Team Best Memorial Respondent Nalsar Public International

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1st NALSAR Public International Law Moot, 2021

Team Best Memorial - Respondent
Case Concerning the Military Attacks by The State of Mazia and by The
Republic of Grasona
State of Mazia … Applicant;
Versus
Republic of Grasona … Respondent.
TABLE OF CONTENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES V
A. TREATIES & CONVENTIONS V
B. CASES V
C. ARTICLES, JOURNALS & YEARBOOKS VII
D. BOOKS & COMMENTARIES VIII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 01
IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES 02
STATEMENT OF FACTS 03
SUMMMARY OF PLEADINGS 05
PLEADINGS 06
ISSUE I: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA ON 21 06
JULY 2017 WERE UNDERTAKEN AS A MEASURE OF RIGHT OF SELF-
DEFENCE AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT IN VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MAZIA AND DID NOT AMOUNT TO THE
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
ON THE USE OF FORCE AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
[A] Grasona's bombings were a lawful act of self-defence 06
under the UN Charter
1. Bombings carried out by AUF in Grasona constitute an 06
armed attack
2. Non-State actors are capable of carrying out armed 08
attacks
[B] In Arguendo, if the armed attack was not carried out 09
by AUF, the same can be attributed to Mazia under State
Responsibility
1. Violation of international legal obligation by Mazia 10
2. Armed attack by AUF is attributed to Mazia 11
a) Mazia bears vicarious responsibility 11
b) Substantial involvement of Mazia 12
[C] Grasona complied with the requirements of necessity 13
and proportionality
1. Grasona's self-defence was in pursuance of necessity 14
a) Use of force exercised as a last resort 14
b) Reasonable proximity between attack and 14
response
c) Attacks directed towards AUF centres 15
2. Mazia's unwillingness necessitated the use of force 15
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3. Grasona's bombings were proportionate use of force 16

ISSUE II: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF 17
BOMBINGS ON 21 JULY 2019 ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA
SPECIFICALLY TARGETED THE AUF TRAINING CENTRES AND NOT THE
CIVILIAN LOCALITIES AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO A
VIOLATION OF THE FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL I OF 1977 OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL
LAWS
[A] Non-existence of an armed conflict between Grasona 17
and Mazia
1. Non-existence of an international armed conflict 17
a) There is no resort to armed force between the 18
states
b) Absence of “effective” or “overall control” of Mazia 18
over AUF
[B] In Arguendo, there exists an international armed 19
conflict between Grasona and Mazia
1. Grasona did not violate the principle of distinction 19
during the second round of bombing
a) The attacks were directed against AUF training 20
centres pursuant to a military objective
b) AUF and FRU are combatants under IHL 20
[C] Grasona did not violate the principle of proportionality 23
in the second round of bombings
1. The second round of bombings offered military 23
advantage
2. The elimination of AUF training centres outweighs 24
incidental loss of life
3. Grasona’ undertook feasible precautionary measures 25
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 26
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
AUF Association for United Faronaland
Art. Article
ARSIWA Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts
AP I Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions
ARSIWA Article on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts
CIL Customary International Law
FRU Farona Rights Unity
GAF Grasonian Air Force
GC Geneva Convention
IAC International Armed Conflict
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
IHL International Humanitarian Law
UN Charter United Nations Charter
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UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. TREATIES, CONVENTIONS & STATUTES
Bibliographical information Page No.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 21, 23
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 17
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS
287
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol 18, 19, 20, 24,
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 25
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 6, 7, 8, 13
UNTS 26
B. CASES
International Court of Justice and Permanent Court of International Justice
Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the 9
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J (July 09)
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime 18, 19
of Genocide (Bosn. &Hen. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J (July
11)
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 9, 16
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. (Dec.19)
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United 7, 8, 14, 15
States of America), 2003 I.C.J. (November 6).
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 6, 7, 8, 10
Tehran (Iran v. United States of America), 1980 I.C.J. (May 24)
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, 1949 I.C.J 10, 12, 15, 16
(9 April)
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 6, 13
(1996) I.C.J (July 8)
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 6, 7, 8, 14, 16,
(Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. (June 27) 19
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of 9,
Germany/Denmark v Netherlands), 1969 43 I.C.J. (Feb 20).
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for 18
the Former Yugoslavia, November 16, 1998)
The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, (Appeals Chamber), Case No. IT- 17, 18, 19
94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), 2 October, 1995
International Criminal Court
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 18
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-T-67 (June 12, 2009).
C. ARTICLES, JOURNALS & YEARBOOKS
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Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 9

Categories of International Law, 12 EJIL (2001)
Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 16
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52VA. J. INT’L L.
(2012)
Greenwood, International Law and the “War Against Terrorism, 78 8
Int. Aff. (2002)
H. Fischer, 2002, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 21
Vol. 5
James A Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the 6
Prohibition of the Use of Force 32 MichJIntlL 215, 229(2011)
Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? 14
Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 IRRC
(2008)
JE Noyes & BD Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of 13
Joint and Several Liability, 13 Yale JIntIL (1988)
Karin, What Matters is the Armed Attack, not the Attacker!, HJIL 8
(2017)
Kirsten Schmalenbach, The Right of Self-defence and “The War on 13
Terrorism” One Year After September, 3 Ger. Law J. (2002)
Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self- 8, 16
defence and Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. (1982)
Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law 12, 14
After 11 September, 51 Int Comp Law Q (2002)
O. Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist 16
Bases, 11 HJIL (1988-1989)
Paulina Starski, Right to Self-defence, Attribution and the Non- 11
State Actor, Birth of the “Unable or Unwilling” Standard?, 75 HJIL
(2015)
René Värk, Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Armed 12
Forces, 14 ENDCP (2011)
S. Murphy, Self-defence and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An 16
Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AJIL (2005)
Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in 7
Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter (2002) 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 41, 47-51
(2002)
Soheil Ghasemi, Sic Utere Principle Revisited: State Responsibility 10
for Cross-Border Violence?, CILJ, (May 06, 2019)
Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and The Law of War, 86 IRRC 21
(2004)
Williams Gareth D., Piercing the Shield of Sovereignty: An 13
Assessment of the Legal Status of the “Unwilling or Unable” Test,
25 UNSWLJ (2013)
Y. Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self- 12
Defence - Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on
Jus ad Bellum, IntLaw (2002)
Yoram Dinstien, Legitimate Military Objective in Current Jus in 20
Bello, 78 Int’l Law Studies, (2002)
F. BOOKS & COMMENTARIES
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Avra Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence under Customary 14

International Law and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
(2000)
Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 8
(2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2002)
Christine Grey, International Law and Use of Force, (3rd ed., 8
Oxford University Press 2018) (2008)
E. Jimenez de Arechaga, International Responsibility' in Manual of 9
Public International Law, (M. SØrensen, 1968).
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Proportionality in the Conduct of 24
Hostilities The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment, Chatham
House The Royal Institute of International Affairs (2018).
Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by 14
States, (2004).
Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International 16
Law, (2006)
Gray Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, (2nd ed., 13, 16
Oxford University Press) (2004).
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We 16
Use It, (1995)
J. De Preux, Commentary on The Geneva Prisoners of War 23
Convention of 1949, (J. Pictet. 1960)
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on The Notion of Direct 23
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,
(2009)
Oppenheim's International Law, (9th ed., Jennings & Watts, 16
2002)
Schachter, International law in Theory and Practice, (1991) 16
Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Art.51 of the UN Charter: 6, 7, 14
Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice, (2010)
Vincent-JoËl Proulx, Transnational Terrorism and State 13
Accountability: A New Theory of Prevention, (1st ed. 2012)
Waldemar Solf, Art. 52, in New Rules for Victims of Armed 20, 23
Conflicts: Commentary on The Two 1977 Protocols Additional to
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch &
Waldemar Solf ., 1982);
Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, (3rd ed. New 8, 14, 15,16
York Cambridge University Press 2000) (1988)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Art. 36 (1) of the ICJ statute reads that:
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force.”
Art.40 (1) of the statute reads that:
“Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the
notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the
Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be
indicated.”
It is hereinafter most respectfully submitted that the Parties have submitted the
questions contained in the Special Agreement (together with Corrections and
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Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to Art.40 (1) of the Court's
Statute1 . Therefore, in accordance with Art. 36(1) read with Art. 40(1) of the Statute
of ICJ, this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the present case.
IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES
The State of Grasona respectfully requests this Hon’ble Court to adjudge that:
ISSUE 1: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA ON 21 JULY 2017 WERE
UNDERTAKEN AS A MEASURE OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT IN
VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MAZIA AND DID NOT AMOUNT TO THE
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON THE USE OF FORCE AND ANY
OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW .
ISSUE 2: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF BOMBINGS ON 21 JULY 2019
ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA SPECIFICALLY TARGETED THE AUF TRAINING CENTERS AND NOT THE
CIVILIAN LOCALITIES AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF THE FOUR GENEVA
CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF 1977 OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL LAWS .
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1965/1968 Independence of Mazia/Grasona
1977 Formation of FRU to attain equal representation for Faronas in
political participation and employment.
1998 Devolution of powers amidst skepticism by Faronian population
1996 Formation of AUF for a United Faronaland with the belief that
Mazia should be governed in accordance with the Farona ethnic
practices.
10 Jan 2002 AUF gives call for a nationwide strike to make the Faroni
language as the compulsory medium of instruction which fails.
Demands primarily anchored to Farona ethnicity and to its
cultural, social and spiritual world.
2002 Policy paper released by AUF- establishment of a United
Faronaland including Mazia and Western Province of Grasona,
proclamation the support of Faronas of Mazia and the mention
that Farona people of the Western Province of Grasona would
be convinced to join the future United Faronaland.
March 2016 Incidents of violence targeting government property and
premises.
April 2016 Regular confrontations between security forces and suspected
members of FRU reported.
December 2016 Federal government informed that 78 militants belonging to
FRU were killed and 19 security personnel lost their lives in
relation to the situation in Western Province.
28 Jan 2017 AUF declared its support to the FRU and called for FRU to shun
its demand for an independent state.
15 Feb 2017 FRU informed that their struggle for independent Faronaland
would continue.
March-April 2017 Bombings took place killing 123 security personnel.
5 May 2017 Grasona attributed the bombings to AUF militants and urged
Mazia to take immediate action against the same.
6 July 2017 Two suicide bombers exploded themselves resulting in loss of
36 security personnel. Grasona informed the media that they
found credible evidence to prove that the suicide bombers
belonged to AUF.
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21 July 2017 Grasona confirmed bombings in six locations in Mazia targeting

AUF training centres and successfully killing several militants
and their equipment. Mazia confirmed the bombings by
Grasona.
22 July 2017 Mazia confirmed that the second round of bombings hit civilian
localities leading to several civilian casualties. Grasona denied
the civilian casualties. Media reported killing of 32 persons
near the border.
23 July 2017 Mazia issued a statement on the violation of its sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and the killing of civilians due to the
bombings carried out by Grasona and stated that it would
respond.
25 July 2017 Mazia issued a statement confirming attacks on two military
bases in Grasona as a measure of self-defence. Additionally,
the permanent representative of Mazia to the United Nations
submitted a letter to the president of the United Nations
Security Council regarding the attacks.
26 July 2017 Grasona informed that they only targeted the AUF training
centres as a measure of self-defence because Mazia was
unwilling and unable to take action against AUF and the
attacks by Mazia were in violation of international law and the
UN Charter.
29 July 2017 NMRCO negotiated an understanding for referring the matter of
legality of actions of both the states to the ICJ.
17 April 2019 Submission of Special Agreement to ICJ pursuant to Art. 40(1)
of the statute.
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
ISSUE I: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA ON 21 JULY 2017 WERE
VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MAZIA AND DID NOT
AMOUNT TO THE VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON
THE USE OF FORCE AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The series of bomb attacks carried out in Grasona by AUF constitute an armed
attack. As such, Grasona's incursion into and bombings in Mazia's territory were a
lawful exercise of Grasona's inherent right of self-defence. AUF's attacks can constitute
an armed attack for the purpose of self defence under Art. 51 under the accumulation
of events doctrine. In any event, non-State actors are capable of carrying out armed
attacks. Furthermore, Mazia bears responsibility for the attacks by virtue of
attributability of AUF attacks to Mazia. Moreover, Grasona complied with customary law
requirements of necessity and proportionality in carrying out the bombings.
ISSUE II: GRASONA'S BOMBINGS DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF BOMBINGS ON 21 JULY
2019 ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA SPECIFICALLY TARGETED THE AUF TRAINING
CENTRES AND NOT THE CIVILIAN LOCALITIES AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO A
VIOLATION OF THE FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF
1977 OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAWS.
The Respondent submits that there exists no armed conflict between Grasona and
Mazia, as such IHL cannot apply. Absence of an IAC is evidenced by the fact that there
is no resort to armed force between the states. Mazia possesses neither “effective” nor
“overall control” over AUF. In the alternative, even if the threshold for an International
Armed conflict is met, Respondent complied with its IHL obligations. Grasona complied
with the principle of distinction in the second round of bombings since its campaign
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was directed against AUF training centers which were a legitimate military objective.
Moreover, FRU and AUF members are combatants under IHL and, therefore, targeting
them was lawful. In any event, the elimination of AUF training centers which were
responsible for carrying out attacks in Grasona outweighs any incidental loss of life.
PLEADINGS
ISSUE I: THAT GRASONA'S BOMBINGS ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA ON 21 JULY 2017 WERE
VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MAZIA AND DID NOT AMOUNT TO
VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON THE USE OF FORCE AND ANY
OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
[A] GRASONA'S BOMBINGS WERE A LAWFUL ACT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER THE UN
CHARTER
1. The prohibition against the use of force is not absolute2 . International law
permits States to use force through the exercise of their right of self-defence under
Art.51 of the UN Charter3 . Bombings in Mazia are justified in pursuance of exercise of
self-defence, being a necessary and proportionate response to the AUF's armed
attack4 . Furthermore, the Respondent submits that Grasona's failure to report its
action to the Security Council does not estop it from asserting self-defence. Reporting
is merely a procedural mechanism for monitoring compliance with Charter
commitments.5
1. BOMBINGS CARRIED OUT BY AUF IN GRASONA CONSTITUTE AN ARMED ATTACK
2. Destruction of property and loss of life have been recognized as constituting an
armed attack in international law6 . In determining the existence of an armed attack,
the following are to be considered; first the scale of attacks and second its effects in
terms of damage or casualties as relevant variables7 . The Respondent submits that
multiple bombings took place in the months of March and April, 2017 resulting in the
death of one hundred twenty three security personnel8 . Further explosions occurred in
the month of July, 2017 additionally leading to the death of thirty six security
personnel9 . The cumulative effect of the loss of life evidences the gravity of these
attacks justifying the characterization of an armed attack10 .
3. In Nicaragua, this Court laid down the test of ‘sufficient gravity’ of use of force to
constitute an armed attack triggering the right of self-defence. The test requires that
only the ‘most grave forms of use of force’ would amount to an armed attack within
the meaning of Art. 51 of UN Charter11 . The threshold of gravity is a flexible one, which
is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case12 . The Respondent humbly
submits that the nature of attacks with respect to six bombings in the first round
followed by subsequent explosions in the second affirms the magnitude of the attacks
against Grasona and undoubtedly qualifies to invoke appropriate self-defence
measures. The attacks were recurrent and grave in nature owing to the gross violation
of Grasona's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The said attacks, in blatant disregard
of principles of international law, also led to the loss of over one hundred fifty lives.
IN ARGUENDO, THERE EXISTS INSUFFICIENT GRAVITY TO CONSTITUTE AN ARMED ATTACK
4. Assuming but not conceding that there is insufficient gravity to constitute an
armed attack, the Respondent most humbly submits that the series of hostile attacks
give rise to a substantial claim of self-defence to Grasona under the ‘accumulation of
events doctrine’ with respect to AUF attacks13 . The doctrine demands consecutive
attacks to take place which are linked in time, source and cause and that the attacks
are part of a ‘continuous, overall plan of attack’. The Respondent contends that the
attacks were carried out by AUF as the singular source, and occurred in consecutive
months against Grasona which establishes the systematic continuity and overall plan
of attacks14 . The Respondent contends that the attacks were carried out against
Grasona by AUF being the singular source, and occurred in consecutive months which
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establish their systematic continuity and overall plan.

2. NON-STATE ACTORS ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT ARMED ATTACKS
5. The Applicant may argue that Grasona's bombings cannot be covered by the
exception of self-defence under Art. 51 since the attacks were not carried out by
Mazia. The Respondent, however, respectfully submits that Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter
does not require that an armed attack be perpetrated by a State in order to justify an
act of self-defence on the territory of another State15 . Since Mazia allowed its territory
to be used as a safe haven by AUF which perpetrated armed attacks, Grasona is
justified in engaging in acts of self-defence within the territory of Mazia16 . Art. 51 is to
be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and the Charter's object and
purpose17 . Art.51 refers to an ‘armed attack’ without specifying the attacker18 .
6. Furthermore, customary law permits States to use force extraterritorially in self-
defence against non-State actors. A rule of customary law can emerge rapidly if State
practice is ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ and evinces the international community's
recognition that a rule of law is involved19 . The practice of NATO, OAS, ANZUS and EU
member States in acknowledging the US-led response against al-Qaeda as lawful self-
defence affirms a customary rule permitting self-defence against non-State actors20 .
In addition, Security Council Resolutions have also endorsed self-defence against non-
State actors and helped crystallize the customary rule21 . The Respondent states that in
the instant case, the attack by Grasona was carried out as an exercise of self-defence
in response to the explosions by AUF on its territory.
[B] IN ARGUENDO, IF THE ARMED ATTACK WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BY AUF, THE SAME CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED TO MAZIA UNDER S TATE RESPONSIBILITY
7. Assuming but not conceding, that AUF did not cause the armed attack, the
Respondent submits that the same is attributed to Mazia under State Responsibility on
two counts, the first being violation of international legal obligation, and the second
being attributability of the attack to Mazia22 .
1. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION BY MAZIA
8. Mazia is obliged to protect Grasona from harm which is essentially connected
with its sovereignty23 . The Respondent submits that Mazia, on account of its failure to
neutralize AUF on its territory failed in its responsibility under the sic
uteretuoutalienum non laedas principle, which proscribes a State to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury to the territory of another24 . A
breach of the aforementioned principle covers failure on the part of state to suppress
the armed operations of non-State actors directed from its territory25 . Even after
urging Mazia to act against AUF on the basis of credible evidence adduced, Mazia failed
to mitigate the threat posed by AUF which was operating out of its territory, thereby
breaching the aforementioned principle.
9. Further, a state's obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for
acts against other states has been recognized by this Hon’ble Court26 . In extension,
the Court in Tehran Consular Case has noted international responsibility on account of
the failure of a state's obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the interests
of another State27 . Culpable behavior of a state demands knowledge of the
circumstances potentially injurious to another state28 , which is established if no
“reasonable doubt” remains regarding a state's awareness29 . Acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory by a state directed towards the commission of acts
involving a threat or use of force is prohibited30 .
10. The Respondent submits that Mazia was given credible information detailing
AUF's role in the attacks in Grasona, however, the same was not acted upon, which
ultimately resulted in further explosions in Grasona31 . This evidences the wrongful
omission of Mazia and affirms its failure in preventing its territory from being used
against Grasona, thereby establishing state responsibility.
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2. ARMED ATTACK BY AUF IS ATTRIBUTED TO MAZIA

11. Attributability of the armed attack by AUF to Mazia is substantiated in two
limbs, first being vicarious responsibility of Mazia, and the second being its substantial
involvement.
a) MAZIA BEARS VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY
12. The Respondent contends that Mazia bears vicarious responsibility for failing to
take actions with respect to AUF32 . UNSC resolutions require states to deny safe haven
to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts33 , and mandate all states
to refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons
involved in terrorist acts, while taking the necessary steps to prevent the commission
of terrorists acts by non-State actors34 .
13. The aforementioned requirement subsequently points at the vicarious
responsibility of the state in knowingly acquiescing to the injurious acts of non-state
actors within its territory. The Respondent submits that this Hon’ble Court has
endorsed vicarious responsibility in the Corfu Channel case35 and the same is satisfied
on three grounds. First, a state is or should be aware of a potential terrorist attack
against another state. Second, it is able to prevent the attack but neglects to do so,
and third, it fails to warn the other state of the attack.36
14. Post the six bomb explosions, Grasona informed of having credible information
that these bombings were carried out by the AUF militants coming from Mazia,
following which it urged Mazia to take immediate action against the AUF militants. This
clearly indicates that Mazia was aware of the nature and extent of AUF's activities on
its territory. Sharing of information was not availed by Mazia in neutralizing AUF as
further explosions took place37 . This is significant of Mazia's neglect to deter AUF from
carrying out more attacks. Additionally, no warning or intimation was given by Mazia
in the context of the attack. Therefore, Mazia is vicariously responsible for harboring
AUF and failing to prevent the attack on Grasona.
b) SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT OF MAZIA
15. The conduct of a state is equated with an armed attack in respect of its
substantial involvement38 . Substantial involvement can be active or passive. Under
passive involvement, a State allows non-State actors to operate freely within its
territory39 . Providing bases of operations and tacit acquiescence to the presence of
terrorists in a State entails state responsibility under such involvement. Customary law
accepts the interpretation of substantial involvement encompassing harboring of non-
State actors that conduct cross border attacks40 . The Respondent submits that credible
information was presented to Mazia for acting against AUF on its territory but the same
was inconsequential. Further explosions took place which clearly points out that
necessary action was not taken as promised by Mazia41 . Tolerating the presence of AUF
on its territory without endorsing its activities gives rise to the indirect involvement of
Mazia. In addition, such toleration denotes that Mazia knowingly acquiesced to
activities of AUF within its borders, therefore assuming liability under state
responsibility42 .
16. UNSC Resolutions stipulate that states shall take measures under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter and deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens43 which evidences a de facto authorization of the
right to extraterritorial self-defence against non-State actors44 , thereby affirming the
right to self-defence in response to a terrorist attack45 . The Respondent contends that
Grasona has the right to engage in extra-territorial defense where Mazia is unwilling or
unable to take measures to mitigate the threat posed by AUF, thereby circumventing
the need to obtain consent from the same46 .
[C] GRASONA COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
17. Acts taken in self-defence must meet the customary requirements of necessity
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and proportionality47 . The Respondent submits that such requirements have been met
by Grasona.
1. GRASONA'S SELF-DEFENCE WAS IN PURSUANCE OF NECESSITY
18. Necessity means that a State has no other means to defend itself, but to rely
on force48 . To fulfill the requirement of necessity three components are to be met.
a) USE OF FORCE EXERCISED AS A LAST RESORT
19. A State can only resort to armed force against another State when there are no
realistic alternative means of redressal available49 . Self-defence is permissible only
when peaceful means have reasonably been exhausted50 . Grasona sought to resolve
the matter by urging Mazia to take action against AUF militants, thereby discharging
its burden under the requirement of necessity. Grasona is only required to undertake a
bona fide utilization of diplomatic channels51 which it had exhausted. Moreover,
Grasona is not under an obligation to compromise its sovereignty.52
b) REASONABLE PROXIMITY BETWEEN ATTACK AND RESPONSE
20. ‘Immediacy’ under self-defence mandates proximity in time between the attack
and the response in self-defence53 . After the suicide bombing at the security
checkpoint Grasona undertook air strikes on AUF training centers on 21st July. Grasona
cannot be said to have taken too long in undertaking its self-defensive action since a
mere fifteen days had passed from the date of the last attack by AUF. Moreover, this
condition should not be construed too strictly54 . Some level of preparation is needed to
mount an appropriate and coordinated response55 . Further, the Respondent submits
that Grasona is not obliged to confine itself to an on-the-spot reaction to the armed
attack, but is also allowed to exercise its right to self-defence after the latest attack
has factually ended in order to impede further attacks.56
c) Attacks directed towards AUF centres
21. The use of force must be adequate for the repelling of an armed attack57 . That
is, the action undertaken should in principle be directed against the source of the
armed attack58 . Grasona's air strikes on Mazia's territory solely targeted AUF training
centers in response to bombings by AUF.
2. MAZIA'S UNWILLINGNESS NECESSITATED THE USE OF FORCE
22. Self-defence is a right triggered by an act, rather than the actor59 . Even if Mazia
is not directly responsible for the attacks, Grasona must be able to prevent the same.
State practice60 recognizes a State's right of self-defence against non-State actors
operating extraterritorially in cases61 where the host state is unable or unwilling to act
against the non-State actors62 . The Respondent submits that cross-border force
becomes necessary where an aggressor organizes attacks or is based in another state
which cannot or will not end the aggression63 . Mazia's failure to take requisite action
against AUF evidences its unwillingness, thereby ruling out any cooperation with
Mazia64 . Such inaction by Mazia necessitated the use of force by Grasona in tackling
AUF.
3. GRASONA'S BOMBINGS WERE PROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE
23. To be considered proportional, a response must be limited to what is sufficient
to secure the defender's rights and ensure its security, including the restoration of
security65 . An evaluation of proportionality analyzes the reasonableness of an act of
self-defence66 . Such analysis is carried out through a combination of quantitative and
functional approaches.67
24. Taking into consideration the functional requirement of proportionality which
requires State's use of force to defensive purposes68 , the Respondent submits that
Grasona's bombings were directed only towards AUF training centers. The destruction
of AUF centers was imperative to prevent future cross border attacks and was in the
compelling interest of Grasona's security.
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25. With respect to the quantitative requirement69 , the Respondent submits that
Grasona's response in targeting AUF centres was measured and reasonable taking into
account the cumulative damage suffered in terms of casualties of security personnel
over systematic and recurrent attacks, the source of which was AUF.
ISSUE II: THAT GRASONA'S BOMBINGS DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF BOMBINGS ON 21 JULY
2019 ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA SPECIFICALLY TARGETED THE AUF TRAINING CENTRES AND
NOT THE CIVILIAN LOCALITIES AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF THE FOUR
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF 1977 OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL LAWS
26. The Respondent submits that there exists no armed conflict between Grasona
and Mazia, thus ruling out the application of IHL. The same is substantiated as under.
[A] NON-EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN GRASONA AND MAZIA
27. The Applicant submits the existence of an armed conflict is a necessary
prerequisite for IHL to operate70 . In the absence of an armed conflict, there is no
violation of IHL in the present case.
1. NON-EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
28. The conflict between Grasona and AUF cannot be classified as an International
Armed conflict. For an IAC to exist there must be resort to force between two High
Contracting Parties regardless of the intensity of the confrontation71 . It is well settled
that an IAC does not exist when force is used by individuals or groups.72
a) THERE IS NO RESORT TO ARMED FORCE BETWEEN THE STATES
29. An IAC requires ‘a resort to armed force between states’73 . The criterion is not
satisfied because Grasona has not deployed armed forces against Mazia and AUF is a
non-State group74 . Further, Art.1(4) of AP I to the Geneva Conventions extends the
scope of application of the Conventions to include conflicts in which people are fighting
against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination75 . FRU's secessionist aims do not internationalize the
conflict, because Grasona is neither ‘founded on racist criteria’ nor is it a colonial or
occupying power.
b) ABSENCE OF “EFFECTIVE” OR “OVERALL CONTROL” OF MAZIA OVER AUF
30. Further, the Respondent submits that to assess if an IAC exists by reason of
the indirect participation of a State, the degree of control exerted by that State over
one of the armed groups participating in the hostilities must be considered76 . Under
the effective control test77 , in order to hold a State responsible for the acts of a non-
State group, it must be shown that the group acted on the instructions of, or under
the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct78 . It requires that the
State is involved in the planning of the operation, choosing targets and providing
operational support79 . Furthermore, it does not suffice in itself that the state exercises
‘general control’ over the group, even in cases of a high degree of dependency of the
group on the State80 .
31. The Respondent submits that AUF is neither an organ nor an agency of Mazia
and is an independent association that was functioning without any instructions of, or
under the direction or control of Mazia. Therefore, Mazia does not hold responsibility
over AUF under the effective control test. Additionally, Mazia neither exercised control
over AUF in form of financing, training, equipping nor by having a role in organizing or
directing its military activities of AUF, thereby ruling out the possibility of exercising
overall control as well.81
[B.] In Arguendo, there exists an international armed conflict between Grasona and
Mazia
32. In the event this Court finds that an International Armed Conflict does exist or
that the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are applicable, the
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Respondent humbly submits that Grasona complied with its IHL obligations.
1. GRASONA DID NOT VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION DURING THE SECOND
ROUND OF BOMBINGS
33. Parties to a conflict must distinguish between civilian and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives82 . The Respondent most humbly
submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned principle during the second
round of bombings on two counts.
a) THE ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST AUF TRAINING CENTRES PURSUANT TO A
MILITARY OBJECTIVE
4. Grasona duly made the distinction between civilians and combatants, and
between civilian objects and military objectives. Civilian objects are defined ex
negativo as not being military objectives,83 which make no effective contribution to
military action depending on their nature, location, purpose or use, or whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers no definite military advantage in
the circumstances ruling at the time84 . It is most humbly submitted that Grasona
solely targeted AUF centres in pursuance of a military objective as opposed to civilian
objects.
35. First, the Respondent contends that ‘nature’ as a criterion of military objective
denotes the intrinsic character of the object. To meet this yardstick, an object must be
endowed with some inherent attribute which makes an effective contribution to
military action.85 The training centres of AUF by virtue of their nature and use in
carrying out attacks against Grasona ipso facto constitute a military objective.
36. Second, the requirement of effective contribution relates to military action in
general, and there need not be any “direct connection” with specific combat
operations.86 Training centres effectively contributed to the military action by AUF in
terms of their utility and character as they housed militants and equipment87 . Owing
to their effective contribution to the military action of the AUF, training centres stood
clear as a military objective.
b) AUF AND FRU ARE COMBATANTS UNDER IHL
37. The Respondent submits that no civilians were killed at the border. Only AUF
centres were targeted, apart from which members of FRU were present in the forest
adjoining the border with Mazia. In any event, the attack did not result in the killing of
civilians as both AUF and FRU are ‘combatants’ under IHL. Members of militias or
volunteer corps are combatants under IHL.88 Both AUF and FRU fulfill the conditions for
part of such militias or volunteer groups.
38. In respect of AUF, the Respondent first contends the condition of being
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates implies the existence of an
organizational structure which enforces discipline.89 AUF being an association in itself
affirms the presence of a hierarchy. Its enforcement as an organizational structure is
evident through the release of their policy paper.90
39. Secondly, the condition of a distinctive sign requirement entails the purpose of
making a distinction between civilians and combatants.91 Such distinction is satisfied
as Grasona has successfully killed AUF militants and destroyed their equipment92
which remains uncontested by Mazia. Without a marker of identification this distinction
and the subsequent killings wouldn’t have taken place.
40. The third condition requires a similar distinction by forces during their
operations against the enemy93 . The condition does not require the visibility of arms94 .
The equipment destroyed by Grasona during the bombings is suggestive of them
carrying arms, thereby satisfying the condition.
41. In extension, the Respondent submits that AUF bears responsibility under a
continuous combat function which may be identified on the basis of conclusive
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behavior, where a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in support

of an organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct constitutes
a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed
for the duration of a particular operation.95
42. Six bomb explosions took place killing one twenty three security personnel96
followed by another, killing thirty six.97 The scale of attacks affirms the organized
nature of operations by AUF. Further, the successful killing of militants and
equipment98 points towards the continuous function of AUF as opposed to the
functions being isolated or infrequent. Therefore, Grasona has maintained the principle
of distinction by attacking only AUF centres which have assumed the combatant status
under IHL.
43. With respect to FRU, the Respondent most humbly submits to the Hon’ble
Court that FRU consists of a ten-member Core Committee which constitutes its highest
decision-making body.99 This affirms a hierarchy of command over subordinates. Post
going into hiding because of the arrests, violent incidents were reported from Western
Province targeting government property and premises. In addition, there were regular
confrontations between the security forces and groups of people with weapons
allegedly belonging to FRU. This suspicion, however, gets overridden taking into
account the series of violent incidents and confrontations leading up to the operations
in the Western Province. Further, the fact that seventy-eight militants belonging to
FRU were killed and nineteen security personnel lost their lives is derivative of a
distinction in appearance from the civilian population,100 even if the requirement is not
met by a distinctive headgear or coat.101
44. The requirement that arms be carried openly means that the “enemy must be
able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as regular armed forces,
whatever their weapons.”102 The killing of FRU militants along with the use of weapons
and regular confrontations between security forces and FRU within Western Province
confirms the recognition of FRU members as combatants, thereby validating carrying
of arms. The Respondent submits that the aforementioned substantiation satisfies the
status of FRU as combatant under the Geneva Conventions.103
45. In addition, the Respondent submits that members of FRU have also ceased to
be civilians and lose protection against direct attack by virtue of assuming continuous
combat function.104 The nature of confrontations within Western Province involving FRU
was regular as opposed to sporadic. The killing of seventy eight militants belonging to
FRU in the operations negates the participation as being unorganized.
46. The Respondent submits that civilians were not killed at the border and only
AUF centres were targeted. The attack by Grasona in the presence of FRU members at
the border does not violate the principle of distinction as FRU members were
combatants under IHL as substantiated above. Further, with respect to the killing of
thirty two persons at the border, the Respondent submits that the same cannot be
attributed to Grasona as no evidence has been adduced by either Mazia or the
international media with regards to Grasona's involvement in the killings.
[C] GRASONA DID NOT VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE SECOND
ROUND OF BOMBINGS
[1] THE SECOND ROUND OF BOMBINGS OFFERED MILITARY ADVANTAGE
47. Elimination of the training centres was carried on to secure concrete and direct
military advantage for Grasona as against AUF. A definite military advantage conveys a
“concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and
speculative one.”105 The assessment of military advantage is to be made against the
background of the circumstances prevailing at the time.106 Grasona suffered extensive
damage in the form of casualties of its security personnel as a result of repeated
attacks by AUF. AUF training centres added to the military capability of AUF and acted
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
as a catalyst of attacks against Grasona. Considering the scale and nature of the
explosions in Grasona, neutralization of the AUF centres provided a definite military
advantage by diminishing the overall military capability of AUF and subsequently
effectuating deterrence.
2. THE ELIMINATION OF AUF TRAINING CENTRES OUTWEIGHS INCIDENTAL LOSS OF LIFE
48. Identification of incidental harm with respect to proportionality assessment is
determined through causation and foreseeability.107 While causation of attack by
Grasona is not contested, it is submitted that foreseeability, which relates to whether
incidental harm can be expected to occur, gets diminished on account of feasible
measures being taken and distinction being maintained. The Respondent submits that
targeting of only AUF centres along with the prior warning being advanced rules out
the likelihood of incidental harm.
49. Further, the Respondent submits the protection of civilians from military
operations is not absolute.108 Extensive collateral damage is legally justified by the
military value of the target struck, because of the high military advantage anticipated
by the attack.109 The destruction of AUF training centres was not in excess of “direct
and concrete” military advantage anticipated during the circumstances prevailing at
that time owing to the high military value of the targets. In the face of repeated
attacks from AUF militants coming from Mazia, training centres held military value
hence their destruction offered direct and concrete military advantage. AUF training
centres operated as military bases. Therefore, such elimination outweighs any
incidental loss of life.
3. GRASONA’ UNDERTOOK FEASIBLE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
50. Respondent submits that Grasona took feasible precautions to minimize the
expected collateral damage.110 Feasibility is determined by what is practicable in the
circumstances.111 This includes giving effective advance warning prior to an attack
which may affect the civilian population.112 Grasona intimated that stringent necessary
action would be taken against those who support AUF,113 even when it was not
necessary in order to attain military objectives.114 This evidently establishes a warning
to isolate AUF. Grasona had advanced a warning as to the types of facilities, objects, or
objectives that are likely to be subject to attack to the extent that115 the intimation
prior to the attack amounts to consideration for the location and existence of civilians,
thereby upholding feasible precaution and observing proportionality.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For reasons stated above, the Respondent hereby requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that:
I. GRASONA'S BOMBINGS ON THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA ON 21 JULY 2017 WERE UNDERTAKEN
AS A MEASURE OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT IN VIOLATION OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MAZIA AND DID NOT AMOUNT TO THE
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON THE USE OF FORCE
AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW , AND;
II. GRASONA'S BOMBINGS DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF BOMBINGS ON 21 JULY 2019 ON
THE TERRITORY OF MAZIA SPECIFICALLY TARGETED THE AUF TRAINING CENTRES AND NOT
THE CIVILIAN LOCALITIES AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF THE FOUR
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF 1977 OR ANY OTHER
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAWS , AND;
III. A NY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE I NTEREST OF
JUSTICE.
All of which is respectfully submitted
———
1 Art. 1, Special Agreement Submitted to the International Court of Justice by the State of Mazia and the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of Grasona on the Differences between them Concerning the Military Attacks by the State of Mazia and
by the Republic of Grasona
2 U.N. Charter art. para 4; James A Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of
Force, 32 MichJIntlL 215, 229(2011).
3
U.N. Charter, art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. ¶195 (June 27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. ¶38 (July
8).
4 U.N. Charter, art 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. ¶194-195 (June 27).
5 Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Art. 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice, 8-9 (2010).
6Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. United States of America),
1980 I.C.J. ¶14, 57, 64 (May 24).
7Ruys, Supra note 5, at 139; Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Art. 51 of the
U.N. Charter (2002) 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 41, 47-51 (2002).
8 Compromis, ¶ 11.
9
Compromis ¶ 13.
10
Murphy, Supra note 7, at 43; Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v.
United States of America), 1980 I.C.J. ¶14, 57, 64 (May 24).
11Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. ¶191 (June
27).
12Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003 I.C.J. ¶ 72
(November 6).
13 Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-defence and Reprisal under Modern
International Law, 21 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 41(1982).
14Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 231 (June
27); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003 I.C.J. ¶ 64 (Nov
6); Christine Grey, International Law and Use of Force, 130, 155 (3rd ed., Oxford University Press 2018) (2008).
1980 358 I.C.J. ¶ 28 (Nov 6) (separate opinion of Kooijmans, J.); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-
Defence, 215,216 (3rd ed. New York Cambridge University Press 2000) (1988).
1980 358 I.C.J. ¶ 31 (Nov 6) (separate opinion of Kooijmans J.); Dinstien, Supra note 15, at 215-216; Bruno
Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 802 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2002).
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
18
Greenwood, International Law and the “War Against Terrorism”, 78 Int. Aff. 301, 307-308 (2002); Karin, What
Matters is the Armed Attack, not the Attacker!, HJIL 77, 44-51 (2017).
19North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark v Netherlands), 1969 43 I.C.J.¶ 74
(Feb 20).
20 Statement by the NATO Secretary-General (2001) 40 ILM 1268; Resolution of the Twenty fourth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc No RC24/RES1/01 (21 September 2001); Council of the EU,
‘2372nd Council Meeting (General Affairs)’ (Press Release, 8-9 October 2001) 7; Letter dated 7 October 2001
from the Permanent Representative of the USA, UN Doc S/2001/946 (2001); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also
Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EJIL 993, 997(2001).
21S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (Sept 12, 2001);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 172-173, 314
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Simma J. and Kooijmans J.); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 215 (separate opinion of Higgins J.)(July 9).
22 H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, Dordrecht, 157(1980); E. Jimenez de Arechaga,
International Responsibility' in Manual of Public International Law, 531, 534 (M. Sørensen, 1968).
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23 Island of Palmas Case (United States v Netherlands), II RIAA 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
24 Trail Smelter Arbitration, (United States v. Canada), II RIAA 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb 1928).
25Soheil Ghasemi, Sic Utere Principle Revisited: State Responsibility for Cross-Border Violence?, CILJ, (May 06,
2019), http://cilj.co.uk/2019/05/06/sic-utere-principle-revisited-state-responsibility-for-cross-border-violence/.
26 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (April 9).
1980 I.C.J. ¶ 56-68 (May 24).
28
Special Rapporteur's Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited By International Law in Their 1989 Version, UN Doc. A/CN.4/423, ILC, 41st Sess. Arts. 10-17(1989);
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J 22 (April 9).
29
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J 18 (April 9).
30Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, 25thsess, 1883rdmtg, UN Doc A/Res/2625
(October 24, 1970).
31 Compromis, ¶ 13.
32Paulina Starski, Right to Self-defence, Attribution and the Non-State Actor, Birth of the “Unable or Unwilling”
Standard?, 75 HJIL 455, 485 (2015).
33 S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept 28, 2001);

34S.C. Res. 1269 UN Doc S/RES/1269 (Oct 19, 1999), S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept 28, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1368, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (Sept 12, 2001).
35 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J 17 (April 9).
36 René Värk, Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Armed Forces, 14 ENDCP 74(2011).
38 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (December 14, 1974), A/RES/3314.
39 René, Supra note 36.
40Y. Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence - Appraising the Impact of the September
11 Attacks on Jus ad Bellum, IntLaw 1081, 1082 (2002); Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and
International Law After 11 September, 51 Int Comp Law Q 401, 408(2002); 2, A. Cassese, ‘Article 51 La Charte
des Nations Unies, 1350 (3rd ed. J.-P. Cot and A. Pellet 2005); Kirsten Schmalenbach, The Right of Self-defence
and “The War on Terrorism” One Year After September, 3 German LJ 1, 20 (2002).
419, Vincent-Joël Proulx, Transnational Terrorism and State Accountability: A New Theory of Prevention, 253
(1st ed. 2012).
42JE Noyes & BD Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability, 13 Yale JIntIL 225,
254 (1988).
43
S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept 28, 2001).
44Madeline Holmqvist Skantz, The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine - The Right to Use Extraterritorial Self-defence
Against Non-State Actors, Stockholm University, 41(2017) (on file with Stockholm University).
45
Gray Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, 159 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press) (2004).
46Williams Gareth D., Piercing the Shield of Sovereignty: An Assessment of the Legal Status of the “Unwilling or
Unable” Test, 25 UNSWLJ 588, 619 (2013).
47 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ 245, ¶ 40-41(July 8).
(November 6); Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two
Bodies of Law, 90 Intl Rev. Red Cross 963, 975 (2008).
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49 Byers, Supra note 40, at 406.

50Ruys, Supra note 5, at 95; Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, at 69
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (June 19, 1980); Dinstein, Supra note 15, at 209; Gardam, Necessity,
Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, 150 (2004).
51
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 204 (June
27) (Dissenting opinion of Schwebel J.).
52U.N. SCOR, 140th mtg. at 32 UN Doc. S/PV.1941 (July 12, 1976); M Knisbacher, The Entebbe Operation: A
Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action, 12 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 57, 71 (1977-1978).
53Avra Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence under Customary International Law and Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, 159 (2000); Dinstein, Supra note 15, at 242.
54
Dinstein, Supra note 15, at 210.
55 Ruys, Supra note 5, at 100.
56 Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, at 70 U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (June 19, 1980);
57
Avra, Supra note 53, at 160.
(November 6)
59 ILA, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force, 14 (2018)
http://www.ilahq.org/images/ILA/DraftReports/DraftReport_UseOfForce.pdf.
60
Letter dated 31 March 2015 from the Chargé d'affairesa.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/2); Letter dated 24 July 2015 from the
Chargé d'affairesa.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/2015/563); Letter dated 7 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2015/688); Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2014/695); Letter dated 9 September
2015 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/2015/693); Identical letters dated 8 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
(S/2015/745);
61 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J 22 (April 9).
62Henderson, Editorial Comment- Use of Force in Islamic State, 1 Journal on the Use of Force and Int'l Law 209,
213(2014); O. Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HJIL 309, 311 (1988-
1989); S. Murphy, Self-defence and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AJIL 62, 64,
67-70 (2005).
63
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 307, 334
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Simma J. and Kooijmans J.); 1, Oppenheim's International Law, 419(9th ed.,
Jennings & Watts, 2002); Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. Int'L L. 483 (2012).
64 Compromis, ¶ 12, 13; Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, 1949 I.C.J 18 (April 9).
27).
66
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, ¶ 120 U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (June 19, 1980); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 184 (3rd edn. , 2001).
67Dinstein, Supra note 15, at 219; Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 232
(1995); Schachter, International law in Theory and Practice, 153(1991).
68Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, 148 (2006); Gray, Supra note 45, at
150.
69
Levenfeld, Supra note 13, at 41.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
70 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.IT-94-1-A, 88-97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
71Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
UNTS 287; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.IT-94-1-A, ¶ 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15,
1999).
72
D. Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to The Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163
RCADI, 131 (1979).
73 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case, No.IT-94-1-A, ¶ 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 183 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia November 16,
1998).
74Kreb, Some Reflections on The International Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 JC &
SL 245, 255-56 (2010).
75
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1 ¶ 4, June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
76The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-T-67(June 12,
2009).
77Application of The Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia And Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 207, ¶ 400(26 February).
78
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, UN GAOR 53rd Sess.
Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Application of The Convention on The Prevention and
Punishment of The Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia And Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 207, ¶ 399
(26 February).
79 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
27); Application of The Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia And Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 207, ¶ 400(26 February).
81
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 131, 137, 138, 145 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July
15, 1999).
82Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
84
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
85 Yoram Dinstien, Legitimate Military Objective in Current Jus in Bello, 78 Int'l Law Studies 139, 146 (2002).
86
Waldemar Solf, Art. 52, in New Rules For Victims Of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on The Two 1977 Protocols
Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of 1949, 329 (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch&Waldemar Solf., 1982);
87
Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch' s Experience in Monitoring Internal
Armed Conflicts, 9 AmUIntlLRev 49, 72 (1993).
88 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(a), Aug. 12,1949, 75 UNTS 135;
89 H. Fischer, 2002, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 5, 76.
90
Compromis, ¶ 7.
91 Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and The Law of War, 86 IRRC 93, 106 (2004).
92
Compromis ¶ 14
93
W. Thomas Mallison Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants under the International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CaseWResJIntlL (1977).
94 Fischer, Supra note 89, at 77.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
95Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of The Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct Participation in Hostilities
From Belligerent Status in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 UPaJIntEconL 313, 320 (2011).
96
Compromis, ¶ 11.
99
Compromis, ¶ 19.
100 Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Supra note 95, at 313, 322.
101 Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, ¶ 64 (1956).
102
J. De Preux, Commentary on The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949, 61 (J. Pictet. 1960).
103 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4a, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135.
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on The Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
104
Humanitarian Law, 70 (2009).

105 Waldemar Solf, Supra note 86, at 326.
106 Dinstien, Supra note 85, at 139, 144.

107Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities The Incidental Harm Side of the
Assessment, Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs 13 (2018).
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Resolution, Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law
109
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 92 (Harvard University Press) (2009).

International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 58 , June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
111Judicial and Similar Proceedings: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission: Partial Award regarding Ethiopia's Central
Front Claim 2 (2004) 43 ILM 1275, 1295; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010) 4.
114Yves Sandoz, et al., Commentary on The Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, ¶ 2223(1987).
115
Ibid.
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/
notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake
or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/
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Page 1 Monday, January 22, 2024

1st NALSAR Public International Law Moot, 2021

3. Grasona's bombings were proportionate use of force 16

UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 9

Avra Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence under Customary 14

21 July 2017 Grasona confirmed bombings in six locations in Mazia targeting

establish their systematic continuity and overall plan.

2. ARMED ATTACK BY AUF IS ATTRIBUTED TO MAZIA

behavior, where a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in support

33 S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept 28, 2001);

49 Byers, Supra note 40, at 406.

Humanitarian Law, 70 (2009).

106 Dinstien, Supra note 85, at 139, 144.

Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 92 (Harvard University Press) (2009).

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