BIRAOGO v.
PTC (HENRY) submission of a report containing conclusions and
December 7, 2010 | Menodza, J. | Equal Protection Clause
PETITIONER: Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo
RESPONDENTS: The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
SUMMARY: Biraogo assails in the SC the constitutionality of EO 1 which
created the PTC, an ad hoc committee assigned to invesitate the members of the
previous (Arroyo) administration with regard to graft and corruption. Biraog
contends that it is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution, as it
specifically investigates only the previous administration. The SC indeed ruled
that it is violative and hence void, as it fails to be applied to all members of the
same class since it will only investigate the Arroyo Admin, and not all the past
administrations.
DOCTRINE: Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Hence, in for a classification to be
reasonable as far as a class is concerned, it must be applied to ALL members,
and not to only a particular one.
FACTS:
1. The genesis of the two cases (1 st case yung kay Biraogo) at hand can be
traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when Senator
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with
his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap”.
2. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, PNoy found a need for a
special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous admin. Hence, his signing of EO 1.
3. By virtue of EO 1, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created. This
is a mere ad hoc body formed under the office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit
its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the
Ombudsman.
4. Basically, PTC’s function is to collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information. It cannot
impose criminal, civil, or administrative penalties or sanctions.
5. The characteristics of truth commissions, such as the PTC, are as follows:
a. They examine only past events
b. They investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of
time, as opposed to a particular event
c. They are temporary bodies that finish heir work with the
recommendations
d. They are officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the
state
6. After barely a month of the issuance of EO 1, the petitioners asked the
Court to declare it unconstitutional and enjoin PTC from performing its
functions. They are claiming that, EO 1 vioates the equal protection clause
because it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable. Hence, this petition.
7. Respondents, through OSG, on the other hand, in their consolidated
comment argue that it does nto violate equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN EO 1 is violative of the equal protection clause - YES
RULING: SC granted the petition.
RATIO:
1. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the reuqirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government.
2. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut down is the equal
protection clause.
3. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner.
4. The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
5. Equal protectgion does not require universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
amonge equals as determined according to a valid classification.
6. Such classification shall pass the reasonableness test:
a. Rests on substantial distinctions
b. Germane to the purpose of the law
c. Not limited to existing conditions
d. Applies equally to all members of the same class
7. SC ruled that, EO 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
8. It must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is nto a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
9. “Superficial differences do nto make for a valid classification” (Justice
Isagani Cruz)
10. It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope
is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its
focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
laws should not in any way be circumvented.
11. Corona, C.J, separate: Given the indubitably clear mandate of EO 1, does
the identification of the Arroyo Admin as the subject of the Truth
Commsision’s investigation pass the jurisprudential test of reasonableness?
Stated differently, doe sthe mandate of EO 1 violate equal protection clause
of the Constitution? Yes.
12. Carpio, dissenting: These are not only reasonable but also compelling
grounds for the Truth Commission to prioritize the investigation of the
Arroyo Admin. To prioritize based on reasonable and even compelling
grounds is not to discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly. In any
event, there is no violation of the equal protection clause just because the
authorities focus their investigation or prosecution on one particular alleged
law-breaker, for surely a person accused of robbery cannot raise as a
defense that other robbers like him all over the country are not being
prosecuted. By the very nature of an investigation or prosecution, there
must be a focus on particular act or acts of a person or a group of persons. A
claim of selective prosecution that violates the equal protection clause be
raised only by the party adversely affected by the discriminatory act.
13. Carpio-Morales, dissenting: petitioners cannot properly assert the equal
protection caim of the previous admin. While legislators have locus standi
in certain cases, their legal standing as such is recognized only insofar as
assailed issuance affects their functions as legislators. Breacgh of equal
protection clause raised by petitioner-legislators on behalf of the Executive
Department of the immediate past admin has nothing to do with the
impairment of the powers of Congress. Carpio-Morales finds nothing
arbitrary or unreasonable in the Truth Commission’s defined scope of
investigation. In issues involving the equal protection clause, the test
developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness which has 4 requisites:
a. Classification rests on substantial distinctions
b. Germane to the purpose of the law
c. Not limited to existing conditions only
d. Applies equally to all members of the same class
14. Nachura, concurring and dissenting: In the area of equal protection
analysis, a court objects the legislative/ executive action to one of the three
levels of scrutiny, depending on the class of persons and rights affected by
the action:
a. Rational basis scrutiny – presence of any plausible legitimate
objective for the classification, where the classification serves to
accomplish at objective to any degree, no matter how tiny, would
validate the classification. To be invalidated, the test requires:
i. it has absolutely no conceivable legitimate purpose
ii. it is so uinconnected to any conceivable objective, that is
ubsurd, utterly arbitrary, whimsical, or erven perverse
b. Intermediate scrutiny
c. Strict scrutiny
15. Peralta, separate concurring: The distinctions cited by the OSG are not
substantial to separate the previous administration as a distinct class from
prior administrations as subject matter for investigation for the purpose of
ending graft and corruption. There is no substantial distinction cited
between public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration and public officers who may
be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during prior
administrations in relation to the purpose of ending graft and corruption.
16. Abad, separate dissenting: The idea behind the “equal protection clause”
is that public authorities should treat all persons or things equally in terms
of rights granted to and responsibilities imposed on them. As an element of
due process, the equal protection clause bars arbitrary discrimintation in
favor of or against a class whether in what the law provides and how it is
enforced.
17. Sereno, dissenting: The majority decision defeats the constitutional
mandate on public accountability; it effectively tolerates impunity for graft
and corruption. Its invocation of the constitutional clause on equal
protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse of the same and is a
disservice to those classes of people for whom the constitutional guarantee
was created as a succor. The majority decision accomplished this by
completely disregarding the “reasonableness” and all its jurisprudential
history as constitutional justification for classification and by replacing the
analytical test of reasonableness with mere recitations of general case
doctrines to arrive at its forced conclusion.
18.