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6th LCDNMCC National Moot Court, 2022

Best Team Memorial - Petitioner
Law College Dehradun, Faculty of Uttaranchal University 6th

National Moot Court Competition, 2022
Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
In the matter of
Mr. Y
Versus
Narcotics Control Bureau
Along-with
Mr. Z
Versus
State of Kumbai
Along-with
Mr. X
Versus
State of Kumbai
Petition Filed Under Art. 139A of the Constitution of Indiana
Upon Submission to the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his Lordship's
Companion Justices of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 04
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 03
CASES 04
REGULATIONS 07
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 08
STATUTES 08
WEB RESOURCES 08
OTHER SOURCES 09
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS 11
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 16
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITIONS ARE
MAINTAINABLE?
1.1 Special leave to appeal can be filed against the
judgment of any court.
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1.2 Violation of fundamental rights invokes writ petition.

2. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED BY THE
NDPS ACT, 1985 IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF
ART. 14 & ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA?
2.1 Absence of factors mentioned in section 32B.
2.1.1 The petitioner invokes the principle of Ignorantia
Facti Excusat.
2.2 Absence of quantitative test required for imposing
liability
2.3 Decision of HC is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 &
Art. 21 of the constitution of Indiana.
3. WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 35
OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
BEING VIOLATIVE OF ART.14 & ART.21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
3.1 Essentials of section 35 are not justified.
3.1.1 Modus operandi of organized crime syndicates.
3.1.2 Lack of Conscious possession.
3.2 Presumption of guilt is violative of Art. 14 & Art. 21
of the constitution of Indiana.
3.2.1 Beyond reasonable doubt not proved.
4. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER
SECTIONS 65 (b), 65 (e) & 65(g) OF THE
MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT, 1949 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ART.19 & ART. 25 OF THE
4.1 Punishment prescribed by Maharashtra Prohibition
Act strikes at Art. 19(1)(a).
4.2 Punishment prescribed by Maharashtra Prohibition
Act is violative of Art. 19(1)(g).
4.3 Charges levied under MPA restrict the propagation of
religion guaranteed under Art. 25.
5. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER
SECTIONS 65 (b), 65 (e) & 65(g) OF THE
MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT, 1949 ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ART.29 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA?
5.1 Punishment prescribed under MPA is violative of Art.
29.
5.2 Use of cannabis is valid under reasonable restrictions.
6. WHETHER SECTION 37 OF NDPS ACT, 1985, BARS
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THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 438 OF THE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973?
6.1 Petitioner is eligible for the grant of anticipatory bail.
6.2 Denial of bail violates life and liberty guaranteed
under Art. 21.
PRAYER 46
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Anr. Another
Co. Company
Corp. Corporation
Comm. Committee
CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
Del Delhi
Edn. Edition
Hon'ble Honorable
HC High Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
IPC Penal Code, 1860
Ltd Limited
MPA Maharashta Prohibition Act
NDPS Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Ors. Others
p Page
SC Supreme Court
S. Section
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
u/Sec. Under section
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
S. CASE NAME P.
NO
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 2 SCR 88 34
2. Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 18
2 SCC 513
3. Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik, (2021) 7 SCC 613 19
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4. Acharaj Singh v. State of Bihar, 1966 SCC OnLine Pat 40 36

5. Ajay Hasia Etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi Etc., (1981) 1 25
SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487
6. Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj v. T.N. Legislative Assembly, 33
(2016) 6 SCC 82 (India)
7. Amit Ranjan v. Narcotic Control Bureau, AIR OnLine 2019 43
Del 1066
8. Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2002) 7 SCC 419 29
9. Beaver v. The Queen, 1957 SCR 531 23
10. Bijayananda v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Pat 101 37
11. Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1950 SCR 36
759
12. Chintaman Rao v. the State of MP, AIR 1951 SC 118 : 41
1950 SCR 759
13. David Hoffman & John Rowe, Human Rights In U.K., 223 27
(2013)
14. E. Micheal Raj v. Narcotic Control Bureau, (2008) 5 SCC 24
161
15. Fertilizer Corpn. Kamagar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 36
1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344.
16. Gangadhar v. State of M.P., (2020) 9 SCC 202 18
17. Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P., ((1972) 2 SCC 194 : AIR 28
1972 SC 1756)
18. Gurbaksh Singh Sibia v. The state of Punjab, (1980) 45
19. Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 20
118
20. Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6 SCC 558 25
21. Hari Singh v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1556 29
22. Hasanali v. Mansoorali, 1947, (1948) 50 Bom LR 389 38
23. Health v. Drown, [1972] 2 All ER 561 (HL) 29
24. Inder Sain v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 372 : (1974) 27
1 SCR 215
25. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics C. Bureau v. Sambhu 21
Sonkar, (2001) 2 SCC 562
26. K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 31
SCC (Cri) 305
27. Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 32
808 : AIR 1973 SC 2773 : (1974) 1 SCR 722
28. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Ltd., 16
(2012) 10 Scale 499
29. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 17
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30. Mahboob Khan v. Hakim Abdul Rahim, AIR 1964 Raj 250 27
31. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 33
32. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 24
1978 SC 597
34. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 45
35. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 18
36. Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 28
37. Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629 41
38. Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 US 113 (1876) 25
39. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196 17
40. Narender Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 29
41. Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 28
SCC 684 : AIR 2017 SC 3859
42. Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 29
SCC 684 : AIR 2017 SC 3859
43. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 33
5 SCC 438 (India)
44. Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 28
47. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) 3 SCC 545 25
48. Ouseph alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 4 SCC 24
446
49. P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam, (1980) 3 SCC 141 16
50. Per Lord Wright-James v. Commonwealth of Australia, 38
[1936] A.C. 578 at 613
51. Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCR 453 17
52. Puran Ram Nayak v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 4 RLW 30
2738 (Raj.)
53. Raj Kumar Vajpayee v. State of U.P., (2016) 95 ACRC 22
896.
54. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 29
SCC 70
55. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 45
56. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. Airport Authority of India, 25
(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628
57. Ranjit singh Brahmajeet singh Sharma v. State of 29
Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294
58. Ratansingh Nihalsingh v. State, 1959 SCC OnLine MP 139 20
59. Rt. Rev. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan, 1964 SCC OnLine 39
Ker 182
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60. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 38

61. Saghir Ahmad v. the State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 707. 36
62. Saju v. State of Kerala, (2001) 1 SCC 378 43
63. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842 36
64. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 20
65. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 43
66. Saurabh Mittal v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 44
547
67. Seema Silk & Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement, 30
(2008) 5 SCC 580
68. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73 35
69. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, 20
(2011) 1 SCC 694
70. State of Gujarat v. Abdulrasid Ibrahim Mansuri, (1990) 2 27
GLR 947
71. State of Haryana v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96 31
72. State of M.P. v. Dharkole, (2004) 13 SCC 308 31
73. State of M.P. v. Ram Krishna Balothia, (1995) 3 SCC 221 44
74. State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 16
SCC 334 : AIR 2015 SC 696
75. State v. Gian Singh, (1999) 9 SCC 312 : AIR 1999 SC 24
3450
76. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, 44
(2018) 6 SCC 454
77. Sujit Tiwari v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2020 SC 66 43
78. Sukhdev Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1986 Cri 42
LJ 1757 (P&H)
79. Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness, ([1976] 1 All ER 844 (QBD) 29
80. Supdt., Narcotics Control Bureau, Chennai v. R. Paulsamy, 42
(2000) 9 SCC 549,
81. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 20
481
82. Tilkayat Govindlalji v. the State of Rajasthan, 1962 SCC 37
OnLine Raj 2
83. Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 17
(2004) 5 SCC 1
84. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 778 19
85. Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 43
86. V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., (1966) 3 SCR 736 30
REGULATIONS
1. Article 27, ICCPR 39
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2. S. 32B, NDPS Act, 1985 17

3. S. 35, NDPS Act, 1985 18
4. S. 65, Maharashtra prohibition Act, 1949 19
5. S. 438, CrPC, 1973 21
6. S. 37, NDPS Act, 1985 21
7. S. 21, NDPS Act, 1985 21
8. S. 8, NDPS Act, 1985 21
9. S. 439, CrPC, 1973 21
10. S. 79, Evidence Act, 1872 22
11. S. 4(1)(d), the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act 23
12. S. 16, Indian contract act, 1872 27
13. S. 17, Indian contract act, 1872 27
14. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 38
15. Art. 4, UDHR 33
16. Art. 11(1), UDHR 44
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1. Art. 14, the Constitution of India 22
9. Art. 139A, the Constitution of India 10
STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India
2. Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
3. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
4. The Evidence Act, 1872
5. Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949
6. The Indian Contract Act, 1872
WEB RESOURCES
1. SCC OnLine, http://www.scconline.co.in/
2. LIVE LAW, www.livelaw.in/
3. Manupatra, http://www.manupatra.com
OTHER SOURCES
1. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act,
2001, ACT No. 9 of 2001
2. The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens : A Balancing
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Duty” published in [2007] C.L.J. (March Part.) 142

3. Freedom But Not Really : The ‘Unprotected’ Zones of Art. 19(1)
(a), CALQ (2019) Vol. 4.3 27
4. Cannabis : Your Guide to what's Legal and what's not in India,
2020 SCC OnLine Blog LME 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsel for the Petitioners most respectfully showeth:
In the case of Mr. Y v. NCB, the petitioner has approached this
Hon'ble Court under Art. 136 of the constitution of Indiana.
In the Writ Petition of Mr. Z v. The State of Kumbai, the petitioner
has approached this Hon'ble Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
Indiana.
In the case of Mr. X v. State of Kumbai, the petitioner has
approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indiana.
The above petitions have been clubbed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court under Art. 139A of the Constitution of Indiana.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a country located in the South-Asian subcontinent. In
Indiana Psychotropic substances have been conventionally used by
people for recreational and for medical purposes. Some states have
licensed the growth of such crops for medicinal purposes and are
enlisted in the category of ,manufactured drugs. These psychotropic
substances are also imported inter-state and exported from Indiana.
Indiana is a state member in many international conventions like The
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, the Protocol, amending
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961', ‘the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, 1971, and others.
2. Three petitions were filed in SC for the infringement of
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court clubbed all the petitions and
decided to hear them collectively on 7th and 8th May, 2022.
CASE-1
3. Mr. Y, a resident of the city of Kumbai, is the sole bread earner of
the family. He lost in job during Covid-19 and thus took menial jobs to
provide for his family. To afford the expenses of the medicines from the
private hospital for his younger son he under no other option borrowed
money from Mr. A on the condition that he would work for Mr. A, who
presented himself as a medical supplier with license from the
government and convinced Mr. Y that he was operating upon a
legitimate business while he is a part of an organized crime syndicate.
4. On 16th December a complaint was filed through an intelligence
officer that Mr. Y was proceeding with heroin in a Maruti Ritz vehicle
from Kumbai to the neighboring state Shambala and that the vehicle
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would pass through the Saint Mary's College, Shambala.

5. The car in which Mr. Y was transporting the goods was intercepted
and a search was conducted. Nothing objectionable was recovered from
a personal search. a sealed polythene packet weighing around 400
grams in the trunk of the car along with the other medicines of
questionable nature. Samples were taken and on testing with the drug
detection kit it showed positive for Heroin, later the reports from CRCL
declared it positive for morphine.
6. Mr. Y was charged under sec. 8 and punishable with sec. 21 of
NDPS Act, 1985 which imposed punishment of rigorous imprisonment
for a term of twenty years and a fine of rupees two lakh twenty
thousand was imposed upon him. Mr. Y appealed the decision of
conviction of the sessions court to the HC of Kumbai but the HC also
upheld the decision of the sessions court. Aggrieved by the decision of
the HC Mr. Y filed a special Leave Petition challenging the validity of the
decision of the HC.
CASE-2
7. Yoli is an annual festival of Doka village celebrated in their
community for as long as one can remember. A major part of the
festival is the use of cannabis. Cannabis has been a part of this religion
used in the form of charas, bhang, and ganja. One of the most
commonly used forms of cannabis is the delicacy ‘thandai’ which is
used for recreational purposes.
8. After covid-19, Yoli was celebrated with the supervision of the
state authorities, and police were posted in the outskirts of the village
to maintain the law and order. The police took the cognizance of the
fact that thandai laced with cannabis was served and arrested the
vendor, Mr. Z, for the offences u/Sec. 65(b), 65(e), and 65(g) of MPA,
1949.
9. However, the Vendor Mr. Z was held liable for the offences stated
above and convicted thereafter. Mr. Z appealed to the Supreme Court of
Indiana under Article 32 alleging that the said sections were violative of
his fundamental right of 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and Art. 29 of the
constitution of Indiana.
CASE-3
10. Mr. X is one of the richest business tycoons of the country and is
both an industrialist and a businessman. He has 60 percent of equity
shares in the company power X, a leading company in the power sector
of Indiana and also owns major shares in different ports, airports, etc.
11. On 1st January 2022, the NCB received an information that in
one of the ports owned by Mr. X a ship carrying illegal contraband will
reach the dockyard on 15th January 2022. The NCB raided the ports
and the concerned ship was found. The officers found in the possession
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of the ship- 10 personnel 5 kg. of illegal cocaine. Mr. X apprehending

the arrest and was worried about the reputation of the company so he
approached the HC of Kumbai for granting him the anticipatory bail.
12. However, the same was denied by the HC. Mr. X filed an
application to the Supreme Court that the matter involved a substantial
question of law and the words notwithstanding anything given in Cr.P.C
are arbitrary and unconstitutional as they curtail the fundamental right
of liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the constitution.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
[ISSUE I]
WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
[ISSUE II]
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED BY THE NDPS ACT, 1985 IS
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 AND ART. 21 OF THE
[ISSUE III]
WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 35 OF THE NDPS ACT,
1985 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 AND
ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
[ISSUE IV]
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTIONS 65 (b),
65 (e), AND 65(g) OF THE MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT, 1949
ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART. 19 AND ART. 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA?
[ISSUE V]
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION UNDER
SECTION 65 (b), 65 (e), AND 65(g) OF THE MAHARASHTRA
PROHIBITION ACT, 1949 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART.29 OF THE
[ISSUE IV]
WHETHER THE SECTION 37 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985, BARS THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 438 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
1973?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
The petitions are maintainable before the Hon'ble Court. It is further
submitted that in the case of Mr. Y v. NCB, SLP is under Art. 136 of the
Constitution of Indiana is filed in SC against the judgment of the high
court and in the case of Mr. Z v. The State of Kumbai as well as Mr. X v.
The State of Kumbai, the writ petition is filed under Art. 32 of the
constitution of Indiana for infringement of fundamental rights.
2. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED BY THE NDPS
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ACT,1985 IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 & ART. 21

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
that the charge levied under section 8 with rigorous punishment given
by the sessions court under section 21 of NDPS Act, 1985 was higher
than minimum, and HC's decision upholding the judgment is arbitrary
and violative of Art. 14 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana since the
factors prescribed under section 32B of NDPS Act, 1985 is absent in the
present case of Mr. Y v. NCB.
3. WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 35 OF THE
NDPS ACT, 1985 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING VIOLATIVE
OF ART. 14 AND ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
The petitioner humbly submits before the Hon'ble SC that the
presumption of guilt considered by the sessions court under section 35
of the NDPS Act is arbitrary and unconstitutional as in the present case,
Mr. Y's act does not justify the essentials required under this provision.
Hence the sentence of the guilt produced by a sessions court which was
also upheld by the HC violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner
guaranteed under Art. 14 & Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
4. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTIONS
65 (b), 65 (e), AND 65(g) OF THE MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION
ACT, 1949 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART. 19 AND ART. 25 OF THE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the judgment by
the trial court restricts the practice of age-old customs and traditions,
trade and profession, and propagation of religion by an individual. the
punishment given to the petitioner for trading and manufacturing
bhang of the auspicious occasion of Yoli does not come under the ambit
of reasonable restrictions and is justified for religious use. Hence the
judgment strikes at the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19 &
Art. 25 of the Constitution of Indiana.
5. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION
UNDER SECTION 65 (b), 65 (e), AND 65(g) OF THE
MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION ACT, 1949 ARE VIOLATIVE OF
ART.29 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble court that the punishment
prescribed under sections 65(b), 65(e), and 65(g) of the Maharashtra
Prohibition Act, 1949 are violative of Art. 29 of the constitution of
Indiana. It is further contended that the action of the police i.e.
arresting the vendor Mr. Z has violated the fundamental right of Art. 29
i.e. fundamental right to protection of culture.
6. WHETHER SECTION 37 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 BARS THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 438 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
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1973?
In the case of Mr. X v. The State of Kumbai, the petitioner summits
in the hon'ble SC that the rejection of the anticipatory bail by the HC on
the grounds of section 37 of NDPS act is unconstitutional as the
petitioner was eligible for anticipatory bail and the denial of the same
infringes his fundamental rights of life and liberty guaranteed under
Art. 21 of the constitution of India.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
The petitions are maintainable before the Hon'ble Court. It is further
submitted that in the case of Mr. Y v. NCB, SLP is under Art 1361 of the
Constitution of Indiana is filed in SC against the judgment of the high
court and in the case of Mr. Z v. The State of Kumbai as well as Mr. X v.
The State of Kumbai, the writ petition is filed under Art. 322 of the
constitution of Indiana for infringement of fundamental rights.
1.1 Special leave to appeal can be filed against the judgment of
any court.
As rightly pointed out by Krishna Iyer, when extraordinary power
under Art. 136 chases injustice, sky is the limit. Thus, the Supreme
Court while exercising power under Art. 136, not only acts as a “court
of law” but also as a “court of equity”; and such a power is exercised for
doing full and complete justice3 .
i. Art. 1364 talks about Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
which states in clause (1) that “Notwithstanding anything in this
Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India. “This has also been
reiterated in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer)5 , that
Art. 136 confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court
to interfere in suitable cases. Art. 136 is a special jurisdiction and
can be described as “a residuary power, extraordinary in its
amplitude and is a corrective jurisdiction that vest a discretion in
the SC. In the instant case, the petitioner approaches the SC
against the judgement of HC6 which is valid per se. Hence, the
petition is maintainable in the Hon'ble court.
ii. In the case of Khoday Distilleries ltd. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K.
Ltd.7 it was held that Art. 136 commences with a non-obstante
clause, the words are of overriding effect and clearly indicate the
intention of the framers of the Constitution that it is a special
jurisdiction and residuary power unfettered by any statute or
other provisions of Chapter IV of Part. V8 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the state can't disregard the question of the
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maintainability of the petition and bar the right of the petitioner of

approaching the SC claiming any statute.
iii. It is humbly submitted before Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the
case of Kunhayammed v. The State of Kerala9 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that under Art. 136 of the constitution,
the supreme court may reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment-
decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction. Herein in this Special leave petition filed by Mr. Y to
ratify the error in the judgment that was delivered by the Trial
court.10
iv. In the case of N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss11 Supreme Court
observed about the scope of Art. 136 that Art. 136 of the
Constitution is not a regular forum of appeal at all. It is a
“residual” provision that enables the Supreme Court to interfere
with the judgment or order of any court or tribunal in India at its
discretion. After the judgment of the trial court was upheld by
High Court also Mr. Y as a residual option, filed this special leave
petition to protect his rights.
v. Similarly in the case of Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. The
state of Bihar12 , in para no. 14 of the judgment Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that Art. 136 is an “extraordinary jurisdiction”
vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court with implicit
trust and faith. If there is a judgment delivered based on the
circumstance which could be applied or not applied in the absence
of proof of factors mentioned in Section 32B13 of the court, this
would be an injustice to the accused herein Mr. Y.
vi. In the case of Pritam Singh v. State14 , SC held that a special
leave petition only is accepted if there “exceptional and special
circumstances exist”, that “substantial and grave injustice” has
been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.
vii. Here in the case of Mr. Y the court stated while imposing
punishment higher than the minimum, in the absence of proof of
factors mentioned in Section 32B the court may also consider
other circumstances that may deem fit, merely based on the
assumption it is injustice and exceptional because the gravity of
the crime and the punishment granted to Mr. Y is not in
proportion. This will be substantial and grave injustice to Mr. Y
because the gravity of crime and punishment are not completely
proportionate. the judgement by the trial court is based on
assumption that could or could not be fit in his case, there is not
any concrete guiding principle to reach a conclusion.
viii. Simultaneously, Mr. Y also challenged the Section 3515 of NDPS
Act by stating that when there is the possession of the Narcotic
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drugs or psychotropic substances itself was in question16 . A three-

judge bench of this court had considered the said question in the
case of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat17 ,
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that for the purpose of this section, a
fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is
established by a preponderance of probability.
ix. A two-judge bench in the case of Gangadhar v. State of M.P.18 ,
this court held that Section 35 is Stringent provisions of NDPS Act
the gravity of sentence and stringency of provisions of the
punishment. Conviction could not be based on foundation of
conjectures to conclude on domination of probabilities, guilt of
accused, without establishing same beyond reasonable doubt.
herein Mr. Y challenged section 35 of NDPS Act, when the
possession of the Narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances itself
was in question.
Hence, all these aforementioned facts ultimately violate Art. 2119 of
Constitution of India which guaranteed the procedure established by
law, access to Justice, Public and Fair Trial and Investigation.
Thus, the punishment and fine imposed to him are arbitrary in
nature and this petition is maintainable before hon'ble court as this
violated Mr. Y's right to equality and liberty as well.
1.2 Violation of fundamental rights invokes writ petition.
prescribed by HC while upholding the judgement of the lower court in
the case of Mr. Z v. the State of Kumbai and the denial of anticipatory
bail by the HC in the case of Mr. X v. The State of Kumbai violates the
fundamental rights of the petitioners and hence the writ of Certiorari
and Habeas Corpus are invoked respectively. And as stated in Minerva
Mills Ltd. v. Union of India20 , Article 32 must be entertained if the
existence of a fundamental right and its breach, actual or threatened, is
alleged and prima facie established. Art. 32 of Indiana Constitution by
following all the criteria as put forward by law.
1.2.1 Mr. Z v. The State of Kumbai
i. It is humbly submitted before Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
petitioner herein this case Mr. Z filed this petition under Art. 3221
of the Indiana Constitution to avail legal remedy as he was
convicted under Sections 65(b)22 , 65(e)23 , and 65(g)24 , which led
to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.
19(1)(a)25 , 19(1)(g)26 , and Art. 29(1)27 .
ii. Art. 32 guarantees the right to a constitutional remedy and relates
only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III28 of the
Constitution. Unless a question of the enforcement of a
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fundamental right arises29 , Art. 32 does not apply. Here in this

case rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution to Mr. Z were
violated, in addition to this, this petition is maintainable under
Art. 32 of the Indiana Constitution by following all the criteria as
put forward by law.
iii. Similarly, in the case of Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik30 ,
it is well-established that if the termination order is assailed on
the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III31 of the
Constitution, such a grievance can be brought before the
constitutional court including by way of a writ petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution.
iv. This right under Art. 19(1)(g) aims at the welfare and well-being
of the citizens as well as the nation. Under this Article, every
citizen has the right to choose employment, or take up any trade
or occupation, etc as per his volition and free will, at the same
time the State has the right to impose certain limits but herein
this case the occupation carrying out by Mr. Z was according to
the annual festival of yoli that has been celebrated in their
community for centuries old. One cannot deny following or
carrying out his age-old cultural activities as guaranteed under
Art. 29 of Indiana Constitution. Art. 29(1) gives the right to any
section of the citizens residing in India or any part thereof, and
having a distinct language, script, or culture of its own, to
conserve the same.
v. An eleven-judge bench of this Hon'ble Court in the T.M.A. Pai
Foundation v. The State of Karnataka32 , held that Art. 29(1) does
not refer to any religion, Art. 29(1) essentially refers to sections of
citizens which in our case is a community that celebrates age-old
tradition in the village of Doka, who have a distinct language,
script, or culture, even though their religion may not be the same
this does not matter. Hence, the common thread that runs
through Art 29(1) is language, script, or culture, and not religion.
Art. 29(1) gives the right to all sections of citizens, whether they
are in a minority or the majority religion, to conserve their
language, script, or culture. The local community of Doka village
come under minority, they exhibit distinct culture 33 and here
their Fundamental right is violated to conserve culture by
celebrating. Therefore, this petition is maintainable under Art. 32
and under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Indiana.
1.2.2 Mr. X v. The State of Kumbai
i. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in
the case of Sanjay Chandra v. CBI34 , the court observed Unless
exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court
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which may defeat proper investigation and fair trial, the Court will
not decline to grant bail to a person who is not accused of an
offense punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Here mere
seizing cocaine from the port owned by Mr. X could not amount to
tired him under the said section of the Act.
ii. In a similar case, SC held that there is a balance required to be
maintained between the personal liberty of the accused and the
investigational right of the police to investigate the case. Here,
Mr. X is one of He is an influential personality and one of the
richest business tycoons in the country. Here his reputation is at
stake. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)35 , said consideration
regarding bail one of which is the position and status of the
accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses.
iii. In the case of Ratansingh Nihalsingh v. State36 , Supreme Court
held that the right to be at liberty is a valuable, right and when an
application is given for bail, it is this valuable right that the
accused seeks from the Court. Such applications are not to be
mechanically or perfunctorily dismissed. Therefore, denying bail
even under the lack of sufficient grounds is the justice subserved.
iv. In the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. the State of
Maharashtra37 , the Court observed that:“Just as liberty is precious
to an individual, so is the society's interest in the maintenance of
peace, law, and order. Both are equally important. Further,
Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right, and it should
be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In a similar case
court furthermore observed that there is no justification for
reading into section 43838 the limitations mentioned in section
43739 . Herein court held that there is no requirement that the
accused must make out a “special case” to exercise the power to
grant anticipatory bail. In the present case no-where it could be
found that the petitioner is the offender or has any record of the
offence committed prior. Even after the availability of sufficient
grounds, the denial of the bail to the petitioner makes out the
special case as it is against the principle of fairness, equity and
good conscience.
v. This case also involves a substantial question of law and the
sections given in Cr. P.C is arbitrary and unconstitutional as they
curtail the fundamental right of liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of
the constitution. In the case of Intelligence Officer, Narcotics C.
Bureau v. Sambhu Sonkar40 , Court laid down some observations
regarding the scheme of Section 3741 of the Act, which reveals
that the exercise of the power to grant bail by the Special Judge is
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not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 43942

CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37
which commences with a non-obstante clause.
Two conditions put forward by this court, the first condition is that
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application
and the second is that the court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offense. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on
granting bail operates. Therefore, the present petitions are
maintainable before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
2. WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED BY THE NDPS ACT,
1985 IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 AND ART. 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
that the charge levied under section 843 with rigorous punishment given
by the sessions court under section 2144 of NDPS Act, 1985 was higher
than the minimum, and HC's decision upholding the judgment is
arbitrary and violative of Art. 1445 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana
since the factors prescribed under section 32B of NDPS Act, 1985 is
absent in the present case of Mr. Y v. NCB.
2.1 Absence of factors mentioned in section 32B and reasonable
grounds
In the case of Raj Kumar Vajpayee v. State of U.P.46 Allahabad HC
stated that “without adverting to factors as mentioned in Section 32B,
the Trial Court could not impose higher than the minimum
punishment.” In the instant case, there are no aggravating factors
present as enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of section 32B for imposing
higher than the minimum punishment which can be justified by the
interpretation of the law as follows:
i. 32B. Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than the
minimum punishment - Where a minimum term of imprisonment
or amount of fine is prescribed for any offense committed under
this Act, the court may, in addition to such factors as it may deem
fit, take into account the following factors for imposing a
punishment higher than the minimum term of imprisonment or
amount of fine, namely:—
(a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms by the offender;
(b) the fact that the offender holds a public office and that he has
taken advantage of that office in committing the offense;
(c) the fact that the minors are affected by the offense or the
minors are used for the commission of an offense;
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the clauses (a) to
(c) per se don't apply in the present case as the petitioner never used
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violence, did not hold any public office and in no way affects the
minors.
2.1.1 The petitioner invokes the principle of Ignorantia Facti
Excusat
Section 7947 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as; “An act was done
by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified,
by law—Nothing is an offense which is done by any person who is
justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by
reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified
by law, in doing it.”
ii. Clause (d) reads as “the fact that the offense is committed in
an educational institution or social service facility or in the
immediate vicinity of such institution or faculty or in other places to
which school children and students resort for educational, sports and
social activities.” The petitioner was asked to deliver the
consignment from Kumbai to Shambala48 and it was unknown to him
that it was drugs inside the sealed packets49 so being in the vicinity
of the college was an innocent move and was unintentional.
Moreover, the petitioner never intended to carry out any business in
the vicinity of the college it was merely on the way to Shambala.
Hence the petitioner could not be held liable under clause (d) of the
said act.
iii. It is further submitted that in clause (e) and clause (f) it is
stated that the fact that “the offender belongs to an organized
international or any other criminal group which is involved in the
commission of the offenses and the fact that the offender is involved
in other illegal activities facilitated by the commission of the
offense.” It is submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the petitioner
was never involved in any crime syndicate he was merely doing a job
to pay back debt under the medical practitioner.
iv. The Supreme Court of Canada in Beaver v. The Queen50 ,
upheld that, “One who has physical possession of a package which
he believes to contain a harmless substance but which in fact
contains a narcotic drug, cannot be convicted of being in possession
of the drug under sec. 4(1)(d)51 of the Opium and Narcotic Drug
Act.” It was further stated, “It is misdirection for a trial judge to tell
the jury that, if possession of a package is established, the only
question for them to decide is whether or not the package, in fact,
contained a narcotic drug, and that the accused's knowledge or lack
of knowledge of that fact, or even his honest but mistaken belief that
it was a harmless substance, are wholly irrelevant to the question of
his guilt or innocence and must not be considered by them.” Thus,
mere possession does not make the petitioner liable for such severe
punishment.
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2.2 Absence of quantitative test required for imposing liability

It appears from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amending Act of 200152 that the intention of the legislature was to
rationalize the sentence structure. The intention of the legislature for
introducing the amendment as it appears to us is to punish the people
who commit less serious offenses with less severe punishment and
those who commit grave crimes, such as trafficking in significant
quantities, with more severe punishment.
i. In the case of E. Micheal Raj v. Narcotic Control Bureau53 , it is
referred to the notification which herein specifies “small and
commercial quantities of various narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances for each contraband material. Entry 56 deals with
heroin, Entry 77 deals with morphine, and so on and so forth.
Therefore, the notification also makes a distinction not only
between opium and morphine but also between opium and opium
derivatives. Undoubtedly, morphine is one of the derivatives of
opium. Thus, the requirement under the law is first to identify and
classify the recovered substance and then to find out under what
entry it is required to be dealt with”. In the present case, the
petitioner was at first taken into custody as the samples tested
positive for heroin54 while in CRCL it tested positive for morphine55
which makes the initial grounds of taking Mr. Y into custody
questionable as the drug was neither correctly identified nor
classified before being dealt with.
ii. In Ouseph alias Thankachan v. the State of Kerala56 , the Court has
taken the quantity of the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance
found in the mixture, relevant for the purpose of imposition of
punishment. In this case, there is no quantitative test as the
amount of pure morphine in the 400gm medicine sample was not
identified. Further, the other questionable medicines recovered
from the car are not defined57 which makes the arrest and
punishment for more than a large quantity of the drugs is
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
2.3 Decision of HC is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 & Art. 21
of the constitution of Indiana.
The apex court itself in the judgment of State v. Gian Singh58 ,
expressed the view as- “It is the fundamental right of every person that
he should not be subject to greater penalty what the law prescribes”
but in the case at hand the punishment prescribed by the trial court
and upholding the judgment by high court strikes at the core of
fundamental rights of the petitioner.
i. Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness
and equality of treatment which was re-affirmed in Maneka
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Gandhi's case59 , with the further observation that the principle of

reasonableness which legally and philosophically is an essential
part of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art. 14 like a
brooding omnipresence which is reiterated in Ramana Dayaram
Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India60 as well.
However, in the present case, Mr. Y was merely a carrier and it
was actually Mr. A acting through him. There was no
reasonableness that the petitioner could have guessed the illegal
business of Mr. A behind the image of a medical supplier61 . The
trial court while giving him the punishment of the same degree as
a person who does the offense intentionally and deliberately
deprives the petitioner of equality of treatment and upholding the
same judgment by the HC prima facie infringes the fundamental
right of equality before law guaranteed under Art. 14 from the
petitioner.
ii. In view of the above decisions and as observed by the Supreme
Court in Ajay Hasia's case62 , it must, therefore, now be taken to
be well settled that what Art. 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because
an action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of
equality. In the present case trial court by giving such a rigorous
punishment to the petitioner who was merely a transporter
violates his right to equality as the gravity of the offense is not at
par with what is given to those who are the active offenders.
iii. In the latest, landmark, laudable, and learned judgment titled
Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab63 , the Apex Court observed that
the quantity of the narcotic substance is a relevant factor that can
be taken into account for imposing higher than the minimum
punishment under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985. Wherein the present case lacks the
quantitative test hence the quantity couldn't be determined and
therefore imposing higher than the minimum punishment is a
violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner.
iv. In the case of Munn v. State of Illinois64 , the US Court referred to
the observation of Justice Field, wherein he stated that the term
‘life’ as here used something more is meant than a mere animal
existence. Thus, it embraces within itself not only the physical
existence but also the quality of life. In the case at hand, the
petitioner was going through a rough patch in life65 , and in order
to fulfill the basic needs of life he undertook the job for the sole
purpose of paying back the debt with a genuine belief that Mr. A
is a medical practitioner. In that case prescribing higher than the
minimum punishment would deprive him of the quality of life that
he was aiming for his family and himself.
v. The Supreme Court has argued in the Olga Tellis v. Bombay
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Municipal Corp.66 that the right to livelihood is born out of the

right to life, as no person can live without the means of living,
i.e., the means of livelihood. In the instant case, the petitioner did
what was required of him to do for his livelihood, and punishing
him for the same with a stringent punishment curtails his right
guaranteed under Art. 21 of the constitution of Indiana. Thus, if
an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes a rigorous
sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be
erased by any subsequent act of expeditions. Therefore, the
punishments prescribed by the NDPS Act, 1985 is arbitrary and
violative of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
3. WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 35 OF THE
NDPS ACT, 1985 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING VIOLATIVE
OF ART.14 & ART.21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
The petitioner humbly submits before the Hon'ble SC that the
presumption of guilt considered by the sessions court under section 35
of the NDPS Act is arbitrary and unconstitutional as in the present case,
Mr. Y's act does not justify the essentials required under this provision.
Hence the sentence of the guilt produced by a sessions court which was
also upheld by the HC violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner
guaranteed under Art. 14 & Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
3.1 Essentials of section 35 are not justified.
Under section 35 of the NDPS Act, it is mentioned that “culpable
mental state” includes intention motive, knowledge of a fact, and belief
in, or reason to believe, a fact.
i. In the present case, the Intention of the petitioner was merely the
transportation of the consignment as part of his job and not the
trafficking of drugs.
ii. Further the motive of the petitioner was to pay back the debt to
Mr. A as he was the sole bread earner67 , he had the obligation to
look after his family which led him to accept the job offered by Mr.
A.
iii. As stated above, Mr. A misrepresented himself as a medical
supplier with a license from govt. and successfully passed himself
as a businessman convincing Mr. Y that it was a legitimate
business68 . The petitioner had no reason to doubt the façade of
Mr. A and hence acted under a mistake of fact.
3.1.1 Modus operandi of organized crime syndicates.
a. The modus operandi of the organized crime syndicates is to
exploit the times of turmoil of people by handing out personal
loans to people and owing them favors and consequently making
them work for the cartel or charging high-interest rates on the
loans.69 And the same happened to Mr. Y who, to pay off his debt,
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had to work as a transporter of Mr. A's goods.

b. In Mahboob khan v. Hakim Abdul Rahim70 , Undue influence was
defined as “a subtle species of fraud whereby mastery is obtained
over the mind of the victim, by insidious approaches and
seductive artifices.” In section 16 of the indian contract act,
187271 “a contract is said to be induced by “undue influence”
where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that
one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other
and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the
other.” And in the present case, Mr. A advanced money to Mr. Y in
time of his distress and used that position to dominate the will of
the petitioner and availed unfair advantage of it72 .
c. Further Mr. A has committed fraud as mentioned in section 1773 of
the Indian contract act, 1872,
“(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true;
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or
belief of the fact;
(4) any other act fitted to deceive;” This clearly complies with the
given case that Mr. A with the intent to deceive actively
concealed the fact that he was involved in organized crimes
and the consignment to be transported was containing drugs
thus committing fraud against the petitioner.
d. In State of Gujarat v. Abdulrasid Ibrahim Mansuri74 referred to
Inder Sain v. the State of Punjab75 that the accused got the parcel
of apples in which opium was also found. The defense of the
accused was that “he did not know anything about the contents of
the parcel. In that case, the prosecution had not adduced any
evidence to establish that the accused was knowingly in
possession of the opium. There was no evidence that the accused
was aware that the parcel contained any contraband substance,
much less opium.” Similarly in the present case, the petitioner
received consignment as a false pretense of the package of
medicines76 and was undertaken by the fraudulent act of Mr. A.
3.1.2 Lack of Conscious possession
Section 35 of the Act recognizes the ‘presumption of culpable mental
state’. Possession need not be physical and could be ‘constructive’. The
Supreme Court defines the word ‘conscious’ as “awareness about a
particular fact” — a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. That
is, a person can still have power and control over the article in question,
while another to whom physical possession is given holds it, subject to
that power or control.77 The term “possession” consists of two elements.
First, it refers to the corpus or the physical control and the second; it
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refers to the animus or intent which has reference to exercise of the

said control78 .
i. In Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh79 , the Supreme
Court set aside the conviction imposed by the High Court and
observed that- “The presumption against the accused of
culpability under Section 35 of the Act to explain possession
satisfactorily, are rebuttable. It does not dispense with the
obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond all
reasonable doubt.” And in the present case as the essentials of
the charges are not met the onus of the burden of proof lies
initially with the prosecution.
ii. In Noor Aga v. the State of Punjab80 , it was observed:—
“An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it
stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then, the
standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence
is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of
proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution
is “beyond all reasonable doubt” it is “preponderance of
probability” on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the
foundational facts so as to attract the rigors of Section 35 of the
Act, the actusreus which is possession of contraband by the
accused cannot be said to have been established.”
iii. In David Hoffman & John Rowe81 , it was held that, “they (reverse
burdens) are permitted so long as they are kept within reasonable
limits and are not arbitrary or disproportionate taking into account
factors such as the opportunity which the defendant had to rebut
the presumption, the importance of the interests at stake, and
evidential difficulty for prosecution and defense. And in the
present case the accused was unaware of the fact that he was
working for an organized crime syndicate and moreover the
prosecution failed to prove the concrete presence of the
knowledge of the fact in Mr. Y's case.
iv. The word ‘possession’ means the legal right to possession as
mentioned in Health v. Drown82 , further in an interesting case of
Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness83 it was observed that where a person
keeps his firearm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own
home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same.
Further in the case of Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab84 , it was held
that “the possession has to be a conscious possession and merely
the fact that the opium was found in the dicky of the car, which
the appellant was driving itself, shall not establish conscious
possession.” And in the present case, the consignment was found
in the car85 and not with the petitioner and the petitioner did not
have control over the consignment as it was to be delivered
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untampered86 . Thus the conscious possession cannot be justified.

Therefore, the absence of consciousness from the petitioner proves
the lack of mens rea. As stated in Hari Singh v. State87 .
3.2 Presumption of guilt is violative of Art. 14 & Art. 21 of the
constitution of Indiana.
The courts have held the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments which ensure that a person will not be
convicted of a crime unless the prosecutor proves that he is guilty
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” This high burden of proof in criminal
cases is closely related to the presumption of innocence of the accused.
i. Further in cases of Narender Singh v. State of M.P.88 , Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra,89 and Rajesh
Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav v. CBI90 it is clearly held that The
presumption of innocence is a human right. Thus Mr. Y is also
innocent until proven so. In a recent article, “The Presumption of
Innocence and Reverse Burdens : A Balancing Duty”91 it has been
stated that, it is not suggested that a negative can never be
proved but there are cases where such difficulties are faced by the
accused e,g,. honest and reasonable mistake of fact. It is also
stated that in determining whether a reverse burden is compatible
with the presumption of innocence regard should also be had to
the pragmatics of proof. But courts will not allow these pragmatic
considerations to override the legitimate rights of the defendant.
Pragmatism will have greater sway where the reverse burden
would not pose the risk of great injustice, where the offensee is
not too serious or the reverse burden only concerns a matter
incidental to guilt.
And in the present case there is no intention of guilt is present
therefore imposing such a stringent punishment is violative of the
fundamental rights of the accused as one must be considered as
innocent until proven guilty.
3.2.1 Beyond a reasonable doubt not proved
In the case of Puran Ram Nayak v. State of Rajasthan92 , the court
held that the Presumption u/Sec. 35 of the N.D.P.S. Act applies
only when the prosecution discharges the initial burden cast upon
it. But in the present case the accused gets the benefit of doubt
because of following reasons which are as follows—
i. It is a settled position of law that the prosecution must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the
accused. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Noor Aga's case93 which has been referenced in
the above-mentioned judgment of Naresh Kumar v. State of
Himachal Pradesh94 along with the ratio rendered in V.D. Jhingan
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v. State of Uttar Pradesh95 wherein the Supreme Court held- “It is

not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty. The
onus of proof lies upon the accused person is to prove his case by
a preponderance of probability.”
ii. In Seema Silk and Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement96 , it was
observed- “Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be
raised in several statutes as, for example, the Negotiable
Instruments Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. The
presumption is raised only when certain foundational facts are
established by the prosecution. The accused in such an event
would be entitled to show that he has not violated the provisions
of the Act.” One has to keep in mind, as expressed by an eminent
jurist that presumptions are bats in law; they fly in twilight but
vanish in the light of facts. Thus, it is pellucid that unless the
foundational facts are not established by the prosecution, a mere
charge under a statute would not be enough for the presumption
to apply.
iii. The Hon'ble SC in State of Haryana v. Bhagirath97 , stated that “It
is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind
entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused
might not have committed the offense, which affords the benefit
to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. But in the present
case, the respondent couldn't prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Even after the lack of supportive evidence, the court
upheld the arbitrary punishment which violates the right to a fair
trial of the petitioner as well as the right to equality as the HC
failed to check the power vested upon it to do justice equitably.
iv. In the case of K. Gopal Reddy v. the State of A.P98 , and State of
M.P. v. Dharkole99 , it was held that “A reasonable doubt does not
mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may fit through
the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or
other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of
reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded
upon reasons.” The respondent except the possession could not
bring any reason for the conviction of the appellant that too of
unconscious possession as the knowledge, intent, and motive was
absent. Thus the punishment only on the presumption without the
concrete evidence strikes at the very meaning of the fundamental
rights of the petitioner.
v. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Right
to life doesn't mean merely being alive but leading a meaningful,
complete, and dignified life. The punishment merely based on the
presumption of guilt without the supporting facts deprives the
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petitioner of his fundamental right to a dignified life.

vi. In the case of Noor Aga Khan v. The state of Punjab100 , it was
held by the apex court that, though not explicitly mentioned in
the constitution, the presumption of innocence is nevertheless a
potent background to the conception of justice, in preserving
confidence in enduring integrity and security of a legal system. It
is furthermore put forth that a fair trial would mean a trial in
which bias or prejudice for or against the accused is being
eliminated. Erroneous convictions defeat public interest; guilty
may just be unfortunate enough to meet the high demands of the
standard of proof. If the courts are to already presume that the
person under trial is a culprit the court will proceed on biases
rather than evidence which in the present case is vividly seen
happening hence, it violates the Art. 14 of the constitution of
Indiana.
vii. It is pertinent to note that the rules relating to burden and
standard of proof in criminal trials are indispensable because they
promote individual freedom and are a bulwark against oppression.
Reversing the burden of proof renders the accused a presumptive
criminal disregarding his individual liberty and dignity and
thereby violating Art. 21 which gives right to an individual to live
with dignity. Wrongful convictions strip an individual of dignity
and respect in society. The case at hand makes the petitioner
liable over the offense he didn't have the requisite mensrea to
commit and had done in good faith and straightly violates his
right to dignified life and liberty.
viii. We find guidance in the observations of the Apex court in
paragraphs 25', ‘26’ ‘27’, and ‘28’ in Kali Ram v. State of
Himachal Pradesh101 , in forming our opinion considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case. The relevant extract of the
said decision is as follows: “Another golden thread that runs
through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases
is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be
adopted. This principle has special relevance in cases wherein the
guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial
evidence.” Hence the intention to commit the crime stated by the
prosecution witness is too weak and remote, and could not be
successfully established the presumption of guilt could not be
taken as the means to impose punishment of such grave nature
that directly disregards the concept of right to equality and right
to dignifies life.
Therefore, the presumption under S. 35 of NDPS act is
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unconstitutional as being violative of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of The

65 (b), 65 (e) & 65(g) OF THE MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION
ACT, 1949 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART. 19 & ART. 25 OF THE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the judgment by the

trial court restricts the practice of age-old customs and traditions, trade
and profession, and propagation of religion by an individual. the
punishment given to the petitioner for trading and manufacturing
bhang of the auspicious occasion of Yoli does not come under the ambit
of reasonable restrictions and is justified for religious use. Hence the
judgment strikes at the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19 &
Art. 25 of the Constitution of Indiana.
4.1 Punishment prescribed by Maharashtra Prohibition Act

strikes at Art. 19(1)(a).
Supreme Court has always recognized the right to freedom of
Speech and Expression as one of the important parts of Art. 19 of the
constitution. The constitutional tradition of protecting the valuable right
is composed of judgments that have been expansively interpreted in
Art. 19(1)(a), hailing this right as one having paramount importance,
with powerful rhetoric as to why it must be zealously protected.102
i. In the landmark case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India103 , the
Supreme Court said that it is possible that a right does not find
express mention in any clause of Article 19(1) and yet it may be
covered by some clause of that Article. This is true for freedom of
the press is one such important fundamental right which, though
not expressly mentioned, is implicit in Article 19(1)(a). Similarly
expression of joy and festivities have not been mentioned under
freedom of expression but it is applicable under article 19(1)(a).
ii. In the case of National Legal Services Authority v. Union of
India104 and Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj v. T.N. Legislative
Assembly105 it is stated that under Art. 19(1)(a) the natural right
to freedom of speech and expression of an individual is treated as
absolutely essential to his being.
iii. Art. 4 of UDHR106 talks about “Cultural activities, goods, and
services” which refers to those activities, goods, and services,
which at the time they are considered as a specific attribute, use
or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of
the commercial value they may have. Cultural activities may be
an end in themselves, or they may contribute to the production of
cultural goods and services. In the present case, Mr. Z a vendor
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was arrested because he was selling ‘thandai’107 a refreshing

beverage laced with cannabis leaves and seeds on the occasion of
Yoli, celebrated annually to thank their local deity ‘Doki’, goddess
of food grains for good yield.108 The punishment prescribed clearly
violates the Art. 19(1)(a) i.e. freedom of Speech and Expression
of Mr. Z since it was clear from the fact sheet that ‘thandai’ served
with cannabis leaves and seeds is an important part of the festival
and is produced only during Yoli as a recreational purpose109 . The
vendor expressed his beliefs, and sentiments that are religious
and cultural in nature by selling the delicacy in the village festival.
iv. Further the petitioner submits before the hon'ble court that it is
nowhere stated that consumption of thandai(bhang) on just one
specific festival which occurs annually results in poor health for
the people. Also, there is a widely accepted and experimented fact
that limited and occasional use of drugs is beneficial for the
human body thus in no way it is violating public health. Along
with this, the petitioner would like to draw the attention of the
Hon'ble Court that no case of drug abuse and addiction was
reported by the authority in the village of Doka which clearly
signifies that the use has only been done for the purpose of
expression of cultural beliefs. Therefore, the prevalent custom of
consumption of thandai on the occasion of yoli does not affect the
health of the people and is not consumed in a large quantity thus,
it upholds the subject of health.
v. In the context of the subject of morality, it is clear that the selling
of thandai by Mr. Z and consumption by people was not for the
purpose of addiction or for the purpose of intoxication but to
thank their goddess ‘Doki’ and to celebrate their good harvest,
festivities, as the purpose of recreation and to mark a
remembrance to their local culture and their tradition after two
years. Thus the court in prescribing the punishment under the
MPA for expression of belief is strictly violative of Art. 19(1)(a)
which has also been reiterated in A.K. Gopalan's110 case that-
“Art. 19(1)(a) guarantees Indian Citizens the right to freedom of
speech and expression. It does not delimit the grant of that right
in any manner and there is no reason arising either out of
interpretational dogmas or pragmatic considerations why courts
should strain the language of the article to cut down the
amplitude of that right.”
vi. In the Art. 13(3)(a)111 of the constitution of India it is stated that
“law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation,
notification, custom, or usage having in the territory of India the
force of law. In the present case, it has been clearly stated that
the festival of Yoli has been celebrated in the community for a
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long time which clearly points out that it was a custom. Custom
means a way of behaving or a belief that has been established for
a long time.112 The term custom and usage actually refers to the
ways that different sections of the government react to new
situations and that have been used for so long that they have
become accepted to practice. The fact that the festival took place
under the supervision of state authorities113 signifies its
acceptance of custom as a source of law to the government. Thus,
it also upholds the subject of maintenance of public order. The
power of customs could be understood by looking at the
regulation passed by the US (TSA) allowing Sikh men to keep
wearing their turbans during security screening at airports. Also,
the wearing and carrying of kirpans by Sikh people is legal
because it has been deemed an important part of their religion
and custom. It is regarded as a ceremonial item representing one
of the articles of faith and also symbolizes the defense of the
good. Hence the punishment deprives the petitioner of his right to
freely express his religious belief.
vii. Further it is the fundamental duty of every citizen under article
51A(e)114 to promote harmony and the spirit of common
brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending
religious, linguistic, and regional or sectional diversities. Any
section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part
thereof having a distinct language, script, or culture of its own
shall have the right to conserve the same. They have a right to
preserve it which they did by having their traditional beverage
thandai, singing their local folklore, telling stories about their
tradition, etc. It is their means of expressing their religious and
cultural festivities. Thus, the punishment prescribed has clearly
violated the freedom of expression of people.
viii. It is stated in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India115 , that “the
Preamble of the Constitution of India inter alia speaks of liberty of
thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship. It also says that
India is a sovereign democratic republic. It cannot be
overemphasized that when it comes to democracy, liberty of
thought and expression is a cardinal value that is of paramount
significance under our constitutional scheme.” Thus, the
punishment prescribed for expressing one's cultural beliefs defies
the very soul of Part. III of the constitution.
4.2 Punishment prescribed by Maharashtra Prohibition Act is
violative of Art. 19(1)(g).
Freedom of practicing any trade, profession, or business is a very
important right of an individual because it helps him to earn his
livelihood and fulfill his basic needs.
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i. Art. 19(1)(g) guarantees every citizen the right to pursue or carry

out an occupation of his own choice.116 and it aims to protect
individuals from state action that may restrict and put constraints
on their practice of earning a livelihood117 . In the present case, it
can be seen that Mr. Z was a vendor who was selling the thandai
laced with cannabis leaves and seeds, at the festival that was
being held on the occasion of yoli. Charges of offenses against Mr.
Z are a clear violation of freedom of practicing any trade and
profession or business. Being a vendor, it is the right of Mr. Z to
sell his commodities at the village festival.
ii. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India118 , this Court said:“It
may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest
of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to
carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this
object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of
that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution.” And in the present
case, not just the petitioner's right to conduct a trade is violated
but also his right to express is also infringed. “Therefore, the right
of freedom of expression cannot be taken away with the object of
placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen”.119
iii. In Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,120 the court
held that “the phrase “reasonable restriction” connotes that the
limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of the right
should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is
required in the interests of the public. The word “reasonable”
implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a
course which reason dictates. Legislation that arbitrarily or
excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality
of reasonableness unless it strikes a proper balance between the
freedom guaranteed in Art. 19(1)(g) and the social control
permitted by clause (6)121 of Art. 19, it must be held to be
wanting in that quality.
4.3 Charges levied under MPA restrict the propagation of religion
guaranteed under Art. 25.
According to Art. 25(1)122 - all persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience, and the right freely to profess, practice, and
propagate religion and all these freedoms are subject to public order,
morality, and health.
i. In the case of Baijaynanda Giri v. State of Bihar123 “The question
must always be asked — “Does the impugned law prohibit the
propagation or practise of religion in its character as such ?” The
true approach is to consider the directness of the legislation. It
means that all the people or citizens of India can freely practice,
profess and propagate their religion or follow customs prevalent in
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their community but it should uphold the subjects of public order

i.e. following rules, regulations, laws laid down by the state and
central authorities, morality i.e. following the principles that help
to make a clear distinction between the right and wrong actions or
behavior and health i.e. all practices or customs followed or
practiced must not harm or violate the health of the public as well
as of the self. In the present case, it can be seen that the people
of ‘Doka’ village celebrate the festival of Yoli by consuming
thandai, singing their local folklore, telling stories about their
tradition, etc.124 It is their means of expressing their religious and
cultural festivities. Also, this custom in their community has been
prevalent for a very long time and it is done in a good faith i.e. to
thank their goddess and to celebrate their good harvest. The other
fact is that it is consumed in a limited quantity with does not
affect health plus only for a day i.e. on the occasion of Yoli.
ii. The Supreme Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of
Rajasthan125 held that the test determines question in deciding
what is an integral part of a religion is whether it is regarded as
integral by the community following that religion or not.
Consumption of thandai for recreational purposes and to celebrate
the hard work and good harvest was a custom in the community
which was carried out since time immemorial. Also, it upholds the
subject of morality, public order, and health and hence it is an
integral part of the religion.
iii. According to the facts, it can be stated that consumption of
thandai(bhang) and cannabis has not resulted in poor health for
the people. Also, there is no harm to the self, thus, it is not
violating public health. Therefore, the prevalent custom of
consumption of thandai on the occasion of yoli does not affect the
health of the people and is not consumed in a large quantity thus,
it upholds the subject of health.
iv. In the context of the subject of morality, it is clear that the
selling of thandai by Mr. Z and consumption by people was not for
the purpose of addiction or for the purpose of intoxication but to
thank their goddess ‘Doki’ and to celebrate their good harvest,
festivities, as the purpose of recreation and to mark a
remembrance to their local culture and their tradition. They had a
sense of right and wrong and also of behavior. Therefore, the
subject of morality has been upheld by the people of Doka village
and also by Mr. Z.
v. Also, the festival took place under the supervision of state
authorities and police forces, obeying all laws, rules, regulations,
and orders. Thus, it also upholds the subject of maintenance of
public order. In Hasan Ali v. Mansoor Ali126 , the Bombay High
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Court held that Art. 25127 and Art. 26128 not only prevent doctrines
or beliefs of religion but also the acts that were done in pursuance
of religion. It thus guarantees ceremonies, modes of worship,
rituals, observances, etc which are an integral part of religion.
What is the essential or integral part of a religion has to be
determined in the light of the doctrines and practices that are
regarded by the community as a part of their religion and also
must be included in them.
vi. Further in In Acharaj Singh v. State of Bihar, it was held that, if
bhog offered to the deity is a well-established practice of that
religious institution, such a practice should be regarded as a part
of that religion. Similarly, consumption of thandai has been a
prevalent and well established custom in their community which
is practiced to thank their local deity ‘doki’ i.e. goddess of
foodgrains for a good harvest129 . Therefore it should be allowed
since it is a custom being followed since time immemorial.
vii. In the case of SP Mittal v. Union of India130 , the court held that
Religion need not be theistic. It is not merely an opinion, doctrine,
or belief but has an outward expression in the act as well. With
the change of time, certain things need to be altered as per the
social and cultural structures. Therefore, it can be stated that
according to the needs of society, changes required, prevalent
customs, and traditions in a community with certain exemptions
must be allowed. Laws related to intoxicating substances need not
be struck down but read down in order to preserve social,
religious, and cultural stability in the nation. If changes can be
made in laws related to sexuality then the subject of preserving
culture, customs, and traditions must also be looked upon for
changes that are suitable according to the society.
“The Constitution has been described as the federal compact,
and the construction must hold a balance between all its parts131 ”.
It has been stated that the customs which are prevalent since
time immemorial work as a constructive force to formulate laws.
In the present case, it can be stated from the facts that the
practice has been followed for a very long time and since it was an
area of tourism the same was under the supervision of the state
as well. Therefore, the charges levied were out of the blue and not
in accordance of the law as the silence of the state amounts to the
consent for the sale of thandai and hence violates the right to
propagation of religion under Art. 25 of the constitution of
Indiana.
65 (b), 65 (e) & 65(g) OF THE MAHARASHTRA PROHIBITION
ACT, 1949 ARE VIOLATIVE OF ART. 29 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
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INDIANA?
prescribed under sections 65(b), 65(e), and 65(g) of the Maharashtra
Prohibition Act, 1949 are violative of Art. 29 of the constitution of
Indiana. It is further contended that the action of the police i.e.
arresting the vendor Mr. Z has violated the fundamental right of Art. 29
i.e. fundamental right to protection of culture.
5.1 Punishment prescribed by MPA is violative of Art. 29
According to Art. 29(1)- Any section of the citizens residing in the
territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script,
or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. It
extends to all the citizens and is an absolute right for minorities to
preserve their language and culture and cannot be subject to
reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public.
i. As per the facts, it is clear that the people living in Doka village are
a community. In a judgment passed by the Kerala High Court, Rt.
Rev. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan132 it was held that “any
religious or linguistic community which is less than 50% of the
total population shall be considered as a minority.” And as per
Art. 27133 of ICCPR states that minority groups should not be
denied the right to enjoy their own culture134 . As per the facts, the
community in the village believed in a particular religion and their
local deity ‘Doki’ and also celebrated the festival ‘yoli’ as a tribute
to her. The people lived in a village in the state of Kumbai, which
clearly points out that their population is less than 50% of the
total population of the country. They have their particular custom
that is the major part of the festival135 i.e. consumption of thandai
in order to celebrate the hard work of farmers. The act of the
vendor was an expression of the custom followed by the people of
the village and the charges violate the rights of minorities from
expressing their religion.
ii. It is brought to the attention of the Hon'ble Court that the people
of Doka village celebrate the festival every year and consume
thandai laced with cannabis leaves and seeds. It is also submitted
before this Court that the measures taken up by the police
authorities cannot be said to be done in the public interest or
public good because consumption of thandai was part of their
custom and people selling and buying it were only expressing
their culture that was prevalent from a very long time in their
community. It is a clear violation of their cultural right. And the
fact that the custom was prevalent for a long time clearly shows
the ill intent of the state to interfere with the affairs of minorities
which was earlier kept untouched.
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5.2 Use of cannabis is valid with reasonable restriction

Inflicting the charges on offenses and arrest of Mr. Z has clearly
violated the right of protection of culture and interest of minorities.
Being a minority is the right of the people to follow and practice their
customs and traditions.
i. In 1961, the international treaty, Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs136 classified cannabis as a hard drug. The Indian delegation
opposed this because of the social and cultural use of cannabis in
India. Finally, the definition of cannabis included ‘flowering or
fruiting tops (excluding seeds and leaves when not accompanied
by tops) from which resin is not extracted’. States have the power
to draft laws on cannabis and allow the use of seeds and leaves
(popularly used to make bhang). UP and Rajasthan, for example,
have authorized shops that sell the same. Thandai, a milkshake
made with bhaang is especially popular in UP during Holi and the
use of bhaang is also well known in festivals such as
Mahashivratri. Among Sikh Nihangs, bhang is popular, especially
during Hola Mohalla. Indian Sufis place the spirit of Khidr within
the cannabis plant, and consume bhang. Therefore bhang is legal
under the NDPS Act because of the Act's definition of cannabis137 .
ii. There may be a general ban on the use of cannabis and related
products but consumption of cannabis must be given exemption
on certain occasions which are prevalent for a long time and have
become customs. Also, the use of cannabis and other intoxicants
must be allowed under some reasonable restrictions.
iii. In curing certain chronic diseases, medicinal drugs are used and
they too have side effects such as cancer, heart problems, nausea,
mental problems etc similarly consumption of cannabis can cause
heart problems, breathing problems, delusions, nausea, etc. when
medicinal drugs with severe side effects can be used for the
treatment of diseases, these have been legalized then use of
cannabis only for a single day too within a limited quantity must
fall under the use within some reasonable restrictions and
categorized as certain exemptions on expressing cultural
festivities. Also, there is no mention of bhang in NDPS, 1985
which justifies the fact that Mr. Z cannot be held liable for the
offenses.
iv. In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh138 , the Supreme
Court opined that a restriction in order to be referred to as
reasonable shall not be arbitrary and shall not be beyond what is
required in the interest of the public. In the present case, it is
clear that the people of the village were a community and
everyone had a general interest in celebrating the festival and
consuming thandai. Arresting and punishing the vendor is
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arbitrary in nature and also violated his rights. Therefore,

consumption of bhang must be allowed with some reasonable
restrictions which are in the interest of the general public.
v. The Supreme Court of India in the important case of Mohd. Hanif
Quereshi139 held that there cannot be a blanket ban on the
slaughter of cattle as would lead to the extinction of the trade of
beef butchers for their daily sustenance. So, for that there is an
exemption in Section 18 of the act which states that buffalo above
the age of 13 years can be slaughtered after certification from the
competent authority. Similarly in the present case, it can also be
stated that total prohibition on the consumption of bhang on the
occasion of yoli which is a prevalent custom also violates the
fundamental right of freedom of expression of festivities and
cultural celebrations.
6. WHETHER SECTION 37 OF NDPS ACT, 1985, BARS THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 438 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1973?
In the case of Mr. X v. the State of Kumbai, the petitioner summits
in the hon'ble SC that the rejection of the anticipatory bail by the HC on
the grounds of section 37 of NDPS act is unconstitutional as the
petitioner was eligible for anticipatory bail and the denial of the same
infringes his fundamental rights of life and liberty guaranteed under
Art. 21 of the constitution of India
6.1 Petitioner is eligible for the grant of anticipatory bail.
Section 37: Offenses to be cognizable and non-bailable.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure;
(b) no person accused of an offense punishable for 2[offenses
under section 19140 or section 24141 or section 27A142 and also for
offenses involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless—
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offense and that he is not likely to commit any
offense while on bail.
i. In the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Union Territory of
Chandigarh143 , it is plain from the language of section 37(1)(b)
144
that the court must adopt a negative attitude towards bail
but turn positive firstly if it is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
of an offense under the Act and secondly that he is not likely to
commit any offense while on bail. Both these tests must be
satisfied before bail can be granted.” Similarly in the present
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case, there is no proof that the petitioner was directly involved

in the trafficking of drugs, and the drugs were found in the
possession of the ship personnel145 not in the possession of Mr.
X. Hence the petitioner was eligible for the anticipatory bail
abinitio.
i. The Hon'ble SC in Supdt., Narcotics Control Bureau, Chennai v.
R. Paulsamy146 , formed an opinion that certain aspects like non
-compliance with the procedure, discrepancies in the evidence
presented, etc cannot be examined properly for an anticipatory
bail or bail stage of hearing. And these aspects are really
intricate in establishing the innocence of the accused in NDPS
cases. In the case at hand both the essentials required for the
grant of anticipatory bail are justified firstly that the petitioner
has not done the offenses per se and secondly provision S. 37
(b)(ii) which disallows the courts to grant bail until it is
completely satisfied that the accused has not committed the
offense is also justified as at this pre-stage of a trial, it is very
hard for any court to come to such conclusion of presumption
of guilt without any prior record of offenses.
ii. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v.
Shiva Shankar Kesari147 , has tried to lay down an approach that
needs to be adopted while granting bail under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act. The Court should not look over the records that
say that the accused is not guilty, rather it should look for the
reasonable grounds that point out that the accused is not guilty
and then take their decision of granting the bail. Thus, a Court
has to look over the provisions and then decide the feasibility
of granting bail to the accused. Further SC in the case of
Sanjay Chandra148 contends that the legislature has used the
words ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ instead of ‘the
evidence’ which means the court dealing with the grant of bail
can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case
against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” In the
present case, no evidence could be said conclusively against
the petitioner as no offense has been committed by him
firsthand. And in the case of Sujit Tiwari v. State of Gujarat149
the court opined that “Bail can be granted where there is
reasonable possibility that accused may be acquitted.”
iii. Further it is submitted in the Hon'ble court that the petitioner
didn't exercise ownership over the seized substance it was ship
personnel who was found in possession and merely on the
ownership of ship doesn't make him liable and as stated in
Saju v. State of Kerala150 , the SC accepted that “it is a settled
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position of law that act or action of one of the accused cannot

be used as evidence against other”. Hence, the detention of the
ship personnel151 can't be regarded as a milestone to place the
liability on the petitioner.
The concept of anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes
influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the
purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them
detained in jail for some days. The very purpose of the provisions
relating to anticipatory bail is to ensure that no person is confined in
any way until and unless held guilty. When a person has reason to
believe that he may be arrested on the accusation of committing a non-
bailable offense then he can move to the High Court or the Court of
Session u/s 438152 of CrPC for anticipatory bail. In the instant case, the
petitioner being a majority share-holder of the leading company in the
power sector of Indiana also having great say in the economic
conditions, and having an influential personality gives rise to the
possibility of false implications against him which can also be read in
the judgment of Amit Ranjan v. Narcotic Control Bureau153 , when there
is material on record to show that prosecution was inherently doubtful,
there is material on record to show that there is a possibility of false
implication and since he was the owner of the ship the police might
take him in custody for interrogation which will further deteriorate his
reputation thus, he had all the grounds to get anticipatory bail from the
court of law.
6.2 Denial of bail violates life and liberty guaranteed under Art.
21
In the light of relevant provisions enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights : - Art. 11(1)154 - Everyone charged with a
penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to the law in a public trial at which he has had all the
guarantees necessary for his defense. There is thus a valid reason
which has been enumerated as to why bail ought to be allowed to
prevent pre-trial detention.
i. Section 37 of NDPS Act which excludes Section 438 Cr.P.C.,
violates constitutional mandate under Art. 14 and 21 and is ultra
vires the Constitution. The said provision was upheld in State of
M.P. v. Ram Krishna Balothia155 . If a Court is not debarred from
granting anticipatory bail even in most heinous offenses including
murder, rape, dacoity, robbery, NDPS, sedition, etc., which are
punishable with longer periods depending upon parameters for
grant of anticipatory bail, taking away such power in respect of
offenses under the Act is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14.
ii. In the case of Tarun Jain v. Directorate General of GST Intelligence
DGGI156 , the Delhi High Court opined that anticipatory bail is a
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statutory right in consonance with the Right to life and personal

liberty under Art. 21 of the Constitution, it is essential to be alive
to the various facets that form a part of rights under Art. 21 of the
Constitution. Further, it was stated that “the court must give
effect to Art. 21 of the Constitution in the letter as well as in spirit
while deciding the anticipatory bail application. The basic tenet on
which the criminal justice system operates is “innocent until
proven guilty” and in view of the same, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India has time and again reiterated that “bail is the rule
while jail is an exception.”
iii. In the case of Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. The State of
Maharashtra157 it was found that denial of bail amounts to
deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the
imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section
438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by
the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a
procedural provision that is concerned with the personal liberty of
the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of
innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for
anticipatory bail, convicted of the offense in respect of which he
seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and
conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its
provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal
freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with
unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in
Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned.
iv. Further in Maneka Gandhi's158 case, it was made crystal clear that
in order to meet the challenge of Art. 21 of the Constitution, the
procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty
must be fair, just, and reasonable. Herein the denial of
anticipatory bail by the HC is not in accordance with the fair and
reasonable grounds as the petitioner fulfills all the necessary
elements required for the grant of the bail and hence strikes
straight to the right to life of the petitioner.
v. In the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar159 , the court
held that “It is equally well settled by the decisions of this Court
that Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only be a substantive
law but also by a law of procedure. This statement of Hon'ble
court per se states that the NDPS Act no matter under what
exceptions it brings cannot escape the liability of infringing the
fundamental rights. Hence the order of HC while presuming the
immunity of section 37 and denying the anticipatory bail violates
the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi. General guidelines for granting anticipatory bail were provided by

the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibia v. The
state of Punjab160 and imposing extra restrictions under Sec. 37
(b)(ii) render the entire judgment useless.
vii. The rationale behind enacting S. 438 was to safeguard the
personal liberty of individuals, however, the use of words ‘may, if
it thinks fit in S. 438(1) of CrPC and the absence of any specific
restraints on the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail
clearly indicates that the legislature intended to confer very wide
discretionary power on the courts to grant anticipatory bail.
Therefore, the denial of the anticipatory bail u/Sec. 37 of NDPS Act,
1985 is unconstitutional as it bars the application of S. 438 of CrPC,
1973.
PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the counsel for the petitioner humbly prays that the Hon'ble
Court be pleased to adjudge, hold and declare:
1. The present petitions are maintainable before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
2. The punishment prescribed by the NDPS Act1985 is arbitrary and
violative of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
3. The presumption under section 35 of the NDPS Act, 1985 is
unconstitutional and is violative of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of the
4. The punishment prescribed under sections 65 (b), 65 (e), and 65
(g) of the Maharashtra prohibition act, 1949 are violative of the
article. 19, article 25, and article 29 of the Constitution of
Indiana.
5. And section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, bars the application of
section 438 of the code of criminal procedure1973.
And/or pass any order that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the
interest of equity, justice and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the Petitioner shall
duty-bound forever pray.
———
1 Art. 136, The Constitution of India.
3
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam, (1980) 3 SCC 141.
4 Supra No. 1.
5 State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 SCC 334 : AIR 2015 SC 696.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6
Para 20, Moot proposition.
7 Khoday Distilleries ltd. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Ltd., (2012) 10 Scale 499.
8 Part V, Chapter IV, The Constitution of India.
9 Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359.
10
11 N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohan doss, (2007) 9 SCC 196.
12 Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 1.
13 S. 32B, NDPS Act, 1985.
14
Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCR 453.
15 S. 35, NDPS Act, 1985.
16 Para 22, Moot proposition.
17 Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 SCC 513.
18
Gangadhar v. State of M.P., (2020) 9 SCC 202.
20 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
21 Supra no 2.
22
S. 65(b), Maharashtra Prohibition Act.
23 S. 65(e). Maharashtra prohibition Act, 1949.
24 S. 65(g). Maharashtra prohibition Act, 1949.
25 Art. 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India.
26 Art. 19(1)(g), The Constitution of India.
27 Art. 29(1), The Constitution of India.
28 Part III, The Constitution of India.
29 Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 778.
30 Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik, (2021) 7 SCC 613.
31 Supra no 25.
32 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
34
Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
35
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118.
36 Ratansingh Nihalsingh v. State, 1959 SCC OnLine MP 139.
37 Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694.
38 S. 438, CrPC, 1973.
39 S. 437, CrPC, 1973.
40 Intelligence Officer, Narcotics C. Bureau v. Sambhu Sonkar, (2001) 2 SCC 562.
41 S. 37, NDPS Act, 1985.
42 S. 439, CrPC, 1973.
43
S. 8, NDPS Act, 1985.
44 S. 21, NDPS Act, 1985.
46 Raj Kumar Vajpayee v. State of U.P., (2016) 95 ACRC 896.
47 S. 79, Evidence Act, 1872.
49 Para 17, Ibid.
50 Beaver v. The Queen, 1957 SCR 531.
51 S. 4(1)(d), the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act( United States).
52 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001, ACT No. 9 of 2001.
53 E. Micheal Raj v. Narcotic Control Bureau, (2008) 5 SCC 161.
55
Para 18, Ibid.
56 Ouseph alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 4 SCC 446.
58 State v. Gian Singh, (1999) 9 SCC 312 : AIR 1999 SC 3450.
59 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597.
60
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC
1628.
61
62 Ajay Hasia Etc v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi Etc, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63 Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6 SCC 558.
64
Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 US 113 (1876).
66 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) 3 SCC 545.
67
68 Para 13, Ibid.
70
Mahboob khan v. Hakim Abdul Rahim, AIR 1964 Raj 250.
71
S. 16, Indian contract act, 1872.
73
S. 17, Indian contract act, 1872.
74 State of Gujarat v. Abdulrasid Ibrahim Mansuri, (1990) 2 GLR 947.
75
Inder Sain v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 372 : (1974) 1 SCR 215.
76
77 Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P., ((1972) 2 SCC 194 : AIR 1972 SC 1756).
78 Mohan lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222.
79
Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684 : AIR 2017 SC 3859.
80 Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
81 David Hoffman & John Rowe, Human Rights In U.K., 223 (2013).
82
Health v. Drown, [1972] 2 All ER 561 (HL).
83 Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness, [1976] 1 All ER 844 (QBD).
84
Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2002) 7 SCC 419.
85
86
Para 14, Ibid.
87 Hari Singh v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1556.
88
Narender Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699.
89 Ranjit sing Brahmajeet sing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294.
90 Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
91
“The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens : A Balancing Duty” published in
[2007] C.L.J. (March Part) 142.
92
Puran Ram Nayak v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 4 RLW 2738 (Raj).
93 Supra no 64.
94
Supra no 63.
95 V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., (1966) 3 SCR 736.
96 Seema Silk & Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2008) 5 SCC 580.
97
State of Haryana v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96.
98 K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305.
99 State of M.P. v. Dharkole, (2004) 13 SCC 308.
100
Supra no 64.
101
Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 : AIR 1973 SC 2773 : (1974) 1
SCR 722.
102 Freedom But Not Really : The ‘Unprotected’ Zones of Art. 19(1)(a), CALQ (2019) Vol. 4.3
27.
103
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
104
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 (India).
105
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj v. T.N. Legislative Assembly, (2016) 6 SCC 82 (India).
106
Art. 4, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
107
109 Para 24, Ibid.
110 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 2 SCR 88.
111 Art. 13(3)(a), The constitution of India.
112
114
51A(e), The Constitution of India.
115 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.
116 Fertilizer Corpn. Kamagar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344.
117
Saghir Ahmad v. the State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 707.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
118
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842.
119 Ibid.
120 Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1950 SCR 759.
121 Art. 19(6), The Constitution of India.
122
Art. 25(1), The Constitution of India.
123 Bijayananda v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Pat 101.
125 Tilkayat Govindlalji v. the State of Rajasthan, 1962 SCC OnLine Raj 2.
126
Hasanali v. Mansoorali, 1947, (1948) 50 Bom LR 389.
130
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51.
131 Per Lord Wright-James v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1936] A.C. 578 at 613.
132 Rt. Rev. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan, 1964 SCC OnLine Ker 182.
133 Art. 27, ICCPR.
134
Ibid.
136 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 − INCB.
137
Cannabis : Your Guide to what's Legal and what's not in India, 2020 SCC OnLine Blog LME
4.
138
Chintaman Rao v. the State of MP, AIR 1951 SC 118 : 1950 SCR 759.
139 Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1959 SCR 629.
140 S. 19, NDPS Act, 1985.
141 S. 24, NDPS Act, 1985.
142 S. 27A, NDPS Act, 1985.
143
Sukhdev Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1986 Cri LJ 1757 (P&H).
144 S. 37(b)(ii), NDPS Act, 1985.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
146 Supdt., Narcotics Control Bureau, Chennai v. R. Paulsamy, (2000) 9 SCC 549.
147 Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798.
148
Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40.
149 Sujit Tiwari v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2020 SC 66.
150 Saju v. State of Kerala, (2001) 1 SCC 378.
152
S. 438, CrPC, 1973.
153 Amit Ranjan v. Narcotic Control Bureau, AIR OnLine 2019 Del 1066.
154 Art. 11(1), UDHR.
155 State of M.P. v. Ram Krishna Balothia, (1995) 3 SCC 221.
156
Saurabh Mittal v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 547.
157 Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454.
158 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
159 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279.
160 Gurbaksh Singh Sibia v. The state of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : AIR 1980 SC 1632.
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Page 1 Monday, January 22, 2024

6th LCDNMCC National Moot Court, 2022

Law College Dehradun, Faculty of Uttaranchal University 6th

1.2 Violation of fundamental rights invokes writ petition.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 438 OF THE

4. Acharaj Singh v. State of Bihar, 1966 SCC OnLine Pat 40 36

60. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 38

2. S. 32B, NDPS Act, 1985 17

Duty” published in [2007] C.L.J. (March Part.) 142

would pass through the Saint Mary's College, Shambala.

of the ship- 10 personnel 5 kg. of illegal cocaine. Mr. X apprehending

ACT,1985 IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF ART. 14 & ART. 21

maintainability of the petition and bar the right of the petitioner of

drugs or psychotropic substances itself was in question16 . A three-

fundamental right arises29 , Art. 32 does not apply. Here in this

not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 43942

2.2 Absence of quantitative test required for imposing liability

Gandhi's case59 , with the further observation that the principle of

Municipal Corp.66 that the right to livelihood is born out of the

had to work as a transporter of Mr. A's goods.

refers to the animus or intent which has reference to exercise of the

untampered86 . Thus the conscious possession cannot be justified.

v. State of Uttar Pradesh95 wherein the Supreme Court held- “It is

petitioner of his fundamental right to a dignified life.

unconstitutional as being violative of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of The

It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble SC that the judgment by the

4.1 Punishment prescribed by Maharashtra Prohibition Act

was arrested because he was selling ‘thandai’107 a refreshing

i. Art. 19(1)(g) guarantees every citizen the right to pursue or carry

their community but it should uphold the subjects of public order

5.2 Use of cannabis is valid with reasonable restriction

arbitrary in nature and also violated his rights. Therefore,

case, there is no proof that the petitioner was directly involved

position of law that act or action of one of the accused cannot

statutory right in consonance with the Right to life and personal

vi. General guidelines for granting anticipatory bail were provided by

2 Art. 32, The Constitution of India.

7 Khoday Distilleries ltd. v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Ltd., (2012) 10 Scale 499.

8 Part V, Chapter IV, The Constitution of India.

9 Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359.

11 N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohan doss, (2007) 9 SCC 196.

12 Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 1.

13 S. 32B, NDPS Act, 1985.

15 S. 35, NDPS Act, 1985.

16 Para 22, Moot proposition.

17 Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 SCC 513.

19 Art. 21, The Constitution of India.

20 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.

23 S. 65(e). Maharashtra prohibition Act, 1949.

24 S. 65(g). Maharashtra prohibition Act, 1949.

25 Art. 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India.

26 Art. 19(1)(g), The Constitution of India.

27 Art. 29(1), The Constitution of India.

28 Part III, The Constitution of India.

29 Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 778.

30 Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik, (2021) 7 SCC 613.

32 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.

33 Para 23, Moot proposition.

36 Ratansingh Nihalsingh v. State, 1959 SCC OnLine MP 139.

37 Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694.

38 S. 438, CrPC, 1973.