Best Team Memorial Petitioner LCDNMCC National Moot 07 202 Muzzamil212393 Hnluacin 20230829 220441 1 41

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Tuesday, August 29, 2023

Printed For: Md Muzzamil Ibrahim, Hidayatullah National Law University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
© 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
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7th LCDNMCC National Moot Court, 2023

Best Team Memorial - Petitioner
Law College Dehradun, Faculty of Uttaranchal University 6th

National Moot Court Competition, 2022
Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
In the matter of
Petition No. __ of 2023
Aliza Firdos and others
Versus
State of Kaloshia
Indiana Young Lawyers Association
Versus
Union of Indiana
Akhandanand Tripathi
Versus
Union of Indiana
Petition Invoked Under Art. 139A of the Constitution of Indiana
Upon Submission to the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his Lordship's
Companion Justices of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHOHIRTY 05
CASES 05
REGULATIONS 07
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 08
WEB SOURCES 09
OTHER SOURCES 09
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS 11
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 16
I. WHETHER, THE WEARING OF A HIJAB IS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) & ARTICLE 25 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
1. HIJAB BAN IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
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(1) HIJAB IS A FORM OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH PROTECTED BY

ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
(2) THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED FAILS TO PASS THE LITMUS TEST
FOR FREE SPEECH
(3) VIOLATION OF POSTULATES GIVEN BY PRIVACY
JURISPRUDENCE INTERMINGLED WITH FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
(4) THE ARGUMENT ABOUT QUALIFIED PUBLIC SPACE IS
FRIVOLOUS AND DEVOID OF ANY MERIT
(5) THE ACTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT IS IN VIOLATION OF
DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY & THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
TEST
2. THE HIJAB BAN IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 25
(1) THE WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE OF DRAKISM RELIGION
3. THE HIJAB BAN IS ALSO VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 18 OF
ICCPR
II. WHETHER, THE 106TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT,
2022 IS, CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
1. IT IS AGAINST ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
DEFIES THE BASIC INTENT OF THE CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY.
(1) RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION CHALLENGES THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION.
(2) RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION DOES NOT FIND MUCH
IMPORTANCE IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO.
(3) EQUATING RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH
INDEPENDENCE OR SECESSION WOULD BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
III. WHETHER, THE IMPOSITIONOF THE PRESIDENT'S RULE IN
THE STATE OF KALOSHIA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
1. THERE WAS NO SITUATION OF FAILURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN THE STATE.
(1) FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IS NECESSARY
BEFORE IMPOSING PRESIDENT'S RULE IN THE STATE
(2) NOT EVERY SITUATION OF INTERNAL DISTURBANCE AND
RIOTS AMOUNTS TO FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MACHINERY IN THE STATE
2. GOVERNOR WAS NOT GIVEN A CHANCE TO EXPLORE ALL
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
(1) PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT'S RULE IS THE LAST RESORT
(2) NO ISSUANCE OF WARNING OR ADVISORY
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3. GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN S.R. BOMAI V. UNION OF INDIA

WERE NOT FOLLOWED BY THE UNION IN THE INSTANT
CASE
(1) THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES WERE LAID DOWN WHICH WAS
NOT FOLLOWED IN THE INSANT CASE
IV. WHETHER,THE STATE OF KALOSHIA CAN BE GIVEN THE
RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM THE UNION OF INDIANA?
1. ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS INDIANA THE
STATUS OF A UNITARY STATE
2.THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION DOES NOT
NECESSARILY GIVE THE STATE THE RIGHT TO SECEDE.
PRAYER 44
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
Ltd Limited
HC High Court
Hon'ble Honourable
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil & Political
Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
IJP Indiana Janta Party
ISP Indiana Samaj Party
S., § Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases Online
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
Sess. Session
SLP Special Leave Petition
UN United Nations
US United States
v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
S.NO CASE NAME P.
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1. Aam Aadmi Party v. Union of India, (2014) 16 36

SCC 396
2. Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth, 17
(1943) 67 CLR 116 (High Court of Australia)
3. Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 19
1
4. Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher 40
Education v. Union of India, (2016) 6 SCC 635
5. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 31
3 SCC 1.
6. Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368 24
7. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 21
SCC 615
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) 19
(1969, Supreme Court of United States)
9. City of Chicago v. Wilson et al, 75 III. 2d 525 18
(1978, Supreme Court of Illinois, United States)
10. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, 26
AIR 1990 Cal 104
11. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowmnets, 25
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamior of
Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005
12. Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 31
1
13. Dennis v. United States, 340 US 887 (1950) 19
14. Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development 23
Corporation Ltd., (2003) 8 SCC 9
15. Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families 34
Association v. Union of India, (2016) 14 SCC
536
16. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 31
17. Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 40
(2020) 12 SCC 259
18. Haji Ali Dargah Trust v. Noorjehan Safia Niaz, 25
(2016) 16 SCC 788
19. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. Union of India, 32
(2016) 16 SCC 744
20. Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh 39
Jamat, (2008) 5 SCC 33
21. HS Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 594. 35
22. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of 26
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Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1

23. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 36
SCC 1
24. Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 21
761
25. Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 16
SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1480
26. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 36
SCC 1
27. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 20
SCC 1
28. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1 34
29. Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, 41
(1971) 1 SCC 85
30. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 17, 20
248
31. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of 18
India, (2014) 5 SCC 438
32. Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 24
588
33. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 18
SCC 1
34. Nicaragua v. United States of America, [1986] 29
ICJ Rep 14
35. Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 33
486
36. Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 22
37. Prashant Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 2 41
SCC 409
38. Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 18
SCC 727
39. Purnima Yadav v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 35
148
40. Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184 40
41. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 33, 36
SCC 1
42. Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, 21
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1293
43. Regina (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High 24
School, [2007] 1 A.C. 100
44. Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 30
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45. Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 33

SCC 831
46. Sardari Lal v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 411 33
47. Schenek v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919) 19
48. Shiw Kumar Prasad Singh v. Union of India, 38
(2005) 7 SCC 147
49. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 19
1
50. Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of 24
Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 9 SCC 548
51. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 24
52. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 28, 37, 39,
40
53. S. Srikishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 39
1957 AP 734
54. St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, 24
(1992) 1 SCC 558
55. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 33, 35
SCC 592
56. Sunder Lal Patwa v. Union of India, AIR 1993 33
MP 214, 233-34
57. Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 18
9 SCC 501
58. The Author v. State of France, [2012] HCR 59 26
59. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 17
District, 393 US 503 (1969) (1969, Supreme
Court of United States
60. Union of India v. Rajesh P.U, (2003) 7 SCC 285 22
61. United Kingdom v. Albania, (1949) ICJ Rep 244 30
62. Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service 22
Commission, (2021) 5 SCC 370
BOOKS
S.NO BOOK NAME P.
1. DD Basu, A Commentary on the Constitution of 33
India, 536 (1st ed., 1950)
2. MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1059 (8th 18
ed., 2018)
3. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 670 (14th 25
ed., 2022)
STATUTES & REGULATIONS
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S.NO NAME P.
1. Art. 1, International Covenant on Civil and 42
Political Rights, 1966
2. Art. 1(1), International Covenant on Civil and 42
Political Rights, 1966.
3. Art. 18, International Covenant on Civil and 26, 42
4. Art. 25, International Covenant on Civil and 43
5. Art. 2(4) United Nations, Charter of the United 28
Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI
6. Art. 18, United Nations Declaration on Human 26
Rights, 1948
7. S. 133(2), Karnataka Education Act, 1983 15
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
S.NO NAME P.
1. Art. 3, 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 27
2022.
2. Article 3A, The 106th Constitutional 28
Amendment Act
3. Art. 1, The Constitution of India. 28
4. Art. 3, The Constitution of India 41
6. Art. 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India 15
7. Art. 19(2), The Constitution of India 18
9. Art. 25, The Constitution of India 22, 15
13. Art. 139A, The Constitution of India 9
14. Art. 51(A), The Constitution of India 24
17. The Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment 16
Act, 1976
JOURNALS & REPORTS
S.NO NAME P.
1. Balraj Puri, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and 31
Right of Self-Determination, Volume No. 36 |
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Economic & Political Weekly | 200, 215 | (2001)

2. Christopher Rudolph, Sovereignty and Territorial 29
Borders in a Global Age, Volume no. 7|
International Studies Review-JSTOR| 1, 9|
(2005)
3. Dietrich Mursuiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of 42
Secession-Reconsidered’, Modern Law of Self-
determination 23 (1993)
4. Helen Quane, The United Nations and the 42
Evolving Right to Self-Determination, Volume
no. 47| The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly-JSTOR| 537 (1998), 541
5. Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention, and Self- 29
Determination, Volume no. 20 | Denver Journal
of International Law & Policy | 8, 9 | (1991)
6. L.C. Buchheit, Secession : The Legitimacy of 42
Self-determination, 1978; A. Heraclides,
Secession, Self-determination and Non-
intervention : In Quest of a Normative
Symbiosis, Journal of International Affairs 435
(1992)
7. L. Oppenheim, R.Y. Jennings, Arthur Watts, 29
Oppenheim's International Law, Volume No. 1 |
420, 428 | (2008)
8. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 34
Sarkaria Commission Report 1983-1988
9. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 37
Punchhi Commission Report 2007-2010
10. Neil MacFarlane and Natalie Sabanadze, 30
Sovereignty and self-determination : Where are
we?, Volume no. 68| Sage International Journal
-JSTOR| 609. 616 | (2013)
WEB SOURCES
S.NO NAME P.
1. SCC OnLine (http://www.scconline.co.in/) -
2. Manupatra (http://www.manupatra.com) -
3. Live Law (www.livelaw.in/) -
OTHER SOURCES
S.NO NAME P.
1. U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the 30
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
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Independence and Sovereignty, Res. 20/2131,

Sess. 20, U.N. Document, (21/12/1965),
A/RES/20/2131
2. U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on 28
Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, Res. 2625, Sess. 25, U.N.
Document, A/RES/2625(XXV) (24/10/1970)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsel for the Petitioners most respectfully showeth:
1. In the case of Aliza Firdos v. State of Kaloshia, the Petitioner has
approached this Hon'ble Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of Indiana.
2. In the case of Indiana Young Lawyers Association v. Union of
Indiana, the petition is pending for adjudication before this
Hon'ble Court under Article 143 of the Constitution of Indiana.
3. In the case of Akhandanand Tripathi v. Union of Indiana, the
Petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution of Indiana.
The above petitions have been clubbed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court under Article 139A of the Constitution of Indiana.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a country located in South Asian Subcontinent. State of
Kaloshia is one of the important states of Indiana. Initially, when
the Constitution of Indiana was being formed, State of Kaloshia
did not intend to be part of the territory of Indiana; however,
because of its geographic extent, the army of Indiana was sent to
the state to threaten the ruler. The king had to sign the
Instrument of Accession out of sheer pressure.
2. The majority population of Indiana practices the Induism religion,
whereas majority population in the state of Kaloshia practices the
Drakism religion. Since 2014, the IJP party has been in power at
the Central Government but in the state of Kaloshia there is
coalition government between IJP and ISP party.
CASE 1
1. One day, a private school in Kaloshia denied entry to girls
belonging to the Drakism religion, on the ground that they were
wearing a Hijab. After few days, the State Government of Kaloshia
issued a notification under S. 133 (2) of the Karnataka Education
Act, 1983, stating that no student who is wearing a Hijab or is not
in proper uniform shall be allowed to attend the classes either in
schools or in colleges, irrespective whether it is a government
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institution or a private institution.

2. This led to a lot of agitation among the people of Kaloshia, stating
that wearing of Hijab is their customary practice and comes under
the freedom of speech and expression granted under Art. 19(1)
(a), and it is a part of their right to practice any religion freely
granted by Art. 25 of the Constitution of Indiana.
3. In respect of this, one of the students named Aliza Firdos filed a
Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Kaloshia challenging
the notification of the Government. The High Court of Kaloshia
declared that the notification of the State Government is
constitutionally valid. In response to the judgment of the High
Court regarding the Hijab-ban issue, Aliza Firdos and other
students filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble SC of
Indiana.
CASE 2
1. Since the Union of Indiana had ratified the Charter of the United
Nations and the ICCPR, the Parliament of Indiana introduced the
106th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2020 (Annexure - 1) to add
Art. 3A to the Indiana Constitution, which gave the right to the
states that in case they want to secede the Union, they can
propose the same. After a referendum, the state can secede from
the Union.
2. In lieu of the High Court judgement in the Hijab-Ban, people of
Kaloshia started to protest violently on the road and in public
places. Meanwhile, a group of young advocates, who represented
themselves as an organization named Indiana Young Lawyers
Association, approached the President of Indiana on the issue that
the 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2022, is against the
constitutional framework and what was intended by our
Constituent Assembly Members.
3. In response to this, the President of Indiana transferred the
dispute to the Hon'ble SC for adjudication under Art. 143 of the
Constitution of Indiana. The petition is pending for further
hearing.
CASE 3
1. After the High Court Judgement in the Hijab-Ban issue, the people
of Kaloshia started to protest violently in public places. However,
there was no such damage caused to the public property but
there was political tension prevailing as the members of ISP were
unwilling to be in a coalition government after the notification
regarding the hijab ban was released. As per their party stand,
they were not consulted before releasing the same.
2. Despite many requests from the IJP, the coalition government
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broke. Assuming that the demonstrations and the break - down of

the coalition government, the Government of Indiana imposed
President'S rule in the State of Kaloshia on the ground of failure of
constitutional machinery.
3. In response to the imposition of emergency, the former Deputy
Chief Minister of Kaloshia named, filed a writ petition before the
Hon'ble SC of Indiana stating that the act of the Central
Government was arbitrary. It argued that guidelines laid down in
SR Bommai v. Union of India were not followed. The writ petition
is pending before the Hon'ble SC.
1. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
[ISSUE I]
WHETHER, THE WEARING OFA HIJAB IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
UNDER ARTICLE19(1) (A) & ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA?
[ISSUE II]
WHETHER, THE 106 THCONSTITUTIONALAMENDMENT ACT, 2022 IS,
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
[ISSUE III]
WHETHER, THE IMPOSITIONOF THE PRESIDENT’S RULEIN THE STATE
OF KALOSHIA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
[ISSUE IV]
WHETHER, THE STATE OF KALOSHIA CAN BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO
SECEDE FROM THE UNION OF INDIANA?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. WHETHER, THE WEARING OF A HIJAB is A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) & ARTICLE 25 OF THE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana the
notification issued by the Government of Kaloshia by virtue of S. 133
(2) of the Kaloshia Education Act is arbitrary and unconstitutional as
hijab forms an integral part of Drakism and therefore, cannot be
restricted unreasonably. Hence, the judgement of the High Court of
Kaloshia upholding the hijab ban violates the fundamental rights of the
Petitioners granted by Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 25 of the Constitution of
Indiana.
II. WHETHER, THE 106TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT,
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the 106th
Constitutional Amendment Act, 2022 is constitutionally invalid because
it is against Art. 1 of the Constitution of Indiana and does not stand
true on the basic intent of the members of the Constituent Assembly. It
is further contended that the separatist nature of Amendment 106
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which focuses solely on secession and separation, can be clearly said to

be against the Constitution of Indiana and hence rendered
unconstitutional.
III. WHETHER, THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT’S RULE IN
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the imposition of
Presidents rule in the state of Kaloshia is unconstitutional because there
was not a situation of failure of constitutional machinery in the state. It
is further contended that Governor of Kaloshia was not given enough
chances to explore all possible alternatives before imposing President's
rule in the state of Kaloshia as laid down in SR. Bommai case by the
Hon'ble SC. Hence, the imposition of Presidents rule in the state of
Kaloshia infringes the federal nature of the Constitution of Indiana.
IV. WHETHER, THE STATE OF KALOSHIA CAN BE GIVEN THE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that the
State of Kaloshia cannot be given the right to secede from the Union of
Indiana as it is in contravention to Art. 1 of the Constitution of Indiana
that provides for it to be a unitary state. Thereto, the right to self-
determination given by ICCPR to people cannot be construed to give
them the right to secession as well. Thus, given the 106th Constitutional
Amendment Act is arbitrary and unconstitutional, the State of Kaloshia
cannot be given the right to secede from the Union of Indiana.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE WEARING OF A HIJAB IS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) AND ARTICLE 25 OF THE
It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Court that, the right to
wearing hijab is an essential religious practice in Drakism religion and
the restriction imposed on it is arbitrary, unsubstantiated and illogical
in light of the constitutional safeguards. Thereto, it is pleaded that the
notification issued by the State Government of Kaloshia under S. 133
(2) of the Kaloshia Education Act, 19831 and the subsequent
judgement of the High court of Kaloshia banning wearing of hijab in
schools is violative of [1] Art. 19(1)(a)2 & [2] Art. 253 of the
Constitution of Indiana and [3] Art. 18 of International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ICCPR) because,
firstly Hijab is form of symbolic speech protected by Art. 19(1)(a) and,
secondly, the right to wear hijab is an essential religious practice of
Drakism.
1. HIJAB BAN IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
i) It is humbly stated before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that the ban
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on wearing of hijab placed by the virtue of the notification issued

by the Government of Kaloshia and further upheld by the
judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Kaloshia is violative of
Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
(1) HIJAB IS A FORM OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH PROTECTED BY ARTICLE
19(1)(A)
ii) It is humbly submitted that, the wearing of hijab by the girl
students in the State of Kaloshia, is a symbolic expression of their
identity to the public as a woman who follows Drakism. It is a
representative of their right to free expression in the secular State
of Indiana.
iii) In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala4 , the Hon'ble SC held
that one of the prime features of a welfare state is secularism and
freedom of individual without which society cannot fully prosper
and grow in a democratic set-up. Thus, even before the addition
of the word ‘Secular’5 in the Constitution, the State of Indiana still
had the value of secularism embedded in the fundamental
principles of its Constitution.
iv) In Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth6 , the court observed
that religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or a belief but is
rather a combination of the outward expressions and acts in
respect to the religion as well. The girl students in the present
case wore hijab as a part of the outward expression depicting
their religion Drakism and is fairly covered by their right to freely
express their acts and opinions under Art. 19(1)(a)7 .
v) In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India8 , the court observed that “no
art. in Part III of the Constitution is an island but a continent”
meaning that it is inclusive of not only the specific provisions
mentioned but rather comprises all those rights that are needed
for the correct interpretation of the ones already mentioned. This
case thus lays down the Art. 19(1)(a)9 is comprehensive enough
to also include symbolic speech and its expression in the form of
an outwardly act as well.
vi) The choice of appearance and apparel is a form of symbolic
speech which is protected by the Petitioners right to freedom of
speech and expression. In the recent past, clothes have been
used as a symbolic speech having political, religious and social
connotations. The US SC in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District10 noted that the only reason for which restrictions
may be placed on symbolic speech/conduct amounting to speech
is when such conduct caused an immediate disturbance and
disturbed the peace and order of the school. The Petitioners in the
present case, wore hijab as a symbol reflecting their faith and
belief in Drakism and in no way created any disturbance or public
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disorder that could validate the impugned notification issued by

the Government of Kaloshia. 11
vii) The ruling in Tinker12 lays down the acknowledgment given by
the court that deviations from school uniform can express a
message, or a viewpoint and those deviations may not be
prohibited by school authorities unless there was a countervailing
interest in maintaining order which was threatened by the
deviation.
viii) Freedom of speech and expression in different forms is the élan
vital of sustenance of all other rights and is the very seed for
germinating the growth of democratic views. Plurality of voices
celebrates the constitutionalist idea of a liberal democracy and
ought not to be suppressed.13 To take away this right from the
citizens, the country will then break into fragments leading to
social, political, cultural and religious barriers and the subsequent
turmoil created by this.
ix) In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India14 , the
Hon'ble SC broadened the scope of Art. 19(1)(a)15 while stating
that the word ‘expression’ also includes mannerism as well as
clothes that a person wear depicting that person's identification to
the community. Similarly, the act depicting one's affiliation to a
particular religion through choice of clothes is a key aspect of a
person's fundamental right to expression and autonomy. x) A
similar view was also taken up in cases like Navtej Singh Johar v.
Union of India16 as well by the US SC in City of Chicago v. Wilson
et al17 . It has been observed that conduct of person is also crucial
in determining the community a person belongs to. The
judgement of the High Court of Kaloshia favouring the hijab ban is
causing the Petitioners from being able to communicate a part of
their religious identification to the society and is thus violating
their right to freely express their own selves the way they are and
should thereto be struck down on the anvil of causing religion-
based discrimination. Moreover, in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union
of India.18 wherein it is observed that there is a preambular
assurance that the republic would be one which guarantees to its
people liberty, dignity, equality of status and opportunity and
fraternity. This idea envisaged in the Preamble provides us with
the duty to protect the religious beliefs and expressions of the
faith of the minorities as well. The same proposition was also
given in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India19 , wherein the
court again held that the aim of our Constitution is protecting and
promoting unity in our diversity.
xi) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that Drakism is
a minority religion in the State of Indiana making it critical for the
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people practicing it to express their cultural and religious

minority. In NALSA20 , the court also noted that no unreasonable
restriction can be placed on an individual's right to appearance in
regards to restrictions given under Art. 19(2)21 . Since the wearing
of hijab is a customary practice of Drakism religion, thus this deep
-rooted practice cannot be meddled with as the wearing of
headscarves in no way form a part of the reasonable restrictions
under Art. 19 (2)22 of the Constitution of Indiana.
(2) THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED FAILS TO PASS THE LITMUS TEST FOR
FREE SPEECH
xii) It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Bench that courts
across the globe have laid down various tests, through judicial
precedents, to determine whether the restriction imposed on the
fundamental right to free speech and expression of a person is
reasonable or not. In Schenck v. United States23 the court sui
generis laid down the ‘clear and present danger test’ which stated
that a speech could only be regulated if it was directly
proportional to clear and present danger resulting as an effect to
that. The ‘clear and present danger test’ was later replaced by
tests of similar nature like the ‘balancing test’ given in Dennis v.
United States24 .
xiii) In a landmark case of Brandenburg v. Ohio25 , the US SC laid
down the ‘imminent lawless action test’ which is known in
common parlance as the ‘Brandenburg test’. This test asserts the
viewpoint that the constitutional safeguards for free speech do not
allow the state to prohibit or outlaw advocating for the use of
force or breaking the law, unless that advocacy is particularly
intended towards inciting or producing impending lawless action.
xiv) The ‘Brandenburg Test’ revolutionized the abstraction of
reasonable restrictions imposed on free speech and has come to
evolve as the ‘litmus test’ for the contemporary notion of free
speech in the judiciary of the State of Indiana as well. In Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India26 , the court applied the ‘Brandenburg
Test’ and thereto observed that when a speech is a threat to
decency and morality in society, restrictions can be imposed to
tackle the same. In Amish Devgan v. Union of India27 , the court
recently relied on this test to come to an efficient conclusion.
xv) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that by
applying the premise given in the ‘Brandenburg test’ to the
present case of Aliza Firdos v. State of Kaloshia, we can conclude
that the symbolic speech of wearing headscarves or Hijab did not
create any indecency or public disorder for it to accordingly result
into imminent or even remote lawlessness in the state. A closer
analysis to the issue illustrates that the fact that the girl students
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were wearing the Hijab by itself, was not a source for violence. It
was only after the enforcement of the government order, and the
counter-protests, that the law-and-order situation deteriorated.28
xvi) Henceforth, it is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that
girl students wearing the hijab was not directly indecent nor did it
cause public disorder, that there is no imminent danger caused
because a girl student wore the hijab inside the school. Thus, the
hijab ban is in violation to the Petitioners' right to free speech and
expression as is guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a)29 of the Constitution
of Indiana.
(3) VIOLATION OF POSTULATES GIVEN BY PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
INTERMINGLED WITH FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
xvii) It is humbly submitted that as seen in Maneka Gandhi30 , the
right to privacy under Art. 2131 also embraces at the very
minimum, the right to freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression and the freedom of religion as well. This means that a
law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of personal
liberty and privacy has to meet the requirements of Art. 19. In
K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India32 , the court ruled:“While the
right to freely “profess, practice and propagate religion” may be a
facet of free speech guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a), the freedom
of the belief or faith in any religion is a matter of conscience
falling within the zone of purely private thought process and is an
aspect of liberty”33
xviii) Three aspects of this right are outlined by Justice Nariman : (i)
the aspect that relates to the physical body, such as interference
with the freedom of movement or surveillance of one's
movements; (ii) informational privacy pertaining to one's private
information and materials; and (iii) the privacy of choice, which
includes the freedom to make one's most intimate and personal
decisions. In conjunction with Art. 21, liberty allows a person to
make decisions about everything in life, including what to eat,
how to dress, and which religion to practice. It was also ruled that
the state must take all necessary precautions to protect each
person's right to privacy, which has both a positive and negative
connotation.34
xix) Thus, the girl students have a fundamental right to express
themselves the way they want to and is protected by both the
right to privacy under Art. 21 and the right to free speech and
expression under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana. The
argument by the Petitioners that what one wears is fairly within
their right to individual choice substantiated by the privacy
jurisprudence35 is in congruous with the legal elucidation given.
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(4) THE ARGUMENT ABOUT QUALIFIED PUBLIC SPACE IS FRIVOLOUS

AND DEVOID OF ANY MERIT
xx) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that in
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala36 , the court held that our
Constitution practices tolerance and everyone should therefore
work towards protecting the same. The Constitution of Indiana is
based on the postulate of secularism and non-interference of state
in the religious affairs of the public at large. Keeping this premise
in mind along with the ruling in Bijoe37 , it is pertinent to mention
that wearing hijab is a part of the religious, social & cultural
practice of Drakism religion and has been peacefully, openly and
uninterruptedly followed for over decades.
xxi) In its most humble submission, the counsels for the Petitioners
contends that the High Court of Kaloshia was mistaken in finding
that the Petitioners cannot assert their fundamental rights inside
a classroom which the court terms as “qualified public places”38
and the rights inside a school are only “derivative right.”39 The
Hon'ble Apex Court further rejected the Petitioner's claims about
‘reasonable accommodation’40 and held that educational
institutions particularly schools come under the ambit of ‘qualified
public space’41 and thereto, the girl students cannot exercise their
rights over the prescribed dress code which does not include
wearing hijab to schools.
xxii) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that discipline
must not come at the expense of either freedom or dignity. A pre-
university student's privacy and dignity are violated if her hijab is
required to be removed at the school entrance. It violates her
fundamental rights, which are outlined in Art. 19(1)(a) and 21 of
the Constitution of Indiana. This right to her dignity and her
privacy she carries in her person, even inside her school gate or
when she is in her classroom. It is still her Fundamental Right and
not a “derivative right”42 as has been described by the High Court.
Thereto, a balance has to be maintained between school discipline
and the right to expression by the cultural and religious minorities
in a democratic set-up.
Thus, we can conclude that the constraint imposed on the
appearance of women and their choice of self-presentment of their
religion Drakism is constitutionally impermissible and an explicit
violation of Art. 19(1)(a)43 of the Constitution of Indiana.
(5) THE ACTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT IS IN VIOLATION OF
DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY & THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE TEST
xxiii) It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that in
Om Kumar v. Union of India44 , this court laid down an important
doctrine that is being widely followed in cases where breach of
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fundamental rights is in question. The court observed that

restriction on fundamental freedom have always been checked on
the “anvil of proportionality”, it further said that the courts have
been using this doctrine since 1950 to test the validity of
restrictions imposed by administrative actions.
xxiv) Similarly in Union of India v. Rajesh P. U45 , the court again
noted that the application of this doctrine of proportionality
becomes a necessity when we see a case where the administrative
action has been severer in comparison to the result it was
expected to produce and therefore, the remedy to the victims of
these brutal administrative actions, is provided by the court using
this very doctrine.
xxv) In Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation
Ltd.46 , the court held that doctrine of proportionality speaks of the
premise that the means used to fulfil the objective should be
narrowly tailored and it should be the least restrictive means per
say. In this case the corporation terminated the appellant's
employment in this instance in an effort to prevent employees
from acting carelessly. The court adopted the doctrine of
proportionality in this case and evaluated the magnitude of
penalty, even if there were other least restrictive ways or
punishments under bye-law under which he was punished but
they were not used. xxvi) It is most humbly proffered before the
Hon'ble Bench the basis of doctrine of proportionality is that the
appellate authority only ensures that whether the procedure was
right or the punishment given was the least restrictive way to
fulfil its objective. Applying this proposition, we can thereto
conclude that in the present case, the administration could have
used other restrictive means lesser in magnitude than the ones
used by them to discipline students in schools. The least
restrictive means were available to the administration which if
used, would have not resulted in the breach of Petitioner's
fundamental rights. xxvii) When an administrative body restricts
fundamental rights through its actions, the doctrine of
proportionality is applied; in these situations, the court
determines whether the measure taken by the body is the least
restrictive means to achieve the purpose and if it is not, the
restriction imposed will be quashed by applying this doctrine.
Here in this case, it can be clearly observed that the notification
issued by the Government of Kaloshia was intended to bring
about discipline and uniformity in the schools. The notification,
even though might have intended otherwise, created
discrimination and violation of the students' rights as are granted
by Art. 19(1)(a) & Art. 25 of the Constitution of Indiana. Thus, it
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can be concluded that the action of the State Government suffers

from the violation of the ‘Doctrine of Proportionality’ in as much as
in taking the extreme step of banning the Hijab within the
campus, the possible alternatives that pass the ‘least restrictive
test’ have not been explored.47
2. THE HIJAB BAN IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 25
i) The notification issued by the Government of Kaloshia by virtue of
Kaloshia Education Act, 1933 is violative of Petitioners right to
freedom of religion granted by Art. 25(1) of the Constitution of
Indiana.
ii) In Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh48 ,
the court while interpreting Art. 25 held that religion can only be
defined as whatever links a man to his own conscience and
whatever moral or ethical standards govern the lives of persons
who hold that religious belief. In another case of S.P. Mittal v.
Union of India49 , the court held that religion under Art. 25(1)50 is
a matter of belief and doctrine, concerning the human spirit,
expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship. Therefore, this
provision affords to all person's freedom to believe which may not
necessarily be religious, but which may spring from one's
conscience.
iii) It is most humbly proffered before the Hon'ble Bench that in
Regina (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School51 , a similar
issue was dealt with wherein a ban was placed on wearing of hijab
in schools. The court held that the school's task is also to promote
the ability of people of diverse races, religions and cultures to live
together in harmony. Fostering a sense of community and
cohesion within the school is an important part of that and
therefore educational institutions have to accept and protect the
diverse cultural backgrounds every student brings along with
them. In Aruna Roy v. Union of India52 , the court yet again laid
emphasis on religious tolerance and diversity that should be
protected at all costs.
iv) Similarly in the case of St. Stephen's College v. University of
Delhi53 , the court pointed out that it is a responsibility of every
educational institution in the country to promote and foster
tolerance, both in mind and spirit, towards other communities and
their cultures and beliefs. It was further held that in the nation
building with secular character sectarian schools or colleges,
segregated faculties or universities for imparting general secular
education are undesirable and they may undermine secular
democracy. Furthermore, it is a fundamental duty under Art. 51-
A54 that every citizen of the country has to unite in preserving the
rich heritage and culture followed in the State of Indiana. v) In
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Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India55 , it was held that the casual labor
does not mean that he had surrendered all his constitutional
rights in favor of the Respondents. It was thus submitted that
fundamental rights under the Constitution cannot be bartered.
They cannot be unreasonably compromised, nor can there be any
estoppel against the exercise of fundamental rights available
under the Constitution.56
vi) It is submitted that the issue of variety and our vibrant multiple
culture is significant in the context of our current case. Our
educational institutions, especially our pre-University colleges, are
the pillars of development of cognitive and psychological tolerance
towards other fellow students. In order for the children to imbue
the constitutional values of tolerance and accommodation toward
those who may speak a different language, eat different food, or
even wear different clothes or apparels, they need to be
counselled and guided in the right institutions while they are still
at an impressionable age and just beginning to realize the rich
diversity of this country and if these educational institutions follow
a non-secular culture by banning hijab, this is bound to create a
divide between the people who align with the faith against the
ones who do not. Students in multicultural communities should be
taught to recognize, accept, and respect social differences.
Furthermore, it is argued that the contested government order
excludes and undermines diversity and tolerance in the
classroom. Thus, it is discriminatory and violative of Art. 2557 of
the Constitution of Indiana.
(1) THE WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
OF DRAKISM RELIGION
vii) It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana
that in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt58 , the court while
determining what constitutes essential religious practice held that
it is any activity that constitutes a significant part of the particular
religion and is ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that
religion itself. The Hon'ble SC in Haji Ali Dargah Trust v.
Noorjehan Safia Niaz59 observed that that in order that the
practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they
must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral
part of that particular community.
viii) The present case at hand deals with Art. 25(1)60 and the
violation of the individual right granted by the provision. The
‘essential religious practice test’ has evolved over time by means
of various judicial precedents. Justice Chandrachud in Indian
Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerela61 , opined that “the
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test should rather be whether a practice subscribes to the

Constitution irrespective of whether it is essential or not.”
ix) In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhuta62 , the question
regarding tandav as an essential religious practice of Hinduism
was upheld by the Hon'ble SC as it formed a core belief in the
religion manifesting the Lord Shiva in the purest form. In
furtherance of that the court held that Art. 2563 and 2664 of the
Constitution is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but
extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore,
contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and
modes of worship which are essential or integral part of religion.
x) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that Hijab as a
form of symbolic speech of Drakism religion is deeply tied to the
faith of these women and, has for decades in a row, acted as a
representation of their religion. The Quran itself speaks of wearing
outer garments when women go out so as to distinguish and
protect them from getting harassed. The practice that is so
evidently interpreted and has been peacefully, openly and
interruptedly followed for ages cannot be restricted as it
eventually becomes an essential practice of that religion
particularly for the people who believe in that faith. xi) Thus, if we
take the above premise given by this very court in numerous
decisions, we can safely conclude that Hijab as a practice of
Drakism religion does constitute an essential religious practice of
that religion.
3. THE HIJAB BAN IS ALSO VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 18 OF ICCPR
i) In the case of The Author v. State of France65 , it was held that
wearing of turban by the Sikhs is not simply a religious symbol,
but an essential component of their identity and a mandatory
religious precept. It stated that the evidence laid does not prove
that the wearing of turban in any way poses a threat to the rights
and freedoms of the other students in the school. Thereto, it held
the ban on turban in the schools in France as violative of Art. 1866
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
wearing of a turban is regarded as a religious duty for a man and
is also tied in with a person's identity. The Committee therefore
considered that the author's use of a turban or a keski is a
religiously motivated act, so that the prohibition to wear it
constitutes a restriction in the exercise of the right to freedom of
religion. Art. 1867 of UDHR also provides for freedom of religious
belief and since Indiana is also a member of the U.N and a
signatory to the declaration, the Union has also violated that
provision as well.
ii) It is humbly submitted that the State of Indiana is a signatory68
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to the ICCPR. This covenant provides for “basic human rights that
are inalienable, indestructible and cannot be taken away or
infringed by the states who are part of the convention without any
proper justification.”69
iii) Art. 18 of the Covenant provides that “No one shall be subject to
coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice.”70 Keeping this in mind, it is humbly
stated before the Hon'ble Bench that the notification issued by the
Government of Kaloshia allowing the hijab ban in schools around
the state is in direct violation of the girl student's right to adopt
any belief of their choice as is guaranteed by Art. 18 of the
Covenant.
iv) Thereto, it is rightfully pleaded that the right to wearing hijab is
an essential religious practice in Drakism religion and the
restriction imposed on it is arbitrary, unsubstantiated and illogical
in light of the constitutional safeguards granted by Art. 1971 & Art.
2572 of the Constitution of Indiana.
II. WHETHER THE 106TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT,
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the 106th
Constitutional Amendment Act,73 2022 is constitutionally invalid
because, firstly it is against [1] Art. 1 of the Constitution and does not
stand true on the basic intent of the members of the Constituent
Assembly of holding the territorial sovereignty of the country supreme.
Secondly the right to self-determination challenges the principle of non
-intervention and does not find much importance in the present
scenario and thirdly equating the right to self-determination with
independence or secession would be unconstitutional.
1. IT IS AGAINST ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND DEFIES
THE BASIC INTENT OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
i) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Art. 174 of
the Constitution describes the State of Indiana as a Union of
States. In addition, territorial integrity and national sovereignty
are the basic fundamentals of the Constitution.
ii) The case of S.R.Bommai v. Union of India, 75 highlights the
fundamentals of our country and the vision of our founding
fathers, the judgment reads that Art. 1 calls Indiana, “Bharat, a
union of territories” and at the same time they designed a strong
central government with a considerate amount of powers to the
state governments in order to ensure that the center is able to
fight against separatist forces that may target the unity and
integrity of the nation.
iii) The Counsels on behalf of the Petitioners humbly contend that to
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concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any

fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the
community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their
good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within
States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be
to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as
a territorial and political unity.
iv) In addition, Art. 3A of the 106th Amendment76 grants the power
to secede from the Union to a State which clearly defeats the idea
behind Art. 1 of the Constitution.
v) The principle of territorial integrity is an essentially important part
of the international legal order. It is enshrined in Art. 2(4) of the
UN Charter.77 This basic rule is further reiterated in numerous
international instruments and especially in the Friendly Relations
Declaration78 This underlines the inviolability of the territorial
integrity and political independence of States.
vi) Further, ethnic identities are not only ascriptive but also evolved
and constructed. Some dialects, in the process of growth, acquire
the status of languages. For geographical, cultural and other
reasons, some regions acquire self-consciousness. Over time, such
emerging identities may seek self-determination and separate
identity within every nation. As no identity can be perfectly
homogeneous and all identities contain potential new identities,
the process of separateness of ethnic identities would be endless.
Essentially, if this concept is carried to an extreme, it means
every one of the thousands of nationalities on earth should have
its own state. 79
vii) Adding to the above, the right to self-determination has
increasingly been used in the post-colonial age by separatist
groups and secessionist movements around the globe as a
justification for their activities. 80
viii) Gleaning from the aforementioned arguments, it can be clearly
adduced that the 106th Amendment is constitutionally invalid as
it does not hold true to the basic principles of territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the State of Indiana.
(1) RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION CHALLENGES THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON INTERVENTION.
ix) In international law, the principle of non-intervention includes,
but is not limited to, the prohibition of the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state (Art. 2.4 of the Charter).81 The prohibition of intervention “is
a corollary of every state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence”. 82 The principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of States also signifies that a State should not
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otherwise intervene in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of

other States.83
x) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared early on that no
state had a right to intervene in another and that intervention was
a manifestation of a policy of force that had no place in
international law84 . The General Assembly adopted declarations in
1965 and 1970 explicitly prohibiting intervention in the affairs of
sovereign state.85
xi) It is pertinent to note that the principle of non-interference in
domestic affairs of another State strengthens the traditional
practice of holding tight to national integrity of the population of a
state and regarding any external effort at securing the self-
determination of particular people in a state as amounting to
interference in the affairs of that state.
xii) To that end, it can be concluded that the right to self-
determination, granted by Art. 3A86 of the 106th Amendment,
challenges the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs
of a State and hence questions the feasibility of the principle.
(2) RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION DOES NOT FIND MUCH
IMPORTANCE IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO.
xiii) United Nations and state practice up to the 1990s provides
evidence that the international community thus far has recognized
only a very limited right to self-determination which includes 1)
freedom from a former colonial power, and, once independence
has been achieved, 2) freedom of the whole state's population
from foreign intervention or undue influence. Although the latter
proposition is sometimes phrased as freedom from colonial, alien,
or foreign domination, in practice it has been invoked successfully
only in cases of actual invasion by foreign military forces. Whether
in the context of decolonization (e.g., Katanga, Biafra) or
subsequent to independence, there is no legal support for the
proposition that the right to self-determination encompasses a
right of a region of a state to secede from that state.87
xiv) In this vein, a similar observation was made by the Hon'ble SC
of Canada that held that Quebec88 could not unilaterally separate
from Canada because it would violate both the Canadian
Constitution and international law. It further observed that:“The
international law right to self-determination only generates, at
best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former
colonies; where a people are oppressed, as for example under
foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political,
economic, social and cultural development. In all three situations,
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the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-

determination because they have been denied the ability to exert
internally their right to self-determination.”89
(3) EQUATING RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH INDEPENDENCE
OR SECESSION WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
xv) The internal right of self-determination90 of the natives basically
provides for a people to be able to have a full voice within the
legal system of overall nation state, control over natural
resources, the appropriate ways of preserving and protecting their
culture and way of life and to be able to be a visible partner or
participant with strong powers within the overall national polity.91
Internal self-determination often times become the case of dignity
and managing one's own affair92 and of right of choosing93 per
say.
xvi) Though the Court, in the Quebec94 case, did not specify the
concept of substantial majority, it is obvious that a bare majority
at a particular moment is not entitled to take the vital decision for
all future generations. For at another moment, under the influence
of some other event, the popular mood may be different.95
xvii) Adequate constitutional and institutional arrangements within a
larger framework may in many cases safeguard the rights of
territorial as well as non-territorial identities better than can be
done through secession.
xviii) Gleaning on the aforementioned arguments, it can be adduced
that right to self-discrimination, in the present times, cannot be
viewed through the singularly focused lens of secession. Taking
into account the separatist nature of the 106th Amendment which
focuses solely on secession and separation, it can be clearly said
to be against the Constitution of Indiana and hence rendered
unconstitutional.
xix) Hence, concluding from the aforementioned arguments, it is
most reverently submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the 106th
Constitutional Amendment Act, 202296 is constitutionally invalid
as it against Art. 1 of the Constitution and challenges the
territorial sovereignty of the State of Indiana. Also, it defeats the
principle of non-interference of international law.
III. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT’S RULE IN
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that the imposition
of President's rule in the state of Kaloshia under Art. 35697 of the
Constitution is completely unconstitutional and stands constitutionally
invalid. The Counsel for the Petitioners propose this contention in a
three-fold manner : firstly, [1] neither there was a situation of failure
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of the Constitutional machinery in the state and secondly, [2] nor a

chance was given to the Governor to explore all possible alternatives,
and lastly, [3] the essential guidelines laid down in the S.R. Bommai
case were not followed in the instant case.
1. THERE WAS NO SITUATION OF FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MACHINERY IN THE STATE.
Art. 356 is limited to rectifying “a failure of Constitutional machinery
in the state98 ”. The marginal heading of the Art. 356 also points out to
the same. However, in the instant case, it was not a situation of failure
of constitutional machinery in the State of Kaloshia but merely of law
and order.
(1) FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IS NECESSARY BEFORE
IMPOSING PRESIDENT’S RULE IN THE STATE
i) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that Art. 356 of
the Constitution provides proclamation of the President's rule in
the state only if a situation has arisen where the functions of the
government cannot be carried in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution99 i.e., to say there is a failure of the
Constitutional machinery in the state.
ii) The SC in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India100 observed “failure
of constitutional machinery is a condition precedent for the
imposition of president's rule.” Failure of constitutional machinery
means “a serious break down which calls for immediate resort and
when it cannot be remedied by any other means”101 .
iii) Similarly in Sunder Lal Patwa v. Union of India102 the SC held that
“the cause for imposition of Presidents rule in the state should be
no other than failure of constitutional machinery in the state”.
This term is of great importance and requires greater level of
satisfaction103 .
iv) In the instant case, this essential precedent of “failure of
constitutional machinery” was absent in the state. It was only a
situation of sudden outbreak of riots and protests, making the
case fall under the situation of law and order which falls short of
failure of constitutional machinery. Court must interfere with such
an action by the President where there is no break-down of the
constitutional machinery104 . That would be an instance of ultra
vires, i.e., use of the power for a purpose other than intended by
the Art.
v) It is humbly submitted that there was no occasion of failure of
constitutional machinery in the state because mere helplessness
of a State to meet a threat to public order or peace is not a
permissible ground for invoking Art. 356. Union is first expected
to provide assistance to the state by Art. 355105 and that Art. 356
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has to be used only as a last resort.

(2) NOT EVERY SITUATION OF INTERNAL DISTURBANCE AND RIOTS
AMOUNTS TO FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN THE STATE
vi) Mere Internal disturbances resulting in the riots and protest does
not amount to failure of Constitutional machinery in the state. It
is a greater term which requires higher level of satisfaction.
vii) The SC in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India106 held “a sudden
outbreak of riot resulting in failure on the part of the State
Government to maintain public order does not justify the
President's Rule in the State.” The power can be used only in an
extreme difficult situation viz. where there is an actual and
imminent breakdown of the constitutional machinery, as
distinguished from failure or worsening of law-and-order situation.
viii) In the instant case, there was only persistent and intensified
protest going on in the state of Kaloshia and that too did not
cause any significant damage to public and private properties107 .
Juxtaposing the protest with failure or break-down of
constitutional machinery is clear case of misuse of powers of Art.
356 of the Constitution.
ix) The Hon'ble SC in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families
Association v. Union of India108 held that “mere internal
disturbance in a state does not attract the drastic powers of Art.
356 of the constitution until and unless it is backed by an armed
rebellion or situation is so grave that it makes it impossible to
carry out the provisions of the government in the state
constitutionally.”
x) It is contented that not every ‘internal disturbance’ situation
necessarily creates a condition of failure of constitutional
machinery109 . It needs to be examined along with its implications,
effects and extent. If the term “failure of constitutional machinery
in state” is construed in wide terms and every law-and-order
situation in a state is juxtaposed with failure of constitutional
machinery, then it will undermine the spirit of constitutional
distribution of power between state and union making state
dependent on the pleasure of union executive110 .
xi) Similarly, according to the Sarkaria Commission111 report “a
situation where the state government loses its majority support in
the assembly” is not enough for the imposition of Presidents rule
until and unless Governor has explored all possible opportunities
for installing an alternative government. Therefore, the imposition
of Presidents rule in the instant case in the state of Kaloshia
assuming the demonstrations and breakdown of coalition
government is mere abuse of power of Art. 356 and therefore,
stands constitutionally invalid.
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xii) It is pertinent here to mention that even the members of the

Constituent assembly were critical to add Art. 356 in the
Constitution. It was only after when Dr. Ambedkar made it clear
that “the Central Government would first give warning to the
State concerned, and that if the warning failed, it would order an
election, allowing the people of the State to settle matters
themselves; it was only when these remedies failed that the
President would resort to the power of imposition of President's
rule.” The assembly accepted the provision as explained by Dr.
Ambedkar.
xiii) Furthermore, Constitution is a permanent document which has
to be operated on the phenomena upon which the founding
fathers laid their vision. The imposition of President's rule in in the
state of Kaloshia in such an arbitrary manner without holding any
elections, clearly violates the grounds upon which the founding
fathers of the Constitution laid Art. 356.
xiv) Failure on the part of the Government to save the lives and
properties in the State, as a result of sudden out-break of
violence, alone, cannot be a ground for imposing drastic powers of
Art. 356. The Presidential Proclamation, therefore, for the above
given reasons, deserves to be quashed in state of Kaloshia being
an invalid exercise of power under Art. 356 of the Constitution.
2. GOVERNOR WAS NOT GIVEN A CHANCE TO EXPLORE ALL
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Art. 356 is an extraordinary remedy and must be used only as a last
resort under exceptional circumstances only. The drastic powers of Art.
356 are exceptions to the ordinary federal framework of our
Constitution and can be imposed only after all other remedies have
been explored and failed112 .
(1) PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT’S RULE IS THE LAST RESORT
i) Federal nature is the essence of our Constitution. In order to
preserve it the use of drastic powers of Art. 356 must be the last
resort only when no other remedy is available. This has been
affirmed by the Hon'ble SC in State of Rajasthan v. Union of
India113 .
ii) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that the SC in HS
Jain v. Union of India114 by setting aside proclamation under Art.
356 in the state of U.P held that “Before proclamation of
Presidents rule, Union first has to explore all possibilities of
formation of government in a democratic manner in the state”.
Therefore, there is a constitutional mandate to explore all possible
alternatives before imposing President's rule in the state.
iii) Similarly, the SC in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India115
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
observed “Emergency powers under Art. 356 which disturbs the

ordinary constitutional distribution of powers must be used
sparingly and as a last resort, only if, on careful consideration of
subsisting situation, no other measure is available.”
iv) In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu116 the SC has held that “If
the coalition government falls or if there is any doubt to ruling
party's majority in the assembly, the Governor should explore all
possibilities of having a government enjoying majority support in
the assembly. Thus, the Governor may ask the said party to prove
its majority by a floor test, and if such measure proves to be
unfruitful, the Governor may consider holding fresh elections and
till then form a caretaker government. Only when all these
possible measures fail, the President rule may be imposed upon
the state”. It is submitted that exploration of other possible
measures is utmost important and must be considered before
proclamation of Presidents rule in the state.
v) Thus, in order to preserve the federal nature of our Constitution,
the Union has to act as a gentle protector. At first, it must explore
and use other available powers to ensure the protection of the
state, and only when such attitude leads to worsening situation
the Union may impose President's rule in the state117 . In the
present case the Union intervened hastily without exploring other
possible alternatives and no chance was given to the governor to
explore possible measures, thus the proclamation of Presidents
rule in the state of Kaloshia stands unconstitutional and invalid.
(2) NO ISSUANCE OF WARNING OR ADVISORY
vi) Before proclamation of emergency powers under Art. 356, some
warning or advisory has to be issued to the state government.
This is to restraint the Union from completely taking over the
state constitutional machinery as long as the state is capable of
correcting itself118 .
vii) Dr. Ambedkar while speaking in context of Art. 356 observed
“The first thing the Union will do before using Art. 356 is issue a
warning to the state, that things are not happening in a way in
which they were intended to happen”.
viii) Similarly, the Sarkaria commission119 also felt that it would be
improper if the Union gives no prior warning to the state to correct
itself before using powers under Art. 356. Punchhi commission120
also expressed the same views and expressed that before using
Art. 356 the union has to give a warning to the state in order to
let it correct itself.
ix) Similar opinion was taken by the Hon'ble SC in S.R Bommai v.
Union of India121 where it held that “using of drastic powers under
Art. 356 by the Union would be improper without the issuance of
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warning to the state.”

x) Thus, it was important for the Union to follow the due process of
issuing a warning to the state before imposing President's rule
which was not followed in the instant case and thus the
President's rule stands invalid and unconstitutional in the state of
Kaloshia.
3. GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN S.R. BOMAI V. UNION OF INDIA
WERE NOT FOLLOWED BY THE UNION IN THE INSTANT CASE
The SC in SR Bommai v. Union of India122 gave a landmark decision
strengthening the federal structure by giving due autonomy to the
state. It laid down the essential guidelines which has to be followed in
context of using Art. 356. The violation of these guidelines amounts to
the violation of the precedent set by the Hon'ble SC.
(1) THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES WERE LAID DOWN WHICH WAS NOT
FOLLOWED IN THE INSANT CASE
i) The union must give sufficient time and warning to the state. It
must give at least one week's time to the state to respond to the
allegations amounting to presidential rule in the state before
using powers under Art. 356123 . No prior warning or sufficient time
was given to the state of Kaloshia before emergency powers under
Art. 356 was declared by the Union.
ii) In case where the support to the ministry of state is withdrawn by
some legislator, chance has to be given to the governor first to
test the strength of the ministry by a floor test in the house. In
case the floor test is not conducted, the reasons have to be
recorded in writing for not doing so124 . In the instant case the
governor was not given a chance to explore all possible
opportunities. Neither he was able to conduct the floor test nor a
chance was given to conduct fresh elections in the state.
iii) When the ministry of the state loses its majority support in the
assembly, the governor has to explore all possible alternatives for
installing an alternative government or ordering fresh elections
rather than using Art. 356 directly125 .
iv) With regards to the scope of Art. 356, the President's rule can be
imposed for no other condition than failure of “constitutional
machinery in the state”. It implies a situation of grave emergency
where no other possible course is available. It means a complete
breakdown of the constitutional elements of the state and not just
the breakdown of the administrative machinery126 . None of the
usual signs and symptoms of “grave emergency” existed in the
state of Kaloshia. There were simple protest and riots going on
which falls short of failure of constitutional machinery in the state.
Thus, Emergency was proclaimed in the absence of any situation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of “failure of constitutional machinery”.

v) Using powers under Art. 356 of the Constitution is an exception to
the federal nature of our Constitution and thus it must be used
only in exceptional circumstances127 . Before proclamation of such
drastic powers, the Union has to consider-whether such powers
are necessary in a particular situation? If not, then the Union
must abstain itself from using such powers and must find
alternative possible solutions. In using such powers there has to
be no-mala fide intention on part of the Union128 . In the instant
case, no possible alternative was let to be explored by the Union.
Use of emergency powers in the state of Kaloshia in the absence
of such extraordinary situation clearly distorts the federal
structure of the Constitution.
IV. WHETHER THE STATE OF KALOSHIA CAN BE GIVEN THE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that the
State of Kaloshia cannot be given the right to secede from the Union
because firstly [1] Art. 1129 of the Constitution grants Indiana the
status of a unitary state and secondly [2] the right to self-
determination does not necessarily give the states the right to secede.
1. ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS INDIANA THE
STATUS OF A UNITARY STATE
i. It is humbly proffered before the Hon'ble SC that in Hinsa Virodhak
Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat130 , the Hon'ble SC held that
by virtue of Art. 1131 of the Constitution, states do not have a right
to secede from the Union of India. Furthermore, emphasis was
laid down on the fact that the Drafting Committee of the
Constituent Assembly deliberately used the word “Union” instead
of “Federation” in Art. 1132 of the Constitution of Indiana.
ii. It is submitted that here in the present case as well, Art. 1 of the
Constitution of Indiana uses the word “Union” which indicates that
the Union of Indiana is not a result of agreements put in place by
different states and that the states cannot be given a right to
secede from the Union per say. Though the country can be divided
by the formation of different states under it so as to managing the
administration efficiently and effectively, but the country of
Indiana will still remain an integral whole with the people of the
country living under a single imperium that derives all powers
from a single source.
iii. In S. Srikishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh133 , the court held that
the Union of India was not the result of any compact between the
component parts. As indicated by the preamble, it professes to
have been brought into existence by the people of India. It is,
therefore, self-evident that it is not open to any State or group of
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States to secede from the Union or to vary the boundaries of their

own free-will.
iv. The Union of Indiana, as is clear from both the Preamble to the
Constitution and the Art. 1, it is clear that it is state formed by
the idea for the different states under it to remain intactly a part
of the Union and cannot thereto, separate on their own whims and
fancies. A state guided by its free-will would otherwise, lead to
defeating the purpose the drafters of the Constitution.
v. It is humbly submitted that the State of Kaloshia signed the
Instrument of Accession and thereto, chose to be a part of the
Union of Indiana. Thus, defining the relationship of the State with
the Union of India, which clearly stipulates that the State of
Kaloshia, like other states, is and shall be an integral part of the
Union of Indiana. This further means that the instrument of
accession had the power and authority to unite different states
under one single imperium of the Union and states cannot secede
from it after paying allegiance to it for years.
vi. It is submitted that in the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of
India134 , that the states in the Union of India cannot claim
sovereignty as the Constitution has nowhere granted them the
right to secede from the Union.135 This claim is neither a qualified
nor constitutional right and thereto, states cannot assert this
right.
vii. In another case of Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher
Education v. Union of India136 , the court reiterated the same and
held that in a Union like India states are not at liberty to propose
secession in any form from the Union. The states form an integral
part of the Union and vice-versa so taking one out of the other will
defeat the entire purpose and object of the unitarian status that
the people of the country have given to itself.
viii. In the case of Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha137 , the court held that
Art. 3138 & 4139 of the Constitution does empower the Parliament
to alter the boundaries of the state, add new states into the union
by creation or by merging two existing states. The court referred
to the famous quote by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that said “India is an
indestructible union with destructible units.”140 This clearly points
out to the significance of unitarianism as an integral part
embedded in the Constitution of the country.
ix. It is humbly submitted that the Art. 3A141 of 106th amendment to
the Constitution is arbitrary and unconstitutional in light of the
unitary status that Art. 1 of the Constitution of Indiana endows on
the country. It was stated in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v.
Union of India142 , that every provision and statute have to be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
construed in accordance with other provision to make it consistent

with the object sought to be achieved.143 The State of Kaloshia
cannot claim the right to secession as a right as the right to
secede would defeat the whole purpose of the Instrument of
Accession that it signed at the time of its accession into the Union
of India.144
x. Thus, it is rightfully pleaded before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that
the states cannot be given the right to secession as it is against
the spirit of Art. 1145 of the Constitution.
2. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION DOES NOT
NECESSARILY GIVE THE STATE THE RIGHT TO SECEDE.
i) It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana that the
right to self-determination is granted to all by virtue of Art. 1146 of
the ICCPR. As is evident, the Union of Indiana signed and ratified
the Covenant thereby, giving its citizens the right to determine
themselves according to their own free-will. However, this right
provided by Art. 1(1)147 does not give the right to states to
unilaterally secede from the Union and form an independent state.
ii) Despite the history of the radical logic of the right of self-
determination it is clear that both the extant international regime
and the regime of multinational states do not recognize the
human rights of “nationalities” to secede from the existing nation-
state framework and frontier.
iii) It is submitted that secession leads to disruption of state's
national integrity and thus creates a national havoc in the
country. As a result, the right to self-determination is
categorically denied under international law. Indiana has been
very clear about where it stands on the self-determination
principle. It has ratified the ICCPR and has interpreted Art. 18,148
which guarantees the right to self-determination, as applying only
to those who are “under foreign domination,”149 and not to
sovereign independent States or to a segment of the population
that is essential to maintaining national integrity.
iv) The right to self-determination has been recognized by the UN as
a fundamental freedom for those who live under colonial and
foreign rule. People who have already organized themselves into a
State and are not subject to colonial or foreign dominance are not
covered by the right. Therefore, the right of communities to
generally separate from the State of which they are a member is
not included in the principle of self-determination. Therefore, in
the post-colonial era, the idea of internal self-government needs
to be established for the principle of self-determination to become
really universal in scope.150
v) It is thereto, a right that encourages more stable and efficient
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
solutions to minority and majority rights issues before they turn

into civil war and demands for secession. It acknowledges that
indigenous people and minorities have the right to significant
internal self-determination and control over their own affairs in a
way that is consistent with the state's ultimate sovereignty.151
This right of significant participation and autonomy is granted by
Art. 25152 of the ICCPR.
vi) It is humbly submitted that ICCPR by virtue of its provisions
nowhere recognizes or given authorization of any kind to
secession. This means that a state like Indiana which has ratified
and signed the Covenant, cannot give its people the right to
secession on the anvil of the right of self-determination. These
two rights are not complementary to each other and have
different connotations in International Law.
vii) In the post-colonial era, the meaning of self-determination is to
internally give the people right to manage their own affairs and
the right to political participation in key affairs of the Union.
Indiana being a unitary state has misinterpreted the meaning of
self-determination by granting the states a right to secede from
the Union. It is clear that the states in Indiana do not possess a
separate and distinct identity from that of the Union. The citizens
of the country have a single nationality and a single citizenship
thus making the Union supreme to that of the individual states.
viii) Despite having a thorough understanding of the multifaceted
nature of Indiana's enormous diversity, those who drafted the
Constitution of Indiana, held back from establishing a fully
federalized political system at the time of the nation's
independence out of concern for further division and secessionist
tendencies in the already divided nation from Belani.153
ix) Thus, it is rightfully pleaded before the Hon'ble SC of Indiana
that the right of secession cannot be granted to the states as the
right to self-determination does not envisage in itself the right to
secede from the Union as well. The constitutionally validity of the
106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2022154 is already in
challenge before this court, thereto, the State of Kaloshia cannot
secede from the Union of Indiana.
PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the Counsels for the Petitioner humbly prays that the Hon'ble
Court be pleased to adjudge, hold and declare:
1. That, the notification issued by the State government of Kaloshia
under S. 133 (2) of the Kaloshia Education Act, 1983, pertaining
to the ban on entry of students wearing Hijab in schools and
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
colleges as unconstitutional and violative of Art. 19(1)(a) and 25

of the Constitution of Indiana.
2. That, the 106th Constitutional Amendment 2022 as
Constitutionally invalid.
3. That, the imposition of President's rule in the State of Kaloshia as
unconstitutional.
4. That, the State of Kaloshia cannot be given the right to secede
from the Union of Indiana.
5. And/or pass any order that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the
interest of equity, justice and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the Counsels for the Petitioner shall
duty-bound forever pray.
———
1
S. 133(2), Karnataka Education Act, 1983.
2
Art. 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India.
3 Art. 25, The Constitution of India.
4 Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1480.
5
The Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment Act, 1976.
6 Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth, (1943) 67 CLR 116 (High Court of Australia).
7 Ibid, at 2.
8
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
9 Ibid, at 1.
10 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 US 503 (1969) (1969, Supreme
Court of United States).
11
Para 32, Moot Proposition.
12 Ibid, at 10.
13 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1059 (8th ed., 2018).
14
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
15 Ibid, at 1.
16 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
17
City of Chicago v. Wilson et al, 75 III.2d 525 (1978, Supreme Court of Illinois, United
States).
18 Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501.
20
Ibid, at 2.
21 Art. 19(2), The Constitution of India.
22 Ibid, at 18.
23
Schenek v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919) (1919, Supreme Court of United States).
24
Dennis v. United States, 340 US 887 (1950) (1950, Supreme Court of United States).
25 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) (1969, Supreme Court of United States).
26
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
27 Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.
28 Para 35, Moot Proposition.
29
Ibid, at 1.
30 Ibid, at 8.
32 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
33
Ibid, at 31.
34 Ibid, at 31.
36
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.
37 Ibid, at 35.
39 Ibid., at 37.
40 Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1293; Jeeja Ghosh v.
Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761.
41 Ibid, at 37.
42 Ibid, at 37.
43 Ibid, at 1.
44 Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386.
45 Union of India v. Rajesh P.U, (2003) 7 SCC 285.
46 Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., (2003) 8 SCC 9.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 9 SCC 548.
49 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51.
50 Ibid, at 9.
51 Regina (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, [2007] 1 A.C. 100.
52
Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368.
53 St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558.
54 Art. 51(A), The Constitution of India.
55 Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 588.
56
V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 670 (14th ed., 2022).
57
Ibid, at 8.
58 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowmnets, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamior of

Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005.
59 Haji Ali Dargah Trust v. Noorjehan Safia Niaz, (2016) 16 SCC 788.
60 Art. 25(1), The Constitution of India.
61 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.
62 Commissioner of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, AIR 1990 Cal 104.
63 Ibid, at 8.
65 The Author v. State of France, [2012] HCR 59.
66 Art. 18, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
67 Art. 18, United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, 1948.
68
69 Ibid, at 69.
70 Ibid, at 67.
71 Ibid, at 1.
72 Ibid, at 8.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
75 S.R Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
76 Art. 3A, The 106th Constitutional Amendment Act.
77 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at :
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930 .html%20[accessed%2029%20December%
202022] last seen on 08/01/2023.
78 U.N General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly

Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter, Res. 2625,
Sess. 25, U.N. Document, A/RES/2625(XXV) (24/10/1970) available at http://www.un-
documents.net/a25r2625.htm last seen on 10/01/2023.
79 Christopher Rudolph, Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age, Volume no. 7|
International Studies Review-JSTOR| 1, 9| (2005) available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3699618 last seen on 13/01/2023.
80 Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention, and Self-Determination, Volume no. 20 | Denver Journal
of International Law & Policy | 8, 9 | (1991) available at
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1795&context=djilp last seen on
13/01/2023.
81 Ibid, at 78.
82 L. Oppenheim, R.Y. Jennings, Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, Volume No. 1 |
420, 428 | (2008| available at
https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law/9780582302457.001.0001/law-9780582302457
last seen on 15/01/2023.
83 Nicaragua v. United States of America, (1986) ICJ Rep 14.
84
United Kingdom v. Albania, (1949) ICJ Rep 244.
85 U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic

Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, Res. 20/2131,
Sess. 20, U.N. Document, (21/12/1965), A/RES/20/2131, available at
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_2131-xx/ga_2131-xx.html last seen on 21/01/2023.
86 Ibid, at 73.
87
Neil MacFarlane and Natalie Sabanadze, Sovereignty and self-determination : Where are
we?, Volume no. 68| Sage International Journal-JSTOR| 609. 616 available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709362 last seen on 21/012023.
88 Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217.
89 Ibid, at 88.
90
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
91 Balraj Puri, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Right of Self-Determination, Volume No.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
36 | Economic & Political Weekly | 200, 215 | (2001| available at

https://www.epw.in/journal/2001/04 /commentary/sovereignty- territorial-integrity-and-right
-self- determination.html last seen on 17/01/2023.
92 Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648.
93
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.
94 Ibid, at 87.
95 Ibid, at 88.
96
Ibid, at 90.
98 Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. Union of India, (2016) 16 SCC 744.
99
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831.
100 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592.
101 DD Basu, A Commentary on the Constitution of India, 536 (1st ed., 1950).
102
Sunder Lal Patwa v. Union of India, AIR 1993 MP 214, 233-34.
103
Sardari Lal v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 411.
104 Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 486.
105
Art. 355, The Constitution of India.
106 Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1.
107
108
Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India, (2016) 14 SCC 536.
109 Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1.
110
Ibid, at 106.
111
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Sarkaria Commission Report 1983-1988,
available at http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/ report-of-the-sarkaria-commission, last seen on
28/12/2022.
112 Purnima Yadav v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 148.
113 Supra 1.
114
HS Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 594.
115 Supra 4.
116 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117
Aam Aadmi Party v. Union of India, (2014) 16 SCC 396.
118 Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1.
119 Supra 6.
120
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Punchhi Commission Report 2007-2010,
available at http://interstatecouncil .nic.in/punchhi-commission, last seen on 28/12/2022.
121
Ibid, at 79.
122 Ibid, at 79.
123
Ibid, at 102.
124 Ibid, at 77.
125
Ibid, at 151.
126
Ibid, at 56.
127 Shiw Kumar Prasad Singh v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 147.
128 Ibid, at 194.
129
Ibid, at 78.
130 Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat, (2008) 5 SCC 33.
131 Ibid, at 119.
132 Ibid, at 119.
133 S. Srikishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1957 AP 734.
134 Ibid, at 79.
135 Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 259.
136 Andhra Pradesh State Council of Higher Education v. Union of India, (2016) 6 SCC 635.
137 Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184.
138
Art. 3, The Constitution of India.
140
Ibid, at 11.
141 Ibid, at 78.
142 Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.
143 Prashant Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 2 SCC 409.

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145 Ibid, at 119.
146
Art. 1, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
147 Ar. 1(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
149 L.C. Buchheit, Secession : The Legitimacy of Self-determination, 1978; A. Heraclides,

Secession, Self-determination and Non-intervention : In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis,
Journal of International Affairs 435 (1992), https://www.worldcat.org/title/3380012 last seen
on 24/01/2023.
150 Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination, Volume no.
47| The International and Comparative Law Quarterly-JSTOR| 537, 541 (1998) available
https://www.jstor.org/stable/761423 last seen on 24/01/2023.
151 Dietrich Mursuiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession-Reconsidered’, Modern Law of Self-
determination 23 (1993), https://www.etd.ceu.edu last seen on 25/01/2023.
153
154
Ibid, at 78.
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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Tuesday, August 29, 2023

7th LCDNMCC National Moot Court, 2023

Law College Dehradun, Faculty of Uttaranchal University 6th

(1) HIJAB IS A FORM OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH PROTECTED BY

3. GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN S.R. BOMAI V. UNION OF INDIA

1. Aam Aadmi Party v. Union of India, (2014) 16 36

Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1

45. Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 33

Economic & Political Weekly | 200, 215 | (2001)

Independence and Sovereignty, Res. 20/2131,

institution or a private institution.

broke. Assuming that the demonstrations and the break - down of

which focuses solely on secession and separation, can be clearly said to

on wearing of hijab placed by the virtue of the notification issued

disorder that could validate the impugned notification issued by

people practicing it to express their cultural and religious

(4) THE ARGUMENT ABOUT QUALIFIED PUBLIC SPACE IS FRIVOLOUS

fundamental rights is in question. The court observed that

can be concluded that the action of the State Government suffers

test should rather be whether a practice subscribes to the

concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any

otherwise intervene in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of

the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-

of the Constitutional machinery in the state and secondly, [2] nor a

has to be used only as a last resort.

xii) It is pertinent here to mention that even the members of the

observed “Emergency powers under Art. 356 which disturbs the

warning to the state.”

of “failure of constitutional machinery”.

States to secede from the Union or to vary the boundaries of their

construed in accordance with other provision to make it consistent

solutions to minority and majority rights issues before they turn

colleges as unconstitutional and violative of Art. 19(1)(a) and 25

3 Art. 25, The Constitution of India.

13 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1059 (8th ed., 2018).

16 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.

18 Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727.

19 Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501.

21 Art. 19(2), The Constitution of India.

27 Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.

28 Para 35, Moot Proposition.

31 Art. 21, The Constitution of India.

32 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

35 Para 33, Moot Proposition.

38 Para 34, Moot Proposition.

44 Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386.

45 Union of India v. Rajesh P.U, (2003) 7 SCC 285.

46 Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., (2003) 8 SCC 9.

47 Para 33, Moot Proposition.

49 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51.

51 Regina (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, [2007] 1 A.C. 100.

53 St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558.

54 Art. 51(A), The Constitution of India.

55 Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 588.

58 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowmnets, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamior of

60 Art. 25(1), The Constitution of India.

61 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.

62 Commissioner of Police v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, AIR 1990 Cal 104.

64 Art. 26, The Constitution of India.

65 The Author v. State of France, [2012] HCR 59.

66 Art. 18, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.