Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No.

189185, August
16, 2016

Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural
practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City, viz.:

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. 3 The
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the
newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban
against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs
through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.5 They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise
of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation
of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section
5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance
because it would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and
business in the interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of
promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of
the Local Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because the distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being
more deleterious than other modes; that aerial spraying produces more drift that
causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and obnoxious experience the part of
the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even with use by the respondents
of highly advanced apparatus, such as the Differential Global Positioning System,
Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers, Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray Valve System,
Control and Display Unit and the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System;36 that
because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied by the
respondents), there is no need to provide for a substantial distinction based on the
level of concentration;37 that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they
become air pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and the activity thus falls under the authority of the local
government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and
promote human health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.

1
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not
thereby oblige the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the
respondents only choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the
transition period by erroneously adding the months required for each of the stages
without considering other steps that may be simultaneously undertaken; 39 that the
Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,40 by which the
six-month period for the folding-up of business operations was declared a legitimate
exercise of police power; that the respondents did not present any documentary
evidence on the feasibility of adopting other methods; 41 that only 1,800 hectares out
of 5,200 hectares of plantations owned and operated by PBGEA's members use
aerial spraying, hence, the perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on
aerial spray to the banana industry is entirely misleading; 42 that the urgency of
prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-month transition period; that the
complaints of the community residents - ranging from skin itchiness, contraction
and/or tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in breathing after
exposure to spray mist - only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm
to the residents; that considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R.
Panganiban, a pharmacologist and toxicologist, established that fungicides could
cause debilitating effects on the human body once inhaled or digested, the CA erred
in holding that there was no correlation between aerial application and the
complaints of the residents; that given that aerial spray produces more drift and is
uncontrollable compared to the other methods of applying fungicides, the ordinance
becomes reasonable;43 and that the medical-related complaints of the residents
need not be proven by medical records considering that these were based on
personal knowledge.44 chanrobleslaw

The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a valid
exercise of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable; that
the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a
portion of their landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer
zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone does
not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their property; 45 and
that the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property
owners that the use of property bears a social function.

Ruling:

II
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. 108 In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable. 109 chanrobleslaw

2
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government.110 A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.111 The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 112 chanrobleslaw

Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action.113 This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge. 114 chanrobleslaw

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being

unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months
after publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate
time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives
them of efficient means to combat the Black Sigatoka disease.

The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of
protecting the health of the residents.

We find for the respondents.

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application

within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected
plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the
RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying
within three months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the
conversion.115 In the assailed decision, the CA appropriately observed:

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone
will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations.117 As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents
and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the
three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute
abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under
Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the
imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the
beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.

3
The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,118 we have thoroughly explained that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its
property, viz.

The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the
effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of
the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer
zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring
payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if
the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or
productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and
completely deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make
other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its
supposed collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the
ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by
prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of
concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter
buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the
landholding.

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures
every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of
equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
legitimate governmental objective.119 chanrobleslaw

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction,120 nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. 121 The guaranty of
equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
classification.122 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.123 In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. 124chanrobleslaw

Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.

4
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the
Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test.125 This test
requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its
exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means
employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.126 To determine the propriety of the
classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.

The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis
test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative
purpose.127 The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or
social welfare,128 or to any other case not involving a suspect class. 129 chanrobleslaw

When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be

treated under intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. 130 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the
law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially
related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad generalizations.131 chanrobleslaw

The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly

interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 132 chanrobleslaw

The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning
residents of Davao City argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny
approach when it declared that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the ban included all substances including water and vitamins. The
respondents agree with the CA, however, and add that the ordinance does not rest
on a valid distinction because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the
classifications of pesticides observed by the FPA.

We partly agree with both parties.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and
(2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based
on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. 133 chanrobleslaw

5
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to
be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the
avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under
Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on
purpose (elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification found in Section 4
of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the
classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned
because the ordinance does not make any express or implied reference to it. We
have to search the voluminous records of this case to divine the animus behind the
action of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying as an
agricultural activity. The effort has led uS to the following proposed resolution of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod,134viz.:

The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance

because of the unstable wind direction during the aerial application, which (1) could
potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources; (2)
was detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in
the. nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly,
the mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift resulting
from the aerial application; hence, the classification based on the intent of the
proposed ordinance covered all agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of
fungicides that caused drift.

The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.

A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address
is necessary.

Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods of application and

equipment,135 the choice of which methods depend largely on the objective of
distributing the correct dose to a defined target with the minimum of wastage due to
"drift."136 The term "drift" refers to the movement of airborne spray droplets, vapors,
or dust particles away from the target area during pesticide application. 137 Inevitably,
any method of application causes drift, which may either be primary or secondary.
As fittingly described by scholars:

Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through

airplanes, ground sprayers, airblast sprayers or irrigation systems. 139 Several factors
contribute to the occurrence of drift depending on the method of application, viz.: Ch

The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are
aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual
spraying.140 However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against
aerial spraying.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the
environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement
that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?

6
We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment.141 A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted
with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. 143 A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational
means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the
law.144
chanrobleslaw

The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be
sustained in view of the petitioners' failure to substantiate the same. The
respondents have refuted this claim, and have maintained that on the contrary,
manual spraying produces more drift than aerial treatment145 As such, the decision
of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness.

Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
"overinclusive" because its .impending implementation will affect groups that have
no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will
unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in
the intended class based on the purpose of the law. 146 chanrobleslaw

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance
applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the
agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially treat
their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances.
The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides
and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable
inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience,
discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to
address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities including the
respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever to the intended
purpose of the ordinance.

The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not based
on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does the rational basis scrutiny
automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the
wisdom of the local legislature.148 To reiterate, aside from ascertaining that the
means and purpose of the ordinance are reasonably related, the classification should
be based on a substantial distinction.

However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a

distinction based on the level of concentration or the classification imposed by the
FPA on pesticides. This strenuous requirement cannot be expected from a local
government unit that should only be concerned with general policies in local
administration and should not be restricted by technical concerns that are best left

7
to agencies vested with the appropriate special competencies. The disregard of the
pesticide classification is not an equal protection issue but is more relevant in
another aspect of delegated police power that we consider to be more appropriate in
a later discussion.

The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6
by virtue of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. This
requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding,
geographical location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing
characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be
avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial
technology because of the financial capital required therefor.

The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more
burdensome to the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve
the 30-meter belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be identified
through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in
a survey plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as
to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone
shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than what are being grown
therein.149 The arbitrariness of Section 6 all the more becomes evident when the
land is presently devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables, and trees
or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are then to be planted. It
is seriously to be doubted whether such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of
the drift to the nearby residential areas.

Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities
engaging in organic farming, and' do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide
drift. The classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.

A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the

governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. 150 Where
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater
discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary. 151 In this light, we strike down
Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious
classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.

The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in
its Section 2, to wit:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to
eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural
activities by all entities within Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only
ideal venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial
spraying. It effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed at
efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other
crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the
spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their
production and harvest. As earlier shown, the effect of the ban will not be limited to
Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading to the
country's economy.

8
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable
in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical
alternatives that will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on their
operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the ordinance. In the view of
Regional Director Roger C. Chio of DA Regional Field Unit XI, the alleged harm
caused by aerial spraying may be addressed by following the GAP that the DA has
been promoting among plantation operators. He explained his view thusly:

Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and Factfinding Activities
on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations,153 submitted by the fact-
finding team organized by Davao City, only three out of the 13 barangays consulted
by the fact-finding team opposed the conduct of aerial spraying; and of the three
barangays, aerial spraying was conducted only in Barangay Subasta. In fact, the
fact-finding team found that the residents in those barangays were generally in favor
of the operations of the banana plantations, and did not oppose the conduct of aerial
spraying.

9
2. SPARK vs Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442. August 08, 2017
Facts:

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody." 3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a)
Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02, dated August 26, 1999, entitled
4

"Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa
Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-
13, dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No.
5

8046 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following
6

Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301, Series of 2014, entitled "An
7

Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00
A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes"
dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an

9

association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular
the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition,
10

arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c)
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive
due process. In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
11

amended by RA 10630. 12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law
enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators. They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical
13

assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the
alleged curfew violator. 14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover
the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night,
and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (b) fail
16

to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose. They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets
17

during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children
of the community. 18

10
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 thereof,
19

contravenes Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
20

imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that
the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be
imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to
the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by
law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They
further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory
parental counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be
out during curfew hours.

Ruling:

The petition is partly granted.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents
of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In
this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right
to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing
curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for
civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as
parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the
privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's
independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and
well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared
for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations]
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
58

and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59

11
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children." In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
60 61

"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only
62

described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents'
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. The rationale for the State's
63

deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court
in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti), as follows:
64

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests." Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to
66

the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children." 67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of
these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision.

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
70

parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their
role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and
the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of
experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that
operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone
to making detrimental decisions during this time. 72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors
are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their
parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively
given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the
73

ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors'
activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
74

infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to
spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities
to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US court observed that the city government "was entitled to
75

12
believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing.
A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the
street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children." Curfews may also aid
76

the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets." Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our
77

local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal
curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents'
right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right
to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates
the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors
from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest. In78

addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if
made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
95

State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the
96

interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. 97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e.,
that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775 RA
98 99

9262 RA 9851 RA 9344 RA 10364 RA 9211 RA8980, RA9288, and Presidential Decree
100 101 102 103 104 105 106

(PD) 603, as amended.

107

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It
reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such
curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce
curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other
words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the
minors' exercise of the right to travel.

13
a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared

policies. This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect
133

and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations
by the State. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
134

must give way. As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a
135

compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on
minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and
care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas,
so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them
against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that
citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their
constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the
extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is
possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors
as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social,
religious, or civic. Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored
142

as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other
constitutional rights.

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the
Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely:
(a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those
running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those
working at night. 146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of
legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It
also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas
day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta,
All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday. 147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions
are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms.
To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at
night from school or work. However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and,
148

14
to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon
protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights
than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in
detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from
engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such
activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes
to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such
as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier. This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their
149

religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political
rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside
curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate
activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest
to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments
of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable
relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the
Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot
subsist independently despite the presence of any separability clause.
150

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free
exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

15
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of
these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling
minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and
of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in
the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew
hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even
during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with
these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits
unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly
loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the
strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of
the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure;
the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with
this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing
reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions
must be struck down as invalid.

16
Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This 4

tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates
5

were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners
6

as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay"

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid
for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
8

Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3)
days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’). 9

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop
10

be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending
this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. 11

On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate
12

removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to
petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners
initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. They question respondents’ notice dated February
14

22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due
course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the
Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the
questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining
respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order. 15

On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and
17

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to
question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda
subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the
Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being
oversized are valid and constitutional.

17
Ruling:

II.B

The violation of the constitutional right

to freedom of speech and expression

Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
their regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized are valid and
constitutional.
131

II.B.1

Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. 132

No law. . .

While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law
Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental
acts.

II.B.3

Size does matter

The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expression. The present case is in point.

It is easy to discern why size matters.

First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it
easier to view its messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it
easier for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians,
the passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The
larger the fonts and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their attention and, thus,
the greater the possibility that they will understand its message.

Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader.
From an ordinary person’s perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more
about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived
importance given by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the
message. The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put by the
speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the
public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when they make
the effort to emphasize their messages.

18
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more
opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to
communicate. Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates and an
expression of support, larger spaces can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the
candidates’ platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of ideas,
catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned
electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance
and accountability in our government.

These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political
parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms of public discussion during elections are framed and
kept hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the
candidate. Worse, elections sideline political arguments and privilege the endorsement by
celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact encourage
it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better incentive to demand
discussion of the more important issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former
have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on appearances
and empty promises.

Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are fundamentally part of
158

expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.

II.B.4

There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic
right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to
criticize government actions.

Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open,
[and] ethical dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity." This theory may
159

be considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the
participation of all who will beaffected by the decision." It anchors on the principle that the
160

cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in
161

running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or
nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on
deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable.
Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental
functions.

Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent,
should thus be protected and encouraged.

Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies." 162

In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs." This court has, thus, adopted the
163

principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . . [including
even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 164

19
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This
theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
[the] free trade in ideas:" 165

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 166

The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop
their own conclusions." A free, open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping
167

new ones. This promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and
weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs and economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the]
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us." In fact,
168

free speech may "best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." It is in this context
169

that we should guard against any curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade
of ideas.

Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment," among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
170

Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc, this court discussed as follows:
171

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees. (Emphasis supplied)
172

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an]
important democratic role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation,
and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any]
governmental interference." They also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a
173

free space for the development of individual personality, distinct group identity, and dissident
ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the state." Free speech must be protected as the
174

vehicle to find those who have similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward
common goals.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities
against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic
governance]." Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially
175

vulnerable groups: "the citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by
despotic federal officials" and the minorities who may be oppressed by "dominant factions of
176

the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish ends[.]" According to
177

Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part." We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential
178

oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on public issues.

Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. This provides that
179

"nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]" "[A] dam about to
180

20
burst . . . resulting in the ‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of
restriction’" has been used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets. In order to
181 182

avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful
methods in making passionate dissent. This includes "free expression and political
participation" in that they can "vote for candidates who share their views, petition their
183

legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their
concerns[,]" and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar acts. Free speech must, thus, be
184 185

protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression
of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.

II.B.5

Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. As such, it is
186

subject to regulation by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate. Election propaganda is

187

defined under Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows: SECTION 1.
Definitions . . .

....

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted,
published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of
being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or
a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate
or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers,
and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear
on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-
blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.

On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions,
views and beliefs about issues and candidates." They argue that the tarpaulin was their
188

statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH
Law, and their criticism toward those who voted in its favor. It was "part of their advocacy
189

campaign against the RH Law," which was not paid for by any candidate or political
190

party. Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their]
191

freedom of expression should be declared unconstitutional and void." 192

This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme
of constitutional values." These rights enjoy precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming
193 194

Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:

Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or
otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." (Citations omitted)
195

21
Carpio Morales vs CA , G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et
al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection
with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of

Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). 15 Pursuant
to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification
of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous
activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City
Mayor of Makati:

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension
for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of
a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt
was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati
Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of
bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the
release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public
service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay
in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against
them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas),
to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et
al., upon receipt of the same.

Ruling:

22
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that
the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office
to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157 particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct
harassment or political pressure would."159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the

Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,

composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and
at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for
the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies.
Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the
Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from
political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in
the impairment of their core functions"163; cralawlawlibrary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional
duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon
which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based"; 164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need

for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates
amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil
Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the
effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared
towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence

23
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent
bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive
Department:

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be
abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed,
altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made; cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto
the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial
tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can
be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction
against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of
insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

Kabataan Partylist vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

24
Facts:
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367,
which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by
the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 11, 2012 and December
12, 2012,6 respectively. Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement
a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters 7 in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of
biometric technology.8 RA 10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013,9 and
took effect fifteen (15) days after.10

RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not
been captured shall submit themselves for validation."11 "Voters who fail to
submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated x x
x."12 Nonetheless, voters may have their records reactivated after the May 2016
Elections, provided that they comply with the procedure found in Section 28 13 of RA
8189,14 also known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."15

On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
validation,17 deactivation,18 and reactivation of voters' registration records
(VRRs).19 Among others, the said Resolution provides that: (a) "[t]he registration
records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration
for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be
deactivated in the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be conducted
prior to said elections";20 (b) "[t]he following registered voters shall have their
biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do not have BIOMETRICS
data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who
have incomplete BIOMETRICS data appearing in the VRS";21 (c) "[d]eactivated
voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d) "[d]eactivation x x x shall
comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of
individual notices to the deactivated voters."23 Resolution No. 9721 further
states that, as of the last day of registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on
October 31, 2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics
data.24 Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct [an]
information campaign on the conduct of validation."25 cralawred

On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced

the mandatory biometric system of registration. To make biometric registration
convenient and accessible to the voting public, aside from the COMELEC offices in
every local government unit, it likewise established satellite registration offices in
barangays and mails.26

On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which amended
certain portions28 of Resolution No. 985329 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that
ERBs shall deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to submit for validation despite
notice on or before October 31, 2015," and that the "[d]eactivation for cases
falling under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board

25
hearing."30

A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public
information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing
registration.31

On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which

provides for the "procedures in the deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have
biometrics data in the [VRS] after the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and
validation."33 Among others, the said Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the
lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with
the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) "[s]end individual notices to the affected
voters included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data." 34 It also
provides that "[a]ny opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be filed
not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,35 [Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853."36 During the ERB hearing, which proceedings
are summary in nature,37 "the ERBs shall, based dn the list of voters without
biometrics data, order the deactivation of registration records on the ground of
'failure to validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to "[s]end individual notices to
the deactivated voters within five (5) days from the last day of ERB
hearing."39 Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the "[Registration records
of voters with incomplete biometrics data and those corrupted data
(biometrics) in the database shall not be deactivated and be allowed to
vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized National, Local and [Autonomous Region on
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections."40

On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721,
9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics validation
rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of
deactivation;41 (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;42 (c) biometrics validation gravely violates
the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised
with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable
deprivation of the right to suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded
due process;44 and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as warning
against exacting adherence to the system.45 Albeit already subject of a prior
petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument that
deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the
registration period contrary to Section 847 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray
that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863,
and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from
deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters who
are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to
extend the system of continuing registration and capture of biometric information of
voters until January 8, 2016.

26
Issue:

The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for
the exercise of suffrage:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must
not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of
suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory
disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as
per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive
requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared
towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-
economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good.

To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on
January 15, 1907, mandated that only men who were at least twenty-three (23)
years old and "comprised within one of the following three classes" were allowed to
vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th of August, 1898, held the office of municipal
captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of
any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the value of P500.00, or who
annually pay P30.00 or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak,
read, and write English or Spanish.

When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to
twenty-one (21) and the foregoing class qualification and property requirements
were removed.69 However, the literacy requirement was retained and only men who

27
were able to read and write were given the right to vote. 70 It also made women's
right to vote dependent on a plebiscite held for such purpose. 71

During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the
literacy and property requirements to broaden the political base and discontinue the
exclusion of millions of citizens from the political systems:

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as

fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position
or office, or to perform a public duty or function." 76

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse

on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration",
which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's
qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v. Abaño,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it
was stated that "[t]he act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not
one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a
qualified voter without exercising the right to vote." 79 In said case, this Court
definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a
qualification for the right of suffrage:

Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a

qualification for such right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully
enjoined. Section 115 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector may

vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the
permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. ( Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still
comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere

procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage." This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth),
wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote
nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:

RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as

"the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a
qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he
resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the
[ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to
systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367,

or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the
policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as

28
part of the registration process:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to establish a clean,

complete, permanent and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of
an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such
other identifiable features."84

Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to

submit themselves for biometrics validation:

Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking

the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."

The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the removal of

the registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book
of voters for failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA
10367]."85 Section 7 states:

Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of

validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the
law creates artificial class of voters86 is more imagined than real. There is no favor
accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient"
only rightfully results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the
intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws, which only works "against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality."87

It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189
already provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the
disqualifications under the Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed.

With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation

imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721,
9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It
was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a
mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would
do well to be reminded of this Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it
was held that:

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a

literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers
of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which
is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to

29
further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in
this case.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the

standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection.92 As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.93

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest,94 and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same.95

In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement
under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to
facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing - if not
eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L.
Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as
to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly
reflective of the genuine will of the people.96 The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the
above-said interest. Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for
biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a)
personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent
evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It
is, in effect, a manner of updating one's registration for those already registered
under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-registration
process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel
technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has
enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be
inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain
days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are
remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an
administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not turned a blind eye to
these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by holding continuous
registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of
18 months. To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC
even went to the extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in
shopping malls and conducted the same on Sundays.98 Moreover, it deserves
mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered

30
voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it
only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall
remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising
their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still
apply for reactivation99 following the procedure laid down in Section 28100 of RA
8189.

That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently
justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest.

31