How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

: A Poliheuristic Perspective
Author(s): Alex Mintz
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Feb., 2004, Vol. 48, No. 1, The Poliheuristic
Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb., 2004), pp. 3-13
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176265

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How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

ALEX MINTZ
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University

United Nations Studies

Yale University

Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PH
postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by
applying a "noncompensatory principle" to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a criti-
cal, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are
acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker uses
more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the author
applies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles in
this issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statis-
tical, experimental).

Keywords: Decision analysis; poliheuristic theory; multimethod approach

How do foreign leaders, such as Yasser Arafat and Bashir Assad, make decisions?
How did American presidents, such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Dwight
Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, decide to use force or to refrain from using force?
The leading decision paradigm in international relations is the rational actor, expected
utility theory. According to this theory, nations are led by rational, forward-looking
leaders who seek to maximize the expected gains of policy choices in a holistic and
compensatory (additive) fashion (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).'
This special issue offers an alternative to the expected utility (EU) theory of deci-
sion and other rational-analytic decision models. Poliheuristic (PH) choice theory
postulates a two-stage decision process in which the menu for choice is narrowed ini-
tially by a noncompensatory analysis that eliminates options by the use of one or more
heuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an
attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz 1993). Examples of the
noncompensatory heuristic that guides the elimination of options are threats to a
leader's political survival and political constraints on the use of force.

1. Other important decision theories are bureaucratic politics, cybernetic theory, and prospect theory.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 1, February 2004 3-13

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261056

? 2004 Sage Publications

3

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4 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE 1

Types of Decisions Studied by Poliheuristic Theory

Type of Decision Author

Use of force Mintz (1993)

Nonuse of force DeRouen (2003)
Diversionary uses of force DeRouen (2001)
Tests of nuclear weapons Sathasivam (2003)
Initial crisis reaction DeRouen and Sprecher (2004)
War termination Mintz and Geva (1998)
Coalition formation Mintz (1995)
Intraparty rivalry Mintz (1995)
Level of force used in a crisis Redd (2002)
Learning Yang (2003)
Influence of advisers Redd (2002)
War and peace decisions Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000)
Framing Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)
Military uprising Mintz and Mishal (2003)
Defection and retaliation Clare (2003)
Decisions by experts and novices Dacey and Carlson (2004)
Negotiation Eisenband (2003)
Conflict resolution Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000); Mintz and Mishal (2003)

By focusing on a two-stage process, poliheuristic choice theory integrates elements

of the cognitive psychology school of decision making with elements of the rational
choice school. The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory,
nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cogni-
tive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of sur-
viving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are
more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations
are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process.
The poliheuristic model is applicable to single decisions, group decisions, sequen-
tial decisions, and decisions in strategic settings. Poliheuristic theory focuses on both
the process of decision making and the outcome of decisions and explains why and
how decisions are made by world leaders. A key premise of poliheuristic theory is that
policy makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions, including
strategies that are suboptimal (Mintz et al. 1997).
Although poliheuristic theory has been in existence only since 1993, the PH
research program has already received considerable attention in such leading journals
as the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, and numerous
conferences, including those sponsored by the American Political Science Asso-
ciation (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), Midwest Political Science
Association (MPSA), Peace Science Society International (PSSI), and the Interna-
tional Society for Political Psychology (Redd 2003, 101).

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 Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 5

TABLE 2

The Poliheuristic Decision Calculus in American Foreign Policy

President Crisis Author

Eisenhower Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954) DeRouen (2003)

Eisenhower Guatemala (1954) Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)
Reagan Grenada (1983) DeRouen (2001)
Bush Sr. Iraq (1991) Mintz (1993)
Clinton Kosovo (1998) Redd (2000)

Poliheuristic theory has been applied to a

relations: decisions on the use of force, nonu
escalation, crisis termination, framing, lear
tion, and conflict resolution (see Table 1 an
Table 2 lists cases of poliheuristic decision
hower, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) previou
Mintz (1993), Redd (2000), and Taylor-Rob
for the use of the noncompensatory princ
cases.

Goertz (2004) provides additional examples of noncompens

decision making by American presidents:

1. The U.S. political establishment wanted to return the Panam

treaty "was negotiated under Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford
Carter administration. However, public opinion polls showed
move. As a result, there was much hesitation in the Senate r
(Goertz 2004, 20-21).
2. "Realists, such as Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kissinger, considere
in war but were constrained by public opinion" (Goertz 2004, 2

Several scholars have applied poliheuristic theory to decis

Middle East: the late President Hafez al-Assad of Syria (see
Trusty 2000), former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakista
former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (see Mintz 2000),
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority (see Clare 2003; Mintz a
(2003), Mintz (1995), and Mintz and Mishal (2003) have also a
theory to cases involving Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Ra
and Sharon). These case studies are listed in Table 3. Obvious
political constraints in nondemocratic societies are different
democratic leaders.
Poliheuristic theory has also been used to explain other theories of international
relations. For example, DeRouen (2001, 70) claimed that diversionary theory is con-
sistent with the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic choice theory "for the
president is unlikely to select any alternative in which the political dimension is not

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6 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

TABLE 3

Poliheuristic Studies of Decisions by Leaders in the Middle East

Leader Country/Entity Decision Author

Hafez al-Assad Syria Syria's peace and war decisions Astorino-Courtois and Trusty
vis-a-vis Israel (2000)
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Patterns of conflictual and Clare (2003)
Authority cooperative interactions
with Israel

Yasser Arafat Palestinian Decisions during the Palestinian Mintz and Mishal (2003)
Authority Intifada of 2000-2002
Saddam Hussein Iraq Gulf War of 1991 Mintz (2000)
Netanyahu, Peres, Israel Decisions before and after the Clare (2003)
Rabin Oslo Accord of 1993

Yitzchak Shamir Israel Decisions on coalition formation Mintz (1995)

in 1992, 1994
Nawaz Sharif Pakistan Pakistan's decision to test the Sathasivam (2003)
bomb in 1998

Ariel Sharon Israel Decisions during the Intifada Mintz and Mishal (2003)

satisfied for fear of political repercussions." Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that the
noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory helps explain the democratic peace
phenomenon because leaders of democracies refrain from attacking another democ-
racy because it is politically too costly. However, no such constraint is placed on demo-
cratic leaders when the opponent is nondemocratic (Mintz and Geva 1993). The
authors also showed that the noncompensatory principle played a role in President
Bush's 1991 war termination decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein in Baghdad
when then-president Bush was enjoying very high levels of public approval (Mintz
and Geva 1998).
Studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far only used case studies and experimen-
tal analysis. The contributors to this special issue offer multiple tests of poliheuristic
theory with multiple methods (formal, statistical, and experimental).

WHAT IS POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING?

The term poliheuristic can be broken down into "the roots poly (ma
tic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by de
to simplify complex foreign policy decisions" (Mintz et al. 1997, 55
refers to the notion that political leaders measure gains and losses in
Poliheuristic theory postulates that when making decisions, policy m
two-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that
able to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and
alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizi

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 Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 7

minimizing risks (see Mintz 1993, 2003; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 19
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).2
Poliheuristic theory sees domestic politics as "the essence of decision." High
cal audience costs are nonadditive. Avoiding major loss is noncompensatory (se
Goertz 2004). Domestic political audience costs are an integral part of foreign
decision making. Policy makers are political actors whose self-interest in politic
vival is paramount (Russett and Barzilai 1992; Sathasivam 2003). Consequently
icy makers are likely to reject outright any alternative that poses potentially ver
political costs, even if that same alternative also yields potentially high benef
other dimensions (although military and strategic considerations are also no
pensatory under certain conditions).

TWO-STAGE GAMES

Poliheuristic theory identifies a process by which leaders make decision

simplifying complex foreign policy decisions while focusing on the dimens
decision. They then evaluate remaining alternatives using analytic processi
of alternatives is reduced to a more manageable size by employing a noncom
decision analysis. Sathasivam (2003, 57) therefore argued that poliheuris
goes beyond previous attempts to predict foreign policy decisions that use
actor" or "bureaucratic politics" models by looking not only at why dec
made but also at how these decisions were made (see also Christensen and R
Whereas several theories of political decision making originated in econom
theory of political decision making because it specifically postulates that le
major political loss and that such a loss is noncompensatory for politica
makers.

Poliheuristic theory is compatible with a host of contingency theories o

and judgment that attribute to the decision maker sufficient flexibility in a
decision process to changing problems and conditions (Beach and Mit
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Tetlock 1992). The main characterist
theory are as follows:

* Poliheuristic theory is dimension based, noncompensatory, nonholistic, satisf

order sensitive (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen 1994). This set of characterist
guishes it from other theories of decision making (expected utility theory, cybe
ory, prospect theory).
* In strategic settings, such as those that characterize many war and peace dec
Morrow 1997), the poliheuristic decision maker eliminates, in the first stage, no
or her noncompensatory alternatives but also alternatives perceived to be
infeasible for an opponent (for an example, see Astorino-Courtois and Trusty
reduced choice sets can then be subjected to a standard game-theoretic analy
second stage of the decision (Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001).

2. Experimental studies have shown that analytic decision models, such as expected utilit
likely to be employed by decision makers when the number of alternatives available to the leader

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8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

* In sequential settings, each decision in the sequence of decisions is a tw

heuristic decision. Thus, Saddam Hussein's decisions in fall 2002 and spring
viewed as a sequence of poliheuristic decisions on whether to cooperate (mi
United Nations inspectors.
* In sequential and interactive (strategic) situations,3 each decision is part of
decisions by both players in a strategic interaction, each employing poliheu
tions in each decision node in a strategic setting (see Eisenband 2003). Acco
thesis, Saddam Hussein and George Bush have engaged in a sequential an
poliheuristic game consisting of numerous mini-decisions.

Because it uses decision shortcuts and rules of thumb, poliheuristic

explain complicated foreign policy decisions. It is unique in its ability
multiple players, multiple alternatives, and multiple dimensions, such as
terizing N-adic arms races, N-nation alliance decisions, and environmen
It is inherently built on the assumption that policy makers simplify comp
sion problems by first using simple cognitive shortcuts and then applyi
decision calculus to arrive at a choice.

Poliheuristic theory can be refuted and falsified by finding the decision process to
be compensatory, alternative based, holistic, or order insensitive. As the authors of
articles in this issue show, however, the theory is quite robust.

AN EXAMPLE OF
PO,IHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

At the core of the poliheuristic theory is the noncompensatory princip

making. It serves to eliminate alternatives in the first stage of the decisi
example, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament vetoed the propose
of 62,000 U.S. troops to Turkey as a launching pad for a possible attac
This decision was reportedly due to strong public opposition to deploy
troops on Turkish soil despite promises from the United States for a hug
package, worth $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees, and U.S. pr
Europeans to accept Turkey into the European Union. Although the econ
itary benefits associated with cooperation with the United States were hu
cal costs for the Turkish parliament were apparently negative and noncom
The move by the Turkish parliament is a good example of the use
compensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in decisions by state lea
politicians. Despite a very high score on the economic aid dimension, a
the political (public opinion) dimension did not compensate for the e

3. In these situations, the poliheuristic (PH) model resembles the logic of the iterat
elimination procedure in game theory, yet the PH model specifically predicts that the po
noncompensatory, assumes a two-stage process rather than an iterated elimination process co
eral steps, uses decision weights, and is also applicable to very complex decision situatio
players with multiple options. In dynamic situations, the PH model often predicts outcomes
from those reached using games of strategic interactions that are based on rational choi
settings, PH eliminates from the outset unacceptable alternatives (such as doing nothing),
tives do not reappear during the decision process.

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 Mintz /HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 9

nomic benefits, and the deployment of force alternative was not approved by m
of the parliament. In noncompensatory terms, there were no substitution eff
trade-offs between the political and economic dimensions of the decision.4
Turkey has been torn between widespread public opposition to a war agai
fellow Muslim state and intense pressure from Washington. At the time the d
was made, the expectations, according to Reuters (March 1, 2003), were that
would, "almost certainly, lose an almost concluded financial aid package amoun
some $6 billion in U.S. grants and up to $24 billion in loan guarantees." The p
for deployment of U.S. forces was rejected by the Turks, even in face of a ma
package from the United States and military-strategic commitment to Turkey f
United States and Great Britain. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal welcomed t
come and said, "This has shown again that the whole world now has to give impo
to national [public] opinion and show understanding of parliament when appr
Turkey" (Reuters, March 1, 2003).
Once the option to deploy U.S. forces on Turkish soil had been rejected by
ment, the Turkish government evaluated the remaining alternatives that adva
the second stage of the decision process and decided, in an attempt to minimize
costs and maximize benefits, to allow air passage over Turkey's airspace to co
planes.
The noncompensatory political loss aversion variable in poliheuristic theory can be
operationalized in several ways as follows:

? Threat to a leader's survival

? Significant drop in public support for a policy

? Significant drop in popularity
? The prospects of an electoral defeat
? Domestic opposition
? Threat to regime survival
? Intraparty rivalry and competition
? Internal or external challenge to the regime
? Potential collapse of the coalition, government, or regime
? Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader
? Demonstrations, riots, and so forth
? The existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government)

NEXT STEPS IN THE POITHEURISTIC

RESEARCH PROGRAM

The next steps in the PH research program are as follows:

* Apply poliheuristic theory to key issues and puzzles in international relations:

on alliance formation and dissolution, deterrence decisions, armament and disa

4. A reviewer of this article has pointed out that a much larger amount of economic aid to Tu
have eventually "compensated" for domestic opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops.

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10 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

decisions, diversionary uses of force, counterterrorism, enduring rivalry,

Apply PH to other important domains in international relations-e.g., In
Political Economy (IPE)-while analyzing economic aid and trade decision
mental decisions, financial decisions, and so on. Apply PH decision making
tion formation process and to bargaining.
* Develop empirical criteria to identify (a) "key" decision dimensions, (b) the
for when the noncompensatory (avoid major loss) principle applies, and (c)
tions under which decision makers switch from the first stage of decision ma
second stage in the PH decision calculus.
* Automate poliheuristic theory and PH decision rules. This will make it easie
to apply and test the theory using different data sets on a variety of geograp
torical contexts.

* Identify poliheuristic equilibria, that is, spell out the conditions under which players in a
strategic setting reach an equilibrium in an interactive two-stage poliheuristic process.
* Compare PH conceptually and empirically to cybernetic and expected utility models of
the use of force. For example, compare PH findings to Ostrom and Job's (1986) and
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) findings.
* Assess whether bureaucratic/organizational political constraints or domestic political
constraints are more salient and influential as noncompensatory domestic dimensions of
decision making.
* Examine the impact of framing and marketing on poliheuristic choice. In contrast to
expected utility, PH is order sensitive. Is it also affected by the way alternatives, dimen-
sions, and implications are framed? Examine the link between affect and PH decision
making.
* Extend the PH model to group decision making and sequential decision making, which
characterize many foreign policy situations. The simplest representation of PH is as a sin-
gle individual making choices based on the noncompensatory decision principle. How-
ever, political choices in bureaucratic or democratic settings are often the product of
group and societal processes in which an individual leader must interact with others to
make and implement choices.

MULTIMETHOD TESTS OF THE THEORY

As pointed out above, most studies of poliheuristic theory have thus f

case studies and experiments in studying leaders' decisions. The contrib
special issue go beyond the case study method and process-tracing analys
ing multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (statis
experimental).5
Stoll (forthcoming) points out that research that relies on any one me
usually inferior to research that makes use of several methods. It is a rare
which "one method is so superior that the others can safely be ignored.
multimethod approach in international relations is rare (but see Maoz et al
ing, for a multimethod analysis of conflict management and conflict r
well as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's 1992 work applying multiple m
decisions to initiate wars).

5. Consistent with the policy of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, articles in this issue
by at least two anonymous referees.

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 Mintz /HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 11

A multimethod approach to foreign policy analysis can

1. cross-validate results based on different methods of inquiry,

2. help generalize results beyond a specific case,
3. contribute to theory development because different methods (e.g., formal, case stu
may uncover unexpected findings that may be reincorporated into a refined theory a
retested,
4. enhance confidence in results and substantiate or refute theory,
5. identify differences and similarities in results based on methods used,
6. lead to robust and standardized results, thus contributing to scientific advancement in
international relations (Mintz 2003).

Specifically, in this special issue, Goertz (2004) uses formal theory and spatial
analysis to formalize and extend poliheuristic theory. Dacey and Carlson (2004) use a
formal model to compare decision making of experts and nonexperts in foreign policy.
DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) use probit analysis on a data set of N-nations' initial
reaction to international crisis. Christensen and Redd (2004) and Mintz (2004) use
experimental tests of the theory, and Stern (2004) provides a qualitative overview of
poliheuristic theory relating it to other emerging theories of foreign policy decision
making: problem representation, decision units, and cognitive constructivism.

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