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GRADUATE STUDIES
OFFICIAL ANSWER SHEET
PHDL304 STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH
PHDL316 EKSTRAKTURA NG WIKANG INGLES
FIRST SEMESTER SY2023-2024

NAME: MARINEL D. LIWANAG

DATE SUBMITTED: November 2, 2023

INSTRUCTIONS:
Assignment for research and presentation: Philosophy of language
You have been assigned a philosopher who has made important contributions to the field
of philosophy of language. Your task is to conduct some research on the philosopher's main
ideas and arguments on language , and how they relate to other philosophers and theories in
this area.
Your research should be presented as an essay that follows a clear structure: an
introduction that introduces your philosopher and his main thesis, body paragraphs that explain
and analyze their arguments and evidence, and a conclusion that summarizes your findings and
evaluates their significance.
Your essay should demonstrate your ability to use logical reasoning and synthesis to
construct and evaluate arguments. You should also use appropriate academic language and
citations to support your claims.
You should submit your essay as a Word document or PDF file by the deadline.
You should also prepare for an oral presentation of your essay, be ready to explain your
main points, answer questions, and engage in dialogue with others.
Assigned philosopher
LIWANAG, MARINEL DE LEON- John Searle
ANSWER:

Do the Words We Say Shape the Way We Think?

By Marinel D. Liwanag

On the book titled: "Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind", Searle wrote “An
utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the
Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived”. Hence, on
this essay I will discuss Searle’s Intentionality and Speech Act Theory and will try to answer the
question: Do the words we say shape the way we think?
Before delving deeper into the main topics of this essay, it is important to note the
background information of the proponent of “Intentionality” and “Speech Act”. The proponent,
John Searle, was born on July 31, 1932, in Denver, Colorado. He is most decidedly a philosopher
whose estimable contributions to the philosophy of language are well-deserving of a volume
dedicated to commentary. He was a prominent American philosopher with influential works that
encompassed the philosophy of language, speech act theory, and the philosophy of mind, which
have substantial contributions to epistemology, ontology, and the study of practical reason.
Raised by a business executive father and a physician mother, Searle's early life included
multiple relocations before the family settled in Wisconsin. At the age of 19, he received a
Rhodes scholarship to study at the University of Oxford, where he earned his philosophy
doctorate in 1959. He then embarked on an academic career at the University of California,
Berkeley, eventually becoming Mills Professor of Philosophy and later Slusser Professor of
Philosophy. However, in 2019, Searle faced a significant downfall in his career when he lost his
emeritus status at Berkeley. This was due to violations of the University of California's policies
related to sexual harassment and retaliation, marking a tarnish on his otherwise distinguished
academic legacy.
Turning the page to Intentionality, Searle’s stated, “Intentionality is that property of many
mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs
in the world”. Hence, Intentional states refer to both the psychological mode and content, where
the former can be belief, desire, hope, fear, etc., and the latter pertains to what is believed,
desired, hoped for, feared, etc. This is quite likened to Frege’s notion of “sense and reference”,
where the sense of a word or sentence is its mode of presentation, while its reference is the object
or objects it picks out in the world. However, it is important to note that the content of a mental
state should not be confused with the object of that thought. The content is part of the mental
state, and the Intentional state, with its content, is about some object. When you believe, you
believe something. When you have a desire, you desire something. When you hope, you hope for
something. When you have fear, you fear for something. It is part of the meaning of being in
these mental states that they have an aboutness feature.
Further, Fotion (2000) explicated that Intentional states have a direction of fit that depends
on the psychological mode. For instance, if Susan believes it is raining, the direction of fit is
mind-to-world. Meaning, Susan knows and sees (mind) that it is raining as of the moment
(world) where she lives in. But if she wants her friend to come over to visit her—in the case that
in the world sense, that the phrase “it is raining” is subtly used to mean something other than the
phrase, hence on this sense, it is used by Susan with a probable reason to enjoy the cold weather
in cuddling or snuggling her friend—, thus, it is world-to-mind. Searle sees that illocutionary
forces are like psychological modes, and that both speech acts and Intentional states have content
and take objects, and that both have direction of fit. For instance, the phrase “I’m hungry” would
mean differently in different ways: it could either be a thought expressing his/her hungriness, or
an intention to eat something with someone who heard that phrase. Hence, the one who uttered
may intend to just express his feelings of being hungry or his intention to eat something with that
someone.
For instance, the belief that PBBM is a great president is a full Intentional state with
content that is about PBBM and his greatness. Intentionality is present within the content in the
reference to PBBM and in the predication that he is great, but also in the full speech act.
Therefore, the full speech act's Intentionality implies that it is a real-world fact that PBBM was
great, rather than the Intentional state being about its own content. This statement is true
according to Russel if and only if ‘PBBM’ exist in real world and it should be the case that “he is
great”. Meanwhile, Donnelan’s distinction between referential and attributive supports this
example by explicating that language can be used to refer to things in the world as well as
describe them in various ways. In this case, PBBM is referred to as President with its attributive
sense of being ‘great’ using a language an individual is adept to. Further, Wittgenstein supports
this claim by stating that the meaning of a word or sentence is determined by the way it is used in
a particular context, rather than by any underlying mental or linguistic structure.
Put simply, Tsohatzidis (2007) explicated the idea that “linguistic intentionality does not
merely require the expression of propositions and the existence of conditions under which they
might or might not be satisfied, but also the association of those propositions with illocutionary
forces of various kinds, which determine the various kinds of acts (asserting, requesting,
promising, etc.) that possession of a language characteristically makes possible. Second, the
idea that, in a similar way, mental intentionality does not merely require the apprehension of
propositions and the existence of conditions under which they might or might not be satisfied,
but also the association of those propositions with psychological modes of various kinds, which
determine the various kinds of states (believing, desiring, intending, etc.) that possession of a
mind characteristically makes possible.”
However, this is not the case with language. Searle’s expresses himself on this point.
“Since sentences – the sounds that come out of one’s mouth or the marks that one makes on
paper – are, considered in one way, just objects in the world like any other objects, their
capacity to represent is not intrinsic but is derived from the Intentionality of the mind. The
Intentionality of mental states, on the other hand, is not derived from some more prior forms of
Intentionality but is intrinsic to the states themselves. An agent uses a sentence to make a
statement or ask a question, but he does not in that way use his beliefs and desires, he simply has
them. A sentence is a syntactical object on which representational capacities are imposed:
beliefs and desires and other Intentional states are not, as such, syntactical objects (though they
may be and usually are expressed in sentences), and their representational capacities are not
imposed but are intrinsic.”
Searle further dealt on this matter on his Speech Act Theory. The following sentences,
taken from Speech Acts, help explain what all this means. Searle says: “Imagine a speaker and a
hearer and suppose that in the appropriate circumstances the speaker utters one of the following
sentences: 1Sam smokes habitually; 2Does Sam smoke habitually?; 3Sam, smoke habitually! (This
one might be deviant, that is, one that a normal English speaker might not utter.); 4 Would that
Sam smoked habitually. (1969: 22). Fotion (2000) explicated that when a speaker utters any of
the sentences the referring act is the same. From the sentences, “Sam” is the person being
referred to while the predicating act is “smoking habitually”. The referring act “Sam” and the
predicating act “smoke habitually” taken together make up what Searle calls the propositional
act. Uttering just the propositional act is like uttering (or writing) “Sam’s habit of smoking”.
Fotion (2000) clarified that if a speaker uttered that much and never expound it, the
hearers/listeners would likely be puzzled and not understand what the person is trying to mean.
Hence, Searle's theory of speech acts is a general account of illocutionary acts, which includes
the sub-actions of referring and predicating to form propositional acts with propositional content.
Thus, it distinguishes between "illocutionary acts," which he regards as the "complete" speech
acts, and "perlocutionary acts," which concern the consequences or effects of illocutionary acts
on hearers. Further, the illocutionary effect is concerned with language rules while
perlocutionary effect deals with causes. Thus, on this note: sentence 1: “Sam smokes habitually”
expresses assertion; sentence 2: “Does Sam smoke habitually?” expresses a question; sentence 3:
“Sam, smoke habitually!” issues a request; and, sentence 4: “Would that Sam smoked
habitually” expresses a wish.
However, to know about the structure an individual must be cognizant on the language
process. Searle and further enumerated by Fotion (2000) stated that it requires taking account of:
(a) the speaker’s intention to send a message; (b) his intention to have his intention to send a
message recognized by the hearer and (c) the intention to have the hearer recognize that the
message being sent is in accordance with the language rules of a shared language. These
propositions is also reflected in a communication process where sender sends the message and he
ensures that the receive received the message in the most comprehensible way. Failing to do so
would warrant miscommunication from the communicators. This type of communication process
is evident to Searle’s input and output conditions. The former refer to the speaker, the latter to the
hearer. The requirement for both conditions should meet the criteria that both speaker and hearer
understand the language being used, both are conscious of what they are doing, neither is
suffering from some physical impediment (e.g. the speaker has laryngitis and the hearer is deaf)
that might block communication and that they are not engaged in some special activity such as
play acting. Searle turns to his four “characterizing” conditions which, in summary form, are: the
propositional content condition (the “what” of a speech act); the preparatory conditions (the
background of a speech act); the sincerity condition (the hearer’s accompanying psychological
feelings and thoughts); the essential condition (what the speaker wants to accomplish
linguistically by issuing a speech act). The role intentions, preparatory conditions, the sincerity
condition, and the essential condition play in the process of making communication between and
among people who understand the same context, language, and intentions possible.
It can be concluded that Searle wanted to prove that mind and language relate to one
another and both exhibit intentionality. According to him, everyone is driven by his/her
intentions which are all intrinsically imprinted in his/her mind. Hence, it could make language
invincible as it is already embedded in the culture, tradition, religion, and mind among others
which cannot be changed only if it is spoken, meant and interpreted. Thus, it could be implied
that if a language takes on a life of its own it can cast everyone’s mind in how it thinks. This is
the probable reason why everyone says that that words (language, speech acts) have its own
meaning.
REFERENCES

Searle, J. (1969). “"Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language".

Searle, J. (1983). "Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind".
Searle, J. (2004). “Mind : A Brief Introduction”. Oxford University Press
Fotion, N. (2000). “John Searl”. Routledge
Tsohatzidis, S. (2007). “John Searle's Philosophy of Language : Force, Meaning and Mind”.
Cambridge University Press