Marketing Research 12th Edition Aaker

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 Teaching Notes for Cases
Case 6-1

PROMOTION OF ROCKET SOUP

It is easy to see that weeks 5, 12, 23, 36 and 37 were important sales weeks for Rocket.
Additionally, weeks 2, 8 and 31 were important sales weeks for the competition. The impact
of these weeks and nearby weeks were illustrated by changes in total category volume, total
category dollar spending, Rocket’s and competitors volume, and sales in the weeks following
high volume movement. It also appears that promotions work quite well, and there is high
demand elasticity. Consumers aren’t brand loyal and see many substitutes. However, it
appears that price wars are damaging, and don’t produce the desired effects for the soup
makers.

Week 2
In week 2 it can be inferred that one or more of Rocket’s competitors held promotional
activities, since Rocket’s price was $ 1.11 a can and the category price in week 2 was $.68 a
can (category dollars/category volume). This resulted in Rocket’s share to drop from 5.1% to
2.4%. Total category volume increased by 139% to 14,288 cans ( 1 4, 288- 5984)/5 984), and
category dollars increased to $ 9780. Rocket’s volume did increase by 12.7%, but this is a
slight increase compared to its competitors’ volume, which increased by 146%. Sales in
weeks 3 and 4 were fairly stable, as it appears that neither Rocket nor its competitors entered
into any sizable promotional activities.

Week 5
In week 5, it appears that Rocket lowered its price $.16 to $.63 a unit and enjoyed a 389%
increase in sales volume, along with a 57.4% gain of the market. Its average competitor’s
price was $.83 in week 5, and their volume dropped by 31 % to 3269. Total category volume
and spending increased relatively slightly at 36% and 23% respectively, which leads to the
conclusion that Rocket was the only supplier engaged in vast promotional activity. Sales in
the weeks between 5 and 8 went back to normal, with Rocket’s share of the market coming
down to its usual 8% to 10%. There was no real significant change in category dollars or
volume, and there was little promotional activity initiated by Rocket or its competitors.

Week 8
In week 8, Rocket’s share of the market dropped all the way to 4.5%, which had to be due to
vast promotional activities partaken by one or (probably) more of its competitors. Their
competitors’ volume rose by 115% to 11,066, while Rocket’s volume only increased by 15%
to 513. Rocket’s price was $.98 a unit, while its competitors’ average price was $.72. Total
category volume and spending increased by 107% and 77%, respectively. Between weeks 8
and 12, no substantial activity took place with prices, Rocket’s volume, total volume, and
category spending remaining fairly consistent.

Week 12
In week 12, Rocket launched a promotional blitz. First of all, the price was lowered to $.04.
Rocket’s volume increased 2482%, from 624 units the previous week to 16,113 units, and its
market share grew to 82.1%. Meanwhile, the competitive volume dropped 20% to 3520 units.
Total category volume increase to 19,633 units, but this was solely because of Rocket’s

1
gains. Total category dollars actually declined to $3982, which is mostly due to Rocket sales
at $.04. There must have been many in-store giveaways of rocket soup, weeks 12 through 22,
market share for Rocket was quite volatile, as Rocket and its competitors engaged in price
promotions. Rocket’s revenues fluctuated greatly during this period, as did the total category
dollars.

Weeks 22 and 23
During week 22, it appears that Rocket engaged in store promotions for its soup. its market
share increased to 63.7% while its price ($.96) was not the cause of this. Rocket’s volume
increased over 1300% to 5319 units, while its competitors’ volume dropped 13% to 3033
units. Total category volume and spending increased during week 22, but Rocket was the
main beneficiary.

During week 23, its competitors recovered by increasing volume to 4806 units, while
Rocket’s volume was cut by more than 50% to 2280 units. Rocket’s revenues fell by more
than 67% from week 22, and its market share decreased 32.2% to 5311. This would imply
that many soup manufacturers (Rocket included) intentionally or unintentionally engaged in
price-warfare. In the weeks between 23 and 31 the price warfare seemed to continue. Market
shares for Rocket (and others) was volatile.

Week 31
In week 31, competitive volume reached its all time study high, at 14,642 units, while
Rocket’s volume remained fairly constant from the week before, at 957 units. Rocket’s share
was a paltry 6.1 %, even though its price was fairly cheap {by its own standards), at S.74 a
unit. Category dollars only increased by 39%. What this implies is that one or more of
Rocket’s competitors had promotional blitzes.

In the weeks between 31 and 36, there continued to be great volatility in market share for
Rocket (dropping from 20% down to 3.9% then up to 7.1 %). Rocket volume and competitive
volume went in opposite ends from each other, and this along with price changes and changes
in category dollars, implies that there were disjointed promotional activities that occurred,
and perhaps many of these were done solely by individual stores.

Week 36 and 37
In week 36, Rocket lowered its price 32% to $.74 cents a unit. This helped it to gain back a
huge market share of 47.5% and increase its volume 10-fold and its revenues 7-fold.
Competitive volume decreased 10% to 4550 units, while category volume and dollars
increased to 8672 units and $7699, respectively. The increases were mostly absorbed by
Rocket.

In week 37, Rocket again lowered its price, this time all the way to $.49, which caused a
furthering of the same movements from week 36. Rocket increased volume to a staggering
9190 units, while its revenues increased to $4466. Total category and dollars were also up, to
13,165 units and $8694, respectively. Rocket’s market share lifted off and reached 69.2%
Rockets competitors did not fare as well, as competitive volume decreased again to 4057
units, a 20% decline from week 35.

2
In the weeks that followed, Rocket’s competitors rebounded and gained 91.2% of the market,
while Rocket settled back to 8.8%. Category dollars and volume went back to familiar
territory, and all in all, the market finally seemed to return to a state of normalcy.

Since the price for this promotion is zero, the sensitivity of sales volume to price is not
known. Also the existence of additional requirements for the receipt of the free soup
(purchase of $ 10 of other goods) means the volume of soup demanded at a price of $0.00 is
not known either. Knowledge of the demand curve is not increased by the promotion in week
12 and Rocket won’t have any additional valid information regarding incremental value as a
result of price changes.

Since the receipt of “free soup” does not depend on the consumers normal cycle of
purchasing soup (they will store until needed or wanted), this can be considered to be
borrowed from future sales. It will not only be borrowed from future Rocket sales but also
from other brand’s sales also. The degree of borrowing from Rocket’s future sales will not be
known and will make the impact of the promotion hard to assess. It will also impact sales for
the next 40 + days.

As the graph indicates, there is a strong inverse relationship between the price of Rocket
soup and its corresponding volume sales. However, there is some elasticity differences
between price increases and decreases.

Based on the data given, we project that if Rocket reduces its price by ten percent,
volume sales will increase by approximately 28 percent. Correspondingly, if Rocket soups
increases its price by 10 percent, expected volume sales are expected to decrease by
approximately 22 percent.

In comparing the display only response to the non-promotional response, there are
several similarities and differences. Both types of responses show an inverse relationship
between price and volume; overall, the lower the price, the higher the volume. Occasionally,
in both the display only and the non-promotional responses, this inverse relationship is very
weak, and the volume does not significantly increase when the price is lowered.

The difference between the display only and non-promotional responses to price is the
strength of their inverse relationships between price and volume. When the price is over $1,
the non-promotional volume is greatly reduced. The display only response, however,
supports a higher volume at prices over $1. For example, when the price is over $1, the
display only volume is never below .36. On the other hand, the non-promotional volume is
never over .29. The inverse relationship between price and volume with display only is
stronger, however, when the price is lowered substantially. The display only response is
greater that the non-promotional response when the price is lowered. In both scenarios, when
the price is $.69, the volume increases. However, with the display the volume is
approximately 30% higher at this price than without promotion.

3
 Case 6-2

KERRY GOLD PRODUCTS, INC.

Teaching Suggestions

This case can be used to either: (1) briefly illustrate the depth of supermarket scanner
data obtained from a typical application to a repeat purchased grocery product, or (2) serve as
the basis for a more thorough analysis of the margarine market using the wealth of data
available in the case. The latter is a more revealing use of the case for one only appreciates
the richness of the data, and the possibilities for new insights into market behavior, after
massaging the data in a variety of ways. In this respect, the case is deceptive for a creative
student with a calculator can develop a number of analyses.

The following questions have been found to be useful for focusing on a thorough analysis
of the data:

(a) How would you describe the behavior of consumers in the margarine market?

(b) What effect does promotional activity have on competitive position in the
margarine market?

(c) How would you describe the Kerry Gold strategy? What is your evaluation of this
strategy?

(d) Does scanner data provide significant new insights beyond store audit data and
periodic controlled experiments?

Consumer Behavior in the Margarine Market

Here the students should be asked to combine their personal experience with repeat
purchased products with the scanner data to draw some preliminary conclusions about
consumer behavior.

• a dominant feature of this market is repeat purchase behavior. However, the

inter-purchase time is evidently highly variable in view of the evidence of household
inventory building during periods of low promotional prices. For example, compare
average weekly volume during April (a high promotion period) versus July (a low
promotions period). While there is some seasonal effect, it is striking that average
weekly volume in July is only 58% of the volume in April.

• the market is highly competitive, with four brands struggling to maintain their position.
No doubt these problems are exacerbated by the lack of loyalty, plus a possible threat
of de-authorization of one of the brands because the chain may not want to carry four
brands of a relatively undifferentiated product.

• the chain store probably uses this product category as a traffic builder, by featuring it
weekly in newspaper inserts.

4
Effects of Promotional Activity

The most useful data come from the figure showing the first 18 weeks of a 52-week
analysis. It will be seen that when Kerry Gold reduced its price from $0.58 to $0.38, sales did
not double or triple but were 26 to 32 times the pre-promotional level. One wonders whether
this surge in volume was attenuated by out-of-stock problems. Here the scanner data needs to
be supplemented with audit data. Brand B promotions were more modest, with reductions of
10 to 15 percent and these resulted in sales increases of 3 to 8 times the pre-promotional
level. This data assumes even more importance when we look at the results as a whole,
summarized over the year. In general, it appears that Kerry Gold bought share in the first half
of the year, and Brand B followed suit in the second half, with no discernible effect on the
basic consumer franchise as measured during the weeks in which no brands ran promotions.
This interpretation should be qualified by the possibility that heavy inventory building may
have kept a large “deal prime” segment out of the market for a long period. This could be
tested by looking for shares and volume patterns during the remainder of the year, if there
were longer period when no deals were available.

Kerry Gold Strategy

The strategy of this brand is clearly revealed by the following table that shows the
number of weeks each brand was sold at the major price points:

Price Point Kerry Gold Brand Brand B Brand C Brand D

$0.58 14 weeks 7 weeks 9 weeks 2 weeks

$0.54 6 weeks 10 weeks

$0.49 or $0.50 5 weeks 7 weeks 4 weeks

$0.44 1 week 2 weeks

$0.38 4 week ______ 1 week _______

18 weeks 18 weeks 18 weeks 18 weeks

Also instructive is the finding that 93 percent of the volume of this brand was sold at 38
cents. As a consequence, no other brand exhibits the large swings in weekly volume. One
wonders whether the product manager knows how much volume moves at very low deal
prices. In any event, the strategy as it is executed, is to buy share. Because no other brands
typically meet this price, either the profitability is poor or Kerry Gold is the lowest cost
producer. It is unlikely that the brand is spending anything on franchise building advertising
or promotions.
There are two possible reasons why Kerry Gold spends the bulk of their promotion funds
in the first half of the year. Either it is poor budgeting or poor sales for a control, or the brand
is trying to look good in the first half to maintain their shelf position during the second half.
A more sensible (i.e., profitable) option would be to emulate Brand B or C and offer
more frequent promotions that are less costly. A serious question could also be raised about

5
the evident decision to emphasize price promotions, which has resulted in a weak consumer
franchise.

The Value of Scanner Data

Once product managers are exposed to the level of detail provided by scanner services,
they are unlikely to be satisfied with regular audit data. Indeed, a bimonthly aggregation of
sales data would have completely obscured the volume of sales in this chain that is
attributable to deals. Certainly, with a bigger data base, it should be possible to formulate
reasonable models about the joint effect of weekly absolute price level, and the competitive
price spread for that week on brand sales volume. A useful project would be to have students
specify such a regression model for each of the brands. This model could be used to design
alternative promotional strategies, that could subsequently be tested within a supermarket
chain offering scanner data.

The major limitations are that scanner data does not provide information on stockouts, or
consumer inventory building—which implicates the interpretation of the results—and is not
presently adequate for measuring market share because of limited coverage of sales area.
Some of these problems can be resolved with special studies.

Over the long run, the possibilities are impressive, as the following excerpt from an
analysis of scanner data by a British author (Derek Bloom in the June 1980, Journal of
Advertising Research) suggests.

Future Developments

The Behavior Scan installation may seem futuristic to a British audience, but such
facilities will be widely used in America within the next couple of years for test marketing
and advertising research. By the mid-1980s scanner-store panels could be taking over as the
usual form of retail auditing in the United States for product groups whose sales are not
importantly shared by specialist stores. It will be possible to track very small markets and to
change item specification retrospectively. We may envisage the following developments
toward the end of the decade:

(1) Data will automatically be transmitted by telephone line to the computers analyzing
the figures, and onto the clients, so that they will be available on a basis according to
the clients’ needs: four weekly, weekly, daily, or even hourly. It will be truly
continuous data. The collection of in-store information about promotions, stockouts,
facings and so forth will become a normal part of stores’ own requirements and will
itself be incorporated in the data bank.

(2) Instead of predetermined standard regions, users will be able to specify their own area
requirements in relation to sales regions, climatic regions, or income characteristics.
They will also be able to pick out experimental design-based groupings of towns or
districts for tests.

(3) Eventually, it will not be necessary to equip panel households with special identity
cards because of the growth of the “cashless society,” which will make the use of

6
 credit cards normal in supermarkets, especially in scanner stores. Panel sizes could be
much larger in consequence and conditioning effects reduced still further.

SAMI envisages a “wide variety of report formats including an on-line capability to

query and apply mathematical models to data received from thousands of stores.
Manufacturers will be able to analyze, using robust data, such detailed information as brand
performance in stores stocking their product where a two color store flyer is present
supported by an end-aisle display. While fragments of information of this type are available
today in hard copy formats, extensive data from many, many stores will be accessible via
CRTSs in the future” Partner, 1979).

Though developments in Britain will come on faster than in the United States for a
variety of reasons, no doubt Britain shall still be training by the end of the decade in the
installation and exploitation of scanners. The timetable that seems probable is as follows:

1980-1982: experiments by retailers and by market research companies;

1983-1986: widespread scanner installation and development of specialist research

facilities concentrating on in-store activity;

1987-1989: scanners normal in all but small supermarkets, though still rare in
independents; retail auditing of supermarkets’ sales based on
scanners; scanner-store consumer panels introduced.

Since in my view advertisers will rapidly discover that scanner data are superior to that
which they have received hitherto, conventional auditing methods will wane in popularity. In
addition to their timeliness for marketing action, scanner data will provide real price-point
information on stock availability. Scanner data will miss door-to-door sales, sales through
market stalls and small convenience stores, but for the bulk of the market, the information
will be outstandingly good.

It will have to be borne in mind that the people best placed to exploit the sudden increase
in knowledge about sales and their correlates are the retailers themselves. We can expect
them to develop much more powerful analytic methods for determining what brands and
sizes they should stock, and to forecast the effects of pricing policy on customer flow, sales
and profits. The scanner will not only change methods for the measurement of markets and
marketing activity—and probably change the conclusions that are drawn as well—but it will
also change markets themselves.

One major prospective problem both in the United Kingdom and in America is that of
data indigestion: the sheer quantity of information that will become available will simply not
be capable of being inspected visually in detail—or comprehended if it is. The alternatives
open to users will be either to rest content with highly summarized reports, so losing most of
the benefits that scanner data could provide, or to supplement them by making use of
terminal-based analysis facilities on a large scale. Even so, understanding the findings, and
therefore determining what action is possible and desirable, will be hampered until the
research community has developed norms and models that can make sense of the new kind of
information that increasingly will be available.

7
 Web Case 6-1

PARADISE FOODS

Introduction

This case is an interesting example of the pitfalls of having access to mountains of market
research data. Supermarket scanners, electronic test market facilities and computer-based
marketing models are the new power tools of the packaged goods industry. Services such as
InfoScan and BehaviourScan produce product data which are vastly richer than that which
were available S10 years ago. Getting the data is easy, it’s much more difficult to interpret
the data with the necessary sophistication and caution. The experience of Bill Horton points
out at least three ingredients that are essential to making a sound decision in a case like the
Sweet Dream launch: (1) objectivity, (2) the perspective that comes from having wrestled
with many previous launches, (3) experience in applying complex research and analytical
methods.

Teaching Suggestions

The two assignment questions given at the end of the case are designed to get the students
thinking about whether or not the marketing research techniques used by Paradise Foods
were appropriate and effective. These can provide a starting point for a class discussion about
the benefits and drawbacks of standardized marketing data to supplement the material
covered in the textbook.

A secondary teaching point can be made about new product launches. Bob Murphy, Bill
Horton’s boss, summed up the Paradise philosophy on new products when he said, “You
know how this company works. We don’t hold the withdrawal of a new product against the
manager if withdrawal is the right decision.” Students could be asked to comment on this
statement. While it sounds generous, a company that excuses new product failures because
withdrawal is the right decision is sending out a message that it is not serious about new
products. In some companies, aborting product launches is always the right decision. In the
highly charged and political atmosphere of the Paradise dessert group, people like Barbara
(who see another employee’s success as a threat to their own career) can easily sabotage even
the most promising new product. When you add Bob Murphy to the team - an executive
committed to upholding she staffs quo - the deck is stacked even further against the launch.

Assignment Questions

1. Issues that were overlooked in evaluating Sweet Dream.

Bill Horton has collected a considerable amount of data to support the launch of Sweet
Dream. Indeed, he seems to have too much data in terms of how he has packaged it for the
marketing committee. We can only speculate about what Bill chose to include in his 40-page
report and 30-page appendix, but he failed to persuade a group of managers skeptical of
computer printouts in the first place.

Grateful acknowledgment is given to Jerry Della Femina, William H. Moult and John M. Keenan for their
commentaries on the Paradise Foods case found in the Harvard Business Review (September-October,
1988), which provided the basis for this case solution.

8
 The issues Bill Horton overlooked in evaluating Sweet Dream fall into two categories.
The first is organizational and the second is research related. On the organizational side, the
structure of the Paradise Dessert group is not uncommon. There is a division between new
and established products. Established products are what generate current profits and cash
flows. In a company like Paradise Foods, they are also the products run by the most senior
managers in the group. This type of structure encourages biases that Bill should have
considered. The new data Bill generated after the committee rejected the Sweet Dream
launch was used to attack LaTreat. Bill’s analysis of the product’s faltering franchise seems
persuasive, but confronting Barbara directly demonstrates little political insight. Bill doesn’t
understand the culture at Paradise Foods nor does he seem to understand that launch
decisions at most companies are made on more than just the black-and-white realities of
market tests.

This lack of political understanding is also evident in the type of research Bill collected.
In all his months of research, Bill never addressed explicitly the one issue that most worried
the marketing committee—the cannibalization of LaTreat. The BehaviourScan data suggests
that the two products compete with one another. But the products are very different: one is a
frozen novelty on a stick and the other is a cookie-layered ice cream sandwich. Perhaps
Sweet Dream has certain characteristics, taste, texture, calorie content, etc. that Paradise
could use to distinguish it more clearly from LaTreat, thereby reducing cannibalization. But
Bill doesn’t seem to know what these characteristics might be.

In addition, Bill has not considered all the issues involved in forecasting Sweet Dream’s
post launch performance based on the test market results nor in Paradise’s agenda for the
product. (The rollout might be nation-wide or the company might want to introduce the
product on a regional basis). One major issue is “forced distribution” effects. In a segment as
competitive as frozen deserts, is it realistic to expect Sweet Dream to get as much freezer-
space nationwide as it did in the test supermarkets? Will the product be displayed as
aggressively? Will Paradise’s salesforce and distributors pay as much attention to it? The
likely answers to these questions are no. Bill might have suggested starting the Sweet Dream
launch with a “sell-in” test in a lead market to verify that Paradise will be able to deliver on
the company’s retail stocking objectives. This would also have made the launch less
threatening to managers such as Barbara.

2. The Sweet Dream Launch

Most students will realize that the case for launching Sweet Dream on the basis of the
data collected is very compelling. A repurchase rate of 45% after 26 weeks is impressively
high by industry standards and represents a high level of consumer satisfaction. In a market
category like frozen desserts, novelty is a prerequisite for success. A company that wants to
maintain a significant overall presence has no choice but to introduce new products on a
regular basis so as to recapture consumers as they tire of existing products.

Why should Paradise launch Sweet Dream?

1. LaTreat is an older product in a category that thrives on novelty. Bill’ breakdown of

LaTreat sales by customer categories is compelling evidence that there is plenty of
room for a new premium-priced indulgent dessert. LaTreat will suffer cannibalization
from other competitive entries if not from Sweet Dream.

9
 2. Sweet Dream should be able to cannibalize LaTreat at a favorable absolute
contribution margin level. That is, overall dessert-group profits will increase by
having both products on supermarket shelves. Sweet Dream has done well in its low
promotion markets (Midland and Pittsfield) while more aggressive promotion in
Corvallis and Marion simply generated a lower quality trial by price shoppers—hence
the lower repeat rate. Paradise needs a coordinated strategy for its two products that
will maximize their combined profits.

3. In the Sweet Dream rollout LaTreat will be able to defend its hardcore users. This
should improve total company share of the frozen specialties category and reduce the
three-year payout period that Barbara Mayer calculated for the marketing committee.

Additional Research

Bill has enough data on which to recommend the Sweet Dream launch. However, there is
additional research that would be helpful and even essential, given the Paradise environment,
to support his recommendation.

Bill knows how Sweet Dream performed quantitatively in terms of trial, repurchase and
market share in both test markets. There is no need to open more test markets. But these
results explain very little about why there is a market opportunity for Sweet Dream in the
first place. Bill should generate consumer attitude data on the frozen specialty dessert
category in general, and on Sweet Dream, in particular. Not only could this information be
used to help clearly differentiate Sweet Dream from LaTreat, it also might help the marketing
committee to find his report more persuasive.

10
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MP25274.
Brakes and clutches. 30 min., sd., color, videotape (3/4 inch) ©
Tel-A-Train, Inc.; 16Jan74; MP25274.

MP25275.
Degradation in plastic materials: cause, effect, cure. 46 min., sd.,
color, videotape (3/4 inch) in cassette. (Plastics) © General Motors
Institute; 14Jan74 (in notice: 1973); MP25275.

MP25276.
Flammability and flame retardants in plastic. 36 min., sd., color,
videotape (3/4 inch) in cassette. (Plastics) © General Motors
Institute; 14Jan74 (in notice: 1973); MP25276.

MP25277.
Greene Valley grandparents. Center for Southern Folklore. 10
min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Judy Peiser & Bill Ferris. © Judy
Peiser & Bill Ferris; 17Jun73; MP25277.

MP25278.
Our way of life. Effective Communication Arts, Inc. 27 min., sd.,
color, 16 mm. © American Heart Association; 1Mar74; MP25278.

MP25279.
Three plus you. 12 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © The American
National Red Cross & The American Association of Blood Banks;
1Feb74; MP25279.

MP25280.
Alcoholism: industry’s costly hangover. 27 min., sd., color, 16 mm.
© Aetna Life and Casualty; 4Mar74; MP25280.
MP25281.
Say it with Celia. Instructional Television Center, the School Board
of Broward County, Florida. 740 min., sd., videotape (2 inch) ©
Instructional Television Center, the School Board of Broward
County, Florida; 1Dec70; MP25281.

MP25282.
Potpourri. Instructional Television Center, the School Board of
Broward County, Florida. 740 min., sd., videotape (2 inch) ©
Instructional Television Center, the School Board of Broward
County, Florida; 1Dec70; MP25282.

MP25283.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 531. Ambassador College. 29
min., sd., color, videotape (3/4 inch) in cassette. © Ambassador
College; 14Jan74 (in notice: 1973); MP25283.

MP25284.
Huckleberry Finn. An Arthur P. Jacobs production. 118 min., sd.,
color, 35 mm., Panavision. Based on The Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn, by Mark Twain, pseud. © United Artists Corporation;
13Mar74; MP25284.

MP25285.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 573. 29 min., sd., color, videotape
(3/4 inch) in cassette. © Worldwide Church of God; 2Apr74;
MP25285.

MP25286.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 575. 29 min., sd., color, videotape
(3/4 inch) in cassette. © Worldwide Church of God; 4Apr74;
MP25286.
MP25287.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 577. 29 min., sd., color, videotape
(3/4 inch) in cassette. © Worldwide Church of God; 27Mar74;
MP25287.

MP25288.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 580. 29 min., sd., color,
videotape (3/4 inch) in cassette. © Worldwide Church of God;
27Mar74; MP25288.

MP25289.
Garner Ted Armstrong. Program 581. 29 min., sd., color, videotape
(3/4 inch) in cassette. © Worldwide Church of God; 27Mar74;
MP25289.

MP25290.
Chlorine and the firefighter. The Chlorine Institute, Inc. Produced
in cooperation with the National Fire Protection Association. 29
min., sd., color, 16 mm. © The Chlorine Institute, Inc.; 22Mar74;
MP25290.

MP25291.
The Managerial grid in action. BNA Communications, Inc. 30
min., sd., color, 16 mm. (Managerial grid) Appl. au.: Robert R. Blake
& Jane Srygley Mouton. Prev. reg. Nov. 1965, A828649. NM:
abridgment. © Robert R. Blake & Jane Srygley Mouton; 22Apr74;
MP25291.

MP25292.
The Grid approach to conflict solving. BNA Communications, Inc.
30 min., sd., color, 16 mm. (Managerial grid) Appl. au.: Robert R.
Blake & Jane Srygley Mouton. Prev. reg. Nov. 1965, A828649. NM:
abridgment. © Robert R. Blake & Jane Srygley Mouton; 22Apr74;
MP25292.

MP25293.
Laboratory emergencies. Old Pueblo Enterprises. By Rod
O’Connor. 5 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. (Laboratory safety, pt. 4) ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 1Mar71 (in notice: 1970);
MP25293.

MP25294.
Preventing laboratory accidents. Old Pueblo Enterprises. By Rod
O’Connor. 5 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. (Laboratory safety, pt. 3) ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 1Mar71 (in notice: 1970);
MP25294.

MP25295.
Handling reagents. Old Pueblo Enterprises. By Rod O’Connor. 5
min., si., color, Super 8 mm. (Laboratory safety, pt. 2) © Harper and
Row, Publishers, Inc.; 1Mar71 (in notice: 1970); MP25295.

MP25296.
Laboratory first aid. Old Pueblo Enterprises. By Rod O’Connor. 4
min., si., color, Super 8 mm. (Laboratory safety, pt. 5) © Harper and
Row, Publishers, Inc.; 1Mar71 (in notice: 1970); MP25296.

MP25297.
Mitosis in animal cells. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. By Alfred F.
Owczarzak, J. Mole Bajer & Andrew S. Bajer. 5 min., si., color, Super
8 mm. in cartridge. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 24Jan72;
MP25297.

MP25298.
 Advanced microscopy. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. By Walter Plaut.
6 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl. au.: Harper and
Row, Publishers, Inc., employer for hire. © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc.; 1May71; MP25298.

MP25299.
Conformation in ring compounds. 3 min., si., color, Super 8 mm.
(Structure and stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova &
Harold Goldwhite. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72;
MP25299.

MP25300.
Drawing structures. Pt. 2. 2 min., si., color, Super 8 mm.
(Structure and stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova &
Harold Goldwhite. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72;
MP25300.

MP25301.
Phototaxis in amoeba and euglena S P. Unit One Film Prod., Inc.
By Andrew S. Bajer & J. Mole Bajer. 5 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in
cartridge. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70; MP25301.

MP25302.
Cytoplasmic motility. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. 5 min., si., color,
Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl. au.: Andrew S. Bajer & H. Howard.
© Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70; MP25302.

MP25303.
Cation analysis: Wet chemical methods. Old Pueblo Films. 6 min.,
si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl. au.: Rod O’Connor & Bruce
Fowler. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 14Jul70; MP25303.

MP25304.
 Cation analysis: Chromatography and ion exchange. Old Pueblo
Films. 6 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl. au.: Rod
O’Connor & Bruce Fowler. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.;
14Jul70; MP25304.

MP25305.
Normal mitosis in plant cells (haemanthus). Unit One Film Prod.,
Inc. 5 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl. au.: Andrew S.
Bajer. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 1Oct70; MP25305.

MP25306.
Fixation and dehydration in haemanthus. Unit One Film Prod.,
Inc. By Andrew S. Bajer & J. Mole Bajer. 4 min., si., color, Super 8
mm. in cartridge. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70;
MP25306.

MP25307.
Microscope illumination: the light path. Unit One Film Prod., Inc.
By Walter Plaut. 6 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Appl.
au.: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., employer for hire. © Harper
and Row Publishers, Inc.; 1Oct70; MP25307.

MP25308.
Meiosis. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. 5 min., si., color, Super 8 mm.
Appl. au.: Andrew S. Bajer. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.;
21Sep70; MP25308.

MP25309.
Behavior of unicells. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. 4 min., si., color,
Super 8 mm. Appl. au.: Andrew S. Bajer. © Harper and Row
Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70; MP25309.

MP25310.
 Mitochondria in living cells. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. 4 min., si.,
color, Super 8 mm. Appl. au.: Andrew S. Bajer, Alfred F. Owczarzak
& Leo Jones. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70;
MP25310.

MP25311.
Abnormal mitosis in plant cells. Unit One Film Prod., Inc. By
Andrew S. Bajer & J. Mole Bajer. 10 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 21Sep70; MP25311.

MP25312.
D N A replication. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 3 min., si.,
color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Macromolecular biosynthesis)
Appl. au.: J. Lawrence Fox & George Kelvin. © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc.; 8Nov72; MP25312.

MP25313.
Induction and repression. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. By J.
Lawrence Fox & George Kelvin. 3 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in
cartridge. (Macromolecular biosynthesis) © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc.; 13Nov72; MP25313.

MP25314.
Protein translation. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 3 min., si.,
color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Macromolecular biosynthesis)
Appl. au.: J. Lawrence Fox & George Kelvin. © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc., 13Nov72; MP25314.

MP25315.
R N A transcription. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. By J.
Lawrence Fox & George Kelvin. 3 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in
cartridge. (Macromolecular biosynthesis) © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc.; 3Nov72; MP25315.
MP25316.
Optical isomers. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 2 min., si.,
color. Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Structure and stereochemistry)
Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova & Harold Goldwhite. © Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72; MP25316.

MP25317.
Restricted rotation around carbon — carbon double bonds. Harper
and Row, Publishers, Inc. 3 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge.
(Structure and stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova &
Harold Goldwhite. © Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72;
MP25317.

MP25318.
Structural and geometric isomers. Harper and Row, Publishers,
Inc. 2 min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Structure and
stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova & Harold Goldwhite. ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72; MP25318.

MP25319.
Conformations of cyclohexane. Harper and Row, Publishers. Inc. 3
min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Structure and
stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova & Harold Goldwhite. ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72; MP25319.

MP25320.
Rotation and conformation. Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc. 3
min., si., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. (Structure and
stereochemistry) Appl. au.: Joseph Casanova & Harold Goldwhite. ©
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.; 30Oct72; MP25320.

MP25321.
 There has to be an answer. 12 min., sd., color, Super 8 mm. Appl.
au.: Ross Roy, Inc. © Chrysler Corporation; 17Jan74 (in notice:
1973); MP25321.

MP25322.
Inside the 9 1/4 inch axle. Chrysler Corporation. 12 min., sd.,
color, Super 8 mm. Appl. au.: Ross Roy, Inc. © Chrysler
Corporation; 18Feb74 (in notice: 1973); MP25322.

MP25323.
Betty White guarantee. 30 sec., sd., color, 16 mm. © MNP Texize
Chemicals Company, division of Morton Norwich Products, Inc.;
10Oct73; MP25323.

MP25324.
Talking bottles. 30 sec., sd., color, 16 mm. © Pfizer, Inc.; 27Nov73;
MP25324.

MP25325.
Sir Johnny on the spot. A Centron production. 12 min., sd., color,
16 mm. © Centron Corporation, Inc.; 19Apr74; MP25325.

MP25326.
Santa Fe Federal Savings and Loan Association supersavers club
promotional spot. 60 sec., sd., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. ©
Santa Fe Federal Savings and Loan Association: 22Dec73; MP25326.

MP25327.
Santa Fe Federal Savings and Loan Association supersavers club
promotional spot. 30 sec., sd., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. ©
Santa Fe Federal Savings and Loan Association: 22Dec73; MP25327.
MP25328.
Drilling and blasting. A Menkle Services production. 30 min., sd.,
color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. © Laborers AGC Education and
Training Fund; 1Apr74 (in notice: 1973); MP25328.

MP25329.
Clearing timber on construction work. A Menkle Services
production. 24 min., sd., color, Super 8 mm. in cartridge. Add. ti.:
Clearing timber on construction sites. © Laborers AGC Education
and Training Fund; 25Jan74 (in notice: 1973); MP25329.

MP25330.
Role enactment in children’s play, a developmental overview.
Arsenal Family and Children’s Center, University of Pittsburgh.
Made by Steve Campus Productions, Inc. Produced in cooperation
with the Department of Child Development and Child Care, School of
Health Related Professions, University of Pittsburgh. 29 min., sd.,
color, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. © University of Pittsburgh,
Arsenal Family and Children’s Center; 16Dec73; MP25330.

MP25331.
What happens when you go to the hospital? Arsenal Family and
Children’s Center, University of Pittsburgh. Made by Steve Campus
Productions, Inc. Produced in cooperation with the Department of
Child Development and Child Care, School of Health Related
Professions, University of Pittsburgh. 12 min., sd., color, 16 mm.
Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. © University of Pittsburgh, Arsenal Family
and Children’s Center; 16Dec73; MP25331.

MP25332.
Concept instancing of role enactment. Arsenal Family and
Children’s Center, University of Pittsburgh. Made by Steve Campus
Productions, Inc. Produced in cooperation with the Department of
Child Development and Child Care, School of Health Related
Professions, University of Pittsburgh. 18 min., sd., color, 16 mm.
Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. © University of Pittsburgh, Arsenal Family
and Children’s Center; 16Dec73; MP25332.

MP25333.
Moat monster. Arsenal Family and Children’s Center, University of
Pittsburgh. Made by Steve Campus Productions, Inc. Produced in
cooperation with the Department of Child Development and Child
Care, School of Health Related Professions, University of Pittsburgh.
11 min., sd., color, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. © University of
Pittsburgh, Arsenal Family and Children’s Center; 16Dec73;
MP25333.

MP25334.
The Mayor comes to dinner. Arsenal Family and Children’s Center,
University of Pittsburgh. Made by Steve Campus Productions, Inc.
Produced in cooperation with the Department of Child Development
and Child Care, School of Health Related Professions, University of
Pittsburgh. 14 min., sd., color, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. ©
University of Pittsburgh, Arsenal Family and Children’s Center;
16Dec73; MP25334.

MP25335.
City builders. Arsenal Family and Children’s Center, University of
Pittsburgh. Made by Steve Campus Productions, Inc. Produced in
cooperation with the Department of Child Development and Child
Care, School of Health Related Professions, University of Pittsburgh,
18 min., sd., color, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Sara Arnaud. © University of
Pittsburgh, Arsenal Family and Children’s Center; 16Dec73;
MP25335.

MP25336.
Measurement and statistics. Educational Media Corporation
production. 16 min., sd., color, 16 mm. (Basic psychology) Appl. au.:
Don L. Sorenson. © Educational Media Corporation; 1Sep73;
MP25336.

MP25337.
Driver performance test. Aetna Life and Casualty. 23 min., sd.,
color, 16 mm. © Aetna Life and Casualty; 2Jan74 (in notice: 1973);
MP25337.

MP25338.
You can’t just hope they’ll make it. An Oz. of Prevention
production. 19 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © Industrial Alcoholism
Films; 7Sep73; MP25338.

MP25339.
We don’t want to lose you. An Oz. of Prevention production. 23
min., sd., color, 16 mm. © Industrial Alcoholism Films; 7Sep73;
MP25339.

MP25340.
Future action computerized training system. 20 min., sd., color, 16
mm. Add. ti.: F. A. C. T. S. © International Harvester Company;
22Mar74; MP24340.

MP25341.
Linking sound and symbol: a musician teaches reading readiness.
26 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © The Kingsbury Center, Inc.; 23Jan74;
MP25341.

MP25342.
Reaching out. Gerald Edwards. Produced in cooperation with the
United States Office of Education. 45 min., sd., color, 16 mm. ©
Gerald Edwards; 10Jan74; MP25342.
MP25343.
D O S libraries. 30 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk operating
system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72 (in
notice: 1973); MP25343.

MP25344.
D O S environment. 10 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72
(in notice: 1973); MP25344.

MP25345.
Introduction to D O S. 9 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72
(in notice: 1973); MP25345.

MP25346.
J C L formats and functions. 22 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360
disk operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.;
1Mar72 (in notice: 1973); MP25346.

MP25347.
D O S librarian programs. 22 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72
(in notice: 1973); MP25347.

MP25348.
Assign card and assign command. 23 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm.
(S/360 disk operating system) © Edutronics Systems International,
Inc.; 1Mar72 (in notice: 1973); MP25348.

MP25349.
 Copy function-C O R G Z. 22 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72
(in notice: 1973); MP25349.

MP25350.
Supervisor. Pt. 2. 20 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk operating
system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72;
MP25350.

MP25351.
I P L and supervisor. Pt. 1. 21 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.;
1Mar72; MP25351.

MP25352.
D O S workshop. 23 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk operating
system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72;
MP25352.

MP25353.
Labels and additional J C L. 31 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk
operating system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.;
1Mar72; MP25353.

MP25354.
Linkage editor. 25 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (S/360 disk operating
system) © Edutronics Systems International, Inc.; 1Mar72;
MP25354.

MP25355.
The Decisive hours. Ortho Diagnostics. Made by Aron and Falcone,
Inc. 30 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation
d. b. a. Ortho Diagnostics; 21May73 (in notice: 1972); MP25355.
MP25356.
A Special kind of matter. The Upjohn Company. 28 min., sd.,
color, 16 mm. NM: compilation. © The Upjohn Company; 1Apr74;
MP25356.

MP25357.
The Man and the land. Indiana, Michigan & Ohio Farm Bureaus.
Made by On Scene Cine Films. 28 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © Indiana
Farm Bureau, Inc., Michigan Farm Bureau & Ohio Farm Bureau
Federation, Inc. (in notice: Indiana, Michigan & Ohio Farm
Bureaus); 1Mar74; MP25357.

MP25358.
Reward and punishment. 14 min., sd., color, 16 mm. © CRM
Productions, a division of Ziff Davis Publishing Company & James
Gardner Child Development Centers; 21Mar74; MP25358.

MP25359.
If elected. 55 min., sd., color, 16 mm. Appl. au.: Wayne H. Ewing.
© Wayne H. Ewing; 14May73; MP25359.

MP25360.
A Student centered classroom. Houghton Mifflin Company. Made
by Ethnographics, Inc. 20 min., sd., color, 16 mm. (English through
interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company; 1Oct73; MP25360.

MP25361.
Story theater. Houghton Mifflin Company. Made by
Ethnographics, Inc. 25 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (English through
interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company; 4Dec73; MP25361.

MP25362.
 Small group improvisation — elementary. Houghton Mifflin
Company. 20 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (English through interaction)
© Houghton Mifflin Company; 3Jan73; MP25362.

MP25363.
Discussing topics — elementary. Houghton Mifflin Company. 22
min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (English through interaction) © Houghton
Mifflin Company; 24Oct73; MP25363.

MP25364.
A Pupil centered classroom — elementary. Houghton Mifflin
Company. Made by Ethnographics, Inc. 20 min., sd., color, 16 mm.
(English through interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company;
3Jan73; MP25364.

MP25365.
Large group improvisation — secondary. Houghton Mifflin
Company. Made by Ethnographics, Inc. 20 min., sd., color, 16 mm.
(English through interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company;
3Jan73; MP25365.

MP25366.
Body English — elementary. Houghton Mifflin Company. Made by
Ethnographics, Inc. 20 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (English through
interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company; 3Jan73; MP25366.

MP25367.
Creative dramatics — elementary. Houghton Mifflin Company.
Made by Ethnographics, Inc. 20 min., sd., b&w, 16 mm. (English
through interaction) © Houghton Mifflin Company; 3Jan73;
MP25367.

MP25368.