Every Voter Counts - Winning Over Low-Income Voters

EVERY
VOTER
COUNTS
Winning over
low-income
voters By
Claire Ainsley and
Frank Soodeen
Shifting loyalties across the wider
electorate means voters on low incomes
could play a significant role in dozens
of battleground seats across England,
Scotland and Wales at the next election.
Every voter counts: winning over
low-income voters
Claire Ainsley and Frank Soodeen
This report presents research commissioned by JRF since 2016 into the
preferences, attitudes and voting patterns of people living on low incomes
in Britain. It includes findings from a 15,000-person survey carried out
in summer 2019 as well as earlier research and maps the distribution of
‘swing’ low-income voters in what are likely to be some of the closest
fought parliamentary seats at the next election. Its core message is that all
the political parties need to engage seriously with the day-to-day concerns
of voters living on a low income – because it is the right thing to do for
a just and more compassionate society, and because they could be critical
to the electoral politics of Britain. We also recommend some ways of
reconnecting with low-income voters, many of whom feel like no-one
is speaking for them.
What you need to know

• Low-income voters are a large segment of the electorate. There are approximately 9.5 million,
2.7 million of whom can be characterised as swing voters.
• Although low-income voters are still more likely to vote Labour than the Conservatives, today they
are less tribally loyal to one party.
• Brexit is not the most important issue to most of these voters. More want action to revitalise the
places they live in, provide opportunity for themselves and their children to thrive, and for their living
standards to improve.
We can solve UK poverty

JRF is working with governments, businesses, communities, charities and individuals to solve UK poverty.
This report is part of our work to build the political and public will we need to solve UK poverty, and builds
on the recommendations and evidence in our strategy to solve UK poverty.
October 2019
www.jrf.org.uk
Contents
Executive summary ii
1 Introduction 1
2 Who is on a low income? 2
3 What matters to low-income voters? 12
4 Connecting with low-income voters 21
5 Conclusion 25
Notes 26
References 27
Appendix A: Methods 28
Appendix B: Constituencies where low-income voters were 33
larger than the majority achieved in 2017
Acknowledgements 37
About the authors 37
i
Executive summary
This report presents the case for politicians of all parties to work harder to understand and connect
with low-income voters – their concerns, their ideas and their values. This is the right thing to do in a
democratic society but low-income voters are also a group with increasing power and importance in the
overall picture of British politics.
New estimates suggest that there are approximately 9.5 million such voters in Great Britain, and they
are voting in greater numbers. Between 2015 and 2017, low-income voter turnout increased by seven
percentage points, the first noteworthy rise for 30 years. And, in a recent poll, 59% of low-income voters
who had not voted in the 2017 election said they now planned to vote at the next one.
Voting intentions
Although low-income voters are still more likely to vote Labour than the Conservatives, today they are
less tribally loyal to one party. Between 2010 and 2017, more than half of low-income voters either
changed parties, or whether they voted or not. We estimate that there are 2.7 million low-income swing
voters (defined as switching their vote between 2015 and 2017). At the last election there were
130 seats in which the number of low-income swing voters was bigger than the majorities achieved in
2017.
Independently of this project our research partners at Hanbury Strategy have been developing an original
framework for thinking about the next contest based on seat demographics and past elections. Current
polling suggests that numerous seats in Scotland, the West Country, and Remain heartlands may change
hands. What happens in three distinct types of constituency in England and Wales which Labour
currently hold will therefore play a major role in determining the occupant of Number 10 after the next
election. Of these 109 seats, 40 have more low-income swing voters than the 2017 majority achieved.
What matters to low-income voters?

Like everyone else, low-income voters will vote for parties that are nearest to their values and attitudes,
and those of the social groups they identify most closely with. These decisions are shaped by personal
circumstances, the health of their respective communities, and the experiences and views of friends,
families and neighbours.
Most low-income voters lean left on questions of the economy but are much more split on socio-cultural
values. On Brexit, they largely reflect the national balance between Leave and Remain (although are
slightly more in favour of no deal than the general public) but Brexit is not the most important issue
to most of them.
On other questions about how society should be run, low-income voters don’t appear to have a
dramatically distinct set of preferences compared with the average voter. But the struggle of living on
less than everyone else gives rise to specific considerations around the cost of living, health, and housing
especially.
Overall the policies that edged into the top five for low-income voters on their priority issues were about
their local area, including training and job opportunities. But low-income voters (and voters overall), also
declared high levels of support for there being more secure tenancies in the private rented sector, more
council/housing association homes for rent, and guaranteeing social security benefits rise in line with
inflation.
Building common ground

The striking finding from the research JRF has commissioned is just how disillusioned many people are.
Distrust is high, and the current parliamentary fractures are serving to reinforce an existing perception
that politics is not working well for people on a low income. Many people live in areas where they feel
politicians, national or local, have not served their places, whatever the personal standing of their elected
ii
MP. Yet this doesn’t diminish people’s strong wish to improve their own prospects and those of their
communities.
There is scope for all the major parties to make headway with low-income voters but attempting to
appeal to narrow segments may completely alienate other parts of a similar demographic. This is risky
when low-income voters are so numerous and the projected majorities in many of the battleground
seats are so small. Parties must find ways to build common ground between the new electoral coalitions
they need to form a parliamentary majority, not pick off one group against another.
Whether it is ‘a country that works for everyone’, ‘for the many not the few’, slogans need to be backed
up by reality, and it is time for the concerns, hopes and ideas of people living on a low income to rise to
the centre of politics. All political parties stand to gain by listening to the concerns of these voters and
acting on them. So too does our democracy.
iii
1 Introduction
“We haven’t got the attention before Brexit; I don’t know if we’ll get it after.”
Woman, Middlesbrough1
People struggling to get by on low incomes are more than ready for change. The experience of living
on a low income has been overlooked in public and political debate for as long as they can remember –
they have felt they have no voice in our society. This simply cannot be right.
The result of shutting people on low incomes out of policy-making and debate is a political culture that
fails to take full account of their concerns and interests, and policies that have not been designed to
equip them to build better lives.
Building on JRF’s commitment to amplify the voices of people in poverty, since 2016 we have
undertaken extensive quantitative and qualitative research with the UK’s leading political researchers
to promote understanding of the concerns and interests of people living on a low income (Box 1).
In this report we combine insights from that work with our research into the main causes of poverty,
and how these and their consequences are experienced day-to-day.
In the first section, we set out who is most likely to live on a low in income in Britain and their key
concerns. A consistent finding across different sources is that low-income voters are not especially
different to people on higher incomes when it comes to how they approach many of the big issues
of the day. But their experience of trying to make ends meet while being held back by numerous
restrictions means there are some specific considerations.
In the second section, we look at how people on low incomes voted in recent elections and
the pivotal role they might play in the next one due to their rising turnout and volatility among
the wider electorate.
In the third, we present the results from a large survey of low-income voters and a nationally
representative sample to understand the values and attitudes shaping voting intentions right now.
Finally, we conclude with some suggestions for what the parties might do to gain and hold support
among this vital group ahead of the next election, and beyond.
Box 1: The research

This paper draws on the following research projects commissioned by JRF since 2016 to understand
the attitudes and concerns of people on low incomes.
Britainthinks (2019) Audience benchmarking – public segmentation. Internal report for JRF
Dunatchik, A et al (2016) Social and political attitudes of people on low incomes. NatCen
ComRes/JRF/UK in a Changing Europe (2019) What do people want from Brexit? ComRes
Hanbury Strategy (2019a) Dataset containing information regarding low-income voters. Internal
report for JRF
Hanbury Strategy (2019b) Survey results: two-thirds low income (survey of 10,000),
one-third NatRep (survey of 5,000) carried out in August 2019. Internal report for JRF
Goodwin, M and Heath, O (2019) Low-income voters in UK general elections, 1987-2017. JRF
Goodwin, M and Heath, O (2018) Brexit, general election and IndyRef: the role of low-income voters in
Scotland. JRF
Goodwin, M and Heath, O (2017) UK 2017 general election vote examined: income, poverty and Brexit.
JRF
Goodwin, M. & Heath, O (2016) Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and a lack of opportunities. JRF
Taylor, E et al (2017) Social and political attitudes of people on low incomes. NatCen
1
2 Who is on a low income?
“I work full-time and all the girls I work with, they never have anything left out of their pay.
Once they get paid, they have probably about £50 left in a month.”
Woman, Newcastle2
Living on a low income means being locked in a daily struggle to make ends meet, with rising living costs,
low-paid or insecure work, and changes to social security severely restricting people’s options.
Among people experiencing poverty in the UK, rates are consistently highest among parents and
dependent children (JRF, 2017; DWP, 2019)3. This group makes up around half of all people in poverty,
whilst more than one in ten are pensioners (JRF, 2018). People living on a low income are typically part
of households where someone is working, although they may be unable to work enough hours or not be
paid enough to reach a decent standard of living when household costs are factored in. Some people
cannot work because of caring responsibilities, disabilities or ill health.
Lone parents face an especially high risk of living in poverty – nearly twice as high as any other family
type. Much of this is down to people being unable to work because of caring responsibilities that are hard
to match with the types of paid work available locally. But since 2010/11, child poverty has been rising
across most types of working families4 – whether they are a lone parent (the majority of whom are in
work), couple families, and regardless of whether the adults are full-time or part-time workers. Rising
costs (particularly housing), inadequate wages, and cuts to benefits and tax credits are key constraints
that lock them into hardship (JRF, 2018).
Around a third of people in poverty are home-owners, a third are in social housing, and a third are
renting their homes from private landlords (DWP, 2019). Around 320,000 people are homeless
(Shelter, 2018). On average, home-owners will be older as most families with dependent children
in poverty live in rented accommodation.
Those living on a low income reflect society’s wider inequalities too: when disability benefits are not
counted as income nearly half (48%) of people living in poverty live in a household where someone has
a disability (Social Metrics Commission, 2019). The UK poverty rate is twice as high for Black, Asian and
Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups as it is for those who are ethnically white (Weekes-Bernard, 2017).
Low-income voters have a variety of beliefs

To get a snapshot of their political beliefs and attitudes right now we carried out a detailed national
survey over August 2019 with Hanbury Strategy, polling around 15,000 voters across the country
(where 10,000 of our respondents were on low incomes and 5,000 were nationally representative).
The survey posed a combination of perennial questions from the British Social Attitudes and British
Election Study surveys and some newer ones covering more topical issues to measure low-income voters
against three underlying values dimensions – left-right, liberalism-authoritarianism, and welfarism.
We also asked questions about past voting behaviour, current intentions, and people’s attitudes towards
political leadership and specific policies, focusing on areas that we knew were important to low-income
voters from previous JRF research. A survey this large allows us to make comprehensive cuts across
different regions and local authorities, as well as to draw reasonable distinctions between low- and
higher-income groups. Unless stated otherwise, the figures cited below are derived from this survey.
Using Latent Class Analysis techniques our research partners at Hanbury Strategy were able to segment
low-income voters into several distinct groups based on their economic and socio-cultural beliefs.
Although there are few dramatic differences across the groups, there are contrasts worth noting.
The largest group: ‘the persuadable middle’ make up around 42% of low-income voters. Slightly over
half these voters favour the two biggest parties (with Conservatives leading by about 10%) and they voted
by a smaller majority to leave the EU (53% to 47%). Just under half are over the age of 55 (47%).
2
Their take on economics is even-handed: on the one hand 27% agree that private enterprise
is best placed to sort out Britain’s economic problems (versus 22% disagreeing), but they also support
state ownership of major public services and industries (33% agree versus 20% disagreeing).
The second largest group at 27% of low-income voters is ‘the radicals’. By a ratio of nearly 16 to 1 they
prefer the Labour party over the Conservatives and were the only group to be majority (78%) Remain
voters. This group had the most graduates (27%) and 50% were between the ages of 35 and 55. Of all
the groups they were the most in favour (51%) of major public services and industries being brought
into state ownership.
The third largest group: ‘the traditional working class’ forms 18% of low-income voters. Comprising
older, manual workers who are vocally supportive of leaving the EU (22% support the Brexit Party), this
group is more culturally conservative than the average low-income voter. They are the most likely to be
married and a third favour the Conservative party at this point.
We classify 8% of low-income voters as ‘the disengaged’. Less educated than the average, this group is
far less likely to vote in an election than the others, or to have strong views on any of the issues we asked
them about. They are also younger than average, with only 21% older than 55 and are the second most
ethnically diverse group (20% non-white).
The final group at 5% of low-income voters is ‘the young urbanites’. Young, urban, well-educated, and
economically right leaning, this group has the highest proportion of men (56%) and is the youngest group
with 68% under the age of 35. They are most likely to have children but also most likely to be single and
have the highest proportion of non-white respondents (33%). Although the least supportive of increasing
government spending, they are still more likely to favour Labour over other parties, but the margins are
smaller than other groups where Labour is in the lead.
3
Figure 1: How sub-groups of low-income voters intend to vote compared to the GB
average (August 2019)
Source: Hanbury 2019b. JRF/Hanbury Strategy Poll, 15,009 sample (10,008 low income, 5,001 nationally representative) conducted
between 8 and 27 August, 2019.
In terms of geography:
• The North West has a higher-than-average concentration of ‘the radicals’ and lower than average
concentration of ‘the young urbanites and ‘traditional working class’ voters.
• In London the proportion of ‘the young urbanites’ is 74% greater than the low-income voter
average.
• In the South East the ‘traditional working class’ voters are 14% greater than average.
• ‘The disengaged’ are overrepresented in the West Midlands.
No party can afford to ignore low-income voters

“We give ideas but nobody of authority takes them on board, they seem to think that
they’re better than us and they don’t implement what we’re asking for.”
Woman, Leeds5
Low-income voters are distinct from better-off people in reporting a common experience of feeling
politically marginalised; regardless of whether they voted Leave or Remain, support Labour, Conservative,
another party or none. People on lower incomes say they feel that ‘the decks are stacked against them,’
and that changes such as school or hospital closures will be pursued, irrespective of their views. There is
also a sense that they will be the ones to live with any negative consequences (Dunatchik et al, 2016).
This sense of being overlooked applies within and between places. In April and May 2019, the market
research company ComRes – on behalf of JRF and UK in a Changing Europe – conducted 18
deliberative workshops with low-income voters living in deprived areas across the UK6. Throughout,
participants spoke of a London-centric economy that left them feeling isolated and abandoned. In the
northern and Midlands cities and towns the talk was of a general North-South divide, with the latter seen
as an unequal beneficiary of wealth and investment. Several groups pointed to the uncertainty over the
4
HS2 railway plans as evidence of this perceived lack of investment. Yet low-income voters in southern
towns and cities also reported feeling the impact of falling outside of the greater wealth and influence
of London (ComRes, 2019).
Such widespread feelings of political exclusion will lead to consequences for today’s politicians. If voters
do not feel that current politicians are listening to them or acting on their concerns, they will either turn
away entirely from the political process or start to look elsewhere. This sets up the conditions either for
a crisis of legitimacy or further volatility as voters who feel unrepresented turn away from established
parties to newer entrants.
But working harder to represent people on low incomes isn’t just the first step to better statecraft; one
that might lead to a more cohesive and just society. It is also very good politics. There are considerable
electoral advantages to understanding who is living on a low income in Britain today, and how to win
them over.
Low-income voters are turning out to vote in greater

numbers – and are more likely to switch parties than
before
“You’ve got two political parties, doing what’s best for them to try and get power
as opposed to doing what’s best for the people that they represent.”
Man, Bolton7
Until the late 1980s, there was little difference in turnout8 at general elections between voters on a
middle or high income and voters on low incomes. This changed throughout the 1990s as the numbers
of low-income voters choosing to vote steadily declined. At the 2017 general election the trend was
bucked as low-income voter turnout increased by 7 percentage points (Goodwin and Heath, 2019);
with turnout more generally up by 2.6 percentage points at that election (House of Commons 2019).
This does not look likely to be an exception. In a preliminary poll of 5,000 low-income voters carried out
by Hanbury Strategy for JRF in July 2019 as part of this project, 59% of low-income voters who had
not voted in the 2017 election said they now planned to vote at the next one (Hanbury 2019a).
The reasons behind this change are unclear. One theory is that Jeremy Corbyn’s unambiguously left-
wing stance is drawing back traditional low-income Labour-leaning voters who had drifted away during
the New Labour era. The 2017 election was also unusual in that both major parties tried to include in
their platforms more that would appeal to lower-income voters, and that it followed the surprise
referendum result. Whatever the cause, in 2017 Labour reversed a trend of sliding support among
low-income voters, increasing its share among this group by 13 percentage points. But so did the
Conservatives; growing their low-income vote share by 5 percentage points according to British Election
Study (BES) data (figure 2) (Goodwin and Heath 2019).
5
Figure 2: Party support among low-income voters, 1987-2017
Source: Goodwin and Heath, 2019
This reflects a wider pattern of vote switching and indeed those on the lowest incomes are now most
likely to change their votes. Between 2010 and 2017, more than half of voters on a low income either
changed whether they voted or not between elections, or changed which party they supported (Mellon,
2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2019).
Yet even as more people on low incomes return to the voting booth, a large minority may do so with
feelings of ambivalence. Asked in August 2019 which of Jeremy Corbyn and Boris Johnson low-income
voters preferred as Prime Minister more than a third (38%) declared themselves undecided (Hanbury
2019b). This could be about specific individuals but it is also in keeping with earlier findings that overall,
low-income voters are less likely to feel affiliated to any ‘side’ than those on higher incomes. When asked
by NatCen, nearly a third said they did not feel represented by any political party, compared with just
12% of people on higher incomes (Taylor et al, 2017).
Figure 3: Support of a political party by income group (2016)
Source: Taylor et al, 2017
6
Electoral significance of low-income voters
We know that turnout is rising among low-income voters but until recently it was difficult to achieve
reasonably robust estimates of overall numbers and their geographical spread across UK parliamentary
constituencies. Newer methodologies such as those used in the ONS’s Households in Poverty are making
this more feasible. Our research partners at Hanbury Strategy drew on it and other sources to achieve
constituency-level estimates of low-income voters, defined here as living on less than 60 % of median
incomes (after housing costs) (see methods section).
Their analysis found 9.5 million low income voters across Great Britain. Using a regression model and
a poll of 5,000 low-income voters carried out in July 2019, Hanbury also estimate that there are 2.7
million low-income swing voters (defined as those who had switched parties between 2015 and 2017
(Hanbury Strategy, 2009a). The constituency-level low income voter data for Great Britain is published
on an interactive map on JRF’s website, along with the underlying tables. To give a sense of low-income
voters’ distribution across marginals, table 4 in Appendix B sets out the 130 seats in which the number
of low-income swing voters was bigger than the majorities achieved in each seat in 2017.
The role of low-income voters at the next election

But as we noted earlier, British politics is experiencing an unprecedented level of fragmentation (figure
4). In 2017, 85 seats were won by a majority of 4% or lower. Relatively few of those seats will be equally
marginal at the next election and the key battlegrounds may in fact be elsewhere.
Figure 4: How voting intentions have shifted in Great Britain since the 2017
general election (August 2019).
Source: JRF/Hanbury Strategy Poll, 15,009 sample (10,008 low income, 5001 nationally representative) conducted between 8 -
27 August, 2019.
Yet making precise predictions about where these will be is fraught with pitfalls. Increased voter volatility;
scope for opinion to shift dramatically depending on Brexit outcomes; local considerations; and the
effects eventually of the parties’ respective campaigns will all have a bearing on the eventual outcomes.
Independently of this project, our partners at Hanbury Strategy have been developing an original
framework for thinking about the next contest based on seat demographics and past elections.
7
Current polling suggests that numerous seats in Scotland (where of the 59 seats – 31 have more
low-income swing voters than the majority achieved in 2017 – see appendix B), the West Country,
and Remain heartlands may change hands. What happens in three distinct types of constituency in
England and Wales which Labour currently hold will therefore play a major role in determining the
occupant of Number 10 after the next election. Of these 109 seats, 40 have more low- income swing
voters than the 2017 majority achieved.
The first group comprises a belt of sixty seats in the North and Midlands which the Conservatives have
never won. They include places like Wakefield, Great Grimsby and Penistone and Stockbridge. Termed
elsewhere as the ‘Red Wall’ by the framework’s author James Kanagsooriam, it is made up of a mixture
of constituencies which for demographic reasons have always been quite marginal but have consistently
remained Labour; constituencies where the Conservatives significantly increased their vote share in 2017
but didn’t win; and a scattering of seats with five figure majorities but which could be become marginal
because of voters’ strong pro-Brexit views. Among these 60 seats, 16 have more low-income swing
voters in them than the 2017 majorities achieved.
The second are 38 ‘Uniform National Swing’ seats in England and Wales. Currently held by Labour
they have however all at some point between 2010 and 2017 returned Conservative MPs. With mixed
demographic make-up and electoral features, they have the potential to either remain Labour or move
en masse as a 'batch’ driven by whatever the final difference in vote share between the parties turns out
to be. They include places like Ipswich; Bedford and Peterborough in England, and Gower, Vale of Clwyd
and Cardiff North in Wales. Of these, 23 are seats where low income swing voters are more numerous
than the majority achieved in 2017.
The final group of 11 seats in Wales include marginal, leaving voting constituencies particularly in Clwyd -
Alyn and Deeside, Clwyd South that could could prove competitive. Of these, one seat (Wrexham) has
more low- income swing voters than the majority achieved. Table 1 sets out the full list of seats, with
those where low income swing voters are especially significant highlighted in bold.
8
Table 1: Potential battleground seats at the next General Election (Hanbury
Strategy 2019a)
2017 Low income

Region Seat 2005 2010 2015 2017 Majority swing voters
Wales Alyn and Deeside Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,235 2,760
East Midlands Ashfield Lab Lab Lab Lab 441 4,795
North West Ashton-under-Lyne Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,295 4,144
Yorkshire and Barnsley East Lab Lab Lab Lab 13,283 4,163
Humberside
North West Barrow and Furness Lab Lab Lab Lab 209 3,410
East Midlands Bassetlaw Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,852 4,461
Yorkshire and
Humberside Batley and Spen Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,961 4,899
London Battersea Lab Con Con Lab 2,416 5,394
Eastern Bedford Lab Con Con Lab 789 5,859
West Midlands Birmingham, Edgbaston Lab Lab Lab Lab 6,917 6,106
West Midlands Birmingham, Northfield Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,667 4,729
North East Bishop Auckland Lab Lab Lab Lab 502 4,643
North West Blackpool South Lab Lab Lab Lab 2,523 3,828
North East Blaydon Lab Lab Lab Lab 13,477 3,788
North East Blyth Valley Lab Lab Lab Lab 7,915 3,390
East Midlands Bolsover Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,288 3,854
North West Bolton North East Lab Lab Lab Lab 3,797 5,003
Yorkshire and Bradford South Lab Lab Lab Lab 6,700 4,563
Humberside
London Brentford and Isleworth Lab Con Lab Lab 12,182 5,795
Wales Bridgend Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,700 3,232
South East Brighton, Kemptown Lab Con Con Lab 9,868 5,085
South West Bristol North West Lab Con Con Lab 4,761 5,156
Lib
North West Burnley Lab Lab Lab 6,353 4,162
Dem
North West Bury North Lab Con Con Lab 4,375 3,448
North West Bury South Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,965 3,470
South East Canterbury Con Con Con Lab 187 5,005
Wales Cardiff North Lab Con Con Lab 4,174 2,212
Wales Cardiff South and Lab Lab Lab Lab 14,864 4,470
Penarth
East Midlands Chesterfield Lib Lab Lab Lab 9,605 3,898
Dem
North West Chorley Lab Lab Lab Lab 7,512 3,254
North West City of Chester Lab Con Lab Lab 9,176 4,081
North East City of Durham Lab Lab Lab Lab 12,364 4,825
Wales Clwyd South Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,356 3,227
Yorkshire and
Colne Valley Lab Con Con Lab 915 4,476
Humberside
West Midlands Coventry North West Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,580 4,709
West Midlands Coventry South Lab Lab Lab Lab 7,947 6,988
North West Crewe and Nantwich Lab Con Con Lab 48 4,094
London Croydon Central Lab Con Con Lab 5,652 4,758
Wales Delyn Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,240 2,947
North West Denton and Reddish Lab Lab Lab Lab 14,077 3,183
East Midlands Derby North Lab Lab Con Lab 2,015 4,428
East Midlands Derby South Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,248 6,528
Yorkshire and
Dewsbury Lab Con Lab Lab 3,321 5,707
Humberside
Yorkshire and Don Valley Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,169 3,908
Humberside
Yorkshire and Doncaster North Lab Lab Lab Lab 14,024 3,779
Humberside
West Midlands Dudley North Lab Lab Lab Lab 22 4,833
London Ealing Central and Lab Con Lab Lab 13,807 6,854
Acton
North West Ellesmere Port and Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,390 2,985
Neston
London Enfield North Con Con Lab Lab 10,247 5,033
London Enfield, Southgate Con Con Con Lab 4,355 4,498
9
East Midlands Gedling Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,694 3,087
Wales Gower Lab Lab Con Lab 3,269 2,807
Yorkshire and
Great Grimsby Lab Lab Lab Lab 2,565 4,635
Humberside
Yorkshire and
Halifax Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,376 4,994
Humberside
Yorkshire and Hemsworth Lab Lab Lab Lab 10,174 4,665
Humberside
East Midlands High Peak Lab Con Con Lab 2,322 3,295
South East Hove Lab Con Lab Lab 18,757 5,746
North West Hyndburn Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,815 3,868
London Ilford North Con Con Lab Lab 9,639 4,737
Eastern Ipswich Lab Con Con Lab 831 5,234
Yorkshire and
Humberside Keighley Lab Con Con Lab 239 3,871
London Kensington Con Con Con Lab 20 7,621
Lancaster and
North West Fleetwood Lab Con Lab Lab 6,661 3,578
North West Leigh Lab Lab Lab Lab 9,554 3,961
East Midlands Lincoln Lab Con Con Lab 1,538 4,967
North West Makerfield Lab Lab Lab Lab 13,542 3,770
North East Newcastle upon Tyne Lab Lab Lab Lab 10,349 3,564
North
West Midlands Newcastle-under- Lab Lab Lab Lab 30 3,686
Lyme
Wales Newport East Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,003 4,047
Wales Newport West Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,658 4,308
North East North Durham Lab Lab Lab Lab 12,939 3,906
North East North West Durham Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,792 3,494
North West Oldham East and Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,182 4,189
Saddleworth
North West Oldham West and Lab Lab Lab Lab 17,198 6,012
Royton
Yorkshire and Penistone and
Lab Lab Lab Lab 1,322 4,648
Humberside Stocksbridge
Eastern Peterborough Con Con Con Lab 607 6,812
South West Plymouth, Sutton and Lab Con Con Lab 6,807 6,315
Devonport
Lib Lib
South East Portsmouth South Con Lab 1,554 7,304
Dem Dem
South East Reading East Con Con Con Lab 3,749 5,104
Yorkshire and
Rother Valley Lab Lab Lab Lab 3,882 3,661
Humberside
Yorkshire and
Scunthorpe Lab Lab Lab Lab 3,431 3,994
Humberside
North East Sedgefield Lab Lab Lab Lab 6,059 3,896
North West Sefton Central Lab Lab Lab Lab 15,618 2,312
Yorkshire and
Humberside Sheffield South East Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,798 5,022
North East Stockton South Lab Con Con Lab 888 4,380
Stoke-on-Trent
West Midlands Central Lab Lab Lab Lab 3,897 6,083
West Midlands Stoke-on-Trent North Lab Lab Lab Lab 2,359 4,229
South West Stroud Lab Con Con Lab 687 3,700
Wales Swansea West Lab Lab Lab Lab 10,598 3,644
Wales Torfaen Lab Lab Lab Lab 10,240 2,249
North East Tynemouth Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,666 3,508
Wales Vale of Clwyd Lab Lab Con Lab 2,379 3,489
Yorkshire and
Wakefield Lab Lab Lab Lab 2,176 3,944
Humberside
North East Wansbeck Lab Lab Lab Lab 10,435 3,284
North West Warrington North Lab Lab Lab Lab 9,582 3,867
North West Warrington South Lab Con Con Lab 2,549 3,012
Warwick and
West Midlands Leamington Lab Con Con Lab 1,206 3,508
North West Weaver Vale Lab Con Con Lab 3,928 3,664
West Midlands West Bromwich West Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,460 5,239
North West West Lancashire Lab Lab Lab Lab 11,689 3,637
North West Wigan Lab Lab Lab Lab 16,027 4,365
North West Wirral South Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,323 2,177
10
North West Wirral West Con Con Lab Lab 5,365 1,935
West Midlands Wolverhampton North Lab Lab Lab Lab 4,587 4,911
East
West Midlands Wolverhampton South Lab Con Lab Lab 2,185 4,671
West
North West Workington Lab Lab Lab Lab 3,925 2,830
North West Worsley and Eccles Lab Lab Lab Lab 8,379 4,208
South
Wales Wrexham Lab Lab Lab Lab 1,832 3,314
Wales Ynys Mon Lab Lab Lab Lab 5,259 3,187
In the next sections we set out how political parties might appeal to low-income voters. This includes an
assessment of their values and we identify the messages and policy solutions that are most important to
with low-income voters.
11
3 What matters to low-income
voters?
“But you can’t live on minimum wage. Once you’ve paid all your rent, all your bills,
everything that comes out, your petrol, once you’ve lived, what have you got left?”
Woman, Dudley9
Like everyone else, low-income voters will vote for parties that are nearest to their values and attitudes,
and those of the social groups they identify most closely with. These decisions are shaped by personal
circumstances, the health of their respective communities, and the experiences and views of friends,
families and neighbours.
For the past four years, JRF has contracted the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) to carry
out an income-based analysis of the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey. We aimed to spread awareness
of the concerns of people living on a low income, with robust data to supplement what people living in
poverty tell us matters most. Whilst opinion polls capture topical issues as they rise and fall in prominence
in the public mind, the BSA survey captures people’s attitudes over time. These tend to fluctuate less and
reflect enduring concerns. The findings resonate with the stories people tell of their own concerns. Five
of the six frequently mentioned concerns for people on a low income revolved around their physical and
financial well-being, and that of their loved ones.
Figure 5: Six most frequent concerns or worries (proportion of people by income

quintile, 2016)
Housing stands out as an especially important worry for those with the lowest incomes compared with
better-off people: 30% of people in the poorest fifth say housing is a concern for them, compared with
12%-21% of those in the better-off groups.
On questions about how society should be run, low-income voters don’t appear to have a dramatically
distinct set of preferences. For example, a greater proportion are likely to say the Government should
reduce financial inequalities, but the difference between income groups, even on a question like this,
is fairly small.
12
Figure 6: Support for government action to reduce financial inequalities, by income
group (2016)
Parties and political leadership

In a near reverse of the national trend, the Labour Party holds an eight-point lead over the Conservatives
among low-income voters (figure 7). In Scotland, low income voters are significantly more likely than
average voters to prefer the Greens (8% vs 2%) and the SNP (45% vs 37%). They are significantly less
likely than average voters to support the Liberal Democrats (9% vs 16%) and the Conservatives (13% vs
22%). Across Great Britain, low-income voters are also more likely to support the Brexit party and less
likely to support the Liberal Democrats than the wider electorate. Despite this evidence of abiding
partisanship at the GB-wide level (favouring Labour), Boris Johnson is the preferred choice for Prime
Minister, albeit by a narrower margin compared to average voters (10% vs 20%).
Most party leaders, especially in England, are not trusted by low-income voters. Indeed, the only major
political leader to enjoy an overall positive score was Nicola Sturgeon (among voters in Scotland). In
England the politicians least trusted to keep their promises were, in descending order: Nigel Farage
(-28%); Jeremy Corbyn (-26%); Jo Swinson (-25%) and Boris Johnson (-14%). Asked to choose from
a list of words that best described the major party leaders low-income voters scored:
• Boris Johnson highest with ‘incompetent’ (34%) ‘dishonest’ (30%) and ‘strong’ (27%);
• Jeremy Corbyn with ‘weak’ (36%); ‘incompetent’ (34%) and fair (24%);
• Nigel Farage with ‘dishonest’ (33%); ‘incompetent’ (29%) and ‘divisive’ (23%);
• Jo Swinson with ‘fair’ and ‘weak’ (30% each) and ‘incompetent’ (19%).
• Among low-income voters in Scotland Nicola Sturgeon scored highest with ‘strong’ (39%);
‘patriotic’ (32%) and ‘fair’ (32%).
13
Figure 7: Low-income voters’ voting intention compared to a nationally
representative sample (GB only) (August 2019)
Source: Hanbury strategy 2019b. JRF/Hanbury Strategy Poll, 15,009 sample (10,008 low income, 5,001 nationally representative)
conducted between 8 and 27 August, 2019.
Across all age groups, apart from voters over the age of 55, people on low incomes have a
strong preference for party leaders to share their values and ‘understand people like me’ (59%)
over providing strong leadership and results (41%). Low-income voters are also more responsive
to campaigning. Twice as many as average voters make their decision in the voting booth. Only 54%
have made their minds up before the campaign, compared to 62% of the general population.
Brexit versus other issues

At the time of the EU referendum most low-income voter groups reflected the fine balance between
Leave and Remain seen across the UK. The exceptions were the ‘radicals’ who voted strongly to remain
and the ‘traditional working class’ who voted strongly for Brexit. Compared to the UK average voter,
excluding ‘don’t knows’, low-income voters are slightly more supportive of leaving the EU with no deal
(26% to 23%), and less supportive of revoking Article 50 (40% to 44%). Some focus group participants
in the ComRes research said they felt like they were lied to during the referendum campaign, with false
information spread. But those who believe the UK should leave say they feel deeply let down and angry
with politicians who are ignoring what they asked them to do, and some feel patronised by the 'political
elite' who are not listening.
14
Figure 8: ‘Which of the following is your preferred Brexit outcome (including don’t
know)?’
Source: Hanbury 2019b.
“They make a decision, they ask for a vote, we vote, and then they say, ‘Oh, actually, we
don’t like that, we’ll all have to vote again.’ So, there’s no confidence in anybody, is there?”
Woman, Dudley10
Yet three years after the referendum, Brexit only just about makes it into the top five issues that matter
most to low-income voters and their families at 20% (ranked joint fifth alongside education and the
economy). Confirming many of the NatCen findings (Taylor et at 2017), the most important issues
for low-income voters today are the cost of living (50%); health (48%); crime (26%) and housing (21%)
(see figure 15) (Hanbury 2019b).
This may help to explain why although low-income voters match the UK population on a host of
economic issues, they are much more likely to believe that cutting welfare benefits would damage too
many people’s lives. They are also far less likely to support the view that people who receive benefits
would be able to cope as well if their benefits were cut (figure 9).
15
Figure 9: Percentage of low-income voters/nationally representative voters who
agree with the following statements on welfare (August 2019)
The focus on the cost of living and hostility to welfare cuts echo other sources, which suggest that
even as Britain recovers from the 2008 financial crash with high employment and some real wage
growth, people on low incomes are not feeling it. Indeed, they are “just as pessimistic about their
household’s financial position as they were during the economic crises of the early 1990s and post-2008
climate” (Goodwin and Heath, 2019). Starker still, ComRes’s focus group research for JRF revealed
“a deep-seated anger with the political establishment for years of perceived economic marginalisation,
resulting in poverty and a lack of opportunities for people to thrive in their area. Low-income voters
describe this feeling being present well before Brexit and still prevalent today” (ComRes, 2019 p5).
What policies appeal most to low-income voters?
“I think we need a big investment from somebody, you know, we’re probably not the most-
skint town in the country… it just needs somebody to believe in us.”
Man, Middlesbrough11
In our August 2019 poll with Hanbury Strategy we focused the policy questions on three priority areas
identified by low-income voters in previous research, asking voters of all incomes for their views on
reasonably well-known ideas for how to:
• enable people to progress at work and balance paid work with home life
• help low-income voters meet the costs of essentials, whether through the social security system
or through the provision of low-cost housing
• improve the quality of life and increase opportunities in deprived areas.
All the policy ideas tested polled well amongst voters, and there was little difference between low-income
voters and the general public (figures 10 and 11). This suggests that many policies aimed at attracting
low-income votes could be a vote-winner amongst the wider electorate, too.
16
Figure 10: Policies with the highest level of support (0 being least supportive;
10 highly supportive) among low-income voters, and average voters
Overall the policies that edged into the top five for low-income voters were on local economic growth,
training and job opportunities. But low-income voters, and voters overall, also declared high levels of
support for there being more secure tenancies in the private rented sector, more council/housing
association homes for rent, and guaranteeing social security benefits rise in line with inflation.
Figure 11: levels of support (0 being least supportive; 10 highly supportive) among
low-income and nationally representative voters for policies to support in work
progression and help with essential costs (August 2019)
17
Figure 12: % of low income and nationally representative voters who support
policies to balance work and caring (August 2019)
Source: Hanbury 2019b. JRF/Hanbury Strategy Poll, 15,009 sample (10,008 low income, 5,001 nationally representative)
Low-income voters had similar views to the rest of the country when it comes to how the Government
can improve people’s work-life balance (figure 12). All groups are most supportive of ensuring
guaranteed hours and greater flexibility for workers. Likewise, when it comes to ideas for how to help
people progress at work and manage everyday costs, there are minimal differences between low-income
voters and the general population, both being broadly in support of all of them. However, low-income
voters are slightly more likely to be in favour of guaranteeing that social security benefits rise with
inflation (figure 11) and to place greater importance on benefits for unemployed people and single
parents, and less on state pensions than the broader population (figure 13).
Figure 13: % levels of support prioritising specific areas of social security

spending among low-income and nationally representative voters (August 2019)
Source: Hanbury 2019b. JRF/Hanbury Strategy Poll, 15,009 sample (10,008 low income, 5,001 nationally representative)
18
Breaking down low-income voters’ views by demography also revealed differences:
• Older low-income voters are less concerned with being granted more paid holiday and improved
parental leave pay/rights. They are more supportive of getting guaranteed hours each week and
advance notice of these.
• Younger low-income voters also prioritise advance notice of hours and guaranteed hours but less
forcefully than older groups.
• Support for prioritising social security spending on single parents declines with age (55% among
18-24 year-olds; 14% among the over-55s). The trend is the opposite for state pensions; older
people prioritise this far more than younger voters.
• Across all age groups support for spending on benefits for the unemployed showed the narrowest
range of support (38% among 18-24 year olds vs 21% among the over 55s). Support for spending
on tax credits for low-paid workers showed the second narrowest range (55% among 18-24 year-
olds vs 73% among the over-55s).
There are also distinct differences in priorities around social security between BAME and ethnically
white low-income voters. BAME respondents care more about support for single parents (45% vs 32%)
and unemployed people (42% vs 29%), as well as child benefits (47% vs 35%). Ethnically white respondents
on the other hand prioritise state pensions to a much greater degree. The discrepancy may be down to a
combination of underlying differences in the age structure of the ethnically white and BAME populations,
or (in the case of unemployment benefit) reflective of the different risks faced by the two groups in the
jobs market (Weekes-Bernard, 2017).
While there was often little difference between demographic subsets of low-income voters, substantive
differences emerged when Hanbury Strategy analysed the value-based clusters’ attitudes towards policy.
This is particularly true of how they prioritise areas of policy compared to the low-income national
average. ‘The disengaged’ are more concerned about housing than other groups, whilst ‘the traditional
working class’ place less importance on welfare or housing than the average low-income voter.
Figure 14: Relative priorities of low-income voters, arranged by sub-group

(August 2019) Th
Most of these findings are unsurprising. Earlier qualitative and quantitative research for JRF revealed a
duality to low-income voters’ views. BSA respondents were emphatic that they had the power to improve
their lives (Taylor et al, 2017) and the ComRes (2019) research showed a strong desire among many
19
respondents to retrain and upskill themselves to compete for local jobs. Alongside the ambitious ideas
that focus group participants suggested for how to improve their areas, harnessing local energy (Box
2), what comes across is people’s strong wish and belief in themselves to improve their own prospects
and those of their communities. But equally, many are realistic about the scale of the challenge and do
not think they can do this on their own. They believe that central and local government must also provide
necessary levels of support. The divides over social security among low-income voters are also striking.
Clear age gradients over some aspects of social security spending imply that, on some questions of policy
at least, needs alongside value-driven preferences can help to shape political attitudes.
Box 2: A selection of ideas put forward by ComRes focus group participants for how to increase
opportunities and revitalise local areas
“Drop in learning centres… rather than just being set to having to go to college at this time
and got to doing whatever course you want to do, having it where you can just drop in when
you’ve got the time.”
Woman, Worksop12
“A localised
“So, training
one of the scheme
things to keep
that would people inisthe
be required area.” training scheme to keep people
a localised
in the area.”
Man, Leeds13
“I think equally a lot of the small businesses need to be given some sort of free training on
marketing, on how to get online. I think that should be there for them.”
Woman, Southampton14
“Council-owned empty shops could become pop-up shops… enables people to sell their
products, their ideas, and it would bring people in. That would create more of a community
feel, and people would be more inclined to look after the area as well.”
Woman, Southampton15
“Lowering the rates for where the shops are. They’re all that high they can’t afford to keep
them.”
Woman, Worksop16
“It’s the businesses who aren’t necessarily from the area, coming in to the area. Don’t just
take all of the money out of it. They should be held to account. All businesses should be held
to account. They can’t just come in here [….], take and not give anything back.”
Man, Southampton17
20
4 Connecting with low-income
voters
The major strategic challenge facing the UK parties is stitching together electoral coalitions that will
deliver parliamentary majorities, when societal groupings have become much more disparate and diverse
than in the previous century. As traditional class-based political analysis is replaced by interest in newer
divides such as age, values or ethnicity we have tried to show that income, and the experience of living
on low incomes specifically, is a politically salient variable. Equally, we have demonstrated that voters living
on a low income do not act as a unified bloc, but they do hold important and overlooked electoral power.
So how can political parties connect with low-income voters and ensure they are better represented?
The striking finding from the research JRF has commissioned is just how disillusioned many people are.
Distrust and cynicism are high, and the current parliamentary fractures are serving to reinforce an
existing perception that politics is not working well for people on a low income. Many people live in areas
where they feel politicians, national or local, have not served their places, whatever the personal standing
of their elected MP.
It is also clear that despite the unique role Brexit will play if there is a general election soon, it would be
a mistake to run campaigns purely about Brexit to attract voters amongst this group. Brexit is not the
uppermost issue in their minds (figure 15).
Figure 15: The most important issues for low-income and nationally representative
respondents and their families (August 2019)
Most voters on a low income are concerned about the same things as everyone else: their local
schools and hospitals, their communities, crime and safety, and so on. Whilst every voter will
consider their own economic circumstances, for low-income voters the top concern is debt and
21
personal finances (Taylor et al, 2017). At the 2017 general election, low-income voters who perceived
that their finances had worsened in the six months prior were much more likely to vote for the
opposition than the incumbents, and there were far more of them than those who perceived their
personal finances had improved (Goodwin and Heath, 2017). In more recent polling, a third of
low-income voters believed that the cost of living had risen in the past year and only 16% of voters
on a low income were satisfied with the economy (figure 16).
Figure 16: How satisfied are low-income voters with the economy? (August 2019)
Yet economic concerns need to be balanced with an understanding of the values that inform voter
choice. All voters take into consideration several factors when making their selection. And the values and
issues that drive voters on a low income are not that dissimilar to voters in other income groups. Overall
as a group they are suspicious about relying on private enterprise to resolve Britain’s economic problems,
but so too are the general population. Likewise, all income groups agree that ‘ordinary working people do
not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’. The only group that polls under 60% agreeing with this are
those on the highest fifth of incomes, and even then, a majority agree (Taylor et al, 2017). There is high
support for government support to help industry to develop new products and technology, even if there
is more division about state ownership of key industries (Curtice, 2017 and Hanbury 2019b).
The diverse groupings that make up voters on a low income overall make it unlikely that they will break
decisively for any one party at the next general election. But all the main parties could make headway by
showing they grasp what is important to low-income voters, and couch their messages in the values that
matter to them most. Given that the parties will need to stitch together diverse electoral coalitions, they
will be disadvantaged at the ballot box, if, in appealing to one narrow group, they alienate other potential
voters.
22
Connecting with low-income voters: recommendations
JRF’s extensive research and work with people living on a low income show that the parties that do the
following are more likely to connect with voters. The policies have the advantage that they also poll well
amongst the general public – and none of the policies are outright unpopular with the wider population.
Given the widespread distrust in politicians of all parties, there is a real risk that undelivered promises to
low-income voters will only deepen disengagement and fragmentation. Whilst political leaders and their
strategists may look to the next election, their local and national representatives are building a long-term
contract with the people about what a party stands for.
Over a lifetime, every adult in Britain could vote in more than ten general elections. Voters may not recall
every detailed policy position, but they do remember broken promises, neglect, and feeling like no-one
is speaking for them. Parties need to go beyond ‘retail’ offers and rebuild trust with low-income voters.
Our recommendations to reconnect with low-income voters are:

1. Show that the party is on the side of low-income voters, with a clear programme for improving the
living standards of the least well-off people in our society.
2. Credible plans, resources and powers for transforming the prospects of people living in held-back
places.
3. Rebuild trust by listening to people who are living on and beneath the breadline, their concerns,
hopes and ideas; avoid narratives and policies pitting one group against another; and put voters on
a low income at the centre rather than the margins of democracy.
A programme to improve living standards

High employment cannot be relied upon to improve the living standards of those living on a low income.
Increases to the National Living Wage are welcome but the combination of low hours, insecure contracts,
and the fact that many people cannot work full-time or at all due to disability or caring responsibilities
severely restricts their options and prospects. There has to be much more concerted action to improve
access to good-quality work, and position social security as a public service that we can all rely on.
In the short-term, one of the most popular measures (also the most important to making a difference
to people’s financial circumstances) entails ending the benefit freeze and guaranteeing social security will
rise with inflation. The freeze on most working-age benefits and tax credits has left millions, mainly in
working families, facing ever-greater barriers to make ends meet, having to cut back on essentials and
locked into poverty.
Whilst social security cannot be solely relied upon to improve living standards, lifting the personal tax
allowance pays out much more to higher earners than it does those on low incomes, so choices need
to be made to target resources to best effect. Given that low-income voters report that housing is one
of their top priorities and concerns, one way to immediately address need is to reset local housing
allowances (LHA) and uprate them in line with rents. Low-earning households face housing costs 50%
higher than they were 20 years ago – an unmanageable strain on their budgets – whilst housing costs
for the highest-earning households have not risen at all (JRF, 2018). This situation is fuelling the rise of
in-work poverty. For many low-income families, housing costs wipe out the gains from a rising National
Living Wage, tax cuts and high employment.
Making work pay for the worst-off people, ending the benefit freeze, re-setting local housing allowances
and scrapping the five-week wait within Universal Credit are necessary to loosen the grip of poverty,
but also to send important signals to the electorate that the parties understand the daily struggles people
face.
Doing the opposite, and knowingly deciding not to improve the lives of a substantial portion of our
society, would signal an unacceptable disregard for their concerns and their quality of life, and create
further distrust in the political system among low-income voters.
23
Transforming the prospects of people in held-back places
Low-income voters in deprived towns and cities believe that the UK’s economic and political priorities
are far too dominated by London. People feel forgotten about, and stripped of investment, talent,
funding and attention as a result of decisions being made with a ‘London mind-set’ or focused only on
boosting select cities. Unleashing the economic potential of held-back places will require investment in
enterprise, growth, good jobs and programmes to ensure that people on low incomes are connected to
these new opportunities.
Turning this around needs far greater ambition than has been shown so far; for instance by committing
to an investment of the kind recommended by the UK2070 Commission – £10 billion a year over the
next 25 years, above and beyond existing spending commitments. To make sure this investment truly
meets the expectations of voters in the parts of the country that feel overlooked, it should be targeted
at places with lower-than-average employment rates and earnings. Rather than forcing local authorities
to jump through a series of hoops in competition with other areas, the allocations should be based on
a transparent formula, and should grant local leaders, in consultation with their residents, the greatest
possible flexibility to respond to local priorities, whether these are better bus services, digital connectivity,
tailored training programmes or attracting new employers (Tinker, 2018).
Investment has to be matched with opportunities, both for businesses and employers, to offer good jobs
and training, and to support workers to progress and prepare for the future. There is a risk that the
march of technological progress will leave these workers at ever-greater risk of unemployment, low pay
and insecurity, in parts of the country falling further behind our economic powerhouses in London and
elsewhere.
To unshackle workers across the country and equip them to grasp the opportunities ahead, the parties
should pledge to take the following steps as part of a new settlement on adult skills:
• create a Retraining Tax Credit, targeted at low-skilled workers, to encourage businesses to invest in
their workforce. This would cost £0.79 – £0.87 billion per year, to train up to 1.5 million low-skilled
workers over five years
• invest in basic skills training and adopt the recommendations of the Augar Commission on post-18
education to provide more funding, simpler access and more financial support for those on low
incomes in the further education sector
• use regional growth funding and the new Shared Prosperity Fund to invest in skills and people,
as well as in infrastructure.
Put voters on a low income at the centre of democracy

For too long, people on a low income have been left marginalised and under-represented. Policy
decisions have not been made in their favour, their concerns have been overlooked, and the subsequent
disconnection is damaging for society. At worst, their financial circumstances have been used against
them when what most people need and want is to feel part of a just and compassionate society. Policies
that try to target one group at the expense of the other have unintended consequences, and often just
mean that public services like social security have even more pressure placed on them, rather than
enabling people to get the opportunities and skills they want to get on in life.
The reality is that voters on a low income, just like what it means to be working class today, are not one
single group voting en masse for any one party; but a series of more disparate groupings with varied
values, identities and wants. Attempts to appeal to one narrow segment – such as by assuming those
voters have more socially conservative views – may completely alienate other parts of a similar
demographic. Parties must find ways to build common ground between the new electoral coalitions
they need to form a parliamentary majority, not pick off one group against another.
Whether it is ‘a country that works for everyone’, ‘for the many not the few’, slogans need to be backed
up by reality, and it is time for the concerns, hopes and ideas of people living on a low income to rise
to the centre of politics. All political parties stand to gain by listening to the concerns of these voters
and acting on them. So too does our democracy.
24
5 Conclusion
This report shows that we can change the unacceptable situation where many people feel they have
no voice in society.
There is a real opportunity right now, as low-income voters return to the polling booth in greater
numbers, to show that politics can make a difference. But it will take politicians who deeply understand
what’s going in their lives and their hopes for the future, and who will follow through on any promises
they make.
Most voters are realistic enough to not expect overnight changes to their communities or in their own
lives. But they are understandably weary of politicians who say all the right things yet fail to deliver any
noticeable difference, or even worse, preside over deteriorating circumstances.
Everything low-income voters have told us is important to them can be done if we choose to do it. More
job opportunities, greater scope for retraining, help for low-paid or unemployed people to manage the
costs associated with having children; disabilities or living somewhere with a competitive housing market;
and greater freedom for their communities to imagine new futures for themselves are all reasonable
demands.
In all likelihood, the country will soon face its third general election in just five years, where the pressure
will be on for rapidly drawn-up manifestos. There will be little time to change the way people on low
incomes are engaged in decisions on policy formation. But what is so apparent is the wealth of ideas in
communities up and down the country about what needs to be done. People on low incomes have voices.
They need to be listened to.
25
Notes
1. Quote from a participant in a ComRes (2019) focus group for JRF and UK in a Changing Europe
p.81
2. Quote from a participant in a Britainthinks (2019) focus group for JRF.
3. Poverty here is taken to mean living on resources that are well below minimum needs as denoted
by, a household income that is less than 60% of median income, adjusted for their household size
and type. However references throughout this report to ‘low-income voters’ should not be read as
automatically referring to people in poverty. See the methods appendix for a fuller explanation.
4. Poverty rates among self-employed couples have remained broadly flat over the same period.
p.82
6. Focus groups were held in Glasgow, Middlesbrough, Bolton, Dudley, Newport, Hastings, Leeds,
Worksop and Southampton.
p.78
8. Turnout is measured by whether respondents reported having voted in the election, or not.
Although survey estimates of turnout tend to over-report official turnout the BES survey estimates
of non-voting closely follow trends over time from official data. This figure is based on analysis by
Goodwin and Heath of a specially constructed dataset, which combines each of the face-to-face
British Election Studies (BES) since 1987.
p.38
10. As above p.82
11. As above p.22
12. As above p.53
13. As above p.53
14. As above p.53
15. As above p.27
16. As above p.26
17. As above p.30
18. https://www.improvementservice.org.uk/research.html
26
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Curtice, J (2017) ‘The Role of Government’ in BSA 34. London: NatCen
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Goodwin, M and Heath, O (2019) Low-income voters in UK general elections, 1987-2017. York: JRF
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27
Appendix A
Methodology and definitions of ‘low incomes’
Researchers in social policy and political science do not always use the same definitions when talking
about people on low incomes. JRF defines poverty as when a person’s resources are not enough to meet
their minimum needs including social participation. In our annual poverty monitoring reports, we use the
widely accepted headline proxy indicator of how many households live on an income (from all sources
including benefits, after tax and National Insurance has been paid) of less than 60% of the median,
equivalised for their family type, after housing costs (AHC) have been subtracted from income.
This indicator (published every year in Households Below Average Incomes (HBAI)) is calculated by the
Department for Work and Pensions, using data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), with
adjustments for the size and composition of households. There are weaknesses with this measure, not
least that it cannot capture the costs of meeting basic needs except for those linked to housing. But it is
also relatively simple and in producing a number that can be easily tracked over time gives us a rough
sense of how many people – children, working-age adults, and pensioners – are falling well behind the
mainstream, as reflected by average incomes.
Recently, the Social Metrics Commission – with support from JRF and other leading research
organisations – has made strides to improve poverty measures, suggesting how to factor in the
unavoidable costs that many families face, such as childcare or ones linked to a disability and
expanding the list of material resources available to families to look at liquid assets as well as
income. Furthermore, by using a 3-year rolling estimate for its low-income threshold, it also goes some
way to countering the limits of ‘point in time’ poverty data.
In contrast, political scientists rarely treat poverty as a discrete analytical variable. Inferences about
relative disadvantage are instead made by looking at some of the commonly tracked variables such as
survey participants’ income, class, or educational background that are known to influence political
preferences. But even the most reliable and extensive surveys of political attitudes and behaviour tend
not to ask enough relevant questions about personal circumstances (especially living costs and household
composition) to be able to confidently identify who is in poverty according to the measure we would
usually use. Furthermore, the national surveys on which the best poverty estimates rely are not suited to
analysis below regional level because of small sample sizes at lower geographies. This makes it impossible
to produce estimates of opinion and attitudes for small defined geographic areas using precisely this
measure.
We’ve tackled these challenges in several ways in this report, with the definition of low income used in
each piece of analysis set out below:
28
Table 2: Definitions of low-income
Source Measure of low income Consistency with official measure

British Social Being in bottom quintile of Broadly consistent – but uses bottom fifth rather
Attitudes Survey income distribution than below poverty line
Incomes of less than
Somewhat different – we are looking at
UK in a Changing £18,000 in last year,
low individual income in this analysis. Many will have
Europe adjusted in phase 2 for
low household income, but some may meet the
deliberative those who are retired to
criteria and not be poor because of incomes from
workshops look at earnings when last
others in their household.
working
For phase 1:
a) Modelled Households in As consistent as we can be given the lower
poverty estimates geography needed
b) Regression based Somewhat different – we are looking at low

on individuals with incomes individual earnings here. Some may meet the
under £17,000 criteria and not be in poverty because of other
Low-income
income sources or incomes from others in their
voters
household
For phase 2:
Family incomes of less Somewhat different, however the reweighting
than £17,000 reweighted of the results should improve consistency
to reflect the family make-
up of people in poverty
Broadly consistent. Using gross income and looking
British Election Equivalised gross income, at incomes before housing costs are deducted will
Study Before Housing Costs mean there are some differences, especially for
households with high housing costs
British Social Attitudes survey analysis

Every year NatCen asks over 3,000 people their views on how they think Britain is run. New questions
are added each year to reflect current issues, but all questions are designed with a view to repeating them
periodically to chart changes over time. The people selected to participate in the survey are interviewed
in their homes by one of NatCen’s interviewers.
Recently we have sought to improve the quality of the available data. Since 2016 JRF has
funded NatCen to include new income questions within the survey. Participants are asked to list income
received from different sources (such as earnings, social security and savings) separately, thus providing
more detail for the analysis stage, and reducing the risk that any income sources are forgotten.
The income variable is then equivalised taking away in housing costs and divided into
quintiles. Compared with the equivalent measure from the 2015/16 Family Resources Survey
(FRS) overall the proportions of each household type on low income are very similar between the two,
suggesting the BSA income variable is a reasonable estimate of the actual incomes of the poorest fifth
of households. The approach is already yielding important insights how people on low incomes’
preoccupations differ and resemble those of their better off counterparts. However, this is a relatively
expensive and time intensive method and not easily replicated.
UK in a Changing Europe analysis

In April and May 2019, we commissioned ComRes to conduct 18 deliberative workshops with
low-income voters living in nine deprived areas across the UK to understand the priorities for
29
low-income voters as the UK looks to leave the European Union. Locations were informed by JRF’s
typology of different places, indices of deprivation and parliamentary majority. For the analysis of this
report, types of places, as indicated through Pike et al’s Uneven growth report, are used throughout.
Table 3: Type of place and location of deliberative workshops
Location: Location:
Type of place
Phase 1 Phase 2
Core city (the principal cities of
their city regions, hosting high-
level services and anchor Glasgow Leeds
institutions that attract
investment and people.)
Freestanding city (not
overshadowed but are smaller
Newport Southampton
than core cities and some
distance from them.)
Freestanding town (as above) Middlesbrough -
Overshadowed town (have

larger neighbouring cities that
host the higher-level functions, Bolton
Worksop*
main employment sites Hastings*
attracting commuters and Dudley*
provide the principal growth
opportunities.)
Participants were recruited using a combination of both in-house recruitment via an established panel
and on-street local recruitment partners for harder-to-reach areas. A screening questionnaire was
designed jointly by ComRes, JRF and UK in a Changing Europe. The aim was to establish a rigorous set
of sample quotas to ensure that we spoke to a relevant and comparable set of people across all locations.
The main sample focused on people on low incomes by excluding:

• those currently in full-time education
• those who can pay their bills and save, and
• those with earnings over £18,000 over the last 12 months before tax.
It included those claiming in-work and out-of-work benefits and limited the number of those not on
benefits included. Recruitment also aimed to ensure a variety of participants based on age, gender,
education, ethnicity, employment status, benefits, parenthood, living status and EU Referendum vote.
Following phase one of fieldwork, the sample was adjusted to limit those who are retired to a maximum
of two participants per group to control for any skew towards older generations in the data.
This piece of research was conducted across two phases using a deliberative approach to provide a
comprehensive overview of the priorities of low-income voters. Phase one was an exploratory exercise
with 12 workshops taking place between 23 April and 3 May 2019. Six locations were chosen for phase
one so that ideas could be fully explored and a comprehensive list of priorities could be formed.
Participants were asked to consider their local area more generally and were asked to explore areas
they would like to see change and improve while also identifying the challenges and barriers to these
changes.
30
Following an in-depth analysis session with JRF and UK in a Changing Europe where key themes, ideas
and proposals were identified as recurring in phase one, phase two was designed to delve deeper into
specific ideas.
Three locations were chosen for phase two and six workshops took place between 14 and 17 May 2019.
Debates occurred within the groups to flesh out the positive and negatives of proposals to see where
priorities lay. Deliberative workshops were moderator-led and were designed to engage participants
and explore complex ideas in interactive ways.
For the full detailed methodology, including sample and recruitment details please see the published
report (ComRes, 2019).
Low-income voters
We also wanted to establish the potential for low-income voters to affect the outcome in marginal seats
ahead of the next general election and to gather actionable insights about the values and messages that
most resonate with them (chapters 2, 3 and 4). Care was needed given the paucity of high-quality data
surrounding low-income households at a local level. Our research partners at Hanbury Strategy proposed
a two-phase approach.
First, they used publicly available modelled data to estimate the distribution of low-income voters across
UK parliamentary constituencies. For England and Wales, the ONS’s Households in poverty estimates for
middle layer super output areas in England and Wales was adjusted to look at individuals in poverty, taking
account of different age profiles within each constituency. For Scotland, the Improvement Services’ Local
Incomes and Poverty in Scotland was used18.
Hanbury then ran a short 5,000 sample poll across Great Britain to understand the electoral preferences
of low-income voters (defined as those with less than £17,000 in annual income) and the proportion
that could be considered genuine swing voters. The poll exclusively sampled low-income voters but was
representative of other relevant demographic distributions.
The responses from this survey generated a binary index of whether a respondent is a swing-voter
or not. Its size allowed Hanbury to run a logistic regression identifying causal relationships between
demographic variables collected within the survey and whether a low-income respondent is a swing-
voter. The output of the logistic regression allowed us to estimate the proportion of low-income
swing voters with respect to the demographic composition of individual constituencies.
The second phase of the research entailed a survey of 15,000 voters across the country, where two
thirds of our respondents were low-income (defined as having a family income of less than £17,000)
and one third not on low incomes. A survey of this size allowed us to make comprehensive cuts across
different regions and council areas, as well as reasonable distinctions between low- and high-income
group when it came to the political, social and economic values and attitudes of voters across the
country. This survey was reweighted so the share of family types in the sample matched the make-up
of families in poverty.
British Election Studies

The British Election Studies (BES) face-to-face survey represents the gold standard for analysing the
behaviour and attitudes of voters in British politics. It is based on a nationally representative probability
sample and conducted by a team of specially trained investigators, who carry out the face-to-face
interviews with respondents in their homes. Another advantage of the BES is that it is carried out just
after people voted at a general election, when the issues and their voting decision are still fresh in their
mind. This is particularly important when it comes to turnout.
We commissioned Professors Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath to analyse a specially constructed
dataset combining each of the face-to-face British Election Studies (BES) since 1987. This series covers
30 years, eight elections and consists of more than 26,000 interviews. They applied a measure of
equivalised household income before housing costs, which considers the total gross household income
and adjusted it for the number of adults living in the household and whether there are any children living
31
at home; using the OECD equivalence weights, which are rescaled to a couple without children = 1.
Each additional adult = 0.33 and a child living at home = 0.20.
They then constructed income groups based on quintiles in each election year, defining those on low
incomes as the bottom quintile and those on high incomes as the top quintile (the highest 20%). Because
the BES lacks a detailed income module like the one developed with NatCen and contains no information
about living costs such as housing; we cannot tell how far the cohorts of the lowest income voters at
each General election match with the composition of the poorest fifth of adults for each of the periods
analysed. It is therefore possible that some types of voters are either under or over-represented.
Overall appropriateness of measures

In conclusion we have tried, as far as the surveys we rely upon allow, to gather information about the
views of voters on the lowest household incomes, factoring in where possible costs and household size.
In some cases, we have not been able to look at incomes at the household level or have not been able
to control for the composition of different household types. This is an inescapable consequence of
relying largely on existing datasets and panel providers. References to the views of low-income voters
should be read in that context. However, although the samples for each individual survey we relied on
for this report don’t match perfectly, a stable set of preoccupations, attitudes and values do recur across
them and match in many cases what we’d expect from research into the experience of households living
in poverty.
32
Appendix B
Table 4: Constituencies where low-income voters were larger than the majority
achieved in 2017 (Hanbury 2019a)
Low-
2017 2017
2017 income
Region Constituency first second
majority swing
party party
voters
Nottinghamshire Ashfield Lab Con 441 4,795

Cumbria Barrow and Furness Lab Con 209 3,410
London Battersea Lab Con 2,416 5,394
Bedfordshire Bedford Lab Con 789 5,859
West Midlands Birmingham, Northfield Lab Con 4,667 4,729
Durham Bishop Auckland Lab Con 502 4,643
Blackpool North and
Lancashire Con Lab 2,023 4,275
Cleveleys
Lancashire Blackpool South Lab Con 2,523 3,828
Greater Manchester Bolton North East Lab Con 3,797 5,003
Greater Manchester Bolton West Con Lan 936 3,442
Avon Bristol North West Lab Con 4,761 5,156
Nottinghamshire Broxtowe Con Lab 863 3,206
West Yorkshire Calder Valley Con Lab 609 3,575
Cornwall Camborne and Redruth Con Lab 1,577 3,323
Kent Canterbury Lab Con 187 5,005
Cumbria Carlisle Con Lab 2,599 3,167
Carshalton and
London LD Con 1,369 3,538
Wallington
Gloucestershire Cheltenham Con LD 2,569 3,938
Chingford and
London Con Lab 2,438 3,676
Woodford Green
London Chipping Barnet Con Lab 353 4,896
Cities of London and
Westminster
West Yorkshire Colne Valley Lab Con 915 4,476
Cumbria Copeland Con Lab 1,695 2,698
Northamptonshire Corby Con Lab 2,690 4,939
West Sussex Crawley Con Lab 2,457 4,386
Cheshire Crewe and Nantwich Lab Con 48 4,094
London Dagenham and Rainham Lab Con 4,652 4,808
Durham Darlington Lab Con 3,280 4,283
Derbyshire Derby North Lab Con 2,015 4,428
33
West Yorkshire Dewsbury Lab Con 3,321 5,707
West Midlands Dudley North Lab Con 22 4,833
East Sussex Eastbourne LD Con 1,609 4,907
London Enfield, Southgate Lab Con 4,355 4,498
Finchley and Golders
Green
Humberside Great Grimsby Lab Con 2,565 4,635
London Harrow East Con Lab 1,757 4,917
East Sussex Hastings and Rye Con Lab 346 5,762
London Hendon Con Lab 1,072 6,996
Derbyshire High Peak Lab Con 2,322 3,295
Suffolk Ipswich Lab Con 831 5,234
West Yorkshire Keighley Lab Con 239 3,871
London Kensington Lab Con 20 7,621
London Kingston and Surbiton LD Con 4,124 4,970
Lincolnshire Lincoln Lab Con 1,538 4,967
Nottinghamshire Mansfield Con Lab 1,057 4,812
Middlesbrough South
Cleveland Con Lab 1,020 3,698
and East Cleveland
Buckinghamshire Milton Keynes North Con Lab 1,975 7,422
Buckinghamshire Milton Keynes South Con Lab 1,665 2,959
Morecambe and
Lancashire Con Lab 1,399 3,632
Lunesdale
West Yorkshire Morley and Outwood Con Lab 2,104 2,947
Staffordshire Newcastle-under-Lyme Lab Con 30 3,686
Derbyshire North East Derbyshire Con Lab 2,860 3,547
Norfolk North Norfolk LD Con 3,512 3,834
Northamptonshire Northampton North Con Lab 807 3,135
Northamptonshire Northampton South Con Lab 1,159 5,708
Norfolk Norwich North Con Lab 507 3,449
Oxford West and
Oxfordshire LD Con 816 3,534
Abingdon
Lancashire Pendle Con Lab 1,279 4,229
Penistone and
South Yorkshire Lab Con 1,322 4,648
Stocksbridge
Cambridgeshire Peterborough Lab Con 607 6,812
Hampshire Portsmouth South Lab Con 1,554 7,304
West Yorkshire Pudsey Con Lab 331 2,591
London Putney Con Lab 1,554 4,121
Berkshire Reading East Lab Con 3,749 5,104
Berkshire Reading West Con Lab 2,876 4,881
London Richmond Park Con LD 45 3,457
34
Lancashire Rossendale and Darwen Con Lab 3,216 3,643
Scarborough and
North Yorkshire Con Lab 3,435 4,156
Whitby
Humberside Scunthorpe Lab Con 3,431 3,994
Wiltshire South Swindon Con Lab 2,464 4,377
Hampshire Southampton, Itchen Con Lab 31 5,531
Merseyside Southport Con Lab 2,914 3,689
Cornwall St. Ives Con Lab 312 4,185
Hertfordshire Stevenage Con Lab 3,386 3,473
Cleveland Stockton South Lab Con 888 4,380
Staffordshire Stoke-on-Trent Central Lab Con 3,897 6,083
Staffordshire Stoke-on-Trent North Lab Con 2,359 4,229
Staffordshire Stoke-on-Trent South Con Lab 663 3,297
Gloucestershire Stroud Lab Con 687 3,700
Shropshire Telford Con Lab 720 3,792
Essex Thurrock Con Lab 345 6,178
Cornwall Truro and Falmouth Con Lab 3,792 4,258
West Yorkshire Wakefield Lab Con 2,176 3,944
West Midlands Walsall North Con Lab 2,601 5,644
Cheshire Warrington South Lab Con 2,549 3,012
Warwick and
Warwickshire Lab Con 1,206 3,508
Leamington
Hertfordshire Watford Con Lab 2,092 4,448
West Midlands West Bromwich West Lab Con 4,460 5,239
Westmorland and
Cumbria LD Con 777 2,698
Lonsdale
Wolverhampton North
West Midlands Lab Con 4,587 4,911
East
Wolverhampton South
West Midlands Lab Con 2,185 4,671
West
Hereford and
Worcester Con Lab 2,508 4,022
Worcester
Clwyd Wrexham Lab Con 1,832 3,314
Gwynedd Arfon PC Lab 92 2,907
Clwyd Aberconwy Con Lab 635 2,698
Clwyd Vale of Clwyd Lab Con 2,379 3,489
Dyfed Ceredigion PC LD 104 3,003
Dyfed Preseli Pembrokeshire Con Lab 314 3,217
South Glamorgan Vale of Glamorgan Con Lab 2,190 3,461
Scotland Airdrie and Shotts SNP Lab 195 1904
Scotland Argyll and Bute SNP Con 1328 2292
Caithness, Sutherland
Scotland LD SNP 2044 2481
and Easter Ross
35
Scotland Central Ayrshire SNP Con 1267 2932
Coatbridge, Chryston
Scotland Lab SNP 1586 4431
and Bellshill
Dunfermline and West
Scotland SNP Lab 844 2781
Fife
East Kilbride, Strathaven
and Lesmahagow
Scotland East Lothian Lab SNP 3083 3874
Edinburgh North and
Leith
Scotland Edinburgh South West SNP Lab 1097 3696
Scotland Edinburgh West LD SNP 2988 3211
Scotland Glasgow Central SNP Lab 2267 4109
Scotland Glasgow East SNP Lab 75 3550
Scotland Glasgow North SNP Lab 1060 2827
Scotland Glasgow North East Lab SNP 242 4161
Scotland Glasgow North West SNP Lab 2561 4807
Scotland Glasgow South SNP Lab 2027 3964
Scotland Glasgow South West SNP Lab 60 2903
Scotland Gordon Con SNP 2607 2748
Scotland Inverclyde SNP Lab 384 2721
Kirkcaldy and
Cowdenbeath
Lanark and Hamilton
East
Linlithgow and East
Falkirk
Scotland Midlothian Lab SNP 885 2411
Scotland Motherwell and Wishaw SNP Lab 318 2732
Scotland North East Fife SNP LD 2 2567
Paisley and
Renfrewshire North
Perth and North
Scotland SNP Con 21 2931
Perthshire
Rutherglen and
Hamilton West
Scotland Stirling Con SNP 148 2618
Scotland West Dunbartonshire SNP Lab 2288 2330
36
Acknowledgements
We thank the analytical team at Hanbury Strategy for supplying the 2019 data used in this
report (in particular James Hicks, Joe Slater, Neil Reilly and James Brackin). Ameet Gill and
James Kanagasooriam at Hanbury also provided invaluable support and political insight.
At JRF, Peter Matejic, Adél Schofield and Katie Johns were instrumental in keeping this project
on track. Chris Goulden, Helen Barnard and Daisy Sands (JRF) gave very useful comments on earlier
drafts. The responsibility for the accuracy of the report, and any errors, lies with the authors alone.
About the authors

Claire Ainsley is JRF’s Executive Director. Follow her on Twitter @claire_ainsley
Frank Soodeen is JRF’s Deputy Director (External Affairs). Follow him on Twitter @franksoodeen
To speak to us about this research, contact the authors.

See https://www.jrf.org.uk/about-us/our-experts
37
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has supported this project as part of its programme of research and
innovative development projects, which it hopes will be of value to policy-makers, practitioners and
service users. The facts presented and views expressed in this report are, however, those of the author[s]
and not necessarily those of JRF.
A pdf version of this publication is available from the JRF website (www.jrf.org.uk). Further copies of this
report, or any other JRF publication, can be obtained from the JRF website (www.jrf.org.uk/publications)
or by emailing info@jrf.org.uk
A CIP catalogue record for this report is available from the British Library.
All rights reserved. Reproduction of this report by photocopying or electronic means for non-commercial
purposes is permitted. Otherwise, no part of this report may be reproduced, adapted, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise without the
prior written permission of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
© Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2019

First published October 2019 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation
PDF ISBN 978-1-911581-70-3
Cover image: iStock KIVILCIM PINAR - SolStock
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EVERY

What you need to know

We can solve UK poverty

What matters to low-income voters?

Building common ground

Box 1: The research

Low-income voters have a variety of beliefs

No party can afford to ignore low-income voters

Low-income voters are turning out to vote in greater

Source: Goodwin and Heath, 2019

Figure 3: Support of a political party by income group (2016)

Source: Taylor et al, 2017

The role of low-income voters at the next election

2017 Low income

Figure 5: Six most frequent concerns or worries (proportion of people by income

Source: Taylor et al, 2017

Source: Taylor et al, 2017

Parties and political leadership

Brexit versus other issues

Source: Hanbury 2019b.

What policies appeal most to low-income voters?

Figure 13: % levels of support prioritising specific areas of social security

Figure 14: Relative priorities of low-income voters, arranged by sub-group

Our recommendations to reconnect with low-income voters are:

A programme to improve living standards

Put voters on a low income at the centre of democracy

2. Quote from a participant in a Britainthinks (2019) focus group for JRF.

10. As above p.82

11. As above p.22

12. As above p.53

13. As above p.53

14. As above p.53

15. As above p.27

16. As above p.26

17. As above p.30

Curtice, J (2017) ‘The Role of Government’ in BSA 34. London: NatCen

House of Commons (2019) UK Election Statistics: 1919-2019: A Century of Elections. London

JRF (2017) UK Poverty 2017. York: JRF.

JRF (2018) UK Poverty 2018. York: JRF

Social Metrics Commission (2019) Measuring Poverty 2019. London.

Tanner, W et al (2019) Human Capital. London: UK Onward

Tinker, R (2018) Designing a Shared Prosperity Fund. York: JRF

Source Measure of low income Consistency with official measure

b) Regression based Somewhat different – we are looking at low

British Social Attitudes survey analysis

UK in a Changing Europe analysis

Table 3: Type of place and location of deliberative workshops

Overshadowed town (have

The main sample focused on people on low incomes by excluding:

British Election Studies

Overall appropriateness of measures

Nottinghamshire Ashfield Lab Con 441 4,795

About the authors

To speak to us about this research, contact the authors.

© Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2019

Joseph Rowntree Foundation

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