J Indian Philos

DOI 10.1007/s10781-016-9299-6

Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic

Interpretation of Madhyamaka

Giuseppe Ferraro1

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract This paper supports the thesis that nihilistic interpretations (such as the
‘qualified’ one Westerhoff presents in a recent contribution) of Madhyamaka philos-
ophy derive from generally antirealistic and/or metaphysical approaches to Nāgārjuna’s
thought. However, the arguments and many images by way of which the author of the
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) and his Indian commentators defend themselves from
the charge of nihilism show limits in these approaches, and rather confirm that
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy should be read as a theoretical proposal that is at once realistic
and antimetaphysical. The epistemology inherent to the soteriological dimension of the
Buddha’s teaching, of which Nāgārjuna presents himself as a faithful continuer,
assesses on the one hand the accomplishment of a ‘cognitive revolution’ consisting in
the achievement of a new (and ultimate) vision of reality and on the other the avoidance
of any metaphysical description of the same vision. Comprehension of the Madhya-
maka philosophical enterprise through a realistic-antimetaphysical lens seems to hinder
and prevent the possibility of any nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna.

Keywords Madhyamaka · Nihilism · Realism · Antimetaphysics

Bāhiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In
reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In
1
reference to the cognized, only the cognized.

1
Bāhiya Sutta: Bāhiya (Udāna 1.10), translated from the Pāli by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight
(Legacy Edition), 25th November, 2015, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.than.html.

& Giuseppe Ferraro

giuseppeferraro2003@yahoo.com.br; diapason3@gmail.com
1
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil

123
 G. Ferraro

The Problem and Westerhoff’s Solution

Nāgārjuna’s alleged nihilism2 is definitely a vexata quaestio in Madhyamaka

studies. In a recent paper,3 Jan Westerhoff exemplarily displays the terms of the
problem: on the one hand, there is a system—Madhyamaka philosophy—that claims

2
In this paper, the word “nihilism” is referred to the position of someone who denies—as Mādhyamikas
allegedly do—the ultimate existence of the phenomenal and instead asserts the ultimate reality of pure
nothingness. Therefore, this position should be distinguished from the view of the ucchedavādins,
“annihilationists” and “materialists”, who reduce the self to the four great elements and deny any post-
mortem existence (see Dīghanikāya I.1.85–91), deny the “ripening of the fruit of joyful and sorrowful
karman” (natthi sukatadukkaṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko, Dīghanikāya I.2.171) and deny “this and
the other world” (natthi ayaṃ loko, natthi paro loko, ibidem. According to Salvini—Salvini (2011, p. 83)
—the expression paraloka should be understood in the sense of next rebirth or next existence).
The recognition of the distinction between these two kinds of “deniers” is clear, for example, in a portion
of the Savitarkā Savicārā Bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi called nāstikavāda (Yogācārabhūmi, 151.19–
155.5), in which there is the refutation of (a) the canonical annihilationists, who deny “[the moral value
and transcendent effect of] gift, sacrifice” (nāsti dattaṃ nāstīṣṭam, Yogācārabhūmi, 151.20, translation by
Schmithausen 2000, p. 257), and (b) a Mahāyāna nihilism which allegedly claims that “everything is non-
existent in any regards” (sarvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇena nāsti, Yogācārabhūmi, 151.21, translation by
Schmithausen 2000, p. 257).
The words ucchedavāda and nāstitā/nāstitva (Pāli natthitā) may roughly be referred, respectively, to
these two positions. However, these terms are frequently used interchangeably—to be sure, in
Madhyamaka literature they could often be considered synonyms. For example, when Nāgārjuna, in
Ratnāvalī 43, speaks about nāstitādṛṣṭi, he is not referring to the “non-existence of everything”
(Westerhoff 2016, p. 366), but to “the denial of something very specific: karmic results” (ibidem). In
other words, here a nāstika must be considered an ucchedavādin and not a nihilist (denier of everything).
Also in MMK 15.10ab we can argue that Nāgārjuna considers the concept of nāstitva as an equivalent of
ucchedavāda (and astitva as a synonym of śāśvatavāda): “[It] exists [corresponds to] the eternalist
conception; [it] does not exist is the annihilationist view (astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanam).”
However, the context of this verse is Nāgārjuna’s reflection about the Kātyāyanāvavāda, where the
Buddha—at least in the Kaccānagottasutta, that is, in the Pāli version of this sūtra—seems to distinguish
the levels of sassata and uccheda diṭṭhi from those, respectively, of atthitā and natthitā (Salvini 2011,
p. 59, argues that “[i]f we wish to look for non-Mahāyāna sources related to Nāgārjuna’s thought, the Pāli
Canon may not be the best candidate” and observes, ibidem, p. 62, that the presence in the
Kaccānagottasutta of the pronoun sabbam before atthi e natthi—which brings about a dichotomy,
between “everything exists” and “everything does not exist”, that is actually “milder” than the pure
opposition between “[it] exists” and “[it] does not exist” we find in MMK 15—strengthens his point that
Nāgārjuna is using some Sanskrit version of the Kātyāyanāvavāda, possibly the one we find in
Nidānasamyukta 19. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Sanskrit Advice to Kātyāyana he
read contained, like the Pāli version and differently from the one we find in Nidānasamyukta 19, some
explicit reference to the śāśvata-uccheda dichotomy). The categories of atthitā and natthitā—as,
respectively, “state or condition of is” and “state or condition of is-not”—are mentioned by the Buddha
as, seemingly, the categories at the bottom of “eternalism” and “annihilationism”. Shulman (relying on
Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000, p. 734, n. 29) believes that in the Kaccānagottasutta atthitā and natthitā “refer to
sassata and uccheda and should not be understood to imply abstract notions of existence and non-
existence” (Shulman 2014, p. 103). I am not convinced that is so. It seems to me that the significance of
the Buddha’s discourse is here to rule out eternalism and annihilationism views through the exclusion of
the wider categories of “being” and “non-being”. Thus, the real problem with sassata and uccheda point
of views is that they make use of the astitā and nāstitā categories. Anyhow, it is exactly in this sense that
Nāgārjuna interprets the Kātyāyanāvavāda and the middle way pointed out by the Buddha: indeed,
Madhyamaka is a philosophical project that avoids the attribution of the categories of “being” and “non-
being” (and not those of “eternity” and “non-eternity”) to any dharma.
This means that in Madhyamaka usage, the word “nāstika”, even though it partly corresponds to
“ucchedavādin”, shows a tendency to cover a semantic range broader than this last word: an
ucchedavādin, as long as he recurs to the category of non-being to define the post-mortem destiny of the

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

to faithfully follow the middle path, and therefore rules out negation, non-being, and
nihilism (to the same extent it opposes being, substantialism and astitādṛṣṭi). On the
other hand, we have a long and articulate history of interpretations (Buddhist and
not, ancient and contemporary)4 that—in fact neglecting Madhyamaka protests and
allegations—consider Nāgārjuna and his followers, definitely, as nihilists. From this
divergence, the question arises: is Nāgārjuna wrong in thinking there is a non-
nihilistic way to read his most radical statements (such as, for example, the ones
contained in verses like MMK 5.5, 13.3 or 23.85)? Or is he right, and therefore those
who consider him a nihilist are misunderstanding him? Now, supporters of the idea
that he is not a nihilist ought to explain how such a misunderstanding, by so many
prominent scholars, is actually possible. On the other hand, defenders of the
nihilistic interpretation should explain (better than contemporary scholars—such as
the “early” Poussin,6 Lamotte, Wood, Burton, Williams, Oetke,7 Tola-Dragonetti or
Narain—have so far) how Nāgārjuna (and his followers and many interpreters who

Footnote 2 continued
self, is certainly a nāstika. But a nāstika could be something more than a materialist-annihilationist: some
later usages of this term seem indeed to refer to the metaphysician who employs the non-being category to
deny the ultimate existence of every dharma and, consequently, could be considered a nihilist. For
example, it is in this sense—of “nihilist” and not “annihilationist”—that the word “nāstika” is used by the
author (possibly Asaṅga) of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, when he (in the Tattvārthapaṭala) accuses the Mād-
hyamikas of being pradhāna nāstika, “utmost nihilists”; in the same way, when Vasubandhu (see
Westerhoff 2016, p. 349) ascribes to the Mādhyamikas the assertion of the non-existence of all things
(sarvanāstitā), he is assuredly condemning them as nihilists.
Actually, the concern of Mādhyamika authors is not to be considered “materialist” or “annihilationists”
(a charge that actually nobody, ancient or contemporary, seriously levels against them) but, indeed,
“nihilists”: consequently—as we are going to see—even when Nāgārjuna denies the fruits of karman
(MMK 17) or the existence of the self (MMK 18), and therefore the opponent accuses him of being a
nāstika in the sense of ucchedavādin, the commentators react as if they are facing a more general charge
of being nihilists.
3
Westerhoff (2016).
4
See Westerhoff (2016, pp. 340–357).
5
MMK 5.5: “Therefore, neither a characterizable nor a characteristic exists; an entity apart from a
characterizable and characteristic definitely does not exist either” (tasmān na vidyate lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ
naiva vidyate | lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto naiva bhāvo ´pi vidyate ||).
MMK 13.3.a-c: “On the basis of the experience of change, [we maintain that there is] a lack of own
nature of entities. But an entity without own nature does not exist” (bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ
anyathābhāvadarśanāt | nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo ‘sti). On the basis of Bhāviveka’s and Candrakı̄rti’s
comments, it is possible to argue that this kārikā (as well as the first part of MMK 13.4) expresses an
opponent’s point of view. My reading is based on Buddhapālita’s vṛtti.
MMK 23.8 “All color, sound, taste, touch, smell and dharmas are similar to Gandharva cities, like
mirages and dreams” (rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca kevalāḥ | gandharvanagarākārā
marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ ||).
6
Wood (1994, p. 245) notes that Poussin, in one of his later papers (see Poussin 1938), essentially
disowns—in what Lamotte will call an “about-face” (machine arrière) and a capitulation to
Stcherbatsky’s position—his previous nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna.
7
Oetke, who believes (1996, p. 59) that “Nāgārjuna’s fundamental philosophical thesis was that on the
level of final truth no entities, no dharmas exist” and that Wood’s interpretation (overtly nihilistic)
“comes very close to the one” he himself “suggested” (ibidem), is however reticent in considering
entirely suitable the expression “nihilist interpretation” to qualify his own and Wood’s reading: “The term
‘nihilist interpretation’ gives only an approximate characterization of W[ood]’s position and one might
even doubt that the choice of this term is felicitous” (ibidem).

123
 G. Ferraro

do not consider him a nihilist) could have committed the major mistake of believing
that he defends views (in primis, the middle way) he actually does not defend, and
rejects positions (such as nihilism) he actually supports.
Westerhoff’s solution8 is to ascribe to Madhyamaka a special form of nihilism in
some way consistent with the middle path and different from other kinds of nihilism
ascribed to Nāgārjuna, which he actually disavows and from which he defends
himself. Put very briefly, Westerhoff’s hypothesis is that this particular Madhya-
maka nihilism, which “rests on a combination of eliminativist and non-
foundationalist premises”,9 is the view that everything is appearance, including in
this “everything” the very statement “everything is appearance” and any other
attempt to find something fundamental, or a non-apparent and ultimately real steady
point. This antirealist position would be, on the one hand, technically a nihilism
(indeed, it claims that there is nothing ultimately existent); yet, on the other, it is also
a middle path (and this in some way explains why Nāgārjuna—not, however,
according to Westerhoff, Candrakı̄rti10—rejects the label of sarva-nāstika, and
prefers that of śūnyatāvādin, that is, grounded on the equations established in MMK
24.18, of an advocate of the madhyamā-pratipad): indeed, appearances do exist.
Therefore, the non-being of appearances is ruled out, together with the being of
objects that are allegedly a substrate of these appearances.
This antirealist interpretative approach proposes the following solution to the
contradiction between Nāgārjuna and his interpreters pointed out above: Nāgārjuna
is correct in thinking that his view is a theoretical middle path11 and is not therefore
the nihilism his opponents ascribe to him12; yet he does not see (differently from
Candrakı̄rti) that his position is still a kind of nihilism. On their part, his opponents
(along with the scholars cited above) are not mistaken in claiming that Madhyamaka
is a nihilism: any fault in their interpretative position would lie in the fact that they
do not grasp the full subtlety of Nāgārjuna’s thesis, confusing it with a grosser form
of nihilism.
Yet, Westerhoff’s hypothesis generates some perplexities: the first is that a
thoroughly non-foundationalist and antirealist interpretation of Madhyamaka
8
Westerhoff, in any case, acknowledges that his “nihilist interpretation of Madhyamaka”, even though it
is “both textually and philosophically defensible”, may not be “the only possible interpretation, or even
necessarily the best interpretation in all contexts” (Westerhoff 2016, p. 370). In particular, he believes that
this interpretation is especially suitable for opposing a “naı̈ve realist understanding, according to which
the world is pretty much the way it appears” (Westerhoff 2016, p. 372).
9
Westerhoff (2016, p. 358).
10
Westerhoff (2016, p. 350) thinks that in his commentary ad MMK 18.7 (beginning from PsP 368.16),
Candrakı̄rti is admitting that between Madhyamaka and nihilism there is an “essential identity (vastutas
tulyatā).” In my opinion, however, as I will try to demonstrate below (see note 53), the general meaning
of Candrakı̄rti’s commentary to MMK 18.7 does not entail his admission of an identity between
Madhyamaka and nāstika’s negations.
11
Even though Nāgārjuna does not present himself explicitly as a Mādhyamika—according to Saito
2007, p. 155, “the first to call himself a ‘dBu ma pa’ (*Mādhyamika) or ‘dBu ma(r) smra ba
(*Mādhyamikavādin)” was Bhāviveka –, passages like MMK 15.6–7, 15.10, 18.6 or 24.18 show that he
considers his own teaching (on emptiness and dependent co-origination) as a middle way between being
and non-being.
12
See (2016, pp. 362–369), where the author lists five different “conceptions of nihilistic positions that
Madhyamaka explicitly rejects.”

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

thought seems to leave Madhyamikas quite unarmed against criticisms like the one
advanced by Yogācārins. The author of the Tattvārthapaṭala of the Bodhisattv-
abhūmi,13 for example, points out that “[w]here the thing referred to by the concept
does not exist, the groundless conceptual fiction likewise does not exist”;14 that is,
“due to the absence of the thing itself which serves as a basis of the concept,
conceptual fictions must all likewise absolutely not exist.”15 This means that a (non-
foundationalist and antirealistic) position like “everything is just appearance and
nothing ultimately real” is utterly paradoxical, because the lack of something real
would rule out the possibility of something being conventional.16
If we try to defuse this paradox, depending on what we stress, we can reach two
different solutions. If we highlight its second part (“nothing is ultimately real”), we
get a radical form of nihilism: the denial of any ultimate reality entails that even
conventional reality (i.e. appearances) cannot exist. As the Bodhisattvabhūmi (most
likely, although not explicitly referring to Mādhyamikas)17 puts it: “Because they
deny both conceptual fiction and reality, they should be considered the nihilist-in-
chief.”18 On the other hand, if we stress the first part of the paradox (“everything is
just appearance”) we reach some form of reificationism (or noumenalism), because
the notion of appearance (or conventionality) only makes sense if opposed to the
notion of reality; without something real to compare it with, what is apparent, or

13
The traditional ascription of the Yogācārabhūmi to Asaṅga is disputed by Schmithausen, who merely
admits the possibility “that Asaṅga compiled Y[ogācārabhūmi] or […] somehow participated in its
compilation […]. But this possibility still needs verification” (Schmithausen 1987, p. 186). More recently,
Delhey (2013, p. 502) remarks that “Schmithausen’s hypothesis according to which the Yo[gacārāvhūmi]
came into being as the result of a complex process of compilation and redaction of heterogeneous
materials is the most convincing.” In the light of these considerations, the Asaṅga’s authorship of the
Bodhisattvabhūmi—which many contemporary scholars take for granted—seems at least questionable.
14
tatra prajñaptervastu nāstīti niradhiṣṭhānā prajñaptirapi nāsti. Translation by Siderits (2015, p. 124).
15
prajñaptyadhiṣṭhānasya vastumātrasyābhāvātsaiva prajñaptiḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ na bhavati, Translation
ibidem.
16
In Thakchöe words (2015, p. 89): “if all is mere designation, no entity could be an acceptable des-
ignatum, a basis of designation. Absent a designatum, the process of its designation would be
impossible.”
The same reasoning is proposed by Sthiramati, in his Triṃśikābhāṣya: “the following conclusion does
not withstand reason (yukti): ‘consciousness too, like the object of consciousness, is only conventional
and not ultimate’; because what would follow is non-existence even conventionally”, translation by
Salvini (2015, p. 46). Therefore, according to this (Yogācāra) logic, a designatum has to exist: “[b]ecause
it is impossible to have an upacāra without a basis, necessarily the transformation of consciousness exists
in reality”, translation ibidem. The expression “transformation of consciousness” is the translation of
vijñānapariṇāma, which “is explained by Vasubandhu as the actual referent of indirect expressions like
‘self’ or ‘dharmas’” (Salvini 2015, p. 43), while upacāra (“which could perhaps even be translated as
‘approximation’, Salvini 2015, p. 44) is “[t]he term that Vasubandhu employs to express the idea of a
secondary or indirect usage” (ibidem).
17
“Asaṅga has not specifically named the Mādhyamika, but Bhāviveka takes it that they are the target”
(Gold 2015, p. 215). However, “it is quite possible that Asaṅga did not have the Madhyamaka per se in
mind when he made his critique. Perhaps Nāgārjuna’s was not the only available interpretation of the
Mahāyāna scriptures during the centuries of its youth. Perhaps there was a diversity of interpreters of
Madhyamaka, within which some, but not all, advocated the view that Asaṅga is here criticizing as a
nāstika view” (Gold 2015, p. 216).
18
prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ (Bodhisattvabhūmi, Tattvārthapaṭala,
http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/5016) Translation by Siderits (2015, p. 124).

123
 G. Ferraro

phenomenical, turns out to be real. Using Westerhoff’s own example19, if we say

there are only fake-Rembrandts, and no real Rembrandts, it remains unclear in what
sense these paintings are fakes of something and not, in fact, authentic paintings,
perhaps only bearing a great resemblance to each other (or we may say that if there
is no rope—or anything else—to be mistaken for a snake, then what looks like a
snake must be an actual snake).20
Neither of these two conclusions seems to be what Westerhoff has in mind in his
interpretation of Madhyamaka: he does not want to read it as an extreme form of
nihilism, namely “one that even denies appearances”;21 and surely, his reading does
not correspond to any form of reificationism. However, it is not clear to me (in line
with Yogācāra criticism) how the position “everything is just appearance, and
nothing ultimately real” would not lead to one of these two results, and could be
qualified as a “mild” form of nihilism, consistent with the middle way.
Furthermore, we could ask in which sense the qualified nihilism Westerhoff
ascribes to Nāgārjuna is not a dṛṣṭi or a metaphysical position, i.e. a theoretical
approach to reality the author of the MMK declares should be abandoned and
avoided. Westerhoff argues22 that a nihilism claiming that everything (including the
nihilistic thesis itself) is appearance—or, in other words, a theory of emptiness that
is itself empty—cannot qualify as metaphysics. According to Westerhoff, in order to
attribute the state of a metaphysical view or dṛṣṭi to a thesis, it is necessary for its
truth not to be empty, “but substantial.”23 A “substantial truth” would be, using
Cabezon’s metaphor cited by Westerhoff,24 an entity (specifically, a statement) that
escapes the “free fall” to which everything is subjected. However, in my view, to
speak of metaphysics we need less than an entity of this kind: even a truth that “falls
along” with anything else—as long as it is (or tries to be) a truth, that is, a statement
19
See Westerhoff (2016, p. 359).
20
These two ways of defusing the paradox of conventions existing without any ultimate reality seem to
correspond to the more general critique that Yogācāra levels against Madhyamaka: according to
Thakchöe’s reconstruction, since Mādhyamikas deny any foundation of conventional truth (in particular,
inasmuch as they deny the existence of dependent and perfect nature), they fall into the extreme of
nihilism (see Thakchöe 2015, p. 80); however, “[s]ince the Mādhyamika argues that conceptual nature is
real, the Yogācārin paints the Madhyamika as reificationist” (ibidem). It is possible to argue that, from a
Yogācāra point of view, the extreme of reificationism affects more properly the Svātantrika lineage of
Tibetan interpretation of Madhyamaka, while nihilism would be a more proper Prāsaṅgika fault. Indeed,
according to the framework of the “tenet systems” (grub mtha’) doxographical approach, the difference
between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is that, even if both admit conventional truth and deny ultimate
reality, the former “asserts that all phenomena inherently exist even conventionally” (Newland 1999,
p. 64), while the latter “denies that phenomena inherently exist even conventionally […], but does admit
the mere conventional existence of phenomena” (ibidem). Now the Svātantrika “inherent existence” of
conventional reality seems to obliterate the datum of the inexistence of ultimate reality, so that the
conventional would be reified and would become the only existent reality. On the other hand, the
Prāsaṅgika stress on the merely conventional (and not inherent) existence of appearances seems to
strengthen the weight of inexistence of ultimate realities, and makes Prāsaṅgika vulnerable to the
accusation of being a radical form of nihilism.
21
Westerhoff (2016, p. 362).
22
See Westerhoff (2016, p. 365).
23
ibidem.
24
The emptiness of everything gives “a picture of a world of elements in free fall”, Cabezon apud
Westerhoff (2016, p. 361, note 74).

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

that reliably represents a state of things (in this case, the statement that maintains
that everything, including itself, is falling)—is, even if just conventionally, a dṛṣṭi25
or a metaphysical position, and is therefore in conflict, if ascribed to Nāgārjuna,
with those passages (more explicitly MMK 13.8, where emptiness is pointed out as
a “means to rule out every theory”, dṛṣṭīnām niḥsaraṇaṃ; or MMK 27.30, where the
Buddha’s Dharma is said to be taught “in order to eliminate all theories”, sarva-dṛṣṭi
prahāṇāya) where the author of the MMK declares he aims to reject all
metaphysical points of view.26

Realistic-Antimetaphysical Solution

Westerhoff himself admits that the solution to our opening question (regarding the
discrepancy between how Nāgārjuna presents his thought and how many of his
exegetes interpret him) could give rise to some doubts: “Like most philosophical
theories, neither eliminativism nor non-foundationalism is uncontroversial.”27
However, it seems to me that in the matter in question it is possible to advance a
less controvertible solution or, in other words, a more philologically consistent
explanation. This solution consists in reading the Mādhyamikas’ anti-nāstitā
arguments in the light of the broader “realistic-antimetaphysical” interpretation I
advanced recently.28
In short, this interpretation claims first that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is realistic
insofar as it acknowledges—in line with the Buddha’s position—the existence of a
reality in itself (tattva, dharmatā, paramārtha)29 that could be the object of an
ultimately true cognitive experience (yathābhūtadarśana, paramārthasatya,

25
The “falling of something”, that is, its emptiness of svabhāva, seems just equivalent to saying that very
something is conventional, but not that it is not that something. So, for example, the lack of svabhāva of
the Four Noble Truths does not prevent them being considered, in MMK 24, as “conventional Noble
Truths”. Therefore, a naiḥsvabhāvikadṛṣṭi should still be considered a dṛṣṭi.
26
Besides the idea (more peculiar to the “semantic” interpretations of Nāgārjuna) that for a statement to
be a dṛṣṭi it should be a substantial entity, we find in the Buddhological literature the view that a dṛṣṭi is a
theoretical position that has substantial entities as its object. For example, Seyfort Ruegg believes that a
dṛṣṭi (“speculative view or dogma”, Seyfort Ruegg 2000, p. 114) must be a view that hypostatizes its
object. So, in particular, the term śūnyatādṛṣṭi (differently from śūnyatadarśana or śūnyatāvāda) would
imply a necessarily reified conception of emptiness (cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1981, p. 2, note 6). In other words,
in this case dṛṣṭi would not (necessarily) be an entity that does not fall along with everything, but an entity
which speaks about non-falling entities.
It seems to me that, in this case too (besides the difficulty—raised by Huntington 2003, pp. 76–77—of
fully distinguishing dṛṣṭi from darśana in Madhyamaka literature), we do not have enough textual ground
to support this view.
In short, I believe that Nāgārjuna’s recommendation to avoid any dṛṣṭi refers to any speculative view
(empty or substantial) regarding any kind of entity (reified or not).
27
Westerhoff (2016, p. 358).
28
See Ferraro (2013, 2014).
29
Stanzas like MMK 15.6, 18.7, 18.9, 24.9, 24.10, Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 5 or Acintyastava 41 could be quoted as
passages where the reference to an ultimate level of reality (in terms of tattva, dharmatā or paramārtha) is
more explicit.

123
 G. Ferraro

nirvāṇa)30; nevertheless, at the same time, this philosophy is rigorously antimeta-

physical to the extent that it opposes (again in tune with at least one dimension of
the Buddha’s teaching31) any attempt to define reality, that is, to project any dṛṣṭi on
it or, in other words, to construct any possible metaphysics.32 Consequently,
Madhyamaka negations, i.e. the qualification of every dharma as empty, should be
read as the denial of the contents of a specific epistemic dimension, the conventional
one (saṃvṛti-satya), made—as MMK 24.8 suggests—“on the basis (samupāśritya)
of the supreme [cognitive] level (paramārtha)”, the achievement of which is the
culmination of the soteriology of the buddhas. This very negation (or emptying
operation), however, has no descriptive function (or, in any case, definitional
function) with regard to ultimate truth33; conversely, emptiness (alias pratītyasa-
mutpāda)—as MMK 13.8 categorically states—is a mere conceptual tool, the
purpose of which is to eliminate any dṛṣṭi, that is, any attempt to provide definitions
about how things ultimately stand (MMK 18.5, more radically, explains that
emptiness leads to the extinction of dichotomic thought, which could be considered
the very basis of any dṛṣṭi).34

30
The presupposition of a reality independent from common or ordinary mind, the possibility of an
extraordinary epistemic achievement of that reality (in terms of Medieval Christian philosophy, the
possibility of an adaequatio rei et intellectus) and the definition of that epistemic experience as (ultimate)
truth—all this belongs to the general definition of “realism” in philosophy.
31
The Buddha’s antimetaphysical attitude is explicit in many renowned sūtras: for instance (once again
recalling Salvini’s remark that Nāgārjuna’s sources were possibly in Sanskrit), the Ānandasutta
(Saṃyuttanikāya IV.10.419), where the Buddha refuses to take a side on the issue of the existence of the
self; the Aggivacchasutta (Majjhimanikāya II.3.187–192), where the Buddha leaves Vacchagotta’s
“metaphysical” questions avyākṛta or “indeterminate”; the Cūḷamālukyasutta (Majjhimanikāya II.2.122–
128), again on the avyākṛta, and with the notorious image of the man shot with a poisoned arrow; the
Sīsapāvanasutta (Saṃyuttanikāya V.12.1101), where the Buddha affirms that his teaching, exclusively
aimed at overcoming sorrow, excludes—like a handful of leaves excludes all the leaves of the entire
forest—all other countless speculative possibilities; the Brahmajālasutta (Dīghanikāya I.1), which
condemns the 62 dṛṣṭi; as well as, of course, the Kaccānagottasutta (Saṃyuttanikāya II.1.15).
In regards to the metaphysical dimension of the Buddha’s teaching (where he defines realities such as
the mind, the world or the nirvāṇa), we can argue that Nāgārjuna’s commentators would characterize it
(as Candrakı̄rti explicitly does in PsP 494.6–7 with regard to doctrines such as those of the skandhas, the
dhatus, the āyatanas, the āryasatyas and even pratītyasamutpāda) as “based on the conventional truth.”
32
The definition of “metaphysics”—besides other uses the term may have had in the history of Western
philosophy—that seems to me more appropriate is the one a contemporary “metaphysician” like van
Inwagen (2009, p. 1) relates thus: “When I was introduced to metaphysics as an undergraduate, I was
given the following definition: metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality. This still seems to me to be the
best definition of metaphysics I have seen.” In this sense, Nāgārjuna’s position would not be
“metaphysical”, since it is in no way a study, a reflection or an elaboration on ultimate reality.
33
According to the present reading, the word satya in the locution paramārthasatya does not qualify the
characteristic of a true statement (or belief), that is, a statement that corresponds to a real state of things.
Indeed, paramārthasatya is not a specific representation of some particular state of things. Rather, it is the
(general) way buddhas see reality: a way that certainly corresponds to how reality is in itself, but that does
not equate to a specific statement or a series of statements. Likewise, saṃvṛtisatya is not a specific true
expression (only partly or supposedly referring to reality), but a general way of seeing things, a cognitive
approach or an epistemic level: the one of common, unenlightened people.
34
According to the present reading, Siderits (2015, p. 114) is right when he says that if Mādhyamikas are
not nihilists, “they are in some other line of work than that of saying something about the ultimate nature
of reality (or saying that nothing can be said about it).” However, I think that Nāgārjuna’s silence on the
ultimate nature of reality is not due—as the antirealistic approach to Madhyaka believes—to the absence

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

Compared with the paradoxical position that we summed up, in the previous
section, with the formula “everything is just appearance and nothing ultimately
real”, the realistic-antimetaphysical viewpoint here ascribed to Nāgārjuna seems
better equipped to face the various logical, philosophical and doctrinal challenges to
which Madhyamaka is susceptible.
To begin with, here the basic idea is that “everything is appearance compared to
ultimate reality.” This, first of all, allows us to reject the accusation (for example, the
one of the author of the Bodhisattvabhūmi) that Nāgārjuna’s conventional truth
would be groundless, with all the paradoxical consequences this assumption entails.
Secondly, most importantly for the aim of this paper, the antimetaphysical
feature of this interpretation prevents the possibility of considering Nāgārjuna’s
realism as nihilism. According to Siderits, the charge of nihilism is “threatening
only if one takes seriously the idea that there is an ultimate nature of reality, a ‘how
things are anyway’.”35 However, if we exclude that Nāgārjuna qualifies at all this
“how things are”, the threat of nihilism ceases to be worrying. The notion of
emptiness could turn Madhyamaka into a nihilism only if it is considered as a
qualification or a description of ultimate reality; however, this could not be the case,
since emptiness is represented by Nāgārjuna as just an antimetaphysical tool—with
no denotative power—to get rid of every attempt to describe ultimate reality.
Moreover, the mere position (or presupposition) of an ultimate reality (accessible
to the buddhas) cannot be considered a form of substantialism or reificationism.
Indeed, according to this reading, phenomena are just conventionally real, without
any ontic referent or substantiality; the very reality in itself could also not be
considered a substance or something endowed with the attribute of existence. In
fact, the non-implicative (prasajya) nature of Nāgārjuna’s negations prevents us
from inferring the substantiality of ultimate reality from the negation of
substantiality of conventional reality. Actually, the category of being does not
qualify the tattva-paramārtha any more than the category of non-being (or the
combination or the lack of being and non-being).36
Finally, it has to be noted that Nāgārjuna’s rigorously antimetaphysical approach
prevents him from being reproached (in the same way Mādhyamikas, for example,
could accuse Yogācārins) for the paradox of ineffability (or expressibility)37: it is
true that tattva is declared to be—in MMK 18.9—“not divided by dichotomic
thought” (prapañcair aprapañcitam), “without conceptualization” (nirvikalpam)

Footnote 34 continued
of “reality” in his philosophy, but to reasons very akin to those, certainly soteriological, behind the
Buddha’s silence on metaphysical issues.
35
Siderits (2015, pp. 113–114).
36
Therefore, Madhyamaka is a “middle way” not because it identifies a midway position between being
and non-being, but insofar as it refuses any theoretical position based on the categories of being, non-
being.
37
In Deguchi et al.’s (2013, p. 426) definition, the expressibility paradox is that “there are no ultimate
truths; but there are, for example, that is one. Ultimate reality is nondual. One cannot, therefore, apply
concepts to it. So it is ineffable. But one can say things about it (e.g., in explaining why it is ineffable), so
there are ultimate truths.” Or (2008, p. 400) “Buddhism is akin to any of a number of positions that claim
that there is an ineffable reality, and then go on to explain why this is so, in the process, saying things
about that reality.”

123
 G. Ferraro

and “without differentiation” (a-nānā-artham), but this just allows us to think that
ultimate reality is not the same as conventional truth and not that it is something
ineffable (nor effable, nor both or neither). Once again, the negations should be
interpreted in the prasajya fashion, and do not suggest a metaphysics counterposed
to the one that is rejected.38

Eyewitnesses, Hallucinations, and Visual Impairments

The criticism levelled against Mādhyamikas in the Bodhisattvabhūmi is reported by

Bhāviveka in Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.82.ac: “if nothing is real, there cannot be
any designation. Someone who holds this view is a nihilist.”39 In other words,
according to this view, nihilism is the inevitable outcome of the alleged non-
foundationalism (or antirealism) of the Mādhyamikas. Bhāviveka’s reply to this
criticism—in the Tarkajvālā ad Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.84—is: “We never
said that things are completely non-existent. We think that dharmas arise in a
relative sense from homogeneous causes and conditions, like illusion […] We think
that dharmas are empty from the ultimate point of view.”40 Now, as Gold
opportunely points out, such a reply actually “fails to take up Asaṅga’s critique
directly. Remember, the target view is the view that only designations exist. An
appropriate response should make clear why this critique misses the mark.”41 In
fact, a proper response to Asaṅga (or whoever was the author of the Bodhisattv-
abhūmi) should clearly show that Madhyamaka is not antirealist (or perhaps that
antirealism does not necessary lead to nihilism); but here Bhāviveka just claims that
no dharma has ultimate reality. We can observe that technically this is not an
antirealist stance, because the fact that nothing of the Abhidharma (or common
sense) vision of reality exists does not automatically mean (once more, for the
prasajya peculiarity of Nāgārjuna’s pratiṣedha) that absolutely nothing exists; the
denial of every single dharma does not prevent the possible existence of an ultimate
reality that is not qualifiable as a dharma. However, from an Abhidharma point of
view (where ultimate reality is nothing but dharmas), Bhāviveka’s reply to the
criticism ascribed to Asaṅga could be easily misunderstood as the antirealistic
position we are condensing with the formula “everything is just appearance and
nothing at all ultimately exists.” Now, if an antirealistic stance of this kind was
actually the only way through which Mādhyamikas defend themselves from the
accusation of being nihilist, it seems they would have few chances to succeed.
Proof of this is the fact that prominent scholars who consider Nāgārjuna’s thought as
antirealistic continue to interpret Madhyamaka as nihilism.
Yet, Bhāviveka’s seemingly inaccurate and misleading attempt to reject the
charge of nihilism in Tarkajvālā 5.84 is not the only or the standard path
Mādhyamikas follow in order to defend themselves from this accusation. In fact, if

38
For further remarks on realistic-antimetaphysical interpretation and the paradox of ineffability, please
see Ferraro (2014, pp. 453–455).
39
Translation by Eckel (2008, p. 281).
40
Tarkajvālā ad Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 5.84. Translation by Eckel (2008, p. 283).
41
Gold (2015, p. 218).

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

we look at the many passages in the commentaries to the MMK (and even in
Nāgārjuna’s work) where the Mādhyamikas claim to be non-nihilist (but also when
they want to distinguish their position from the view—either common or
philosophically sophisticated—that conceives reality in substantialist terms), their
arguments follow a recurring, seemingly realistic-antimetaphyisical pattern:
Nāgārjuna and his followers claim their negations are “based on” (we may say,
having MMK 24.8 in mind, samupāśrayanti) an epistemic dimension, a vision of
reality from which they (and the buddhas) purportedly talk, but which they never
define at all, confining themselves—quoting Huntington—to just “making propa-
ganda” for it42; an epistemic level different from the conventional, where every
metaphysical assertion, be it substantialist or nihilist, must be placed. This
“epistemic dimension” is represented by a number of similes in which the
Mādhyamikas are compared to sighted and reliable people, in opposition to people
whose ability to see is lacking, or who hallucinate.
The application of such a pattern could be found, for example, at the beginning of
MMK 13. In his commentary on the first kārikā of this chapter, Candrakı̄rti reports
the objection of an opponent who, faced with all the negations presented by
Nāgārjuna in the previous twelve chapters, points out: “is it not the case, it being
thus, that no things exist? Thus, this would certainly be the wrong view that negates
(apavādinī) all entities.”43 According to Candrakı̄rti, Nāgārjuna’s reply to this
objection is in the next verse (13.2ab): “If everything with a false nature is
deceptive, what is here subtracted (muṣyate)?”.44 The meaning of such a reply

42
The sense in which Huntington (2007, pp. 128–129) uses this expression (borrowed from a
Wittgenstein’s reasoning in Lectures and Conversations) does not exactly correspond to the use made of it
here.
43
nanv evaṃ sati na santi sarve bhāvā iti sarvapadārthāpavādinī mithyādṛṣṭir eva syāt, PsP 238.11.
44
tan mṛṣā moṣadharmaṃ yad yadi kiṃ tatra muṣyate.
It seems to me that for a full understanding of this verse it is crucial to consider that muṣyate is the
passive voice of a verb (√muṣ) whose primary meaning is “to steal, rob” (cf. Monier-Williams 1986 or
Huet 2012). The many versions of muṣyate with an active voice and/or with the meaning of “to deceive,
delude” lead to grammatically unjustified solutions—for example, Inada (1993, p. 92): “What is there
which deludes?”; Nietupski (1996, p. 126): “what, in that case, is deceptive?”; Garfield (1995, p. 208):
“what deceives?”—or hardly intelligible: for example, Bugault (2002, p. 170): “sur quoi porte alors la
déception?”; Vélez de Cea (2003, p. 99): “¿ qué hay tras el engaño?”; Jones (2010, p. 15): “what is
deceived?”; Siderits and Katsura (2013, p. 139): “what is there about which one is deceived?”.
The (passive) meaning of “robbery” or “subtraction” is present in Oetke’s translation of the verse (1992,
p. 206). However, this author does not read the first two pādas of MMK 13.2 as the reply to the objection
identified by the commentators at the end of their gloss to the previous stanza, but as an opponent
objection, to which the second verse (cd) would be a reply: “Objection: if that which has the dharma of
‘theft’/fraud is false/feigned, what [is then which] become ‘robbed’/feigned there (i.e. feigned as being
otherwise than it actually is) (¼ What is the bearer of the dharma of ‘theft’/fraud)? Answer: The
Venerable has said this as a means of kindling/stimulating/indicating emptiness.”
The image presented by Buddhapālita in his vṛtti to this stanza (that is, in few words, it is impossible to
subtract something from a naked man) confirms that the meaning of muṣyate has to be “is stolen”, and that
the verse (ab) in question should be understood as the reply to the objection reported by Candrakı̄rti (that
is, paraphrasing: “to say that everything is deceptive is not the same as saying that entities do not exist?”).
In Saito’s translation (1984, p. 180): “if [something] were deceived, robbers (caura) would also attack the
wealth of a Pāśupata (¼ a worshipper of Śiva Paśupati) and a Nirgrantha (¼ a naked Jaina).” Saito is here
compelled to use “deceived”, because the Tibetan translators—perhaps not grasping the semantic nuance
that allows Indian authors to play with the meanings of moṣa (delusion, deception) and √muṣ, which

123
 G. Ferraro

seems to be: Madhyamaka negation—likewise the subtraction of something

inexistent—is the negation of something the (awakened) Mādhyamikas do not
have experience of and that, to them, does not exist. Therefore, it is as if
Mādhyamikas deny a hallucination they do not have. On the contrary, as we are
going to see, a nihilist would be someone who denies things he has experience of.
The commentaries by Candrakı̄rti and Bhāviveka show that the verse has to be
read precisely in this sense. The former asks: “When we do not perceive any object,
what is there subtracted?”45; the latter cites the image of “the horns of a hare”46 as
an example of something inexistent that, as such, cannot lose the attribute of
existence. We may observe that this kind of reasoning closely resembles the
example given in MMK 7.31: one cannot cut off a second head after the first one is
cut off.
Kārikā MMK 8.12 too—toward the end of a chapter that has excluded any
possible account of the notions of “agent” and “action”—is introduced by
Candrakı̄rti with an explicit charge of nihilism leveled against Nāgārjuna by an
opponent: “Have you determined that entities do not exist (na santi)?”.47 The
reply48 by the author of PsP is that it is rather the view of the opponent, “the
proponent of the existence of things endowed with own nature” (bhavatas
sasvabhāva-vādinaḥ), that, “due to the lack of an own nature of entities”
(svabhāvasya bhāvānāṃ vaidhuryāt), entails “the negation of everything” (sarv-
abhāvāpavādaḥ). On their side, since Mādhyamikas—as Candrakı̄rti also explains
—do not believe in own nature and the ultimate existence of entities, they would not
be really denying something.49 In fact, as Ratnāvalī I.55 (quoted by Candrakı̄rti50)
claims, the negation of the object of a non-perceived mirage is not a true negation,51
or rather—as we can infer from examples of this kind—it is not the same kind of
negation as someone who denies the object of his actual mirage.
In the commentaries on the central verses of MMK 18 a discussion is developed
from the remark of an opponent who says that “Mādhyamikas are indistinguishable
from nāstikas, because [the Mādhyamikas] claim that entities like good and bad

Footnote 44 continued
firstly means “to steal” (however, as MacDonald 2015, vol. 2, p. 162, note 314, points out, even though
“Candrakı̄rti tends to understand moṣadharma[ka] as if it would be derived from √muṣ”, moṣa actually
corresponds to Pāli mosa, formed from musā, which corresponds to Sanskrit mṛṣā, from √mṛṣ, “to
neglect”)—use the same word (slu) to render both moṣa (of the compound moṣadharma) and muṣyate.
But it seems obvious that the meaning of Buddhapālita’s image is that two ascetics lacking of any wealth
could not be robbed (rather than deceived) by robbers.
45
yadā tu padārtham eva kaṃcin na paśyāmaḥ tadā kiṃ tatra muṣyate, PsP 239.4.
46
Cf. Nietupski (1996, p. 116).
47
kim avadhāritam etad bhavatā na santi bhāvā iti, PsP 188.10.
48
See PsP 188.10–11.
49
“But we, on account of the dependent arising, do not at all perceive an ‘own nature’ of anything—thus,
what would we be denying? (vayaṃ tu pratītyotpannatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvam eva nopal-
abhāmahe | tat kasyāpavādaṃ kariṣyāmaḥ), PsP 188.11–12.
50
PsP 188.14–15.
51
“If [someone], having thought that a mirage was actually water, going there, assumed that water does
not exist, he would be a stupid” (marīciṃ toyam ity etad iti matvā gato’tra san | yadi nāstīti tat toyaṃ
gṛhṇīyān mūḍha eva saḥ ||).

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

actions, the agent, the fruit, and the whole world are empty of own nature. For the
nāstikas also claim that [all] this does not exist.”52
The nāstikas mentioned here (deniers of the world, of the agent/self and of the
fruit of action) are, undoubtedly (given the content of the negations mentioned),
those we in note 2 called “materialist-annihilationists”. However the Mādhyamikas’
defense strategy against this accusation (i.e. that the Madhyamaka position is
indistinguishable from the materialist) is the same followed to defend themselves,
generally, from the charge of being nihilist. This is quite reasonable, as long as the
Mādhyamikas deny the same things denied by materialists (like the self and the
future life) just insofar as they deny everything: consequently, the Mādhyamikas do
not really have to explain why they are not materialists, but—once again—why they
would not be nihilists, or, in other words, they have to clarify the general sense of
their negations and not the specific significance of their negation of the self or the
fruits of karman.
Therefore Candrakı̄rti, after consenting, not without reluctance, that Madhya-
maka and nāstika negations could be somehow formally comparable,53 claims that
what really diversifies the two positions are epistemological aspects: “[between
Mādhyamikas and nāstikas] there is no identity/comparability because of the
difference in their understanding (pratipattṛbhedāt).”54

52
nāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikā yasmāt kuśalākuśalaṃ karma kartāraṃ ca phalaṃ ca sarvaṃ ca lokaṃ
bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyam iti bruvate | nāstikā api hi etan nāstīti bruvate, PsP 368.4–6.
53
Candrakı̄rti, does admit that “the non-establishment (asiddhi) [of things]” makes Madhyamaka and
nāstika positions “actually (vastutaḥ) comparable/similar (tulya)” (PsP 368.16).
Westerhoff (2016, p. 350) suggests that the meaning of the expression vastutas tulyatā is of (as is
certainly allowed by the semantic range of the two words) “essential identity.” Nevertheless, in the
previous lines of his commentary (ad MMK 18.7), Candrakı̄rti had set forth some arguments against the
idea of an exact conceptual identity between Madhyamaka and nāstika views: first, “For the
Mādhyamikas, proponents of dependent arising, claim that the entire present and next world are devoid
of own nature, since they arise attaining, that is, in dependence upon causes and conditions”
(pratītyasamutpādavādino hi mādhyamikāḥ hetupratyayān prāpya pratītya samutpannatvāt sarvam eva
ihalokaparalokaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ varṇayanti | PsP 368.7–8); on the other hand, “It is definitely not the
case that the nāstikas consider the other world and so forth to be inexistent through [their] being empty of
the nature of existence on account of arising in dependence,” (naiva nāstikāḥ pratītyasamutpannatvād
bhāvasvabhāvaśunyatvena paralokādyabhāvaṃ pratipannāḥ | PsP 368.8–10). Secondly—Candrakı̄rti
adds in PsP 368.13–15—even though they (the Mādhyamika and the nāstika) both uphold the inexistence
(nāstitva) “of what does not exist with an own nature” (svarūpeṇa avidyamānasyaiva), [the two views] are
not identical, because the Mādhyamikas accept the conventional existence (saṃvṛtyā) [of things]”
(saṃvṛtyā mādhyamikair astitvena abhyupagamān na tulyatā).
Therefore, the two positions, according to Candrakı̄rti, are not conceptually identical. But since his
interlocutor/opponent—certainly not grasping all the theoretical subtleties of the difference between
emptiness and non-existence expounded by Candrakı̄rti—is insisting, the author of the PsP ends up
admitting there could be some likeness, a formal or “literal” identity, but not even, on pain of
contradiction with what he defended in the previous lines, a real identity.
54
pratipattṛbhedād atulyatā, PsP 368.16–17. Since pratipattṛ is the agent noun of prati√pad, the
expression should be more literally translated “there is no identity, because of the difference of the [two]
understanders” (or “a difference in the one who comprehends”, Salvini 2008, p. 188). The term pratipatti,
which in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit mainly means behavior, practice, performance, (Edgerton 1986) in
classical Sanskrit means, first, perception, knowledge, comprehension, intelligence (See Monier-Williams
1986, and Huet 2012). Of course, given the “ethical intellectualism” of the Buddhist tradition, the two
meanings—as part of the Eightfold Path—entail each other, because the right vision implies good
behavior and, vice versa, good behavior arises from the right understanding of things. It is clear, however,

123
 G. Ferraro

To clarify this difference in understanding between the nāstikas and the

Mādhyamikas, Candrakı̄rti reiterates the image (already present in Buddhapālita’s
vṛtti to the same verse) of the “eyewitness”: two individuals are accusing a third of
stealing; yet, the first one has not seen the theft, but is nevertheless—“persuaded by
an enemy of that [thief] (tadamitrapreritaḥ)”—incriminating the suspect; while the
second has actually seen the thief stealing. “Even though there is actually no
difference there [i.e. in regard to identifying the thief], due to the fact that there is a
difference between the [two] witnesses/knowers (parijñātṛ), the one (ekaḥ) is said to
be ‘a liar’, whereas the other is said to be truthful.”55 Therefore, between the two
witnesses there is, first of all, a totally different cognitive experience: the first has
not seen, whilst the second has. This certainly holds ethical implications (the
behavior of the first is indeed blameworthy), but the main point is that it is the
parijñā (“knowledge”, “understanding”), respectively, of the Mādhyamikas and of
the nāstikas, that is different.
Before the example of the eyewitness in his own commentary, Buddhapālita—
also convinced that between a nihilist and a follower of Nāgārjuna there is an
enormous (atimahat)56 difference—had suggested the image of the blind man who
“could for instance also state that a certain place is pleasant but since he cannot see
[its beauty] as his sight is lacking the eye of knowledge he will err and falls
down.”57
Candrakı̄rti, again in the PsP ad MMK 18.7, proposes another simile related to
the sense of sight: a blind man (certainly, the nāstika theoretician) and a sighted one
(the Mādhyamika) may even look alike whilst determining their way in a region
with dangerous precipices—nevertheless, between the two there is a “major
difference” (mahān viśeṣaḥ).58 In the same place, however, Candrakı̄rti presents
also another “non-visual” and more directly epistemological image:
For just as there is a great difference – as regards the similarity in the
equanimity [cultivated] – between a common man and an arhat, whose
equanimity is respectively with or without real discernment (apratisaṃ-
khyāyapratisaṃkhyāya), […] there is similarly a difference between nāstikas
and Mādhyamikas.59

Footnote 54 continued
that the difference the Mādhyamikas claim between themselves and nihilist or substantialist theoreticians
is, above all, epistemological rather than ethical. Yet, Westerhoff (2016, p. 351)—perhaps reading
pratipatti in its Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit “ethical” meaning—suggests that the difference established by
Candrakı̄rti between the nihilists and the Mādhyamikas is in the “ethical and soteriological status of their
assertions.”
55
tatra yady api vastuto nāsti bhedaḥ tathāpi parijñātṛbhedād ekas tatra mṛṣāvādīty ucyate aparas tu
satyavādīti | PsP 368.17–369.1.
56
See Lindtner (1981, p. 206).
57
Buddhapālitavṛtti ad MMK 18.7, translation by Lindtner (ibidem).
58
See PsP 369.5–6.
59
yathaiva hy upekṣāsāmānye [‘]pratisaṃkhyā[ya]pratisaṃkhyāyopekṣakayor iva pṛthagjanārhatoḥ […]
yathāsti sa mahān viśeṣas tathā nāstikānāṃ mādhyamikānāṃ ca viśeṣo bhaviṣyati (PsP 369.4–7).

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

All these images confirm that Mādhyamikas claim for themselves, as the basis for
their negations, a kind of epistemic experience that certainly does not belong to
materialists. This argument, as stated previously, is not used by Mādhyamikas just
to explain the meaning of their negation of the self, karman or future existence (that
is, those negations that formally correspond to negations of the nāstikas
“materialist-annihilationists”), but also to illustrate the meaning of every negation
they hold and, thereby, to show why they cannot be considered nihilists. Just like
negations of the materialist do not rest on a real experience of the absence of the
specific things denied by him, the universal negation of a nihilist would not be based
on the same kind of insight into the nature of reality that is behind Mādhyamikas’
negations. So, even though Mādhyamikas and nihilists’ negations could be formally
alike, they are grounded on a different kind of epistemic experience: the nihilist who
says “nothing exists” has not the same vision of reality that is behind the
“everything is empty” pronounced by the Mādhyamika.
The certainty that the Madhyamaka position is founded and motivated by a
specific cognitive experience is confirmed by an observation made by Bhāviveka in
his commentary to MMK 13.7:
The cognition of emptiness does not make the emptiness of entities; rather, in
this case, it makes clear that entities do not have that as self-nature. For
example, it is like the light of a butter lamp making clear the absence of a pot
in a room, but it does not make non-existence. It is not that if that [pot] does
not exist, [its absence] would exist.60
This passage by Bhāviveka closely resembles Nāgārjuna’s well-known reasoning
in the svavṛtti to Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) 64: “the expression ‘all entities are
without own nature’ does not cause (na karoti) all entities to be without own nature,
but rather, since own nature doesn’t exist, it makes known (jñāpayati) that entities
lack own nature.”61 The famous image follows: “suppose someone said, while
Devadatta is absent from the house, ‘Devadatta is in the house’ and someone would
reply, ‘he is not’. That statement does not bring about the non-existence of
Devadatta, but it only makes the absence of Devadatta in the house known.”62
Once again, the significance of this example is that Mādhyamikas base what they
say on a specific kind of epistemic experience, one that belongs neither to nihilists
(who would say, even though they do not experience the absence of Devadatta in the
house, that he is not there), nor of course to common people, who comprehend
reality as a set of entities endowed with own nature and—differently from the
nihilists—do not even question their apprehension and belief (therefore, they are
convinced Devadatta is in the house, and do affirm he is).

60
Prajñāpradīpa ad MMK 13.7, translation by Nietupski (1996, pp. 123–124).
61
niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti | kiṃ tv
asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayati | Vigrahavyāvartanīsvavṛitti (VVV) 80 (ad VV 64).
62
kaścid brūyād avidyamānagṛhe devadatte ‘sti gṛhe devadatta iti | tatrainaṃ kaścit pratibrūyān nāstīti |
na tadvacanaṃ devadattasya asadbhāvaṃ karoti kiṃ tu jñāpayati kevalam asaṃbhavaṃ gṛhe
devadattasya | VVV 80–81 (ad VV 64), translation by Westerhoff (2010.1, p. 113).

123
 G. Ferraro

Indeed, also with regard to common people (and to “substantialist” philosophers,

who defend the ultimate existence of the entities—for example, the dharma,
represented by their concepts), the Mādhyamikas ascribe to themselves a different
cognitive experience. Among the similes used to illustrate this difference, once
again, those related to the sense of sight are frequent. For example, on several
occasions,63 Candrakı̄rti compares the ordinary cognitive experience to the
perception of flies and hairs/strings that affects the vision of a person with timira,
that is, with a “visual distortion […] nowadays known as myodesopsia, sometimes
also referred to as vitreous floaters”64: a disorder almost always caused by
“posteriour vitreous detachment (PVD)”:65
Those affected by [the visual disorder called] timira, as a consequence of their
affliction, are attached to an actually inexistent own-nature of hairs, etc. as
having actual own nature; similarly, common people, inasmuch as their mental
eye is impaired (upahata) by the visual disorder of nescience, are attached to
entities, which are [actually] without own nature—as having an own nature.66
Conversely,
however, somebody who does not perceive something—like someone without
timira in regard to the hairs perceived by someone affected by timira—in
saying ‘[it] does not exist’, would not be saying that something does not exist,
because there is nothing that could be denied (pratiṣedhya). Still, for the sake
63
See, for instance, besides the two passages quoted here, PsP 172.14–173.1 (ad MMK 7.32); PsP 373ff
(ad MMK 18.9); PsP 392.12. (ad MMK 10.3).
64
Westerhoff (2010.2, p. 41).
65
The visual impairment called timira is sometimes rendered in secondary literature as, generically,
ophthalmia or sometimes as cataract (see, for example, Conze 2009, p. 208; Thakchöe 2007, p. 84 or
Newland 1992, p. 110). However, the symptoms often described by Candrakı̄rti—vision of hairs/strings
(keśa) or flies (maśaka)—are not that of cataract (an eye disease notoriously consisting in the concealing
and progressive darkening of vision), but they suggest the disturbance (the semiology of which is
described by Westerhoff in 2010.2, pp. 41–43) caused by “posterior vitreous detachment” (PVD).
The point here is not a merely terminological pedantry, but it seems to me that it has conceptual
implications: the PVD and its consequences are not described (as it could be easily confirmed by googling
it) as a “pathology”, but as a condition of the eye (frequent in adults over 65); it does not bring about a
concealed or blurry vision, but the real perception of inexistent objects. Now, a simile with a healthy
individual and someone affected by cataract seems to definitely represent the situation in terms of reality
and appearance. Conversely the image of a normal eye condition and the condition caused by PVD could
be better referred to two different representations of reality, somehow both true (so that we can talk about
dve satye). In a next section of this paper we will return to this point.
An objection to the rendering of timira as the condition caused by PVD is, certainly, that the primary
meaning of this word is, actually, darkness, obscuration of vision and, properly, veiling illusion (cf.
Edgerton 1986): therefore a meaning that corresponds (as also ayurvedic vocabulary confirms) more to
the symptoms of cataract than of PVD. The fact, however, is that the symptoms described by Candrakı̄rti
are not those of cataract, but exactly those caused by PVD (among which, in our quick googling, we find
the vision of “floating strings”, “spots and dots” or “swarms of bees”). From these considerations, it
seems reasonable to understand timira not according to its more literal meaning, but (supposing that the
Indian medicine of the seventh century lacked a complete nosology of eye disorders) on the basis of the
symptomatology presented by Candrakı̄rti.
66
yathā hi taimirikāḥ timirapratyayād asantam eva keśādisvabhāvaṃ sasvabhāvatvena abhiniviṣṭāḥ |
evam avidyātimiropahatamatinayanatayā bālā niḥsvabhāvaṃ bhāvajātaṃ sasvabhāvatvena abhiniviṣṭā |
PsP 261.2–4.

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

of stopping the attachment (abhiniveśa) to what is false of those who are

mistaken, we—like [persons] without timira—say ‘no things exist (na
santi)’.67
Finally, all these images allow us to identify three different epistemic situations:
(1) that of the ordinary man (or the substantialist philosopher), whose perception is
comparable to the sight of someone affected by the timira disorder. He perceives and
conceives reality as a sum of entities existing in themselves—i.e. endowed with
svabhāva—and does not question this conception, believing it a truthful represen-
tation of what is ultimately real. (2) The situation of the hypothetical nihilist
theoretician that Nāgārjuna and his followers are accused of being, which is
comparable—as is the case of the historical nāstika “materialists”—to that of a false
witness or to a blind man. The crucial aspect of this situation is that this individual
would be someone who has not overcome the ordinary vision of reality; then, he still
perceives things in terms of svabhāva. His most direct cognitive approach to reality
would be the same of common people; he would not be capable of a full
naiḥsvabhāvika vision; the universe still would seem to him a totality of separate
substances (with all the psychological, epistemological and “existential” conse-
quences such a vision entails). Yet, in contrast to an ordinary man or a substantialist
philosopher, the nihilist would not subscribe to the same vision of things; he would
disclaim it and, like Mādhyamika philosophers, he would declare that phenomenal
objects do not ultimately exist. But his statement would not be motivated by an actual
cognitive revolution, that is, by a thorough overcoming of avidyā. (3) The third
epistemic situation is that of the buddhas (also the situation the Mādhyamika masters
ascribe to themselves), comparable to that of eyewitnesses, people devoid of sight
pathologies, or any person who does not experience a given phenomenon. They deny
the existence of objects of ordinary experience, because their cognitive experience is
extraordinary, and therefore they no longer see reality as a set of things endowed with
a self, but see it in another way (one about which nothing is said by Nāgārjuna).
A conclusive simile, comprehensive of these three epistemic-philosophical
modalities, could be that of three individuals: the first (comparable to the ordinary
man) hallucinates, but does not know that he does, and so believes in the ultimate
reality of the object of his false vision. The second one (the nihilist whom
Mādhyamikas refuse to be identified with) has the same hallucination, but he
disowns it, claiming the object he perceives has to be illusory and ultimately not
real. The third (the Mādhyamika master) also asserts that the object perceived by the
first two is illusory, but says this because he does not experience it; he does not
hallucinate, so he does not see illusory objects, but reality.
Dve satye
We would observe that the anti-nāstitāvāda images presented above—except the
one of the absence of Devadatta in the house, or of the cut of “a second head” (in

67
yas tu taimirikopalabdhakeśeṣu iva vitaimiriko na kiṃcid upalabhate sa nāstīti bruvan na kiṃcin nāstīti
brūyāt pratiṣedhyābhāvāt | viparyastānāṃ tu mithyābhiniveśanivṛttyartham ataimirikā iva vayaṃ brūmo
na santi sarvabhāvāḥ iti | PsP 273.14–274.3 (I am following Poussin’s suggestion—1903, p. 274, note 1
—to insert na between bruvan and kiṃ in PsP 274.1).

123
 G. Ferraro

fact, both extremely significant)—belong to the MMK commentators, not to

Nāgārjuna. Therefore, if instead of Madhyamaka in general we want to focus only
on the position of its founder, someone who pays heed to a warning like Oetke’s on
the “limitations of the relevance of an ‘exegetical tradition’”68 with regard to the
interpretation of an ancient author69 would require more textual evidence (besides
the passage of the VVV quoted above) in Nāgārjuna’s work, in order to prove that
his is a definitely non-nihilist and anti-nihilist position.
Now, it seems to me that such textual evidence, formulated exactly according to
the pattern of the commentators’ samples accounted so far (i.e. according to the
model of claiming that the Mādhyamika denies things on the basis of an epistemic
experience the nihilist theoretician would not live), is contained in one of the most
crucial passages of the MMK, that is in verses 7–9 of chapter 24.
In the first six kārikās of this chapter, an opponent criticized Nāgārjuna for his
notion of emptiness, which seems to nullify everything, including the logical
foundations of the Four Noble Truths and its corollaries. This charge, as Candrakı̄rti
explains, is nothing more than a strong accusation of nihilism: the opponent,
“because of his [wrong] discrimination (svavikalpanayā), [is] erroneously superim-
posing (adhyāropya) the meaning of non-existence (nāstitvaṃ) on the notion of
emptiness.”70 Now, to reply to the opponent’s accusation, Nāgārjuna claims (in
stanzas 8 and 9) that the buddhas’ Dharma is based on two truths, lokasaṃvṛtisatya
and paramārthasatya, and that the distinction between the two ought to be deeply
understood in order to understand the “profound tattva (truth/reality)” embedded in
the Buddha’s teaching.
Thus Nāgārjuna, aiming to rebut the most serious and articulated charge of
nihilism in the whole MMK, resorts to the dve satye. This means that, according to
him, the doctrine of the two truths is the best possible reply to those who consider
the Mādhyamika a nihilist. If we bear in mind the various images cited above, we
can appropriately presume that Nāgārjuna means that his negations (that is, his
notion of emptiness) are not of the same kind as the nihilist, because Nāgārjuna’s
teaching is based on a kind of truth (i.e. on a cognitive experience) different from
the truth substantialist, nihilistic and generally metaphysical positions are based on.
Similar to a sighted man with respect to someone impaired by the timira visual
disorder, Nāgārjuna declares empty (viz. denies) what he does not see: i.e. he denies
substantial entities perceived at the level of saṃvṛtisatya (a level on which, in any
case, a relevant part of the buddhas’ teaching is based; that is, that part which—
beginning from the sermon at Benares—speaks about reality in substantial and
causal terms,71 and which has an indispensable role, as MMK 24.10 emphasizes, in
68
Oetke (2003, p. 462).
69
“The extreme view that the consideration of an exegetical tradition is indispensable for any
understanding of a (philosophical) teaching is absurd and self-defeating”, Oetke (2003, p. 464).
70
See PsP 490.8 (svavikalpanayaiva nāstitvaṃ śūnyatārtha ity evaṃ viparītam adhyāropya. Actually, this
sentence is addressed directly to the opponent, and should be read in the second person). A few pages
before (at PsP 475.7), commenting the first verse of MMK 24, Candrakı̄rti had already said that according
to the opponent of Nāgārjuna “what is empty is not existent” (yac chūnyaṃ tan nāsti), PsP 475.7.
71
As samples of statements that pertain to the domain of saṃvṛtisatya, Bhāviveka noticeably suggests:
“‘Entities such as form, etc., arise, stay and pass away’, ‘Devadatta goes’, ‘Vasumitra eats’, ‘Somadatta

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

achieving the most elevated cognitive and spiritual stages). Therefore, by referring
to the two truths, Nāgārjuna alludes to the fact that he is an “eyewitness” to the
absence of what ordinarily manifests itself, and not a nihilist who speaks about
something he has no experience of.
Claiming to have a supreme (parama) vision of reality (regardless of what this
could really mean)72 is definitely not nihilistic talk, but realistic. However, the
Madhyamaka perspective is also drastically antimetaphysical: about reality and its
possible vision Nāgārjuna says nothing at all; rather, he challenges and rejects every
attempt to say something. To say something about reality necessarily means using
the categories of being and/or non-being and then falling into metaphysical
constructions that are not only necessarily unfaithful representations of reality, but
also prevent the possibility of achieving its fruition.73
Given that Nāgārjuna’s philosophical program entails an attack firstly on the
“positive” metaphysics of the Abhidharma schools, it is not surprising that his
language is mainly negative: in fact, he denies the existence of all possible entities
ordinarily and “metaphysically” thinkable. Were there not the factor of “ultimate
truth” (the vision of the sighted person or of the eyewitness), then the Madhyamaka
negation would actually be indistinguishable from a nihilistic negation. Indeed, a
nihilist does not have a cognitive experience that is other than and beyond the
hallucination of common people (and of the substantialist philosopher). By denying
all the aspects of his hallucination, he is left with nothing. Conversely, Nāgārjuna
denies in the name (or on the basis) of an epistemic experience of reality which is
different from and subsequent to the hallucination: it is exactly this experience—
answering an old question posed by Nagao in a paper actually dedicated to
Yogācāra—which is “‘what remains’ in śūnyatā.” However, since the Madhyamaka
program exclusively consists in promoting this supreme epistemic experience,
without describing it in any way, its discourse ultimately resembles that of the
nihilist: both, after all, deny the substantialist vision (viz., the hallucination).

Footnote 71 continued
meditates’, ‘Brahmadatta achieves liberation’”, Prajñāpradīpa to MMK 24.8, translation by Uryuzu
(1971, p. 33). Therefore, conventional truth is that in which individuals and things appear as singular
entities or processes, separated among them and endowed with ontological autonomy.
Candrakı̄rti, on his part—as already mentioned in a previous note—lists some (canonical) teachings
based on conventional truth: “the doctrines of the skandha, of the dhatu, of the āyatana, of the noble
truths and of dependent arising”, PsP 494.6–7. Here too, the objects of the teachings listed are singular
and “substantial” (certainly, the pratītyasamutpāda Candrakı̄rti alludes to on this occasion is the
“canonical” dependent-arising, whose intrinsically existent twelve links are connected by way of cause
and effect transitive and not reciprocal relationships).
72
We may ask, for example, how Madhyamaka positions itself in the discussion (see Almogi 2009,
p. 163) about the kind of jñāna that grounds the buddhas’ soteriological activities: whether it is a “non-
conceptual gnosis” (nirvikalpajñāna) or a “pure mundane gnosis” (śuddhalaukikajñāna). The definition of
tattva as nirvikalpa (in MMK 18.9) and the claim that the vision of the enlightened absolutely lacks the
“hairs and flies” of ordinary cognitive experience could be evidence for the former hypothesis.
73
As MMK 15.6 states: “Those who see intrinsic and extrinsic nature, being and non-being, do not see
the truth/reality (tattva) in Buddha’s teaching” (svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvam eva ca | ye
paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane ||).

123
 G. Ferraro

Difficulties of Antirealistic and Metaphysical Readings in Avoiding

Nihilistic Interpretation

Returning to the opening question regarding “who is right” with regard to the issue
of Nāgārjuna’s self-understanding as non-nihilist and his interpreters who considers
him a nihilist, the discussion developed so far fosters the conclusion that
Madhyamaka arguments and images seem sufficient and suitable to distance
Madhyamaka from nihilism: thus, someone who judges Nāgārjuna as a nihilist
would be misunderstanding him. So, at this point, the need arises to explain how
such a widespread interpretative mistake could arise.
My point of view is that the error in question stems from two different basic
misconceptions: the first disregards the realistic aspect of Madhyamaka philosophy,
while the second ensues from the difficulty of relating with a discourse as rigorously
antimetaphysical as Nāgārjuna’s.

Nihilistic Interpretations Arising from Antirealistic Readings

Antirealistic interpretations of the images above would say that the supreme
cognition (or the ultimate truth) Mādhyamikas ascribe to themselves is the
discovery that there is no ultimate reality. As Siderits puts it:
One might say that the special epistemic status of enlightened ones comes not
from their grasping how things ultimately are, but from their having overcome
all sources of error about how things are. […] [T]he ultimate nature of reality
is something that is inexpressible and only cognizable nonconceptually
because, there being no ultimately real entities to figure in truth-makers for
purported descriptions of the ultimate nature of reality, no such description
[…] can be asserted.74
In other words, Mādhyamikas, in order to defend themselves from the charge of
nihilism, would assert they experience the inexistence of a “reality in itself” which
could be the object of negation.
However, in the first section of this paper we saw, in line with the contention of
the Bodhisattvabhūmi, that the antirealistic position—unless we maintain that either
paradox or absolute reificationism is a possible key for reading Nāgārjuna’s work—
could neither be (as Westerhoff suggests) a “mild” form of nihilism, nor (in line
with Siderits’ approach) a non-nihilist point of view, but it necessarily ends up being
extreme nihilism: if nothing exists ultimately, nothing (including appearances) can
exist at all.
Thus, the “enormous” (atimahat) difference between a Mādhyamika and a
nihilist would turn out to be that the former experiences that absolute negation of
everything that the latter just puts forward, without living it. In this way, the
Mādhyamika’s defense against the accusation that he is a nāstika would surprisingly
be that he is much more nihilist than a simple (or perhaps a fake) nāstika, who just
speaks, without really knowing what he says.

74
Siderits (2015, pp. 120–121).

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

Definitely, on the basis of the available Madhyamaka textual material, it is

difficult to defend such a conclusion, especially as long as we have at our disposal a
much “lighter” or (Ockamian) “economical” exegetical solution: Mādhyamikas are
not antirealist, and therefore their final position is not that “everything is
appearance, and nothing ultimately exists”, but “every phenomenon is just
conventionally true, while reality is the object of ultimate truth, about which
nothing should be said.”
Westerhoff (or, more generally, scholars who prefer an antirealistic and semantic
approach to Nāgārjuna’s thought) would probably consider this kind of reading—
which only in a certain sense could be described in terms of the appearance/reality
distinction75—as “a radical error theory according to which we live in a world of
illusions, and have to discover the reality beneath all the shadows of error.”76
Against this kind of “misunderstanding of Madhamaka”, “[t]he antidote […] is a
dose of semantic non-dualism, i.e. the argument that for Madhyamaka there is
ultimately only one truth, the conventional one.77
The problem with a realistic interpretation of Madhyamaka would be, Westerhoff
argues, that it can be considered as a residual or a reflection of views the
Madhyamaka “sets out to negate.”78 But in fact, it seems to me that this very
mistake belongs to antirealist readings of Nāgārjuna, as long as they cannot avoid
ascribing to Madhyamaka that radical nihilism it sets out to reject.

Nihilistic Interpretations Arising from Metaphysical Readings

Not every scholar who considers Nāgārjuna’s philosophy a kind of nihilism shares
the (semantic) exegetical approach of reducing or denying the evidence indicating
that this philosophy ultimately aims at the accomplishment of an epistemic change
in terms of a transition from ordinary to supreme vision of reality. Instead, since the
time of ancient Indian writers, the majority of Nāgārjuna’s nihilistic interpreters
recognize that the author of MMK does admit an ultimate level of reality, and that
he is trying to promote in his readers some kind of change in their cognitive
approach to the same reality.
The suggestion here is that even though these writers have no difficulty in
recognizing the “realistic” aspect of Nāgārjuna’s thought, they have problems in

75
Actually, the dichotomy appearance/reality does not seem the best way to describe the realistic-
antimetaphysics interpretation of Madhyamaka: in fact, insofar as Nāgārjuna does not comment on what
the world is like at the end of the epistemic revolution we are talking about, we have no conclusive
elements for establishing a relationship between (a supposedly apparent) “before” and (a supposedly real)
“after” the achievement of nirvāṇa. As a matter of fact, the images most frequently chosen by Nāgārjuna
to metaphorically represent his epistemology do not exactly suggest the pattern of something real which
appears different; rather, examples like the city of Gandharva, the artificial man created by the Buddha,
or the hair and flies seen by someone impaired by timira are (as we observed in note 65) inexistent objects
really perceived by deceived people. And of course we cannot disregard that when Nāgārjuna’s
epistemological discourse is less metaphorical and more explicit, he speaks of two levels of truth (or
reality), and not one true and one apparent level.
76
Westerhoff (2016, p. 372).
77
Westerhoff (2016, pp. 372–373).
78
Westerhoff (2016, p. 372).

123
 G. Ferraro

dealing with its “antimetaphysical” dimension. Indeed, especially in the field of

philosophy (where Nāgārjuna’s work is mainly received and studied), we come
across what could be called “the compulsion to metaphysics”, that is, the tendency
to conceive the philosophic enterprise as basically consisting in the establishment of
definitions of reality in itself. Not only in those traditions (widespread in the West
too, since the times of Anaximander or Parmenides) that admit two or more levels of
truth, but even in the philosophical contexts that conceive only one level of truth,
philosophy (or “first philosophy”) is largely metaphysics: that is, an attempt to
describe how things ultimately are.
Therefore, it is possible to conjecture that ancient and contemporary interpreters,
educated and influenced by such a conception of philosophical activity, have some
trouble dealing with a project like Nāgārjuna’s, which, although fully framed
according to the language and the logical-conceptual proceedings of philosophy,
does not bring about any metaphysics, and actually consists in an extraordinary
attack on any attempt to read reality through any logical category (affirmative or
negative, astika or nāstika). Thus, it happens that many scholars, not fully realizing
how a thoroughly philosophical project could be only destruens, are unable to
refrain from ascribing to Nāgārjuna some kind of definition of ultimate reality.
To be sure, the history of metaphysical interpretations of Nāgārjuna cannot be
reduced to his reading as a nihilist thinker. On the contrary, during the twentieth
century absolutistic, monistic, relativistic, etc., interpretations of the Madhyamaka
project prevailed. Nonetheless, these positive interpretations really seem an
unwarranted “projection”: on the textual plane there is very little (if anything)
that allows exegetical conclusions of this kind. After all, if we persist in thinking (or
if we are unable to refrain from thinking) that Nāgārjuna is advancing his own,
peculiar definition of ultimate reality, a nihilistic reading seems more justified than
any positive metaphysical interpretations: actually, what Nāgārjuna almost invari-
ably does is “to empty” and deny what ordinarily manifests itself as existent; if these
negations had any metaphysical function, the most consistent conclusion would
actually be that Nāgārjuna is describing ultimate reality in terms of emptiness,
absence or nothingness.
An author who concludes that Nāgārjuna’s words are a description of reality in
terms of “sheer, unqualified, absolute nothingness”79 usually cannot conceal his
perplexities80 (is not a statement such as “ultimate truth is that nothing exists” “both

79
Wood (1994, p. 280).
80
Only Wood (among the nihilistic interpreters of Nāgārjuna who I know) seems to feel comfortable with
the conclusion that the ultimate truth supported by the Madhyamaka would be that of pure nothingness:
“The nihilist view is a radical one, but I am not quite sure that it is philosophically untenable, i.e. that it is
actually refutable as being incoherent. The view does not seem to involve any logical inconsistence”,
Wood (1994, p. 278).
Even Oetke (who is, as we have seen, generally in tune with Wood’s conclusions) finds some
difficulties in the nihilistic position. Especially relevant (though, I beg to observe, too parsimonious in
punctuation) is his observation that a statement like “on the level of highest truth it is true that nothing
exists” is problematic, because “the possibility appears to be precluded to attribute truth to the central
Madhyamaka tenets while maintaining the view that all sorts of being true consist in the existence of
some correspondence-relation which connects linguistic entities like expressions or propositions
expressed by them on the one hand and some non-linguistic entities on the other because the content

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

obviously empirically false […] and straightforwardly inconsistent”?81) or even

indignation:82 after all, what kind of experience, except perhaps death, could be
described in such terms?
If, however, we consider the possibility that Nāgārjuna is not denying reality on
the one hand and is not defining anything at all on the other, then our perplexities
(and anger!) diminish drastically: Nāgārjuna is not saying how reality is; he is just
denying that it is just as it commonly appears. Given that there is another fashion in
which reality could manifest itself and given that Nāgārjuna’s negations are not
definitions of this other fashion, his words definitely do not configure any kind of
nihilism.

Conclusion

Antirealistic and nihilistic interpreters share two assumptions: (1) that a realistic
interpretation of Madhyamaka would necessarily be a metaphysical reading and (2)
that metaphysical interpretations of Madhyamaka would necessarily be radical
nihilistic readings. On this basis, the former, as long as they deny the presence of
any ultimate reality in Madhyamaka, conclude that Nāgārjuna’s thought is neither
metaphysics nor nihilism; the latter, inasmuch as they ascribe an ultimate truth to
Madhyamaka, believe that this truth can only equate to nothingness.
In this paper I have argued that the difference between these two readings is more
apparent than substantial: a careful evaluation of antirealistic readings shows that
they are logically indistinguishable from nihilistic ones (unless we want to defuse
the paradox of the mere existence of appearances in the reificationist fashion of
saying that appearances are ultimate reality).
Nevertheless, the conclusion that Madhyamaka is a radical form of nihilism does
not do justice to the many passages in which Nāgārjuna and his followers grant they
are not nihilists. If we do not want to reduce the difference between a Mādhyamika
and a nāstika to the fact that the former experiences the nothingness, while the latter
just speaks of it (and then that the former would be a real nihilist, while the latter
just a fake one), we must think that supreme truth is the cognition of something real.
The only hindrance to this realistic conclusion would derive from the assumption
(1) above: if it were true that a realistic stance is necessarily a metaphysical

Footnote 80 continued
of the relevant tenets is such that its truth is incompatible with the existence of entities”, Oetke (1996,
p. 100).
81
Westerhoff (2016, p. 337).
82
Burton, for example, shows all his annoyance towards a viewpoint that seems to him like “a night in
which all cows are black” (Burton 2001, pp. 62–64). According to him, the reality described by
Nāgārjuna appears “irrevocably subjective as well as philosophically and religiously/spiritually barren”
(ibidem, p. 66). A viewpoint of this kind “is surely a recipe for despotism” (ibidem). Finally, Burton
concludes, “meditation on emptiness would thus be a total shutting down of the mind (rather than a state
of knowledge), though why the attainment of such mental blankness would be desirable I cannot
understand” (ibidem, p. 83): an appraisal which recalls the way through which, almost 150 years before
Burton, Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire (apud Tuck 1990, p. 33) condemned Buddhism as a whole as a
“monstrous enterprise in which every potential service to mankind is sterilized by a pervasive nihilism.”

123
 G. Ferraro

position, we cannot but conclude—to the extent that assumption (2) seems
unquestionable—that Madhyamaka is a radical nihilism. However, my argument is
that the mere presupposition of an ultimate reality, with no positive attribute
referred to it, does not configure a dṛṣṭi or a metaphysical position. And if
Madhyamaka philosophy is not a metaphysics, it cannot be a nihilism.

Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful to Professor Anne MacDonald, whose remarks and

emendations (regarding both conceptual and formal questions) were essential to the development of
the present version of this paper. I also would like to thank Professor Akira Saito, who gave me his
consent to quote his unpublished translation of Buddhapālita’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-vṛtti, and the
anonymous reviewer of the manuscript, for his/her precious comments and suggestions.

Abbreviations
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
PsP Prasannapadā
VV Vigrahavyāvartanī
VVV Vigrahavyāvartanīsvavṛitti

References

Texts
Acintyastava. Sanskrit edition in Lindtner, C. Master of Wisdom. Writings of the Buddhist Master
Nāgārjuna. Translations and Studies. Cazadero: Dharma Publishing, 1997, 163–171.
Bodhisattvabhūmi of Asaṅga. Ed. Dutt, N. Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute. 1966. Edited online by
the Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon, http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/7616.
MMK. Shaoyong, Y. (2011) Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. New Editions of the Sanskrit, Tibetan
and Chinese Versions, with Commentary and a Modern Chinese Translation. Shanghai: Zhongxi
Book Company.
Pāli Suttapiṭka. Edited online by the Vipassana Research Institute. http://www.tipitaka.org/.
PsP. Poussin, L. de La Vallée (1903). Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec
la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. St. Petersburg: Bibliotheca Buddhica IV.
Ratnāvalī. Hahn, M. (1982). Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī. Vol. 1. The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese).
Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag.
VV(V). Johnston, E. H., & Kunst, A. (2005). The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna. Vigrahavyāvartanī.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1st ed. 1951).
Yogācārabhūmi. Bhattacharya, V. (1957). The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga: The Sanskrit Text
Compared with the Tibetan Version, part 1. Calcutta: The University of Calcutta.
Yuktiṣaṣṭikā. Sanskrit fragments in Lindtner, C. Master of Wisdom. Writings of the Buddhist Master
Nāgārjuna. Translations and Studies. Cazadero: Dharma Publishing, 1997, 174–175.

Studies
Almogi, O. (2009). Rong-zom-pa’s Discourses on Buddhology. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph
Series XXIV. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu. (2000). The connected discourses of the Buddha: A translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya.
Boston: Wisdom Publications.

123
Realistic-Antimetaphysical Reading Vs Any Nihilistic…

Bugault, G. (2002). Nāgārjuna. Stances du milieu par excellence. Traduit de l’original Sanskrit présenté et
annoté. Paris: Gallimard.
Burton, D. (2001). Emptiness appraised: A critical study of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Conze, E. (2009). Buddhist thought in India. London: Routledge (1st ed. 1962).
Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J. L., & Priest, G. (2013). How we think Mādhyamikas think: A response to Tom
Tillemans. Philosophy East & West, 63, 435–462.
Delhey, M. (2013). The Yogācārabhūmi Corpus: Sources, editions, translations, and reference works. In
U. T. Kragh (Ed.), The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and
Tibet. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press.
Eckel, M. D. (2008). Bhāviveka and his opponents. Cambridge, MA: Department of Sanskrit and Indian
Studies Harvard University.
Edgerton, F. (1986). Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary and grammar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1st
ed. 1954).
Ferraro, G. (2013). Outlines of a pedagogical interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s two truths doctrine. Journal of
Indian Philosophy, 41(5), 563–590.
Ferraro, G. (2014). Grasping snakes and touching elephants: A rejoinder to Garfield and Siderits. Journal
of Indian Philosophy, 42(4), 451–462.
Gold, J. C. (2015). Without Karma and Nirvāna Buddhism is Nihilism: The Yogācāra contribution to the
doctrine of emptiness. In J. L. Garfield &˙J. Westerhoff (Eds.), Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or
rivals? (pp. 213–241). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garfield, J. L. (1995). The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhya-
makakārikā. Translation and commentary. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huet, G. (2012). Héritage du Sanskrit: Dictionnaire sanskrit-français. http://sanskrit.inria.fr/.
Huntington, C. (2003). Was Candrakı̄rti a Prāsaṅgika? In G. Dreyfus & S. McClintock (Eds.),
Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction (pp. 67–91). Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Huntington, C. (2007). The emptiness of emptiness. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1st ed. 1989).
Inada, K. K. (1993). Nāgārjuna. A translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an introductory essays.
Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Jones, R. H. (2010). Nagarjuna. Buddhism’s most important philosopher. Plain English translations and
summaries of Nagarjuna’s essential philosophical works. New York: Jackson Square Books.
Lindtner, C. (1981). Buddhapālita on emptiness. Indo-Iranian Journal, 23, 187–217.
Lindtner, C. (1997). Master of wisdom. Writings of the Buddhist Master Nāgārjuna. Translations and
studies. Cazadero: Dharma Publishing.
MacDonald, A. (2015). In clear words. The Prasannapadā, Chap. 1. Volume I: Introduction, manuscript
description, Sanskrit text; Vol. II: Translation, Tibetan text. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Monier-Williams, M. (1986). A Sanskrit–English dictionary. Etymologically and philologically arranged
with special reference to cognate Indo-European languages. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1st ed.
1872).
Newland, G. (1992). The two truths. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Newland, G. (1999). Appearance and reality. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Nietupski, P. (1996). The examination of the conditioned entities and the examination of reality. Journal
of Indian Philosophy, 24(2), 103–143.
Oetke, C. (1992). Pragmatical implicatures and text-interpretation (The alleged logical error of the
negation of the antecedent in the Mūlamadyamakakārikās). Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik (StII),
16, 185–233.
Oetke, C. (1996). Nihilist and non-nihilist interpretations of Madhyamaka. Acta Orientalia, 57, 57–104.
Oetke, C. (2003). Some remarks on thesis and philosophical position in early Madhyamaka. Journal of
Indian Philosophy, 31(4), 449–478.
Poussin, L. de La Vallée (1938). Buddhica. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 3, 137–160.
Saito, A. (2007). Is Nāgārjuna a Mādhyamika? Studies in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra and Mahāyāna
Scriptures, 153–164.
Salvini, M. (2008). Conventions and agency in the philosophies of the Mahāyāna. Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis. London: School of Oriental and African Studies.
Salvini, M. (2011). The Nidānasamyukta and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: understanding the Middle
Way through comparison and exegesis. Thai International Journal of Indian Studies, II, 57–95.

123
 G. Ferraro

Salvini, M. (2015). Language and existence in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. In J. L. Garfield & J.
Westerhoff (Eds.), Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or rivals? (pp. 29–71). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Schmithausen, L. (1987). Ālayavijñāna: On the origin and the early development of a central concept of
Yogācāra philosophy. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
Schmithausen, L. (2000). On Three Yogācārabhūmi passages mentioning the three Svabhāvas or
Lakṣaṇas. In J. Silk (Ed.), Wisdom, compassion, and the search for understanding: The Buddhist
studies legacy of Gadjin M (pp. 245–263). Honolulu: Nagao. University of Hawai’i Press.
Seyfort Ruegg, D. (1981). The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India. Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz.
Seyfort Ruegg, D. (2000). Three studies in the history of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka philosophy.
Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
Shulman, E. (2014). Rethinking the Buddha: Early Buddhist philosophy as meditative perception.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siderits, M., & Katsura, Sh. (2013). Nāgārjuna’s middle way. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Boston: Wisdom
Publications.
Siderits, M. (2015). The case for discontinuity. In J. L. Garfield & J. Westerhoff (Eds.), Madhyamaka and
Yogācāra: Allies or rivals? (pp. 111–126). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thakchöe, S. (2007). The two truths debate. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Thakchöe, S. (2015). Reification and Nihilism. In J. L. Garfield & J. Westerhoff (Eds.), Madhyamaka and
Yogācāra: Allies or rivals? (pp. 72–110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tuck, A. (1990). Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of scholarship. On Western Interpretation of
Nāgārjuna. New York: Oxford University Press.
Uryuzu, R. (1971). Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradı̄pa (Chapter 24). The Research Bulletin of the Faculty of
General Education, The Faculty of General Education, Kinki Unversity, Osaka, 2(2), 15–56.
Van Inwagen, P. (2009). Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Vélez de Cea, A. (2003). Nāgārjuna. Versos sobre los Fundamentos del Camino Medio (Mūlamadhaya-
makakārikā). Traducción del sânscrito, introducción y notas. Barcelona: Kairós.
Westerhoff, J. (2010.1). Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī. The Dispeller of Disputes. Translation and
commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Westerhoff, J. (2010.2). Twelve examples of illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Westerhoff, J. (2016). On the Nihilist interpretation of Madhyamaka. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 44(2),
337–376.
Wood, T. E. (1994). Nāgārjunian disputations. A philosophical journey through an Indian looking-glass.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

123