient and exces-
sive part having the same length—and therefore cannot be conceived in
arithmetical terms (NE, II.6). The mean is not fixed, but flexible in the
sense that it depends on the individual and circumstances (NE, II.8). It is
not necessarily one point, but may cover a range of dispositions and
actions (Koehn, 2012), and it does not involve only one parameter
because being virtuous requires that one should feel and act “at the
right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people,
KAPTEIN
with the right motive, and in the right way” (NE, II.6). The mean is not
only quantitative but can also be qualitative (Oates, 1936) because peo-
ple can be blamed for doing something that is particularly wrong, for
example, “being angry with the wrong person” (Rapp, 2006, p. 120). The
mean is neither an infinite tendency—there is no excess of a virtue
(Oates, 1936)— nor is it in the object: it is in the subject because the
objective of a given mean must be something beyond that mean
(Koehn, 2012). Furthermore, the doctrine is not intended to provide prac-
tical guidelines (Rapp, 2006); it does not imply moderateness and medioc-
rity (Koehn, 2012; Losin, 1987); and hitting the mean is not easy but
even difficult (NE, II.6; II.9; IV.1) and hard work (Sison & Ferrero, 2015).
2.3 | Contribution of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean has it opponents and proponents. One
of its critics is Hursthouse (1980, 2006, p. 99), for whom Aristotle’s
doctrine is “not only a false doctrine, but a silly one.” Williams (1985)
and Barnes (1976) are also very critical. Urmson (1973) is less critical
because he considers the doctrine to be, “at the very least . . . a sub-
stantial doctrine worthy of Aristotle’s genius” (p. 230). For Urmson, the
doctrine is plausible when correctly interpreted. Losin (1987) is more
positive. In his view, the doctrine of the mean is a worthwhile enter-
prise. For Curzer (1996), the doctrine offers a plausible picture of the
virtues. Oates (1936), Bosley (1995), Bostock (2000), Rapp (2006),
Koehn (2012), and Hartman (2013) also defend the significance of Aris-
totle’s doctrine of the mean. For example, Oates (1936, p. 392) appre-
ciates its flexibility and points out that “the fact that it admits of
comparatively simple elucidation bespeaks its great usefulness as a
practical guide to living.”
To date, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean has been applied to
some extent in the business and management literature. For example,
Hadreas (2002) applies the doctrine to the vices and virtues of
wealth. Moberg (1997) refers to the doctrine but then only examines
the deficient side of employee vice. The contribution of Aristotle’s
doctrine of the mean to our paper is its emphasis on the importance
of recognizing and specifying for a given virtue not only the defi-
ciency extreme but also the corresponding excess extreme. To pro-
pose and embed a virtue without defining and acknowledging what
counts as its excess is to ignore the fact that a virtue is a mean and
that exceeding the mean is counterproductive. Aristotle’s doctrine of
the mean also helps us to determine whether a proposed virtue really
is a virtue. If every virtue has two vices, then if we are unable to
define both its deficient and excessive sides, we have to conclude
that it is a false virtue.
3 | THE CORPORATE ETHICAL VIRTUES
MODEL
The CEV Model is grounded on a virtue-based theory of business
ethics. An important point of departure of the CEV Model is that
organizations can be ethically assessed because they are moral enti-
ties. We can attribute organizations with moral agency or autonomy
because they have a strategy, structure, and culture (Kaptein &
| 3
Wempe, 2002). In this respect, the CEV Model deviates from an
individualistic or functional conception of ethical responsibilities, such
as that proposed by Velasquez (1983). The CEV Model extends the
conception proposed by French (1984), who bases the moral
autonomy of organizations on their internal decision-making struc-
ture, by adding the organizational strategy and culture as grounds
for ascribing moral responsibility to organizations. To view organiza-
tions as moral entities is not to deny the individual responsibility of
employees. There may be situations in which both the organization
and its employees can be held morally responsible (Constantinescu &
Kaptein, 2015).
The CEV Model posits that the virtuousness of an organization is
located in the way it stimulates employees to behave ethically and pre-
vents them from behaving unethically (Kaptein, 1998). Because of the
actual and potential influence of the organizational strategy, structure,
and culture on the behavior of employees, the organization contributes
to the behavior of employees or fails to do so where it is required. The
CEV Model proposes that the more an organization stimulates employ-
ees to behave ethically and the more it discourages them from behav-
ing unethically, the more virtuous it is. The virtuousness of an
organization is not directly related to the frequency of (un)ethical
behavior by employees, although the basis and expectation of the CEV
Model is that the more virtuous an organization is, the less unethical
behavior and the more ethical behavior there would be (Kaptein,
2008).
According to the CEV Model, corporate ethical virtues are the
organizational conditions for ethical behavior. They are embedded in
the organizational strategy, structure, and culture, which reflect the
capacity of an organization to stimulate ethical behavior and to dis-
courage unethical behavior among employees. To define the relevant
virtues, Kaptein (1998) conducted a qualitative analysis of real-life
cases that encompassed a diverse range of unethical behaviors caused
by a failing organizational strategy, structure, or culture. He then cate-
gorized the organizational factors that contributed to unethical behav-
ior and formulated them positively into seven ethical virtues: clarity,
congruency, feasibility, supportability, transparency, discussability, and
sanctionability. Kaptein (2008) proposes that this set of generic and
procedural virtues are relevant and applicable to any business
organization.
To measure the corporate ethical virtues, Kaptein (2008) devel-
oped a questionnaire that is proven to have robust validity. Factor anal-
ysis showed that the virtue of congruency falls into two distinct
categories: ethical role modeling of supervisors and ethical role model-
ing of management higher in the line of command than one’s supervi-
sor. A survey of 341 work groups showed that at least six virtues are
significantly related to the frequency of observed unethical behavior
(Kaptein, 2011a). Other research showed a significant relationship
between the virtues and whistle blowing (Kaptein, 2011b), engagement
(Huhtala et al., 2014), commitment (Huhtala & Feldt, 2016), absence
due to illness (Kangas et al. 2017), well-being (Huhtala et al. 2011,
2016), delinquency (De Vries & van Gelder, 2015), and citizenship
~as, 2014).
(Ruiz-Palomino & Martínez-Can
4 |
T A B LE 1 Corporate ethical virtues and their vices
Sphere
1. Norms for ethical behavior
2. Ethical behavior of managers and supervisors
3. Resources for ethical behavior
4. Motivation for ethical behavior
5. View on ethical behavior
6. Discussion of ethical issues
7. Enforcement of ethical behavior
4 | APPLYING ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE
OF THE MEAN TO THE CEV MODEL
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean treats virtues as the mean between
two vices. With respect to the CEV Model, the deficient side of its vir-
tues has been considered implicitly by Kaptein (1998, 2008), without
defining or describing them, while the excessive side has not yet
received any attention. The questions we want to address now are
what the corresponding excessive side is for each of the seven pro-
posed virtues of the CEV Model, how we can label both these excesses
and their relevant deficiencies, and why excess increases the likelihood
of unethical behavior. Table 1 presents an overview of the results.
4.1 | Patronization
The CEV Model’s virtue of clarity refers to the organization making
clear to employees what is expected of them in ethical terms (Kaptein,
2008). The CEV Model holds that if employees understand what is
expected of them, then they are more likely to behave ethically and
less likely to behave unethically. This corresponds with the rational-
bureaucratic control theory, which proceeds from the assumption that
employees will behave ethically if they have a clear understanding of
what is expected of them (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl,
2002). Therefore, the ethical norms to which employees are expected
to adhere should be concrete, comprehensive, and understandable.
We can label the absence of clarity as ambiguity. In such a situa-
tion, the organization’s expectations of its employees are vague and
unclear. The CEV Model already notes that vagueness is a potential
antecedent to unethical behavior. Given that the ethical issues encoun-
tered in the work environment differ from those in other social settings
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999), employees who are left to rely on their
own values and norms run a greater risk of behaving unethically than
employees who are adequately informed. In their research among pur-
chasing agents, Robertson and Rymon (2001) found that ethical ambi-
guity on the part of the organization—defined as the degree of
uncertainty about what is ethically expected of employees—correlated
with employees’ unethical behavior.
Next to a lack of clarity, there can also be situations in which there
is, so to speak, too much clarity: there are too many norms, or they are
KAPTEIN
Vice: deficiency Virtue: mean Vice: excess
Ambiguity Clarity Patronization
Subversiveness Congruency Pompousness
Scantiness Feasibility Lavishness
Animosity Supportability Zealotry
Opaqueness Transparency Overexposure
Muteness Discussability Talkativeness
Laxity Sanctionability Oppressiveness
too detailed, or both. There is then too little or no room for the perso-
nal morality of employees because morality is too closely prescribed by
the organization. At its extreme, ethics is programmed to the last detail,
and employees experience the organization as a dictatorship that
leaves them with no moral freedom. In such organizations, there are,
for example, overly voluminous policies (Cropanzano & Byrne, 2001).
Where there is too much clarity, we can label the situation as
patronization.
Patronization is in itself unethical because in its extreme, employ-
ees are treated like robots that can be fully programmed, indoctrinated,
and brainwashed. There is thus a total absence of respect for the indi-
vidual’s moral autonomy, that is, the moral identity, opinion, and con-
science of the individual (Faunce, Bolsin, & Chan, 2004; Stansbury &
Barry, 2007). Furthermore, patronization increases the risk of employ-
ee’s unethical behavior because it decreases their moral sensitivity. The
more the organization prescribes norms, the more it discourages
employees from using their own moral judgment because it suggests
that where there are no prescribed norms everything is allowed.
Patronization also inhibits employees’ exercise of discretion in situa-
tions that require adapting to changing conditions (Cropanzano &
Byrne, 2001). According to resistance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981),
an organization that is patronizing toward its employees may prompt
unethical behavior if people feel that the norms infringe on their
autonomy and that doing the opposite of what is being prescribed
would restore their freedom (see also Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon,
Miller, & Hall, 2003).
There is some evidence that there can be too much clarity and
that it has negative consequences. Katz-Navon, Naveh, and Stern
(2005) conducted a study in which they looked for a curvilinear rela-
tionship between the level of detail in safety procedures and the num-
ber of treatment errors in Israeli hospitals. They found that employees
experience procedures negatively not only when these are seen as
lacking but also when they are perceived to be excessive. Procedures
that are too detailed may be viewed as interfering with the daily work-
flow, as bureaucratic, as complicating the jobs of employees, and as
burdensome, demanding too great an investment of time and human
resources. The researchers found an optimal level between the two
extreme poles of too little and too much detail: an optimal intermediate
level of detail where safety performance peaked as a result of
KAPTEIN
employees being able to use the procedures and thus avoid resenting a
high degree of imposed structure.
4.2 | Pompousness
Congruency is the second virtue in the CEV Model. Congruency, also
called consistency, refers to the extent to which managers and supervi-
sors set a good example for employees regarding ethics (Kaptein,
2008). Managers and supervisors are important role models within
~o, & Harrison, 2005). The behavior of
organizations (Brown, Trevin
managers and supervisors that is consistent or aligned with the ethical
norms of the organization serves to reinforce the importance of these
norms while communicating to employees the sort of behavior
expected of them. Research by Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes,
and Salvador (2009) has shown that employees imitate the ethical lead-
ership displayed by their managers.
A deficiency in congruency can be labeled as subversiveness. In
such circumstances, role model behavior is not only absent, but man-
agement can even display behavior that contradicts ethical norms. This
would entail undermining ethical norms, for example, through fraud,
corruption, and intimidation (P

aez & Salgado, 2016). Longitudinal
~o, and Sweitzer (2008) involving
research conducted by Detert, Trevin
265 restaurants showed that when employees perceive their managers
as abusive, unethical behavior, such as theft, disregard for rules, and
carelessness in the workplace, increases.
Next to a lack of role-model behavior, there can also be too much
role modeling. In this situation the behavior of managers and supervi-
sors is stilted, pretentious, bombastic, and magniloquent. It is over the
top, as if they are angels or saints. Managers and supervisors then go
too far, for example, by refusing any gifts, never declaring expenses, or
never taking part in any sideline activities. In this regard, Kolb (2011)
argues that CEOs should not be like saints by exercising too much self-
restraint concerning their wages. We can label the situation of exces-
sive congruency as pompousness.
Pompousness is a vice in itself in that managers and supervi-
sors are hypocritical by pretending to be more ethical than they
actually are or could be (Benjamin, 1990). It also increases the like-
lihood of unethical behavior by employees. In situations character-
ized by pompousness, employees may perceive management as
sanctimonious and thus take them less seriously. Employees may
also take management less seriously because it does not show a
good understanding of the difficulties employees face to behave
ethically in their work. Employees may also see managers and
supervisors as being naïve, unable to see that being highly ethical
may pose some threat to the economic performance of the organi-
zation. This could lead employees to be less influenced by the
management’s example and to rely too much on their own
discretion.
One study already indicates the negative consequences of pom-
pousness. In their paper, “Can a leader be seen as too ethical?,”
Stouten, van Dijke, Mayer, De Cremer, and Euwema (2013) demon-
strate the curvilinear effects of ethical leadership on organizational citi-
zenship behavior. Their explanation for their findings is that employees
| 5
consider leaders who are too ethical to be less attractive as role mod-
els. Employees view leaders who maintain high levels of ethical norms
and behavior as ethically unattainable. They feel that their own moral-
ity pales in comparison to that of management, that they are being
looked down upon, and that they are morally unequal; all of which dis-
courage them from behaving ethically.
4.3 | Lavishness
The third virtue in the CEV Model is feasibility, also called achievability,
realizability, or attainability. This virtue implies that employees have at
their disposal sufficient time, budgets, equipment, information, and
authority to fulfil their ethical responsibilities (Kaptein, 2008). The
more resources employees have, the better they are able to realize
~ o (1986) argues,
their ethical responsibilities. For example, as Trevin
employees who have sufficient time to carry out their responsibilities
are more inclined to behave ethically than those who are under great
time pressure. Latham and Locke (2006) also show that goals should be
attainable in order for employees to do what is expected of them.
Feasibility is deficient when employees have insufficient or no
resources at their disposal to realize their ethical responsibilities. Strain
theory, developed by Merton (1938), suggests that people resort to
unethical behavior when they are unable to achieve their goals through
legitimate means. Research by Cressey (1953) and Robertson and
Rymon (2001) shows that the more limited the resources employees
have at their disposal, the higher the frequency of unethical behavior.
We label this vice as scantiness.
Next to the deficiency of resources, there is also the excess of fea-
sibility. This is when there are more resources available than what is
optimally required to meet ethical responsibilities. In these circumstan-
ces, the organization is extravagant and even wasteful, in the sense
that it thinks there is no too high a price for ethics: too many resources
are invested in behaving ethically, and there is no or hardly any limit to
their availability. For example, employees are given too many training
courses in ethics, managers get a blank check or carte blanche in man-
aging ethics, and ethics officers have infinite budgets and limitless
authority. In his discussion of the feeling or action of giving, Aristotle
identifies prodigality as the vice, liberality as the mean, and meanness
as its deficiency (NE, IV.1). In our case, we call the excess of feasibility
lavishness.
Lavishness is in itself a vice because it misuses resources and
diverts them away from other more deserving causes. Bowmen, as
cited by Singer (1993), stated that an organization can be too ethical:
“You can spend too much time, too much effort, on almost anything.”
Bowmen did not suggest that organizations should not be ethical but
that there are limits. “A company, too, can pay so much attention to
‘doing good’ that its traditional business suffers.” When ethics receives
too much or a disproportionate amount of attention, it may threaten
the financial viability of the organization, which will decrease the room
for ethics in the organization, and in the case of bankruptcy, it will
exclude ethics in its entirety.
Lavishness also increases the risks of unethical behavior because it
may lead to recklessness, inefficiency, extravagance, laziness, and
6 |
passivity. Baucus and Near (1991) found in their event history analysis
that organizations operating in munificent environments were most
likely to behave illegally. Spector et al. (2006) and Bruursema, Kessler,
and Spector (2011) found that boredom, as a result of too much time
available, increases the risk of unethical behavior, like shirking responsi-
bilities, destroying property, and stealing. In this regard, Kim et al.,
McInerney, and Sikula (2004) use the concept of the mean to argue
that it is not only when employees perceive goals as being too difficult,
but also when goals are seen as too easy to achieve that their perform-
ance declines. This corresponds with earlier findings of an inverted
U-shaped relationship between stress and performance: the median
or optimal level of stress would produce the most effective results
(Kim et al., 2004). If we apply this to ethics, ethical goals and norms
that are challenging but attainable lead to the best ethical performance
of employees.
Some empirical research demonstrates that some type of lavish-
ness leads to unethical behavior. In their laboratory studies, Gino and
Pierce (2009) found evidence that an overabundance of wealth leads
to unethical behavior. Participants who observed a visibly large pool
of money upon entering the experiment room cheated more fre-
quently than the participants who were not placed in such an envi-
ronment. The study further found that the mechanism behind this
effect was that the presence of abundant wealth provoked feelings of
envy toward wealthy others, which then stimulated unethical
behavior.
4.4 | Zealotry
The fourth virtue of the CEV Model is supportability. This virtue
requires that employees are stimulated by the organization to identify
with the ethics of the organization. The CEV Model posits that the
more committed the employees are to the ethics of their organization,
the more ethical behavior there will be within the organization
(Kaptein, 2008). Research by Tyler and Blader (2005) shows that
when employees are encouraged to identify with the values of their
organization, they are more intrinsically motivated to adhere to the
rules of their organization. This virtue is consistent with the view of
social bond theory (Hirschi, 1969) that people engage in ethical
behavior when they feel attached or committed to a given
community.
Where supportability is lacking, organizations stimulate employees
to become apathetic or indifferent to ethics. Organizations may even
stimulate employees to become averse and hostile to ethics, which
encourages opportunistic and egoistic behavior. For example, Peterson
(2002) shows that an ethical climate of egoism correlates positively
with unethical behavior. We can label this situation as animosity.
Can there be an excess of supportability? This would apply in sit-
uations where employees are stimulated to be overly committed to
ethics. In the context of unethical behavior within organizations, Sims
(1992) discusses the dangers of overcommitment and excessive loyalty

(2001) points out that the virtue of loyalty does not
to the group. Mele
include allowing others to dominate you. For him, one who acts with
true loyalty is neither slave nor fanatic, but remains a free, reasonable
KAPTEIN
and responsible being, with creative ability and personal initiative. Loy-
alty is thus the mean between treachery and fanaticism. We can then
label the excess of supportability as zealotry, when employees are
whipped up to adore and glorify ethics as if nothing else matters. In
this kind of situation, ethics is presented to the employees as gospel
truth that they have to believe and preach. The drive to be ethical
becomes an obsession and compulsion, and fanaticism may even turn
into extremism.
Zealotry is not only unethical in itself because it infringes on the
will of employees; it can also lead to unethical behavior through sub-
mission, blind loyalty, or slavish conformity. The experiments of Mil-
gram (1974) demonstrated that unquestioning obedience to authority
can lead people to do bad things. Other research shows the potentially
negative consequences of groupthink (Asch, 1955) and over-
identification with one’s task (Zimbardo, 2007). If too much emphasis is
placed on ethics, it can lead to tunnel vision and a disregard for other
relevant business considerations. Staw and Boettger (1990) demon-
strate the risks of tunnel vision in general, whereas Darley and Batson
(1973) show how this can lead to unethical behavior.
4.5 | Overexposure
Transparency is another virtue in the CEV Model. This virtue, also
referred to as visibility and observability, is present when ethical and
unethical behavior and their consequences are observable to those
who can act upon it (Kaptein, 2008). This virtue is relevant because it
helps to steer, modify, and alter behavior so that it can become (more)
ethical. When employees know in advance that their behavior is visible,
they will be stimulated to behave ethically. This view is put forward by
deterrence theory: for unethical behavior to be inhibited, potential per-
petrators must believe that they will be caught (Gibbs, 1975). Hollinger
and Clark (1983), for instance, demonstrate the impact of transparency
on theft in the workplace.
Transparency can also be absent. In this situation, there is no
transparency, internally or externally, regarding the ethical and unethi-
cal behavior of employees. Employees are not aware of the nature or
consequences of their own behavior or that of others. Managers also
do not have an overview that allows them to know whether ethical or
unethical behavior is taking place in their organization. Taken to its
extreme, there is not only “information underload” (O’Reilly, 1980) but
also a complete absence of any kind of information concerning ethical
and unethical behavior. What is going on in the organization is obscure
and nontransparent. We label this deficiency in transparency as
opaqueness.
There can also be too much transparency. Taken to its extreme,
every action of every employee is monitored, recorded, and reported,
and everyone has access to all information. No information is hidden
and everything can be observed. Big Brother is watching. There is
information overload, even if it is irrelevant and unnecessary (Martin,
1995), and confidentiality and secrecy do not exist. Tapscott and Ticoll
(2003) called an organization where everything is visible as the naked
corporation. We will therefore call the excess of transparency
overexposure.
KAPTEIN
Overexposure is a vice in itself because it implies that all data
that the organization can gather is or could be made public, thus
possibly violating the privacy of those involved (Stevenson, 1980). In
this case, nobody would be able to control or limit access to infor-
mation about oneself or others, thus undermining the right to pri-
vacy (cf. Burgoon et al., 1989). For this reason, Garaventa (1998)
suggests that ethical business conduct does not demand unrestricted
openness.
Overexposure is also a vice because it increases the risk of
employees behaving unethically. It may, for example, lead employ-
ees to make inferior decisions. Bawden and Robinson (2009) point
to the risk of information overload in their discussion of “the dark
side of information.” People receive so much information that it is
no longer possible to process and use it effectively (Feather,
2000). This is what Edmunds and Morris (2000) refer to as info-
glut. Studies on information overload among consumers and
investors (Paredes, 2003) suggest a U-shaped relationship
between information load and quality of decisions made (cf.
Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974). Receiving too much information
causes stress and confusion (O’Reilly, 1980), an inability to differ-
entiate between what is and what is not critical (O’Reilly, 1980), a
feeling of a lack of control (Edmunds & Morris, 2000), analysis
paralysis (Stanley & Clipsham, 1997), and anxiety (Bawden & Rob-
inson, 2009). Paredes (2003) describes how excessive information
can blind people and lead to inferior decisions: when the load
increases, people shift to simpler and less accurate decision-
making strategies to cope with the deluge of information that con-
fronts them. Therefore, too much information may lead to less
~o, Weaver,
ethical or even unethical decisions because, as Trevin
and Reynolds (2006) argue, ethical decisions require the good use
of information.
Recent research by Bernstein (2012) highlights one of the per-
verse effects of the pursuit of organizational overexposure. Ber-
stein conducted a field study at the second largest mobile phone
factory in the world into what she calls the transparency paradox
and found that the management’s intention to increase transpar-
ency bred secrecy among employees, thus reducing transparency
and performance. Because managers arrived at the factory floor in
different uniforms, employees knew when inspections were being
conducted. Thus, there was no surprise effect and employees were
able to strategically conceal their activities through codes and other
costly means. Mechanisms for achieving transparency improved the
vision not only of the observer but also of the observed, and this
increased awareness of being observed had a negative impact on
performance. Bernstein therefore argues for the creation of zones
of privacy.
4.6 | Talkativeness
The sixth virtue in the CEV Model is discussability. Discussability refers
to the room employees have in their organization to discuss ethical
dilemmas and alleged unethical behavior (Kaptein, 2008). Discussability
is important as it signals that ethics is important and that employees
| 7
can help and learn from each other. Studying six large companies,
~o, Weaver, Gibson, and Toffler (1999) showed that the degree
Trevin
to which employees can openly talk about ethics is a good predictor of
the prevalence of ethical behavior.
In an organization where discussability is absent, criticism is nei-
ther encouraged nor welcomed. The same holds for having room to
speak about ethical dilemmas. Employees who wish to discuss ethical
issues may encounter opposition and fear that harm will come to them
if they do so. According to Bird and Waters (1989), the persistent
avoidance of moral talk strengthens an amoral organizational culture. In
such organizations there is silence about ethics. We call the absence of
discussability muteness.
There can also be an excess of discussability. Jackson (1965)
indicates that not just too little but also too much talking during a
group meeting would be undesirable. In our case, too much discuss-
ability would mean that within the organization there are endless
discussions about ethics without reaching any conclusions and deci-
sions. All discussions stay open. Even when decisions have been
made, they can still be reopened and reversed at any moment.
Everyone can always have a say in every ethical issue, and criticism
is never too much, barred, or outdated. We can label this situation
as talkativeness.
As it is unethical in itself, talkativeness is a vice. Too much discuss-
ability means that personal, confidential, and secret issues can be dis-
cussed openly, which then violates the character of these issues. It also
means that everyone can interfere in every matter that arises without
respect for the autonomy and authority of others. It may lead to anar-
chy, to what Bruhn (1990) describes as the monkeys running the zoo,
and thus to complete disrespect for the authority of management. Too
much discussability can also be offensive if people can say what they
think even if it is inappropriate and hurtful to others. It also makes for-
giveness, an important ethical principle (Richards, 1988), impossible
because unethical behavior from the past can always be brought back
to the table (Worthington, 2006).
Talkativeness is a vice because it inhibits ethical behavior among
employees. When everything is open for discussion, it can lead to inde-
cisiveness, impasses, and inaction. Managers postpone making deci-
sions because discussions in the organization are ongoing. Employees
cannot act because they keep on discussing things, continuously raising
new issues, and waiting for unanimity that is not forthcoming. As a
consequence, ethical issues are not solved but rather grow, the number
of prevailing ethical dilemmas increases, and ethical behavior is
postponed.
To date, there is hardly any empirical research that points to the
existence of and damage caused by talkativeness. Only Naong’s (2012)
research in a telecommunications company points to the existence and
effects of indecisiveness of managers. Naong found that the indecision
of managers, which leads to discussions staying open too long, make
employees feel “adrift in the ocean” as a result of confusion, uncer-
tainty, stress, self-doubt, emotional paralysis, and anxiety. This indeci-
siveness leads to a lack of direction and purpose and to poor
performance.
8 |
4.7 | Oppressiveness
The final virtue in the CEV Model is sanctionability. Sanctionability
refers to employees being punished for behaving unethically and
rewarded for behaving ethically (Kaptein, 2008). Reward and punish-
ment are important behavioral stimuli (Falkenberg & Herremans, 1995).
Reward will lead to repetition and punishment to avoidance. When
people are not punished for unethical behavior or are rewarded for
such behavior, the message is that unethical behavior is acceptable or
~ o, & Sims, 1994). Rom
an and Luis Munuera
even desirable (Ball, Trevin
(2005) found evidence that salespeople who were rewarded for ethical
behavior displayed less unethical behavior.
The absence of sanctionability in an organization implies that
unethical behavior is tolerated or even rewarded and that ethical
behavior is not rewarded or may even be punished. Such a permissive
or lenient environment inhibits employees from behaving ethically and
stimulates them to behave unethically. We label the absence of sanc-
tionability as laxity.
Next to deficiency in sanctionability is the possibility of excess.
This would apply when an organization overreacts in response to ethi-
cal or unethical behavior. In such situations, punishment will be too
severe, and it could even be brutal or cruel. Rewards will be dispropor-
tionate and excessive: employees who display ethical behavior will be
praised to high heavens. We label such excessive sanctionability as
oppressiveness.
Oppressiveness is unethical in itself because sanctions should be
fair; that is, punishment should be proportionate to the transgression
committed (Ryberg, 2007). For example, firing an employee for making
one minor mistake during an e-learning course in business ethics would
be unfair. Oppressiveness also increases the risk of unethical behavior
if employees fear sanctions so much that they become reluctant to act
and shift risky tasks to others or even conceal their own behavior. Lav-
ishly rewarding ethical behavior runs the same risks because it can
stimulate employees to behave unethically in a covert way so that they
improve their ethical performance. Oppressiveness may also diminish
the influence of sanctions because employees who are punished
harshly may rationalize it by convincing themselves that punishments
are less or not important, whereas employees who observe that others
are excessively rewarded for ethical behavior may also rationalize it by
convincing themselves that rewards are less or not important.
There is a rich body of empirical research on the effects of rewards
and punishment on the behavior of people. The experimental research
of Brummelman, Thomaes, de Castro, Overbeek, and Bushman (2014)
shows the adverse effect of well-intended but inflated praise on chil-
dren: it conveys to children that they should continue to meet very
high standards, while it discourages those with low self-esteem from
taking on challenges, whereby they miss out on crucial learning experi-
ences. Excessive praise for ethical behavior may similarly result in
others giving up their efforts to behave ethically. Other research indi-
cates that rewarding prosocial behavior leads to less social behavior
because people want to avoid creating the impression that they are
doing good things for instrumental reasons (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee,
1997).
KAPTEIN
5 | CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The objective of this paper was to explore what the excessive (as
opposed to deficient) extremes are of the virtues advocated by the
CEV Model, how to define these excessive vices, and why they
increase the likelihood of unethical behavior of employees. Having suc-
cessfully identified, conceptualized, and characterized the two
extremes that correspond to each of the seven virtues of the CEV
Model, this paper has shown that each of these virtues can be seen as
the mean between two vices.
5.1 | Research implications
An important theoretical insight of this paper is that studying the vir-
tues of organizations necessitates taking into account both the defi-
cient and excessive extremes of those virtues. Thus, the focus should
not only be on how organizations can become more virtuous, but also
on how they can avoid becoming “too virtuous.” Virtues can only be
studied and managed in relation to their vices.
Future research may examine whether it is possible to locate the
mean more precisely. Aristotle’s doctrine does not involve an arithme-
tic exercise that results in exact instructions for organizations as to
what to do (NE, II.6). Hence we should be reluctant to criticize the vir-
tues and vices in this paper on the grounds that they are not suffi-
ciently concrete. However, more research can be done to understand
the means and their corresponding vices: what they entail, what their
elements and indications are, and when a virtue becomes a vice. Aris-
totle claims that one vice is more opposed to the mean than the other,
and one vice is closer to the mean than the other (NE, II.8). A question
that relates to this and that this paper has not addressed is which vices
—either the deficient or excessive kind—are more opposed and closer
to their relevant mean. Another future research possibility is an exami-
nation of the extent to which the mean depends on the individual and
the circumstances: how it works and whether it can be modeled so as
to better identify where the mean should lie for an organization.
A fundamental topic for future research is whether the desirable
position of a particular corporate ethical virtue depends on the position
of other corporate ethical virtues. Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean
assumes a unity of virtues in the sense that it is impossible for two vir-
tues to conflict with each other (Telfer, 1989). Empirical research so far
shows that the virtues in the CEV Model are positively related with each
other (Kaptein, 2008, 2011a). For Aristotle, a virtuous person exhibits all
of the virtues; the virtues do not properly exist as distinct qualities but
rather as different aspects of a virtuous life. It would, however, be inter-
esting to find out whether in the case of organizations the virtues can
compensate for each other, for example, if less role modeling can be
compensated for by greater supportability. This would imply that organi-
zations should define the relevant mean for the different virtues in their
mutual relationship, which would render identifying the mean even
more complex.
The concept of corporate virtues as the mean between two vices
requires new empirical research. First of all, research is needed into the
existence of the excessive (as opposed to the deficient) vices. The
KAPTEIN
notion of excessive corporate vices may be criticized for being hypo-
thetical and nonexistent. Organizations may have no reason to exceed
the mean because of the extra effort it would require. Aristotle said that
people naturally lean toward one vice rather than the other because
one vice is intrinsically more tempting than the other. According to him,
more people are, for example, stingy than prodigal (NE, IV.1). Empirical
research may thus determine whether excessive vices for organizations
exist in practice, to what extent they exist, and to what extent organiza-
tions are more inclined to lean toward the deficient rather than the
excessive vice. Since, as Aristotle argues, different people lean toward
different vices (NE, II.9), it would be interesting to find out whether like
people, organizations have different tendencies, and if so, how this can
be explained, and what its implications are. It would also be interesting
to find out to what extent two corresponding deficient and excessive
vices differ in their impact on unethical behavior. For Aristotle, one vice
can be a greater evil than its other extreme counterpart. For example,
meanness is “a greater evil than prodigality” (NE, IV.1). Based on empiri-
cal analysis regarding the impact of both vices on unethical behavior, it
could be determined which of the vices is worse.
5.2 | Managerial implications
The main implication of this paper for the management of organiza-
tions is that stimulating ethical behavior and discouraging unethical
behavior requires a balance on seven continua. Management should
not only embed the virtues proposed in the CEV Model but should also
take care that they do not embed these virtues to such an extent that
they increase the risk of unethical behavior.
Hitting the mean requires, according to Aristotle, practical wisdom
(NE, II.6). For him, it is not possible to be good without practical wis-
dom (NE, VI.13). As the mean depends on the individual and the cir-
cumstances, management needs practical wisdom to find out, for each
of the corporate virtues, what the mean is for their organization and
what the organization’s current position is in relation to that mean.
This requires management to monitor the organization to establish
whether the virtues are embedded adequately.
Once management knows what the position of the organization is
in relation to each mean, the challenge is to improve the organization by
coming closer to them. Organizations can then follow Aristotle’s sugges-
tion to drag themselves away, toward the contrary of the mean they
are inclined to (NE, II.9). For organizations, this would mean that, for
example, if they are inclined toward ambiguity they could aim toward
patronization. In the event that organizations are pushed in the wrong
direction, for instance when regulators want to impose too many rules
and monitoring systems, this paper presents the insight and vocabulary
for management to counter such a move, given that not only too little
but also too much is not good for the ethics of organizations.
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Muel Kaptein is Professor in Business Ethics and Integrity Manage-
ment at RSM Erasmus University. His research interests include the
management of ethics, the measurement of ethics, and the ethics of
management. He has published articles in journals like Academy of
Management Review, Journal of Management, Journal of Management
Studies, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Human Relations, and Organi-
zation Studies. Muel is also equity partner at KPMG, where he co-
founded KPMG Integrity in 1996.
How to cite this article: Kaptein M. When organizations are too
good: Applying Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean to the corporate
ethical virtues model. Business Ethics: A Eur Rev. 2017;00:1–12.
doi:10.1111/beer.12147.