INTERTANKO-Seafarer's Practical Guide To SIRE 2.0 Inspections

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INTERTANKO
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- Seafarers· Practical Guide to
- SIRE 2.0 Inspections
© INTERTANKO 2023
All rights reserved
- Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the information contained in this publication is correct,
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neither the authors nor INTERTANKO can accept any responsibility for any errors or omissions or any
consequences resulting therefrom.
No reliance should be placed on the information or advice contained in this publication without
independent verification. All rights reserved.
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Distribution or reorod11rtinn of this: public;ition i,; ,;t,ictl y prohibilcci unle:s:, µrior
authorisation has been granted by INTERTANKO.
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V1 . November 2023
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Introduction & scope
Foreword 4
Introduction 5
Layout and how to use this Document 6
Chapter 1. Vessel, Operator and Inspection Particulars 9 liiiiii
Chapter 2. Certification and Documentation 11

2.1. Certification 12 ........
2.2. Management Oversight 13
2.3. Structural Assessment 16
2.4. Defect Management 21 I.....
2.5. Management of Change 23
2.6. Statutory Management Plans 24
2.7. Safety Management System 27
......
2.8. General Information 29
Chapter 3. Crew Management 31
3.1. Crew Qualification 32
3.2. Crew Evaluation 37
3.3. Crew Training 45
3.4. Crew Compliance 51
3.5. Crew Familiarisation 53 l......
Chapter 4. Navigation and Communications 57
4.1. Navigation Equipment 58
4.2. Navigational Procedures 73
4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management 82
4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures 86 liiiiiiiliiiil
4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment 93

Chapter 5. Safety Management 99
5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills 100
5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems 120
5.3. Portable Firefighting Appliances 138 I.-
5.4. Lifesaving Appliances 145
5.5. Permits to Work 156
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5.6. Fixed and Portable Gas Detecting Systems
1.,,-,j
163
5.7. Safety Management 170
5.8. Area Inspections 178
5.9. Lifting and Rigging 185
5.10. Safe Access 187
5.11. Sample Management 194 liiiiiiiiil
5.12. Safety Equipment 195

Chapter 6. Pollution Prevention 197
6.1. r'OIIUtlon rrevennon - f\ec.oru Duuf..:, 1Q8
6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations 207
6.3. Ballast Operations 210
6.4. Deck Area Pollution Prevention 212
6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention 215
6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors 219
Chapter 7. Maritime Security 223

7 .1. Ship Routing 224
7.2. Ship Hardening and Access Control 225
7.3. Communications and Monitoring 227 iiliiiiiii,L.
7.4. Ship Security Officer 228

7.5. Cyber Security 229
-- Chapter 8. Cargo and Ballast Systems 231
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8.1. Oil 232
8.2. Chemicals 236
8.3. Oil & Chemical 247
8.4. LPG
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275
8.5. LNG 282
8.6. Gas (Common to all vessels under JGC Code) 286
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8. 7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations 309
8.8. 080 I Combination Carriers 318
8.99. All Types 320
Chapter 9 . Mooring and Anchoring 331
9.1. Mooring Equipment Management 332
9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement 336
9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures 337
9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management 338
-- 9.5. STS Operation Management

9.6. Single Point Mooring
340
343
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9.7. Shuttle Tanker Mooring System 345
Chapter 10. Machinery Spaces 347
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10.1. Engineering Procedures 348
10.2. Machinery Status 353
10.3. Safety Management 359
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10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems 367
10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management 369
10.6. LNG Bunkering Management 372
10.7. Fire Protection Measures 377
Chapter 11. General Appearance and Condition 381
11.1.1 to 11.1.36: All Vessels 384
11.1.40 to 11.1.42: Additional for Crude/ Product/ Chemical/Shuttle/OBO 400
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11.1.50 to 11.1.52: Additional for LPG (Pressurised vessel) 402
11.1.60 to 11.1.62: Additional for LPG (Semi-refrigerated and fully refrigerated vessels) 403
11.1.70 to 11.1.72: Additional for LNG with Membrane Tanks 405
11.1.80 to 11.1.82: Additional for LNG with Moss-type Tanks 406
11.1.90 to 11.1.95: Additional for Specialised Bow Loading Shuttle Tankers 408
Chapter 12. Ice Operations 411
12.1. Ice operations training 412
12.2. Sub-zero LSA & FFA procedures 413
- 415
12.3. Sub-zero machinery operation procedures
12.4. Sub-zero cargo and ballast operation procedures 416
12.5. Sub-zero deck machinery operation procedures 418
12.6. Ice navigation procedures 419
......... Appendices 421
- Indicative Assignments of Tagged Ranks

Questions by Type (Table)
TMSA KPI References (Question number and vessel type)
422
426
428
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Foreword
Risk management is an integral element of the vetting process and its importance cannot be overstated.
Managing and mitigating any form of perceived risk is essential in ensuring that high standards of quality and safety are
achieved, and ship vetting is a major part of the process that charterers follow when selecting ships for cargoes they are
charged with. Ship inspections are, consequently, critical to the vetting process. -
The importance of positive vetting is recognised by owners, managers and ship staff alike. Those involved in their
company's safety and quality operations invest a large amount of time, training and financial resources to contribute to lliiiiiiiiiii
the efforts needed to successfully trade their vessels.
INTERTANKO has always supported the OCIMF SIRE inspection system and will continue to work closely with OCIMF to liiiiiiiiii
develop it further. The highest standards of ship safety and security and operational excellence is what everybody strives
for and aims to achieve.
We all want the same thing in the end, but some common sense is also needed along the way to achieving these goals.
Over the last 50 years, INTERTANKO has provided support and guidance to its Members, who have all committed to
maintaining high standards of ship operations. However, quality ship operations cannot be achieved without the complete
commitment of the management team both ashore and on board.
In addition to INTERTANKO's Guide to the Vetting Process, a consolidated reference of the requirements of all energy
majors and Port State Control MoUs, this guide aims to share the knowledge needed by ships' crews to prepare for
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successful vetting inspections.
The Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections is the result of an INTERTANKO Vetting Committee initiative and
has been written for all Officers and crew on board to enable them to better understand the content and requirements of
the SIRE 2.0 Vessel Inspection Questionnaire. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Anastasios
Kartsimadakis of Tsakos Shipping and Trading. 'Tasos' was instrumental in the production of this publication in his then
role as secondee to INTERTANKO's Athens office as Vetting Manager. His invaluable contribution is very much appreciated
by the Committee and Secretariat alike.
My vision is that this publication, both in print and online, will provide a greater understanding of the requirements of
the SIRE 2.0 questionnaire and thereby make shipboard preparation for inspections second nature to all Officers and crew
serving on board oil, chemical and gas tankers.
I believe it to be an essential addition to the library of every tanker.
Stefanos Stylianos, Minerva Marine, Inc.

Chairman, INTERTANKO Vetting Committee
4 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

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Introduction
- The purpose of this guide is to assist staff and operators to prepare for a vessel's SIRE 2.0 ship inspection.
- The importance of consistently successful ship inspections cannot be understated for, without these, vessels will find
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it extremely difficult to trade. Good and thorough preparations will not only show an Inspector the competency and
professionalism of the crew, but also how well the vessel is managed.
OCIMF introduced SIRE 2.0 as a risk-based vessel inspection programme which will supersede the traditional SIRE
programme as launched in 1993. The new approach has resulted in a new questionnaire focussed on equipment,
procedures, and human factors, with SIRE 2.0 inspections on board tankers to be conducted by trained and accredited
OCIMF Inspectors using a certified web-enabled tablet.
- The SIRE 2.0 introduces new terminology and both operators and crew are encouraged to familiarise themselves
with the training resources, which are available on the OCIMF website. INTERTANKO Members, as well as the
Secretariat, have been actively engaged, and instrumental, in the trial inspections and phased implementation plan
of SIRE 2.0.
This publication follows each chapter of the SIRE 2.0 Inspection Questionnaire and provides guidance on the
responsibilities for each question. Each ship owner, ship management company/operator or technical manager
should, under their own Safety Management System (SMS), have their own allocations of such responsibilities on
board.
Those on board at the forefront of the inspection will usually be the Master, Chief Officer, Chief and 2nd Engineers,
referred to as "Senior Officers". It should be recognised that underperformance from junior Officers and any other
member of the crew could result in a negative observation and such comments could result in the vessel potentially
---, failing a clearance process. It is noteworthy to mention here that SIRE 2.0 also provides the Inspector the possibility
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to raise a positive observation under the human element response tool where the crew's performance exceeds
normal expectations.
Questions are often directed to those Officers/personnel with direct responsibility or who are involved in the operation/
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process being examined. A considerable number of questions are directed to the "accompanying Officer", thus it
is of utmost importance that the Officers accompanying the Inspector in each department are well versed with
the procedures on board. For example, when a cargo operation is carried out, which, in general, involves all Deck
Officers, and at times on certain vessels an Engineering Officer or Gas Engineer, then all of those Officers involved
should be expected to be interviewed and thus have knowledge of the relevant question being asked.
Although the SIRE 2.0 questionnaire distinguishes between Core, Rotational 1 and Rotational 2 questions, it is of
utmost importance that seafarers are able to answer every question relevant to their type of vessel as the CVIQ is
compiled using an algorithm which is automatically issued to the Inspector's tablet. The Core questions will be asked
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during each inspection, but neither operators nor seafarers will have knowledge of which rotational questions will
be asked ahead of the inspection.
- Knowledge of legislation, as well as the contents of documents and publications as identified in the OCIMF
question libraries, forms a vital part of demonstrating the understanding of each question within the SIRE 2.0. In the
publication at hand, the authors have compiled and summarised the inspection guidance, the suggested Inspector
actions, the expected evidence and the potential grounds for a negative observation for each and every question as
they are outlined in the OCIMF question libraries.
INTl:IHANKO has provided a means oi reporting Inspector behaviour in a confidential manner in order to ensure
continuous improvement of ship inspections and inspection procedures for its Members. The reporting system has
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been developed in an electronic format which allows the reports to be submitted directly into a database. In view
of the confidential nature of this system, a username and password, which can be obtained from INTERTANKO,
is required to upload reports - please email marine@INTERTANKO.com to obtain your username and password.
- This Guide should be used in conjunction with the latest OCIMF-SIRE 2.0 Question Libraries.
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Remember, a well-prepared vessel will expedite any ship inspection.
Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 5

Layout and how to use this Document
Layout and how to use this Document

This guide contains all questions as addressed in OCIMF SIRE 2.0 Question Library (Part 1 and Part 2, version 1.0) 1 .
The structure of the guide is designed in such a manner that facilitates easy and quick identification of question category
and type, as well as their reference to the PIO and Photographs repository, as applicable, which is expressed with the use
of pictograms which are marked as active (blue) or inactive (grey).
Question Overview
The question is presented as it is written in the SIRE 2.0 questionnaire and its number indicates the Chapter, the Section
of the Chapter and its number.
This question is from Chapter 4 Navigation Equipment, Section 1 Navigation Equipment.
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4.1.1. Were the Master and navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the set up and
operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel and were records available to demonstrate that the ECDIS had
been operated in accordance with company procedures at all stages of a voyage?
Question Category
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There are three question categories, namely hardware, human and process, with the majority of questions examining all
three categories (as indicated in this example). Question categories were assigned following the guidance provided in SIRE
2.0 Question Library Question Programming Attributes Version 2 0 (January 2023). 2
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0 Hardware: is active when the question or supporting guidance refers to a vessel's structure, machinery, outfitting,
or equipment.
rw��
000
Human: is active when the question or supporting guidance refers to the familiarity of vessel staff with a .
company procedure, written process or the use or operation of machinery or equipment.
Process: is active when the question is related to an SMS (either on the procedures or their implementation) or
a documented process.
PIQ
The Pre-Inspection Questionnaire (PIQ) is an online questionnaire, completed/updated by the Operator before
the submission of inspection request and provides information on the vessel. The responses to PIQ questions
trigger the inclusion of certain conditional SIRE 2.0 questions and it is active when the question relates to a
PIQ question. The responses to the PIO are electronically captured within SIRE and then used as an input to the
compilation of the vessel's bespoke SIRE 2 .0 inspection.
Photograph
This is active when a question refers to one of the standard photographs provided by the vessel operator prior
to the inspection and the photograph provided should be representative of the general condition of all srmrlar
areas. If the area in the photograph had been upgraded whilst the remaining similar areas had not, then the
photograph cannot be considered being representative of the general condition.
1
OCIMF SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 1 and Part 2 are available at OCIMF website https://rb.gy/xzqv1 and https://rb.gy/43y2f.
2 The guidance is available at OCIMF website https://rb.gy/fonrc

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Question Type
• Core Questions: These questions are allocated to every inspection applicable to vessel type and its operation.
- @O Rotational 1: The questionnaire algorithm will ensure that the question is covered over a period of time.
••
These questions will be allocated approximately every third or fourth inspection, depending on several
variables.
- Rotational 2: These questions will be allocated approximately every sixth inspection, depending on
several variables.
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Objective
The objective statement summarises why a question exists.
- Example question 4.1.1: To ensure that ECDIS units fitted to the vessel were used to effectively navigate the vessel.
ROVIQ Sequence
Provides an indication for the review of the question in relation to the physical location or activity sequence of the
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inspection.
Tagged Rank
Indicates the person or team to whom the question is applicable. A table is provided as an annex to this guide (see page
422) which details the relevant tagged ranks to the associated questions. This should help crew members identify which
question is relevant to their position on board.
-- Verification by
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This is an editable field to be completed by the operator depending on the Operator's SMS or instructions, indicating
the responsible person on board, or in the office, who is responsible for verifying if the vessel fully complies with the
requirements of the question.
Practical Guidelines
Most of the questions are reviewed under the Human, Procedural and Hardware element. For ease of pre-inspection
onboard verification and with the aim of covering all aspects of potential grounds for a negative observation, the
structure follows the VIQ guidelines. It should be noted that the list of potential grounds for a negative observation is not
exhaustive.

Layout and how to use this guide
Human Element
This aims to assess how familiar the responsible person, or team, is with company procedures, the associated tasks, and
the use of equipment - the accompanying Officer, though, will be the one being interviewed most of the time. Certain
questions (i.e.: 5.5 Permits to work) are addressed to Ratings.
Procedural Element
This aims to assess the procedure, or a documented process, as reflected via a specific checklist. Emphasis is placed on key
procedures and checklists while at the same time no reference is being made to basic procedures already covered by the
VIQ (such as standard enclosed entry procedures and hot work procedures). Negative observations are identified through
the TMSA classification coding.
Hardware Element
This is to assess the condition of equipment and structure. Negative observations are supported by a photograph, which
may be taken to support "slight superficial deterioration".
TMSA
The most relevant KPI applicable to the top-level question is identified and summarised. A table is provided as an annex
L
to this guide which highlights the relevant questions to each question. This should help operators when reviewing their
TMSA to identify which SIRE 2.0 question relates to which TMSA element.
Comments/SMS Reference
This is left blank to be completed by the Operator. The purpose of this field is to enable Operators to reference their own
SMS chapter(s) or paragraph(s) to the related SIRE 2.0 question, which will help the crew to quickly identify the relevant
SMS part to each question.
Those using the online version will see the notes entered by their fleet managers or other administrators in this section.

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- Chapter 1.
Vessel, Operator and
Inspection Particulars
Chapter 1. Vessel, Operator and Inspection Particulars
Chapter 1. Vessel, Operator and Inspection Particulars I.-

Most of the questions in SIRE 2.0 Chapter 1 will be filled automatically on the Inspector's tablet from the download of
the HVPQ and PIQ. L...,_
It is therefore of utmost importance that the Operators accurately update HVPQ, PIO, Certificates etc. prior to the
inspection.
The questions are reproduced here below:
1.1.1. Name of the vessel (data from HVPQ)
1.1.2. Vessel IMO number (data from HVPQ)
1.1.3. Date the inspection was completed (data from inspection submission)
1.1.4. Was a full inspection of the vessel completed? (data from inspection submission)
1.1.5. Port of Inspection (data from inspection submission)
1.1.6. .flag (data from HVPQ)
1.1.7. Deadweight (Summer Deadweight data from HVPQ)
1.1.8. Date the vessel was delivered (HVPQ data from IOPPC)
1.1.9. Name of the OCIMF inspection company (data from inspection booking)
1.1.10. Date and time the Inspector boarded the vessel (data from inspection record)
1.1.11. Date and time the Inspector departed the vessel (data from inspection record)
1.1.12. Time taken for the inspection (data from inspection record)
1.1.13. Name of the Inspector (data from inspection booking)
1.1.14. Date the HVPQ was last updated (data from HVPQ)
1.1.15. Vessel's operation at the time of the inspection (data from inspection record)
1.1.16. Products being handled (data from inspection record)
1.1.17. Vessel type (data from PIQ)
1.1.18. Hull type (data from HVPQ)
1.1.19. Name of the vessel's operator (data from inspection booking)
1.1.20. Date the current operator assumed responsibility for the vessel (data from HVPQ)
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1.1.21. Date of the last Port State Control inspection (data from PIQ)
1.1.22. Name of the Classification Society (data from HVPQ)
1.1.23. Date of departure from the last dry dock (data from HVPQ)
1.1.24. With the vessel's designation as recorded on IOPP certificate (HVPQ data from IOPPC)
1.1.25. Name of the vessel's P&I club (data from HVPQ)

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,.......,
Chapter 2 .
- Certification and
- Documentation
Chapter 2. Certification and Documentation
2.1.1. Were the Master and Senior Officers familiar with the company procedure for keeping the vessel's
Statutory Certification up to date, were all certificates and documents carried onboard up to date and was
the vessel free of Conditions of Class or significant memoranda?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure that the vessel had been surveyed in accordance with all statutory requirements
Objective
and that certification is onboard to confirm compliance.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, pre-board.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Officer, Senior Officers.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (2.1.1)
Human The Accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for indexing and filing
certificates and documents.
Process The Inspector will review the Class Survey Status Reports (CSSR) prior to the inspection and will identify
Conditions of Class and/or significant memoranda. He will also verify that dates noted in HVPQ and PIQ
(PIQ 2.1) are accurate.
A systematic process must be in place to track the validity and filing of all Statutory and Classification
Certificates.
The vessel operator must have procedures in place for shipboard crew to ensure the validity and accuracy
of Statutory and/or Class Certificates as well as indexing and filing of certificates and documents.
The certificate index must indicate the expiry date of all Statutory Certificates as well as the supporting
surveys and inspections. The index must be up to date.
Obsolete certificates and documents must be promptly removed.
Prior to the inspection, the vessel operator must have uploaded data relating to the vessel's certification
and survey status through the HVPQ and PIQ (PIO 2.1), in addition to uploading a recent copy of the Class
status report. Uploaded data must be accurate. Where the Classification Society certifying the vessel
offers the owner a set of CSSRs, the latest version must be uploaded and a copy must be available on
board. These should be uploaded not more than four days before the inspection.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if a Condition of Class has been issued, memoranda
relating to a defect to structure, machinery or equipment has been issued or if a short-term certificate
because of a defect or damage to the ship's structure, machinery or equipment is issued.
Where electronic certificates and documentation are used on board, it must be made sure that these are
controlled through the vessel's Safety Management System.
Hardware Defective structure, machinery or equipment identified in the CSSR over the past 12 months will be sighted
on site by the Inspector to confirm that they have been closed out or the Inspector will assess the progress
of rectification.
TMSA KP\ 4.2.1 requires that a procedure is in place to ensure the validity and accuracy of Statutory and/or
Classification Certificates.

- 2.2. Management Oversight
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2.2.1 Had the vessel been attended by a company Superintendent at approximately six-monthly intervals
and were reports available to demonstrate that a systematic vessel inspection had been completed during
each attendance through the pre-inspection questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
To ensure that the vessel has been periodically and systematically inspected by company
Objective Marine and Technical Superintendents to provide shore management with a complete
technical and operational appraisal of their vessel.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer.
Verification by
Human
Process The vessel operator must plan and schedule at least two inspections per year onboard each vessel to ensure
that the ship is maintained in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations, and
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with any additional requirements established by the vessel operator. These inspections must cover all the
operational areas and equipment that are accessible for observation.
Intervals between inspections shall not exceed seven months. If the vessel was new to management, e.g.
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handover or delivery, there must be a Marine or Technical inspection carried out beforehand. The interval
between successive inspections conducted by either a Marine Superintendent or a Technical Superintendent
separately should not normally exceed 14 months. Additional vessel visits by senior management, Electrical
Superintendents or those visits that deal with a narrow/specific scope of issues are not deemed to have
fulfilled the need for a full inspection. Dates of the last inspections must be declared via the PIQ (PIQ 2.2).
Remote inspections are allowed but there must be company procedures stating the circumstances where
remote inspections can be used as a substitute to physical inspection, the verification process for all areas
on the ship and the required content of the final inspection report. Remote inspection should not be
carried out if a physical inspection could reasonably be carried out.
Following each inspection, a report must be made in a defined format to report the findings of the
inspection. All reports must be reviewed/signed off by shore management and reports must be available
on board. T he report must include any non-conformities (NCs) and their possible cause, if known, and
the appropriate corrective action taken to close the NC. Preventive measures and the records of these
preventive actions must be kept available on board.
These plans and reports for the past 18 months should be ready on-hand to present to the Inspector. The
Inspector is expected to verify that declared company inspections had occurred by looking at inspection
reports . The Inspector will be checking that the intervals between inspections, as well as the scope covered
by the inspection, are satisfactory.
- Hardware
T MSA KPI 12.1.2 requires that the inspection plan covers all vessels in a fleet, with at least two inspections
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onboard each vessel a year.

2.2.2 Were recent ISM Internal audit reports available on board, had corrective actions been taken on board
to close out any non-conformities and had this corrective action been verified by shore management?
Question Category
(Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
(1@08
To provide assurance that the vessel had been operated in compliance with the company
Objective
Safety Management System.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Officer.
Verification by
Human The Master and Senior Officers must be familiar with the internal audit programme process and with
the system for recording and tracking of ISM audit non-conformities (NCs) to closure. The format and
checklists presented to the Inspector should be on the most recently updated revised standardised format.
Process The vessel operator should carry out internal safety audits onboard and ashore at intervals not exceeding 12
months to verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the SMS. Only in exceptional
circumstances can this interval be exceeded, but by no more than three months. The circumstances should
be properly documented and be ready to present to the Inspector.
The Inspector is expected to request to sight and review:
• The company procedure for scheduling and performing internal ISM audits including the standard audit
formats and/or checklists. The procedure must include a time limit set to close NCs.
• The latest two internal ISM audit reports.
• The system for recording and tracking ISM audit NCs to closure.
The Inspector will check that records of closure of NCs are complete, e.g. deadline set for closing NCs,
when the corrective actions were actually completed, and the vessel operator's verification of corrective
actions. The Inspector will also verify if the relevant shipboard personnel responsible for the areas being
audited have access to, and are aware of, the audit findings. Objective evidence for the corrective action
recorded to close-out a non-conformity must be available on board.
For cases where the vessel operator had recently taken over management of the vessel and an internal
audit had not yet taken place, the planned completion of the internal audit should be indicated.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 12A.1.1 requires that the company has documented audit procedures and standard audit forms. The
formats are designed, as required, for ISM Code, the ISPS Code, ISO Standards and any company internal
audits.
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-- 2.2. Management Oversight
2.2.3 Was the Master fully conversant with the company's Safety Management System and had Master's
Reviews of the system taken place in accordance with the ISM Code and company procedures?
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Question Category
••••
Process)
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-- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To provide assurance that the vessel had been operated in compliance with the company
Safety Management System.
Documentation.
,......., Tagged Rank Master.

Verification by
Human The Inspector is expected to interview the Master to ascertain how conversant he is with the layout and
--, contents of the SMS and the safety and environmental protection policies.
Process The vessel operator should clearly define and document the Master's responsibilities in relation to the ship's
safety management system (SMS). The company should establish the format and agenda, the frequency
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(at least annually) and a specified timeframe for company responses to the review.
Master's review: The Master is responsible for periodically reviewing the SMS and reporting any
deficiencies in the SMS and suitable corrective actions to the shore-based management .
The Inspector is expected to query on the occasions (the previous two) that SMS reviews were carried out
by the Master. In particular, the Master would be expected to retrieve information on deficiencies that were
uncovered by the Master in previous SMS reviews - hardcopy and digital copies of this information should
be kept readily on hand. The information on SMS deficiencies should include proposals by the Master for
--
corrective actions and recommendations for improving the SMS relevant to those related ship operations.
The Master should have received responses or decisions from the company regarding the last two SMS
reviews carried out within a specified timeframe.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.2 requires that policy and procedures are formally reviewed at regular intervals to ensure robustness
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and effectiveness. Policy and procedures are reviewed at company-defined intervals and amended as
necessary.
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- Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 15
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the procedure to maintain the Enhanced Survey File
in accordance with the Classification Society Rules, and was the vessel free of any visible or documentary
evidence of concerns with the structural condition of the hull or cargo and ballast tank coatings?
Question Category
••••
{Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure that the structure of oil and chemical tankers are subject to enhanced survey
Objective and complete historical records of any damage, deterioration and subsequent repairs to
their hull structure are available onboard.
ROVIQ Sequence Pre-board, Main Deck, Documentation.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Engineer.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for maintaining the enhanced
survey file, or electronic record, and the coating technical file.
Process The vessel operator should ensure that all sections of the Enhanced Survey File are duly maintained and
up to date with the details required by the vessel's Classification Society. The ship's crew is expected to
have carried out the periodic inspection of cargo holds, ballast tanks and void spaces as per the operator's
schedule. Presenting of the inspection records would be requested by the Inspector.
The records in the Enhanced Survey File will contain records of any structural repairs identified and whether
they were completed or not. The vessel defect reporting system should also be duly updated to reflect the
status of repairs. The Enhanced Survey File should be kept on hand during the inspection for the Inspector
to review the Enhanced Survey File and tally the vessel repair history against the preceding 12 months of
records in the vessel's defect reporting system. For damages, there should be an accompanying incident
report onboard.
The condition evaluation report should be properly reviewed in that the coating condition of cargo or
ballast tankers that were reported as fair or poor is reflected.
Substantially corroded tanks
Areas or areas with deep pitting recorded should be accompanied with thickness measurement readings
and you should expect the Inspector to review them. The Coating Technical File will also be reviewed by
the Inspector who would particularly note the areas where coating repairs were carried out. Cracking,
denting, distortion and excessive corrosion or thinning of structural members should have been attended
to through an occasional survey and the follow through from the occasional survey should have been
completed with records and evidence ready for presenting to the Inspector.
Hardware The Inspector will carry out a physical inspection, with focus on the areas that he/she has taken note of in
the files and records. During the physical inspection, the Inspector would also verify if there are any other
concerns with hull structural integrity such as cracking, denting, distortion and excessive corrosion or
thinning (as compared with design profile) of structural members that were not reflected in the files and
documents.
TMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spacers are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.
The frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of Class, Flag State and national
authorities.
�.

-
-
2.3. Structural Assessment
2.3.2 Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the company procedure to maintain the Class
Survey File, and was the vessel free of any visible or documentary evidence of concerns with the structural
condition of the hull or hold space and ballast tank coatings?
--
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
0 rw��
000
- To ensure that the structures of gas carriers were subject to the required surveys and
-
Objective complete historical records of any damage, deterioration and subsequent repairs to the
hull structure were available on board.
ROVIQ Sequence Pre-board, Main Deck, Documentation.
-
Verification by
Human The Master and/or Chief Engineer must be familiar with the company procedure to ensure the vessel's
Survey File is maintained, complete and up to date.
Process The vessel operator should ensure that there is a procedure to ensure the vessel's Class Survey File is
-
maintained and up to date to reflect the complete Class status reports, survey reports, repair history and
coating conditions.
The ship's crew is expected to have carried out the periodic inspection of cargo holds, ballast tanks and void
spaces as per scheduled. The Inspector will request that Inspection reports are presented.
Records of any structural repairs identified and whether they were completed or not must be reflected
in the Class Survey file. The vessel defect reporting system should also be duly updated to reflect the
status of repairs. For damages due to a casualty or incident, there should be an accompanying incident
- report available onboard. The Inspector is expected to review the Survey File and tally the vessel repair
history against the preceding 12 months of records in the vessel's defect reporting system. Cracking,
denting, distortion and excessive corrosion or thinning of structural members should have been attended
to through an occasional survey and the follow through from the occasional survey should have been
,......., completed with records and evidence ready for presenting to the Inspector.
The Coating Technical File should be properly updated so that the coating condition of cargo or ballast
tankers that were reported as fair or poor are reflected. A survey report containing details of substantially
corroded tanks and areas, or areas with deep pitting, will lead to a negative observation. So will Classification
-
reports recording fair or poor ballast tanks coating conditions.
Hardware During the physical inspection, the Inspector will also be observing if there are any other concerns with hull
structural integrity such as cracking, denting, distortion and excessive corrosion or thinning (as compared
-
with design profile) of structural members that were not reflected in the files and documents.
-
..........
-
-
2.3.3 Were the Master and Senior Officers familiar with the company cargo, ballast & void space inspection and
reporting procedure and, were records available to demonstrate that all inspections had been accomplished
with the required timeframe with reports completed in accordance with company instructions?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
To ensure that the condition of cargo, ballast and void spaces was properly evaluated with
Objective defects to structure, coating or fittings effectively managed.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Cargo Control Room.
Tagged Rank Master, Senior Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company cargo/ballast/void space inspection
procedure and/or reporting criteria.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures in place for cargo, ballast and void space inspections. Frequency
and actions to be taken when a space cannot be inspected must be defined. Condition of each space
must be reported in a standard format.
The ship's crew is expected to have carried out the periodic inspection of cargo holds, ballast tanks and
void spaces as scheduled. The Inspector will request that inspection reports are presented. The inspection
intervals required are as follows:
• Cargo tanks on oil and chemical tankers should be inspected by ship staff at intervals of 2.5 years
with six months +/- window, so as to align with the renewal and intermediate survey regimes.
• Hold spaces on gas carriers should be inspected annually.
• All ballast tanks, void spaces, pipe trunks and cofferdams must be inspected annually for all vessel
types. (Make sure they are not overdue by more than a month).
• Where conditions of Class, memoranda or coating conditions require more frequent inspections of
cargo, ballast and/or void spaces, they have to be conducted by ship staff and be documented.
! The Inspector will verify the enclosed space entry records and permits for recent cargo, ballast and void
space inspections.
The date ranges of inspections should be declared in the PIO (PIO 2.3) and the Inspector will sight and
verify that the date ranges are as per required and to establish if there are any overdue inspections. The
inspection reports must be a standard format as per laid out in company procedures.
Records of any structural repairs identified, and whether they were completed or not, must be reflected
in the Class Survey file. The vessel defect reporting system should also be duly updated to reflect the
status of repairs. For damages, there should be an accompanying incident report onboard. The Inspector
is expected to review the Survey File and tally the vessel repair history against the preceding 12 months of
records in the vessel's defect reporting system.
Hardware

- 2.3. Structural Assessment
-
2.3.4 Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for detecting leakage of liquids
between cargo, bunker, ballast, void and cofferdam spaces which included inspecting the surface of ballast
water prior to discharge, and were records available to show that the necessary checks had been performed?
Question Category
••••
{Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
-
Process)
To ensure that leakage of liquids between adjacent cargo, bunker, ballast, void and
Objective
-
cofferdam spaces or from pipelines passing through such spaces is detected.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
Tagged Rank Master and Deck Officers.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for periodically checking
-
empty spaces for liquid ingress or monitoring the levels of full or partially full tanks for migration of liquid
between spaces.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the company procedure for inspecting the surface
of ballast water prior to discharge when a ballast tank adjoined a cargo or bunker tank or had piping
containing oil passing through it.
......... Process The vessel operator should ensure that there are procedures covering leakage detection. These should
-
include:
• Inspecting the surface of ballast water in tanks adjacent to cargo or bunker tanks, and areas where
oil pipes such as hydraulic lines run through, before discharging of ballast overboard.
-
• Periodic sounding of empty tanks and spaces to detect migration of liquids from other spaces in the
event of structural failure or pipeline leakage.
• Periodic monitoring of the level of contents in tanks that are full or partially full to detect migration
of liquids between adjacent or interconnected spaces.
• Testing of ballast lines which pass through cargo tanks or fuel tanks.
• Mitigating actions when contaminated ballast water is found or when there is evidence of cross
-
contamination of contents across different spaces.
The Inspector is expected to sight these procedures and to verify the following:
• The sounding records and records of inspection of ballast water prior to discharge, ballast lines
test, in accordance with the company procedures.
• Periodic soundings of empty tanks had been conducted.
• The ballast tank sighting arrangements could be readily used to sight the surface of ballast water prior
to discharge.
• Whether the tanks that adjoin cargo or bunker tanks could be readily inspected without the removal of
numerous bolts to access the inspection hatch or to make an enclosed space entry.
• Whether liquid leakage or cross-contamination was detected in an empty space or ballast tank as a
-
result of structural or pipeline failure during the past 12 months.
• Records of ballast line tests which pass through cargo or fuel tanks.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.
--
--
-
� Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 19
2.3.5 Had the vessel been enrolled in a Classification Society Condition Assessment Programme?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To provide an objective assessment of the operational reliability of a vessel in critical areas

Objective at the request of a vessel's owner, typically at the third special survey and periodically
thereafter.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Pre-board.
Tagged Rank Master.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated for vessels that have passed their 15th anniversary from the initial
delivery date and, where the vessel operator had declared that the vessel had been awarded a CAP rating
in at least one module.
Prior to the inspection, the vessel operator would have to:
• Provide information on the vessel's CAP status in the PIQ (PIQ 2.3) and must ensure that the submitted
information are accurate. Do note that the date of CAP survey should not be entered as the date of
CAP Certificate issue date in the PIO.
• Upload the CAP certificate to the document store.
During the inspection onboard, the Inspector is expected to request to sight:
• The CAP certificate showing the completion of the assessment survey and the final ratings for the
modules.
• The final ratings for the CAP modules completed.
• Evidence that the onboard CAP survey was carried out and any information or records to supplement
the CAP certificate.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 4.3.4 requires that the frequency and extent of structural inspection of the vessel's cargo, ballast and
void spaces is determined on risk criteria which includes vessel's age and type.

-
-
2.4. Defect Management
2.4.1 Were the Senior Officers familiar with the company procedure for reporting effects on vessel structure,
machinery and equipment to shore-based management through the company defect reporting system and
was evidence available to demonstrate that all defects had been reported accordingly?
- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment are documented and
reviewed by management.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Chief Engineer's Office (could come up at any time during an inspection).
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Engineer and Senior Officers.
-
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Senior Officer must be familiar with the company defect reporting procedure.
A defect reporting system, developed by the vessel operator must be available. It may be incorporated
-
Process
within the SMS. The Inspector will verify the procedure, which should define:
• What constitutes a defect to structure, machinery and equipment that must be reported through the
defect reporting system. This should include:
- navigation equipment
- engine machinery
-
- deck machinery
• cargo-handling machinery/equipment
• hull structure
-
• electronic equipment.
• The process for entering defects into the defect reporting system.
• The timeline for entering a defect into the defect reporting system and then transmitting the report to
-
shore-based management.
• The process for shore-based management to acknowledge a defect and assign a timeline for corrective
action to be taken.
-
• The process for establishing mitigating actions where the reported defect adversely affects the safe
operation of the vessel.
• The requirement to submit an incident report where a defect resulted in, or was the cause of, an
incident as defined elsewhere within company procedures.
- Hardware The Inspector will also note any obviously defective structure, machinery or equipment not covered by any
defect report. In addition, defects caused by an incident, or if the defects had caused an incident, would
be noted to see if investigation had taken place.
- TMSA KPI 4.1.2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet to cover all
onboard equipment and Conditions of Class. Companies will strive to correct any Conditions of Class
without delay.
- Comments/SMS Reference

2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel's structure, machinery or equipment, had the vessel operator notified
Class, Flag and/or the authorities in the port of arrival, as appropriate to the circumstances, and had short-term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or permissions to proceed the voyage been issued where necessary?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure that defects affecting Statutory Certificates or Class-required equipment are

Objective reported to the vessel's Classification Society, Flag Administration and any affected
stakeholders as appropriate.
Verification by
Human Senior Officers must be familiar with the company procedure for notifying Class, Flag and/or other external
stakeholders of defects to the vessel's structure, machinery or equipment after shore management evaluation.
Process ! The Master and Chief Engineer should have prepared a printed list of all open defect reports existing onboard
the vessel at the time of the inspection for the Inspector's use. The list of open defect reports should identify
any defects that have resulted in a notification to the vessel's Classification Society and/or Flag Administration.
Procedures must be available, developed by the vessel operator, for evaluating defects to a vessel's structure,
machinery and equipment to determine whether, when and how the vessel's Classification Society, Flag
Administration and/or other external stakeholders should be informed.
The procedure should define:
• Which defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment should be reported to the vessel's
Classification Society, Flag Administration and/or other external stakeholders.
• When the defects are required to be reported to the vessel's Classification Society, Flag Administration
and/or other external stakeholders and by whom.
• Where short-term certificates and/or Flag waivers have been issued, the external stakeholders that may
need to be notified and by whom.
• The records that must be maintained onboard to demonstrate that the appropriate notifications had
been made to the vessel's Classification Society, Flag Administration and/or other external stakeholders.
The Inspector will review the Class Status report and identify any Conditions of Class, memoranda or short
term certificates that may indicate that there was a defect in the vessel's structure, machinery or equipment.
The Inspector will also review the vessel's defect reporting system and identify any defects that would
be reportable to the vessel's Classification Society or Flag Administration and verify that they were either
reported in the Class Status report or communications were available to demonstrate that Class
and/or Flag had been advised and that no further action was required.
Where the vessel has a short-term certificate or Flag Administration waiver, he will verify that the vessel had
notified external stakeholders of the vessel deficiency, where required to do so, through the pre-arrival
prac"'"""'" "l"l"lir;ihlP tn thP J')nrt nf ;:irriv;:il nr tr;:insit of rontrolled navigational areas
Where the vessel's Classification Society or Flag Administration had required that specific mitigating
measures were taken as a condition of the issuing of a short-term certificate or Flag waiver, the Inspector
will verify that the vessel had complied with the required measures.
Hardware If there are open defect reports in the defect reporting system of a significant nature but there is no evidence
that Class, Flag and/or external stakeholders have been informed in accordance with the company procedure,
the Inspector will identify the defective equipment and raise a negative observation under 'Hardware' .
TMSA KPI 4. 1 .2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet. The defect
n::iporting covers all onboard equipment and includes Conditions of Class.

-
2.5. Management of Change
- 2.5.1 Had the company Management of Change (MOC) procedure been effectively implemented for changes
affecting structure, machinery and equipment governed by Classification Society rules or Statutory Survey?
Question Category
• •••
.........
a
Process)
-
To ensure any changes made to the vessel structure, machinery or equipment is properly
Objective managed to avoid an undesirable outcome.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Anywhere.
,........ Tagged Rank Master, Chief Engineer and Senior Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Senior Officer must be familiar with the company MOC process.
Process The vessel operator should establish MOC procedures to ensure that changes to vessel structure,
machinery and equipment follow a defined process. T he procedure should define:
• What changes are subject to the MOC process and what changes can be excluded from MOC process
-
(such as like for like replacements).
• The process of documenting a request for change, the format of the request and the means of
communicating the request to shore management.
-
• The approval process before implementing the change.
• The notification process for communicating approved changes to stakeholders.
• The supplementary documentation required to support a change request.
• The process to identify and document drawings, manuals, procedures, checklists, etc, which will be
affected by the change along with confirmation that the updates to these have completed.
• How all changes under the MOC process will be indexed onboard and filed on a database.
Prior to the inspection, the vessel operator must declare any applicable changes that have been carried out
onboard and indicate these in the PIQ. (PIQ 2.5: Management of Change)
The Inspector will review the vessel's MOC register or database index and go through the changes that
had been implemented over the last 12 months. During the physical inspection of the vessel, review of
documentation and interviews, the Inspector will take note of any apparent changes to vessel structure,
machinery, or equipment which have not be noted in the PIQ or did not follow the MOC process.
-
Hardware The Inspector will also note any obviously defective structure, machinery or equipment not covered by
any defect report. In addition, defects caused by an incident, or in instances where defects had caused an
incident, would be noted to see if an investigation had taken place.
TMSA KPI 7.1.1 requires that there is a documented procedure for management of change. The procedure
- addresses both permanent and temporary changes onboard and ashore. These may include installation of
new equipment and modification of existing equipment.

-
2.6.1 Were the Master, Deck Officers and Engineer Officers familiar with the vessel's Ballast Water Management
Plan (BWMP) and were records available to demonstrate that ballast handling had been conducted in
accordance with the plan?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure that ballast is always safely handled in accordance with the Ballast Water
Objective Management Convention (BWMC) and Code for Approval of Ballast Water Management
Systems (BWMS Code).
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room.
-
Verification by
Human The designated Officer in Charge of the implementation of the BWMP must be familiar with the content
of the plan. The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the BWMP and the entries required to be
made in the BWRB.
Process The BWMP must be ship-specific and written in the working language of the ship.
The Inspector will review the BWMP and will verify that personnel with specific responsibilities as noted in
the BWMP are familiar with:
• Safety procedures for the ship and crew associated with ballast water management.
• Actions to be taken to implement ballast water management requirements and supplemental ballast
water management practices as set forth in the BWMC.
• Procedures for disposal of sediments at sea and to shore.
• Where, when and how ballast is permitted to be loaded, discharged and exchanged and the processes
that the vessel is required to follow.
• How ballast operations are to be recorded.
• The actions the vessel must take if it cannot comply with any aspect of the approved BWMP, e.g. when
the ballast water treatment plant becomes defective.
The Inspector will also sight and review the BWMC to identify the principal ballast water management
method.
The ballast water record book will be verified to ascertain that recent ballast-handling operations were
conducted and documented in accordance with the BWMP and BWMC. Times and duration of ballast
operations will be verified.
When ballast water exchange operations were conducted, records related to the plans and assessment of
the sequential exchange of ballast, which must include the longitudinal and torsional stresses at each stage
of the operation, must be properly documented and be within limits. Draughts and trim at each stage of
the operation will be verified.
When ballast water treatment or exchange had not been completed in accordance with the BWMP due to
damage or defect to the ballast water treatment plant, records of communications with the Flag and Port
State Authorities and conditions placed on the vessel must be complied with and properly documented.
Hardware The Inspector will sight the ballast water treatment plant to establish that it is functional and there is no
evidence of bypass which contravenes with the BWMP.
TMSA KPI 6.2.3 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of ballast-handling operations, including
ballast water exchange and ballast water treatment.

-
- 2.6. Statutory Management Plans
2.6.2 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the Volatile Organic Compounds (VO() Management Plan,
and had the procedures for minimising VOC emissions set out in the Plan been implemented and documented
as required?
--
Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
To ensure that voe emissions are minimised by implementation of the voe Management
Objective
Plan.
- Verification by
Human ! This question will only be allocated to oil tankers where the vessel operator had declared through the
PIQ (PIQ 2. 6.2) that the vessel is provided with a voe Management Plan.
The Inspector will interview the person identified as responsible for implementing the Plan to verify
if he/she is familiar with the contents and any specific record-keeping requirements.
-
The Inspector will also interview the Accompanying Officer to verify his/her awareness of the voe
Management Plan and any actions required to be completed during the ongoing cargo operation to
comply with the Plan. These provisions may be incorporated in the cargo transfer plan.
Process The voe Management Plan, developed by the operator, for ships that carry crude oil must be ship
specific, approved by the Flag Administration or its Recognised Organisation and be in the working
__, language of the ship.
voe Management Plan Training Records must also be available for the Inspector as well as records
demonstrating compliance with the Plan. The training programmes for ship's crew involved in cargo
---, operations as set out in the voe Management Plan must be implemented.
- Procedures for minimising voe emissions during the loading, carriage and discharge, including crude
oil washing, of crude oil cargoes must be implemented. Records must be maintained to demonstrate
compliance with the Plan.
The target operating pressure for the cargo tanks during loading and carriage of crude oil cargoes must
be clearly indicated in the Cargo Control Room.
-
The Inspector will also verify the records of past cargo operations, tank pressures and other records
at different stages of the cargo-handling operations and voyage required to be maintained by the voe
Management Plan.
-
He will further review the cargo plan and deck logbook for the ongoing operations and verify that
requirements of the VOC Management Plan applicable to those specific operations had been incorporated.
-
Hardware
TMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that voe management procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and
ensure that they are always within permitted levels.
-
-
--
2.6.3 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the contents and requirements of the Ship Energy Efficiency
Management Plan (SEEMP) and had these been fully implemented?
Question Category
Process)
8@08
To ensure that measures set out in the SEEMP to improve fuel efficiency and collect fuel
Objective
consumption data have been fully implemented.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview the Master and/or the Chief Engineer to verify their familiarity with the
contents and requirements of the SEEMP.
Process The vessel operator must have developed a SEE MP which is ship specific, approved by the Flag Administration
or its Recognised Organisation and can form part of the vessel's SMS.
The Inspector will review the SEEMP and, where applicable, records of the collection, aggregation, and
reporting of ship data with regard to annual fuel oil consumptions.
They will expect to see documentary evidence that the package of measures, as listed in SEEMP Part I
to improve the ship's energy efficiency, had been implemented and/or monitored. Measures should
include improved voyage planning, weather routeing, just-in-time arrival, speed optimisation, optimum
trim, optimum use of auto-pilot rudder and heading systems, hull maintenance.
For ships of 5,000 GT and above, the Inspector will verify:
• The SEEMP Part II, which must include a description of the ship-specific method to collect, aggregate,
and report ship data with regard to annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours underway and
other data required by regulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to be reported to the Flag Administration.
• A Statement of Compliance - Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting must have been issued.
• There must be records of the collection, aggregation, and/or reporting of ship data with regard t.o
annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours underway and other data required by regulation
22A of MARPOL Annex VI to the Flag Administration.
• Records of fuel consumption must include all the fuel oil consumed on board, regardless of whether
the ship was underway or not
o by the main engines, auxiliary engines, gas turbines, boilers and inert gas generator, if fitted, and any
other fuel consumer
o for each type of fuel oil consumed e.g. HFO, DO, LNG etc.
Hardware
T MSA KPI 10.1.1 requires that an environmental protection policy and management plan on energy management
-
and efficiency is in place. The policy, which is signed by senior management, includes a commitment
to minimisinq the environmental impact of operations. The policy is conspicuously posted onboard
vessels and in company offices ashore. All company personnel including third-party contractors are
aware and familiar with the policy.
-
-
2. 7. Safety Management System
2.7 .1 Was the relevant content of the SMS manuals easily accessible to all personnel on board in a working
........ language(s} understood by them?
-
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that all personnel on board can access and understand the procedures and
Objective instructions relevant to them, set out in the ship's SMS manuals.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview- Ratings ..
Tagged Rank All personnel.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (2. 7 .1)
Human The Inspector will interview personnel, including Ratings, with specific duties under the Safety
Management System (SMS).
--
They should be familiar with the process to access the sections of the SMS relevant to their role and they
must understand the parts of the SMS manuals relevant to their role in the language(s) in which they were
-
provided (PIO 2.7).
All personnel must have easy access to relevant content of the SMS manual. Navigation procedures and
instructions on the bridge, whether in electronic format or in hard copy, must be easily accessible.
Process During the inspection, the Inspector will review the content of the vessel's SMS to verify that:
• The content of the SMS is relevant to the ship and is ship-type specific.
,-- • Changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorised personnel.
• Obsolete documentation is removed.
Changes to the SMS must be promptly brought to the attention of the onboard personnel.
The SMS manuals must be "user friendly". It must be easy and not time consuming for ship staff to
navigate to the appropriate information.
For manuals that are in hard-copy format, there must be sufficient copies at appropriate locations onboard
for relevant shipboard personnel to access.
-
All the copies of the SMS manuals in different locations on the ships must have been updated with the
latest version.
For manuals only available in electronic format, all relevant personnel must have ready access to a
workstation and have received adequate training to be familiar in accessing the SMS.
In case of the bridge having procedures and instructions in electronic format only, the back-up independent
-
means of power to the workstation on the bridge must be provided.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.4 requires that procedures and instructions are easily accessible to personnel and available at
-
appropriate locations. Sufficient electronic or hard copies of procedures and instructions are easily accessible
to all personnel, including contractors, at appropriate locations.
-
2.7.2 Did the SMS identify clear levels of authority and lines of communications between the Master, ship's
Officers, Ratings and the company, and were all onboard personnel familiar with these arrangements as they
related to their positions?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
a
To ensure alt onboard personnel understand the levels of authority and lines of
Objective communication between the Master, ship's Officers, Ratings and the company as they
related to their position.
Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Ratings
ROVIQ Sequence & Senior Officers.
Tagged Rank All.
Verification by

Human The Inspector will interview Senior and Junior Officers to verify that they are familiar with the lines of
communication between Master, ship's Officers, Ratings and the company. They will also be asked to share
how the information on the identity and contact details of the DPA is disseminated.
Junior Officers and Ratings must be aware of the identity, contact details and role of the DPA.
Process The Inspector will review the SMS manual to verify that documented levels of authority and lines of
communications between the Master, ship's Officers, Ratings and the company are clearly identified. They
will also verify how Officers and Ratings are informed of the identity of the DPA.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 1 A.2.2 requires managers' roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities for achieving objectives to be
defined within the SMS. This could be demonstrated through means of organisational charts (including
reporting lines) and job descriptions (including responsibilities and accountability).
-
-
2.8. General Information
--
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) available through the OCIMF SIRE
Programme database completed accurately to reflect the structure, outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that the information contained within the OCIMF HVPQ provides an accurate
dataset for use by SIRE 2.0 programme participants.
Tagged Rank Master.
Verification by
Human
Process Prior to the inspection, the vessel operator should have updated the HVPQ to ensure that all static and
dynamic information is complete and accurate. The vessel operator has to declare through the inspection
booking system that the information contained within the HVPQ was updated, complete and accurate, in
order for the HVPQ to be released to the Inspector.
In particular, the Inspector will seek to verify the accuracy of the following sections in the HVPQ
• 1 General Information.
• 2 Certificates.
-
• 3 Crew.
,........, • 4 Navigation.
• 7 Structural condition.
• 12 Propulsion.
... and review that information which appears inconsistent with the type and specialisation of the vessel
and make a note of information which will assist in better understanding the background of the questions
assigned to the bespoke Vessel Inspection Questionnaire for the inspection.
During the inspection onboard the vessel, the Inspector will clarify with the Master or an appropriate
Officer on any inconsistencies identified within the HVPQ. Verified errors or omissions within the HVPQ will
be informed to the Master and documented for the inspection. Particular attention is paid to details relating
-
to ownership, Class status, validity of certification or outfitting of the vessel. Through the inspection software,
the Inspector will have access to certificates and documents. The list is available in the SIRE 2.0 Question
Library Part 1.
Hardware
TMSA None specified.

2.8.2 Were records of the most recent Port State Control inspection available onboard, and where deficiencies
had been recorded had these been corrected and closed out in accordance with the company procedure for
defects of non-conformities?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
Objective To provide an accurate record of the most recent PSC inspection.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Pre-Board.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Engineer and other Senior Officers.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (2:8.2)
Human
Process Prior to the inspection, the vessel operator should have provided the details of the last three PSC inspections
through the PIO (PIO 2.8).
The operator will also indicate whether the inspection data was entered in the OCIMF PSC Database. If
this is the case, the Inspector will have access to the database and will be able to review and verify prior to
boarding.
If this is not the case, the Inspector will review the most recent PSC inspection reports available on board and
will review the documented evidence for correction and close out of any deficiencies.
INTERTANKO Members are encouraged to upload their PSC reports into the OCIMF PSC database.
During the inspection, the Inspector will verify:
• The company procedures for managing PSC inspections. The procedures should include the involvement
of the various shipboard personnel during the conduct of a PSC inspection and the process to correct and
close out deficiencies recorded during a PSC inspection.
• The most recent PSC inspection report must be available on the PSC MoU databases. The inspector will
verify that the information submitted on the PIQ is accurate. He will also wish to sight all PSC inspection
reports for the previous three years.
• If the OCIMF PSC Inspection repository is utilised by the vessel operator, whether the most recent PSC
inspection had been uploaded.
• Documented evidence that any deficiencies raised during the last PSC inspection had been rectified and
closed out with approval from shore management through either the non-conformity reporting system or
defect reporting system.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 4.1.2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet.

--
---,
Chapter 3.
Crew Management
Chapter 3. Crew Management
3.1.1. Were the Officers and Ratings suitably qualified to serve onboard the vessel and did the Officer
matrix posted on the OCIMF website accurately reflect the qualifications, experience and English language
capabilities of the Officers onboard at the time of the inspection?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 fQ1J1U
0 0 0
To ensure that all Officers and crew onboard are properly qualified for the type of vessel
Objective and the position they hold onboard.
Tagged Rank All crew.
Verification by
Human The Senior Officer accompanying the Inspector must be familiar with the maintenance of Officer and
Rating certification records onboard. The Inspector will select one deck Rating assigned duties and
responsibilitie.s related to cargo or cargo equipment and verify he holds a certificate of basic training for
oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.
During the inspection and while interviewing the Master, Chief Engineer and other Officers, the Inspector
will pay attention to the standard of English comprehension and spoken English. Where there are concerns
with communication in the English language with any Officer, the Inspector will note the degree of English
recorded against the individual's rank in the published Officer matrix.
Process The vessel operator should have uploaded the updated crew matrix to the OCIMF website not more than four
days before the inspection. The Inspector, prior to the inspection, will review the uploaded matrix and verify that:
• The information included in the matrix is accurate by randomly selecting one Senior Officer and Junior
Officer from each of the deck and engine departments (to include electricians, cargo engineers and
other specialist Engineer Officers, where carried) and cross checking their certificates of competency,
endorsements and sea service records (for time in rank only).
• All Senior Officers, junior deck Officers and cargo/gas Engineers hold a certificate in advanced
training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.
• All junior Engineer Officers hold a certificate in basic training for oil, chemical or liquified gas
tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.
The vessel operator must have developed procedures to ensure that:
• Each crew member is in possession of all statutory and company mandatory certification and
course completion certificates required for their role onboard.
• Certification for each individual is presented in a standard order with an index indicating which
certificates were mandatory for the role onboard.
• A consolidated record of sea service is available for each officer.
Make sure that the sea time in rank for all Officers is accurate and records to verify sea time in rank are
available. (Verification checks will only cover up to 36 months' sea service onboard.) The Flag endorsement
for any individual Officer must reflect the details of the national CoC on which they are based.
OCIMF interprets a "person with immediate responsibility" to include all watchkeeping Officers in
charge of cargo-related operations whether the vessel is at sea or in port. This includes the 2nd Officer,
3rd Officer, 4th Officer and Gas/Cargo Engineer. It may also include the pumpman and other Ratings if
engaged in direct supervision of cargo operations. These crew members should have advanced training for
oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker cargo operations applicable to the type of vessel served on.
Where Ratings, including the pumpman. are assigned duties with direct supervision of cargo operations,
the Inspector will verify that they hold a certificate in advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas
tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3.2.3 requires that the company verifies that vessel personnel quality requirements are consistently met.

3.1. Crew Qualification
.........
-
3.1.2 Were procedures and instructions contained within the Safety Management System and signs posted
around the vessel available in the designated working language of the vessel or a language(s) understood
by the crew, and were the Master, Officers and Ratings able to communicate verbally in that language?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that the Master, Officers and Ratings can read and understand procedures,
Objective instructions and safety signs onboard, and can communicate verbally in the designated
--
working language of the vessel.
ROVIQ Sequence Anywhere.
Verification by
- Practical Guidelines (3.1.2)
-
Human
Process The vessel operator must have designated the working language of the vessel and documented it
within the SMS.
-
The designated working language must be declared through the HVPQ and recorded in the ship's logbook.
The vessel operator must have declared the designated common working language and the
language(s) of the SMS in the pre-inspection questionnaire. This will be inserted in the inspection editor
-
and reproduced in the final report.
It is recognised that Officers and Ratings may speak a language that is convenient to them when engaged
in non-safety-related activities. However, it is expected that:
--
• The Officers will communicate with the Inspector in English.
• While in the presence of the Inspector, the Officers should communicate with each other in English
while discussing matters relating to the inspection. An exception can be made when the level of
English had been declared as poor through the OC/MF crew matrix for one or more of the Officers
concerned, in which case, they should use the designated working language.
• The Officers and Ratings should communicate with each other in the designated working language
and/or English while working with the Inspector.
• Where the Inspector can conduct the inspection in the designated working language of the vessel,
this is acceptable, providing sufficient English communication between Officers is observed to verify
the level of English declared in the OCIMF crew matrix for vessels that must use it for communication
when navigating or interacting with a terminal.
During the inspection, the Inspector will observe communication between the officers and between
Officers and Ratings and he will verify that:
• Crew members are able to verbally communicate effectively in the designated working language of
......., the vessel .
• The accompanying Officer must be able to translate a question, and the subsequent reply, directed at
a Rating, into English consistent with the standard of English declared within the OCIMF crew matrix.
• If for any reason, the accompanying Officer cannot understand the Inspector's question, he should ask
him politely to rephrase the question.
Continues overleaf...

Practical Guidelines (3.1.2) Continued ...
Process Furthermore, the Inspector will observe safety signs and instructions posted around the vessel and verify
(Continued) that:
• The signs or safety instructions are posted in the designated working language.
• Where ratings are not able to read the designated working language, the safety signs or instructions
are additionally posted in a language that they can read and understand.
• It is recommended that the safety signs and instructions are accompanied by photos (as far as practicable
and applicable) rather than text.
The Inspector will also observe the content of the SMS and where it had been developed in a language
other than the designated working language, he will verify that:
• Sections of the SMS containing safety instructions that are required to be understood by the whole
crew had been translated into the designated working language and, any other languages necessary,
to ensure that all Officers and Ratings are able to read and understand the content.
• Checklists and safe working procedures are translated into the designated working language.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.3 requires that procedures and instructions are written in plain language and contain sufficient
detail to ensure that tasks can be completed correctly and consistently.
-
3.1. Crew Qualification
- 3.1.3 Did the complement of Officers and Ratings onboard at the time of inspection meet or exceed the
requirements of the Minimum Safe Manning Document and the declared company standard manning for
routine operations, and had Senior Officers been relieved to ensure continuity of operational knowledge?
Question Category
••••
-
Process}
To ensure that the vessel is always adequately manned for the operations expected to be
Objective undertaken based on the normal trading pattern and any foreseeable specialist operations
or periods of heightened workload.
,........., ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, pre-board.
-
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Officer.
Verification by Operator, Master.

,.........,
-
Human
Process The vessel operator must have developed policies and procedures for the safe manning of the vessel
which set out:
• The approved manning levels for routine operations.
• The approved manning levels for defined specialist operations and high workload situations.
• The minimum interval between the relief of the Senior Officers from the same department.
The vessel operator must provide manning details through the pre-inspection questionnaire as follows:
• Manning required by the Minimum Safe Manning Document.
• Company standard manning level for the vessel during routine operations.
• Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for
continuous/extended/repeated STS operations, if any.
continuous/extended/repeated inter-harbour operations and/or short voyages of less than 24 hours, if
any.
.......... • Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for
operations requiring implementation of additional security measures, if any.
other specialist operations, if any.
• The minimum interval required between the relief of the Senior Officers from the same department.
The information provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final inspection report.
The Inspector will review the information provided by the vessel operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire and compare against:
• The minimum safe manning document.
• A copy of the arrival crew list provided by the Master.
• The current OCIMF crew matrix available on the OCIMF SIRE database.
-- The Inspector will also verify that the actual number of Engineers onboard is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the Safe Manning Document if the machinery space is routinely operated in the manned
--
mode at sea.
-
Process Both Senior Officers from a single department shall be relieved with overlap or parallel sailing period
Continued... for at least one of the Officers to cover the minimum relief interval declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
If simultaneous relieving of Senior Officers of a single department could not be avoided, INTERTANkO
advises you to list the mitigation measures applied in the comments sector of the Officer matrix posted on
the OCIMF website (ref. question 3.1.1).
Watch-keeping schedules shall be posted on the bridge, the cargo control room and the engine control
room. Schedules that include six (6) hours on and six (6) hours off do not comply with either STCW or MLC
2006.
Bridge watches should, in hours of darkness, incorporate two men on duty, one Officer and one look-out.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3A.1.1 requires that procedures ensure that each vessel is appropriately manned in order to maintain
safe operation onboard.
L.

3.2. Crew Evaluation
3.2.1. Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a static navigational assessment by a suitably
qualified and experienced company representative had been completed as declared through the pre
inspection questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of navigational standards
onboard managed vessels.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge.
........., Tagged Rank Master
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated when:
• The vessel operator had indicated that an appropriate static navigational assessment (PIQ 3.2. 1) had
been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months and,
• A dynamic navigational audit had not been completed by a member of the company staff within the
previous twelve months.
The Inspector will review the static navigation assessment and verify that:
• The assessment was conducted on the date declared by the operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
__, • The report was in a similar format and covered the review items suggested by the OCIMF publication A
Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.
• Brief details of the assessor's qualifications and experience must be included within the report. The
assessor must hold a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or have sailed as a Senior Deck Officer.
• The report must contain information relating to the best practice guidance points from TMSA KPI 5.2.2.
Where the report identified areas for improvement there must be evidence that follow up had been
undertaken within a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate through a corrective
-
action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified.
Supporting evidence must be available, demonstrating that the areas for improvement identified
during the dynamic navigational assessment had been closed out within the due dates indicated within
the corrective action plan.
Hardware
TMSA
--
KPI 5.2.2 requires that there is a procedure in place for appropriate shore-based personnel to conduct
navigational verification assessments.
........... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 37

3.2.2 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably
qualified and experienced company representative had been completed while on passage as declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
Process)

Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Documentation.
Tagged Rank Master & Navigation Officers.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection
questionnaire (PIO 3.2.2), that an appropriate dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably qualified and
experienced company representative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the
previous two years.
The Inspector will review the report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably
qualified and experienced company representative and verify that:
• The assessment was conducted during the period declared by the operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• The assessment covered all sections of a voyage as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
assessor must hold a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or have sailed as a Senior Deck Officer.
• The report must be in a similar format and cover the review items suggested by the OCIMF guidance
paper A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.
• The report must contain information relating to the majority of the best practice guidance points from
TMSA KPI 5.3.3.
Supporting evidence must be available, demonstrating that the areas for improvement identified during
the navigational assessment had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective
action plan.
The Inspector will verify the Bridge Logbook which covers the period of the reported dynamic navigation
assessment (for geographical verification purposes only).
Hardware
T MSA KPI 5.3.3 requires that comprehensive navigational audits are conducted while on passage by a suitably
qualified and experienced company representative.

3.2.3 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably
qualified specialist contractor had been completed while on passage as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
{Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type {Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
-
Process)
0 rw��
000
- Objective
.......... Tagged Rank Master and Navigation Officers.
Verification by

...--, Human
--
questionnaire (PIQ 3.2.3), that an appropriate dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably qualified
specialist contractor had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve
months.
-- The Inspector will review the report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably
-
qualified and experienced specialist contractor and verify that:
• The assessment was conducted during the period declared by the operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• The assessment covered all sections of a voyage as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• Brief details of the assessor's qualifications and experience must be included within the report.
........., The assessor must hold a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or have sailed as a Senior Deck Officer.
-
• The report must be in a similar format and cover the review items suggested by the OCIMF guidance
paper A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.
• The report must contain information relating to the majority of the best practice guidance points from
-
TMSA KPI 5.3.3.
-
action plan.
The Inspector will verify the Bridge Logbook which covers the period of the reported dynamic navigation
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.4.1 requires that comprehensive navigational audits are conducted while on passage by a suitably
qualified and experienced person.
.......
-
3.2.4 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that an unannounced remote navigational
assessment, which included review of VDR & ECDIS data by an independent contractor or specialist company
representative, had been completed as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
Process)

Objective
Tagged Rank Master and Navigation Officers.
Verification by
Human
questionnaire (PIQ 3.2.4), that a remote navigational assessment had been undertaken for the vessel being
inspected within the previous twelve months.
The Inspector will review the remote navigational assessment report and verify that:
• The remote navigational assessment included the phases of a voyage as declared in the pre-inspection
questionnaire. The remote navigational assessment should not only cover a period solely at anchor or
open sea navigation where no navigational challenges are present.
• The remote navigational assessment was unannounced and included the download and review of VDR
and ECDIS data.
assessor must hold a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or have sailed as a Senior Deck Officer and must
have proven seafaring experience.
• The report must be substantially in alignment with the format, and contained information, as suggested
by the OCIMF publication A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.
action plan.
The Inspector will verify the Bridge Logbook which covers the period of the reported remote navigation
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.4.1 requires that comprehensive navigational audits are conducted while on passage by a suitably
qu;:ilificd and experienced p,m;on.

-
,.......,
- 3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified
and experienced company representative had been completed as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
To verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of cargo, ballast and bunkering
Objective
operational standards onboard managed vessels.
Tagged Rank Chief Officer and all those responsible for cargo operations.
Verification by
Human
questionnaire (P/Q 3.2.5), that an appropriate comprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified and
previous twelve months.
The Inspector will sight the comprehensive cargo audit report and verify that:
• The comprehensive cargo audit was conducted during the period declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• The comprehensive cargo audit covered the cargo, ballast and bunkering operations as declared
through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• Brief details of the Assessor's qualification and pertinent seafaring experience must be included
within the report. The Assessor must hold, or have held, a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or sailed as
a Senior Deck Officer onboard tankers.
• The report must contain information relating to the majority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI
6.4.2.
Supporting evidence, which may include lessons learned documents across the fleet. must be available
to demonstrate that the areas for improvement identified during the cargo audit had been closed out
within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.
The Inspector will verify the Bridge Logbook and/or Cargo Logbook which covers the period of the
reported comprehensive cargo audit (for geographical and operational verification purposes only).
Hardware
TMSA KPI 6.4.2. requires that comprehensive cargo audits are completed by a suitably qualified and experienced
company representative at least annually. The audit includes observation of cargo, ballast, tank cleaning
and bunker-handling operations.

3.2.6 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive engineering audit by a suitable
qualified and experienced company representative had been completed as declared in the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of machinery space management,
Objective engineering and maintenance standards onboard managed vessels.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Tagged Rank Senior Engineering Officers.
Verification by
Human
questionnaire (PJQ 3.2.6), that an appropriate comprehensive engineering audit by a suitably qualified and
previous 12 months.
The Inspector will sight the comprehensive cargo audit report and verify that:
• The comprehensive engineering audit was conducted during the period declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire.
• The comprehensive engineering audit must cover the machinery space operations during cargo, ballast
and bunkering operations as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• Brief details of the Assessor's qualification and pertinent seafaring experience must be included
within the report. The Assessor must hold or had held a Senior Engineering Officer licence and/or had
sailed as a Senior Engineering Officer onboard tankers.
• The report must contain information relating to the maJority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI
4.4.5.
Supporting evidence, which may include lessons learned documents across the fleet, must be available
The Inspector will verify the Engine Logbook which covers the period of the reported comprehensive
cargo audit (for geographical and operational verification purposes only).
Hardware
T MSA TMSA KPI 4.4.5 requires that comprehensive engineering audits are completed by a suitably qualified and
experienced company representative. The audit includes observation of engineering practices while on
passage.

3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by
a suitably qualified and experienced company representative had been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
- Question Category
••••
Process)
To verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of mooring and anchoring
Objective
operational standards onboard managed vessels.
Tagged Rank Chief Officer and all those involved in mooring operations.
Verification by
..........
Practical Guidelines (3.2.7}
-
Human
questionnaire (PIQ 3.2. 7), that an appropriate comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a suitably
qualified and experienced company representative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected
-
within the previous twelve months.
The checklist used during the internal audit should be available for the Inspector to assess the extent and
depth of coverage of the audit.
The Inspector will sight the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit report and verify that
• The audit was conducted during the period declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The audit must cover the mooring and anchoring operations as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire.
• Brief details of the assessor's qualification and pertinent seafaring experience must be included
within the report. The assessor must hold or had held a Senior Deck Officer licence and/or had sailed as
-
a Senior Deck Officer onboard tankers.
• The report must contain information relating to the majority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI
6A.4.3.
-
Supporting evidence, which may include lessons learned documents across the fleet, must be available
-
The Inspector will verify the Deck Logbook which covers the period of the reported comprehensive cargo
audit (for geographical and operational verification purposes only).
-
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 6A.4.3 requires that comprehensive audits are completed by a suitably qualified and experienced
company representative. The audit uses observations of mooring operations.
-
3.2.8 Had the vessel operator implemented a Behavioural Competency Assessment Programme onboard and
was there evidence available that assessments were being conducted for navigation, cargo, mooring and
engineering operations by approved Assessors?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of competency standards
Objective onboard managed vessels.
Tagged Rank Senior Officers.
Verification by
Human
Process The question will only be generated when the operator had declared that a Behavioural Competency
Assessment and Verification programme was in operation onboard through the pre-inspection questionnaire
(PIQ 3.2.8).
The Inspector will review the Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification programme and will
verify that
• The assessment programme covers as a minimum; navigation, cargo operations, mooring operations
and engineering operations.
• The vessel operator has defined who is considered qualified to be an approved Assessor.
• The vessel operator has defined the training requirement for an approved Assessor.
-
• If vessel staff onboard at the time of the inspection are considered as approved Assessors, then they
must have evidence of the required training for an approved Assessor.
• There must be evidence that the staff onboard at the time of the inspection were actively involved
in the competency assessment programme with historical records of their competency assessments
available for their company service since the inception of the programme.
The OCIMF/INTERTANKO Guide: Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification for Vessel
Operators is available for free on the INTERTANKO website.
Hardware
-
TMSA KPI 3.4.1 requires that procedures to assess crew members for job competency are in place.

-
- 3.3. Crew Training
3.3.1. Had the Master and all navigation Officers attended a shore-based Bridge Team Management training
-
--, course within the previous five years?
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that all Navigation Officers have been trained in the practical application of
Objective
crew resource management in a realistic navigational environment.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated that the Master and all
Navigation Officers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a Bridge Team Management training
course within the previous five years.
The course must have included practical navigational exercises in a bridge simulator, with the simulator
time being at least equivalent to IMO Model Course 1.22.
The Inspector will review the Bridge Team Management training certificates for the Master and Navigation
Officers and verify that:
• The training was completed within the previous five years by each Officer.
• The training was stated as being in accordance with IMO model course 1.22.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.4.4 requires that Navigation Officers undertake periodic refresher bridge resource management
simulator training at a national or industry accredited shore establishment.

3.3.2. Had the Master received formal ship-handling training prior to promotion or when being assigned to
a new type of ship having significantly different handling characteristics to ships in which they had recently
served?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure the Master is familiar with the ship-handling characteristics of the type of ship
Objective to which they have been assigned.
Tagged Rank Master.
Verification by
L
Human
Process The Inspector will compare the sea service record of the Master through the tabulated record of sea
service prepared by the vessel operator with their discharge book and verify the time served as Master
corresponding to the value provided in the Officer Matrix uploaded to the OCIMF website.
Where the Master had served less than thirty-six months sea service in rank, the Inspector will request
evidence that ship-handling training had been provided prior to promotion to Master. This may consist
of either:
• A formal in-house training programme designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code 8-V/a.
• Attendance at a shore-based training course designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.
Where the Master had transferred between vessel types having significantly different handling
characteristics within the previous twelve months of sea service, the Inspector will request evidence that
additional ship-handling training had been provided to the Master prior to taking command of the new
type of vessel. This may consist of either:
• A formal in-house training programme designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code 8-V/a.
• Attendance at a shore-based training course designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.
A company training matrix must be available which clearly identifies the circumstances in which ship
handling training is required to be completed by a Master both at promotion and when being reassigned
to a vessel having significantly different handling characteristics.
The vessel operator must provide an evaluation of the handling characteristics of vessels under
management and identify where training is necessary when transferring between vessel identified as
having specific handling characteristics due to size or nUmber and type of propellers, rudders or thrusters.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.3.2 requires that a formal programme ensures that Senior Officers receive appropriate ship-handling
training before promotion to Master or assignment to a new vessel type.

-
- 3.3.3. Had the Master, Deck Officers, and Cargo/Gas Engineer where carried, attended a shore-based
simulator course covering routine and emergency cargo operations within the previous five years?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw��
000
To establish whether all Officers involved in cargo operations had been practically trained
Objective
I"""""""
in routine and emergency cargo operations in a realistic simulator environment.
Tagged Rank Master. Deck Officers and Cargo/Gas Engineers.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated when the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire that the Master, all Deck Officers and Cargo/Gas Engineers onboard at the time of inspection
had attended a shore-based cargo operations simulator course applicable to the vessel type within the
previous five years.
The Inspector will review the shore-based cargo system simulator training course certificates for the
Master, Deck Officers, and Cargo/Gas Engineer where carried, and will verify that:
• The training had been completed within the previous five years for the Master, each Deck Officer and
Cargo/Gas Engineer. The training may be a refresher training course where a full course had been
undertaken previously. Where a refresher training course was undertaken, the supporting full course
certificate must also be available for review.
• The training course was conducted in a simulator representing the type of vessel being inspected, i.e.,
oil, chemical, LPG or LNG.
• The training certificates indicated that the course content was at least equivalent to the appropriate
IMO model course for the vessel type.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 6.4.1 requires that Officers attend shore-based simulator courses covering routine and emergency
cargo operations.
-
-
-
-
.........

3.3.4. Had the Chief Engineer and all Engineer Officers attended a shore-based engine room management
simulator course covering routine and emergency machinery operations within the previous five years?
Quest,on Category
••••
Process)
0
000
rwrw1�
To ensure that the Chief Engineer and all Engineer Officers involved in manoeuvring
Objective operations had been practically trained in routine and emergency machinery operations
in a realistic simulator environment.
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer and all Engineer Officers.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated that the Chief Engineer and all
Engineer Officers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a shore-based engine room management
simulator course within the previous five years. The course should cover routine and emergency machinery
operations for the type of main propulsion onboard the vessel.
The Inspector will review the shore-based engine room management simulator training certificates
for the Chief Engineer and all engineers onboard and verify that:
• The training had been completed within the previous five years for the Chief Engineer and each
Engineer Officer onboard. The training may be a refresher training course where a full course had been
undertaken previously. Where a refresher training course was undertaken, the supporting full course
certificate must also be available for review.
• The training course was conducted in a simulator representing the main propulsion type of vessel being
inspected.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3.2.2 requires that procedures are in place to provide company-specific additional training for all ranks.

-
3.3.5. Did all key personnel onboard involved in Dynamically Positioned (DP) operations have appropriate
training in accordance with IMO and International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) guidelines and local
regulations applicable to the area of operations?
--
Question Category
••••
- 0 rw��
Process)
000
To ensure that all key personnel onboard are properly experienced, trained and qualified
Objective to participate in Dynamically Positioned (DP) operations in accordance with industry
recommended best practice and local regulation.
-
Tagged Rank Key DP Personnel.
Verification by
- Human
Process The Inspector will review the vessel's completed DP training matrix for all staff onboard at the time of
the inspection and will verify that each person had completed the required training for their role onboard
within the timeframe specified by the company training matrix.
The Inspector will review the DP logbook and DP Operator certificate for one randomly selected DP
......... operator and verify that the logbook had been maintained up to date with DP experience since gaining
the DP operator certificate.
Where the vessel operator required periodic refresher DP training, either by utilising the vessel's own DP
equipment while not conducting actual DP operations or by attendance at a shore-based course, the
Inspector will verify that the refresher training had been completed within the required timeframe.
The Inspector will review the High Voltage, DP/Power Management or DP control system training certificate
for one individual and verify that the training certificate is valid, and any refresher or top-up training
required to maintain validity had been completed within the required timeframe.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3.1.3 requires that procedures are in place to identify and manage mandatory training, including
refresher training, for all vessel personnel.
-
-
--
-
-
-
3.3.6. Had the Master, Officers and Ratings received the required training and familiarisation before being
assigned duties related to handling LNG or other low-flashpoint fuel?
Question Category
Process)
1)@08
To ensure that personnel on board ships using LNG or other low-flashpoint fuels are
Objective adequately qualified, trained, and experienced.
Tagged Rank All crew with assigned duties related to handling LNG or other low-flashpoint fuels.
Verification by
Human This question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated through the pre-inspection
questionnaire that the vessel is outfitted in accordance with the IGF Code to use LNG as fuel.
Process The vessel operator must have developed a procedure to identify which Officers and ratings are required
to hold a certificate for Basic and Advanced training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code.
This information may be provided within a company mandatory training matrix.
Crew members responsible for designated safety duties associated with the care, use or emergency
response to the fuel on board ships subject to the IGF Code are to hold a certificate in Basic Training
(IMO Model Course 7.13).
Masters, Engineer Officers and all personnel with immediate responsibility for the care and use of fuels
and fuel systems on ships subject to the IGF Code, are to hold a certificate in Advanced Training (IMO
Model Course 7.14).
A person/personnel with "immediate responsibility" is defined as "a person being in a decision-making
capacity with respect to handling of fuel addressed by the IGF Code or other fuel-related operations."
There is no requirement for the certificates to be endorsed by the vessel's Flag State or any other authority
and they may be issued by training providers.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defines the requirement
for Basic and Advanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code, which may be in the form of
a training matrix.
The Inspector will review:
• A Basic Training Certificate for one engine room Rating.
• Two Advanced Training Certificates sampled from the Master, Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers. On
existing vessels, alternative certification as required by the Flag State.
• Ship-specific familiarisation records for the LNG or low-flashpoint fuel system.
INTERTANKO has developed the "Onboard Familiarisation Checklist: Alternative Fuels" which is
available on the INTERTANKO Website.
�ardwaro
TMSA KPI 3.1.3 requires that procedures are in place to identify and manage mandatory training, including
refresher training, for all vessel personnel.

-
- 3.4. Crew Compliance
- 3.4.1. Was there an effective system in place to record and monitor the hours of rest for all personnel onboard
in compliance with STCW, MLC or the regulatory requirements applicable to the vessel?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that there is an effective system in place to manage crew rest hours and fatigue.
Documentation.
-
Verification by
- Human
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures defining how hours of rest
-- are managed and recorded.

The hours of rest may be divided into a maximum of two periods, one of which shall be at least six (6) hours
-
in length and the interval between consecutive periods of rest shall not exceed 14 hours.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure that defines how hours
of rest are to be managed and recorded.
- He will review the hours of rest records form and verify that it is in alignment with the prescribed IMO/
ILO format which clearly identifies the hours of rest conformance in any 24-hour or seven-day period.
Physically or digitally signed hours of rest records must be available for all
which have been approved by the Master or their authorised representative.
crew members onboard
The Inspector will review hours of rest records and compare them against logbooks and other records
for a recently completed operation and verify that the hours of rest records realistically reflect the activities
conducted by the vessel and individual seafarers.
The review might include (over the previous three months):
• Bunkering operations including anchoring and the berthing of the bunker barge.
• Loading/discharging operations including inbound/outbound passages and mooring operations.
• Transit of straits or inland waterways with considerable standby requirements such as Singapore/
-
Malacca Straits, Turkish Straits, English Channel/Dover Straits or similar.
• Post dry-dock departure and preparations to return to commercial service.
-
• Navigation during extended periods of restricted visibility.
• Extensive tank cleaning operations.
• Extensive enclosed space operations.
-
• Periods of drills as recorded in the logbook. These should be marked correctly as working hours.
Seafarers who are on call during a normal rest period (for example, when responding to an engine-room
alarm during a period when the engine-room is unmanned), or are required to engage with unscheduled
-
work, have received adequate compensatory rest period.
The compensatory rest period should be added to the rest period to achieve the minimum rest hours required
before the seafarer returns to work. Duty personnel should record the time spent undertaking rounds or
responding to alarms, recognising that a non-conformance because of such a response may be inevitable.
- The inspector w111 also review the hours of rest record summary report provided to shore management
and verify that the management had acknowledged receipt and responded with an action plan where
significant non-conformities were present in the summary report.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3A.1.3 requires that procedures ensure that working and rest hours of all personnel are in line with the
-
STCW, applicable Flag State requirements or any relevant authority guidelines for the vessel trade and are
being accurately recorded and monitored.
-

3.4.2. Were the Master, Officers and crew familiar with the company policy and procedures for drug and alcohol
abuse prevention and had unannounced drug and alcohol testing taken place onboard in accordance with the policy?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
To ensure that no seafarer will navigate a ship or operate its onboard equipment whilst
Objective
impaired by drugs or alcohol.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company policy and supporting procedures for
the prevention of abuse of drugs and alcohol. The accompanying Officer or responsible individual must be
familiar with the use, testing and calibration of the alcohol breath testing device.
Process The Inspector will verify if the vessel operator has developed a policy and supporting procedures to
prevent drug and alcohol abuse in line with established guidelines.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company policy and supporting procedures to
prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol and he will verify that:
• Supply of alcohol is managed and documented in accordance with company expectations. Where
alcohol is permitted, the ship must maintain records of alcohol issued to onboard personnel and visitors.
• The onboard alcohol testing device had been calibrated and/or tested in accordance with the company
procedure and manufacturer's instructions.
• Evidence is available that the persons required to use the onboard alcohol testing device have received
training in its use.
Records must be available to demonstrate that unannounced alcohol testing has been completed in
accordance with the company procedure and must include:
• The initial instruction from the company,
• The documented breath test values for each individual tested (including the Master),
• The message to the company confirming that the tests had been completed.
Records must be available to demonstrate that the frequency of the unannounced alcohol testing is in
accordance with the company procedure. The interval between company-initiated unannounced alcohol
tests should not be more than six months.
Unannounced drug screening tests must be conducted in accordance with the frequency defined by
the company procedure by either onboard collection of samples for later analysis or by the attendance of
an independent agency. The interval between unannounced drug screenings should not be greater than
twelve months.
Where controlled collection of samples for drug screening is required as part of the company procedure,
the minimum stock of sample collection kits must be maintained on board.
The vessel operator's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy must be prominently displayed at
appropriate locations onboard.
Where an incident had taken place, there must be records of post incident drug and alcohol tests having
taken place where required in accordance with the company Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy.
The vessel operator will supply information relating to the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy and
procedure through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
-
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3A.1.4 requires that a formal Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy is implemented and a system
is in place to monitor it on a regular basis.
-

-
- 3.5. Crew Familiarisation
- 3.5.1. Has the company developed an effective familiarisation programme that covered the personal safety
and professional responsibilities of all onboard personnel, including visitors and contractors, and were records
-
available to demonstrate that the familiarisation had been completed as required?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that all onboard personnel, including contractors and visitors, are fully familiar
Objective with their onboard duties, responsibilities and the equipment and machinery fitted to the
vessel relevant to their role.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, anywhere.
Verification by
- Human
During the course of the inspection, Officers and crew members must continuously demonstrate
a proper understanding or familiarity with key equipment or systems under their responsibility. An
observation under another question might be a potential ground for a negative observation under this
question 3.5.1.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company familiarisation procedure and/or
processes.
- Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defines the
familiarisation process for each role onboard, including visitors and contractors. Make sure they
are available on board.
The Inspector will also review the familiarisation records for crew members, recently promoted individuals,
......, contractors and visitors, chosen at random, and verify that familiarisation was conducted as required by
the company procedure.
The Inspector will further verify the records of completed familiarisation as follows:
• For all individuals
-
o essential initial safety training necessary prior to sailing on joining, or upon taking over new
safety-related assignments onboard.
o onboard training in the use of ship's life-saving equipment, firefighting equipment and
survival craft completed within the first two weeks onboard.
- • For Navigation/Deck Officers

o familiarisation with the navigational equipment fitted onboard the vessel prior to taking over
a navigational watch.
o familiarisation with the vessel's cargo, ballast and mooring equipment before taking over a
cargo watch.
• For Engineer Officers
o familiarisation with the main propulsion, manoeuvring, cargo and ballast management and
- power generating equipment fitted onboard the vessel prior to undertaking scheduled duties.
• For specialist Officers
-
o familiarisation with the specialist equipment under their responsibility.
• For contractors
o familiarisation completed before any work was carried out onboard.
If the Company's SMS requires a familiarisation of the auditor performing sailing audits, the Inspector will
- Hardware
verify compliance.
-
TMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.

. .....
3.5.2. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the ship's lifesaving and fire extinguishing appliances
and, had ongoing onboard training and instruction taken place to maintain familiarity?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that all crew can use the ship's life-saving (LSA) and fire-extinguishing (FFA)
Objective appliances in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's instructions to respond
effectively to an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, anywhere.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
Human During the inspection, the interviewed Officers and Ratings must be able to demonstrate their
familiarity with the use, operation and safety considerations of any piece of LSA or FFA provided
onboard.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for conducting and recording
ongoing training and instruction in the use of the ship's LSA & FFA.
When more than one type of LSA is available onboard (i.e., lifejackets, SCBAs, etc) it should be ensured
that operational instructions cover both types.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defines the
requirements for delivering ongoing training and instruction in the use of LSA & FFA provided onboard.
The Inspector will review the list of LSA & FFA included in the onboard training and instruction
programme and verify that all life-saving appliances, including survival craft equipment, and firefighting
appliances, including fixed firefighting installations provided onboard, are included.
The Inspector will sight a fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet and a life-saving
training manual and verify that they are written in the working language of the ship and updated
to include the equipment and appliances provided onboard. (The fire training manual and fire safety
operational booklet may be combined.)
The fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or life-saving manual must be provided in each
crew mess room and recreation room, or in each crew cabin.
The Inspector will review the records of onboard training and instruction for the LSA & FFA and verify that
training and instructions are provided to the crew for each item of FFA & LSA listed within two weeks
of joining the vessel and then at intervals not exceeding two months thereafter.
Where the vessel is provided with a davit-launched life raft, the Inspector will review the instructions for
delivering the required onboard training and instruction, paying attention to any guidance on the use of
a training life raft (which must be conspicuously marked as such), where carried.
The Inspector will review the records of onboard training and instruction and verify that training and
instruction in the use of the davit-launched life rafts, where carried, had been undertaken within the
previous four months.
Hardware
contractors.

3.5. Crew Familiarisation
3.5.3. Had the Master and Navigation Officers been familiarised with the ECDIS equipment installed on board
and were documented records of this familiarisation available?
-
Question Category
Process)
0
000
rw��
To ensure the Master and Navigation Officers are fully familiar with the specific type of
Objective
ECDIS equipment installed on board prior to taking charge of a navigational watch.
Tagged Rank Master and Navigational Watchkeeping Officers.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the onboard
-
ECDIS installation by selecting at least two items from the onboard familiarisation checklist and
requesting that they demonstrate the required actions/knowledge.
-
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that ensures the Master
and all Watch keeping Officers are competent in the use of the type of ECDIS installed onboard prior to
taking charge of a navigational watch.
The procedures must include:
• Timescale for the familiarisation.
• Method of familiarisation with the ECDIS equipment.
• Location of the familiarisation, on board or ashore.
-
• Identity of the appropriately trained crew or training personnel authorised to deliver the familiarisation.
• Means of demonstrating competency upon completion of the familiarisation and before taking charge
-
of a navigational watch.
• Records must be maintained.
The Inspector will verify the ECDIS installation-specific training certificates, where required by the
company familiarisation process.
-
The Master and Deck Officer(s) must have received approved training on ECDIS and must have
appropriate certificate of competency and endorsements issued to the seafarer.
-
The Inspector will review the onboard ECDIS installation familiarisation checklists for the Master and
Deck Officers.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 3 .1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.
-
-
Notes

-
-
........
.........
--
-
Chapter 4.
Navigation and
Communications
Chapter 4. Navigation and Communications
4.1.1. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the set up and
operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel and were records available to demonstrate that the ECDIS
had been operated in accordance with company procedures at all stages of a voyage?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective To ensure that ECDIS units fitted to the vessel were used to effectively navigate the vessel.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge.
Verification by
Human T heaccompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company ECDIS management
and operation procedures. The accompanying Navigation Officer must also be familiar with the
operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel.
Process The operator must have developed procedures for operating and managing the ECDIS fitted. The procedures
must define how ECDIS units should be operated and managed and provide clear guidance regarding:
• Display management.
• Alarms & warnings.
• Setting safety contours and depths as appropriate to the draught of the vessel.
• Setting of safety frame or safety cone.
• Route checking.
The procedures should also address:
• Creating and uploading passage plans.
• Changing passage plans.
• Recalling previous voyages.
• Route checking.
• Plotting manual fixes (visual bearing and radar range).
• Creating parallel index lines.
• AIS and or radar overlay, if fitted.
• Limitations of operating in RCDS mode.
• SCAMIN and how it is displayed.
• CATZOCs and how the information should be used in operation.
• Contingency action in case of single or multiple ECDIS failure.
• Updating software in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
The operator should indicate whether ECDIS is the primary means of navigation through the pre-inspection
questionnaire. The Inspector will review the ECDIS checklists and quick reference guides as well as records
which demonstrate that software updates had been completed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
Records to demonstrate periodic tests required by the manufacturer's instructions must be completed.
Records which demonstrate that the ECDIS settings had been checked periodically during each
voyage must be available.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is evidence that ECDIS settings had been incorrectly
entered at any stage of a voyage and if there is no indication in the passage plan regarding required
changes to ECDIS settings.
INTERTANKO'S Guide to Safe Navigation (including ECDIS) is available on the INTERTANKO website.
Hardware An Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• An ECDIS unit is defective in any respect.
• The second ECDIS, where required to be fitted, was not set up as a backup unit.
TMSA KPI 5. 1 .2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures
may include electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.

-
4.1. Navigation Equipment
4.1.2. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for managing and
operating the radar/ ARPA units fitted to the vessel, and were records available to demonstrate that the
units had been operated and tested in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rww�
000
- Objective
To ensure that the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel are used effectively for navigation
and collision avoidance.
Verification by
-- Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for managing
-
and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.
The accompanying Navigation Officer must also be familiar with the hazards of using AIS data (vectors)
for collision avoidance.
-
The accompanying Navigation Officer must further be familiar with the difference between the
performance characteristics of X-band (9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz) radars.
-
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the management and operation of the radar and
ARPA units fitted to the vessel. The procedures should define:
• When the radar/ARPA units are required to be in operation.
• When and how periodic performance checks are to be carried out and recorded.
-
• The required settings of ARPA audible and visual alarms and warnings for Closest Point of Approach
(CPA) and Bow Crossing Range (BCR) where fitted.
• The required ARPA speed and heading input for collision avoidance purposes.
-
• The process for parallel indexing set-up and use - particularly for complex passages with multiple
sets of indexes.
• The use of the ARPA trial manoeuvre function.
• The danger of displaying AIS data (vectors) on ARPA units for collision avoidance purposes.
• The effect of blind sectors and clutter suppression on the radar performance.
• Restrictions in the use of radar during cargo operations.
• The planned interval for changing the magnetron in 3 GHz and 9 GHz radars.
- The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• The radar/ARPA units had not been in operation in accordance with company procedures and had not
been tested in accordance with company procedures.
- • The heading, speed or positional feeds to the radar/ARPA units were inaccurate when compared to the
master devices.
-
• There was no indication of the scanner blind sectors affecting the radar coverage for each radar unit.
-
Records indicating that the radars/ARPAs have been operated in accordance with company procedures and
performance checks have been conducted as required with satisfactory results must be available.
Hardware The radar/ARPA units must not be defective in any respect. The audible and visual alarms must be working
properly.
The radar magnetrons must be changed in accordance with the planned maintenance schedule.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures
may include Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.

4.1.3. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for operating and
testing the steering control systems fitted to the vessel and were records available to demonstrate that
operation and testing had been carried out in accordance with the procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure the steering control systems fitted to the vessel are tested and used in an
Objective
appropriate manner with changeover procedures understood.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for managing,
-
testing and operating the steering control systems fitted to the vessel.
The accompanying navigation officer must also be familiar with the changeover procedure between
modes of steering control (especially for changing over to emergency control) or action to take when
steering system alarms activate.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the onboard management of the steering gear
and control systems, which provide guidance on the following:
• The steering modes available for use which may include:
o automatic steering
o track steering
o hand steering
o remote conning position steering
o non-follow up steering.
• Changing between the steering modes available. L
• Limitations of and any restrictions imposed on any mode of steering (speed, rudder limit, location etc).
• The testing of steering control systems and power units prior to departure, prior to arrival and periodically
-
during the voyage.
• Changing from one steering control system to another in the event of an alarm or failure.
• Actions required on the bridge to engage/permit remote emergency steering.
Records for the testing of the steering control systems provided for all steering modes and from each
location, as appropriate, rnust be available.
Simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change-over procedures for remote
steering gear control systems and steering gear power units must be permanently displayed on the
navigation bridge.
Hardware The steering control systems should not be defective in any respect.
TMSA KP! s. 1.z requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures
may include actions upon equipment failure and supporting checklists.

4.1.4. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for using the Automatic
Identification System (AIS) fitted to the vessel and were records available to confirm that periodic checks
!""'"""'I and tests had been carried out in accordance with the procedures?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) fitted to the vessel was used to
Objective
-
safely enhance situational awareness durin g navigation.
Verification by
__, Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the
operation and testing of the AIS system fitted onboard. They must also be familiar with the company
guidance related to the use of AIS information in collision avoidance situations.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of
navigation equipment, including AIS. The vessel operator must also have developed procedures for the
operation and testing of the AIS, which must include guidance on:
,_..., • AIS configuration.
• Static and dynamic data input.
• Periodic checks and performance tests.
• The use of AIS data during collision avoidance.
• Limitations for operating the unit during cargo op erations.
• Switching the unit on and off.
,......, Checklists and records of the checks and performance tests required to be carried out on the AIS equipment
fitted must be available.
The vessel static data must be correctly entered in the AIS unit.
Hardware The AIS unit must not be defective in any respect.
There should not be errors in the navigational data feeds to the AIS unit.
While alongside a terminal or port area where hydrocarbon gases may be present, the AIS must be switched
off or the aerial isolated , and the AIS should not be given a dummy load (unless at the request of the shore
authorities).
may include: Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
Seafarers· Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 61

4.1.5. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedure for the use of the
Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) and were records available to demonstrate that it had
been operated and tested in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
000
a
To ensure that the bridge was continually manned throughout a voyage, and at anchor,
Objective by vigilant watchkeeping staff.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the
operation and testing of the BNWAS.
He must be able to explain the process of activating and deactivating the BNWAS.
Process The vessel operator's guidance for the use of BNWAS at anchor should be available.
The operator must have developed procedures to define:
• When the BNWAS is required to be in operation.
• Who will activate the BNWAS and the process for doing so.
• How the system will be protected from unauthorised deactivation.
• What to do if a BNWAS stage 2 or 3 alarm is activated.
• The periodic tests and checks required to verify correct functioning of the BNWAS.
It is an OCIMF expectation that the BNWAS shall be activated at anchor in addition to while the
vessel is at sea.
The password or activation key should not be available to others beyond the Master and her/his
authorised deputy.
Records must be available to confirm that the BNWAS had been in operation and had been tested in
accordance with company procedures.
The Inspector will review Bridge Logbook and relevant checklists.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the BNWAS is defective and if there is evidence that
modifications or adaptations designed to defeat the BNWAS are in use.
TMSA KP! 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These
procedures may include use of BNWAS.

- 4.1. Navigation Equipment
4.1.6. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures governing the
management and operation of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers fitted onboard and
was the fitted equipment configured, used and checked in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers provide reliable and
Objective accurate positional information.
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the GNSS receiver management and
operation procedures, and the equipment fitted to the vessel.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of navigation
equipment, including GNSS receivers. The procedure should define:
• The configuration of the equipment.
• The periodic checks and performance tests to be conducted.
• Where more than one receiver is fitted, the process to switch the output from one receiver to another.
-
• The periodic checks to verify that all equipment is receiving an accurate positional input.
• The actions to take in the event of a single GNSS receiver failure.
• The actions to take in the event of multiple GNSS receiver failures.
-
The Inspector will verify that the antenna offset data is available and had been correctly entered in the
GNSS receiver configuration. He will verify that the GNSS receiver(s) had been set to WGS84 datum.
He will review onboard records to confirm that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out to the
GNSS receivers had been completed as required.
He will also verify that the GNSS position feed to two or more navigational systems was correct and that
........ onboard instructions are posted for any GNSS receiver output inter-switch arrangements .
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• A GNSS receiver is defective in any respect.
• The positional data provided to another piece of navigation or communication equipment such as AIS,
ARPA or a Global Maritime Distress and Safety System transceiver is erroneous.
-
-
-
4.1.7. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for operating and
managing the echo sounder and were records maintained to demonstrate that the equipment fitted to the
vessel had been tested and operated in accordance with the company expectations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
Objective
a
To ensure that the echo sounder is used effectively to monitor the under-keel clearance.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (4.1. 7)
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for managing
and operating the echo sounder and its associated recording device and must be familiar with the
process to calculate the depth under the keel and verify the accuracy of the echo sounder.
The accompanying Navigation Officer must be able to demonstrate that the echo sounder is showing the
expected depth indication under the keel at the time of the inspection.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of the echo
sounder, or other electronic means to measure the depth of water, and the associated means to record
depth history.
• When the echo sounder is required to be in operation.
• Where forward and aft transducers are fitted to the vessel, considerations for the set up and display of
information.
• When the echo sounder recording device is required to be operational and any time/position marking
necessary.
• Where a separate printer is provided, the times the printer is required 'to be recording.
• The criteria for the setting of the depth alarm - where fitted.
• The requirements for periodic checks to confirm the proper functioning and accuracy of the echo
sounder when compared to water of a known depth.
Hardware The echo sounder or recording device must not be defective in any respect.
may include electronic aids to navigation including ARPA. AIS and ECDIS.

-
4.1.8. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation
and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel and were records available to
-
demonstrate that periodic tests had been completed as required by the procedures?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human
-
PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
a
Process)
Objective To ensure that accurate speed data is available to navigational equipment.

Verification by

Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation
......... and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures, taking into account manufacturer's instructions,
which define:
• The periodic checks to verify the accuracy and functionality of the speed and distance measuring
devices fitted to the vessel.
• The periodic checks to verify that the speed output to remote displays and navigational
........ equipment, such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS, is accurate.
-
• The speed input(s) required to be used for navigational equipment such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
The Inspector will verify the records of the periodic accuracy and function tests for the speed and distance
measuring devices and records of periodic verification that the speed input to navigational equipment such
-
as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS are accurate.
He will verify that the speed values displayed by remote display units and ARPA, AIS or ECDIS units are
-
consistent with the master water speed and or dual axis logs as appropriate.
Hardware The speed and distance measuring device(s) fitted to the vessel must not be defective in any respect.
-
--
--
-
-
4.1.9. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use and
testing of the navigation lights and shapes, and was there evidence that the navigation lights had been
tested to confirm full functionality and correct visibility?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that the vessel always displays navigation lights & shapes in accordance with
Objective
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for conducting
checks and tests on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller and navigational shapes.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures to define the periodic checks and tests that are required to be
carried out on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller and navigational shapes. The checks
should include that:
• Primary and secondary navigation lights are fully operational.
• Primary and secondary power supplies to the navigational light controller are operational.
• Power supply failure alarm is operational.
• Where LED lamps are fitted, they are within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity. This may
be achieved by integrated luminous intensity or usage monitoring systems with alarms or by manual
recording of usage.
• Adequate spare lamps are onboard meeting the navigation light manufacturer's specification for
luminosity, or wattage, and focal plane.
• Required navigational shapes are onboard and in good condition (three balls, one cylinder & one
diamond).
• Portable navigation lights, where required to be carried, are in good working order and fitted with the
necessary lanyards to permit hoisting.
The Inspector will verify relevant checklists as well as the inventory of spare navigational lamps identifying
the luminosity or wattage and the navigation lights to which they may be fitted.
He will verify that the navigation lights and navigation light controller had been tested.
Hardware The navigation lights or navigation light controller should not be defective in any respect.
Navigation lights or their screens should not be damaged, relocated or obscured in such a way that the
required spacing and/or arc of visibility of any lights is apparently no longer in compliance with COLREG
Annex 1 requirements.
The required navigational shapes must be onboard and in usable condition.
TMSA KPI 5.1 .4 requires that the company has procedures that ensure all navigational equipment is maintained
as operational.

-
4.1.10. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedure for managing Marine
Safety Information broadcasts by NAVTEX and SafetyNET and were warnings affecting the vessel's route
-
plotted on the voyage charts?
Question Category
••••
- 0 rw��
Process)
000
To ensure that broadcast navigation warnings affecting a vessel's planned route are
Objective
effectively managed.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (4.1.1 O)
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the'company procedure for managing
Marine Safety Information received through NAVTEX and SafetyNET, or the equipment fitted to the
-- Process
vessel.
The vessel operator must have developed a procedure to require that the Marine Safety Information
received through the NAVTEX and SafetyNet systems is promptly reviewed and, where appropriate, applied
to the voyage charts and passage planning documentation.
The procedure should define the process for:
• Setting up the NAVTEX and SafetyNET EGC receivers to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts
applicable to the vessel's location and route.
• Reviewing incoming messages and transferring pertinent information to the passage charts and
documentation.
• Where information is transferred directly from NAVTEX to an ECDIS unit the process for identifying
-
warnings that will affect the vessel's route.
• Filing, retaining and disposing of Marine Safety Information broadcasts.
• Removing Marine Safety Information from electronic and paper charts once the warning has expired
or is cancelled.
-
The Inspector will verify that Marine Safety Information messages received through NAVTEX and SafetyNET
are being acknowledged and filed in accordance with the company procedure.
Hardware The NAVTEX and/or SafetyNET EGC receiver must not be defective in any respect.
The NAVTEX receiver must be programmed to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts from coast
- radio stations appropriate to the vessel's route.

The SafetyNET EGC receiver must be programmed to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts for
NAVAREAs and Coastal Warning Areas appropriate to the vessel's route.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
,..........
,.......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 67

4.1.11. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedure for preserving data
from the VDR/S-VDR and were records available to demonstrate that tests of the equipment had been
completed as required?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
0
To ensure that the VDR fitted to the vessel is continually recording all required data
Objective
streams and procedures are in place to preserve records in the event of an incident.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for VDR/S-VDR
management and data preservation.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures which ensure that:
• The VDR/S-VDR is subject to an annual performance test by an approved testing or servicing facility.
• The VDR/5-VDR is tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair of the
VDR/S-VDR itself.
• The VDR/S-VDR is tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair of
navigational or communications equipment providing data feeds.
• Instructions are posted near to the VDR/S-VDR controls for preserving data to prevent it being
overwritten.
• The circumstances in which VDR/5-VDR data is to be preserved to capture any data that may be of
value to incident investigation irrespective of whether the incident related to navigational situations.
The vessel operator should have declared the period that the long-term storage within the VDR or S-VDR
retains data before being overwritten through the pre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be
inserted in the final report.
The Inspector will verify that the declaration made within the pre-inspection questionnaire relating to the
VDR/S-VDR data retention period was not less than required: If installed before 1 July 2014, minimum
12 hours before being overwritten; If installed after 1 July 2014, minimum of 720 hours before being
overwritten.
Hardware The VDR/S-VDR must not be defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 5.2.3 requires that the person(s) responsible for navigational standards ensures that navigational
procedures are regularly reviewed and updated.
The procedures are updated to reflect new legislation, technology and updated industry standards.
Examples may include ECDIS and VDR including data recovery.

- 4.1.12. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures relating to the
magnetic and gyro compasses carried onboard, and were records available to demonstrate their accuracy
and reliability?
- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that standard, gyro and GNSS compasses and their heading output to
Objective
navigational equipment are accurate and reliable.
Verification by
-- Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures, and the
--
equipment fitted to the vessel.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures to ensure that:
• Standard magnetic, gyro and GNSS compasses carried onboard are properly maintained and
-
serviced.
• Heading information for each compass is frequently checked through terrestrial, celestial and/or
comparative observation.
• Frequent checks are made for heading accuracy output to all navigational equipment.
-- •
•
•
A record of error for each compass is maintained
An up-to-date deviation card is available on the bridge for the standard magnetic compass.
The standard magnetic compass is adjusted when:
- the deviation consistently exceeds a defined value,
........ • becomes unreliable,
- suffers damage,
- records of compass error have not been maintained over the preceding two years.
The Inspector will verify the standard compass adjustment and residual deviation certificate, compass
error records and service records for the gyro compass(es).
Hardware • The heading shown by a compass, or a repeater, must not be erroneous.
• A standard magnetic, gyro or GNSS compass must not be defective in any respect.
• The periodic service for Gyro Compass should not be overdue by more than 5% of the service interval.
• Where required, manual speed and latitude corrections for a gyro compass must correctly be set.
-
4.1.13. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation
and testing of the VHF/DSC transceivers fitted to the vessel, and were records available to demonstrate that
periodic tests and checks had been completed in accordance with company expectations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
a
To ensure that VHF radio is used to enhance navigation safety and support the obligations
Objective
of the vessel under SOLAS to render assistance to non-SOLAS vessels in distress.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for the use and
testing of the VHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel. He must also be familiar with the operation of the VHF/
DSC units.
The accompanying Navigation Officer must further be familiar with the hazards and limitations of using
VHF radio during collision avoidance situations and the relevant Master's standing orders.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures which define how the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to
the vessel will be used, operated and tested. These procedures may include:
• The VHF frequencies and/or channels that must be monitored on a continuous basis while the
vessel is at sea and/or at anchor.
• The periodic checks and tests to be carried out to verify that the VHF/DSC equipment is fully functional
(checklists must be available).
• The record-keeping requirements for the routine and emergency use of the VHF/DSC equipment.
• The company expectations regarding radio etiquette when using the VHF/DSC equipment.
• The use of VHF and compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREG).
• The need to identify any VHF units not connected to the Voyage Data Recorder and any
-
restrictions on their use for critical communications.
The Inspector will review records of testing, the GMDSS Radio Logbook and operational records for the
previous voyage and verify that the appropriate VHF channels were being monitored and records were
being maintained of all significant communications. They will review the data inputs to the VHF/DSC
equipment and verify that the static data was correctly programmed, and the dynamic data was being
correctly received from external feeds.
Hardware The VHF and/or DSC units must not be defective in any respect.
The static and/or dynamic data displayed by the VHF and/or DSC units must be accurate.
may include electronic aids to navigation 1ncludin9 ARF'A, AIS di ,d ECDIS.

-
- 4.1.14. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedure for testing and using
the daylight signalling lamp?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that there is a means of attracting the attention of other vessels by visual means
Objective
both during daylight and during darkness.
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for the use and
testing of the daylight signalling lamp.
-
Process The vessel operator must have developed navigational procedures which define:
• The company expectations for preventing the risk of collision and the means at the disposal of the
navigation Officer to attract the attention of another vessel in accordance with the International
-
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
• The checks and tests required to be undertaken to ensure all navigation equipment is available for
-
immediate use including the daylight signalling lamp and its battery.
The Inspector will review the bridge equipment testing records and verify that the daylight signalling lamp
had been periodically tested.
Hardware The Inspector will test the daylight signalling lamp on both battery and mains power and verify that the
-
unit is fully functional. He will also check the availability of spare bulbs and verify that at least three spare
bulbs are available that comply with the manufacturer's specifications.
The daylight signalling lamp should not be defective in any respect.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-- Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 71
4.1.15. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use and
testing of the sound signalling equipment fitted to the vessel and were records available to confirm that
periodic tests had been completed and the equipment used in accordance with company expectations?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type {Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
To ensure that the vessel was able to make sound signals to comply with the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG).
Bridge.
Master and Navigation Officers.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company expectation for the use of
sound signals during restricted visibility, collision avoidance and manoeuvring in compliance with
the COLREGs.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures to define:
• The expected use of the vessel's sound signalling equipment to comply with the COLREGs in or near an
area of restricted visibility, during collision avoidance and while manoeuvrir)g.
• The Bridge Logbook entries or checklists that will be used to confirm that sound signalling equipment
was used in compliance with the COLREGs and company expectations during restricted visibility.
• The periodic tests required to be conducted to verify the effectiveness of the sound signalling
equipment, including automation, provided to the vessel.
-
The Inspector will review the bridge equipment testing records and verify that periodic tests had been
completed to confirm the functionality of whistles, bells and gongs and, their automation, to conform
to the requirements of the COLREGs.
He will also review the Bridge Logbook and/or checklists for restricted visibility (BPG checklist B13 or
equivalent) to identify any recent period of restricted visibility whilst the vessel was underway or at
anchor and verify that sound signals were recorded as being sounded as required by the COLREGs.
Hardware The sound signalling equipment, or its automation, must not be defective in any way.
may include navigating in heavy weather/restricted visibility/ice.
-
-
4.2. Navigational Procedures
-
4.2.1. Were the Master and Navigating Officers familiar with the company passage planning procedures
and had all voyages been appraised, planned, executed and monitored in accordance with company
procedures, industry best practice and both local and international rules?
- Question Category
••••
a
Process)
0 rw��
000
,.........
- Objective
To ensure that passages are planned and executed from berth to berth in accordance with
international/local rules and industry best practice guidance.
Tagged Rank Master and Navigating Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company passage planning procedures
and navigational record keeping procedures, relating to navigational activities.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures to ensure that onboard staff appraise, plan, execute and
monitor all passages from berth to berth in accordance with international/local rules and industry best
practice. The procedures must define:
• The format of the passage plan and the minimum information that must be included. The list of
items which should be included is provided in the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 Library Part 1.
-
• The process to verify that all navigational and environmental considerations have been included
in the final passage plan.
• The review and approval process for a passage plan including utilising the ECDIS route checking
function.
• The record-keeping requirements as they relate to the progress of the passage and navigational
events.
• The actions to take to update the passage plan when circumstances change requiring the vessel to
deviate from the originally agreed plan.
• The requirement for preparing the passage plan on both paper charts and ECDIS where the vessel
has a single ECDIS unit or has nominated paper charts as the primary means of navigation.
• The requirement for a passage plan briefing including the Master, all Navigation Officers and a
representative from the engineering department.
Standard passage planning forms which require the passage plan to be documented in a consistent
--
manner, capturing all data identified within the procedures must be available.
Passage plan appraisal forms/checklists to verify that all information pertinent to the passage had been
considered must also be available.
The passages must be planned and executed following collision regulations, company navigation procedures
and guidance provided on the charts, routing guides and sailing directions.
The charted passage plan must include all pertinent information required to be displayed in accordance
- with the company procedures.

The passage plan must be reviewed and approved in accordance with company procedures.
Route checking and scanning must be conducted prior to commencing a voyage or when a planned
voyage is changed or updated.
-
Practical Guidelines (4.2.1) Continued...
Process The passage plan must be followed and may identify alternative routes for contingency use.
(Continued) The vessel's position must be manually fixed in accordance with company navigational procedures and
the planned position fixing method and interval.
Records of the progress of a voyage must be maintained in accordance with company procedures.
A vessel should be expected to deviate from the planned passage to the extent necessary to safely comply
with the collision regulations. Due consideration should be given to such when appraising the passage and
developing the plan to ensure that there is adequate sea room, and the watch conditions are appropriate.
The Inspector will verify the ECDIS passage planning station and/or paper charts showing the reviewed
passage plan and monitoring history. He will also verify the Bridge Logbook, movement book and
other records documenting the progress of the voyage.
Hardware

- 4.2.2. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company under keel clearance (UKC)
policy and procedure, and were records available to demonstrate that the required calculations had been
completed at the appropriate points during each voyage and the vessel had remained in compliance with
the UKC policy?
Question Category
- ••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that the vessel always maintains a safe under keel clearance.
-- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Bridge.
Master and Navigating Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for conducting and documenting
UKC calculations.
Process The vessel operator must have a UKC policy and procedure which define:
,......., • The minimum dynamic UKC required to be maintained;
o during open sea passage
o during coastal/restricted waters passage
o within port limits
o while alongside
o while at SBM/CBM berths
o at anchor.
-
• The factors to be considered when calculating and evaluating UKC, which should include;
o the predicted height of the tide.
o changes in the predicted tidal height, which may be caused by wind speed and direction and/or
high or low barometric pressure.
o nature and stability of the bottom e.g. sand waves, siltation etc.
o accuracy of hydrographic data, (references to reliability are often included on charts or in the form
of CATZOC on ENCs).
o change of water density and the corresponding increase in draught.
o the vessel's size and handling characteristics and the increase in draft due to heel.
o wave response allowance, which is the vertical displacement of the hull due to heave, roll and
-
pitch motions.
o the reliability of draught observations and calculations, including estimates of hogging and
sagging.
o reduced depths over pipelines and other obstructions.
o the predicted increase in draught due to squat. (Squat information relevant to the vessel for both
loaded and ballast passages should be readily available on the bridge.)

Practical Guidelines (4.2.2} Continued...
Process The vessel operator must have a UKC policy and procedure which defines (continued):
Continued... • When UKC calculations are to be completed.
• The method of calculating and documenting the calculations performed.
• Where the results of the UKC calculations must be communicated, e.g., Master/Pilot information
exchange.
• Where the results of the UKC calculations shall be used, i.e. ECDIS depth or echo sounder alarm
settings.
• The need to update UKC calculations to reflect the new predicted time of passing over critical
hydrographic features where a passage is delayed.
• The actions to be taken when the required UKC could not be maintained at all stages of a planned
voyage.
• The required action where an external party requires an UKC in excess of the company requirement.
The vessel operator will have declared the required minimum required UKC applicable to the vessel within
the PIO (PIO 4.2).
The Inspector will review samples of calculations to ensure that they had been carried out for the predicted
time of passing a critical hydrographic feature as set out in the passage plan, to ensure that the speed used
for calculation had not been exceeded by more than 10% when actually passing the critical hydrographic
feature, to determine that no error had been made in either the source data or resulting calculation when
passing a critical hydrographic feature.
The Inspector will verify the Deck Logbook, bell books, echo sounder records, Master/Pilot information
exchange documentation and charted passage history.
More best practices on UKC can be found in INTERTANKO's Guide to Safe Navigation (Including ECDIS)
which is available to download on the INTERTANKO website.
Hardware

4.2.3. Had the Master prepared Master's Standing Orders, supplemented by Daily Orders, which emphasised
and reinforced the company expectations with regards to navigational requirements including restricted
visibility, CPA/BCR and minimum passing distance from navigational dangers and navigational aids and, if
so, had all Navigation Officers signed to acknowledge their understanding of the same?
Question Category
- ••••
Process)
To ensure that all Deck/Navigating Officers are aware of the key expectations of both the
Objective
company and the Master with respect to the navigation of the vessel.
-
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the content of the Master's Standing Orders.
The Master must have prepared their own Standing Orders which must be signed and dated on being
assigned to the vessel and at subsequent updates. They must also be signed for understanding by each
navigation officer when they join the vessel and before undertaking their first navigation duties.
The SMS procedures should require supplementary orders to be issued by the Master each day in a Bridge
Order Book to cover periods when the Master may be resting or otherwise engaged. The daily orders
must be used to supplement the Standing Orders, must address the navigational concerns or preparations
relevant to the period under review, and should also be used to give additional instruction relevant to the
,.........., operation of the vessel in the short term and prior to the next time the Master expects to be present. These
-
orders should be signed by each OOW when taking over a watch, to confirm that they have read,
understood and will comply with the orders.
The Master's Daily Orders must be signed, dated and timed, to supplement her/his Standing Orders. Records
must indicate that instructions contained within the Master's Standing or Daily Orders are being followed.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures which require the Master to issue Master's Standing Orders,
giving guidance on the mandatory and desirable content.
The content of the Master's Standing Orders should not degrade the company expectations documented
__, anywhere within the Safety Management System.
-
The Master's Daily Orders should not degrade the company expectations documented anywhere within
the Safety Management System.
The orders, as written, should reference company navigational procedures and identify any circumstances where
-
the Master wishes his instructions to be stricter than the company requirement documented within the SMS.
The Standing Orders must define the Master's expectations in respect of:
• What is considered to be restricted visibility and the actions to take on encountering it.
-
• Minimum CPA/BCR permitted during normal navigational watches.
• Minimum passing distances from navigational dangers and/or navigational aids during normal
navigational watches.
• How the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS were required to be set, checked and in what
circumstances they moy be changed.
• Calling the Master.
• The process for the Master to formally take the con of the vessel from the officer of the watch.
• The hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision avoidance situations.
Normal navigational watches are when the Master or his deputy, as defined by the company, are not
required to be on the bridge as part of the official bridge team composition.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.1 .3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.

4.2.4. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company electronic chart management
procedures and were onboard ENCs and RNCs managed, corrected and used appropriately?
Question Category
•••• -
Process)
To ensure that only fully corrected official electronic charts are used for navigation where
Objective
ECDIS is required to be carried
Verification by

Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the electronic chart management and
correction procedures. He must also be familiar with the process for applying Temporary and Preliminary
(T&P) notices to ENCs and RNCs. The Inspector will request the accompanying officer to demonstrate how
T&P notices are applied:
• Manually.
• By use of an overlay.
• Incorporated as part of the update of the ENC database. (CAES and C EES 593 charts).
Process The operator will declare via the PIQ (PIQ 4.1) what the primary means of navigation is.
-
The Inspector will review the onboard electronic chart management system for ENC and RNC and verify
that the charts required for the previous voyage were available and permitted for use on each ECDIS.
The vessel operator should have procedures to manage the procurement and updating of ENCs and RNCs
to ensure compliance with the SOLAS carriage of nautical publications requirements.
• Which electronic charts must be available on board the vessel at all times.
• The process to determine which electronic charts must be available on board for a voyage.
• How to obtain or update chart permits to ensure the electronic charts required to be carried by the company
or for use during a voyage are available onboard and remain valid throughout a proposed voyage.
• How to track which charts have current permits.
• How to obtain electronic chart corrections and apply them to available charts.
• How to track or view the electronic chart update history to verify that each ENC is fully corrected.
• How to manage passage planning and monitoring where full ENC coverage is not available.
• How to manage T&P notices applicable to ENCs or RNCs.
The company procedures may refer to instructions provided by a third-party supplier but the procedures
available onboard must define all necessary steps and record-keeping requirements to ensure that the
management of electronic charts is complete.
There must be an onboard management system to track the permits held by the vessel for ENCs and RNCs.
Individual ENC or RNC permits must not expire prior to or during the predicted phase of a voyage.
The vessel should not complete a voyage witt1 missing ENC or RNC lUverdge and st1ould not complete a
part of the voyage with RNCs when ENCs are available for the area in question.
The vessel must update the ENCs and RNCs to the latest available notice to mariners, including T&P
corrections.
The vessel must not operate in RCDs mode without availability of an appropriate folio of up-to-date paper
charts.
An onboard management system to track Notices to Mariners corrections applied to ENCs and RNCs must
be available for review by the Inspector.
Hardware

-
- 4.2. Navigational Procedures
4.2.5. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company paper chart management
procedures and were onboard paper charts managed, corrected and used appropriately?
Question Category
••••
,.......
a
Process)
--
--
To ensure that the only fully corrected official paper charts are used for navigation when
Objective
required to be carried or used.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the paper chart management and
correction procedures.
Process Where a vessel carries paper charts to comply with the carriage of charts and nautical publications
regulations, to mitigate gaps in ENC coverage, or for any other reason where paper charts will be used for
navigational purposes, the vessel operator should have procedures to ensure that the paper charts are the
-
latest edition and fully corrected before use.
The procedure should define the process for:
• Correctly identifying the paper charts required for an intended voyage.
-
• Ensuring paper charts required for an intended voyage are corrected prior to commencing passage
planning.
• Tracking the correction status of paper charts not in use.
• Managing Temporary and Preliminary (T&P) notices.
• Procuring new editions and additional paper charts.
• The actions to be taken when directed to a port where appropriate paper charts are not onboard.
• Obtaining weekly and cumulative Notices to Mariners.
• Replacing damaged or worn paper charts.
The vessel must not complete a voyage with missing or inappropriate scale charts without any evidence
that the company had been involved in identifying mitigating actions.
There must be a systematic process to apply and remove T&P notices and NAVTEX and NAVAREA warnings.
-
The vessel must update voyage paper charts to the latest available Notice to Mariners and must not use
outdated editions.
Paper charts in use should not be torn, stained or worn so much that detail is likely to be obscured from
-
the user.
The Inspector will verify the paper chart correction records, recent passage plan records showing which
paper charts had been used, the paper charts used on the previous voyage, and communications and
mitigation plans agreed with the company where the vessel had been directed to a port and the required
- Hardware
paper charts were not on board.
TM�A KPI 5.1.2 requires that com prehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation ore in place.
-
-
4.2.6. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for testing the navigational
equipment, main propulsion, steering gear and thrusters prior to use and prior to critical phases of a passage
or operation and, did checklists or logbook entries confirm the required tests had been completed as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery is confirmed as fully

Objective
operational prior to critical phases of a passage or operation.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for testing
navigational equipment and manoeuvring equipment.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with any checks and tests required to be carried out
according to the company navigational and manoeuvring equipment checklist(s).
Process The vessel operator must have procedures which require navigational and manoeuvring equipment to be
functionally tested at defined points prior to, and during, a passage or operation. These procedures must
be available on board for the Inspector to review.
The procedures should define the extent of the testing required to be carried out based on regulation, local
rules, risk assessment and the vessel's operation at the time of the required test.
The vessel operator should have developed checklists, adapted to reflect the equipment and systems fitted
to the vessel, to ensure that comprehensive tests are carried out systematically.
The ship-specific checklists should address the following:
• Steering Gear Test Routines.
• Preparations for Sea (modelled on BPG 86 and supporting notes).
• Preparations for Arrival.
The Inspector will verify completed checklists to verify that testing during a recent passage or, sequence of
operations, had been performed in accordance with the company procedures. He will also verify the Bridge
and Engine Logbooks.
Evidence must be available that the timing of the rudder movement from hard-over to hard-over, using
each steering gear power unit singly and together, had been checked to ensure consistency with previous
tests and the manufacturer's specification.
Where a vessel operator had developed its procedures based on an administrative waiver of repetitive
steering tests , documented evidence of such a waiver should be available onboard.
Hardware Defects with navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery identified through the testing process,
which could not be immediately corrected by onboard staff, should be entered into the vessel's defect
reporting system.
Where a defect(s) with an item of navigational and/or manoeuvring equipment had been identified
during these tests but had NOT been rectified at the time of inspection, the Inspector will raise a negative
observation for this question 4.2.6, and a negative observation in the Hardware response tool of the
question relating to the particular equipment if it is included in the CVIQ for the inspection.

- 4.2.7. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedure for the carriage and
management of nautical publications and was evidence available to demonstrate that publications had
been managed in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective To ensure nautical publications used for navigational purposes provide the most accurate
-
information available.
Verification by
--
-
Human The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for managing, ordering
and updating nautical publications.
Process The vessel operator should have procedures that identify which mandatory and discretionary nautical
publications are required to be carried on board and the process for managing, ordering and updating
them to the latest information or edition available.
- Where regulations allow for the carriage of mandatory publications in electronic format, the procedure
should indicate how backup provisions are provided onboard.
-
Acceptable publications in electronic form should be those issued by IMO or an Administration or a body
authorised by an Administration to ensure correctness of their contents and to safeguard against illegal
copying. A medium could either contain one publication or as many publications as possible. In any case,
-
the medium should be treated in accordance with the document control procedures in the ship's SMS
including procedures for timely update.
An inventory of nautical publications indicating their edition date and latest correction applied, where
-
applicable, must be available for the Inspector to review.
A negative observation will be raised if nautical publications, required to be carried, in either electronic or
hard copy, in accordance with the company procedure are found to be missing, obsolete or uncorrected.
- Hardware
Nautical publications required to be carried in hard copy, such as the International Code of Signals and the
IAMSAR Manual, must be available on board.
- TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.

4.3.1. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures defining the minimum
bridge team composition and engine room operating mode, and were records available to demonstrate that
recent voyages had been planned and executed in accordance with company expectations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that the bridge team is adequately resourced, and the machinery space
Objective operated appropriately at all stages of a voyage including while at anchor, conducting
STS operations or drifting.
Verification by
Human The Navigation Officer must be familiar with the company procedures which define the required bridge
team composition and engine room operating mode at all stages of the voyage.
Process The vessel operator must have procedures defining the required bridge team composition during
all stages of a voyage, including while at anchor, drifting, or conducting "at sea" STS operations,
DP operations or underway storing/personnel transfer operations, considering traffic density,
proximity to navigational hazards, weather conditions and visibility.
The vessel operator must have procedures defining the engine room status, and when required to be
manned the engine room team composition, during all stages of a voyage including while at anchor
or drifting, or conducting "at sea" STS operations, DP operations or underway storing/personnel transfer
operations. considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards, weather conditions and visibility.
The company procedure must not be ambiguous with regards to the need for hand steering in any
defined watch composition.
The passage plan must identify the required bridge team composition for all stages of a voyage. The
passage plan must also identify the required engine room operating mode for all stages of a voyage. The
Inspector will verify compliance with Company Procedures.
-
Records indicating that the bridge had been operated with the Officer of the watch as the sole lookout in
contravention to company procedures at any stage of a voyage; the required engine room operating mode
as documented in the passage plan not being fulfilled will be grounds for negative observations.
Procedures must include requirements with regards to changes in the bridge team composition from one
level to another and the times of each change must be recorded in the logbook or bell book.
The operator's procedures must further include:
• The role of each bridge team member for each defined bridge team composition must be described.
• The circumstances in which the helm will be manned.
• The circumstances in which the Officer of the watch may be the sole lookout.
• The substitution of the Master during prolonged periods of enhanced bridge team composition.
• The passage planning requirement to identify the anticipated change in bridge team composition and
machinery space status and, when manned, the requirement to be on standby for manoeuvring.
• The requirement to record when the machinery space status changes from unattended to attended and
--
when the machinery space is on standby for manoeuvring.
• When determining the bridge team composition, careful consideration should be given to non-
navigational activities to ensure that the bridge team is never degraded by duties such as escorting the
pilot to the embarkation station or the completion of administrative tasks.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These
procedures may include Bridge manning levels.

-
- 4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management
-
4.3.2. Were the Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures defining machinery space operating
mode and, where required to be attended, the machinery space team composition during the various stages
of a voyage, and were records available to confirm the machinery space had been operated accordingly?
- Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
To ensure that the machinery space is adequately manned or monitored at all stages of a
......., Objective
voy age or operation.
- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Verification by
Engine Control Room, Bridge.
Engineer Officers.
Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures which define the
-
expectations for the operating status of the machinery space or when required to be attended, the
machinery space team composition.
The required machinery space status must be communicated to engineering staff to permit effective
resource management.
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures which define:
• The circumstances in which the machinery space may be operated in the unattended mode.
• Where the machinery space is required to be attended, the required machinery space team
composition considering proximity to navigational hazards, traffic density and the state of visibility.
......... • The minimum engine room manning requirements for activities such as drifting, "at sea" STS operations,
Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.
• When the machinery space is required to be attended for navigational safety, the role of each
machinery space team member.
• The substitution of the Chief Engineer during prolonged periods of enhanced machinery space
team composition.
• T he record-keeping requirements for the change of machinery space status and/or machinery space
-
team composition.
• The communication of the required machinery space status and/or manning level to the engineer
officers at the passage planning stage and daily.
-
Records must indicate that the required machinery space status, as documented within the passage plan,
has been complied with at any stage of a voyage.
Records must also indicate that when operating in the attended status for navigational purposes, the
-
machinery space team composition is in accordance with the company procedure.
Records of the machinery space status or team composition must be available.
The Inspector will review the Engine Room Logbook and the Engine Room Daily Order Book.
-
Hardware

4.3.3. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures for integrating a Pilot (or
similar role*) into the bridge team and were records available to demonstrate the process had been followed?
Question Category
Process)
• @ 0.
To ensure that there is an effective process to integrate the Pilot (or similar role*) into the
Objective
bridge team.
Verification by
Human • The Navigation Officer must be fully familiar with the company procedure for integrating a pilot
into the bridge team.
• The accompanying Navigation Officer must be familiar with the practical requirements (the source,
intent and meaning of the information) for each item included on the Master/Pilot information and/
or Pilot card checklists.
-
Process • The Master/Pilot information and/or Pilot card checklists will be reviewed by the Inspector. They must be
complete, accurate and not contain erroneous safety related information pertinent to the operations
being undertaken. The Pilot* must acknowledge the handover of information, or where the Pilot
had refused to sign, the time of the completion of the handover must be recorded.
• The time of the completion of the Master/Pilot information exchange must be recorded for all the
operation(s) available.
• The times of the transfer of the conn between the Master and Pilot, between Pilots and between the
Pilot and Master, as applicable, must be recorded (also on outbound voyage).
• Defective equipment affecting safe navigation, manoeuvring or mooring operations, where it exists,
must be recorded on the pilot card checklist for all operations.
The Master/Pilot exchange must be documented, discussed and agreed before any transfer of conn or
responsibility takes place. The Master/Pilot exchange must be repeated whenever there is a change of Pilot.
The Inspector will review the Bridge Logbook, Bell Book and operational records.
The operator must have developed a procedure to ensure the Pilot (or similar role*) is integrated into the
bridge team and that specific information is documented and discussed prior to any transfer of conn or
responsibility takes place.
The information should include but not be limited to:
• The vessel particulars and manoeuvring characteristics.
• The planned passage.
• The review of the ECDIS and the status of safety depth alarms and layers in use.
• The use of any navigational aids provided by the Pilot.
• Mooring and/or anchoring requirements.
• Towage and/or tug ci:,:,bLdrrLe.
• Under keel clearance.
• Relevant defects and/or constraints.
The vessel must utilise checklists that have been adapted to the specific needs of the company and vessel type.
* Similar role for the purpose of this question includes: Mooring Master; Lightering Master; Marine Advisor;
Deep Sea Pilot, etc.
Hardware
TMSA KP! 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These
procedures may include Navigation with Pilot on board.

4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management
- 4.3.4. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the company procedures to prevent disruption
and distraction on the bridge, and were these procedures being complied with?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
-
To ensure that the bridge team can always maintain a safe navigational watch, free from
Objective disruption and distraction.
Tagged Rank Master, Navigation Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to prevent disruption and
,....... distraction on the bridge.
-
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge
including guidance on:
-
• Bridge access by personnel with no operational bridge responsibilities.
• The use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices.
• Internal and external communications.
• Non-essential activity.
• Internet and email access on the bridge.
• The effective management of the bridge space where it is combined (multifunctional bridge) with the
cargo and/or machinery control and monitoring functions.
-
The Inspector will raise a negative observation when there is evidence of non-compliance with the company
procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge.
Where a multifunctional bridge space is provided, an observation will not be made relating to non-
navigational activities occurring on the bridge, provided that the bridge space is laid out and divided up in
such a way that the operation and monitoring of the cargo and/or machinery systems can be undertaken
without distraction to the bridge team.
Hardware
- TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
-
-
4.4.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacon (EPIRB) and was the EPIRB in good order with records available to demonstrate that had it been
inspected, tested and maintained as required?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure the Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) will function correctly
Objective
in an emergency.
Tagged Rank Master and Navigation Officers
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the required inspection and testing of the EPIRB and
be able to show the manufacturer's instructions on the frequency of conducting the self-test function to
preserve battery life.
The accompanying Officer must be able to explain:
• How to perform the self-test.
• The procedure to follow if the EPIRB is accidentally activated in a non-emergency situation.
• How to manually operate the EPIRB.
Process The vessel operator must have developed a procedure to ensure that EPIRBs are periodically inspected,
tested and maintained, and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
Most EPlRB's have a self-test facility.
The EPIRB must never be tested by actual operation.
However, self-tests will use some of the beacon's limited battery power and should only be performed in
accordance with the beacon manufacturer's guidance.
Beacon operating instruction manual must be available on board.
Pictorial instructions for manual operation must be visible at the location of the beacon.
The Inspector will review the GMDSS Radio Logbook.
Records must be available and completed for:
• Periodic inspections and self-tests of the EPIRB.
• Annual tests for all aspects of operational efficiency.
• Five-yearly maintenance at an approved shore-based maintenance facility (or more frequent if required
by the Flag State).
Hardware The EPIRB must be:
• Armed and ready for automatic activation.
• Capable of floating-free unimpeded or being easily manually released.
• Clearly marked with the required information and operating instructions.
• Free of visible defects, signs of damage, degradation or cracks to the casing, or of water ingress.
The EPIRB must not be defective in any respect.
The EPIRB battery must have an indication of its expiry date.
The hydrostatic release must be in good order and not past its expiry date.
The lanyard must be:
• Tied to the vessel or the mounting bracket.
• In good condition and neatly stowed.
TMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety
Officer. Safety inspections of the ship: Include all accessible areas of the ship.

- 4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures
- 4.4.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the Search and Rescue Transmitters
(SARTs), and were the SARTs in good order with records available to demonstrate that had they had been
-
inspected and tested as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure the Search and Rescue Transmitters (SARTs) will function correctly in an
Objective
emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Lifeboat Deck.
,........ Tagged Rank Master and Officers.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose and operation of the SARTs.
The accompanying Officer must be able to explain/demonstrate how to mount a SART on a lifeboat
or life raft. He must be able to describe how a SART transmission would be displayed on a radar
screen.
-
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the required inspection and testing of the SARTs, and
be able to explain how to perform the self-tests on the SART units provided onboard.
Process The stowage location(s) of SARTs must be clearly marked with the recommended symbols and with the
-
required operating and/or testing instructions.
Records of periodic inspections and self-tests of the SARTs must be complete.
-
The vessel operator must have a procedure to ensure that SARTs are periodically inspected. tested and
ready for immediate use in an emergency.
SART self-tests will use some of the beacon's limited battery power and should only be performed in
accordance with the transponder manufacturer's guidance.
-- Hardware
The Inspector will review the GMDSS Logbook and records of periodic inspections and tests of the SART(s).
The SART(s) must be located on board as required.
The SART(s) battery will be checked for expiry date.
The SART(s) must not be defective in any respect.
The lanyard shall not be missing from a SART.
Officer. Safety inspections of the ship include all accessible areas of the ship.
-
-
4.4.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the survival craft
portable two-way VHF radios and were they in good order with records available to demonstrate that had
they been inspected and tested as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios will function correctly in an
Objective
emergency.
Tagged Rank Master and Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose and operation of the survival craft
portable two-way VHF radios, and familiar with the required inspection and testing of the survival craft
portable two-way VHF radios.
Process The survival craft portable two-way VHF radio must be clearly marked with the required brief operating
instructions clearly indicated on the exterior of the equipment.
The stowage location of survival craft portable two-way VHF radios must be clearly marked with the
recommended symbols and the number of radios.
The survival craft portable two-way VHF radio battery must not have passed its expiry date.
The vessel operator must have developed a procedure to ensure that survival craft portable two-way VHF
radios are periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency. Procedures must
also provide guidance on the use of the radios for non-emergency communications.
The survival craft portable two-way VHF radios may be used for routine on-board communications when
capable of operating on appropriate frequencies. There is no requirement for them to be Ex-rated or of an
intrinsically safe type, but if the units are being used for shipboard operations, then there must be effective
measures in place to prevent them being used in the gas hazardous area.
The Inspector will review the GMDSS Radio Logbook and records of periodic inspections and tests of
the equipment.
Hardware The survival craft portable two-way VHF radios should not be defective in any respect.
A survival craft portable two-way VHF radio should have a wrist or neck strap with a weak link, and
should have provision for attachment to clothing.
The seal of replaceable primary battery or radio must be intact.
Survival craft portable two-way VHF radios or replaceable primary batteries should be of a highly visible
yellow/orange colour or marking.
Officer. Safetv inspections of the ship include all accessible areas of the ship.

- 4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures
- 4 4 .4.
: Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the proced
Question Category
ures for sending and receiving
distress, urgency and safety messages and were suitable instructions posted by the GMDSS
equipment?
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure effective communications will be made by the vessel in an emergency situation.
ROVIQ Seq uence Bridge.
-
Verification by
Human A qualified GMDSS operator must have been designated in the emergency station as being responsible
for radio communications in a distress.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedures for sending and receiving distress,
-
urgency and safety messages contained in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue Manual Volume Ill, (IAMSAR Vol Ill), Section 4.
They must also be familiar with the requirements for GMDSS radio watchkeeping on their vessel, and
-
with the process of preparing and transmitting distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS equipment.
They must know the process for recording the details of distress, urgency and safety messages received.
-
Process The operator must have developed procedures for emergency communications which give guidance on,
and designated responsibility for, distress communications in an emergency situation using the vessel's
GMDSS equipment.
Instructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS
equipment should be clearly displayed by the equipment.
The company must have developed procedures for emergency communications using the GMDSS
-
equipment.
The Inspector will verify the entries in the GMDSS Radio Logbook and verify that distress, urgency and
safety messages received had been recorded in accordance with company procedures.
-
Instructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS
equipment must be clearly displayed by the equipment.
A copy of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Volume Ill, latest edition,
-
(IAMSAR Vol Ill) must be available at the GMDSS radio station.
Hardware
-
TMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures
and cover all credible emergency scenarios.
Vessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact
details, vessel equipment and changes in company procedures.
-
-
-
4.4.5. Were the Master and Navigation Officers familiar with the operation, testing and maintenance of
the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment and were records available to
demonstrate the equipment was in good order?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure effective communications in routine or emergency situations.

Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the operation of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio
and satellite communications equipment.
The accompanying Officer must also be able to describe the daily, weekly and monthly radio tests required
in accordance with the SMS (including Flag State requirements) and the manufacturers' maintenance and
operation manuals.
Process The operator must have developed procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and log keeping
of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment. These should include the
method chosen to ensure availability of GMDSS equipment at sea.
Details of equipment fitted can be found in the Record of Approved GMDSS Radio Installation. SOLAS
defines three methods to ensure availability of GMDSS equipment at sea.
• At sea electronic maintenance, requiring the carriage of a qualified radio/electronic officer and adequate
spares and manuals.
• Duplication of certain equipment.
• Shore-based maintenance.
There must be evidence of a shore-based maintenance programme to ensure availability of the radio
equipment where this is one of the documented maintenance choices for the vessel, and the certificate
should not be expired.
Evidence that the required daily, weekly and monthly radio tests had been performed must be available.
There must also be evidence that the capacity of the G MOSS reserve batteries had been tested within the
last 12 months.
The GMDSS Radio Logbook must provide a record of all events connected with the radio communications
facilities on board.
Hardware All items of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment must be operational
and not defective in any respect.
The GMDSS printer(s) must be working properly, printouts must be readable and there must always be
enough paper rolls available.
GMDSS equipment aerials or antennae must be in good condition. not damaoed or not defective in
any way.
The emergency lighting for the radio station must be functioning properly.

--,
4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures
- Hardware
GMDSS equipment is required to be powered from three sources of supply:
Continued ... • The ship's normal supply.
• The ship's emergency generator (if fitted).
• A dedicated radio battery supply.
The batteries must be charged by an automatic charger that is powered by the main and emergency
generators. The batteries are required to have the capacity to power the equipment for one (1) hour on
ships with an emergency generator, and six (6) hours on ships not fitted with an emergency generator.
The capacity of the battery or batteries should be checked, using an appropriate method, annually. One
method of checking the capacity of an accumulator battery is to fully discharge and recharge the battery,
using normal operating current and period (e.g. 10 hours), when the ship is not at sea (i.e. will not require
the GMDSS equipment for watchkeeping purposes until the batteries are fully charged after the test).
The GMDSS reserve battery locker:
-
• The GMDSS reserve batteries must be charging correctly.
• Must not contain damaged batteries.
• Must be weather tight.
• Must be properly ventilated.
• Must not contain inappropriate material.
--. • Goggles, rubber gloves, a protective apron and an eye-wash bottle must be available in the GMDSS
-
reserve battery locker where lead-acid/alkaline batteries are installed.
TMSA KPI 5.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that ensure all navigational equipment is maintained
as operational. Procedures include defect reporting, suitably trained personnel to maintain navigational
equipment or shore-based maintenance support, and provision of spares as appropriate.
-
4.4.6. Were the Master, Officers and crew aware of the potential danger of using radio or mobile telephone
equipment during cargo- and ballast-handling operations and was there a sufficient number of intrinsically
safe portable radios for use in operational areas?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure a hazard is never created by the inappropriate use of radio or mobile telephone
Objective equipment during cargo or ballast operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Main Deck, Cargo Control Room.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers, Ratings.
Verification by
Human The Master, Officers and Ratings must be familiar with the company procedures for the safe use
of radio and telephone equipment during cargo- and ballast-handling operations.
Process The operator must have procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo- and
ballast-handling operations, ensuring:
While the vessel is at a terminal:
• No MF/HF radio transmissions are made.
• Main transmitting antennae are earthed or isolated.
• Fixed VHF and UHF equipment is switched to low power (one watt or less).
• Portable VHF or UHF radios have a power output of one watt or less.
• Any damaged portable VHF or UHF radios are withdrawn from service and clearly marked as such.
• Sufficient intrinsically safe VHF or UHF portable radios are provided to coordinate cargo, ballast and
bunker-handling operations.
In addition, procedures should ensure:
-
• Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones are prominently displayed at the gangway.
• Non-intrinsically safe mobile phones, including any provided by the terminal for ship/shore
communications, are not used outside of the accommodation block.
• If the use of intrinsically safe mobile phones is allowed outside of the accommodation block, they must
be clearly identified, and proper certification is provided.
Hardware If MF/HF radio or radar equipment is under repair/service, this must be discussed at the pre-transfer
conference and a safe system of work agreed.
TMSA KPI 6.2 .1 requires that comprehensive procedures for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations are
in place for all types of vessel within the fleet.
The planning procedure is specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. This may include ship/shore
interface and communications.

4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment
- 4.5.1. Was the latest Annual DP Trial report available on board, were the Master and Officers familiar with
the contents, and had they taken part in onboard training and drills involving various DP scenarios?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that the vessel's DP system is fully operational, and that the vessel is fault
tolerant according to the equipment class requirements.
Bridge, Engine Control Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer (DP Operator) must be familiar with the procedures for conducting Annual DP
Trials and the content of the report(s).
-
Process The vessel operator must have developed procedures giving guidance on the performance of Annual
DP Trials within+/- 3 months of the anniversary date of the original FMEA Proving Trials or following
any modifications to the onboard DP Systems.
A copy of the Annual DP Trials reports should be available on board. Evidence must be available that the
Annual DP Trials had been witnessed by a competent and independent third party.
......... Onboard training and drills involving various DP scenarios, (ideally based on the experience gained from
-
the Annual DP Trials), should be conducted, and records maintained.
A negative observation will be raised if:
• The Annual DP Trials date had not been synchronised following a new FMEA proving trial conducted
after a major upgrade or conversion.
• T he Annual DP Trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year as part of
-
the planned maintenance system, but there was no documentary evidence to show that the test results
were subject to independent scrutiny and approval.
• Where the Annual DP Trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year as
-
part of the planned maintenance system, test sheets for items tested were either incomplete, lacking
detail or not signed off by the person carrying out the test.
• It could not be shown that following the Annual DP Trials, the listed category 'A' findings had been
rectified.
• Findings from previous Annual DP Trials were found to be 'open' with no documented close out actions,
and/or had not been recorded as deficiencies in the onboard SMS.
• The latest Annual DP Trials report did not contain a statement that the vessel was considered fit to carry
out DP operations equivalent to its DP class.
• The latest Annual DP Trials report did not contain list of findings.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. T hese procedures
may include actions upon equipment failure.
--
-
-
4.5.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of Position Reference
Systems (PRS), and was the equipment in satisfactory condition with sensor offset data readily available to
the DPO'?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure Position Reference Systems are in satisfactory condition with sensor offset data
Objective
readily available to the DPO.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the use of Position Reference
Systems during DP operations at each offtake location.
Process • The vessel operator must have developed procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during
DP operations at each offtake location and/or the procedure should reference procedures provided by
the field operator.
• There should be a minimum of three different, operational, Position Reference Systems (PRS) available
to the DP operator during an offtake operation.
• Controls for PRS should be accessible within easy reach of the DP control station.
• PRS sensor offsets including a clear description of the common reference point and sign convention
should be adequately filed and readily available to DPOs. All offset measurements for transducers.
GNSS antenna, scanner heads, taut wire gimbals etc. should be measured relative to the common
reference point. This data should be updated after any change to sensor location on board.
• These procedures may form part of the vessel-specific DP operations manuals and/or field operations
manuals.
The Inspector will review the Sensor offset data file, DP logbook and DP data log and look for any indication
of PRS faults.
• One or more of the PRS was not in satisfactory operational condition.
• On a DP2 or DP3 vessel, fewer than three different, operational, Position Reference Systems (PRS) had
been available to the DP operator during an offtake operation.
• The DP system was not equipped with a minimum of two independent differential satellite positioning
systems.
• Controls for PRS were not accessible within easy reach of the DP control station.
• PRS sensor offsets were not adequately filed and readily available to DPOs.

-
- 4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment
- 4.5.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for reporting and recording DP
events and incidents, and were all DP parameters being logged and recorded?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure DP events and incidents are recorded, reported and investigated, and lessons
learnt from incidents used to increase industry safety standards.
Documentation, Bridge.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for recording, reporting and
investigating DP-related incidents, undesired events and observations.
Process Company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP-related incidents, undesired events and
-- observations must be available.

-
• Records of DP-related incidents, undesired events and observations.
• Independent data logger records.
• DP fault log.
The company procedures must include a system to actively transfer industry experience and operational
knowledge gained from DP-related incidents, undesired events and observations.
DP-related incidents, undesired events and observations should be reported according to the vessel's ISM
system or via the method set out in IMCA M 103, latest revision.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• An investigation into a DP-related incident, undesired event or observation had not been closed out
-
within a reasonable timeframe.
• Records of faults related to the DP system had not been retained on board.
Hardware The vessel must be provided with an independent data logger unit that records all DP parameters, and
-
procedures must ensure relevant data are secured in the event of a DP incident. Data must be retained on
board for a minimum of 1 year.
-
The independent data logger must not be defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 8.1.1 requires that procedures ensure prompt reporting and investigation of incidents and significant
near misses.
-
4.5.4. Was the vessel provided with a comprehensive DP operations manual and were the Master and
Officers familiar with its contents, including DP checklists, capability plots, consequence analysis and activity
specific operating guidelines (ASOG)?
Question Category
e@oe
Process)
To ensure the Master and Officers are provided with comprehensive procedures for
Objective conducting DP operations.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the contents of the DP operations manual, including
capability plots, DP footprints, consequence analysis and activity specific operational guidelines (ASOG).
Process The vessel operator should have comprehensive procedures for DP operations contained within a DP
operations manual. Procedures should include:
• DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists.
• DP operating instructions.
• Risk assessment reviews.
• Guidance on the use of Capability plots, DP footprints, and Consequence analysis.
• Activity-specific operating guidelines (ASOG) which should include, for example, direction on:
o the number of generators to be online
o increasing the power output of generators that are already online
o policy on standby generators.
Risk assessment reviews should reflect changes in operating locations, position reference sensors and/or
Field Operations Manuals.
• DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists had not been completed as required.
• There were no risk assessments for specific DP operations/locations.
• Following a failure of a DP component, a risk assessment had not been completed prior to resuming
operations.
• DP capability plots were not readily available at the DP control location.
• Hard copies of the DP capability plots were not available.
• DP footprint plots were not available for comparison of the vessel's actual position keeping ability
compared with DP capability plots.
• On a DP2 or DP3 vessel, the DP control system did not include 'consequence analysis' software.
Hardware
may includ<> actions upon cguipm<>nt failure, actions upon encountering adver:;e weather, :;upporting
checklists.

4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment
- 4.5.5. Were up to date Field Operations Manuals on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel
trades, were the Master and Officers familiar with their content, and were records available of the regular
communication checks with terminal installations as required by Field Specific Operating Guidelines {FSOG)?
- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure the Master and Officers are aware of the procedures and regulations at each
Objective offshore terminal to which the vessel trades, and that regular communications are
established as required by Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG).
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedure for verifying that the field operation manual
in use is the latest edition.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the content of the field operation manual, including Field
Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG) and contact numbers, call signs and communications channels for
both operational and emergency use, for the last offshore terminal visited.
Process The vessel operator should have procedures to ensure that the most up-to-date editions of the field
operations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.
Records of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by FSOG should be
maintained.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 1A.2.3 requires that relevant reference documents are provided as a supplement to the SMS both
-
onboard and ashore.
-
-
-
Notes
-
-
--
-
-
-
Chapter 5.
- Safety Management
Chapter 5. Safety Management
Practical Guidance on Emergency Response Plans and Drills (applicable for all questions under this
sub-chapter)
The following guidance is applicable for all drills.
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:
1. Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined frequency.
2. Record the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.
3. Define the action to be taken if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.
The vessel operator should have developed a ship-specific shipboard emergency response plan for every emergency
condition, which identifies the steps the crew must take immediately to bring the situation under control and, in the
short- and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.
Vessel emergency response plans must be reviewed at least annually to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,
vessel equipment and changes in company procedures.
They should additionally be reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been used.
The Master and Officers onboard should ensure that:
• The drill scenario is realistic and adequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.
• Where a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, the Company is notified.
1. The shipboard emergency response plan for every emergency condition.
2. The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.
3. The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.
4. The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel's activities as recorded within the Bridge
Logbook.
The Inspector will interview:
At least one Rating, Navigation and Engine Officer to verify they are familiar with the ship-specific procedure for emergency
response and their role as identified in the muster list during an emergency situation.
Emphasis on Safety
All drills must be conducted under safe conditions. This means that the entire drill should, as far as possible, be carried
out in such a way that it is safe in every respect.
The lowering of a lifeboat with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of a drill that may, depending
on the circumstances, involve an unnecessary risk. Such drills should only be carried out if special precautions are observed;
consequently, elements of the drill that may involve unnecessary risks need special attention or may be excluded from
the drill.
Abandon ship drills should be planned, organised and performed so that the recognised risks are minimised and in
accordance with relevant shipboard requirements of occupational health and safety.
Drills provide an opportunity to verify that the life-saving system is working and that all associated equipment is in place,
in good working order and ready for use.
Before conducting drills, it should be checked that the lifeboat and its safety equipment have been maintained in
accordance with the manufacturers' instructions, as well as noting all the precautionary measures necessary.
Abnormal conditions of wear and tear or corrosion should be reported to the responsible Officer immediately.
Emphasis on learning
Drills should be conducted with an emphasis on learning and be viewed as a learning experience, not just as a task to
meet a regulatory requirement to conduct such drills. Whether they are emergency drills required by SOLAS or additional
special drills conducted to enhance the competence of crew members, they should be carried out at safe speed.
During drills, care should be taken to ensure that everybody familiarises themselves with both their duties and the
equipment. If necessary, pauses should be made during the drills to explain especially difficult elements. The experience
of the crew is an important factor in determining how fast a drill, or certain drill elements, should be carried out.
Lessons learned during the course of a drill should be documented and made a part of follow-up shipboard training
discussions and planning for the next drill session.

5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills
5.1.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the onboard emergency response plans, and were records
available to demonstrate that all mandatory and company defined emergency drills had been completed
and documented as required by company procedures?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human PIQ P hotograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
To ensure that vessel staff can manage onboard emergencies through a consistent and
Objective
structured process.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room.
Tagged Rank
-
Senior and Junior Deck Officer, Senior and Junior Engine Officer.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer as well as Deck and Engine Senior and Junior Officers will be asked to
demonstrate:
• The system of shipboard emergency contingency plans.
• Company's procedures for conducting drills, recording the details of drills and what to do if a drill could
not be completed within the required due date.
• Their role and responsibilities during emergency drills.
......... If drill records are supported by photos, these should be taken with an intrinsically safe camera.
-
Inspector will review work and rest hours records to verify that drills are recorded as a "work time" activity.
Process The company's procedures will be reviewed against the following as a minimum:
• The requirement to conduct emergency response drills.
• The requirement to record the outcome of an emergency response drill in a consistent manner.
• The requirement to track the completion of completed drills to ensure that mandatory and company
obligations are met.
• Evidence that the required drills were completed within the required timeframe.
• The actions to be taken if a drill could not be completed within the required timeframe.
• Drill schedule and records indicating that each drill has been completed within the required timeframe.
• Where a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, there is objective evidence that
the vessel operator had acknowledged the vessel's notification of a postponement.
Hardware The steering control systems should not be defective in any respect.
-
-
-
5.1.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for the principal fire
scenarios for the vessel type, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the plans in accordance
with the company procedures?
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that the crew will respond to a fire situation in accordance with the vessel's
Objective
shipboard emergency response plans.
Tagged Rank Senior and Junior Deck Officers, Senior and Junior Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human The drill scenarios should be realistic, addressing the equipment which was tested followed by a full
evaluation.
If more than 25% of crew change is performed, a fire drill should be conducted within 24 hours of leaving
port.
The Inspector will raise questions to on-signers to verify their familiarisation with their duties during
emergency.
If drill records are supported by photos, these should be taken with an intrinsically safe camera.
The Inspector will review work and rest hours records to verify that drills are recorded as a "work time"
.......
activity.
Process Shipboard emergency response plans (for the principal fire scenarios) and records of completed drills will
be reviewed by the Inspector.
Drill dates will be cross-checked against vessel activities as recorded within the bridge logbook.
All emergency response plans for the principal fire scenarios should be exercised.
Hardware Ensure that the equipment used during drills shall immediately be brought back to its fully operational
condition and any faults and defects discovered during the drills shall be remedied as soon as possible.
Note that one item that is usually missing from fireman equipment following a drill is the flashlight.
Fire hoses used during the drill should be returned to their position and confirmed that they are in good
order.
The length of fire hoses in the engine room should not exceed 15 metres.

5.1.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the vessel's SOPEP or SMPEP, and had drills taken place
to test the effectiveness of the onboard emergency response actions required by the Plan and company
procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a spill situation in accordance with the
vessel's Shipboard Oil Pollution Plan (SOPEP) or Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency
Plan (SMPEP).
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room.
-
Verification by
Practical Guidelines {5.1.3)
-
Human The scenarios for contingencies as stated in either the SOPEP or SMPEP shall be practised on a regular basis
as required by the company to ensure that all on board are aware of their duties in the event of an incident.
The Inspector will interview at least one Deck Officer and an Engine Officer to verify that they are familiar
with their duties in the event of a spill incident.
The Inspector will focus on deck and engine OOW during bunkering operation.
The accompanying Officer should be familiar with the content of the vessel's SOPEP or SMPEP.
- If drill records are supported by photos, these should be taken with an intrinsically safe camera.
The Inspector will review work and rest hours records, to verify that drills are recorded as a "work time"
-
activity.
Process Drill scenarios should be realistic and cover operational spills for both cargo and bunker operations.
List of specific contact details for the port of inspection will be reviewed and should be updated. Additional
contact details are required by the USCG Vessel Response Plan when trading in US waters.
Inspector will review the records of the latest drill to verify that records are consistent with the vessel's
activities as recorded in the Bridge Logbook.
- Hardware
If a drill had been deferred from the defined drill schedule, supporting evidence indicating that Company
is notified and date of rescheduling should be available.
Ensure that the equipment used during drills is immediately brought back to its fully operational condition
-
and any faults and defects discovered during the drills shall be remedied as soon as possible.
Ensure that anti-pollution equipment is in good condition, not obstructed and is properly labelled.
TMSA KPI 11.1 .1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures
-
5.1.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for enclosed space rescue,
and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance
with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective Enclosed space rescue emergency response drill.

ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Rating, Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview an Officer and/or a Rating (especially those who participated in the last drill) to
verify that they are familiar with the rigging and operation of the provided hoisting arrangement(s).
A common question that will be raised is about the Attendant role and their actions in case of emergency
and especially what they would do if someone collapsed and the rescue team is delayed.
They may believe - wrongly - that they can hold their breath or are fit enough not to be affected in the
same way as those inside.
Attendants should have a clear list of tasks at this time (e.g. raise the alarm but do not enter the space/
opening; keep talking to the people inside; set up equipment outside; brief the command centre and
rescue team when they arrive) which is a proven technique for keeping them focused.
Process The shipboard emergency response plan should identify the actions that crew must take to conduct a rescue
from an enclosed space in a safe manner without further endangering those involved in the operation.
Each enclosed space entry and rescue drill shall include:
• Checking and use of personal protective equipment required for entry.
• Checking and use of communication equipment and procedures.
• Checking and use of instruments for measuring the atmosphere in enclosed spaces.
• Checking and use of rescue equipment and procedures.
• Instructions in first aid and resuscitation techniques.
• The permit for the space that the drill had been conducted in.
Hardware Enclosed space rescue hoisting arrangement(s) provided for cargo, ballast, bunker, void and cofferdam
spaces will be sighted during the inspection.

- 5.1.5. Were the Master and Ship Security Officer (SSO) familiar with the vessel's Ship Security Plan (SSP),
and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the measures and procedures specified by the SSP?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a security threat in accordance with
the vessel's SSP.
Documentation, Interview - Security Officer.
Tagged Rank Master and SSO.
Verification by
-- Practical Guidelines (5.1.5)
Human The 550 should be able to demonstrate his familiarisation with security drills and exercises as per SSP.
The drills should test the following as a minimum:
• The Ship Protection Measures (5PM), including testing the security of all access points.
• Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
• The bridge team's security knowledge.
• The crew's understanding of any different actions required in the event of a pirate attack compared to
........
other types of attack.
Process The vessel shall have a Flag State approval letter or an endorsement stamp on the SSP. Note: It is
recommended the company provides the vessel with a letter which confirms what parts of the SSP the
SSO can reveal to Inspectors. Inspector will NOT request to sight either the SSP or the security
contingency plans.
-
The Inspector will review the schedule of security drills to verify that all security drills were completed within
the timeframe defined in the drill schedule.
Where the ship had entered a High-Risk Area in the last twelve months, suitable security drills should be
conducted with the 5PM in place, prior to entering the High-Risk Area and supportive evidence to be
available.
Hardware Inspector will check the operation and records of maintenance for satellite phone in Citadel room.
TMSA KPI 13.1.3 requires that measures have been developed to mitigate and respond to all identified threats to
vessels and shore-based locations.
-
.........

5.1.6. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the procedure for launching the lifeboat(s), and
had abandon ship drills taken place in accordance with company procedures and the requirements of SOLAS
and the Flag Administration?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the crew were able to safely launch the vessel's lifeboat(s) in an emergency
Objective and conduct abandon ship drills strictly in accordance with manufacturer's instructions
and company procedures.
ROVIQ Sequence Lifeboat deck, Documentation, Bridge, Interview - Deck Rating.
Verification by
Human One or more Ratings and the accompanying Officer will be interviewed to verify that they are familiar with
the ship-specific procedure for the launching of the lifeboat during an abandon ship drill.
Feedback from drills should be captured/recorded to verify the training is effective. Any corrective and
preventive actions noted should be effectively followed up and closed.
Process The Inspector will sight and review:
• The specific procedure for launching a lifeboat as part of a drill.
• Records of the latest drill to be ensured that is completed within the timeframe by the drill schedule.
• The date and time of latest drill to be in line with records in Bridge Logbook.
• Every crew member shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire drill every month.
• The drills of the crew shall take place within 24h of the ship leaving a port if more than 25% of the
crew have not participated in abandon ship and fire drills on board that particular ship in the previous
month.
Hardware Lifeboat engine and emergency lighting for mustering and abandonment shall be tested at each abandon
ship drill.
TMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.

-
- 5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills
5.1.7. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for a cargo vapour or
liquid release, including potential fire, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard
-
emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a cargo vapour or liquid release. including
Objective potential fire, in accordance with the vessel's shipboard emergency response plans.
-
Verification by

--, Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid
release.
Responsible Officers should be able to demonstrate the steps that must be taken immediately to bring the
......... situation under control, and then, in the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the
environment and property.
Process Emergency response plans should contain the following as a minimum:
• cargo containment leakage
• cargo connection rupture, pipeline fracture or cargo spillage
• lifting of a cargo system relief valve
• fire following leakage of cargo.
• The shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid release, including potential fire.
• The shipboard emergency response plans for a cargo vapour or liquid release.
• The records for completed cargo vapour or liquid release drills.
• The vessel's Bridge Logbook for the previous 12 months.
Hardware If special equipment is needed for the safe handling of the particular cargo, it will be reviewed by the
Inspector.
I"'"""""'
-
.......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 107
5.1.8. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for collision, and had
drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a collision situation in accordance with
Objective
the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for a collision situation or
liquid release.
Responsible Officers should be able to demonstrate the steps which must be taken immediately to bring
the situation under control, and then, in the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel,
the environment and property.
Process Emergency response plans should contain as a minimum the following:
• Coordination of response effort.
• Response procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that
protect life, the marine environment and property.
• The person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities.
• The communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts.
• Information concerning the availability and location of response equipment.
• Reporting and communication procedures on board ship.
Hardware
108 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections '

liiiiiiiW
-
5.1.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for grounding, and had
drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with
company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
a
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a grounding situation in accordance
Objective
with the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for a grounding incident.
-
Responsible Officers should be able to demonstrate the steps that must be taken immediately to bring the
situation under control, and then, in the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the
environment and property.
Process The company should develop a shipboard emergency plan for grounding situation which is ship specific.
The shipboard emergency plan for grounding should consider as a minimum:
• Assessing a grounding situation and gathering data for evaluation by a specialist technical advisor on
-
its impact on buoyancy, stability and structural strength and the later decisions on mitigating actions.
• Preserving ECDIS and VDR evidence.
• Communications with the company and third parties.
Hardware
-
-
,..........

5.1.10. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for loss of propulsion,
with company procedures?
Question Category
•@oe
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a loss of propulsion in accordance with
Objective
the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan.
Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Engine
ROVIQ Sequence
Control Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for a loss of propulsion
incident.
A Navigation Officer will be interviewed who should be familiar with the process for estimating the
predicted drift of a disabled tanker, taking into account the wind, current and ship's head.
An Engineer Officer will be reviewed who should be familiar with the location and content of the vessel's
loss of propulsion emergency response plan.
Process The company should develop a ship-specific shipboard emergency plan for the loss of propulsion.
Hardware T he Inspector may review the condition and readiness of emergency manoeuvring system (main engine
local control).

-
,.........
5.1.11. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for failure of electrical
power, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in
accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
- 0 'W�� a
Process)
0 0 0
- Objective
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a failure of electrical power in accordance
-
Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Engine
ROVIQ Sequence
Control Room.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for a failure of electrical
power incident.
A Navigation Officer will be interviewed who should be familiar with the process for estimating the
predicted drift of a disabled tanker, taking into account the wind, current and ship's head.
- An Engineer Officer will be interviewed who should be familiar with the location and content of the vessel's
failure of electrical power emergency response plan.
Process Emergency response plans should contain as a minimum the following:
- • A shipboard procedure for feeding back power from the emergency switchboard to the main
switchboard.
• A shipboard procedure for recovering after a blackout.
Hardware
......... Inspector may review the condition and readiness of the emergency generator.
T MSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures
-
-
-
-
5.1.12. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for steering gear failure,
with company procedures.
Question Category
L
••••
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a failure of the steering gear in
Objective accordance with the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Steering Gear, Interview - Deck Officer.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for a failure of steering
gear incident.
The Inspector will interview one navigation Officer and verify that they are familiar with a method for
estimating the drift of a disabled tanker taking into account the wind, current and ship's head.
If safe to do so, the Inspector will request an accompanying Officer to demonstrate the operation of the
emergency steering system and describes the use of the communication system and alternative power
supplies.
Process In addition to the routine checks and tests prescribed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of SOLAS Chapter V Regulation
26, emergency steering drills shall take place at least once every three months in order to practice emergency
steering procedures.
These drills shall include direct control within the steering gear compartment, the communications
procedure with the navigation bridge and, where applicable, the operation of alternative power supplies.
The shipboard emergency response plan should consider:
• Failure of the steering control systems from the navigation bridge.
• A single steering system failure, either electrical or hydraulic.
• A complete failure of all steering systems and or the rudder(s).
Hardware The Inspector may review the condition and readiness of emergency steering gear and compass repeater.

5.1.13. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for emergency towing,
including the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB), and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that the crew will respond to an emergency towing situation in accordance
Objective with the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan and Emergency Towing Booklet.
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Forecastle, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer
ROVIQ Sequence
Officer.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the location of the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB) and
the emergency towing procedures.
The Inspector will Interview one navigation and one Engineer Officer to verify that they are familiar with
-
the location of the ETB and the deployment process for the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the
vessel.
Process The vessel operator should have developed ship-specific emergency towing procedures contained within
an ETB.
The procedure shall include:
• Drawings of fore and aft deck showing possible emergency towing arrangements.
• Inventory of equipment on board that can be used for towing.
• Means and method of communication.
• Sample procedures to facilitate the preparation for and conducting of emergency towing operations.
Hardware A minimum of three copies of the ETB should be kept on board and located in:
• the bridge
• a forecastle space; and
• the ship's office or cargo control room.
- A copy should also be kept in a common electronic file format, which will allow faster distribution to the
concerned parties.
-
Comprehensive diagrams and sketches should be available and include the following:
• assembly and rigging diagrams
• towing equipment and strong point locations; and
-
• equipment and strong point capacities and safe working loads (SWLs).
.........
-
5.1.14. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the shipboard emergency response plan for man
overboard, including the launching and recovering the rescue boat, and had drills taken place to test the
effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a man overboard situation in accordance
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Deck Rating.
Verification by
- ..
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for man overboard.
The Inspector will interview:
• One navigation Officer and will verify that she/he is familiar with the ship-specific procedure for the
launching, and subsequent recovery of, the rescue boat.
• One Rating to verify that she/he is familiar with her/his role as identified in the muster list during a man
overboard situation.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan to identify the actions
that crew should take in a man overboard situation. Inspector will review the plan to ensure that is ship
specific and updated with the latest industry guidelines.
Hardware

-
__,
-
5.1.15. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the shipboard emergency response plan for
recovery of persons from the water, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard
emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
......., Objective
To ensure that the crew will be able to safely recover persons from the water in accordance
-
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Rating, Documentation, Bridge.
- Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer should be familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for the recovery of
persons from the water.
The Inspector will interview one or more Ratings to verify that they are familiar with the recovery of persons
,........, from the water plan and their expected role in such an emergency response.
-
Process The vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan to identify the actions
that vessel staff must take to recover persons from the water in a safe manner without further endangering
those involved in the operation.
The Inspector will review the plan to ensure that it is ship specific and updated with the latest industry
guidelines.
Ship-specific procedures for the recovery of persons from the water should specify the anticipated
conditions under which a recovery operation may be conducted without causing undue hazard to the ship
and the ship's crew, taking into account, but not limited to:
• Manoeuvrability of the ship.
• Freeboard of the ship.
• Points on the ship to which casualties may be recovered.
......... • Characteristics and limitations of equipment intended to be used for recovery operations.
-
• Available crew and personal protective equipment (PPE).
• Wind force, direction and spray.
• Significant wave height (Hs).
-
• Period of waves.
• Swell.
• Safety of navigation.
Hardware
-
-
5.1.16. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for flooding, and had
drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plans in accordance with
company procedures?
Question Category
L
••••
Process)
0
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a flooding situation in accordance with
Objective the vessel's shipboard emergency response plan.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for flooding.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for each of the principal
flooding scenarios which are appropriate to the vessel type, which will include where applicable, but will
not necessarily be limited to:
• Machinery space flooding.
• Pumproom flooding.
• Forecastle space flooding.
--
• Hull breach.
The plans will identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under
control, and then in the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment
and property.
The Inspector will review the plan to ensure that is ship specific and updated with the latest industry
guidelines.
Hardware
TMSA KP\ 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures
L.

-
5.1.17. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans regarding LNG bunker
,......., operations, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plans
-
in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type {Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that the crew will respond effectively to an emergency situation involving LNG
-
bunker operations in accordance with the vessel's shipboard emergency response plans.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Documentation.
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the emergency procedures contained in the fuel-handling
-
manual for LNG bunkers.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a fuel-handling manual for LNG bunkers that includes
emergency procedures to identify the actions that vessel staff must take in the short- and medium-term
to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property in the event of an incident. These
- emergency procedures may be incorporated into an integrated system of shipboard emergency plans.
LNG bunker operations-related exercises may be incorporated into other required drills such as fire drills.
- The emergency response plans should have been developed to identify any actions that require the crew
to respond in a counterintuitive manner such as identifying hose and pipe coupling connections that open
and close in opposite directions from normal couplings in common use.
The Emergency Response Plan should cover all emergency situations identified in the LNG Bunkering
....... Operations Risk Assessment and may designate responsibilities for local authorities, hospitals, local fire
brigades, PIC, Master and selected personnel from the bunkering facility. As a minimum, the following
-
situations should be covered where appropriate:
• LNG leakage and spill on the receiving ship, on the bunkering facility or from the LNG transfer system.
-
• Gas detection.
• Fire in the bunkering area.
• Unexpected movement of the vessel due to failure or loosening of mooring lines.
• Unexpected moving of the truck tanker.
• Unexpected venting on the receiving ship or on the bunkering facility.
• Loss of power.
Hardware
,......, and cover all credible emergency scenarios.
-
--
-
--
5.1.18. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures setting out the actions to be
taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank, and was all required equipment available and in
satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
'Wrw1�
To ensure the crew can respond promptly and effectively in the event of a cargo leak into
Objective
a double hull tank.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Interview - Deck Officer, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures setting out the actions to be
taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank. He must also be familiar with the location of
the equipment required by company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo
leak into a double hull tank.
Process The company should have procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into
a double hull tank. These procedures should address the various options for maintaining a safe atmosphere
in the tank, including: identifying the cargoes involved and the risks associated with them, continuous
ventilation, filling or partially filling with ballast, securing with PN valves, securing with vent valves fitted
with flames screens and a combination of these.
Procedures should describe the process for each tank, the equipment to be used and its configuration.
They should also provide guidance on how to safely transfer the cargo from the ballast space.
Equipment required by these procedures may include:
• Emergency ballast/cargo system connection spool piece.
• Emergency ballast/inert gas system connection spool piece.
• Flexible inert gas hoses.
• PN valves.
• Flame screens.
• Portable standpipes.
• Portable fans.
-
Records of tests for electrical continuity of the flexible hoses designated for inerting double hull tanks will
be verified by the Inspector.
Hardware During the tour on deck, the Inspector will inspect the equipment required by procedures to verify its
availability, suitable stowage and satisfactory condition.
TMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place
for all vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include maintaining safe tank atmospheres.
Com1ncn1;�/SMS Rcforon'f.o
-
-
- 5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills
5.1.19. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the emergency arrangements to pump out the spaces
forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding and were these arrangements prominently
marked and in good order? (This question is only applicable to 080 and Ore/Oil vessel types.)
Question Category
••••
........ (Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure forward ballast tanks and dry spaces on OBO and Ore/Oil combination carriers
Objective can be pumped out safely in the event of flooding.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Officer, Bridge, Forecastle, Engine Control Room.
Verification by
........ Human The accompanying Officer must be aware of how the forward spaces would be pumped out in an
-
emergency utilising the system provided onboard. This should include the sequence of opening and closing
valves and starting the appropriate pump.
The accompanying Officer should also be familiar with company procedures to pump out the spaces
-
forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding.
Process The vessel operator should have developed vessel-specific procedures to pump out the spaces forward of
the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding, including guidance on:
-
• The use of the pumps/eductors connected to the systems, their direct suctions and overboard valves.
• The proper marking of system valves and controls to ensure correct operation and avoid accidental
opening.
-
The vessel-specific instructions for pumping out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in an
emergency may be included as part of the vessel emergency response plan for forecastle space flooding.
The remote controls for the system should not be accessed via an under-deck passage, a pipe trunk or
-
other similar means of access.
Hardware The arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding
should not be defective in any respect.
The condition of the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event
of flooding must be in satisfactory condition. Operation should be easy in an emergency: the suction wells
in the forecastle dry spaces must not be obstructed by stores, ropes etc., bilge wells must be provided with
gratings or strainers that prevent blockage of the dewatering system with debris and access to the remote
controls must not be obstructed.
TMSA TMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with vessel-specific operations and
equipment.
........
-
........ Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 119
Practical Guidance for the maintenance and inspection of fire-protection systems and appliances l.....i
The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the
relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company.
L...-
ln meeting these requirements, the Company should ensure that:
1. inspections are held at appropriate intervals,
2. any non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,
3. appropriate corrective action is taken, and
4. records of these activities are maintained.
Operational Readiness
All fire-protection systems and appliances should be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate
use while the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable
arrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable
fire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this purpose.
Maintenance and testing

Maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan having due regard to
ensuring the reliability of the system. The on board maintenance plan should be included in the ship's safety management
system and should be based on the system manufacturer's recommendations including:
1. maintenance and inspection procedures and instructions,
2. required schedules for periodic maintenance and inspections,
3. listing of recommended spare parts, and
4. records of inspections and maintenance, including corrective actions taken to maintain the system in operable
condition.
Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, two year,
five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections should be
carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are carried out
by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the completion of the
testing.
In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance and
inspection guidelines should be followed.
--
5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems
5.2.1. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the starting procedure for the emergency fire
pump, and were records available to demonstrate that the emergency fire pump and its location had been
maintained and tested in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
--
- Objective
To ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with
the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Steering Gear, Aft Mooring Deck.
........, Tagged Rank Master, Officers and Ratings.
Verification by

Human The Inspector will interview at least one Rating to verify his/her familiarisation with the starting process
of emergency fire pump and the locations of remote-control activation.
It is recommended that the emergency fire pump is prior to the Inspector's embarkation at the day of
,........, inspection.
-
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the starting and testing of the emergency fire
pump, at each remote-control location.
It is recommended during the testing of the emergency fire pump, that at least two jets of water be used
(one through nozzle on navigation deck and the other from the foremost main deck at the same time) and
it should be verified that the pressure at the nozzle is no less than 5.0 kg/cm 2 •
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that access to the emergency fire pump
-
space remains possible in all circumstances.
Ship-specific starting instructions for the emergency fire pump in the working language of the ship
should be prominently displayed adjacent to the equipment. These instructions are not for the use of the
-
qualified engineering personnel, but for others who might be required to start the emergency fire pump
in an emergency. It is recommended therefore that they contain photographs to illustrate the steps that
should be followed.
- Hardware The Inspector will verify the proper operation of the emergency fire pump (it should be able to start from
all remote-control locations with no delays) and its delivery pressure.
-
The position and identification of the closing devices for the emergency fire pump fuel supply must be
clearly marked.
Pressure gauges for suction and delivery of emergency fire pump should be operational .
The emergency fire pump, and its associated pipework, should be free of leaks and signs of corrosion.
The vacuum pump (self-prime unit), where applicable, should be in good condition.
If applicable, the fuel supply tank should be adequately filled to run the pump at full load for at least 18
hours (3+1 Sh).
The fuel quick closing valve (if applicable) should be located outside the space and must operate correctly.
TMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems
that are not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requiremenb and
manufacturers' recommendations.
-
-
5.2.2. Were the Master, Officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose, testing and operation of the
vessel's fire dampers, the means of closing the main inlets and outlets of all ventilation systems and the
means of stopping the power ventilation systems from outside the space served?
••••
Question Category
Process)
Objective
Interview - Engineer Officer, Exterior Decks, Forecastle, Aft Mooring Deck, Emergency
ROVIQ Sequence
Headquarters, Interview - Rating.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview at least one Officer and one Rating to verify their familiarity, subject to their
normal operational and emergency duties, with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's fire
dampers, skylights, closing devices and remote fan stops.
All Officers and Ratings should be familiar with the required position of each closing device while conducting
cargo operations.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection
systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures which:
• Define the frequency of inspections, tests and maintenance of fire dampers, skylights, closing devices
and remote fan stops.
• Require the vessel to identify each closing device for ventilation inlets or outlets and determine whether
they should be open or closed while conducting cargo operations. This list will be reviewed by the
Inspector.
• Require each closing device for ventilation inlets or outlets to be marked with the required position,
either open or closed, while in port and conducting cargo operations.
When determining whether a closing device for ventilation inlet or outlets should be closed in port the
following should be considered:
• The potential build-up of flammable or explosive gas within a space.
• The potential build-up of heat from items such as laundry driers.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect a representative sample of ventilation closing devices found onboard and verify
that they are in good order, operating freely (manually and remotely) and clearly marked with:
• The spaces they serve.
• Their open/shut positions.
• Any required warning notices e.g. battery lockers.
• Their required position when conducting cargo operations.
The inspector wrll srght the remote stops for accommodation and machinery space fans to verrfy that the
items served by each remote stop are clearly identified.
Remote operated closing devices should not be inhibited or prevented from closing fully by any obstruction.
Access to closing devices or fan stops should be unobstructed.
TMSA KP! 3 .1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
equipment.

-- 5.2. Fixed Fire Protection
5.2.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's fixed
Systems
fire detection and fire alarm system, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected,
tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
,......., (Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
......... Objective To ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Electrician/ ETO, Bridge, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.
-- Verification by
-- Human The Inspector will interview the responsible Officer to verify their familiarity with:
• The purpose, operation and testing of the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system (relevant instructions
should be posted).
• Any delay in sounding the fire alarm programmed into the alarm system.
• Maintenance and testing of the fixed fire detection system, fire alarm system and appliances.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the operation and maintenance of the fixed fire
detection and fire alarm system which defines:
• The frequency of testing individual detectors.
• The method of testing different types of detectors.
• The frequency of testing any output signals to other fire safety systems.
• The frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms on the bridge or in the continuously manned
central control station.
• The actions to be taken to ensure safety is not diminished if a zone is isolated.
The Inspector will review inspection and testing data available at the central control station to verify that all tests
had been completed at the defined frequency and the emergency power supply had been verified as functional.
The main machinery spaces should not be operated in unattended mode with any zone or
detector in the space isolated.
Any areas not covered by the fire-detection system should require regular fire patrols. Where there is
evidence that fire rounds had been carried out during the hours of darkness by the designated bridge
lookout, the Inspector will address this issue under question 4.3.1.
-- Hardware The Inspector will inspect the central control station for the fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems to
verify that:
-
• The system is fully operational.
• The system is not indicating any faults.
-
• Where the spaces containing the fire alarm main or repeater control panels were not continuously
manned, there was no delay in sounding a fire alarm.
• Clear information is displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about the spaces covered and the
location of the sections.
• All zones and detectors are active unless a documented work process is taking place which requires the
temporary isolation of a zone or sensor.
.......... The Inspector will verify that the correct testing devices are available to test the types of detectors provided
onboard.
The Inspector may test randomly some sensors to verify their operational status (i.e.: purifier room,
incinerator, boiler, Diesel Generators, Galley).
TMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including contractors.
The documented procedures may include familiarisation with vessel-specific operations and equipment.
-

carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good working order and available for
immediate use, with the release procedure and operating instructions displayed at the control stations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
Objective the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Aft Mooring Deck, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with:

• The safety precautions for entering the CO2 space .
• The maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• The purpose and operation of the vessel's fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system.
Process If the CO2 bottle room is locked, a key to the door should be in a break-glass type enclosure conspicuously
located adjacent to the door.
Instructions for safe entry into the CO2 room should be posted at each entrance and should include, but
not be limited to:
• Starting the ventilation fan.
• Waiting for a set period before entering.
• The use of a personal gas monitor.
• Making notification of entry and exit.
The vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems,
firefighting systems and appliances which will include the fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing system
Hardware The Inspector will verify if:
• The machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system is defective in any respect.
• T he machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system is not ready for immediate use for
any reason, such as, branch pipes blanked, nozzles or control levers inhibited, etc.
• All cylinders are properly secured and their flexible pipes are not damaged or twisted.
equipment.

-
5.2.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's machinery
space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good working order,
-
available for immediate use, and with operating instructions clearly displayed at the control stations?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the purpose and
operation of the fixed high expansion foam fire extinguishing system.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection
systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
-
Process The operator should have developed procedures to require personnel re-entering the protected space after
a system discharge to wear breathing apparatus to protect them from oxygen-deficient air and products of
combustion entrained in the foam blanket.
The vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances which will include the fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing
system.
-
The first test of foam concentrates should be performed not more than three years after the date of
manufacture, and after that, every year. In addition, for protein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates,
a stability test should be performed prior to delivery to the ship and annually thereafter.
• The vessel's maintenance plan.
• The records of inspections (annual and five-yearly test).
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the spaces containing fixed high-expansion foam to verify that:
• The system and its components are not defective.
• The system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, are posted near the control
station. It is recommended that posted instructions include photos addressing the steps that should be
followed for the system's activation.
• The system valves are clearly identified and the system instructions indicate their required status in
standby and operational conditions, a copy of the foam concentrate annual test certificate indicating
that it is fit for continued use.
• Where the system also protects a cargo pump room, the foam contained in the tank is certified as
-
compatible with the cargo being carried.
• The foam tank is filled to the required level. It is recommended that the level indicator is operated
manually for the verification of proper quantity of foam concentrate.
• The condition of the foam pump and starter.
equipment.

5.2.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's
machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good
working order and available for immediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed at the control
stations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 rw��
000
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Engine Room, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose and operation of the fixed-pressure water-
spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist fire-extinguishing system.
He must also be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances.
He must further know the name and location of the dedicated FW tank used as system's suction. It is
recommended that the minimum level of the tank is stencilled on site.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems,
firefighting systems and appliances which should include the vessel's fixed-pressure water-spray or water-
mist extinguishing system. These records will be reviewed by the Inspector to verify that actions recorded
in the maintenance plan had in fact taken place.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the space(s) containing the fixed pressure water-spray equipment to verify that:
• The system and its components are not defective.
• The system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, are posted near the control
station. It is recommended that posted instructions include photos addressing the steps that should be
followed for system's activation.
• The system valves are clearly identified, and the system instructions indicate their required status in the
standby and operational conditions.
• The system is maintained at the correct pressure and ready for use (automatic mode).
• Inlet and outlet valves are correctly set.
• System nozzles are clean with no signs of defects.
TMSA KP! 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
equipment.

- 5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems
5.2.7. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's fire
pumps, fire main, fire main isolating valves and fire hydrants, and was the system and its components in
good working order and available for immediate use?
- Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
Objective
-
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Engine Room, Exterior Decks, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify their familiarity with the fire main system
with reference to:
• Starting the fire pumps.
,.._ • The purpose and location of the fire main isolating valves.
• The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck fire main.
The Inspector will request an accompanying crew member to randomly check the fire hydrants and fire
main isolating valves to ensure they operate freely and isolating.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and
-
maintenance of fire pumps, fire mains, isolating valves and hydrants which define:
• The frequency of inspection, testing and maintenance of the system and its components.
• The actions to be taken to ensure the ready availability of the systems in sub-zero temperatures.
The Inspector will review the vessel's maintenance plan and records of inspections for the fire mains, fire
pumps, isolating valves and hydrants to verify that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had in fact
taken place.
- Hardware The Inspector will:

• Witness the remote starting of a fire pump (usually emergency fire pump) from the bridge or fire
control station and verify that the pump reaches and maintains the required pressure while discharging
through the anchor washes or other outlet.
• Inspect the deck fire main, particularly on the underside, for external indications of corrosion and
for patching or accelerated wear caused by rope abrasion. They will also check fire lines within the
machinery space(s).
• Inspect the fire pumps and verify that the suction and delivery valves are open.
equipment.

5.2.8. Were the Master, Officers and galley staff familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the
fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems provided in the galley, were the systems in good working
order and available for immediate use, and were galley ranges, exhaust vents and filter cowls free of grease
or combustible material?
••••
Question Category
-
Process)
a
To ensure that the fire-protection measures provided in the galley are properly maintained
Objective and crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the
shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Galley Rating, Internal Accommodation.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers and galley staff.
Verification by
Human Galley staff should be trained on how to handle fires and how to respond appropriately. Training should
include how to operate fixed fire-extinguishing systems fitted to galley equipment. Appropriate fire
extinguishers and fire blankets should be available.
The Inspector will interview a member of the galley staff to verify their familiarity with the purpose and
operation of one or more of the following:
• The fixed fire-extinguishing system.
• The portable fire-extinguishing appliances.
• The ventilation system stopping and isolation process.
The accompanying Officer should be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection
Process Fires are often caused by unburnt fuel or fatty deposits that have collected in galley ranges, flue pipes and
filters. These areas should be regularly inspected to make sure they are clean. Oil and deep-fat fryers should
be fitted with thermostats to cut off electrical power and prevent accidental fires.
The use of portable stoves and cooking appliances on board tankers should be controlled and, when in
port, their use should be prohibited.
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure for maintaining fire safety in the galley which define:
• The frequency of inspections, tests and maintenance of fixed and portable fire-extinguishing systems,
fire dampers and fan stop switches fitted in the galley.
• The frequency of inspection and cleaning of galley ranges, within flue pipes and in the filter cowls of
galley vents.
• Clear instructions should be posted in the galley describing the use of the fixed fire-extinguishing
systems provided.

-
,..........
Hardware The Inspector will inspect vessel's galley to verify that:
• Fixed fire-extinguishing system and its components is not defective.
• Galley ranges are free of fat or other flammable material.
• Grease traps have been recently cleaned.
• Filter cowls of galley vents are free of accumulated fat or oil.
• Fire dampers are properly marked and free to operate.
• Fan stop activation points in or near the galley are clearly marked.
• The deep-fat fryer fixed fire-extinguishing systems fitted had been serviced in accordance with the
---, maintenance plan.
• The deep-fat fryer fixed fire-extinguishing nozzles are free of grease build up and were fitted with their
protective blow out caps if required by system design.
• Portable extinguishers and fire blankets are properly stowed and free from obstructions.
• Fire doors and serving hatch shutters are free to close automatically, if so designed, otherwise are closed
except for when in use.
• There is no evidence that deep-fat frying has been taking place in open pans or fryers not fitted with a
-
fixed fire-extinguishing system.
• Fire detectors should not be inhibited or disabled.
equipment.

5.2.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the water-spray
system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck, and was the equipment in good working
order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
0 0 0
1W1W1�
Verification by

• The location, purpose and operation of the vessel's water spray system for cooling, fire prevention and
crew protection on deck.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.
• The operation of isolation valves and stop valves.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the purpose and
operation of the water spray system with reference to:
• Starting the pumps.
• The purpose and location of the isolating valves and stop valves.
• The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck piping.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems
and firefighting systems and appliances which should include the water-spray system for cooling, fire
prevention and crew protection on deck. Maintenance tasks may include:
• Periodic removal of the installed orifice plates and piping end caps and flushing any debris from the system.
• Cleaning the in-line filters.
• Flushing the system with fresh water.
• Drying the system to prevent internal corrosion.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the space(s) containing the remote controls for the water-spray system for
cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck, to verify that:
• The operating instructions for the water-spray system are posted at the control station.
• Access to the system controls is not obstructed.
• The system valves and controls are properly marked or set.
• Stop valves or isolating valves are operating freely.
• The stop valves or isolating valves are clearly marked.
• There is no evidence of clogged nozzles.
• There is no hard rust, deterioration or temporary repairs to the system pipework.
• The maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances
includes the vessel's water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck and
all the required inspections, tests and maintenance records are available.
• There is evidence that orifice plates or piping end caps had been removed and pipework flushed
through to clear debris or scale from the system.
• The water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck is not defective in any
respect.

,.........
5.2.10. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the fixed fire
extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment, and was
the equipment in good working order and available for immediate use, with the release procedure and
operating instructions displayed at the control stations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
,.........
0 rwrw1u
000
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Compressor Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
-
operation of the system, the maintenance plan and the safety precautions for entering the bottle space
(i.e. C07 room).
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of
the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment
that include:
• A description of the fixed fire-extinguishing system, its components, and its functions.
• Instructions for the operation of the fixed fire extinguishing system.
• A maintenance plan.
The above may form part of the cargo system operation manual and the ship's maintenance plan.
If the control station or release cabinet door is locked, a key to the door shall be in a break-glass-type
enclosure conspicuously located adjacent to the door.
-
Instructions for safe entry into the bottle space should be posted at each entrance and should include, but
not be limited to:
• Starting the ventilation fan.
-
• Waiting for a set period before entering.
• The use of a personal gas monitor.
• Notifying the OOW of entry into, and exit from, the space.
- The entrances to the enclosed space containing cargo-handling equipment e.g., compressor room or
motor room, should be marked with a notice indicating the space is protected by a fixed fire-extinguishing
system.
-
Where a CO 2 system is installed, a notice should be exhibited at the controls stating that, due to the
electrostatic ignition hazard, the system is to be used only for fire extinguishing and not for inerting purposes.
Hardware The fixed fire-extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment
should:
• Not be defective in any respect and to be ready for immediate use.
-
Note: On CO2 systems there are 'pins' in the activation assembly, and traditionally, these pins had to be
removed for the: �ystem w be ready for lmmet/fdle u:se. on some moaern systems, these ·pms' have to be
left 'in' for the system to be ready for immediate use. When inspecting CO2 systems, the Inspector should
determine from the accompanying Officer whether the pins should be 'in' or 'out' for the system to be ready
for immediate use. If in any doubt, reference should be made to the manufacturer's operating instructions.
TMSA KP! 3.1 .4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including contractors.

dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment in good working order and readily
available for immediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed at the control stations.
Question Category
••••
Process)
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Cargo Manifold, Main Deck.
Verification by

operation of the cargo area fixed dry chemical powder extinguishing system.
Process The Inspector will review:
• The operation instructions for the system posted near the operational controls and verify that the
system valves and controls are correctly marked.
• The inspection and servicing data available at the control stations.
• The records of inspections, test and maintenance carried out in PMS.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the components and operational controls of the cargo area fixed dry chemical
powder fire-extinguishing system to verify that they are in good order.
T MSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
equipment.

-
- 5.2.12. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the fixed fire
extinguishing system in the vessel's paint locker and any other flammable liquid locker, and was the system
-
in good working order and available for immediate use?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
Objective
-
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Exterior Decks.
Verification by
- Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the purpose and
operation of the fixed fire-extinguishing system in a paint or other flammable liquid locker.
- Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to manage the storage of paint and flammable
liquids which defines:
• The locations in which paints and other flammable liquids should be stored under normal circumstances.
• The locations where bulk paint or flammable liquids may be stored when the designated lockers are of
-
insufficient capacity in circumstances, such as onboard maintenance programmes utilising riding teams.
• The requirement that paints and flammable liquids must be stored in closed containers.
Note: SOLAS requirements do not apply to cargo sample lockers positioned within the cargo area.
• The vessel's maintenance plan for vessel's fire-protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
• The records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the paint or flammable liquid locker
fixed fire-extinguishing systems.
• No proper instructions for the activation of fixed fire-extinguishing system are posted outside the paint
store.
• Paints or flammable liquids are found stored in lockers or locations not designed to contain flammable
liquids.
• Paints or flammable liquids are stored in open containers.
-
• The maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances
do not include the fixed fire-extinguishing system for paint and flammable liquid lockers or all the
required inspections, tests and maintenance plans.
• There is no maintenance plan for the vessel's available fire-protection systems and firefighting systems
and appliances.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out are incomplete.
• Inspection of the fixed fire-extinguishing system indicates that actions recorded in the plan had not in
-
fact taken place .
• Storage of items in a paint or flammable liquids locker prevents the proper functioning of the fire
extinguishing system provided, for example, stored paint tins are stacked above the level of water spray
nozzles.
• Access to the controls of a paint or flammable liquid locker fire-extinguishing system is obstructed.
• The fixed fire-extinguishing system for the paint locker, or any other flammable liquids locker, is defective
in any respect.

5.2.13. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the machinery
space fixed water-based or equivalent local application fire-fighting system, and was the equipment in
good working order and readily available for immediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed
at the control stations?
••••
Question Category
a
Process)
Objective
the shipboard emergency plan
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by
-
Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the purpose,
operation and required release mode of the fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system whilst
the machinery space is operated in both attended and unattended modes.
The accompanying Officer should be familiar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection
Process Where the vessel is fitted with a fixed water-based or equivalent local application fire-fighting system,
the company should have developed a procedure to define when the system is required to be set to the
automatic release mode, where this is an option, and should include whenever the machinery space is
operated in the unattended mode. The Inspector will review the relevant procedures.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the components of the fixed water-based local application firefighting system
and verify that
• The system operating instructions are posted at the contr0I stations in the operating language of the
ship.
• The water supply valves are open to the system.
• The dedicated tank serving the system is fitted with a low-level alarm or marked with the minimum
required level.
• All manual branch supply valves are open and marked or colour-coded to identify the location they
protect.
• The control panel is powered and set for automatic and/or remote operation.
• The local release stations near to the protected equipment are clearly marked as to their purpose.
• The remote monitoring/control panels in the wheelhouse and other locations are powered on with all
smoke, flame and heat detectors active.
equipment.

-
- 5.2.14. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump
temperature sensing devices, and was there evidence that alarm activation points had been correctly set
and tested in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
- Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that measures specifically designed to prevent fires in the cargo pump room
-
are effective.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Room, Pumproom.
Verification by
-
Practical Guidelines (S.2.14)
Human The Officer in Charge of the cargo operations must be able to identify the temperature sensing device
-
alarm indicator in the cargo control room.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with:
• The actions required in the event of a high temperature alarm activation.
-
• The operation of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.
• The alarm activation settings of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.
Process The Inspector will:
• Review the Company procedures which define the requirements for the operation and maintenance of
the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing devices.
• Review the records of cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing device readings and verify
that the records had been maintained for pumps in operation.
• Review the inspection and testing data for the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensor
monitoring system and verify that:
- the required sensor checks, and tests had been completed at the frequency defined by the company,
- the alarm activation set points had been confirmed.
• Review the process in place to record and assess the readings provided by the temperature sensing
devices fitted to pumps in operation.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensor monitoring system
panel and verify that:
• The temperature monitoring system is fully operational.
• The system is not displaying any faults or obviously erroneous readings.
• The temperature indicated by sensors from different pumps in a similar service are indicating a similar
-
reading.
• The alarm activation settings are displayed for each sensor point.
• The alarm activation set point for one temperature sensing device is demonstrated to be correctly set
(if safe and practical to do).
While in pumproom the Inspector will:
• Inspect one cargo, ballast or stripping pump and verify that the temperature sensing devices are
-
connected at the appropriate locations.
• Verify that no temporary cooling dt:vice::. are rigged on any cargu, ballast or smpptng pump.
• Verify that there is no leakage of cargo, either in the form of a spray or liquid, from the cargo or
-
stripping pump mechanical seals.
TMSA KPI 3.1 .4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including contractors.
.........

5.2.15. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel's deck
foam system, including portable applicators, and was the system in good working order and available for
immediate use, with operating instructions displayed at the control station?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Emergency Headquarters.
Verification by

operation of the deck foam system with reference to:
• Extinguishing spill fires.
• Precluding ignition of spilt oil, not yet ignited.
• Combating fires in ruptured tanks.
The Inspector will interview a Rating and verify their familiarity with the operation and use of foam
applicators and foam monitors.
• Inspection and servicing data available in the space.
• The records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the maintenance plan,
including:
- the annual foam concentrate test results
- the five-yearly test of foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices.
-
• Where the foam concentrate is not effective, or incompatible with the cargo being carried, establish
what additional arrangements are provided and that they had been verified as being to the satisfaction
of the Administration.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the space(s) containing the deck foam system foam concentrate tanks(s), pump(s)
and the system controls and verify that:
• The system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship , are posted near the control
station.
• The system valves are clearly identified, and the system instructions indicate their required status in the
standby and operational conditions.
• A copy of the foam concentrate annual test certificate indicate that it is fit for continued use.
• The foam contained in the tank is certified as compatible with the cargo being carried.
• The foam tank is filled to the required level.
• The deck main and/or foam main, monitors, applicators and isolating valves are in full working order.
• A sample of isolatinq valves and monitors to verify that they are free to move through their full range
(where safe to do so).
equipment.

5.2.16. Were the Master, Officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose, testing and operation of the
vessel's fire doors?
Question Category
••••
- (Hardware-Human
Process)
- Objective
-
Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engine Rating, Engine Room, Forecastle, Internal
ROVIQ Sequence
Accommodation.
Verification by
-
Practical Guidelines (S.2.16)
Human The Inspector will interview an Officer and a Rating to verify their familiarity with the location, purpose and
-
operation of the vessel's fire doors.
Process
-
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure which defines the frequency of inspections, tests
and maintenance for fire doors.
• The records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out in the maintenance plan.
• The Fire Control Plan to verify the required specification of a fire door.
Hardware The Inspector should be aware that local operation of a fire door may be affected if air-conditioning is still
operating during a test.
The Inspector will inspect a sample of fire doors throughout the accommodation, machinery and storage
spaces and verify that:
• They are free of obstructions.
• No non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other arrangements are used
to hold the door open where they are required to be self-closing.
-
• Self-closing arrangements close and latch the door without the need for human intervention.
• The door and frame are free of corrosion or wastage.
• There are no inappropriate cable penetrations through the door, its frame or surrounding bulkheads.
-
• There are no inappropriate alterations or modifications.
• There are no gaps between the fire door and frame.
• There is no damage to the lock mechanism, strike plate or hinges preventing the door closing properly.
• There is no damage to the door packing or frame.
- TMSA
• There are no punctures in the outer skin of the door.
KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
-
equipment.
--

Practical Guidance for the maintenance and inspection of firefighting appliances

Operational Readiness
All fire-protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate
use while the ship is in service. If a fire-protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable
arrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable
fire-protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this purpose.
Maintenance and testing

Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan. Certain
maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by those crew members who have completed an advanced
fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in the maintenance of such
systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recor:nmended inspections and maintenance
are to be completed by trained personnel.
Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, two year,
five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections should be
carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where inspections and maintenance are carried out by
trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the completion of the
testing.
In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturers' maintenance and
inspection guidelines should be followed. Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing
and maintenance procedures should be to the satisfaction of the Administration. These guidelines set out requirements
applicable to breathing apparatus for:
• weekly tests and inspections.
• annual tests and inspections.
• five-year hydrostatic testing and firefighters' outfits for:
• monthly tests and inspections.

5.3. Portable Firefighting Appliances
.......
- 5.3.1. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the location and use of the vessel's firefighters'
outfits, including the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and was the equipment maintained in
good condition and ready for immediate use in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that crew members can respond effectively to a fire or enclosed space rescue
situation in accordance with the shipboard emergency plans.
ROVIQ Sequence Steering Gear, Forecastle, Emergency Headquarters.
- Verification by

- Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the use and
-
maintenance of the SCBA and compressor with reference to:
• Full cylinder endurance.
• Correct cylinder filling pressure.
-
• Cylinder changing and recharging.
• Hygiene requirements.
• The process of filling the SCBA bottles with the onboard compressor, where provided.
-
• The maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
The Inspector will request that an Officer or Rating demonstrates:
• The donning of the SCBA and the safety checks required prior to entering a hazardous environment.
• The test for equipment air leaks.
• The testing of the mask seal with the face.
• The testing of the low air alarm.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the use and maintenance of firefighters' outfits
and self-contained breathing apparatus which define:
• The frequency and method of inspection and testing of the equipment; the Inspector will verify that
SCBAs and the spare bottles are serviced, and pressure tested in accordance with the maintenance
- plan.
should include the firefighters' outfits, SCBA and breathing air compressor or all the required inspections,
tests and maintenance.
,........ • Use of the compressor for recharging cylinders, where fitted.
-
• The provision of two-way portable radiotelephone apparatus for each fire party for firefighter's
communication.
Although SOLAS recommends 'widely separated positions', firefighting training advocates that breathing
-
apparatus should be used by personnel in pairs.
Annual inspections should be carried out to ensure that the air quality of breathing apparatus air recharging
systems is satisfactory.
- The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the inspection of the firefitters' outfits, SCBA or breathing
air compressor 111atcate tnat actions recoraea 1n the plan (or last service) ad not in tact taken place.
The Inspector will review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the
maintenance plan.
Continues overleaf ...
-
-

• The firefighters' suits or SCBAs are not stored in the correct location in accordance with the fire plan;
(unless they are in position for cargo operations in accordance with company procedures).
• The firefighters' outfits are incomplete or defective in any respect.
• The SCBAs and firefighters' outfits are not prepared for immediate use with a fully charged bottle
and the required spare bottle(s) - it is recommended air cylinders (including the spare ones) should be
always filled not less than 91 % of their maximum working pressure.
• An SCBA is defective in any respect.
• The electric safety lamps are not explosion proof type 1.
• Insufficient intrinsically safe two-way portable radios are available for the number of fire teams indicated
on the muster list.
• Not all SCBA cylinders are fully interchangeable.
• The harness and facemasks are not extended for ease of donning.
If the vessel is provided with a breathing air compressor, the Inspector will verify that:
• A usage log is being maintained.
• It has been serviced and inspected in accordance with the maintenance plan.
• A process is in place to test the air quality at a defined interval.
• Compressor air filters are in good condition and spare cartridges are available onboard.
• Where bottles of different pressures are to be filled, detailed instructions for preventing of overfilling of
bottles are available and understood.
equipment.
-
- 5.3. Portable Firefighting Appliances
- 5.3.2. Were the Master, Officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's
fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connection, and was the equipment in good working order and
available for immediate use?
- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
....... Objective
To ensure that crew members can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance
with the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Anywhere, Interview- Rating.
--
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• The accompanying Officer or/and interviewed rating was not familiar with the purpose and operation
of the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections.
• The accompanying Officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection
-
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the inspection, testing and maintenance of fire
hoses, nozzles and international shore connections which define the:
• Frequency of inspection and testing.
• Frequency of pressure testing of fire hoses.
• Replacement criteria for damaged or worn hoses.
-
does not include the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections or all the required
-
inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out are incomplete.
• Inspection of the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections indicate that actions recorded
in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• Fire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections are missing from the locations shown on the fire
control plan unless laid out for cargo or bunker operations.
• Fire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections are not ready for immediate use.
• Fire hoses are either less than 1 Om in length or longer than the maximum permitted for their location.
• The required gaskets, nuts, washers or recommended spanners are missing from the international
shore connection(s) storage location.
• An inspected fire hose, nozzle or international shore connection is found to be defective in any respect.
-
• A random sample of fire hydrants, washers and their connection mechanics are not functioning.
equipment.
comments/5MS Reference
-
-
5.3.3. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's
portable fire extinguishers, and were the extinguishers in good order and readily available for immediate
use with operating instructions clearly marked?
••••
Question Category
Process)
Objective
with the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Anywhere.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the inspection and maintenance plan for portable fire
extinguishers.
• An interviewed Officer or Rating is unfamiliar with the use and/or operation of a portable fire
extinguisher.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• Fire extinguishers are not included in the maintenance plan for fire-protection systems and firefighting
systems and appliances.
• Inspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on fire extinguishers are
incomplete.
• Inspection of an extinguisher indicates that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact
taken place.
• Inspection of the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections indicate that actions recorded
in the plan had not in fact taken place.
• Fire extinguisher(s) are missing or not located as shown in the Fire Control Plan.
• The fire control plan does not comply with MSC.1/Circ.1275 with regards to the distribution of fire
extinguishers.
• Fire extinguisher(s) are not fully charged.
• Fire extinguisher(s) are not readily available for immediate use.
• Fire extinguisher(s) are not clearly marked with the information required by A. 951(23) 8.1.
• Fire extinguisher(s) are not marked with the date of onboard inspection or annual survey.
• In-service fire extinguishers(s) are found to be defective in any respect.
• There are insufficient spare charges or extra extinguishers.
If the vessel is trading in an ice region, the lowest operational temperature of the extinguishers used at
manifolds should be below zero.
TM!;A KPI 3.1 .11 ri;;,quiri;;,s that fnrm.:.I f.:.mili.:.risation orocedures are in place for vessel personnel, includinq
equipment.

-
5.3. Portable Firefighting Appliances
- 5.3.4. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the location and purpose of the Emergency Escape
Breathing Devices (EEBDs) carried on board, and were these devices in good order, suitably located and
ready for immediate use?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that EEBDs are readily available to personnel in the event of a fire or any other
-
emergency on the vessel.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Pumproom, Internal Accommodation, Interview - Rating.
- Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the location, inspection and maintenance of the EEBDs.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the location and purpose of the EEBDs.
Process On all ships, within the machinery spaces EEBDs shall be situated ready for use at easily visible places,
-
which can be reached quickly and easily at any time in the event of fire. The location of emergency escape
breathing devices shall take into account the layout of the machinery space and the number of persons
normally working in the spaces.
Unless personnel are individually carrying EEBDs, consideration should be given for placing such devices
along the escape routes within the machinery spaces or at the foot of each escape ladder within the space.
In addition, control spaces and workshops located within the machinery spaces should also be considered
-
for the possible location of such devices.
• There are no company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs.
• EEBD(s) used for training are not clearly marked.
-
• The EEBDs (and spares) are not positioned in accordance with the fire control plan.
• There are fewer spare EEBDs onboard than indicated on the fire control plan.
• An inspected EEBD is found to be defective in any respect, including:
o the cylinder pressure is outside the normal range
o the unit is passed its expiry date
- o the donning instructions cannot be read

o the unit is not marked with its maintenance requirements, manufacturer's trademark and serial
-
number, shelf life (expiry date) with accompanying manufacture date and name of approving
authority.
• EEBD(s) had not been inspected and maintained according to the company procedures and
manufacturer's instructions.
• Rechargeable EEBD cylinders had not been hydrostatically tested at the required interval.
-
t=quiµrnent.

5.3.5. Were the Master, Officers and engine Ratings familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel's
wheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers, and was the equipment in good order and available for immediate use
with operating instructions clearly marked?
Question Category
•@oe
Process)
Objective with the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Interview - Engine Rating.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers and Engine Ratings.
-
Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the inspection and maintenance plan for wheeled fire
extinguishers.
• An interviewed Engineer Officer or Rating is unfamiliar with the use and/or operation of a wheeled fire
extinguisher.
• Inspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on wheeled fire extinguishers are
incomplete.
• Inspection of a wheeled fire extinguisher indicate that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had
not in fact taken place.
A wheeled fire extinguisher(s) is not:
• fully charged
• readily available for immediate use
• marked with the required information
• marked with the date of onboard inspections or servicing
• included in the maintenance plan for fire-protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.
A wheeled fire extinguisher(s) is:
• missing or not located as shown in the fire control plan
• defective in any respect - there are insufficient spare charges
• not properly secured.
contractors.

-
5.4. Lifesaving Appliances
Practical Guidance for the maintenance and inspection of life-saving appliances

IMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational
-
testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear.
Weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance as specified in the equipment maintenance manual(s), shall
be conducted by authorised service providers, or by shipboard personnel under the direction of a senior ship's Officer in
accordance with the maintenance manual(s).
Thorough annual examinations and operational tests, as described in section 6.2, shall be conducted by certified personnel
of either the manufacturer or an authorised service provider in accordance with section 7 and section 8.
The service provider may be the ship operator provided that it is authorised in accordance with section 3 and section 7.
- Thorough five-year examinations, any overhaul, overload operational tests, as described in section 6.3, as well as repairs,
shall be conducted by certified personnel of either the manufacturer or an authorised service provider in accordance with
section 7 and section 8.
-
Reports and records
All reports and checklists shall be completed and signed by the person who carries out the inspection and maintenance
work and countersigned by the Company's representative or the ship's Master.
Records of maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be updated and filed on
board the ship for the service life of the equipment.
- When thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair are completed, a statement confirming that the
lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose shall be promptly issued by the manufacturer or authorised service provider
that conducted the work. A copy of valid documents of certification and authorisation as appropriate shall be included
with the statement.
Specific Procedures for Inspection, Maintenance, Thorough Examination, Operational Testing, Overhaul and
,........, Repair
Any inspection, maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be carried out
according to the maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation developed by the manufacturer.
A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation as specified in paragraph 6.1.1 shall be
available on board.
,.......
-
5.4.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the davit-launched lifeboats, release
mechanisms and launching appliances, and were they in good order with records available to demonstrate
that they had been inspected and tested as required?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances will be ready for
Objective immediate use in an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will select several items from the monthly inspection checklist required by SOLAS 111/36 and
verify that the accompanying Officer is familiar with how the checks and tests are performed.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the required
inspection and testing of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the lifeboats, release
mechanisms and launching appliances are incomplete.
• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the lifeboats, release mechanisms
and launching appliances are incomplete .
• There are no checklists as required by SOLAS 111/36 available for the inspection of the lifeboats, release
mechanisms and launching appliances.
• Records indicate the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five years.
• There are no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the on-load release mechanism,
with a suitably worded warning notice.
• There are no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine mounted in a conspicuous
place near the engine starting controls. The use of emergency steering gear should also be addressed.
• Inspection of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances indicate that actions recorded
in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• A lifeboat is not marked as required.
• The on-load release control is not clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its surroundings.
• Items of lifeboat equipment are damaged, missing or improperly stowed.
• A lifeboat engine would not start when tested; it could not be demonstrated that the gearbox and
gearbox train are engaging satisfactorily.
• Indicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, is not with the normal range.
• The pressurised air hoses of the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, are in poor condition.
• Nozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, are clogged by salt and/or scale.
• The launching appliance gearcase breather vent is blocked or painted over.
• Lifeboat davit limit switches are not operating freely.
• The lifeboat falls or gripes are in poor condition.
• The lifeboats and launching appliances and their locations are not marked with the required symbols.
• Lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances are defective in any respect.
TMSA
-
KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety
-

.......,
5.4.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems
and its launching appliance, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition with records available to
demonstrate that it had been inspected and tested in accordance with company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release system and launching appliance will be ready
for immediate use in an emergency.
,........ Tagged Rank Master and Officers.
Verification by
-
,........... Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the operation and required inspection of the free-fall
lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment.
• The accompanying Officer cannot demonstrate the operation of lifeboat engine and emergency
-
steering gear.
The Inspector will select several items from the monthly inspection checklist required by SOLAS 111/36 and
verify that the accompanying Officer was familiar with how the checks or tests were performed.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure the free-fall lifeboat. its release systems,
launching appliance and recovery equipment are periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate
use in an emergency.
• There is no company procedure to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance
and recovery equipment are periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an
emergency.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the free-fall lifeboat, its release
systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment are incomplete.
• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the free-fall lifeboat. its release
systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment are incomplete.
• There are no checklists as required by SOLAS 111/36 available for the inspection of the free-fall lifeboat.
its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment.
• Records indicate the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five years.
• The lifeboat is not marked as required.
• There are no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the release system.
• The release system is not adequately protected against accidental or premature release.
• The release system is not clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its surroundings.
• Items of lifeboat equipment are damaged, missing or improperly stowed.
-
• The locking seat harnesses are not in good order.
• The lifeboat engine would not start.
• Thorc <:>re no wotc,-rc::,i::,tonl ;, 1:,ll U\..lion:> fu, :>ldl Lifl� drld operating Lt1e engine mounted 1n a conspicuous
place near the engine starting controls.
-
• When tested, it cannot be demonstrated that the lifeboat gearbox and gearbox train are engaging
satisfactorily.
• Indicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, is not within the normal range.
• Nozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, are clogged by salt and/or scale.
-
• Recovery limit switches, if fitted, are not operating freely.


Continued... • The means provided to secure the lifeboat in the stowed position are in poor condition.
• The free-fall lifeboat is not properly secured in the stowed position.
• Safety/maintenance chains or pins are still in place.
• Hydraulic hoses appear to be in poor condition.
• The rollers and/or skid ramp appear to be in poor condition.
• The free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment are not marked
with the required symbols.
• Inspection of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment
indicate that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.
• The free-fall lifeboat. its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment are defective in
any respect.

- 5.4. Lifesaving Appliances
5.4.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the dedicated rescue boat and launching
appliance, and were they in good order with records available to demonstrate that they had been inspected
and tested as required?
- Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure the rescue boat will be ready for immediate use in an emergency.
-
Verification by
- Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the operation and required inspection of the rescue boat
-
and launching appliance.
The Inspector will request the accompanying Officer to:
• Start the rescue boat engine and engage the drive.
• Demonstrate that the launching appliance can be slewed manually and/or by reserve power.
- Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the rescue boat and launching appliance
are periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections and.routine maintenance of the rescue boat and launching
appliance are incomplete.
• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the rescue boat and launching
appliance are incomplete.
• A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation for the rescue boat and
launching appliance are not available on board.
• Inspection of the rescue boat and launching appliances indicate that actions recorded in the maintenance
plan had not in fact taken place.
• There is no checklist available for the inspection of the rescue boat and launching appliance.
,......., • Emergency repairs had been made to an inflatable rescue boat on board and were pending permanent
repair at an approved servicing station.
- • The rescue boat is not in a state of continuous readiness, for instance, an inflatable rescue boat is not
fully inflated.
• Items of rescue boat equipment are damaged, missing or improperly stowed.
• The rescue boat engine would not start.
--, • Engine cooling system is not operational (for outboard engines).
• There are no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine mounted in a conspicuous
place near the engine starting controls.
• When tested, it cannot be demonstrated that the gearbox and gearbox train are engaging satisfactorily.
• The rescue boat launching device could not be slewed manually or by reserve power in accordance with
its operating instructions.
• The rescue boat or its launching device are defective in any respect.
• The rescue boat and launching appliance and their locations are not marked with the required symbols.
-
--
5.4.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the rocket parachute
flares and line throwing appliances and were they in good order, with records available to demonstrate that
had they had been inspected as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure the rocket parachute flares and line-throwing appliances will function correctly
Objective
in an emergency.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of the rocket parachute flares
and line-throwing appliances.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the required inspection of the rocket parachute flares and
line-throwing appliances.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line
throwing appliances are periodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency. The lines
and rockets of line-throwing appliances should not be stowed apart. Self-contained line throwing units are
often disassembled for transporting to the vessel. Inspectors will check to ensure that the equipment has
been reassembled and rockets correctly positioned ready for immediate use.
• There is no company procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line-throwing appliances are
periodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
• Records of periodic inspections of the rocket parachute flares and line-throwing appliances are
incomplete.
• There are insufficient rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances on board.
• The stowage location(s) of rocket parachute flares and line-throwing appliances are not clearly marked
with the recommended sy mbols and the number of devices stowed there.
• Rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances are not stowed on or near the bridge.
• The stowage of rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances is not water or weatherproof as
required.
-
• Rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances are not clearly marked with brief operating
instructions.
• Any of the following is past their expiry date:
o rocket parachute flares
o line-throwing rockets
o rocket lines.
• Rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances are not ready for immediate use, e.g. rockets and
lines are stowed apart. l-..
• There is no table of lifesaving signals on the bridge.
• Any one of the rocket parachute flares or line-throwing appliances is defective in any respect.
-
150 Seafa_rers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

- 5.4. Lifesaving Appliances
- 5.4.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation of the life rafts, hydrostatic releases and
life raft launching appliances, where provided, and were they in good order with records available to
demonstrate that they had been serviced, inspected and tested as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that life rafts, hydrostatic releases and, life raft launching appliances, where
,......., Objective fitted, will function correctly in an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the operation and required servicing of the life rafts,
hydrostatic releases, and life raft launching appliances, where provided.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that life rafts, hydrostatic releases,
-
and life raft launching appliances, where provided, are periodically inspected and tested and ready for
immediate use in an emergency.
-
• Servicing of life rafts, hydrostatic releases and life raft launching appliances (where fitted) by an
authorised service station had not been completed at the required interval.
• Records of weekly and monthly inspections of life rafts, hydrostatic releases and, life raft launching
-
appliances, where provided, were incomplete.
• There is insufficient life raft capacity for the number of people on board.
• A life raft is not in a state of continuous readiness in any respect except where the life rafts had been
removed for shore servicing after arrival in port and would be replaced before departure.
• A life raft, other than a remotely located survival craft, is not capable of floating free from the ship.
-
• Life rafts are not stowed so as to allow manual release of one raft or container at a time.
• A life raft painter is not permanently attached to the ship.
• The rigging of a hydrostatic release unit is not in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
• A non-disposable hydrostatic release unit is not marked, or had not been serviced, as required.
• A disposable hydrostatic release unit was not marked with, or was past, its expiry date.
• A life raft is not marked, or had not been serviced, as required.
• A life raft embarkation ladder is not provided as required or is in poor condition.
• A life raft launching appliance, where provided, is defective in any respect.
• A remotely stowed life raft is not provided with illumination (connected to emergency circuit) or, an
embarkation ladder or other means of embarkation.
-
• Where a remotely stowed life raft is provided with self-contained battery lamps as the required means
of illumination, there is no evidence that recent tests had confirmed that the lamp would provide three
hours of undiminished performance.
• There are no h;:incihnlrk to i:>n<:urQ s:afo p.is:s:.igG from the deck to the hc.:,d of on emborkotion lodder
.;i
and vice versa.
-
-
5.4.6. Were the lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines, in good order, clearly marked
and correctly distributed around the ship?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that life rafts, hydrostatic releases and, life raft launching appliances, where
Objective
fitted, will function correctly in an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer and/or the Safety Officer must be familiar with the required maintenance and
inspection of the lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines.
Process The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that lifebuoys, and associated lights,
smoke floats and lifelines, are in good order, clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship.
Lifebuoy self-igniting lights do not need to be intrinsically safe if located outside of the gas hazardous area.
However, there must be strict controls in place to avoid those non-intrinsically safe lights being misplaced
into the gas hazardous zone. This may include highlighting or marking of those non-intrinsically safe lights
or other appropriate means .
• Records of inspections and maintenance carried out are incomplete.
• Inspection of the lifebuoys indicate that recorded inspections and maintenance had not taken place.
• There are:
o Less than the required number of lifebuoys
o An insufficient number of lifebuoys with lights
o A lifebuoy fitted with both light and lifeline
o No lifebuoy on either side with a buoyant lifeline of the required length.
• Lifebuoys are not readily available on both sides of the ship, on each open deck or in the vicinity of the
stern.
• Lifebuoy stowage locations are not clearly marked with the approved symbols.
• Lifebuoys are:
o Not marked with retro-reflective tape
o Not clearly marked with the ship's name and port of registry
o Secured in their brackets and not ready for immediate use
o Fitted with defective self-igniting lights
o Fitted with self-igniting lights not of an electric battery type
o Fitted with a non-intrinsically safe light when located within the gas hazardous area of the vessel.
• A self-activatinq smoke float is past its expiry date.
• The self-activating smoke float quick release mechanism is not operating freely.
• A lifebuoy attached to a self-activating smoke float is less than 4kg.
• Lifebuoys, associated lights, smoke floats or lifelines are defective in any respect.

--
5.4. 7. Were the Master, Officers and ratings familiar with the immersion suits, and were the immersion suits
in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that all life-saving appliances are in working order and ready for immediate use.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Forecastle, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by
- Human

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the required inspection and tests required to be carried out
for the immersion suits in accordance with the company procedures.
• An interviewed Officer or Rating is not familiar with the instructions for donning an immersion suit.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that immersion suits are in good order,
readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.
The procedure should include guidance on:
-- • The number, type and sizes of immersion suit provided on board.

• The location(s) and stowage of the immersion suits.
• Monthly inspections.
• Periodic air-pressure testing both before and after an immersion suit reaches ten years in service.
• Records of inspections and air-pressure tests carried out are incomplete.
• Inspection of the immersion suits indicated that recorded inspections and tests had not taken place.
• An immersion suit of an appropriate size is not provided for each person on board.
• The stowage location(s) of immersion suits are not clearly marked, including the number of suits in that
location, with the recommended symbols.
• Immersion suits of an appropriate number are not provided at the location of the forward life raft or
any other required remote location.
• Immersion suits are not readily accessible.
-
• Donning instructions are not legible.
• Immersion suits do not match the description on their storage bags - size, type, etc.
• There is visible damage to immersion suits, e.g. failed seams, detached zips. Immersion suit zippers do
not slide up and down easily or are not functional.
• Retro-reflective tape is in poor condition or missing.
• Whistles, if fitted, are missing or damaged.
-
• Lights, if fitted, are missing or past their battery expiry date.
• If required, immersion suits are not clearly marked to show that a lifejacket must be worn.
• If required, immersion suits are not clearly marked to show that warm clothing must be worn under the
suit.
If suits are vacuum-packed:
• Packaging is damaged and/or vacuum lost.
-
• There are no loose immersion suits available for training purposes.
• Air-pressure tests has not been performed either to manufacturer's instructions or at intervals not
exceeding three years, or more frequently for suits over ten years of age.
-
One or more immersion suits is defective in any respect.

5.4.8. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the lifejackets and personal flotation devices
(PFDs) provided on board, and was the equipment in good condition, and properly maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that all life-saving appliances are in working order and ready for immediate use.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Forecastle, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets
required by SOLAS are in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.
• An interviewed rating is not familiar with the company procedures for the use of "working lifejackets".
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS' are
in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.
Procedures should also provide guidance for the use of "working lifejackets" (also known as workvests,
continuous use lifejackets or PFDs), including the servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.
• There are no company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS are in good order,
readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.
• There is no company procedure providing guidance on the use of "working lifejackets". including the
servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried. If more than one type of lifejackets is provided, relevant
guidance should cover all different types.
• Records of monthly inspections carried out are incomplete.
• Records of annual servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried, are incomplete.
• Inspection of the lifejackets indicate that recorded inspections and servicing had not taken place.
• "Working lifejackets" are not available for when crew members are carrying out work overside or in an
exposed position where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of falling or being washed overboard, or
where work is being carried out in or from a ship's boat.
• The lifejackets required by SOLAS, as provided, are not suitable for the type of lifeboat installed.
• The stowage locations of lifejackets are not clearly marked, including the number of lifejackets in that
location, with the recommended symbols.
• Lifejackets of an appropriate number are not provided on the bridge, in the engine room, at the
location of the forward life-raft or any other required remote location.
• Lifejackets are not readily accessible.
• The retro-reflective tape required to be fitted on lifejackets is in poor condition or missing.
• Lifejacket whistles are missing or damaged.
• Lifejacket lights are missing or past their battery expiry date.
• Releasable buoyant lines, if fitted, are missing or defective.
• Means to lift the wearer of the lifejacket, if fitted, are missing or defective.
• One or more lifejacket is defective in any respect.

5.4.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the periodic testing and
maintenance of the emergency lighting system, was there evidence of periodic testing, and was the system
in proper operating condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the emergency lighting system will operate correctly in the event of a loss
Objective
of primary power and lighting.
Interview- Electrician/ ETO, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Pumproom, Forecastle, Mooring
ROVIQ Sequence
Decks, Lifeboat deck.
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the location of the switches to turn on the emergency
source of lighting.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency
lighting system including:
• Instructions for inspection and testing.
• The frequency and recording of inspection and testing.
These procedures may form part of the vessel's maintenance plan.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.
-
• Company procedures did not require the emergency lighting to be inspected and tested at least once
per week.
• Records indicate that emergency lighting had not been inspected and tested in compliance with
company procedures.
• There are no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.
-
• One or more emergency lights are:
o not working
o dirty/obscured
-
o filled with water.
• Arrangements for lighting the area of water into which survival craft would be launched are not in
satisfactory condition.
-
• The emergency lighting system is defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA KPI 4A.1 .4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and
systems that are not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements
-
and manufacturers' recommendations.
-
-
-
Practical guidance for permits to work

1. Enclosed space entry industry guidance
An operator's procedures for enclosed space entry should address the following as a minimum:
ISGOTI 6:
Chapter 1. Basic Properties and Hazards of Petroleum Chapter 10. Enclosed Spaces.
• 1.4.3.2 Exposure limits • 10.1 Introduction to enclosed space entry safety
• 1.4.5.2 Benzene • 10.6 Authorisation of entry
• 10.7.1 Control of entry into enclosed spaces
• 10.7.2 Atmosphere tests before entry
• 10.7.3 Enclosed space entry permit
• 10.8 Precautions during entry into enclosed spaces
• 10.12.1 Cargo pumproom entry procedures
ISGOTI 6 - Figure 10.1 (below) provides an Enclosed Space Entry decision flow chart which should be consulted and
�
followed prior to each planned Enclosed Space Entry.
Review plan for liiiiiiiiii

intended work and carry out
risk assessment
1 Alternative
Can the task be arrangement to be
achieved without implemented.
enclosed space Enclosed space entry not
entry? required I
I
�
1
Follow chapter 10 guidance
Can the enclosed space -------Yes--------- for controlled enclosed
atmosphere be made space entry
safe?
No
Follow guidance of
Is there an immediate section 10.10 (Unsafe Follow company SMS
risk to the safety of life --- Yes - Atmosphere) ____. and all procedures
1
or to the ship?
No
i
Yes Complete all
preparations for
enclosed space entry
1
Plan review
Master to hold safety
meeting on board attended Shore
by all having responsibilities management approval
during the work Stop other work
1
granted as required
l
Enclosed space
Risk assessment Master to review entry entry permit approved
and work a plan with and issued
1
company management
Is Master satisfied
i
Written statement of Perform task
1
that work can be completed work to be drawn up
safely following company SMS and showing separate
all procedures, along with guidance Yes-. responslbilities for
from section 10.10 (Unsafe work supervision
Atmosphere)? and safety Record completion
of operations
Reproduced from ISGOTT, 6th Edition (2020) with

the permission of OCIMF and partners.

5.5. Permits to Work
5.5.1. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company enclosed space entry procedures, and
was evidence available to demonstrate that all enclosed space entries had been made in strict compliance
with the procedures?
- Question Category
••••
- a
Process)
To ensure that enclosed space entry is always strictly controlled and conducted in
Objective
accordance with industry best practice.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating.
-
Verification by
Human The most effective way to eliminate the risk is TO NOT ENTER an enclosed space.
• The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company enclosed space entry procedure and/
or the process of using or retaining the company enclosed space entry permits.
• The interviewed Rating must be familiar with the enclosed space entry procedure and her/his role in
-
signing the enclosed space entry permit as either an attendant or someone who enters the space.
• The role of the attendant keeping watch outside the space is vital. 'Attendant' means a person who
is suitably trained within the Safety Management System, maintains a watch over those entering
-
the enclosed space, maintains communications with those inside the space and initiates emergency
procedures in the event of an incident occurring. The person who acts as attendant should not be
part of the entry personnel.
• An enclosed space entry permit must not be completed and approved by the same individual who
enters the space.
Process Ship Operators and Masters should ensure that personnel enter the enclosed spaces only when there is no
practicable alternative. Where there is no alternative, the operator should ensure that procedures for safe
entry are in place.
• The company enclosed space entry procedures did not identify all spaces that are considered to be enclosed
spaces along with corresponding precautions for entering each type of identified enclosed space.
• There is no evidence that documented risk assessments were completed and/or reviewed before each
enclosed space entry - risk assessments should be type specific (not pre-completed on the computer).
• The company enclosed entry procedure does not give clear guidance on the requirement to clean
cargo, bunker and ballast tanks prior to entry based on the previous content.
• The company enclosed space entry procedures do not identify any additional precautions required prior
to entering ballast tanks as a result of the use of the Ballast Water Management System (i.e.: test the
.........., atmosphere for chlorine).
• There is no documented evidence for segregating a space by blanking off or isolating all connecting
---
pipelines or valves and electrical power/equipment during a reviewed enclosed space entry, where such
isolation would have been necessary.
• A cargo/ballast tank had been entered without being cleaned in accordance with the company enclosed
space entry procedure. Special attention should be given whilP thP vp��PI is attPnd,:,d by Cl;:,ss for surv,;,ys.
• There is no evidence that an "initial entry" was carried out (ISGOTI 10.8 Precaution during entry into
enclosed spaces), for the work locations and areas inaccessible for testing from deck and spaces with
complicated internal structure that are difficult to ventilate.
The 'INTERTANKO Guidance on Cargo Compressor Room Entry On Board Gas Carriers (Risk based)',
provides a risk-based method to control compressor room entry without lowering safety standards.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place .
-

5.5.2. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings, where directly involved, familiar with the company hot work
procedure, and was evidence available to demonstrate that hot work had been conducted in accordance
with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that hot work is always carried out in a controlled manner.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Engine Room, Main Deck, Interview - Engine Rating.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company hot work procedures, any aspect of the
hot work permit process or the safety precautions referred to within the company hot work procedures
or permit.
• An interviewed Engine Rating is unfamiliar with the designated space hot work instructions.
• Company hot work procedures are not in alignment with the guidance provided by ISGOTI Chapter 9.
• Evidence is available that hot work had been conducted anywhere outside of the designated space
without the issuing of a hot work permit.
• Hot work permits had been issued without:
../ a risk assessment and work plan being prepared for the specific hot work task
../ documented approval for the hot work from the shore management being provided.
• The instructions for conducting hot work in the designated space do not define:
../ when hot work may be or must not be conducted in the designated space
../ who may conduct hot work in the designated space
../ the requirement to gain permission from the MasteF or designated Responsible Officer before
conducting hot work in the designated space.
• Evidence was available that hot work had taken place in the designated space in contravention to the
on board instructions or the guidance provided in ISGOTI chapter 9.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.
-
- 5.5. Permits to Work
- 5.5.3. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedure for working at height,
and was there evidence that risk control measures such as permits to work or documented risk assessments
-
were consistently used whenever work was undertaken at height?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that work at height is always conducted in a controlled manner with procedures
Objective
-
to manage and mitigate risk to workers.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Exterior Decks, Interview - Rating
Verification by
......... Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company's working at height safe work procedures,
including the requirement to conduct periodic checks on specialist working at height PPE and equipment.
-
• There is no requirement to complete a permit or specific risk assessment when working at height unless
the company procedure provided specific exclusions.
• There is no requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height equipment periodically and
record the inventory and condition of the equipment.
• Reviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work at height described and/or circumstances
found onboard the inspected vessel (generic risk assessments).
-
• There are no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist working at height PPE and
equipment.
Hardware
-
-
-
5.5.4. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedures for working over the
side, and was there evidence that risk control measures such as standard work procedures, permits to work
or documented risk assessments were consistently used whenever work was undertaken over the side?
Question Category
••••
Process}
To ensure that work over the side is always conducted in a controlled manner with
Objective procedures to manage and mitigate risk to workers.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company
working over the side safe work procedure and the requirement to conduct periodic checks on specialist
working at height and over the side PPE and equipment.
• There is no requirement to complete a permit or specific risk assessment when working over the side
unless the company procedures provided specific exclusions.
• Reviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work over the side described and/or
circumstances found onboard the inspected vessel.
• There are no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist working at height and over the
side PPE and equipment.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if specialist working at height and over the side PPE and/or
equipment is found to be in apparently poor condition.

- 5.5. Permits to Work
5.5.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for working on electrical
---, equipment and systems, and was there evidence that risk control measures such as permits to work and/
or documented risk assessments were consistently used whenever work was undertaken on electrical
-
equipment and systems?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
To ensure that work on electrical equipment and systems is always conducted in a
Objective
controlled manner with procedures to manage and mitigate risk to workers.
Steering Gear, Bridge, Engine Room, Forecastle, Engine Control Room, Interview -
ROVIQ Sequence
Electrician/ ETO.
........
-
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company safe work procedure for working on electrical
equipment or systems
- • An interviewed electrician or Engineer Officer is unfamiliar with:

../' the company safe working procedure for working on electrical equipment or systems and either the
related permit and/or risk assessment development, review and approval process
../' the additional control measures required when working on:
- high-voltage systems and equipment
- live electrical equipment
- live electrical test benches
- electrical equipment or systems in hazardous areas.
-
• There is no requirement to complete a permit and/or risk assessment when working on electrical
equipment or systems.
• There is evidence that work on electrical equipment or systems had been undertaken that required
either a permit and/or a documented risk assessment but the required documentation had not been
completed or was not available for review.
-
• Reviewed permits and/or risk assessments do not reflect the work on electrical equipment or systems
described and/or the circumstances found onboard the vessel.
• Notices of instructions for the treatment of electric shock are not posted in spaces containing electric
-
equipment and switchgear.
Where no permits and/or risk assessments for work on electrical equipment or systems had been
completed or approved during the previous two months, the Inspector will make a comment in the process
response tool noting the date of the last occasion when work on electrical equipment or systems had been
-- Hardware
documented.
- TMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documPnted pPrmit to work: c:ystGm is in pl;icQ.
---
-
5.5.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the control of hazardous
energy, and was evidence available, through documented risk assessment or permits, that hazardous energy
sources were routinely identified and isolated before working on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where
hazardous energy could be present?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that hazardous energy sources are always identified and effectively isolated
Objective before work starts on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where hazardous energy
sources could be present.
Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview- Deck Officer, Interview- Engineer
ROVIQ Sequence
Officer.
Verification by

• An interviewed Deck or Engineer Officer is unfamiliar with the company control of hazardous
energy procedures.
• An interviewed Deck or Engineer Officer is unfamiliar with the process to identify and document
the isolation of hazardous energy sources before starting work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces
where hazardous energy sources were present.
• There are no company control of hazardous energy procedures.
• There is no inventory of specialist LO/TO equipment.
• Work had been completed that required either a permit, risk assessment or other documented work
procedure to identify and control hazardous energy sources according to the company procedure, but
none had been completed.
• Permits, risk assessment or other documented work processes were in force for hazardous energy
isolation, but the isolation points identified were not locked and/or tagged out as required by the
company procedure.
• LO/TO equipment is found to be attached to machinery or systems during the inspection but there are
no accompanying permits, risk assessment or other documented work process to document the reason
for the equipment being locked and/or tagged out.
Where no records are available for the control of hazardous sources of energy for the previous three
months, the Inspector will make a comment in the Process response tool and note the date of the last
occasion for which control measures for hazardous energy had been documented.
Hardware T he Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no specialist LO/TO equipment available
onboard.
TMSA KFI 9.2.4 requires 1t1at procedures ensure Ll1dL dll iue11Lified mitigation mec1:,u1e:, are c.ompleted prior to
commencing work.

--
5.6.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing, maintenance and
calibration of the vessel's portable and personal gas measurement instruments, and was the equipment on
board sufficient, in good working order, regularly tested and periodically calibrated?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure sufficient calibrated portable and personal gas measurement instruments are
Objective
always available on board to enable safe enclosed space entry and cargo operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Pumproom.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unable to explain or demonstrate:
o the purpose(s) and function(s) of each instrument. including the sensor technology utilised and
whether the instrument can be used in an inert atmosphere and/or at above atmospheric pressure
o the circumstances under which some sensors fitted in measurement instruments provided may be
contaminated
o the description and quantity of spare parts and test gases required to be carried on board. If the vessel
is provided with mixed manufacturer toxic gas testing tubes and suction pumps, Officers should be
aware if the tubes are compatible to be used with different manufacturers tubes
o the method and frequency of testing and calibrating the gas measurement instruments
-
o the circumstances under which personal gas measurement instruments must be worn, e.g. enclosed
space, cargo tank and pump room entry.
• The accompanying Officer is unable to describe the testing, maintenance and calibration of the
portable and personal gas measurement instruments required in accordance with the SMS and the
manufacturers' maintenance and operation manuals.
It is essential that the gas testing equipment is used as per makers' instructions to ensure no
,.........
-
distortion in the accuracy of any possible gas measured.
• There is no evidence that the required testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and
-
personal gas measurement instruments had been performed in accordance with the SMS and the
manufacturers' maintenance and operation manuals.
• The date when each disposable personal gas monitor was first commissioned was not recorded in order
to establish their expiry date.
• Disposable personal gas monitors are in use past their expiry date.
• An incorrect test gas had been used to test a portable instrument.
• Records indicate that the manufacturers' recommended intervals for servicing the equipment and/or for
the replacement of parts such as filters had not been observed.
• The vessel is not equipped with at least two instruments capable of measuring concentrations of
oxygen, flammable gases or vapours (% LFL), H 2 S and CO in order to carry out the tests required for
enclosed space entry.
• There are insufficient tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for the instruments used to
measure toxic gases.
• Hoses or cables used to sample tank atmospheres are of insufficient length to reach the bottom of the
deepest tank.

Hardware • The tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic gases are not suitable for
Continued... the toxic gases or vapours that might be found in the cargo being carried.
• A tanker equipped with inert gas or that utilised nitrogen padding did not have an instrument(s)
capable of measuring oxygen and hydrocarbon content(% Vol) in an inert atmosphere.
• An instrument was used for measuring hydrocarbon content in an inert atmosphere that was not
suitable for this purpose.
• The vessel is not equipped with sufficient operational personal gas monitors to meet the requirements
of the SMS for enclosed space, cargo tank or pumproom entry.
• The vessel is not equipped with sufficient operational person H 2 S gas monitors for personnel involved in
cargo and/or bunker operations where the cargo or bunkers are known or suspected of having a high
H 2 S content.
• There are insufficient test gases available for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.
The Inspector will NOT raise a negative observation if portable or personal gas detecting equipment is
defective or out of service, providing:
• The vessel carries sufficient operational equipment to meet regulatory and operational requirements.
• Defective equipment is clearly marked as 'out of service'.
• Defective equipment has been reported within the defect reporting system.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment
are in place for all vessel types within the fleet.

-
- 5.6. Fixed and Portable Gas Detecting Systems
5.6.2. Were the Master and deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for testing the atmosphere
in double-hull and double bottom spaces for flammable gas, and were records available to confirm that
-
appropriate measurements had been taken using the equipment fitted to, or provided on, the vessel?
Question Category
••••
Process)
.........
- Objective To ensure that structural failures between cargo tanks adjacent to ballast tanks and void
-
spaces of double hull and double-bottom spaces are promptly detected.
Verification by
-
-
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Deck Officer is unfamiliar with
the company procedure for monitoring double-hull, double-bottom and void spaces for hydrocarbon gas
accumulation.
-
• Records, or absence of records, indicate that gas measurements had not been taken and recorded in
• Records, or absence of records, indicate that fixed gas detector tank sensors had been isolated without
appropriate manual gas measurements being taken in accordance with company procedures.
• The fixed gas detector sensors had not been calibrated and/or the flammable gas alarm had not been
set in accordance with company procedures.
• There is no functioning portable flammable gas detector available to take manual gas readings.
• Flammable gasses had been detected in double-hull, double-bottom or void spaces as a result of a
-
structural defect within the previous twelve months.
-
-
-
-
-
-
gas detection systems required by the IGC Code, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly
maintained and calibrated?
Question Category
Process)
8@88
To ensure that the vessel staff can detect unintentional releases or leaks from the cargo
Objective system.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is not familiar with the
purpose and operation of the vessel's fixed gas-detection systems and their calibration.
• The alarm (and, where appropriate, automated shut down) set points for each fixed gas detector sensor
are not set as required by the IGC code or the company procedures.
• Fixed gas detector sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions and
company procedures.
• Where portable gas-detecting equipment had been used to comply with the requirements of the
IGC code, there are no records available for the routine gas monitoring required to be undertaken in
• The maintenance plan does not include the vessel's fixed gas-detection systems or all the required
inspections, tests, and maintenance, including calibrations.
• The fixed gas-detection systems required by the IGC code are:
o not monitoring all sensors provided by the systems
o indicating a system fault
o indicating that one or more sensors is defective.
• The calibration gases available onboard are either of the incorrect type or out of date.
• Calibration equipment required to conduct sensor calibration in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions is not available onboard.
• The gas-detection equipment is located in a non-hazardous space, but the steel enclosure is not capable
of being sealed or is routinely left open.
• Portable gas detecting equipment required to be carried in accordance with the IGC code is not
available.
• The fixed gas-detecting systems required by the IGC code are defective in any respect.
If the system is defective, ensure that a specific RA is issued and mitigation measures are implemented. A
plan for rectification should be available.
contractors.

-
- 5.6. Fixed and Portable Gas Detecting Systems
gas-detection system required by the IGF Code, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly
-
maintained and calibrated in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective To ensure that the vessel is protected from the consequences of unintentional releases or
-
leaks from the gas or other low-flashpoint fuel system.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room.
Verification by
,.......... Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is not familiar with the
company procedure for the operation and maintenance of the fixed gas-detection system and gas safety
system shutdown tests.
• The vessel's maintenance plan does not include the fixed gas-detecting system required under the IGF
Code.
• The maintenance plan does not define the frequency of sensor calibration and automated gas safety
system shutdown tests.
• The fixed gas-detecting system sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with the maintenance
plan.
-
• The audible and visible alarms located on the navigation bridge or in the continuously manned central
control station had not been tested in accordance with the company procedures.
• The fixed gas-detector alarm or automatic shutdown activation set points are not in accordance with
-
the requirements of the IGF Code.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if one or more gas detector sensors are out of service or are
inhibited or disconnected from the sampling sequence.
-
-
contractors.
-
--
-
5.6.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation and maintenance of the cargo pump room
fixed gas-detection system, and was the equipment fully operational with sensors calibrated and alarm
activation points set in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that measures specifically designed to prevent fire in the pumproom are
Objective
effective.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the
operation and maintenance of the pumproom gas-detection system.
• The alarm activation point of one or more hydrocarbon gas sensors is more than 10% LFL.
• The gas-detection sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions at
the frequency defined by the company.
• The audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room, pumproom and on the bridge had not been
tested at the frequency defined by the company.
• Where the pumproom gas-detection system is out of service, there is no record of manual atmosphere
measurements having been taken.
• One or more hydrocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxygen sensors are out of service.
• One or more hy drocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxy gen sensors are inhibited or disconnected from the
sampling sequence.
contractors.
-
- 5.6.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the operation and maintenance of the oxygen sensors and
associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system, and was the equipment fully
operational with sensors calibrated and alarm activation points set in accordance with company procedures
and manufacturer's instructions?
Question Category
-
••••
Process)
To ensure that entry into the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas plant is always
Objective
made safely.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Engine Control Room.
-
Verification by

__,
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the
operation and maintenance of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces,
containing the inert gas system.
• The oxygen sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions at the
frequency defined by the company.
-
• The audible and visual alarms had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.
• The calibration gas used for calibration of the oxygen sensors is out of date or not appropriate for use
with the system.
-
• Where the oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms fitted in the space or spaces containing the inert
gas system are out of service, there is no record of manual atmosphere measurements having been
taken prior to, and during, entry to the space, or spaces, while the inert gas system was in operation.
• One or more oxygen sensors are out of service.
• One or more oxygen sensors are inhibited or disconnected from the sampling sequence.
-
TMSA KP! 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.
--
-
--

5.7.1. Had all onboard incidents been reported and investigated in accordance with company procedures,
and was an incident investigation report or a summarised lessons learned bulletin available for each incident
at or above a defined threshold?
Question Category
Process)
• @) 0.
To ensure that seafarers can learn from incidents that occurred onboard their vessel to
Objective improve safety and pollution prevention standards.
Verification by
Human
Process The pre-inspection questionnaire (PIO) will prompt data entry for each incident type listed in the guidance
notes and the operator should report all incidents occurred the last 18 months.
The data provided through the HVPQ and the PIQ will be extracted and inserted in the inspection editor
and final inspection report.
If an unscheduled dry dock took place, the visit should be recorded in question 2.2.1 and 1.9.1 of the
HVPQ.
OCIMF I INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents (First edition 2018), provides
guidance on how to share lessons from incidents.
• There was no incident investigation report or lessons learned bulletin available onboard for one or more
of the incidents reported through the HVPO or PIO, unless the vessel operator had declared that the
incident investigation was ongoing.
• There is evidence that the vessel had been involved in one of the incident types listed in the inspection
guidance during the 12 months prior to the inspection but the incident had not been reported though
the HVPQ and/or the PIQ.
Hardware
TMSA KP! 8.1 .4 requires that procedures ensure that incidents are investigated and analysed.

5. 7. Safety Management
5.7.2. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company incident and near-miss reporting
procedure and was evidence available to demonstrate that incidents and near-misses had been investigated
and closed out in accordance with the company procedure?
Question Category
-
Process)
G@09
-- Objective
To ensure that seafarers can learn from incidents and near-misses onboard their vessel to
improve safety and pollution prevention.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Rating.
__, Tagged Rank Master, Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
-
• The Master or accompanying Officer are unfamiliar with the process to:
o track each incident and near-miss through to closure
o document onboard incidents and near-misses
o report incidents or near-misses to shore-based management
o investigate incidents and near-misses assigned to vessel staff
o implement and document corrective and preventative actions
o communicate the outcome of a completed incident or near-miss investigation to the vessel's
-
complement.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the process to report a near-miss.
-
Process OCIMF/INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents (First edition 2018), provides
invaluable guidance.
• Incident and near-miss reports had not been:
o reported to shore-based management within the required timeframe
o acknowledged by shore-based management
o investigated at the appropriate level of management either onboard or ashore
o closed out with evidence of implementation of corrective and preventative action.
-
,.......... • There is no system to track incident and near-miss reports through to closure.
• There is no evidence that the outcome of completed incident and near-miss investigations had been
communicated to the vessel's complement.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 8.1.1 requires that procedures ensure prompt reporting and investigation of incidents and significant
near misses.

5.7.3. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedure for holding and
documenting shipboard safety meetings and was evidence available that safety concerns raised at the
meetings were acknowledged and addressed by shore management?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that there is an effective two-way dialogue between the vessel staff and shore
Objective based management in matters relating to safety and pollution prevention at both the
fleet and individual vessel level.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Rating.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting and recording
the minutes of shipboard safety meetings.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the process of contributing to a safety meeting.
The Inspector may ask an Officer or Rating when the last safety meeting was held on board.
• Shipboard safety meetings had not been held at the frequency defined by the company procedure or
at approximately monthly intervals.
• Extraordinary safety meetings had not been held after a serious incident onboard or during a shore
management visit, where practical.
• The minutes of shipboard safety meetings had not been submitted for shore management review.
• Shore management had not acknowledged submitted safety meeting minutes.
• Shore management had failed to address matters included in safety meeting minutes that required
their assistance or intervention.
• There was evidence that a safety meeting had been held on the bridge while at sea or at anchor or in
the cargo control room while conducting cargo- or tank-cleaning operations.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 9A.1.3 requires that onboard safety meetings are held at least monthly. In addition, extraordinary
meetings are held as soon as practicable after any serious incident onboard or within the fleet.

5.7. Safety Management
,..........
5.7.4. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company work planning procedures and
were records available to demonstrate that onboard work planning meetings had been conducted and
,.......... documented in accordance with the procedures?
Question Category
••••
- 0
Process)
To ensure that all onboard work activities are planned to agree the scope of work
Objective and specific safety requirements applicable to each task, and to avoid operational,
departmental or rest hour conflicts.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Rating, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company work planning procedure or the
documentation of the outcome of work planning meetings.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the location or content of the current work planning meeting
record.
• Work planning meetings are not being held at the frequency defined by the company procedure and
had not been approved onboard in accordance with company procedures.
• The detail included in the work planning meeting records is not enough to understand what a job
entails.
• Work planning meeting tasks required permits, risk assessments or detailed work plans to be used but
these were not available.
• Reviewed work planning records did not reflect the actual activities of the vessel during the period of
review.
• Work planning meeting tasks require shore management approval but there was no evidence that
approval had been provided.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 9A.1.4 requires that procedures require daily work planning meetings to take place.
-
-
5.7.5. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the purpose and implementation of the company
Stop Work Authority (SWA) policy and procedure?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
0 0 0
1Wrw1�
To ensure that vessel staff are aware of their responsibility and authority to stop unsafe
Objective work.
ROVIQ Sequence Anywhere.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will randomly question at least three, but not more than five crew members (mostly Ratings)
during the inspection about the company SWA procedure to verify their understanding.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if more than one crew member is unfamiliar with the
company SWA policy and/or procedure.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no evidence that SWA was included and discussed
in work planning processes such as toolbox talks, risk assessments, daily work planning meetings or safety
meetings.
The vessel operator should have developed an SWA policy and procedure which encourages all company
staff and contractors to stop any work that is believed to present a danger to people, the environment or
property.
The Inspector may review records indicating the effective implementation of SWA procedures.
Hardware
T MSA KPI 9A.2.1 requires that intervention to prevent unsafe acts and unsafe conditions occurring is actively
encouraged.

- 5. 7. Safety Management
- 5.7.6. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedures for risk assessment, as
appropriate to their duties, and was there evidence of the development and review of risk assessments in
accordance with the procedures?
Question Category
••••
- 0 rww�
Process)
000
To ensure that new, non-routine or unplanned tasks not covered by existing procedures
Objective are subject to risk assessment before work starts, and that risk assessments are reviewed
before work starts on other specified tasks such as enclosed space entry or hot work.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Rating, Interview Senior Officer.
Tagged Rank
--
Master, Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
-- Human

• An interviewed Senior Officer is unfamiliar with the company risk assessment procedure.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with:
o the risk assessment review process prior to starting a task requiring a risk assessment
o the existence or content of a risk assessment for a task that they had been directly involved with.
• The company risk assessment procedure did not define:
o the circumstances in which a risk assessment must be developed or reviewed
__, o the process for developing a risk assessment
-
o the process for recording the results of a risk assessment
o the process for reviewing an available risk assessment
o who is responsible for completing a risk assessment
-
o who should be involved in the development of a risk assessment
o who is responsible for approving a risk assessment
o who is required to review a risk assessment before work starts on a task.
• A reviewed risk assessment is not relevant to the vessel, its circumstances or equipment.
• A reviewed risk assessment is from a generic risk assessment library, but is not being updated to reflect
the vessel, its circumstances or its equipment.
• There is evidence that a specified task had been completed without an appropriate risk assessment
being reviewed.
• There is evidence that a new, non-routine or unplanned task that requires a risk assessment in
accordance with the company procedure had been completed without an appropriate risk assessment
being developed and approved.
Where there are no risk assessments undertaken during the previous three months, the Inspector will make
a comment in the process response tool and record the date of the last risk assessment that had been
-
developed or reviewed.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 9.2.2 requires that the risk assessment process includes provisions for assessing new, non-routine and
unp lanned tosk�.
- Comments/SM$ Reference
-
-
5.7.7. Were Safety Data Sheets (SOS) available on board for all cargo, bunkers, chemicals, paints and other
products being handled, and were crew members familiar with their use?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure crew members are provided with clear, accurate information on the health and
Objective environmental effects of all hazardous and toxic substances carried on board, including
guidance on their safe handling.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Forecastle.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is not familiar with the purpose
and content of the relevant SDSs.
• There are no company procedures to ensure that up-to-date SDSs are readily available for all hazardous
or toxic substances carried on board and to give guidance on the handling and stowage of these
substances. including PPE requirements.
• There is no SDS available for a cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the inspection.
• The (M)SDS for an Annex I cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the inspection is not in compliance
with the requirements of IMO: Resolution MSC.286(86).
• The (M)SDS for a cargo containing benzene is not in compliance with the requirements of IMO:
Resolution MSC.286(86).
• The (M)SDS for an Annex II or gas cargo on board at the time of the inspection does not include the
information for safe carriage as required by the IBC and IGC code.
• There is no SDS available locally for a toxic or hazardous substance on board at the time of the
inspection.
Hardware T he Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• Appropriate PPE, first aid and eyewash equipment is not available at the storage location of a toxic or
hazardous substance.
• The stowage of containers or packages containing a toxic or hazardous substance is unsatisfactory.
• The storage location of a toxic or hazardous substance is not clean and tidy.
• Incompatible toxic or hazardous substances are stowed together.
• Toxic or hazardous substances are contained in unmarked or incorrectly marked containers.
• Toxic or hazardous substances had been transferred to, and were contained in, unsuitable containers.
• Toxic or hazardous substances are stored in an unsuitable location.
TMSA KPI 1 A.2.3 requires that relevant reference documents are provided as a supplement to the SMS both
onboard and ashore. Reference documents may include regulatory publications and industry guidelines.
The company has a procedure for maintaining the most up-to-date editions in all locations.

- 5.7.8. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
procedure and was there evidence that SIMOPS were considered during work planning and the required
controls implemented for the duration of such operations?
- Question Category
••••
- 0 rwrw1�
Process)
000
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that the impact of SIMOPS is understood and managed effectively.
Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating, Documentation.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the decision matrix or the matrix of permitted operations
where these are provided and required to be used for assessing SIMOPS.
• An interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the term SIMOPS and what their responsibilities would be with
regards to their assigned task when SIMOPS are being undertaken.
- • There is no company procedure which gives guidance and instruction on SIMOPS.

• There are no records available to demonstrate that SIMOPS had been considered during the onboard
-
work planning process.
• Records of SIMOPS controls had not been maintained in accordance with the company SIMOPS
procedure through documents such as:
o work planning meeting records
o risk assessments
o SIMOPS plan/interface documents.
-
• There is evidence of SIMOPS taking place that would have required the company SIMOPS work review
and documentation process to be used but no records are available for review.
• There is evidence of SIMOPS taking place which are specifically prohibited by the company's SIMOPS
procedure.
- Hardware
If there are no records of SIMOPS having taken place during the previous three months, the Inspector will
make a comment in the process response tool, noting the date of the last documented SIMOPS.
- TMSA KPI 9.2.4 requires that procedures ensure that all identified mitigation measures are completed prior to
commencing work.
,............
-
5.8.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the main
deck areas, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that the main deck areas are always maintained in a safe condition.
ROVIQ Sequence Main Deck, Mooring Decks.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety
inspections of the main deck areas are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety
Officer.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance
with the company main deck areas inspection checklist.
• There is no company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the main deck areas are
conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential
hazards to health, safety and the environment.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the main deck areas.
• Safety inspections of the main deck areas were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential
deficiencies listed below (list is not exhaustive):
o non-skid coatings or gratings are not provided in working areas or on walkways
o working areas and/or walkways are not clearly marked
o trip hazards are not clearly marked or highlighted with contrasting paint
o light fittings in gas-hazardous areas have:
- cracks in metal casings or covers
- cracked or broken glass
- failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures
- flame-proof enclosures that are not tight or have missing bolts
- gaskets present between mating metal surfaces L
- paint covering safety features such as relief holes, passages etc.
• Deck wiring and/or conduit runs are not in a satisfactory condition.
• There is leakage (or temporary repair) from a cargo, cargo heating, inert gas or hydraulic systems on
deck.
• A number of deck lights are not operational.
• Deck lighting is not adequate.
• A roller falrlead or otrier item of rotating deck equipment b 11ot well maintained ond free to rotate.
• Fairleads being used with synthetic lines are grooved or roughened.
• A mooring or towing fitting is not clearly marked with its SWL in tonnes (t) by weld bead outline.
• A weathertight door to a deck house is not in a satisfactory condition and capable of being properly
secured.
• Flammable liquids are stored in a deck house which is not specifically designed and classified.
• Lube oil, other oil drums or spare parts/stores are not safely stowed and secured on deck.
• Hydrostatic release unit of life-rafts is not rigged correctly.
TMSA KPI 9A.1. 1 procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated
Safety Officer.

5.8. Area Inspections
5.8.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the
machinery spaces, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the
environment?
-- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective To ensure that the machinery spaces are always maintained in a safe condition.
-
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Steering Gear, Engine Control Room.
Verification by
-
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedures which require that safety
inspections of the machinery spaces are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety
Officer.
with the company machinery spaces inspection checklist.
Process A checklist should be available to facilitate safety inspections for cargo machinery rooms (for LNG vessels),
---, main deck and forecastle spaces.
• There is no company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the machinery spaces are
- Hardware
• Records of safety inspections of the machinery spaces are missing or incomplete.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the machinery spaces.
• Safety inspections of the machinery spaces were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential
o wood, paints, solvents, oil or other flammable materials are stored in boiler rooms or machinery
spaces, including steering gear compartments, unless specifically identified areas had been prepared
and approved for storage of such items
-
o lagging and insulation on high-temperature surfaces such as steam pipes, exhaust pipes etc. is
missing, in poor condition or impregnated with oil
o there are broken or defective light fittings in the machinery spaces
-
o safety guards are not in place for all machinery, rotating shafts or equipment, as necessary
o tank tops and bilges are not painted a light colour so that leaks may be readily located
o spare gear is not properly stowed and/or items of machinery under overhaul are not safely secured to
-
prevent them breaking loose and causing injury or damage in heavy weather
o gauge glass closing devices on oil tanks are not of a self-closing, fail-safe type or are inhibited
o self-closing sounding devices to double bottom tanks are not in good order, closed and capped
o non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other arrangements are used
to hold any fire door in thP m:,rhinory �p;,co<: opon \Nhoro it is; roquircd to be self clo:,ing.
• There is a safety deficiency of any kind in the machinery spaces.
TMSA KPI 9A.1.1 procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated
Safety Officer.
-
_....... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 179
5.8.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the cargo
pumproom, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective To ensure that the cargo pump room is always maintained in a safe condition.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure which require that safety
inspections of the cargo pumproom are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety
Officer.
with the company cargo pumproom inspection checklist.
• Records of safety inspections of the cargo pumproom are missing or incomplete.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the cargo pumproom.
-
• Safety inspections of the cargo pumproom are ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential
a pumproom lighting is not in good condition or their gas tight integrity was compromised
o the pumproom ventilation is not in good condition and not:
- operating in extraction mode
- interlocked with the pumproom lighting
- operating at the lower suction
o the pumproom bilges are not clean and dry
o spray shields or spray protection covers around the glands of cargo pumps or detachable connections
are missing or damaged or dirty
o bulkhead seals are defective in any respect
o exposed rotating shafts are not protected with guards
o pipe lagging is impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping intended to be lagged
o paint or other flammable material is stored in the pumproom unless contained within an area
specifically designed and designated for such storage
a the pumproom rescue harness is not fit for use and not rigged for immediate operation
o safety chains to prevent falling through open vertical ladder accesses are missing or not connected
o cargo and ballast pump emergency stop buttons are not clearly marked
o the pumproom telephone is defective.
TMSA KP! 9A.1 .1 procedures require that satety inspections are conducted at scneau1ea 1mervd1S by a aes1gnai:ed
Safety Officer.

- 5.8. Area Inspections
5.8.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the procedure for safety inspections of the cargo machinery
rooms, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
Question Category
-
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective To ensure that cargo machinery rooms are always maintained in a safe condition.
ROVIQ Sequence Compressor Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure which requires that safety
inspections of the cargo machinery rooms are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated
-
Safety Officer.
with the company cargo machinery rooms inspection checklist(s).
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the location and/or status of the gas-sampling heads in
the cargo machinery room.
• Records of safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms are missing or incomplete.
• Entry requirements and warning notice are not posted at the entrance to the cargo machinery rooms.
• Cargo machinery room lighting is not fully operational.
• Cargo machinery room lighting is inadequate to illuminate the space.
• Cargo machinery room light fittings are not in good condition or their gas tight integrity is compromised.
• The compressor room ventilation system is not maintaining negative relative pressure or is defective.
• Gas leaks are evident in the compressor room.
• Cargo machinery room ventilation inlet or outlet grilles are obstructed.
• The cargo machinery room gas-sampling heads and/or ventilation points are incorrectly set for the
cargo being carried.
• There are no records of tests of the air lock alarm and shutdown system.
• Flammable materials are found stowed in a cargo machinery room.
• Items stored in the cargo machinery room are not properly secured against movement.
• Materials are stowed in a cargo machinery room that obstruct safe unrestricted access to operate valves
-
or rescue an injured person.
• Compressors are not isolated whilst carrying a cargo of Ethylene Oxide or Propylene Oxide.
T MSA KPI 9A.1.1 procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated
Safety Officer.

5.8.S. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the
forecastle, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure which requires that safety
inspections of the forecastle are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.
with the company forecastle inspection checklist.
• Records of safety inspections of the forecastle are missing or incomplete.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the forecastle.
• Safety inspections of the forecastle are ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential deficiencies
listed below (list is not exhaustive):
o weathertight doors to the forecastle space are not in satisfactory condition and capable of being
properly secured
o forecastle spaces are not well illuminated, not free of water, and/or not clean and tidy
o access to bitter end securing arrangements, safety equipment and bilge wells/alarms is not clear and
unobstructed
o chain lockers are not clearly marked as enclosed spaces and/or the doors are not securely closed
o thruster rooms, transfer pump rooms or other any other interconnected spaces are not clearly marked
with required safe entry controls and requirements
o starter panels are not protected from leakage from SW line flanges and/or the watertight entrance
door to the space
o there is evidence of leakage from the anchor wash SW lines into the space
o forecastle overboard valves are padlocked closed and no key is available for emergency
use. It is recommended that the valves are sealed with a breakable seal to prevent accidental opening
whilst at the same time able to open in case of an emergency.
Safety Officer.

- 5.8. Area Inspections
- 5.8.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the
accommodation, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health, safety and the
environment?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that the accommodation is always maintained in a safe condition.

ROVIQ Sequence Internal Accommodation.
Verification by
-
inspections of the accommodation are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety
Officer.
with the company accommodation inspection checklist.
• There is no company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the accommodation are
• Records of safety inspections of the accommodation are missing or incomplete.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the accommodation.
• Safety inspections of the accommodation are ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential
deficiencies listed below:
o accommodation spaces are not well illuminated, not clean, not tidy, not in a hygienic condition and/
,........, or not obstruction-free
o there are overloaded electrical sockets
o the condition of electrical equipment is not satisfactory
o smoking regulations were not being observed
o laundries contain accumulation of clothing that could constitute a fire hazard
o laundry driers and/or vents contain accumulations of lint and fluff that could constitute a fire hazard
o a weathertight door, window or porthole is not in good order and not capable of being properly
secured
o the ship's hospital is not ready for immediate use and is being used as an additional cabin or storeroom
........ o the refrigerated room alarm is not operational
o the refrigerated room alarm had not been regularly tested.
Safety Officer.
-
5.8.7. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for safety inspections of the
ballast and/or bunker pumproom, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to health,
safety and the environment?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle.
Verification by

inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom are conducted at appropriate intervals by the
designated Safety Officer.
with the company ballast and/or bunker pumproom inspection checklist.
• There is no company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker
pumproom are to be conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify
hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.
• Records of safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom are missing or incomplete.
• There is no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom.
• Safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom are ineffective as demonstrated by any of
the potential deficiencies listed below (list is not exhaustive):
o pumproom lighting is not fully operational or its gas tightness is compromised
o the pumproom ventilation is not operating correctly or it was defective
- the pumproom bilges are not clean and dry
- there are leaks from pumps, pipelines, valve glands or instrumentation
- bunker or ballast pipelines are temporarily repaired with patches or bandages
- bulkhead seals are defective in any respect including grease/oil cups that were cracked/broken/
missing or below the minimum level
- exposed rotating shafts are not protected with guards
- pipe lagging is impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping intended to be lagged
- items stored in the pumproom are not properly secured against movement
- paint or other flammable material is stored in the pumproom unless contained within an area
specifically designed and designated for such storage
- the pumproom rescue harness is not fit for use and rigged for immediate operation
- �atcty chain:, lv 1..1• c:vc:, 1 l ro111, ,g L11roug11 ope11 ve1 Lil.al 1auuer accesses are missing or not connected
- bunker and ballast pump emergency stop buttons are not clearly marked
- the pumproom telephone is defective
- there was a safety deficiency of any kind in the pumproom.
Safety Officer.

5.9. Lifting and Rigging
- 5.9.1. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company lifting and rigging procedures,
and was evidence available to demonstrate that each item of lifting and rigging equipment had been
maintained, inspected and tested in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that all lifting and rigging equipment has been thoroughly inspected at least
annually and is always fit for purpose when used.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Room, Main Deck, Interview - Rating.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers, Ratings.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for the management of lifting
and rigging equipment.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the inventory of lifting and rigging equipment.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if an interviewed Rating is unfamiliar with the markings
-
required on each item of lifting or rigging equipment and/or the checks required to be undertaken before
using the item during routine work.
Process
-
• There is no company procedure for the management of lifting and rigging equipment.
• Certification for lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme is not
being maintained in accordance with the Classification Society requirements.
• There is no inventory of lifting and rigging equipment for all equipment not covered by a Classification
Society programme.
• The inventory of lifting or rigging equipment had not been maintained in accordance with company
rigging and lifting procedure.
• Manufacturer's test certificates are not available for each item of rigging equipment and lifting
equipment fall and topping lift wires.
• An item of lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme is out of
service.
• An item of lifting equipment or loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme is found to
be defective in any respect.
• Items of rigging equipment or fall or topping lift wires had not been removed from service in accordance
with the company retirement criteria.
• Items of lifting or rigging equipment are not marked in accordance with the company lifting and
rigging procedure.
-
• Items of lifting or rigging equipment had not been periodically inspected by a competent person in
accordance with the company procedure.
-
Safety Officer.

5.9.2. Where the vessel was fitted with a single cargo hose handling crane, was a risk assessment available
which identified the minimum spare parts that must be carried onboard to ensure continued operation in
the event of a single component failure, and were the identified spare parts available onboard?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that a hose crane is always available to connect and disconnect cargo hoses.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Tagged Rank Senior Engineer Officers
Verification by
Human
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no risk assessment available which identify the
minimum spare parts that must be carried for a single hose-handling crane.
• There is not at least one spare hydraulic hose suitable to replace any hydraulic hose fitted to the hose-
handling crane.
• Any other spare parts identified by the risk assessment as being essential for the continued use of the
hose-handling crane are not available onboard.
TMSA KP! 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts
inventory, which reflects the company's strategy.

5.10. Safe Access
Practical Guidance for gangway, accommodation and pilot ladders

5.10.1. Were the Master, deck Officers and deck Ratings familiar with the company procedures for rigging
the Pilot boarding arrangements, and was the equipment provided in satisfactory condition and used in
accordance with industry best practice?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
-
To ensure pilot boarding arrangements are always correctly rigged under the supervision
Objective
of a responsible Officer.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Rating, Main Deck.
- Tagged Rank
Verification by
Master, Deck Officers, Deck Ratings.

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure for rigging and recovering the
Pilot boarding arrangements.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the Pilot boarding arrangements provided.
-- • An interviewed deck Rating is unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover the Pilot boarding
arrangements.
-
Process The Inspector will raise a negative obseNation if there is no company procedure for the safe rigging of the
pilot boarding arrangements.
• An inspected pilot ladder is found:
........ o without any identification to connect it to its manufacturer's certificate or maintenance records
-
o with defects or arrangements which are specifically identified as unacceptable on BPG Checklist A4
o constructed with materials or in a manner that do not comply with BPG Checklist A4
o without manufacturer's certificates or maintenance records
o to have been repaired in a manner which does not conform to the manufacturer's instructions
o the Pilot access arrangements are not conform with the requirements of BPG Checklist A4.
• The Pilot boarding position is not within the parallel body length of the vessel for all normal operating
draughts.
-
• Where a combination ladder was required due to the vessel's freeboard, the means to secure the Pilot
ladder and the accommodation ladder to the ship's side is missing or broken.
• An item of equipment related to the pilot boarding arrangement is found to be missing or defective.
-
• The Pilot boarding illumination is defective.
• The Pilot ladder securing arrangement does not ensure that the weight of the pilot ladder is supported
by the side ropes.
• The gateway in the rails or bulwark opens outwards, does not have a means to hold it open or impede
the safe passage of the Pilot when embarking or disembarking.
• The deck area in the vicinity of the pilot boarding area does not have a non-slip finish.
-
• Where a pilot boarding arrangement is in the rigged condition during the inspection, it is observed to
be rigged in a manner that does not contorm to JCS BPGS Checklist A4 or the vessel's Pilot boarding
arrangement rigging drawings.
-
• A damaged or retired Pilot ladder is retained onboard but is not clearly marked to prevent its use for
either pilot transfer or any other purpose.
T MSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.
-

5.10.2. Were the Master, deck Officers and deck Ratings familiar with the company procedures for rigging
the accommodation ladders, and were the accommodation ladders in good order and used in accordance
with the company procedure and manufacturer's instructions?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure accommodation ladders are always correctly rigged under the supervision of a
Objective
Responsible Person or Officer.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Deck Rating, Main Deck.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers, Deck Ratings .
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure for rigging and recovering an
accommodation ladder.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the operation or rigging of the accommodation ladder
provided.
• An interviewed deck Rating is unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover an accommodation
ladder.
• There is no company procedure that describes the safe rigging of an accommodation ladder.
• The maintenance records for the accommodation ladders are missing or incomplete.
• The certificate(s) for the five-yearly load test of an accommodation ladder are not available or the test
had not been completed within the required timeframe.
• There is no evidence that the accommodation ladder fall wires had been replaced within the previous
five years or, the manufacturer's certificate is not available for a fall wire in service.
• The fall wire is not long enough to permit the accommodation ladder to be deployed at the maximum
freeboard whilst leaving sufficient turns on the winch drum.
• An inspected accommodation ladder is found:
o without plates or markings showing the restrictions on the safe operation and loading, including
the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination, design load, maximum load on
bottom end plate
o with defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of the ladder, steps,
handrails, stanchions, turntables, rollers, pivots or lifting arrangements
o with defects to its hoisting arrangements
o with defective fall wire(s)
o to have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the ladder or its hoisting
system
o any other defect that compromises its safe use.
• The accommodation ladder illumination is defective.
• Where an accommodation ladder is rigged during the inspection:
o it is observed to be rigged or used in a manner that does not conform to the accommodation ladder
design limitations
o the bottom platform had not been adjusted to keep it level when deployed at the boarding level
o a safety net had not been rigged when required by the company procedure
o there is no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area. (The line should be connected
to the lifebuoy and light).

5.10. Safe Access
5.10.3. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedure for providing safe access
to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth, and was safe access provided by the ship's portable gangway,
the vessel's accommodation ladder or a shore gangway?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure safe access is always provided between the ship and a berth, whether by a
ship's portable gangway, accommodation ladder or a gangway provided by the terminal.
ROVIQ Sequence Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers, Deck Rating.
Verification by
-- Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure for providing safe access to the
vessel while alongside a terminal/berth.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the safe rigging of a portable gangway or accommodation
ladder while at a terminal/berth.
• An interviewed Deck Rating is unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover the portable
gangway, where provided.
• There is no company procedure describing the requirements for providing safe access to the vessel
while alongside a terminal/berth.
• The maintenance records for the portable gangway, where provided, are missing or incomplete.
• Where a portable gangway is provided:
o the certificate for the five-yearly load test of the portable gangway is not available or the test had not
been completed within the required timeframe
o the portable gangway is found:
- without plates or markings showing the restrictions on safe operation and loading, including the
--
maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination and design load
- with defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of the ladder, steps,
handrails, stanchions, rollers, or lifting arrangements
-
- with deteriorated tread/non-skid provision on each step surface
- to have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the gangway
- any other defect that compromised its safe use.
-
• The embarkation and disembarkation area illumination provided by the vessel is defective.
• Where a ship's portable gangway or accommodation ladder is rigged during the inspection as a means
of embarkation or disembarkation to the terminal, it is observed to be rigged or used in a manner that
does not conform to the design limitations of the equipment.
-
• A safety net had not been rigged where required by the company procedure and/or the guidance
provided by ISGOTI6 16.4.3.4.
• A portable gangway is resting on handrails not designed to take the load.
• Where a gangway is resting on the ship's handrails or bulwark, there is no bulwark ladder provided to
give safe access between the deck and the head of the gangway.
• There is no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area (the line should be connected
to the lifebuoy and light).
-
• There is no warning sign at the gangway as per the company procedure and/or 1SGOTI6 23.10.1.
• There is no sign displayed at the gangway warning of the specific dangers of the cargo being handled
(e.g. High H,S) or operations being undertaken (i.e. nitrogen purging).
TMSA KPI 9.2 .1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.
........ Comments/SMS Reference
-
5.10.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company personnel transfer by crane procedure, and
where a personnel transfer basket (PTB) and accessories were provided, were these in satisfactory condition
and used in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's recommendations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 a
To ensure personnel transfer by crane is always conducted in accordance with industry
Objective
best practice guidance.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (S.10.4) liiiiiiiiiiiiil
Human The accornpanying Officer must be familiar with:

• The company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of personnel by crane.
• The use of the PTB or accessories for personnel transfer by crane.
• The checks on the PTB and accessories required to be carried out before personnel transfer by crane is
undertaken.
• the risk assessment and personnel transfer by crane plan development process.
• The contingency plan for crane failure during personnel transfer by crane.
• There is no company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of personnel by crane.
• There are no manufacturer's test certificates available for the PTB or lifting accessories.
• The crane(s) used for personnel transfer are not certified for personnel transfer contrary to the response
to HVPQ question 13 .1 . 7.
• There is no contingency plan for the failure of the crane during personnel transfer.
• There are no training records available for the personnel designated for personnel transfer by crane
operations.
• Maintenance, inspection or testing of the crane, PTB or accessories had not been conducted in
accordance with the company procedure or the manufacturer's recommendations.
• Records of maintenance, inspection or testing for the crane, PTB or accessories are incomplete or
missing.
• Personnel transfers by crane had taken place without a risk assessment and/or personnel transfer by
crane plan being developed to address the circumstances at the time of transfer.
• There is evidence that personnel transfer by crane had taken place using a device or arrangement other
than an approved PTB provided by either the passive or active vessel.
• The PTB or lifting accessories are not marked with:
o the SWL or capacity
o the empty weight.
• Taglines rnee-c1ng the recommendations of the OCIMF information paper are not provided.
• Taglines are terminated with knots or back-splices.
• The PTB had not been replaced in accordance with the company PTB retirement policy or manufacturer's
recommendations.

5.10. Safe Access
5.10.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for helicopter/ship operations,
and had these procedures been complied with?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
-- rw��
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure helicopter/ship operations are performed safely and in a controlled manner.
Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship
operations or the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.
--, Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• There are no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations including:
- o helicopter operations risk assessment

o training and emergency drill requirements
o preparation of a Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan
o use of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent)
o Deck Party Officer and Deck Party Crew assignment
o emergency tools and equipment requirements
o restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.
• There is no helicopter operations risk assessment available.
• There is no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had been reviewed in accordance
with the company procedures.
• There is no record of the required training and emergency drills taking place.
• There is no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.
• The ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent) had not been completed
prior to performing helicopter/ship operations.
• Restrictions on cargo/crane operations during helicopter/ship operations had not been complied with.
- Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• There is no Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan available.
-
• The emergency tools and equipment required by the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations are not
readily available.
TMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy, and the supporting procedures and
instructions, cover all activities undertaken.

5.10.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for helicopter/ship operations,
and had the crew involved received appropriate training?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
To ensure helicopter/ship operations on vessels equipped with helicopter facilities are

Objective performed safely and in a controlled manner.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship
operations or the !CS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.
• There are no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations including:
o helicopter operations risk assessment
o identification of job roles and responsibilities for all personnel involved
o training requirements of all personnel involved
o emergency drill requirements
o use of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent)
-
o emergency tools and equipment requirements
o restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations
o reasons for, and extent of, any operational limitations.
• There is no helicopter operations risk assessment available.
• There is no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had been reviewed in accordance
• No HLAC is available, and there are no/incomplete records of appropriate formal accredited training
courses such as Offshore Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HOA),
followed by ship-specific familiarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations for all personnel
involved.
• There are no records of emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.
• There is no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.
• The JCS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent) had not been completed
prior to performing helicopter/ship operations.
• Restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations had not been complied with.
Hardware The required emergency tools and equipment as set out in the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations
must be readily available.
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy, and the supporting procedures and
instructions, cover all the activities undertaken.

-
5.10. Safe Access
5.10.7. Were the Master, Officers and crew familiar with the escape routes from the machinery spaces,
pump rooms, compressor rooms, accommodation spaces and, when in port, from the vessel, and were these
routes clearly marked, unobstructed and well illuminated?
Question Category
••••
........, (Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
,........, Objective
To ensure that there are marked escape routes available to ship and shore personnel in
the event of an emergency on the vessel.
Engine Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck, Internal Accommodation,
ROVIQ Sequence
Interview - Rating.
Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer cannot direct the Inspector to the escape route from any location within
the vessel where there is potential to take a route to a dead end or space with no exit to an outside
deck.
• An Officer or Rating is unable to demonstrate the opening of an external door which forms part of an
escape route from the inside.
• Except in circumstances where security procedures required external doors to be secured to make entry
from the outside impossible, the accompanying Officer is unable to explain how a properly equipped
firefighting team would be able to access through an external door forming part of an emergency
-
escape route.
Process Company procedure which defines the requirements for identifying and marking escape routes must be
available.
• The escape routes from within the accommodation spaces, machinery spaces, pump rooms, compressor
rooms, thruster rooms or any other spaces where a person could become disorientated in an emergency
are not marked with signs in accordance with IMO guidance.
-- • External doors forming part of an escape route are locked or bolted with no means of rapid opening
from the inside.
• A means of escape is blocked or obstructed.
• Self-closing doors forming part of an escape route would not close and latch without intervention
when released.
• More than one bulb is unlit in any enclosed escape trunk.
-
• The escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access is not marked.
• The escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access is routed over moorings
lines under tension or passes across the outboard side of the cargo manifold in use unless there is no
alternative to such routing.
For ships constructed on or after 1 January 2016, all inclined ladders/stairways fitted to comply with
-
paragraph 4.2 .1 with open treads in machinery spaces being part of or providing access to escape routes
but not located within a pl'Otected enclosure :shall be made ur ::>Leel. Such ladders/stairways shall be fined
with steel shields attached to their undersides, so as to provide escaping personnel protection against heat
-
and flame from beneath.
TMSA TMSA KPI 3 .1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
equipment.
-
5.11.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures addressing the management
of samples of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II cargoes as applicable, and were samples being
properly stored and eventually disposed of?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure cargo and bunker samples are safely stored on board and properly disposed of
Objective in a timely manner.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Chief Engineer's Office.
-
Verification by
Human The responsible Officer must be familiar with the company procedures addressing the management of
bunker fuel oil or Annex I and/or Annex II cargo samples, as appropriate.
• There are no company procedures addressing the management of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or
Annex II cargo samples as applicable, including:
o marking/labelling of samples
o storage arrangements
o records to be kept.
• A log is not kept of all bunker fuel oil samples and cargo samples.
• The disposal of cargo samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record Book Part II or Cargo Record
Book as applicable.
• The disposal of bunker samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record Book Part 1.
• The designated storage space(s) for samples is:
o insufficient for the quantity of samples being retained
o accessible from the accommodation
o not within the cargo area for MARPOL Annex II samples
o subject to high temperatures
o inadequately ventilated
o not protected by a fixed firefighting system or readily available portable firefighting equipment.
• Bunker fuel oil samples are not marked as required by MEPC.96(47) or MEPC.1/Circ.864/rev.1 as
appropriate.
• Annex I cargo samples are not marked as required by company procedures.
• Annex II cargo samples are not marked as recommended in the !CS Tanker Safety Guide.
• The design of a sample locker does not ensure that sample bottles are securely stored and protected
from damage.
• Annex II cargo samples that might react dangerously with one another are not separated in the sample
locker.
• Inhibited Annex II cargo samples had been retained on board beyond the period that the inhibitor
remained active, as stated on the inhibitor certificate.
All cargo samples should be stowed securely in lockers that have access external to the accommodation.
Consideration should be given to storing samples in a location protected by a fixed fire-fighting system,
such as a paint locker.
for all vessel types within the fleet.

-
5.12. Safety Equipment
- 5.12.1. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedures that addressed the use
of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations, and did the procedures prohibit the use of
-
filter type respirators for this purpose?
Question Category
••••
- 0 rwrw1u
Process)
000
Objective To ensure the correct respiratory protective equipment is worn during cargo operations.
Verification by
- Human
Process
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the use of respiratory
protective equipment during cargo operations.
- • There are no company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo
operations.
-
• The company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations do
not prohibit the use of filter type respirators during cargo operations.
• Filter-type respirators are observed being used by crew members involved in cargo operations.
Hardware
- TMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types
within the fleet.
-
5.12.2 Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the location and operation of the decontamination
showers and eyewash stations on deck, and were these facilities suitably marked, easily accessible and
ready for use?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure the decontamination showers and eyewash stations provided on deck are
Objective
always ready to use in an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if an interviewed Rating is not familiar with the location and
operation of the decontamination showers and eyewash stations on deck.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no company procedure which ensures that
decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck are ready for use.
• The decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck are not:
o ready for use
o suitably marked
o easily accessible
o regularly inspected and tested as required by company procedures
o provided with insulation and a recirculation system or a fully heat-traced line.
• Sections of freshwater piping supplying the showers or eye wash stations required to be heat traced
and/or insulated are found with the insulation and/or heat tracing removed.
• The fresh water supply to a shower or eyewash station is found to be either frozen or scalding hot.
TMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types
within the fleet.

-
Chapter 6.
Pollution Prevention
-
Chapter 6. Pollution Prevention
6.1.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Cargo Record
Book, and did the entries contained in the Cargo Record Book accurately record the cargo-related operations
required to be documented by MARPOL Annex II?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that all cargo operations are conducted in compliance with the Procedures and
Arrangements Manual and recorded in accordance with MARPOL Annex II.
Cargo Control Room, Documentation.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for maintaining the CRB in
accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions. The accompanying Officer
must be familiar with the entries required to be made in the CRB.
Process Note that where the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Cargo
Record Book (CRB), instructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including
automatic backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system
were to fail or not be available from the ship's network. The use of the electronic record book must be
authorised by a Declaration from Flag/Class.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the CRB in
accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions.
The Inspector will review the entries in the CRB for a recent series (within the previous six months) of cargo
operations relating to a single cargo and verify that:
• Each operation must be entered in the CRB in the correct chronological sequence from the time the cargo
is initially loaded until the completion of cargo tank cleaning and disposal of any generated tank washings.
• Each entry must include the information required by the instructions in the CRB.
• Each entry must be signed by the Officer in charge of the operation.
• Each page must be counter-signed by the Master.
• Each reference to a named cargo must use the correct official name in accordance with the Certificate
of Fitness.
• Where prewash operations had been carried out in accordance with MARPOL requirements, the CRB
entry must be endorsed by the local port authority inspector or equivalent.
• Discharge of tank washings must be in accordance with the company procedure and MARPOL Annex II.
• Where wash water has been discharged to a reception facility, a receipt or certificate specifying the
quantity of tank washings transferred, together with the time and date of the transfer, must be kept
together with the CRB.
• Where tank washings had been transferred to the sea, the entries in the CRB must be consistent with
the vessel's operations at the time of the operation when compared to the deck logbook.
• Where an error or omission had been made, the method of correcting or inserting an updated entry
must be made in accordance with the company's procedure.
• All entries in record books should be clearly visible, written by pen and any correction should be applied
following a strike through line and signature. The use of correction fluid or the full erasing of an entry
will lead to a negative observation.
The Inspector will record a negative observation when a pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional
discharge) is recorded in the CRB. Where a vessel is an oil/chemical carrier, MARPOL Annex I cargo
operations must be entered in the Oil Record Book Part II rather than the CRB.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are
always within permitted levels.

liiiiiiiill
- 6.1. Pollution Prevention - Record Books
6.1.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book
Part II, and did the entries contained in the Oil Record Book Part II accurately record the cargo-related
operations required to be documented by MARPOL Annex I?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that all cargo operations are conducted and recorded in compliance with
Objective
MARPOL Annex I.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Documentation.
- Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for maintaining the ORB II in
accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions. The accompanying Officer
must be familiar with the entries required to be made in the ORB II.
__, INTERTANKO's publication A Guide for Correct Entries in the ORB Part II - Cargo/Ballast Operations
2nd Edition, provides guidance on proper and consistent completion of the Oil Record Book (Part II -
Cargo/Ballast Operations) for oil tankers. It sets out instructions and general requirements for making
.......... entries in the ORB Part II and lists the items that must be recorded. It also contains example entries for
commonly used cargo/ballast operations.
Process Note that where the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in ORB
11, instructions for the use of the electronic record book system should be provided, including automatic
backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were
to fail or not be available from the ship's network. T he use of the electronic record book should be
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the
ORB II in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.
,........ The Inspector will review the entries in the ORB II for a recent series (within the previous six months) of
-
cargo operations relating to a single cargo and verify that:
• Each operation must be entered in the ORB II in the correct chronological sequence from the time the
cargo is initially loaded until the completion of cargo tank cleaning and disposal of any generated tank
washings.
• Each entry must include the information required by the instructions in the ORB II.
• Each entry must be signed by the officer in charge of the operation.
• Each page must be counter-signed by the Master.
• Discharge of tank washings must be in accordance with the company procedure and MARPOL Annex
-
I.
• Where wash water has been discharged to a reception facility, a receipt or certificate specifying the
quantity of tank washings transferred, together with the time and date of the transfer, must be kept
together with thP ORR II.
• Where water from a slop tank had been discharged into the sea, the entries in the ORB II were consistent
with the vessel's operations at the time of the operation when compared with the deck logbook.
must be made in accordance with the company's procedure.
,.........
-
Process • All entries in record books should be clearly visible, written by pen and any correction should be applied
continued ... following a strike through line and signature. The use of correction fluid or the full erasing of an entry
• Where a transfer of bilge water or sludge from the machinery space had taken place that a corresponding
entry was recorded in ORB I.
• Any failure of the oil discharge monitoring and control system shall be noted in the ORB II.
If ballast water had been loaded into a cargo tank or cargo tanks after the carriage of crude oil, and the
cargo tank(s) had not been crude oil washed, the Inspector will record a negative observation.
The Inspector will also record a negative observation when a pollution incident (accidental or other
exceptional discharge) is recorded in the ORB II.
Where a vessel is an oil/chemical carrier MARPOL Annex II cargo operations must be entered in the Cargo
Record Book rather than the ORB II.
Hardware

--
6.1. Pollution Prevention - Record Books
-
6.1.3 Were the Master and Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Oil
Record Book Part I, and did the entries contained in the Oil Record Book Part I accurately record the machinery
space operations required to be documented by MARPOL Annex I?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that all machinery space operations are conducted and recorded in compliance
Objective
-
with MARPOL Annex I.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room , Chief Engineer's Office, Documentation.
Tagged Rank Master and Senior Engine Officers.
Verification by
Prac;:tical Guidelines (6.1.3)
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Oil
Record Book Part I in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions. The
accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the entries required to be made in the ORB I.
INTERTANKO publication A Guide for Correct Entries in the ORB Part/- Machinery Space Operations,
4th Edition provides instructions on correct record keeping, listing the types of operation that must be
recorded and highlighting common failures and errors. It also includes Flag Administration requirements
and is structured to facilitate integration in the document management system of any individual Member
of INTERTANKO.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for maintaining the ORB I
in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.
The Inspector will review the entries in the ORB I for a randomly selected period of approximately 10
uninterrupted days (within the previous six months) and verify that:
-
• The collection and transfer or disposal of oil residues (sludge) are consistent with the weekly inventory
of oil residues retained on board. (Code C).
• The disposal of sludge using the incinerator is consistent with the capacity of the incinerator when in
-
sludge-burning mode. (Code 12.3).
• The disposal of bilge water through the 15 ppm equipment is consistent with the capacity of the 15
ppm equipment. (Code D 15.1 ).
• The voluntary declaration of quantities retained on board in oily bilge water holding tanks (Code I) is
consistent with the disposals made (Code D15.1 ).
-- • The capacities of the oil residue tanks correspond with the capacities listed in the IOPP supplement.
Engine Room Log Book(s) for the previous six months should also be kept and ready for review.
The Inspector will also review the entries in the ORB I more generally, and verify that:
-
• Each operation had been entered in the ORB I in the correct chronological sequence. The ORB I must
reflect an accurate record of machinery space operations.
• Each entry includes the information required by the instructions in the ORB I.
• Each entry is signed by the Officer in Charge of the operation.
• Each paqe must be counter-sianed by the Master.

Process • Where an error or omission had been made, they will verify that the method of correcting or inserting
continued ... an updated entry had been made in accordance with the company procedure.
• All entries in record books should be clearly visible, written by pen and any correction should be applied
following a strike through line and signature. The use of correction fluid or the full erasing of an entry
• Recorded operations should not be in violation of MARPOL Annex I.
Where sludge (C 12.2) or bilge water (D 15.3) had been transferred to a cargo area slop tank, there must
be a reciprocal entry in the ORB II.
Where sludge (C 12.1) or bilge water (D15.2) had been disposed of to a reception facility, a receipt or
certificate detailing the quantity of residues or oily mixture transferred along with the date and
time of the transfer must be available with the ORB I.
Where bunkering of fuel oil (H26.3) had taken place, the entries in the ORB I must be consistent with the
bunker delivery note (BDN) provided by the bunker supplier.
If bilge water had been discharged in a Special Area, but the oil filtering equipment is not fitted with an
alarm and an automatic stopping device (IOPP Certificate Supplement 2.2.1) or this equipment is out of
service, the Inspector will raise a negative observation.
Where the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the ORB I,
instructions must be available for the use of the electronic record book system. Data must be automatically
backed up to offline storage and there must be an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were
to fail or not be available from the ship's network. The Declaration from Flag/Class must be available.
Hardware If the oil filtering equipment, its alarm or automatic stopping device was, or had been, out of service, there
must be an entry in the ORB I for when the equipment failed and, if applicable, was returned to service.
If the oil filtering equipment is defective in any respect, the Inspector will enter a negative observation
in the Hardware response of question 6.6.1.

,.......,
6.1.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Garbage Record
Book in accordance with the Garbage Management Plan, and did the entries contained in the Garbage Record
Book accurately record the garbage management activities required to be documented by MARPOL Annex V?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that all machinery space operations are conducted and recorded in compliance
Objective
with MARPOL Annex I.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Documentation.
Tagged Rank Master and Senior Engine Officers.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for maintaining the Garbage
Record Book (GRB) in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag Administration instructions. The
accompanying officer must be familiar with the Garbage Management Plan (GMP). The accompanying
officer must also be familiar with the entries required to be made in the GRB.
The Inspector will interview a Rating to verify their understanding of onboard garbage management
including:
,........, • Garbage segregation onboard.
• Disposal of aerosols and batteries.
• Permitted disposals of garbage to the sea.
• Garbage management practices within their operational department.
-
Process Note that where the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the
GRB, instructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including automatic
backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail
or not be available from the ship's network. The use of the electronic record book should be authorised by
a Declaration from Flag/Class.
__, The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the GRB
in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag Administration instructions.
The Inspector will review the entries in the GRB for a selected period of 10 consecutive days which included
--. a port visit (limited to the previous six months) and verify:
• Special areas.
-- • Distance from coastline.

• Whether the waste had been comminuted or ground.
• Food wastes had been disposed of overboard in accordance with restrictions.
- • Each operation had been entered in the GRB in the correct chronological sequence.
• Each entry included the information required by the instructions in the GRB.
• Each entry was signed by the Officer in Charge of the operation.
• Each page was counter-signed by the Master.
-
had been made in accordance with the company's procedure.
-
Process Where garbage had been disposed of to a reception facility, they will verify that a receipt or certificate
continued ... detailing the quantity of garbage by category transferred along with the date and time of the
transfer was available with the GRB.
• Where an error or omission had been made, the Inspector will verify that the method of correcting or
inserting an updated entry had been made in accordance with the company's procedure. All entries in
record books should be clearly visible, written by pen and any correction should be applied following a
strike through line and signature. The use of correction fluid or the full erasing of an entry will lead to
a negative observation.
Where necessary, they will review the GMP.
They will also cross check entries in the GRB with the Bridge Logbook.
INTERTANKO's Environment Committee has released 'Guidance on Waste Management for Tankers' which
takes into account the latest IMO requirements on the discharge of garbage to the sea and provides
additional guidance for items that are either not covered in MARPOL Annex V and its Guidelines, or
that require additional management consideration from a practical perspective. The Guide is available on
INTERTANKO's website.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the garbage collection areas, including the incinerator space and verify that:
• Garbage is being stored and segregated in a safe and hygienic manner in accordance with the GMP.
• Dangerous or toxic waste items, such as aerosols and batteries, are being properly collected and
segregated to prevent them from being incinerated or disposed of ashore with general waste.
TMSA KPI 10.1 .3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are

6.1.5. Were the Master and Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for maintaining the Ozone
depleting Substances Record Book, and did the entries contained in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record
Book accurately record the operations and emissions required to be documented by MARPOL Annex VI?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure all operations involving ozone-depleting substances, including any deliberate

Objective
-
and non-deliberate emissions, are recorded in compliance with MARPOL Annex VI.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Tagged Rank Master & Senior and Junior Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures that described the requirements
-
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, either in paper or electronic format,
in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag Administration guidance.
Process electronic record book for recording the entries required in the
Note that where the vessel is using an
Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, instructions for the use of the electronic record book should
-- be provided, including automatic backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data
recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship's network. The use of the electronic
record book should be authorised by a Declaration from Flag/Class. The Ozone-depleting Substances
Record Book may form part of an existing logbook or electronic record book.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that described the
-
requirements for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, either in paper or
electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag Administration guidance.
They will review the list of equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances included in the
Supplement to the IAPP Certificate, section 2.1.
They will select an item of equipment listed and review the relevant maintenance records.
The Inspector will review the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book and verify that:
• Any equipment recharge, repair or maintenance noted had been correctly recorded in the Ozone
depleting Substances Record Book.
-
• The supply of ozone-depleting substances to the ship, or discharge of ozone-depleting substances to
land-based reception facilities, had been recorded in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, as
appropriate.
They will also review the entries in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book (for the previous six
-
months) more generally, and verify that:
• Each operation had been entered in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book in the correct
chronological sequence.
• Each entry included the information required by the company's procedures.
• Each entry was signed by the Officer in Charge of the operation.
• Each page was counter-signed by the Master.
• Where an error or omission had been made, he will verify that the method of correcting or inserting an
-
updated entry was in accordance with the company procedures.
The entries in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book must be supported by a receipt or certificate
for the discharge of ozone-depleting substances to land-based reception facilities.
-
The Inspector will review the maintenance records for the equipment on board containing ozone-depleting
substances for the previous six months.
Hardware

6.1.6. Were the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 for the control of NOx
and associated emissions in good order?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
To ensure the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI for the control of
Objective
NOx and associated emissions are maintained as required.
ROVIQ Sequence Chief Engineer's Office, Documentation, Engine Control Room.
Tagged Rank Senior and Junior Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for maintaining the documents
and records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the NOx abatement system installed on board and
its operation.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the actions to be taken in the event that a NOx abatement
system fitted suffered a failure that could not be rectified within one hour.
The accompanying Engineer Officer must also be familiar with the strategy for monitoring the catalyst
condition/degradation in a Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) system installed on board, and/or its
implementation and associated equipment.
Process Note that where the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in
the record books, instructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including
automatic backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system
were to fail or not be available from the ship's network. The use of the electronic record book should be
The record books may form part of an existing logbook or electronic record book.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the
documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.
They will review the IAPP Certificate and sight the Technical Files for diesel engines listed in paragraph
2.2.1 of the vessel's International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.
They will further review the Record Books of Engine Parameters for those engines required to undergo
Engine Parameter Checks at initial and subsequent surveys.
They will review the records of diesel engine Tier and on/off status on entering/leaving a NECA
where applicable.
The Inspector will also review the Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) Record Book where applicable and
will want to see records of the discharge of solid residues and bleed-off water from the EGR equipment
where fitted.
Kecoros must be available or continuous or spot-checked NOx levels associated with an SCR system fitted
on board.
The Technical Files for diesel engines listed in paragraph 2.2.1 of the vessel's International Air Pollution
Prevention (IAPP) Certificate should be readily available for Inspector's review.
-
Hardware

--
6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations
6.2.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the arrangements to drain the cargo purnproorn bilges in
the event of flooding or accidental leakage, and were these arrangements in good order?
,__
Question Category
••••
,........, Process)
--
To ensure that the cargo pump room bilge pump could be operated when the pumproom
Objective
was flooded.
-
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for draining the pumproom
-
bilges.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the location and purpose of the remote controls
for the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify that she/he is familiar with the pipeline set
up to pump the pumproom bilges to a slop or cargo tank when the pumproom was flooded.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for draining the pumproom
bilges.
-- The company procedures must provide guidance on:

• Transferring bilge contents to cargo/slop tanks or other containment tanks without risk of pollution.
• Pumping out the pumproom in the event of flooding, including controlling the bilge pump and suction
and discharge valves remotely from the upper deck.
• Periodic testing of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges
The Inspector will also review the shipboard emergency response plan for pumproom flooding.
They will inspect the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges, including the controls on platforms
above the freeboard deck or the upper deck and verify that:
• Valves required to remain open are correctly set.
• Valves or controls are marked with their purpose.
Where necessary, the Inspector will review the ORB II for records of the disposal of pumproom bilge
accumulations.
Where necessary, they will review records of tests of the arrangements for draining the pumproom
bilges.
Hardware Means must be available to operate the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves remotely.
Valves, including steam delivery and condensate return valves, are required to remain in the open position to
-
permit emergency bilge pumping and means to open them remotely must be provided. It is recommended
subject valves to be marked to be kept open at all times and painted in a different colour.
The means available to operate the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves remotely must not be
-
defective.
The bilge pump shall not be defective.
-
-
6.2.2. Were cargo system overboard and sea suction valves checked and verified as closed and secured prior
to commencement of cargo transfer and, where provided, were sea valve-testing arrangements in order
and regularly monitored for leakage?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure all precautions are taken to prevent cargo spillages through cargo system
Objective overboard and sea suction valves.
-
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Pumproom, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to prevent cargo spillages
through cargo system overboard and sea suction valves.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company's procedures to prevent cargo spillages
through cargo system overboard and sea suction valves.
T he company's procedures must include detailed guidance on:
• Taking ballast into cargo tanks via sea-valves.
• Line displacement with sea water.
Precautionary measures must include:
• Checks that cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and secured prior to
commencement of cargo transfer.
• Checks of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage.
• Tests of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between dry-docks.
• The maximum test pressure to which sea valve arrangements should be submitted .
Records of these checks and tests will be verified by the Inspector.
Suitable anti-pollution notices should be posted next to cargo system overboard and sea suction valves
and at the pump operating position.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect cargo system overboard valves, cargo system sea valves and testing arrangements
where fitted.
Cargo system overboard valves and/or cargo system sea valves must be secured using a Lockout/Tag-out
system prior to commencement of cargo transfer.
Where provided, in-line blanks must be inserted.
Where a Lock-ouVfag-out system is not practical as with hydraulic valves, suitable marking to indicate
clearly that the valves are to remain closed must be used.
The leak-detecting arrangement for the direct sea suction valves must be fitted with a pressure/vacuum
gauge, which must not be damaged or defective. The arrangements must be positioned so that both
readings and samples can be taken from a point far enough above the pumproom lower pla'lform level
that there is no possibility of human exposure to gas concentrations which may accumulate below the
floor plates.
T MSA KPI 6.1 .2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment

........
- 6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations
6.2.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for inspections and pressure tests of
the bunker oil (HFO and MOO) pipeline system, and had the tests been performed and the results suitably
recorded?
Question Category
••••
- 0 a
Process)
rw��
000
Objective To ensure the bunker pipeline system is regularly inspected and tested.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Main Deck, Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
,.......... Practical Guidelines (6.2.3)
- Human
Process
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for the inspection and pressure
testing of the bunker pipeline system including the testing method.
The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the inspection and
pressure testing of the bunker pipeline system.
The procedures for the inspection and pressure testing of the bunker pipeline system must include guidance
on the:
• Equipment to be inspected/tested.
• Inspection and test frequency.
• Testing method(s).
-- • The test pressure.

• Disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.
-
• Records to be kept.
The Inspector will review the records of inspection and testing of the bunker pipeline system, the records of
testing the bunker system relief valve, where fitted, and records of testing tank level alarms, where fitted.
The bunker pipeline system must be tested:
• To 100% of MAWP within the last 12 months.
• To 150% of MAWP twice in the last 5 years.
-
The Inspector will also review records of the disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.
The pressure test should be hydrostatic and this to be clearly defined in the company's policy.
Hardware During the inspection, the Inspector will observe the condition of the bunker pipeline system and associated
equipment.
He will write a negative observation if a section of pipeline, pressure gauge, valve, remotely operated valve,
tank level alarm or emergency shutdown device that form part of the bunker pipeline system is defective
in any respect.
He will verify pipelines had been marked with the date and pressure of the last test.
TMSA KP! 6.1.2 requires procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are
in place for all vessel types within the fleet.
--
-
6.3.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for the safe operation of the ballast
water management system (BWMS), and was the equipment in satisfactory condition and used in accordance
with the company procedures and manufacturer's instructions?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
To ensure that ballast is always handled safely in accordance with company's procedures
Objective and manufacturer's instructions.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Pumproom, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer and verify their familiarity with:
• Company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BWMS.
• The hazards from the operation of the equipment and the handling and storage of any chemicals used.
• The actions in the event of the failure of the Ballast Water Management System (BWMS).
Process The Inspector will sight and where necessary, review company procedures for the operation, inspection
and maintenance of the BWMS.
These company procedures must include guidance on:
• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the BWMS.
• Who is permitted to use the BWMS.
• Identification of hazards to the crew presented by the operation of the BWMS.
• Mitigation measures for hazards presented by the operation of the BWMS.
• Use, handling and storage of any active substances, such as chemicals, used by the system for
disinfection or neutralisation.
• Safe disposal of any by-products of the process.
• The possible effects of water density, water temperature and suspended solids on the operation of the
BWMS.
• Actions in the event of the failure of the BWMS.
• Records to be kept of the operation of the BWMS.
Where necessary, the Inspector will review the maintenance and inspection records of the BWMS and
will verify the operation and safety manual for the BWMS.
It is recommended that maintenance of the BWMS be part of vessel's E-PMS.
In the event that installation of BWMS was performed after vessel's delivery, it is recommended that this is
to be effectively managed via MOC and any affected plans be updated.
They will also, where necessary, review the records of the operation of the BWMS.
Note that where the entry procedures for the space containing the BWMS posted at the entrance are
not in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure contained in the SMS for such a space, or
entry into the space containing the BWMS was authorised during the inspection without tull compliance
with the enclosed space entry procedure, the Inspector will make a negative observation in the Process
response tool of question 5.5.1. L

-
6.3. Ballast Operations
Practical Guidelines
- Hardware The Inspector will inspect the BWMS control panel and verify that the system is operational with no
apparent faults or alarms.
They will further review available self-monitoring data to verify satisfactory operation.
-
They will also inspect the visible parts of the BWMS and verify that it is intact and not modified in any
respect.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the BWMS is not fully operational, including pumps, filters
and back-flush arrangements.
They will also raise a negative observation if the BWMS self-monitoring data indicates that the equipment
-
had not operated correctly at the last ballast/deballast operation; if the BWMS had been modified and/or
by-passed; if the BWMS was defective in any respect; if there is insufficient stock of the required chemicals
for injection
TMSA KPI 6.2.3 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of ballast handling operations, which
includes ballast water exchange and ballast water treatment.
__, Comments/SMS Reference
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.........
-
---, Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 211
6.4.1. Were the Master, Officers and ratings familiar with company procedures for the removal of small
quantities of oil or chemical spilled and contained on deck, and was suitable response equipment available,
in satisfactory condition and effectively deployed?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure any oil or chemical spills contained on deck are promptly and safely cleaned up.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Rating.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers and deck Ratings.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical
spilled and contained on deck.
The Inspector will interview a Rating to verify they are familiar with the location, purpose and safe use
of the oil/chemical spill clean-up equipment and PPE provided for dealing with small spills, including the
specific PPE required for the cargoes being carried.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP)
or Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plan (SMPEP).
They will sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical
spilled and contained on deck.
Instructions must be available for the safe use of the spill clean-up equipment, including PPE requirements.
Company procedures must contain:
• A provision that no chemical agent should be used in response to pollution on the sea without
authorisation of the appropriate coastal State and that such authorisation should also be requested,
when required, for use of containment or recovery equipment.
• Guidance on the proper disposal of removed oil or chemical and clean-up materials.
The Inspector will review the inventory of spill clean-up equipment provided on board and the records
of periodic inspections.

6.4. Deck Area Pollution Prevention
-
Hardware During the main deck inspection, the Inspector will verify that suitable spill clean-up equipment is
available at the manifold.
-
He will also:
• Review the arrangement, positioning and condition of the spill clean-up equipment.
• Inspect the stored spill clean-up equipment and confirm that actual quantities broadly agree with the
inventory. Stored equipment should be unobstructed, properly labelled and ready for use.
• Review the means for the rapid disposal of oil or chemical at the aft end of the main deck on both sides
of the vessel.
-
• Where dump valves are installed at the after end of the main deck, he will verify that:
o the valve operating controls would remain above the surface of an accumulation of spilled liquid
o the valve operating controls can be accessed without the need to wade into an accumulation of
spilled liquid
o the opening of the dump valves would result in the draining of accumulated liquid at any state of
list and trim or vapour pressure within the tank and, if not, the limitations that apply are clearly
posted near the location of the dump valves.
Where the transfer of spilled oil or chemical to a cargo/slop tank is not an option, there must be alternative
means to collect spills and water from the deck into an enclosed container with a capacity of at least 2m3 •
........ Hand scoops, shovels or buckets provided must be of the non-sparking type .
- Plastic or other non-metallic portable drip trays placed under a tanker/terminal manifold connection must
be bonded.
Where it is safe to do so, the Inspector will request that at least one portable pump is demonstrated and
-
that it could create and maintain suction.
Portable pumps must be:
• Bonded (earthed) to the vessel's structure.
• Mounted to prevent movement and subsequent damage during operation.
• Ready for immediate use e.g. air must be available.
• Arranged in such a way as to not discharge to a cargo/slop tank via the insertion of the spill pump
discharge hose through a tank opening such as a sighting port.
• Portable pumps should not be used for any other operation/transfer.
--
For non-inerted vessels, the portable pumps must be provided with a connection to a full-depth sounding
pipe or other connection which avoids the free fall of liquid in the receiving tank.
-
The Inspector will write a negative observation if:
• There is no permanently fitted spill tank with suitable means of draining, or a portable drip tray, fitted
under each tanker/terminal manifold connection.
• A plastic or other non-metallic portable drip tray had been placed under a tanker/terminal manifold
-
connection without bonding.
• An interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location and use of the oil/chemical spill clean-up material
and PPE provided, including the specific PPE required for the cargoes being carried.
__, Comments/SMS Reference
.........
-
6.4.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for the disposal of accumulations of
water contaminated with oil and/or marine pollutants in the forecastle and other internal spaces, and had
the procedures been implemented?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure any water contaminated with oil or marine p ollutants generated in the forecastle
Objective and other internal spaces is disposed of properly.
ROVIQ Sequence Pumproom, Forecastle, Steering Gear.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily
waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space bilge wells.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily
waste or other marine pollutants accumulating in internal space bilge wells.
The company's procedures must include:
• Identification of relevant spaces.
• Measures to minimise oily waste generation.
• Monitoring of bilge levels, by inspection or sensor/alarm.
• Arrangements for proper disposal of any oily and/or marine pollutant waste generated.
• Record keeping.
The Inspector will review the records of the disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated
in internal space bilge wells.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect bilge-wells in the forecastle and other internal spaces and note the
arrangements for monitoring and disposal of the contents and arrangements to prevent unauthorised
discharge.
The Inspector will verify the operation of the high-level bilge alarm.
Where pumps or ejectors are fitted, pollution prevention notices must be posted and the overboard
valves must be secured against accidental opening. Testing and maintenance of such equipment must
be included in the vessel's maintenance plan.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the bilge-well of an internal space contains a significant
quantity of oily waste or marine pollutant.

-
6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention
,.......,
6.5.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the emergency arrangements to pump out the machinery
space bilges in the event of flooding, and were these arrangements prominently marked and in good order?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- To ensure that the machinery space bilges could be pumped out promptly in the event of
Objective
a flooding situation.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room.
......... Verification by
- Human The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer or any other available Engineer Officer to verify their
understanding of how the machinery space bilges would be pumped out in an emergency utilising the
-
various systems provided onboard. This should include the sequence of opening and closing valves
and starting the appropriate pump based on the scenarios where:
• There had been a failure of the main seawater circulating system pipework.
• There had been flooding from any source other than a failure in the main seawater circulating system
-
pipework.
The accompanying or interviewed Engineer Officer must be familiar with:
• The location and purpose of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct suctions and
overboard valves.
• The location and purpose of the emergency bilge suction.
• The sequence of opening and closing valves and starting the appropriate pump to effectively commence
-
pumping out the bilges in an emergency.
• MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures in an emergency
flooding situation.
• Company requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves to prevent unauthorised discharge of
oil or oily mixtures.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company's procedures for the use of the
-- emergency bilge pumping arrangements in the machinery spaces.

• The use of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct suctions and overboard valves.
• The use of the emergency bilge suction.
• MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures necessary for the
purpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving life at sea or resulting from damage to a ship or its
equipment.
• Ship-specific requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves, depending on the ship's equipment
-
and design, to prevent unauthorised discharge of oil or oily mixtures.
The Inspector will also request to see the shipboard emergency response plan for machinery space
flooding, the ORB I and the Engine Room Logbook.
-
Continued ovGrlGaf...

Hardware The Inspector will inspect the emergency bilge pumping arrangements in the machinery spaces,
including the associated bilge direct suction valves, overboard valves and the emergency bilge
suction valve and verify that:
• The emergency suction valve is readily accessible.
• Each suction and/or discharge valve required to be opened and/or closed to permit the emergency
pumping of the engine room bilges is clearly marked as to its purpose.
• Where an emergency bilge suction could be served by multiple pumps there must be a clear indication
of which pump should be started to take suction.
• Warning signs to prevent accidental opening of the emergency overboard discharge valve(s) were
posted at appropriate locations.
• Emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves must be sealed in accordance with company
procedures. The seals must be easily breakable. The Inspector may review the records of numbered
seals in the relevant logbook.
The emergency bilge pumping system or lines shall not be defective in any respect.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is evidence that the emergency bilge discharge
arrangements had been used for the disposal of daily machinery space bilge accumulations.
The specific pump that is to be used during engine room flooding should be mentioned on the contingency
plan checklist.
equipment.

6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention
--
6.5.2. Were the Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for the safe use of the incinerator, and
was the incinerator in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company's procedure and in
compliance with MARPOL?
Question Category
- ••••
Process)
0 rw�u
000
- Objective
To ensure that the disposal of garbage and sludge using the incinerator is always carried
out safely and in accordance with the requirements of MARPOL.
-- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Engine Room, Interview - Engineer Officer.
Senior and Junior Engine Officers.
-
Verification by
- Human The Inspector will interview an Engineer Officer who is responsible for the supervision of the incinerator to
verify her/his understanding and knowledge of:
- • Who is permitted to use the incinerator for garbage disposal and what level of supervision must be
maintained.
• The safe operating procedure for the incinerator.
-- • The PPE that must be used when loading the incinerator with garbage.
• The correct garbage loading process.
• The safety interlocks that prevent the garbage loading chutes from being opened in the incorrect
sequence or while the furnace is in operation.
......... • The location of the incinerator emergency stop controls.
• The items that are prohibited from being incinerated.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the safe
use of the incinerator.
-
• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the incinerator.
• Who is permitted to use the incinerator.
-
• When and where incinerator use is prohibited for either garbage or sludge disposal considering:
- the geographical position of the ship and proximity to land
- any local regulations relating to the use of the incinerator
- onboard operations
- the status of the machinery space.
• What is permitted to be incinerated onboard considering the design of the incinerator and the
restrictions imposed by MARPOL Annex VI.
• The checks that must be conducted before the incinerator is used on each occasion.
• The PPE that must be used when loading garbage into the incinerator.
• The actions that must be taken if the incinerator fails or develops a fault.
-
• The requirement to review a risk assessment for the safe use of the incinerator, paying attention to the
effectiveness of the safety interlocks fitted to garbage loading chutes.
• The requirement to post clear and simple operating instructions at the incinerator controls.
-
• The requirement to post a list of items that are not to be incinerated from a safety and/or regulatory
perspective in the 1nc1nerator space.
• How to dispose of incinerator ashes.
• It is recommended that the company's procedures underline the fact that the incinerator should NOT
be in operation when engine room is in UMS mode.
The Inspector will also sight, and where necessary review, the risk assessment for the safe operation
of the incinerator.
The Inspector will want to see the incinerator operation and maintenance manual.
-
Continued overleaf...

Hardware The Inspector will inspect the incinerator and the garbage sorting area and verify that:
• The incinerator appears fully functional and operational.
• Clear and simple operating instructions must be posted at the incinerator controls.
• A list of items that are prohibited from being incinerated must be posted in the incinerator space.
• There must be evidence that prohibited items are being separated and stored for disposal ashore.
• The safety interlocks on the garbage loading chutes must be properly connected and functioning (as
far as possible with the incinerator stopped).
• There is no evidence of localised overheating or leaking of exhaust fumes on the exterior of either the
combustion chambers or the exhaust trunk.
• There is no evidence of oil dripping around the incinerator casing and/or cooling space.
• Inspector will check the incinerator tank in order to verify that its sounding auto-closing device is
operational.
• Inspector will check the sand box in the incinerator area.
• Inspector will raise a negative observation if oily rags are kept close to incinerator area.
Waste shall not be allowed to accumulate around incinerator spaces other than in the correct storage
facilities.
L
- 6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors
- 6.6.1. Were the Master and Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for the use of the oil filtering
equipment, and was the oil filtering equipment in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the
company's procedure, manufacturer's instructions and MARPOL Annex I?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
To ensure that bilge discharges from machinery spaces are always within the limits
-
permitted by MARPOL Annex I.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Engine Room, Interview - Engineer Officer.
-
Tagged Rank Master, Senior and Junior Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will request that an Engineer Officer demonstrates the operation the oil filtering
equipment using the mandatory testing facility (MEPC 107(49) 6.1.1) to verify the proper functioning of:
• The 15 ppm bilge alarm.
• The automatic stopping device.
• The 15 ppm bilge alarm recorder.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Engineer Officer and verify their familiarity with
company procedures and with:
-
• The restrictions on the use of the oil filtering equipment for overboard discharge of bilge water,
particularly as it related to a vessel without an automatic stopping device.
• The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment became defective.
• The actions to take if any part of the oil filtering equipment or its associated pipework was found to
have been tampered with.
• The actions to take if any piping system in the machinery space was suspected as being used to illegally
-
dispose of bilge water or sludge overboard.
It is recommended the test of 15 ppm alarm and three-way operation to be conducted prior to the Inspector
visiting the engine room.
It is recommended the demonstration of alarm function is done by an Engineer.
- Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that describe the use of
the oil filtering equipment provided.
• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the oil filtering equipment.
• Who is permitted to use of the oil filtering equipment.
--
• When the oil filtering equipment may be used for overboard discharge of bilge water, considering
amongst other things:
- whether the equipment was fitted with an automatic stopping device or not. (!OPP Form B section
-
2.2.2)
- operation in a special area, Arctic waters or any other area with potential restrictions and/or
prohibitions
- the company's environmental protection policy.
• The authorisation that must be obtained before the overboard discharge of bilge water may be
conducted.
• The required checks to be conducted on the oil filtering equipment and system pipework before an
- overboard discharge of bilge water may take place.

• The required checks to be conducted on the oil filtering equipment and system pipework upon
completion of an overboard discharge of bilge water.
-
• The actions that must be taken if the oil filtering equipment fails or develops a fault.

Process • The document retention instructions for the 15 ppm bilge alarm data.
Continued • The required frequency of the 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor calibration.
• The co ntrol measures to prevent the unauthorised opening of the oil filtering equipment overboard
valve.
• The control of anti-tampering devices or seals on flanges or pipe connection on the oil filtering
equipment and the connected pipework.
• The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment, its associated system pipework or machinery space
pipework in general was suspected as having been used for the illegal discharge of bilge water or
sludge.
Records of inspection and maintenance of the oil filtering equipment must be available in the
vessel's maintenance plan.
Where necessary, the Inspector will review the manufacturer's instructions for the 15 ppm bilge alarm.
The Inspector will also sight the calibration certificate for the 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor fitted to the
oil filtering equipment. The 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor must have been calibrated within the previous five
years or within the timeframe specified by the manufacturer's operation and maintenance manual, where
this is less than five years.
Where the vessel is exempt from being fitted with an oil filtering device, the Inspector will verify that:
• The vessel was trading within the limitations identified by MARPOL Annex I 14.5.1.
• The IOPP Certificate was endorsed appropriately (14.5.3.4).
• There was no evidence that the machinery space piping was being used inappropriately for bilge water
or sludge disposal.
• The Engineer Officers were familiar with the machinery space bilge water and sludge management
procedures.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the oil filtering equipment and its associated pipework and verify that:
• The overboard valve is secured and sealed against accidental opening.
• A warning sign is posted at the overboard valve indicating that opening the valve is prohibited
without the authority of the Chief Engineer or the Master.
• There are no signs or indicators that the flanges and pipe connections on the oil filtering equipment
and associated piping had been tampered with.
• That each flange or connection that could permit inappropriate use of the oil filtering system or its
disposal overboard is sealed to prevent tampering.
• Inspector will check the internal memory of oil filtering equipment to:
o verify that 15 ppm alarm was tested before the last disposal
o the time and date of the system are properly set
o the capacity of the overboard pump does not exceed her nominal capacity as indicated in the IOPP
certificate.
Where the oil filtering equipment is, or had recently been, defective, the Inspector will verify that an entry
had been made in the ORB I to record the time the equipment was taken out of service and, where
applicable, returned to service.
-

6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors
6.6.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for the use of the oil discharge monitoring
and control system, and was the oil discharge monitoring and control system in satisfactory condition and
used in accordance with the company's procedures, manufacturer's instructions and MARPOL Annex I?
- Question Category
••••
a
Process)
- 0 rw�� 000
To ensure that discharges from cargo and ballast spaces are always within the limits
Objective
-
permitted by MARPOL Annex I.
ROVIQ Sequence Pumproom, Main Deck, Cargo Control Room.
- Verification by
-- Ht1man The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer and verify her/his familiarity with:
-
• The test run and calibration function of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.
• The actions to take if the oil discharge monitoring and control system became defective.
• The company procedure for using the oil discharge monitoring and control system in manual
mode.
• The actions to take if during overboard discharge the dedicated overboard lookout reported sighting
an excessive discharge of oil or an oil slick astern of the vessel.
Process The Inspector will sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the use
of the oil discharge monitoring and control system provided.
,........., The procedures must include:
-
• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.
• Who is permitted to use the oil discharge monitoring and control system.
• When the oil discharge monitoring and control system may be used for overboard discharge of oily
-
mixtures, considering amongst other things:
• whether the vessel was in a special area
• the proximity to land
- the vessel's route
- the operational status of the oil discharge monitoring and control system
........ - the company environmental protection policy.
• The authorisation that must be obtained before the overboard discharge of oily mixtures may be
-
conducted.
• The required checks to be conducted on the oil discharge monitoring and control system before an
overboard discharge of oily mixtures may take place.
• The level of supervision and lookout required during an overboard discharge of an oily mixture:
- in the cargo control room
- on deck
- on the bridge.
• The additional permissions that must be obtained before using the oil discharge monitoring and control
system with any of the automatic inputs and control functions in manual mode.
• The required checks to be conducted on the oil discharoe monitoring and control system upon
completion of an overboard discharge of oily mixtures.
• The actions that must be taken if the oil discharge monitoring and control system fails or develops a
-
fault.
• The print-out or electronic data retention instructions for the oil discharge monitoring and control
system recorder data.
-
• The required frequency of the oil content meter sensor calibration.
• The required frequency of the oil discharge monitoring and control system test functions.
• The control measures to prevent the unauthorised opening of the oil discharge monitoring and control
-
system overboard valve(s).

Process The Inspector will also want to see the manufacturer's maintenance and operation manuals for the
Continued oil discharge monitoring and control system.
The Inspector will review the critical spares as recommended by manufacturers to ensure that are available
onboard.
The Inspector will check that the time and date of the system are properly set.
Where necessary, the Inspector will review the maintenance and inspection records.
The Inspector will also need to see legible print-outs of ODME data or data displayed from memory,
the ORB II and the Bridge Logbook.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the oil discharge monitoring and control system control panel and verify that
• The system is operational with no apparent faults or alarms.
• The recording device was printing the data legibly, or
• It is possible to store and subsequently download the data from memory.
• The sensor input for speed and position is accurate.
• The time and date is synchronised to GMT.
During the deck inspection, the Inspector will inspect the visible parts of the oil discharge monitoring and
control system and verify that it is intact and not modified in any respect.
Where the vessel had conducted an overboard discharge of oily mixtures during the previous six months,
the Inspector will inspect the recorder print out/memory and verify that a selected discharge had been
undertaken with the system in automatic mode with all sensors providing an automatic input.
Where a discharge of oily mixtures had taken place with the oil discharge monitoring and control system
or any of its required data feeds in manual mode, the Inspector will:
• Inspect the ORB II and verify that an entry had been made to record that the oil discharge monitoring
and control system was defective.
• Request documented confirmation that shore-based management had been advised of the
failure of the system and that approval for continuing the discharge in manual mode had been provided.
• Request evidence that the oil discharge monitoring and control system had been repaired and
demonstr.ated as fully operational as soon as possible after failure.
Where the oil discharge monitoring and control system is, or had recently been, defective, the Inspector
will verify that an entry had been made in the ORB II to record the time the equipment was taken out of
service and, where applicable, returned to service.
Where the oil discharge monitoring and control system is, or had been, out of service but where no entry
had been made in the ORB II, the Inspector will make a negative observation under question 6.1.2 in
addition to the observations that will be relevant under this question relating to Hardware, Process and
Human element as appropriate.

-
-
.......,
.........
-
-
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.........
- Chapter 7.
- Maritime Security
Chapter 7. Maritime Security
7.1.1. Was security threat and risk assessment an integral part of voyage planning, and did the passage plan
contain security-related information for each leg of the voyage?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
Objective To ensure voyage planning always addresses security considerations.
Tagged Rank Master, SSO.
Verification by
Human
Process The Inspector will sight UKHO or equivalent security charts and industry best management practice
guidance (BMP) publications and/or regional guidance (e.g., ReCAAP Guidance). He will also want to
see company-specific guidance.
The Inspector will review the passage plan for a recently completed voyage including security-related
notations on voyage charts and the company passage plan appraisal form checklist for a recently
completed voyage. This must be a voyage-specific plan and include any self-protection measures
needed.
During passage planning preparation, current high-risk/piracy areas should be considered/ identified and
if possible or practicable, avoided.
It is recommended that the passage plan includes the transit of high-risk areas at high speed.
The Inspector will also review the security risk assessment for the same voyage.
The risk assessment should be specific for the proposed voyage (not generic) and updated with the latest
available industry best practice and information, as well as details of recent piracy activity.
The Inspector will review, if necessary, the records of the same voyage in the Bridge Logbook.
The Inspector will want to see bridge security cards and/or checklists.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 13.2.1 requires that formal risk assessments of company activities are undertaken to identify and
mitigate potential security threats.

-
7.2. Ship Hardening and access control
- 7.2.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for hardening the vessel when
entering areas of increased security risk, and was there a Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) available?
Question Category
Process)
- 0 rw�� 0.
000
• @
To ensure the vessel can be hardened effectively if scheduled to enter an area of increased
Objective
security risk.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Exterior Decks, Main Deck, Interview - Security Officer.
Verification by
- Practical Guidelines (7 .2.1)
Human The Inspector will interview the Ship Security Officer to verify her/his familiarity with the company
procedures for hardening the vessel when entering areas of increased security risk, particularly the Vessel
-
Hardening Plan (VHP). The VHP may be an integral part of the ship security plan and the SSO need only
show the non-confidential documents providing proof of implementation.
Process The Inspector will sight and where necessary, review the company procedures for hardening the vessel
when entering areas of increased security risk. These should be in accordance with the BMP guidance and
any other defensive measures that may be considered for use.
The Inspector will review the VHP which must be ship-specific, records of implementation of the VHP
such as logbooks, work planning records, reports, photographs etc., the inventory of hardening
materials and inspection and maintenance records for security equipment such as water cannons,
CCT\/, infrared detection cameras, etc.
-
Where the VHP is reported to be an integral part of the ship security plan and confidential, the Inspector
will want to see the date of the last review/major changes to the plan to verify that a VHP plan exist.
If the hardening plan requires the emergency escape door of E/R to be locked from outside, an alternative
-
procedure of using the emergency door in High Risk Areas should be available.
Hardware The Inspector will, during the inspection, inspect the hardening materials currently stored on board.
-
Safety guidance on their use should be available (i.e. safety guidance for working with razor wire or near
ship's side).
If the vessel is hardened in accordance with the VHP at the time of the inspection, the Inspector will verify
that LSA and FFA is accessible and unobstructed.
Inspector will verify hardening measures affecting safety, as indicated by the following examples:
......... • Equipment fitted to allow externally locked doors to be opened from inside should be operational.
• Emergency escape for the engine room should not be locked from outside.
TMSA KPI 13.2.1 requires that formal risk assessments of company activities are undertaken to identify and
mitigate potential security threats.
-
7 .2.2. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedures to control access to the
vessel in port and to ensure the safety of visitors, and were these procedures effectively implemented?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 trrw1U
000
To ensure access to the vessel is controlled at all times, and that all visitors are provided
Objective with an overview of the hazards present and the safety precautions to observe while they
are on board.
ROVIQ Sequence Approaching Vessel, Forecastle, Main Deck, Mooring Decks.
Verification by
Human A continuous gangway watch must be maintained. The gangway watchman must be familiar with
the company procedures including the Ship Security Plan, to control access to the vessel in port and to
ensure the safety of visitors.
If both gangway and pilot ladder are rigged, watch should be available at both stations.
Visitors to the vessel must be required to provide photo identification and a valid ID.
Records must be maintained of visitors boarding and leaving the vessel.
Visitor baggage must be searched in accordance with the company procedures for the appropriate
security level.
Visitors must be escorted from the gangway to the accommodation.
It is recommended control areas in accommodation to be marked with warning signs preventing
unauthorised access to visitor.
The Inspector will sight the company procedures to control access to the vessel in port, to ensure the
safety of visitors. He will sight the visitor Log and visitor Information Card.
Visitors to the vessel must be provided with an overview of the hazards present and the safety precautions
to observe while they are on board, (which may be via a Visitor Information Card), including:
• Smoking regulations (including e-cigarettes).
• Restrictions on movement around the vessel.
• Restrictions on mobile phones and portable electronic equipment.
• Briefing on the hazards of the cargo and any operations taking place e.g. loading, tank-cleaning or
gas-freeing.
• The use of appropriate PPE while onboard.
• Emergency signals and actions in the case of an emergency.
• Drug and alcohol policy.
During the course of the inspection, the Inspector will observe the arrangements for regular patrols of
the deck to monitor potential unauthorised access points e.g. hawse pipes, mooring ropes etc.
When boarding the vessel, the Inspector will observe the security arrangements and induction and
·familiari:,ation procedures for visitors.
Process The Master must provide the terminal with a list of approved visitors, including Agents, Surveyors, Loading
Masters and the SIRE Inspector.
Where CCTV systems are provided, CCTV coverage of the vessel access points must be monitored.
Hardware A notice board must be provided at the access point to the vessel displaying the appropriate warnings to
visitors, including the particular risks from toxic or hazardous cargoes being handled and the operations
taking place.
TMSA KPI 13.1.3 requires that measures have been developed to mitigate and respond to all identified threats to
vessels and shore-based locations.

- 7.3. Communications and Monitoring
7 .3.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with regional maritime security reporting requirements and
operation of the ship security alert system (SSAS) and had this equipment been regularly tested?
Question Category
••••
- (Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type {Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
- To ensure that the vessel staff have knowledge of regional maritime security reporting
Objective
and that the SSAS works.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Internal Accommodation.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers, SSO.
Verification by
- Human The Inspector will verify with the Master or SSO that:
• They are familiar with the company procedures for voluntary security reporting in VRAs.
-
• SSAS, LRIT and dedicated standalone security communications equipment, if fitted, is in
satisfactory condition, regularly tested and records maintained.
• The communications plans may be an integral part of the ship security plan and the SSO need only
show the non-confidential documents providing proof of implementation.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify their awareness of the:
• Purpose and operation of the SSAS, LRIT and dedicated standalone security communications equipment,
if fitted.
• 24-hour contact details of the CSO.
Process The Inspector will sight the 24-hour contact details for the CSO which must be posted appropriately.
T he Inspector will verify that participation in operational VRAs had been considered during each passage
planning phase, and;
• Where security reporting to VRAs is required by company procedures, there must be evidence that
reports had been made as required, or
• Where security reporting to VRAs is not to be made in accordance with company procedures the
passage plan must be annotated with the actions to take, if any, when passing reporting points.
-
Hardware Items of security communication equipment shall not be defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 13.1.5 requires that procedures include the reporting of potential security threats and actual security
-
incidents.
........
.........
-
7.4.1. Did the Ship Security Officer (SSO) have a valid Certificate of Proficiency and a full understanding of
their role, and were ship security records of port calls being maintained as required by SOLAS?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective To ensure the SSO is trained and qualified, and required security records are maintained.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Interview - Security Officer, Interview - Rating.
Verification by
Human The designated SSO must be a member of the crew.

The SSO must have a full understanding of her/his role, responsibilities, and duties. They must be familiar
with:
• The Purpose of the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
• Operation, testing and maintenance of security equipment on board.
• Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP).
• Identity, role and contact details of the CSO.
• The role of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO).
The interviewed Rating must have knowledge of security procedures or response to security alarms.
Process The SMS must clearly designate who should be SSO.
-
The SMS must contain a description of the role of the SSO, and a list of their duties.
The SSO must have a valid Certificate of Proficiency.
There must be evidence of regular security inspections of the vessel by the SSO.
Ship security records must be maintained as required by SOLAS.
The Inspector will request to sight the ship security records for the last 10 port calls.
Hardware
TMSA 13.2.2 requires that the personnel responsible for security receive training appropriate to their role and the
company's activities.
.......
-
- 7.5. Cyber Security
7.5.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for cyber security risk management,
and had these procedures been fully implemented?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
-- 0
-
To ensure the vessel has in place effective technical and procedural measures to protect
Objective
against a cyber incident and ensure continuity of operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room.
- Tagged Rank
Verification by
Master and Officers.
- Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for cyber risk management.
The Inspector will interview the Officer with responsibility for cyber risk management on board to
-
confirm the existence of:
• The company procedures for cyber risk management.
-
• The inventory/register of sensitive IT/OT systems fitted on board.
• Records of approval for external local or remote access to sensitive IT/OT systems.
• Contact details for technical support from the operator's IT department or external IT contractors.
• Records of cyber security training.
• Cyber contingency plans in hard copy.
Officers must be familiar with the back-up arrangements for OT systems critical to navigation and
propulsion.
There must be evidence of formal approval for a technician observed on board to access sensitive equipment
such as ECDIS, etc.
There must be evidence that portable media in use had been checked for malware etc. in a computer not
connected to the ship's control network.
Process Company procedures for cyber risk management must:
• Identified the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and on
-
board.
• Identified the IT and OT systems at risk on board.
• Describe technical protection measures to protect against a cyber incident.
--
• Describe procedural protection measures to protect against a cyber incident.
Company procedures must designate who on board should have an administrator profile and/or who
-
should manage user profiles.
Cyber security awareness must be actively promoted on board.
Hard copies of cyber contingency plans must be provided. Cyber contingency plans must address
the loss of:
• Function or reliability of navigational equipment e.g., ECDIS.
.......... • Availability or integrity of external data sources such as GNSS .
-
• Connectivity with the shore including GMDSS communications.
• Control systems for criLical ::,ystems sucti d:, propulslon, steering etc.
-
-
-
Practical Guidelines (7 .5.1) Continued ...
Hardware During the tour of the vessel, the Inspector will inspect equipment to verify physical cyber security
measures are in place.
Space containing sensitive IT or OT control equipment must be securely locked.
Physical access to sensitive user equipment (such as exposed USB ports on bridge systems) must be
secured or disabled. USB hubs should not be used unless they are properly controlled.
Back-up facilities must be available and used.
On-board computers must be protected by anti-virus software.
Anti-virus software must be regularly updated.
Application software must be regularly updated with upgrades and security patches.
Only a Senior Officer must have an administrator profile.
User profiles must be allowed computer workstations to be used only for their intended purpose.
User profiles must be actively managed.
Generic user profiles and passwords must not be passed on at crew changes.
Usernames and passwords must not be posted at workstations.
Common User Profiles (instead of Super User) should be activated for Auxiliary Boilers control station.
The key for activation of ECR alarms off-scan mode should be in possession of Chief Engineer.
TMSA KPI 13.1.2 requires that the company has documented procedures in place to identify security threats
applicable to vessels trading areas and shore-based locations.

-
-
--
-
Chapter 8.
Cargo and
- Ballast Systems
Chapter 8. Cargo and Ballast Systems
8.1.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of the inert gas
system, and had the inert gas system been used in accordance with ISGOTI guidance, with cargo tanks
maintained in an inert condition at all times, except when it was necessary to be gas-free for entry?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 1Wrw1U
0 0 0
To ensure the inert gas system is used in accordance with ISGOTI guidance, and cargo
Objective tanks are always maintained in an inert condition, except when it is necessary to be gas
free for entry.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the
vessel's inert gas system.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the
inert gas system.
• There are no company procedures for the operation of the vessel's inert gas system which included:
o inerting empty cargo tanks
o operation during discharge, de-ballasting, COW and tank cleaning
o purging tanks before gas freeing
o topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage
o actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• Periodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo tanks.
• Sampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records show that the inert gas system had not been
used in accordance with company procedures and/or ISGOTI guidance.
• Records of the operation of the inert gas system are missing or incomplete.
• The inert gas system is not in use at the time of the inspection, although its use is required by company
procedures and/or ISGOTI guidance.
• lnerted cargo tanks are not being maintained at positive pressure of at least 100mm Water Gauge
(WG).
• The inert gas pressure in the cargo tanks/inert gas main had not been maintained within the range of
values identified within the cargo and ballast transfer plan throughout the discharge operation.
• Inert gas is being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in the IG main of more than 5%
by volume.
• The oxygen content of a randomly sampled cargo tank is more than 8% by volume.
TMSA TMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
place for all vessel types within the fleet.

8.1. Oil
8.1.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures and international regulations for the
planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing operations (COW), and was the COW
-
system in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company procedures for each COW operation?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure crude oil washing operations are always planned, prepared, conducted and
Objective
documented in accordance with international regulation and industry best practice.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Pumproom.
- Verification by

• The person in charge of crude oil washing operations at the time of inspection is not familiar with
company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing
or the contents of the COW manual.
• The person in charge of crude oil washing operations is not suitably qualified in accordance with
company procedures.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with company procedures for the planning, preparation,
conduct and documentation of crude oil washing or the contents of the COW manual.
-
Process Company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing
must include:
• The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of those involved in COW operations.
• The requirement for crude oil washing of cargo tanks for:
o sludge control purposes
o preparation for the carriage of ballast in a cargo tank or tanks.
• Suitability of crude oils for crude oil washing.
• Use of dry crude oil for washing.
• Inspection and testing of COW equipment.
• Planning of COW operations.
• Testing of cargo tank oxygen content prior to COW.
• Completion of COW checklists.
• Maintaining records of COW operations.
-- Hardware T he Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• There is a leak from the COW pipeline system during operation.
-
• A pressure gauge(s) on the tank cleaning line is missing, defective or inaccurate.
• The pressure in the tank cleaning line is not as required by the COW manual.
• COW machines are turning in tanks not being crude oil washed, indicating leaking valves to fixed tank
cleaning machines.
• A cargo tank(s) had not been de-bottomed by at least one metre prior to being used as a source of
crude oil for washing.
-
• A slop tank had not been completely discharged ashore prior to being used as a source of crude oil for
washing. (A slop tank may be considered as a cargo tank if it had not contained slops since the previous
occasion when it had been loaded with crude oil.)
• The tank washing water heater had not been blanked off before crude oil washing.
-
• Hydrants fitted to the crude oil washing line are not fitted with blanks or caps.
• There is significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary repairs on the pipework or
components of the COW system.
-
• The crude oil washing system is defective in any respect.
-

8.1.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo
tanks from the common venting system in accordance with SOLAS, and were these procedures being
followed?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure there are no incidences of cargo tank over or under pressurisation as a result of
Objective the mishandling or failure of vapour or inert gas isolating valves.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for the isolation of individual
cargo tanks from the common venting system.
Process Company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common venting system must
include:
• Maintenance and pre-operational testing of isolating valves.
• Checking the operational status of isolating valves prior to commencing operations.
• Locking arrangements for isolating valves, under the control of the responsible officer.
• Guidance on personnel authorised to operate the isolating valves.
• Provision of clear visual indication of the operational status of the valves or other acceptable means of
isolation.
• A method of recording the current position of the valves/means of isolation at the cargo control room/
position.
A record or display of the current status of the isolating valves must be available.
Locking arrangements for the isolating valves must be under the control of the Responsible Officer.
Records of maintenance or testing of isolating valves must be available.
Records of pre-operational checks of isolating valves must be available.
Clear visual indication of the operational status of an isolating valve or valves must be available.
Operation of isolating valves must be restricted to authorised personnel.
• An isolating valve is incorrectly set.
• The operational status of an isolating valve is not in accordance with the record or display of current
status.
• There is no locking arrangement for an isolating valve or valves.
• An isolating valve is not locked in position.
• An isolating valve is defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1 .2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering
equipment are in place for all vessel types within the fleet.

8.1. Oil
8.1.4. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for planning and documenting
cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile products, and had these procedures been followed?
Question Category
••••
,_ Process)
-
To ensure that tank cleaning and gas freeing operations after the carriage of volatile
Objective
products are always carefully planned, conducted and documented.
...........
-
Verification by
- Human
Process
The Officer responsible for tank cleaning operations must be familiar with the company procedures for
planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile products.
Company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of
volatile products must address:
• Tank washing and gas freeing plans.
• Record keeping requirements.
• Risk assessment.
,........ • Supervision.
-
• Preparation.
• The required atmosphere for tank washing.
• Special tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:
-
o using chemicals in wash water
o using chemicals for local cleaning
o steaming.
• Purging and gas freeing.
Tank washing and gas freeing plans and supporting records must be available for recent tank cleaning
,............. operations.
A negative observation will be raised if records and interviews indicate that
• Tank cleaning operations had not been carefully planned.
• A tank cleaning plan had not been followed.
• Tank cleaning, including after discharge of a slop tank, had been conducted without the use of inert
gas.
• The potential hazards of planned tank washing operations had not been systematically identified and
-
risk assessed, including the risks from any tank cleaning additives used.
• Appropriate preventative measures had not been put in place to reduce the identified risks to ALARP
(as low as reasonably practical).
-
• Tank cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with company procedures.
• Tank cleaning operations had not been supervised by a Responsible Officer.
• Officers and Ratings involved in tank washing operations had not been briefed by the Responsible
-
Officer on their roles and responsibilities.
• StQam had bQQn introducQd into a tank that may havQ had a flammabJQ atmo�pharn.
Hardware
-
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
-
-
8.2.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the inert gas
system, and had the inert gas system been used in accordance with these procedures, industry guidance, and
SOLAS and IBC regulations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
To ensure the inert gas system is always used in accordance with industry guidance,
Objective
SOLAS and IBC regulations and company procedures to prevent fire and explosion.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the
vessel's inert gas system and must be familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the
inert gas system.
• There are no company procedures for the operation of the vessel's inert gas system, including:
o inerting empty cargo tanks
o inerting tanks before commencement of unloading
o operation during discharge and tank cleaning
o purging tanks before gas freeing
o topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage
o actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.
• The inert gas system is not in use at the time of the inspection, although its use is required by industry
guidance, SOLAS and IBC regulations and/or company procedures.
• lnerted cargo tanks are not being maintained at positive pressure.
• Inert gas is being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in the IG main of more than 5%
by volume.
• The oxygen content of a randomly chosen inerted cargo tank is more than 8% by volume.
• Periodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo tanks.
• Sampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records showed that:
o the inert gas system had not been used in accordance with industry guidance, SOLAS and IBC
regulations and/or company procedures
o when inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, inert gas had not been introduced
into the tank through the distribution system while venting vapours in the tank to atmosphere
o when inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, the inerting operation had not
continued until the oxygen content in the ullage space was at or below 8% by volume.
• Records of the operation of the inert gas system and/or inerting of cargo tanks are missing or incomplete.
Hardware

8.2. Chemicals
8.2.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures that addressed the carriage of
inhibited cargoes, and had these procedures been followed?
-
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
- Objective To ensure that inhibited cargoes are carried safely and in compliance with company
procedures and the IBC Code.
Verification by
Human The responsible Officer must be familiar with the company procedures that address the carriage of
inhibited cargoes.
Process T he Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
- • There are no company procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes and include guidance
on:
o inhibited cargo certificates of protection
o temperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes and adjacent spaces
......... o inerting of inhibited cargoes and monitoring of the oxygen level in the vapour space
-
o preventing a build-up of solid polymers in the venting system
o the use of compressed nitrogen to clear arms/hoses after loading
o the addition of extra inhibitor when provided on board
o contingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.
• There is no certificate of protection on board for an inhibited cargo, in accordance with IBC 15.13.3.
• The stated duration of effectiveness of the inhibitor had expired prior to discharge.
• Temperatures of an inhibited cargo had not been monitored during the voyage on at least a daily basis
or as recommended by the cargo manufacturer.
• Temperatures of spaces adjacent to inhibited cargoes had not been monitored on at least a daily basis.
• The oxygen level in the vapour space of a cargo protected by an oxygen-dependent inhibitor had not
been monitored.
• A cargo protected by an oxygen-dependent inhibitor had been inerted before loading or during carriage .
• There is no evidence that venting systems had been regularly inspected for the build-up of solid
polymers, e.g. logbook entries or standing orders.
• Parts of the venting system are blocked by solid polymers.
• Compressed nitrogen had been used to clear the arms/hoses after loading a cargo with an oxygen
dependent inhibitor.
• There is no contingency plan in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation and a rapid rise in temperature
of an inhibited cargo.
Hardware
-

8.2.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the information contained in the Procedures and Arrangements
Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code and the
latest MEPC.2/Circular, and was this information readily available to the officers engaged in cargo planning
and operations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
To ensure that inhibited cargoes are carried safely and in compliance with company
Objective
procedures and the IBC Code.
Verification by

• The Officer responsible for cargo planning and operations is not familiar with the information
contained in the P&A Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in
Bulk, the IBC Code and/or the latest MEPC.2/Circular.
• The Officer responsible for cargo planning and operations is not familiar with the "stripping
quantities" for each cargo tank.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the information contained in the P&A Manual, as it
related to their duties.
• The P&A Manual is not readily available.
• On a ship engaged in international voyages, the P&A Manual is not available in either English, French
or Spanish.
• The information contained in the IBC Code is not readily available.
• A copy of the list of permitted cargoes is not readily available.
• A copy of the MEPC.2/Circular is not readily available.
• The MEPC.2/Circular available is not the latest edition.
Hardware
Comments/SMS Reference·

-- 8.2.4. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for planning and documenting
8.2. Chemicals
cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products, and had these procedures
-
been followed?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
- 0 rww� 000
To ensure that tank cleaning and gas freeing operations after the carriage of volatile and/
Objective
or toxic products are always carefully planned, conducted and documented.
,........ Tagged Rank Master and Deck Officers.
Verification by

-
• The Officer responsible for tank cleaning operations is not familiar with the company procedures for
planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic
products including:
o the relevant sections of the P&A Manual
o tank-cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes
o manufacturers' tank coating guidelines.
• Records and interviews indicate that:
o tank cleaning plans had not been developed in accordance with the procedures and/or the P&A
Manual
o tank-cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with company procedures
o tank-cleaning operations had not been conducted in accordance with the tank-cleaning plan
o tank-cleaning operations had not been supervised by a responsible Officer
,......., o Officers and Ratings involved in tank-washing operations had not been briefed by the responsible
Officer on their roles and responsibilities
o when washing with portable machines, the tank atmosphere had not been treated as non-inert
o steam had been introduced into a tank that may have had a flammable atmosphere
o tank cleaning plans did not address the risks from tank cleaning additives used.
,............ • The company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank-cleaning operations after the
-
carriage of volatile and/or toxic products do not address:
o tank-cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes
o written tank washing and gas freeing plans
o risk assessment
o tank-washing procedures and arrangements
........, o the required atmosphere for tank washing
o manufacturer's coating guidelines
o special tank-cleaning procedures including, where applicable:
- the use of washing media other than water
- recirculation washing
- using chemical additives In wash water
,............. - using chemical solvents or other agents for local cleaning.
o Gas freeing.
• Tank-cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes are not available on board.
• Manufacturers' tank-coating guidelines are not available on board.
• The latest version of MEPC.2/Circular listing approved tank-cleaning agents is not available on board.

Process • Records of written tank washing and gas freeing plans are not available for recent tank cleaning
Continued... operations.
• Written tank-cleaning plans do not include:
o the type of cargo to be cleaned from each tank, and its characteristics. SOS should be available so
that personnel involved are familiar with the hazards
o the major risks during cleaning including toxicity, flammability, corrosiveness, reactivity, and
temperature as well as the safety precautions to be taken
o the safety equipment and PPE to be available and ready for use throughout the operation and during
connecting and disconnecting of hoses at the cargo manifold
o the tanks to be cleaned, cleaning method, cleaning sequence and gas freeing arrangements
o monitoring the pumping of tank washings to ensure correct discharge/transfer
o MARPOL requirements for the disposal of cargo residues and cleaning water (slops)
o segregation of slops to avoid mixing different categories of product, and
o necessary actions required to keep the cargo deck area free from cargo vapours during tank washing
and gas freeing operations.
• Cleaning additives that are not cargo are not stored according to the requirements of the IMDG Code.
• Tank-cleaning operations have been taking place that were not in accordance with the written tank
cleaning plan.
• Tank-cleaning operations have been taking place that were not in accordance with company procedures
and/or the P&A Manual.
• A washing medium other than water had been used to wash a tank, such as mineral oil or chlorinated
solvent, but tank-washing procedures involving the use of such a medium are not available in the P&A
Manual.
Hardware

8.2. Chemicals
-
8.2.5. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for identifying and segregating
incompatible cargoes during cargo stowage planning, and had these procedures been followed?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure cargo stowage is carefully planned to avoid the possibility of co-mingling of

Objective
incompatible cargoes or their vapours.
-- Tagged Rank
Verification by
Master and Deck Officers.

• The Officer responsible for cargo sto wage planning is not familiar with company procedures for
identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes.
• The Officer responsible for cargo stowage planning is not familiar with the contents and use of the
compatibility charts provided on board.
• There are no company procedures for cargo stowage planning that include:
........ o identification of incompatible cargoes using recognised compatibility charts
o means of segregation of incompatible cargoes, including ship specific arrangements.
• There are no compatibility charts issued by a recognised authority available on board.
• The compatibility charts provided on board do not contain the latest information available.
-
• The chart table footnotes and the data sheets for two particular cargoes had not been consulted during
stowage planning.
• Two incompatible cargoes had been stowed adjacent to each other or in a configuration that did not
-
provide double barrier separation.
• Incompatible cargoes had been stowed in tanks that shared a common venting system.
• Tank cleaning had been carried out after carriage of two incompatible cargoes without identifying
mitigations in the tank-cleaning plan.
• Operational means of segregation were observed to be not as indicated in the cargo stowage plan.
• The cargo stowage plan did not identify when care should be taken to avoid the commingling of
noncompatible cargoes, which cargoes were involved, and the means of segregation.
Hardware
--

8.2.6. Were there sufficient escape sets as required by the IBC Code for everyone on board, and did the sets
provide suitable respiratory and eye protection?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure that everyone on board is provided with a suitable emergency escape set to exit
Objective a hazardous atmosphere in case of an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Internal Accommodation, Interview - Rating.
Tagged Rank Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
Human The interviewed Rating must be familiar with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape sets
provided.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are insufficient escape sets for everyone on board at
the time of the inspection, including any contractors, supernumeraries, visitors etc.
• The escape sets provided:
o do not have a design duration of at least 15 minutes
o are not included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the onboard
maintenance plan
o use filter-type respiratory protection
o do not provide suitable eye protection
o are not suitably marked as not to be used for firefighting or cargo-handling purposes
o are not in addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and
machinery spaces.
• An escape set:
o is not fully charged.
o had not been inspected and maintained in accordance with the onboard maintenance plan.
o had been used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.
o had been used as the primary means for entering spaces or compartments with unsafe atmospheres.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel
types within the fleet.

8.2. Chemicals
- 8.2.7. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures relating to the safety equipment required
by the IBC Code, including SCBAs, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition ready for immediate use?
Question Category
••••
Process)
--
--
To ensure the safety equipment required by the IBC Code is always ready for immediate
Objective
use in the event of an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
-- Tagged Rank
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures relating to the safety
-
equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IBC Code.
• There are no company procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the
!BC Code, giving guidance on:
-
o stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment
o inspection and testing of the SCBAs
o non-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use and required rest periods.
• The SCBA required by the !BC had not been:
o inspected at least once a month by a responsible officer, and the inspection recorded in the ship's logbook
o inspected and tested by an expert within the last 12 months.
-
• Where the SCBA required by the IBC code had been tested onboard by an 'expert' member of the crew:
o a copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board
for the crewmember who performed the service was not available with the maintenance records
o the specialist equipment required by the manufacturer to conduct the annual servicing was not
available onboard.
• There are less than three complete sets of safety equipment on board, in addition to those required by
SOLAS regulation 11-2/10.10 for fire-fighting purposes.
• A set of safety equipment do not contain:
o one self-contained air-breathing apparatus (not using stored oxygen)
o protective clothing, boots, gloves and tight-fitting goggles
o fireproof lifeline with belt resistant to the cargoes carried
o explosion-proof lamp.
--
• The protective suits are not suitable for:
o all chemicals listed on the certificate of fitness identified under column 'o' in the table of chapter 17
of the IBC code
o use in a flammable atmosphere.
........ • For the safety equipment required by the IBC, the vessel is not equipped with either:
o one set of fully charged spare air bottles for each piece of breathing apparatus
o a special air compressor suitable for the supply of high-pressure air of the required purity
o a charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare air bottles for the breathing apparatus or
fully charged spare air bottles with a total free air capacity of at least 6,000 litres for each breathing
apparatus on board in excess of the requirements of SOLAS regulation 11-2/10.10.
,..._ Continues overleaf ...


Continued ... • The sets of safety equipment are not stowed:
o outside hazardous areas
o in a suitable, clearly marked, easily accessible place.
• The sets of safety equipment are not ready for immediate use because:
o air cylinders, including spares, are not fully charged
o adjusting straps are not kept slack so as to enable the SCBAs to be donned quickly
o protective clothing, boots and gloves are not ready to be donned quickly.
within the fleet.

- 8.2. Chemicals
-
8.2.8. Were the Master, and Officers familiar with the company procedures addressing the protective
equipment required by the IBC Code, and was this equipment in satisfactory condition and suitable for the
products being handled?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwwu
0 0 0
........ Objective
To ensure crew members are protected from exposure to hazardous conditions when
engaged in cargo operations.
- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Main Deck, Internal Accommodation.
- Verification by

-- Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• The Officer in Charge of cargo operations is not familiar with the company procedures addressing the
protective equipment required by the IBC Code.
• A crew member is observed not wearing adequate protective clothing where there is a risk of accidental
-
exposure to toxic or corrosive products or their vapours.
• A crew member is observed wearing protective clothing incorrectly where there is a risk of accidental
-
• A Deck Officer or Rating is unfamiliar with the selection and donning of a full set of protective
equipment including a protective suit.
• There are no company procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC that include:
o a list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and considering
......... the products to be carried
o what protective equipment was required to be worn for the different types of operations on board,
and products handled, preferably in the form of a cargo-specific PPE matrix
o crew training in the correct use of the protective equipment
o checks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working area
o assessment of a user's fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions
o guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a Type 1/level A and Type 3/level B
,.........,
--
suit protective suit, if applicable
o how protective equipment should be cleaned and stored
o actions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment
o frequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.
• The PPE matrix, where provided, was not cargo specific.
• There was no chemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.
• PPE terminology was not standardised across all company documents.
-

• Protective equipment in use does not provide the degree of protection specified as being required in
the SOS of a cargo being handled.
• Face shields are being worn when disconnecting hoses at the manifold or during any other operation
where there is a risk of being splashed or sprayed with product under pressure.
• Safety spectacles are being used as eye protection in a chemical environment.
• Protective equipment is not stored in an easily accessible, ventilated space, designed for the purpose.
• Protective equipment in use is stored within the accommodation in an unauthorised space or spaces.
• Items of the protective equipment required by company procedures are not available on board.
• There is no evidence that chemical suits are suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.
• An item of protective equipment in use is in poor condition.
• Gloves, boots and/or head gear are of inferior chemical resistance than the protective suits provided.
• Protective equipment is not available in a suitable quantity and range of sizes to fit the crew on board.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel

- 8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the inert gas generator,
and had the system been operated and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and
company procedures?
Question Category
••••
,......... (Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
-
Process)
To ensure the inert gas generator always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design
Objective
criteria.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection,
maintenance and testing of the vessel's inert gas system.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel's
--
inert gas system which include the:
o inert gas generator
o gas regulating valve.
-
• Where the inert gas plant is contained in an enclosed room or space, there are no safe entry procedures
posted at each entrance to the room.
• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant are missing or incomplete.
Where the entry procedures posted at the entrance(s) to the space or spaces containing the inert gas system
are not in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure in the SMS, or entry into a space containing
,......... the inert gas system is authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space
entry procedure, an observation will be recorded under question 5.5.1.
,........ • The gas regulating valve or remote-controlled isolation valves are being operated on local control.
-
• Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices are disconnected or defective.
• There are significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.
• Blower(s) are suffering excessive vibration.
-
• Where only one blower is provided, there are insufficient spare parts available for the blower and prime
mover.
• Where the inert gas generator is not located in the machinery spaces the compartment is not provided
with adequate positive-pressure-type mechanical ventilation.
• The inert gas plant is defective in any respect.
........ TMSA TMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
--
,......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 247

8.3.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the nitrogen generator
inert gas system, and had the system been operated and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions and company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure the nitrogen generator inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance
Objective
with its design criteria.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection,
maintenance and testing of the vessel's inert gas system including the nitrogen generator.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the dangers from:
o an oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage
o the oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.
inert gas system, which include the nitrogen generator and its associated equipment.
• The record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification,
is missing or incomplete.
• Where the air compressor and nitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or buffer tank are installed in
a dedicated compartment, there are no safe entry procedures posted at each entrance to the
compartment.
• Entry procedures are not implemented in accordance with the provisions of question 5. 5.1.
• Any of the following visual and audible alarms is inoperative:
o failure of the electric heater, if fitted
o low feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor
o high-air temperature
o high condensate level at the automatic drain of the water separator.
• The independent mechanical extraction ventilation system serving a dedicated space containing the air
compressor and nitrogen generator or the nitrogen receiver or buffer tank is not operating correctly.
• The nitrogen generator and its associated equipment is defective in any respect.
comments/SMS Reference

-
8.3. Oil & Chemical
)"""all!
8.3.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the flue gas inert gas
system, and had the system been operated and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions
and company procedures?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective To ensure the flue gas inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with its
-
design criteria.
- Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection,
-
maintenance and testing of the vessel's inert gas system.
-
inert gas system which include the:
o boiler uptake valves
o scrubber
o demister
-- o blowers
o gas regulating valve.
-- posted at each entrance to the room.

• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant is missing or incomplete.
• The gas regulating valve or remote-controlled isolation valves are being operated on local control.

• Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices are disconnected or defective.
• There are significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.
• Blower(s) are suffering excessive vibration.
• The inert gas plant is defective in any respect.
........
-
-

8.3.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the maintenance, testing and
setting of the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarms, and were these alarm systems fully operational
and properly set?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarms are always fully operational,
Objective properly set and used during all cargo loading, discharging and transfer operations.
Verification by
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer is not familiar with:
• The company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and
high-high-level alarm systems.
• The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems or individual
cargo tank alarms may be isolated and the safeguards to ensure they were always in operation during
cargo transfer operations.
high high-level alarm systems do not include:
o the mandatory use of the alarms during all loading, discharging and transfer operations
o set points for all alarms
o testing procedures and frequency
o records of testing and maintenance to be kept
o guidance on the use of shipboard automatic closing valves, if fitted
o procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer
operations in the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or high-high-level alarm system or a
single alarm for an individual cargo tank.
• High-high-level alarms are not set at a level to allow the person in charge of transfer operations to stop
the cargo transfer before the tank overflows (typically 98% of the tank capacity).
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarms had not been regularly tested in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
,........
.........
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarms are not in operation at the time of inspection, during loading,
discharging or transfer operations.
• High-level alarms and high-high-level alarms are not fitted.
• High-level and high-high-level alarms are not independent of each other.
• High-high-level alarms are not independent of the fixed tank gauging system.
• High-level alarms are set at or above the high-high-level alarm activation point.
• High-level and high-high-level alarm indicator panels, etc. are not clearly identified as such.
• High-level and/or high-high-level alarm audible and/or visible alarms are not operational in the cargo
control room or on deck.
• The high-level and/or high-high-level alarms are permanently silenced or inhibited.
-
• The high-level and/or high-high-level alarms are defective in any respect.
On a chemical ship, the:
• High-level alarms are not independent of the fixed gauging system.
• High-high-level alarms do not provide an agreed signal for sequential shutdown of onshore pumps and/
-
or valves and ship's valves. (The signal may be dependent on operator intervention.)
• Shipboard automatic closing valves are in use without the specific approval of the Flag State and or Port
State authority.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering
,....._ Comments/SMS Reference
-
......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 251
8.3.5. Were the Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings familiar with the company procedures for dipping,
ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks, and were these procedures
being followed?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
000
f[Jf[J�
To ensure that the required additional precautions are taken when dipping, ullaging and
Objective
sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings.
Verification by

• The Officer in Charge of cargo operations is not familiar with the company procedures for dipping,
ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.
• A Deck Rating is not familiar with company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable
static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks as they relate to their duties.
• There are no company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator
cargoes in non-inerted tanks that describe the additional precautions to be taken against static
electricity including:
o a description of the dipping, ullaging and sampling equipment to be used
o bonding/earthing/cleaning procedures for this equipment
o settling time after completion of operations
o additional precautions if the vessel is not fitted with properly designed and installed full-length
sounding pipes
o actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed tank gauging system, if fitted.
• There is no information available on the type of sounding pipes fitted in the cargo tanks.
• On a vessel fitted with a fixed tank level gauging system but not fitted with IG and not fitted with
full depth sounding pipes, the operator's procedure to be followed in the event of failure of the fixed
gauging system do not adequately address the additional precautions required for dipping, ullaging
and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.
• Metallic components of any equipment used for dipping, ullaging and sampling are not bonded to the
metal structure of the vessel.
• Metal ullaging, dipping, gauging or sampling equipment is introduced into a cargo tank during product
transfer or within 30 minutes of completion without the use of a full-length sounding pipe.
• A non-metal sampling container of more than one litre capacity is introduced into a cargo tank during
product transfer or within 30 minutes of completion without the use of a full-length sounding pipe
• Ropes or tapes made of synthetic materials had been used for lowering ullaging and/or sampling
equipment into cargo tanks.
• A non-metal sampling container was rubbed dry prior to being introduced to a cargo tank.
• Sounding pipes used for dipping, ullaging and sampling cargo tanks are not metallic and/or do not
extend the full depth of the tank and/or are not effectively bonded and earthed to the tank structure.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.6. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for loading flammable static
accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks, and were these procedures being followed?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
To ensure suitable precautions are always taken when flammable static accumulator
cargoes are loaded into non-inerted tanks.
-- Tagged Rank
Verification by
Human The Officer in Charge of cargo operations must be familiar with the company procedures for loading
flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks.
• There are no company procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted
-
,........, tanks which describe:
o the identification of flammable static accumulator cargoes
o the precautions to be taken against hazards from static electricity when loading these cargoes.
• A flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank with:
o an initial rate of more than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets
o an initial rate of less than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets, but for shorter than the required
period:
- 30 minutes or the time taken to load twice the content of the shore pipeline content whichever is
the lesser
- but which must include the time to fill the tank to a depth equal to twice the diameter of the filling
pipe
-
o a bulk rate of more than 1 m/sec when the cargo was not "clean".
• A flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank:
o over the top
--
o in such a way to produce splash filling.
• Upon completion of loading a flammable static accumulator, cargo lines were blown using compressed
air.
• A low-volatility static accumulator cargo was loaded into an uncleaned non-inerted tank that had
previously contained a high-volatility cargo, without following the precautions to be taken against
hazards from static electricity.
Hardware
,........, TMSA TMSA KP! 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo , ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
,........,
.........
-
8.3.7. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation and calibration of the inert
gas system fixed oxygen analyser, and had the equipment been operated, maintained and calibrated in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and company procedures?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas with an oxygen content of not
Objective more than 5% by volume to the cargo tanks at any rate of flow.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Cargo Control Room, Engine Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing and
maintenance of the fixed oxygen analyser including the:
• Method and frequency of calibration.
• Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed analyser.
inert gas system which include the fixed oxygen analyser.
• The records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant are missing or incomplete.
• There are no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and testing the fixed oxygen analyser
in the vicinity of the equipment.
• The fixed oxygen analyser had not been:
o operated, maintained and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and company
procedures
o calibrated within 24 hours prior to starting the inert gas system for each cargo, purging or inerting
operation
o the zero and/or span gas used to calibrate the fixed oxygen analyser was unsuitable, out of date or
not available.
• The fixed oxygen analyser is defective in any respect.
If the local reading at the fixed oxygen analyser do not agree with the remote indications of the oxygen
content in the cargo control room or station and the machinery space control room, an observation will be
made under question 8.3.19. Indicators and alarms for the inert gas system.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.8. Were the Master, Officers and Ratings familiar with the cargo system Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
system, where fitted, and/or the cargo pump emergency stop controls, and was there evidence that the
systems and equipment had been tested in accordance with company procedures?
--
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the cargo-handling system or individual cargo pumps will be brought to a
Objective
-
safe, static condition, either automatically or manually, in abnormal circumstances.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Rating, Cargo Control Room, Pumproom, Main Deck.
Verification by
- Human
-
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the ESD system, where fitted.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with what abnormal or alarm conditions could cause a cargo
pump to shut down automatically.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedure for the testing of the ESD,
- automated cargo pump shutdown and/or the testing of the cargo pump emergency stop controls.
• An interviewed deck Rating is unfamiliar with the location and operation of the cargo pump
emergency stop controls, the circumstances in which they should be activated or the actions to take
after the emergency stop control had been activated.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no company procedure which describe the testing
and operation of cargo system:
• Emergency shutdown systems.
• Automated cargo pump shutdown systems and associated sensors.
• Cargo pump emergency stop controls.
,........, • The testing of the ESD, automated shutdown or cargo pump emergency stop controls and systems had
-
not been tested in accordance with the company procedure.
• The ESD system, automated cargo pump shutdown or cargo pump emergency stop controls or systems
are defective in any respect.
• The manual ESD system control or the cargo pump emergency stop controls are not clearly marked and
ready for immediate use.
.......... • Access to a manual ESD system control or cargo pump emergency stop control is obstructed .
-
-
-
8.3.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and testing of
cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines, and were records available for these activities?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
To ensure cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines are regularly examined, and pressure
Objective
tested when required, to verify their condition.
ROVIQ Sequence Pumproom, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and testing
of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines
that include:
o the frequency of visual external examinations
o the frequency of hydrostatic pressure testing of cargo transfer systems
o the requirement to hydrostatically pressure test a cargo transfer system after repairs, modifications or
sectional replacement
o records to be maintained of inspections and tests.
• The MAWP of the cargo transfer system had not been determined and documented.
• The determination of the MAWP of the cargo transfer system is inconsistent with the ship's drawings
or cargo pump performance curves.
• The cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to 100% MAWP within the last
12 months.
• There is evidence that cargo system piping had undergone repairs, modifications or sectional
replacement that would potentially affect its integrity since the last hydrostatic test without being
retested upon completion of the work.
• The cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to at least 150% MAWP at least
twice within any five-year period.
• The cargo transfer system pressure testing was performed using compressed air or inert gas.
• Cargo, vapour or inert gas pipelines had not been inspected and/or tested as required by company
procedures.
• There are no records of the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and/or inert gas lines as required by
company procedures.
• Cargo system pipelines are not marked with the date and pressure of the last test.
• Inspection of the cargo, vapour and/or inert gas pipelines indicate that'the required inspections and
tests had either not been performed or were Ineffective.
• The visual inspection of the cargo system, vapour or inert gas pipelines determines that the pipelines or
any of their components are in an unsatisfactory condition.
TMSA TMSA KP! 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering

8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.10. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and
operation of the vapour collection system, and was this equipment in satisfactory condition?
-
Question Category
••••
- 0 rw�u
Process)
000
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure that the vapour collection system is in satisfactory condition and operated
correctly when required.
-
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and
operation of the vapour collection system.
There must be evidence that the person(s) in charge of transfer operations had received suitable training/
- Process
familiarisation covering the particular system installed on the tanker.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection
system which include:
o a line diagram of the tanker's vapour collection piping indicating the locations and purpose of all
control and safety devices
o the initial transfer rate
o the maximum allowable transfer rate as limited by the venting capacity of the pressure or vacuum
-
relief valves. or any other factor which would limit the transfer rate
o the maximum pressure drop in the vessel's vapour collection system for various transfer rates
o the relief settings of each pressure and vacuum valve
o pre-transfer procedures, including tests of PN valves, tank level gauges and alarms, and high- and
low-pressure alarms
o procedures to be followed in the event of a fault during vapour collection operations
-
o training and familiarisation requirements.
• The pressure sensing device in the main vapour collection line is inoperative.
• The visible and audible high- and low-pressure alarms at the cargo control room or position are defective
- in any respect.
• The high- and low-pressure alarms are not set as required by company procedures.
-
• The vapour collection system is not approved by the Flag State or Recognised Organisation (such as a
Class Society).
• Where vapour hoses are provided onboard chemical tankers in accordance with IMO MSC/Circ.585
2.2.1, there is no evidence of proper maintenance and testing.
• The vapour collection system is defective in any respect.
......... TMSA TMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that
they are always within permitted levels.
-
8.3.11. Were the Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings familiar with the company procedures for cargo
tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert atmosphere, and had these procedures
been followed?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure that tank washing operations after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert
Objective atmosphere are always conducted safely, and in accordance with the recommendations
of ISGOTI6.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Rating, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and
operation of the vapour collection system.
There must be evidence that the person(s) in charge of transfer operations had received suitable training/
familiarisation covering the particular system installed on the tanker.
• There are no company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a
non-inert atmosphere that include:
o precautions to:
- control the fuel in the tank atmosphere
- control the sources of ignition in the tank
o bonding of portable tank washing machines and hoses
o testing tank cleaning hoses
o avoiding the free-fall or spraying of water into a tank
o prohibition of steaming.
• Records and interviews indicate that during tank washing in a non-inert atmosphere:
o the tank atmospheres had not been tested frequently
o the tank atmosphere had exceeded 35% LFL, but washing had continued
o the tank washing had recommenced with a tank atmosphere above 10% LFL
o wash water throughput was above the recommended levels
o recirculated water was used for washing
o steam had been injected into a tank that was not verified as being gas free
o steam had continued to be injected while the atmosphere exceeded 10% LFL
o the recommended methods/equipment had not been used for dipping tanks
o the liquid level in the slop tank was not maintained at least one metre above the discharge inlets.
• Records and interviews indicate that before tank washing in a non-inert atmosphere:
o the tank bottom and/or the pipeline system had not been flushed and stripped
o the tank atmosphere had not been ventilated to less than 10% LFL
o the electrical continuity of portable hoses had not been tested or tested resistance exceeded 6 ohms
per metre length
o the portable tank washing hoses were not indelibly marked for identification purposes
o the electrical continuity of portable hydrant/hose/machine connections had not been tested.
• Tank-cleaning equipment is defective or deficient in any respect.

-
8.3.12. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of portable cargo
ullage/temperature/interface (UT I) measurement and sampling equipment, and was the equipment in
satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
- Objective
To ensure that portable UTI and sampling equipment is always used in accordance with
international regulations and industry best practice.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview- Deck Rating.
Verification by
-

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures describing the use. operation,
testing and maintenance of the UT! measurement and sampling equipment.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with:
o the seNice rating of the portable UT! measurement and sampling equipment provided onboard
o the service and calibration requirements
o the pre-operational checks of portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment
-
o the procedures for safe use of the equipment including PPE and RPE requirements
o the bonding requirements for using the UTI measurement and sampling equipment.
• An interviewed Deck Rating is not familiar with the company procedures for safe use of the portable
-
UTI measurement and sampling equipment including PPE and RPE requirements.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative obseNation if:
• There are no company procedures describing the use, operation, testing, calibration and servicing of
the portable cargo UTI measurement and sampling equipment.
• Portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment is not being used in accordance with the company
procedures for safe use, including PPE and RPE requirements.
-
• Inappropriate measurement or sampling equipment is observed being used through the vapour locks
(e.g. sounding rods which did not fit on the vapour locks provided).
• Portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment had not been serviced or calibrated according to
manufacturers' instructions or did not have the associated certificates.
-
• Portable UTI measurement or sampling equipment is being used without being bonded in a non-inert
atmosphere or where the company procedure require bonding to be in use.
-
--
-
-

• The portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment in use is not of the correct rating for the
cargo being handled, e.g. equipment rated as 'restricted' is being used in tanks where the cargo being
handled requires a 'closed' device.
• There is no control of the opening of vapour locks and/or ullage ports by unauthorised personnel, e.g.
cargo inspectors.
• Where open cargo measurement and sampling is permitted, cargo tank openings had been left open
after gauging had been completed.
• One or more vapour locks are noted to be leaking during use or when closed with the cap on.
• One or more vapour lock is observed to be damaged or missing.
• No fixed ullage system is fitted but there are insufficient portable UTI units provided to simultaneously
gauge each tank being worked, plus two spares.
• More than two portable UTI measurement units are out of service on a vessel with no fixed cargo level
measurement system.
• There are less than two operational UTl measurement units on a vessel fitted with an operational fixed
cargo level measurement system.
TMSA TMSA 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering

8.3.13. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the primary
and secondary cargo tank venting systems in accordance with SOLAS, and were these systems correctly set?
-
Question Category
a e@oe
Process)
-
- Objective
To ensure cargo tanks are always protected from over or under pressurisation in the event
of inappropriate use of the ventilation system or a failure of a primary protection device.
-
-
Verification by
- Human
Process
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the
primary and secondary cargo tank venting systems in accordance with SOLAS.
• There are no company procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting
,..._ systems in accordance with SOLAS which describe:
o the primary and secondary system for each anticipated cargo tank/group configuration
o the associated settings of the pressure/vacuum sensor alarms, where fitted
o maintenance, test and calibration procedures for the cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system
per the manufacturer's instructions.
-- • There are no records of tests and/or calibration of the cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system
per the manufacturer's instructions.
-
• The primary and secondary venting arrangements are not as described in the HVPQ and/or PIQ.
• The means of providing 'secondary means of allowing full flow relief' do not comply with the SOLAS
requirements.
• Cargo tanks are fitted with vapour isolating valves which might be damaged or inadvertently closed but
are not fitted with either full-flow PN valves or a pressure/vacuum monitoring system.
• Cargo tanks are fitted with vapour isolating valves which would be intentionally closed for vapour
segregation purposes but are not fitted with either two full flow PN valves or a PN valve and a
pressure/vacuum monitoring system on the cargo tank side of the cargo tank vapour isolating valve.
• On a chemical carrier, cargo tanks are fitted with an independent PN valve but there is no secondary
protection in the form of a second full flow PN valve or a pressure/vacuum monitoring system.
• The cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system alarms are not set to operate at the correct value.
-
• One or more cargo tank pressure sensors are not operational.
• One or more cargo tank pressure sensors appear to be inaccurate.
• The cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system is defective in any respect.
-
-
-
........ Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 261
8.3.14. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,
testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems, and were the systems in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure that cargo tank venting systems are maintained in satisfactory condition and
Objective
operated correctly.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation. inspection,
testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.
• There are no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.
• PN valves and/or high velocity vents had not been checked for free movement prior to the
commencement of each cargo operation as required by the Ship Shore Safety Check List - Part 1 A.
Tanker checks prearrival, item 6.
• No information is available regarding the maximum permissible loading rate for each cargo tank and in
the case of combined venting systems, for each group of cargo tanks.
• The flame screen for a PN valve or mast riser is damaged, clogged or missing.
• A PN valve and/or high velocity vent is passing vapour or drawing air inside its design pressure or
vacuum setting.
• High velocity vents had been jacked open during cargo operations.
• A vapour line is in unsatisfactory condition, for example, heavily corroded or with soft patches.
• A PN valve or high velocity vent is defective in any respect.

-
- 8.3.15. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for monitoring leakage into
the cofferdams of deepwell pumps, and had regular purging of the cofferdams taken place to identify any
excessive leakage?
- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure the vessel's deep well pumps are always in full operational condition.
Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating.
-
Verification by

o the company procedure for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps
o the connections, controls and indicators used during the purging process
o the maximum pressure permitted for the purging medium
o the purging medium required for the types of cargo recently carried
o manufacturers' and company guidance on the use of liquid to fill the cofferdams for specialty
products, where this practice was utilised.
• An interviewed Rating is not familiar with the safety precautions to be taken when purging the
deepwell pump cofferdams.
-
• Purging had not been carried out as required by the company procedure for monitoring leakage into
the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.
• There are no detailed records of purging as required by the company procedure for monitoring
-
leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.
• Records of purging indicate leakage levels above the manufacturer's set limits for cargo, hydraulic oil or
lubricating oil for one or more pump, but no defect report(s) had been created to resolve the situation
at the next suitable opportunity.
........ • Records of purging indicate that the cofferdam of one or more pump was apparently blocked, but no
-
defect report(s) had been created to resolve the situation at the next suitable opportunity.
TMSA TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare
parts inventory which reflects the company's maintenance strategy.
-
-
-
-

8.3.16. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing and maintenance of the
non-return devices installed in the inert gas system, and were these devices in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
To ensure the devices installed in the inert gas system to prevent the return of vapour and
Objective liquid to the inert gas plant, or to any gas-safe spaces, function correctly.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,
testing and maintenance of the inert gas system which should include the:
• Deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement.
• Non-return valve.
• There is no evidence that the IG main non-return valve had been opened and inspected as required by
company procedures.
• There is no evidence that the block and bleed valve arrangement, where fitted, had been tested/
inspected for automatic operation and tightness.
• The deck seal level gauge is not clear and readable.
-
• The deck seal water level is not as required.
• The fabric condition of the deck seal, including pipework, is not satisfactory.
• There is no evidence to show the deck seal had been opened and inspected, including pipework, as
required by company procedures.
• The valves of the double block and bleed arrangement are not operating automatically as required.
• The non-return devices installed in the inert gas system are defective in any respect.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.17. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use, inspection and
testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework, and were these items in satisfactory
-
condition and properly fitted when in use?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework meet the
,.......... Objective required pressure rating for the cargo transfer system and will not leak at the flange face
when used.
........ Verification by
- Human
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the use, inspection and
testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.
......., Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• There are no company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces
and other portable pipework that include guidance on:
o the correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework
o provision of test certification
o suitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces
o regular inspection
o pressure testing at least annually
o records to be maintained of inspections and tests.
• There is no inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.
• Test certification is not available for a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework.
- • There are no records available for the inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and
-
other portable pipework as required by company procedures.
• Inspection of the manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework indicates that the
-
required inspections and tests had either not been performed or were ineffective.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework:
o had not been pressure tested to 100% MAWP within the last 12 months
o was not marked with the date and pressure of the last test
-
o did not have the same certified rating (MAWP) as the fixed manifold piping to which it was connected.
• The position of handles or lugs on reducers in use during cargo transfer operations interfere with quick
acting coupling devices or the bolting of flanges.
• More than one spool piece or reducer is fitted between the fixed manifold flange and the flange
presented for connection.
• The flange face of a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework is visibly damaged,
-
corroded or in an unsatisfactory condition.
• Where a long reducPr or c;rool riece is in use. it is not propc;irly supportc;id to prnv,mt undu0 strnss
(applicable to chemical tankers only).
-
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time
of the inspection is defective in any respect.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the
time of the inspection had been repaired but there is no evidence that it had been pressure tested on
completion of the repairs.
-- TMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment

8.3.18. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing and maintenance of
the pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device(s) installed in the inert gas main, and was this device(s) in
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure cargo tanks are not subject to excessive pressure or vacuum should the inert
Objective
gas system fail or where the venting system is used inappropriately.
ROVIQ Sequence Main Deck, Cargo Control Room.
Verification by
Human Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,
testing and maintenance of the inert gas system that include the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices.
o the purpose of a liquid PN breaker
o the process to verify the liquid level in a liquid PN breaker.
Process Company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system that
include the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices must be available.
• The fabric condition of a PN breaker is unsatisfactory.
• PN breaker flame screens are damaged, missing, fitted with gaps, or had been repaired with mesh
which did not conform to the required mesh gauge specification.
• The liquid level in a PN breaker indicates that the device is not filled to its design settings.
• The PN breaker liquid level gauge is not clear and readable.
• A PN breaker is not marked with the:
o design pressure and vacuum opening settings
o date of the last inspection
o type/quantity of anti-freeze and the lowest allowable temperature.
• A PN breaker is:
o set to operate at a lower pressure than that of the secondary venting system
o not set within the safe parameters of the tank structure
o defective in any respect.

-
- 8.3.19. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the indicators
8.3. Oil & Chemical
and alarms in the inert gas system, and had the equipment been operated, maintained and calibrated in
accordance with the manufacturers· instructions and company procedures?
Question Category
- ••••
Process)
To ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design
Objective
criteria.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing and
maintenance of the inert gas system indicators and alarms including the:
• Method and frequency of testing and calibration of the indicators and alarms.
• Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of any of the indicators and alarms .
inert gas system, which include the indicators and alarms.
-
• The record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification,
is missing or incomplete.
• There are no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and testing all instruments and
-
alarms.
• There are no suitable calibration facilities provided for the inert gas instrumentation.
• There are no records of calibration for the inert gas instrumentation.
• Inert gas instruments are not graduated to a consistent system of units, for example, inert gas pressure
indicators.
• The inert gas control panel pressure indicator and/or recorder is:
o defective in any respect
o not consistent with local pressure indicator(s) on deck.
• The inert gas control panel oxygen content indicator and/or recorder is:
o not consistent with the local indicator at the fixed oxygen analyser.
-
• The inert gas pressure indicator fitted in the navigating bridge is inoperative or not consistent with the
inert gas control panel pressure indicator.
• The machinery space control room/machinery space inert gas oxygen content indicator is inoperative or
not consistent with the local indicator at the fixed oxygen analyser.
• Any of the required audible and visual alarms in the inert gas control panel or in the engine control
room/machinery space are inoperative.
• The independent audible alarm or automatic shutdown of cargo pumps at low-low inert gas pressure
in the inert gas main is inoperative.
• Inert gas system indicators and alarms are defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA 6.1 .1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
-
8.3.20. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose and operation of the connections and
interconnections to the inert gas system for routine and emergency inert gas operations, and were these
arrangements in satisfactory condition and clearly identified as to their purpose?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
0 0 0
To ensure the Master and Officers are familiar with the location and use of connections
to, and interconnections with, the inert gas system, which may include:
• Connections for the emergency supply of inert gas from an external source.
• Connections for portable arrangements to introduce inert gas to the double hull
Objective spaces.
• Fixed interconnections with the ballast system piping to introduce inert gas to the
double hull spaces.
• Fixed interconnections with the cargo system piping to introduce inert gas to the
cargo tanks.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the arrangements for the:
o supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency, including the forepeak
o external supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel's inert gas system
o connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and
gasfreeing, if fitted.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the vessel's inert
gas system which include the arrangements for the:
o supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency
o external supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel's inert gas system
o connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gas
freeing, if fitted.
• There is no evidence of inspection and maintenance of the non-return valve between the inert gas
supply main and the cargo piping system.
• The connection for the external supply of inert gas is not clearly marked with its purpose.
• The spool piece to isolate the inert gas supply main from the cargo piping system had been left in place.
• Portable hoses required to connect the inert gas supply main to the double-hull spaces are damaged or
missino.
• One or more of the connections to the inert gas supply main are defective in any respect.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
8.3.21. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedure for cargo heating, and was the cargo
heating system in satisfactory condition and tested and used in accordance with the company procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- To ensure cargo heating is always conducted in accordance with international regulations,

Objective
industry guidance and within the design criteria of the vessel and its fittings.
..........
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures describing the operation,
testing and maintenance of the cargo-heating system including any cargo temperature limits.
• The cargo-heating system had not been operated and/or tested in compliance with company procedures.
• There are no records of the cargo-heating system testing.
• There are no records of cargo-heating operations.
• The cargo-heating system had not been isolated where required in compliance with company
........ procedures
• There are no records of the regular monitoring of the cargo heating system return to detect leakage.
• Inspection of the observation tank or hot well indicate there is significant leakage in the cargo-heating
system.
• There are leaks of heating medium from the associated pipework on deck or in the engine room.
• One or more temperature sensors in the remote temperature indicating system are defective.
• Cargo-heating records indicate cargo temperature limits had been exceeded.
• There is significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary repairs on the pipework or
components of the heating system.
-
• The cargo-heating system is defective in any respect.
T MSA TMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in
.........
,........., Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 269

8.3.22. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for managing on-board doping
operations, and had these procedures been complied with?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure on-board doping operations are properly planned, risk assessed and performed
Objective
safely.
Verification by
Human The Officer responsible for cargo operations must be familiar with the company procedures for managing
onboard doping operations.
• There are no company procedures for managing on-board doping operations that include:
o reviewing the supplier's/contractor's doping plan
o performing a risk assessment of the proposed operation
o supervising the doping operation.
• The vessel had not been provided with the supplier's/contractor's plan for an on-board doping operation.
• A risk assessment had not been performed based upon the supplier's/contractor's plan for an on-board
doping operation.
• The doping plan and/or risk assessment do not include:
o any flammability or toxicity hazards associated with the additive
o the method of doping to be used and any operational restrictions
o arrangements for supervision by ship's crew
o PPE and handling equipment requirements
o contingency measures including the method of clean-up of any spillages
o storage arrangements of any additives to be carried on board
o appropriate anti-static precautions if tanks were not inerted.
• There is no evidence that the doping plan and/or risk assessment had been discussed by all personnel
involved on the ship and in the terminal, including contractors.
• There is no Safety Data Sheet
o available for the additive(s) used for doping
o kept in the vicinity of the doping operation.
• Doping had taken place via an open tank lid when alternative methods were available.
• The doping method utilised involved free fall of additives into non-inerted cargo tanks.
• Additives are stored on board in a manner that do not reflect the flammability or toxicity hazards
indicated in the associated Safety Data Sheet.
• Pressure test records are not available for the injection system used for doping.
• PPE as required by the doping plan and/or risk assessment is not being utilised.
• Contractors are not being supervised by ship's crew as required by the doping plan and/or risk
assessment.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.3.3 requires that the SMS includes procedures for non-routine or specialised cargo and ballast
operations undertaken in the fleet.

8.3. Oil & Chemical
calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0
000
rw��
To ensure the cargo temperature monitoring equipment is maintained in full operational
Objective
condition.
,__ Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for the maintenance, testing
and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.
• The accompanying Officer is unable to demonstrate the operation of the fixed cargo temperature
monitoring equipment, including alarms.
- • There are no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature
monitoring equipment in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
• There are no records of checks, tests or calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.
• The fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and calibrated in accordance
with manufacturer's instructions.
• The fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been calibrated within the last 30 months.
• Portable cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and calibrated in accordance
with manufacturer's instructions.
• One or more temperature sensor in the fixed cargo temperature monitoring system is defective.
-
• The visible and/or audible alarm in the fixed temperature monitoring system is defective.
• The cargo temperature monitoring equipment is defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA 6.1 .2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering
-
-
8.3.24. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for managing cargo and vapour
connections at the cargo manifolds, and were the manifold arrangements in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that cargo and vapour manifolds are always properly connected and monitored
Objective throughout cargo transfer operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Manifold.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures which described the
management of cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.
Process Company procedures which describe the management of cargo and vapour connections at the cargo
manifolds to prevent and detect leakages must be available on board.
• A manifold connection is:
o secured with damaged bolts or bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material
o not fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange
o made using improvised arrangements such as a G-clamp or similar device.
• Where a hose or marine loading arm is secured by camlocks, one or more cams had not properly
engaged with the manifold flange.
• A marine loading arm is improperly supported by jacks or similar arrangements.
• The jacks for a marine loading arm are supported by items not designed to support the load, such as
empty oil drums.
• Cargo hoses are not properly supported during cargo transfer.
• On a chemical tanker, manifold flanges in use are not fitted with spray guards whilst handling acids, or
another cargo that was toxic or corrosive.
• A manifold pressure gauge is:
o not fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve
o missing from an unused manifold connection
o indicating an increased pressure and possible manifold valve leakage.
• A manifold pressure gauge stem is not fitted with a valve or cock and/or is not capped when not in use.
• A manifold blank flange is not:
o as thick as the end flange it is bolted to and there is no supporting documentation to show it is of
the same working pressure rating as the line or system it is connected to
o made o-f steel or other approved material
o secured with bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material
o fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.
• 1 here is a cargo or bunker leak from an unused manifold.

,.........
-
-
Hardware • An unused manifold is not blanked.
continued • A manifold sample point or drain is not blanked or capped when not in use.
• A manifold sample point or drain is positioned to drain directly onto the deck.
-
• The manifold(s) had been drained into the open drip-trays.
• Fixed and/or portable drip-trays had not been drained and cleaned of cargo residues.
• There is no permanent or portable drip-tray underneath a manifold connection.
• Plywood or canvas sheeting had been placed across the manifold drip tray gratings to prevent minor
spillages entering the drip tray freely.
• A portable drip-tray is made of plastic or another non-metallic material but is not bonded to the ship's
structure.
• Manifold drip-tray drains to deck are not fitted with valves and capped.
• On a chemical tanker, there are no suitable means to ensure incompatible cargoes are not mixed in
manifold drip trays and/or drain tanks.
• Vapour manifold presentation flanges are not fitted with the required stud at the 12 o'clock position.
• Vapour manifold connections, including reducers, are not painted/marked as required.
• An elevated manifold working platform does not have effective edge protection and is not properly
identified and marked by warning signs to prevent falls.
......... • The midships hose-handling crane is being used to handle stores, etc. whilst cargo operations are
-
taking place.
• An unused stern manifold is not isolated from the main cargo pipeline system by a blank or the removal
of a spool piece.
• The dangerous area extending at least three metres from the stern manifold valve in use is not clearly
-
marked to prevent access by unauthorised personnel.
-
--
.........
-
-
-
8.3.25. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for receiving nitrogen from
shore for operations such as inerting, purging or padding cargo tank, or for clearing cargo lines?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure cargo tanks are not over pressurised, possibly resulting in serious deformation
Objective or catastrophic failure of the tank structure.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures which describe the procedure
for receiving nitrogen from the shore for operations such as inerting or purging tanks, for padding cargo
tanks or to clear lines.
• There is no company procedure which describes the processes for receiving nitrogen from the shore for
operations such as inerting, purging tanks or padding cargo tanks or for clearing cargo lines.
• Company procedures do not describe the actions to be taken to avoid over pressurisation of cargo
tanks when nitrogen is received from shore, including the:
o requirement to carry out a risk assessment prior to operations
o choice of connection and piping system for receiving the nitrogen
o methods of controlling the incoming flow of nitrogen.
• Risk assessments are not available for operations where the vessel received nitrogen from ashore.
• Ship/shore safety checklists for cargo operations that include receiving nitrogen from shore had not
been completed to document the agreed procedures to receive nitrogen, the maximum pressure and
the flow rate.
• Records show that hoses or loading arms containing flammable cargo had been cleared to the ship
using compressed air.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each
type of vessel within the fleet.

8.4. LPG
- 8.4.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures that addressed the carriage of
inhibited cargoes, and had these procedures been followed?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw��
000
To ensure that inhibited cargoes are carried safely and in compliance with company
Objective
procedures and the IGC Code.
Tagged Rank Master and Officers .
Verification by

Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the Officer responsible for cargo planning is not familiar
with the company procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes.
Process Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• There are no company procedures that addresses the carriage of inhibited cargoes and include guidance
on:
o inhibited cargo certificates
o temperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes
__, o inerting of inhibited cargoes
-
o draining/purging of the reliquefaction system after shut-down
o the use of anti-freeze with inhibited cargoes
o the exclusion of water from the cargo system
o recirculation of cargo to ensure a uniform concentration of inhibitor
o adding inhibitor to a cargo in transit
o the possible toxicity of inhibitors
o contingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.
• There is no certificate on board for an inhibited cargo or the certificate does not contain the minimum
information required.
• The stated duration of effectiveness of the inhibitor had expired prior to discharg�.
• Temperatures of an inhibited cargo had not been monitored during the voyage on at least a daily basis,
or as recommended by the cargo manufacturer.
-
• There is no contingency plan in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation and a rapid rise in temperature
of an inhibited cargo.
• There are no records available to confirm that the oxygen in the inert gas supply into the tanks was less
than 0.1 % by volume where polymerisation of vinyl chloride had been prevented by inert gas when no
inhibitor has been added or inhibitor concentration was insufficient.
Hardware
-
-
-
8.4.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for carrying out cargo-sampling
operations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
0 0 0
1W1W1�
Objective To ensure LPG cargo sampling operations are performed safely.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for performing cargo-sampling
operations.
• Sampling is taking place without the presence of a responsible officer.
• Personnel involved in sampling operations are not wearing the required PPE.
• Personnel sampling a toxic cargo are not wearing SCBA.
• Personnel involved in sampling operations had not been properly informed of the nature of the cargo
being handled and the precautions to be observed.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are no company procedures for performing cargo-
sampling operations for all cargoes included on the vessel's Certificate of Fitness.
• Connections to cargo piping systems for taking cargo liquid samples are not clearly marked.
• There is evidence that connections used for control of atmosphere in cargo tanks during inerting or
gassing up were being used as cargo-sampling connections.
• A liquid-sampling arrangement is not provided with a double valve arrangement.
• Neither of the valves on a liquid-sampling arrangement are of the 'multi turn' type.
• Sampling equipment in use is not fully compatible with the sampling connections.
• Sampling equipment is not properly connected, allowing release of cargo vapour.
• An 'open loop' sampling system is being used to sample a toxic cargo.
• Purging, venting or ullaging of sample containers is being carried out in an unsafe location.
• Electrical equipment used when taking samples is not of the certified safe type.
• Plastic vapour sample bags are being used for liquid samples.
• Sample connection valves used during sampling operations are inadequately secured on completion.
• A sample connection is not capped or blanked to prevent any leakage when the connection is not in
use.
• Sample containers that are not free of cargo vapour are stored in an unventilated space.
• A sampling arrangement is defective in any respect.
• Sampling equipment and sampling connections are incompatible.
TMSA KPI 6.2.2 rc;,quirc;,s that comprc;,hc;,nsivc;, procc;,durc;,c: cov<>r all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each
type of vessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be
carried.

8.4. LPG
- 8.4.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for identifying and segregating
incompatible cargoes and refrigerants during cargo stowage planning, and had these procedures been followed?
Question Category
••••
..-- Process)
To ensure cargo stowage is carefully planned to avoid the commingling of incompatible

Objective
cargoes and refrigerants.
-
-
Verification by

• The Officer responsible for cargo stowage planning is not familiar with company procedures for
identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.
• The Officer responsible for cargo stowage planning is not familiar with the use of the compatibility
chart provided on board.
-- • There are no company procedures for cargo stowage planning that include the:
o identification of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants using all available data
o means of identifying and documenting locations and processes where segregation is necessary.
o means of segregation of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.
• There is no compatibility chart issued by a recognised body available on board.
• Operational means of segregation are observed to be not as indicated in the cargo stowage plan.
• The cargo stowage plan does not identify when care should be taken to avoid the co-mingling of
noncompatible cargoes, which cargoes are involved, and the means of segregation.
-
• A cargo logbook entry was not made of the action taken to isolate the pipeline systems prior to the
loading of incompatible cargoes.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if two incompatible cargoes had been stowed adjacent to
each other or in a configuration that did not provide positive segregation.
TMSA KPI 6.1 .1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place

8.4.4. '(I/ere the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe carriage of propylene
oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective To ensure the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures.
Verification by
Human The Officer in Charge of cargo operations must be familiar with the company procedures for the safe
carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures.
• The vessel is handling PO/EO cargoes but:
o these cargoes are not included on the Certificate of Fitness or NLS certificate, and/or
o there is no approved cargo-handling plan available
o there is no P&A Manual on board.
• There is no segregation certification on board issued by the appropriate shore authority prior to loading
propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) or PO-EO mixtures.
• There are no records to show that the hold spaces are being monitored for PO/EO leakage and/or
oxygen content.
• The cargo loading plan did not document the maximum allowable loading limits for each tank
corresponding to the loading temperature.
• Ethylene oxide is being carried in deck tanks.
• While the vessel is handling PO/EO cargo, blanks are not sealed as required.
• During discharge of PO/EO the tank pressure is not maintained above 0.007 MPa gauge.
• The vessel's cargo hoses used for PO/EO transfer are not correctly marked with "FOR ALKYLENE OXIDE
TRANSFER ONLY".
• Where hold spaces are required to be inerted, oxygen content is more than 2%.
• Where required to be fitted, the cargo tanks are not fitted with a cooling system to maintain the cargo
temperature below the reference temperature.
• The water spray system is not operational or defective in any respect.
• There is no evidence that the gaskets in use are constructed of materials which are resistant to the
cargo.
• There is no jettison equipment available on board.
-
8.4. LPG
8.4.5. Were there sufficient escape sets as required by the IGC Code for everyone on board, and did the sets
provide suitable respiratory and eye protection?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human- PIO Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
To ensure that everyone on board is provided with a suitable emergency escape set to exit
Objective
a hazardous atmosphere in case of an emergency.
-
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Interview - Rating, Internal Accommodation, Cargo Control Room.
Tagged Rank Ratings, Officers and Master.
Verification by
-- Human
Process
The Ratings and all on board must be familiar with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape sets
provided.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are insufficient escape sets for everyone on board,
including any contractors, supernumeraries, visitors, etc. while underway. Maintenance records must be
available.
--
• The escape sets provided:
o do not have a design duration of at least 15 minutes
-
o are not included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the on board
maintenance plan
o use filter-type respiratory protection
o do not provide suitable eye protection
o are not suitably marked as not to be used for firefighting or cargo-handling purposes
o are not in addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and
-
machinery spaces.
• An escape set:
o is not fully charged
o had not been inspected and maintained in accordance with the onboard maintenance plan
o had been used for firefighting or cargo-handling purposes
o had been used as the primary means for entering spaces or compartments with unsafe atmospheres.
within the fleet.
-

8.4.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance
of the cargo tank insulation, and was the insulation reported to be in good condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure the cargo tank insulation is properly inspected and maintained.
Cargo Control Room.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and
maintenance of the cargo tank insulation.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the cargo tank insulation
which included guidance on:
o scope and frequency of inspections
o maintenance procedures
o records to be kept of inspections and maintenance
o fire safety precautions to be taken when undertaking maintenance or repair work in the vicinity of
cargo tank insulation.
• There are no records of the inspection, maintenance, or repair of the cargo tank insulation.
• Inspections of cargo tank insulation had not taken place as required by company procedures.
Hardware Where a defect to the cargo tank insulation had been noted within an inspection report, no defect report
had been generated to follow up with the required corrective actions.

8.4. LPG
8.4.7. Were the vent outlets from the cargo containment system fitted with the correct protection screen or
flame screen required for the cargo being carried, and were the screens in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that the correct protection or flame screens are fitted to vent outlets in accordance
Objective
with the cargo being carried, and that these screens are in satisfactory condition.
- Human
Process
• A vent outlet connected to the cargo containment system is not fitted with the required flame screen
(or safety head) or protection screen for the cargo being carried.
• A flame screen or protection screen fitted to a vent outlet connected to the cargo containment system
is not in satisfactory condition, e.g., blocked or clogged, painted over or damaged.
• Flame screens not currently in use are not stored properly in order to prevent damage and/or marked
clearly so that they could be located readily when required.
• A vessel issued with an International Pollution Prevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid
Substances in Bulk (NLS) does not have the required flame screens (or safety heads) available on board
to fit to the vent outlets connected to the cargo containment system.
• On a vessel carrying a carbon dioxide cargo, flame screens or protection screens are fitted to the vent
outlets connected to the cargo containment system.
-
-
-

8.5.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation, testing and
calibration of the custody transfer measurement system (CTMS), and was the system in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
Process)
0 rw�� •@••
0 0 0
To ensure the vessel is able to measure the quantity of energy loaded from production
Objective facilities, unloaded to a receiving terminal, or transferred to another LNG carrier during
ship-to-ship operations.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation, testing and
calibration of the custody transfer measurement system (CTMS).
• There are no company procedures for the operation, testing and calibration of the custody transfer
measurement system (CTMS).
• The CTMS had not been calibrated as required by company procedures.
• There is no current certificate of calibration for the CTMS available on board.
• There are no records of pre-operational tests of the CTMS.
• The CTMS had not been tested prior to the current loading/discharging operations.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the CTMS is defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each
type of vessel within the fleet.
L-

--
8.5. LNG
maintenance and testing of the Gas Combustion Unit (GCU}?
-
Question Category
••••
Process}
- Objective To ensure the Gas Combustion Unit is properly operated, inspected, maintained, and tested.
Verification by
-
• Actions to be taken in the event of the failure of the GCU in automatic mode and procedures for
manual operation if required.
• Provision to manually isolate the gas fuel supply to the GCU from a safely accessible position.
• Company procedures for testing GCU alarms which may include:
o flame failure
o loss of combustion air supply
o loss of cooling air/dilution air supply
......... o BOG inlet temperature
o combustion gas exit temperature (HH at 535°()
o methane gas concentration in gas pipe duct
o loss of ventilation in gas pipe duct, alternatively loss of N 2 pressure.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the GCU.
-
• Inspections, tests and maintenance of the GCU had not been carried out in accordance with the
company requirements.
• The GCU is defective in any respect.
-
• T he GCU space mechanical ventilation system is defective in any respect.
• Gas-detection equipment fitted in the GCU space is defective in any respect.
• Fire-detection equipment fitted in the GCU space is defective in any respect.
• Vents or bleed lines that may contain or be contaminated by gas fuel from the GCU are not fitted with
flame screens.

8.5.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance
and testing of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system, and were these arrangements
in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure the safe supply of boil-off gas (BOG) to consumers in the engine-room such as
Objective boilers, inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas
turbines.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and
maintenance of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system including:
• The inerting or ventilation systems for the annular space of double-wall fuel pipes.
• Leak-detection systems.
• Ventilation systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.
• Gas-detection systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.
• Automatic and manual operation of master gas fuel valves.
• Arrangements for inerting and gas freeing that portion of the gas fuel piping systems located in the
machinery space.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance and testing of the safety
arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room such as boilers,
inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.
• Inspections, tests and maintenance of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system had
not been carried out in accordance with the company requirements.
• A gas-detection system associated with the LNG gas fuel supply system was not set to activate the
alarm at 30% LFL and shut down the master gas fuel valve at not more than 60% LFL.
• One or more of the safety arrangements for the LNG fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-
room such as boilers, inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas
turbines was inoperative or defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts
inventory which reflects the company's maintenance strategy.

8.5. LNG
8.5.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for protecting the hull structure
from low temperature exposure, and was temperature monitoring and cofferdam heating equipment,
where fitted, in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure the hull is protected against the risk of brittle fracture in the event of a failure of
Objective
the cargo containment or insulation.
Tagged Rank
-
Verification by

,.......
-
• Operation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment.
• Operation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted.
• Actions to be taken if:
-
o a cold spot is detected
o cofferdam temperatures fall below 5 ° C or other stated temperature
o there is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.
• There are no company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and protecting
,......., the hull structure from low temperature exposure that include:
o roles and responsibilities
o guidance on the detection of cold spots by the inner hull temperature measurement system, and/or
by visual inspection
o operation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment
o operation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted
o actions to be taken if:
-
- a cold spot is detected
- cofferdam temperatures falls below 5 ° C or other stated temperature
- there is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.
o Records to be maintained of:
- inner hull temperature readings
- visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots
- cold spots identified and actions taken.
• There are no records of:
o inner hull temperature readings
o visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots
o cold spots identified and actions taken.
• The inner hull temperature measurement system is defective in any respect.
• The alarms on the inner hull temperature measurement system are not set as required by company
procedures or inhibited.
-
• The cofferdam heating system is defective in any respect.
• The temperature in the cofferdam(s) had not been maintained as required by company procedures.

setting of the independent cargo tank high-level and overfill alarms, and were these alarm systems fully
operational and properly set?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure independent cargo tank high-level and overfill alarms are always fully operational,
Objective
properly set and used during all cargo loading, discharging and transfer operations.
Verification by

overfill alarm systems.
• The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems or individual cargo
tank alarms may be overridden and the safeguards to ensure they are always in operation during cargo
transfer operations.
• There are no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level
and overfill alarm systems.
overfill alarm systems do not include:
o the mandatory use of the alarms during all loading, discharging and transfer operations
o set points for all alarms
o testing procedures and frequency
o records of testing and maintenance to be kept
o guidance on the operation of shipboard automatic closing valves
o controls on overriding of overfill alarms/automatic shutdown systems
o procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer
operations in the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or overfill alarm
. system or a single
alarm for an individual cargo tank.
• There were no records of testing and maintenance of the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm
systems, including tests:
o prior to cargo operations
o after dry-docking or decommissioning.
• High-level and/or overfill alarms had not been regularly tested in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions.
• The document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at
each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature was not available on board.
u
• Overfill alarms are set above the applicable maximum allowable loading limit for a cargo tank.
• High-level and/or overfill alarms are not set at the level required by company procedures.
• High-level and/or overfill alarms were not in operation at the time of inspection, during loading,
discharging or transfer operations.
• The high-level or overfill alarm system had been overridden during cargo transfer operations.
• The high-level or overfill alarm system was defective in any respect.

8.6. Gas (Common to all vessels under IGC Code)
.........,
8.6.2. Were the Master, Officers, and Ratings involved with cargo operations, familiar with the functions of
the vessel's cargo transfer Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems, and was the equipment in good working
order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
.......
To ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to an emergency situation during
Objective
cargo transfer operations in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Cargo Manifold, Interview - Deck Rating.
- Verification by

-

• The Master, Officers and Ratings involved in cargo operations are not familiar with the vessel's ESD
systems at a depth relevant to their seniority.
-
o the purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems
o the functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system
o the ESD valve closing timings
o the circumstances in which any part of the ESD may be inhibited, the person who may authorise the
inhibiting and the controls in place to ensure that the ESD system is reinstated immediately after the
......... need to inhibit is over.

• An interviewed Rating, involved as part of the cargo watch, is unfamiliar with the location of the ESD system
manual controls and/or the circumstances in which manual activation of the ESD should take place.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel's
cargo ESD systems.
• A functional flowchart (cause-effect) of the ESD systems is not posted in the cargo control room and
,........., on the bridge.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual does not describe the ESD system.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual does not contain procedures for re-setting of the ESD system after
.......... completion of high-level alarm testing.
• There are no records of checks and tests of the ESD systems before cargo handling operations began.
• There are no records of checks to verify the timing and sequencing of the ESD system functions.
-
.......... • Information about the closure time of the ESD valves and their operating characteristics are not available
on board.
• Records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out are incomplete.
• Company procedures do not include a contingency plan for the circumstances where the ESD link
system, if fitted, is not available.
• The status of the ESD and ship/shore link (SSL) systems is not clearly visible in the cargo control room (CCR).
• Area fire detection system on the weather deck, if fitted, is not fully functional.
• Fusible elements are painted over.
• Access to the emergency push buttons is obstructed, or they are not ready for immediate use.
• Inspection of the ESD systems indicate that actions recorded in the planned maintenance system had
not in fact taken place.
• The ESD systems are defective in any respect.

8.6.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance,
testing and setting of the cargo tank relief valves?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure cargo tank relief valves are properly inspected, maintained, tested, and set.
-
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for:
o changing the set pressure of the cargo tank relief valves and the corresponding resetting of alarms,
including record keeping
o inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo tank relief valves
o actions to take in the event of a cargo tank relief valve malfunction including emergency isolation.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the
automated cargo tank venting system.
• The Officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the cargo tank relief valves had not
received training in accordance with the company procedure.
• There are no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo
tank relief valves.
• There are no records available of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the cargo tank relief
valves including:
o checks prior each cargo operation
o six-monthly visual inspections
o annual verification of free operation using a field test kit, where applicable according to the vessel
operational manual and/or instructions
o five-yearly overhaul.
• Inspections, tests and maintenance of the cargo tank relief valves had not been carried out in accordance
with company requirements.
• Where more than one pressure setting was permitted, there are no records available of the changes
made to the cargo tank relief valve settings.
• Where more than one pressure setting was permitted, there is no sign displayed in the cargo control
room or at the cargo tank relief valve indicating the setting in force.
• Cargo tank relief valves are not sealed. or the seals are broken.
• Where a defective cargo tank relief valve had been isolated, no records had been kept.
• Where a defective cargo tank relief valve had been isolated, there is no sign displayed in the cargo
control room or at the cargo tank relief valve indicating the status of the valve.
• A cargo tank had been loaded despite having a defective and previously isolated cargo tank relief valve.
• A cargo tank relief valve had been painted in a manner which might cause the valve to malfunction.
• Galvanic corrosion is evident on a cargo tank relief valve.
• A cargo tank relief valve is defective in any respect.
• Vent masts contain accumulated rainwater.
• Vent mast drains are found to be open during the inspection.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1 .2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering

- 8.6. Gas (Common to all vessels under IGC Code)
8.6.4. Was a ship-specific Cargo System Operation Manual provided on board, and were the Master and
........ Officers familiar with its content?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw�u
000
To ensure that all ship staff involved in cargo operations have sufficient information about
Objective cargo properties and operating the cargo system so they can conduct cargo operations
-
safely.
- Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the contents of the Cargo System Operation Manual
-
available on board.
• There is no Cargo System Operation Manual available on board.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual available on board is not ship specific.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual available on board does not address the hazards and properties
of all the liquified gas cargoes that the vessel is permitted to carry.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual available on board does not document the overall operation cycle
-- of the ship from dry-dock to dry-dock and/or describe the cargo equipment and systems fitted.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual available on board does not include information on maximum
loading rates.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual is not approved by the Flag Administration or a recognised
organisation.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual available on board is not provided in a language understandable
by the officers responsible for cargo operations.
Hardware
.......
.......
-
8.6.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for monitoring the integrity of
the containment system and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a
safe condition, and had records been maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
a
To ensure that the integrity of the containment system is monitored and that the
Objective atmosphere within the system and hold spaces are always maintained in a safe condition.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for monitoring the integrity of
the containment system and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in
a safe condition.
• There are no company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and maintaining
the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition that include:
o roles and responsibilities.
o guidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include, depending upon the cargo containment
system:
- pressure
- nitrogen consumption
- temperature
- flammable gas levels
- oxygen content
- dew point.
o acceptable ranges for applicable parameters
o actions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range
o set points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms
o records to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the atmosphere
in the required condition.
• Records had not been maintained of nitrogen consumption and nitrogen generator running hours.
• The pressure in the interbarrier spaces had not been maintained at a sufficient level to prevent ingress
from the atmosphere.
• Equipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces is defective in any respect.
• Alarms fitted to equipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces had been
inhibited.
• Alarms fitted to equipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces had not been
set as required by company procedures.
• Hold spaces, without open connection to the atmosphere, are not provided with suitable pressure
gauges.
• Secondary barrier temperature sensors had recorded a low reading indicating that liquid cargo may be
in contact with the barrier.
• Sweeping valves were not closed after purging operations were completed.

8.6.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the management and
operation of the cargo alarm systems, and had these procedures been followed?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
Objective To ensure that there is an effective alarm management system in place.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the management and
operation of the cargo alarm systems.
.......... Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• There are no company procedures for the management and operation of the cargo alarm systems that
include, as applicable:
o roles and responsibilities, including the identities of the personnel responsible for managing changes
to the system, keeping proper records, and carrying out maintenance
-- o authorisation required before changing a set point or overriding an alarm

o requirements for risk assessment before changing a set point or overriding an alarm
o actions to be taken when an alarm is temporarily out in service
o records to be kept, including any changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms
,......., have been overridden.
• The company procedures are not aligned with the systems that are fitted onboard with regards to the
-
controls to prevent unauthorised adjustment of an alarm set point or the overriding of an alarm.
• The password and/or key control to operate the adjustment of alarm set points or the override of an
alarm are freely available and not under the control of those identified by the company procedure for
managing changes to the cargo system.
• There are no records of changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms had been
-
overridden, or records are incomplete e.g., no risk assessments are required.
• An alarm is observed to have been overridden or disabled but there is no record of the required risk
assessment and/or authorisation.
-
Hardware
.........

testing and maintenance of the vessel's inert gas system and its associated equipment, and was the
equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rww�
000
To ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with the requirements
Objective for the cargo carried.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Engine Room, Engine Control Room.
Verification by

testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.
• Where a nitrogen generator is fitted, the accompanying Officer is not familiar with the dangers from:
o an oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage.
o the oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert
gas system that include, as applicable:
o roles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance
o description of the inert gas system fitted on board
o procedures to ensure that instruments and equipment used in the system are maintained in
good condition and calibrated in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment
manufacturers
o arrangements to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system
o guidance on the maximum percentage of carbon dioxide that is acceptable to avoid 'dry ice' formation
o guidance on dew point limitations to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and damage to
insulation at the minimum operating temperature
o arrangements for checking regularly to confirm that the oxygen concentration does not exceed the
specified level and that the pressure is above atmospheric when inert gas is used in the cargo system,
including tanks, holds or interbarrier spaces
o arrangements for monitoring the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces containing
equipment, including nitrogen generators. inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant
systems, that may cause an oxygen deficient environment.
• Inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system had not been carried out in accordance
• The continuous-reading oxygen content meter had not been calibrated in accordance with the
recommendations of or1g1na1 equ1prne11t 111ci11urctuure1·:,.
• Non-return valves to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system had not been
tested for effectiveness at regular intervals.
• There are no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.
• There are no records of checks to confirm that the oxygen concentration did not exceed the specified
level and that the pressure was above atmospheric when inert gas was used in the cargo system,
including tanks, holds or interbarrier spaces.
• There are no records of checks of the inert gas system, before, during and after operation.

--
-
Process • There is no evidence that the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces containing equipment,
Continued... including nitrogen generators, inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant systems, that may
cause an oxygen deficient environment had been monitored.
-
posted at each entrance to the room.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the inert gas delivered is not suitable for the intended
purpose, because:
• It is not chemically compatible with the liquefied gas cargo and the materials of construction of the
cargo system throughout the full range of operating temperatures and pressures.
• The dew point is not sufficiently low enough to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and damage
to insulation at the minimum operating temperature.
• The oxygen concentration exceeds 5%, (or 0.2% or less, as required, for cargoes which can react to
form peroxides).
• It does not have a low concentration of carbon dioxide to prevent freezing at the anticipated service
temperature.
The Inspector will also raise a negative observation if:
• The continuous-reading oxygen content meter and alarm system is defective in any respect.
........
-
• Temporary connections (e.g., spool-pieces) had not been removed from between the inert gas system
and the cargo system following inerting operations.
• The inert gas system is defective in any respect.

8.6.8. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for managing cargo and vapour
connections at the cargo manifolds, and were the manifold arrangements in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure that cargo and vapour manifolds are always safely connected, disconnected,
Objective and monitored throughout cargo transfer operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Rating, Cargo Manifold.
Tagged Rank Master, Officers and Deck Ratings.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures which describe the management
of cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds.
• On an LNG carrier, the accompanying Officer is not familiar with the:
o detailed disconnection procedures
o function of the manifold drain line and the means of remotely opening it in the event of a cargo spill
into the drip tray.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the procedures for monitoring the pressure differential
across the filter to check for possible blockage.
• A Rating on manifold watch is not sufficiently familiar with:
o the hazards associated with low temperature cargoes.
o the identification of potential manifold leakage.
• There are no company procedures which describe the management of cargo and vapour connections
at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.
• On an LNG carrier, there are no detailed disconnection procedures.
• There is no information available on board on the allowable loads for the manifold supports and
pressure rating of flanges, reducers and spool pieces, certified by the vessel's Class Society.
• On an LNG carrier, the meter used to verify that target conditions (flammable gas concentration) for
disconnection had been achieved is not calibrated for measuring methane in nitrogen.
• A manifold strainer had been by-passed.
• A manifold connection is:
o secured with damaged bolts or bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.
o not fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.
o made using improvised arrangements such as a G-clamp or similar device.
• Where a hose or marine loading arm is secured by camlocks, one or more cams had not properly
engaged with the manifold flange.
• A marine loading arm is improperly supported by jacks or similar arrangements.
• The jack for a marine loading arm is supported by items not designed to support the load, such as
empty oil drums.
• The jack for a marine loading arm is supported on gratings that are not designed to support such a
load.
• Cargo hoses are not properly supported during cargo transfer.
• A manifold pressure gauge is:
o not fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve
o missing from an unused manifold connection.


,........,
Hardware • A manifold pressure gauge stem is not fitted with a valve or cock and/or is not capped when not in use.
Continued ... • A manifold blank flange is not:
o as thick as the end flange it was bolted to and there was no supporting documentation to show it
-
was of the same working pressure rating as the line or system it was connected to
o made of steel or other approved material
o secured with bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material
o fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.
• There is a cargo or bunker leak from an unused manifold.
• There are not two independent means of exit for personnel from the manifold area to enable evacuation
-
in the event of an emergency.
• Access to the manifold area for non-essential personnel is not visibly restricted.
• Manifold drip tray gratings are constructed of a material that would be adversely affected by spilled
-
cargo.
• The manifold drip tray on an LNG carrier contains water.
• The hull water curtain is not in operation during an LNG cargo transfer operation.
• The cargo manifold is not permanently and clearly marked, at a suitable location, with its designed safe
working loads.
• Bow or stern loading and unloading lines that led past accommodation spaces, service spaces or control
stations are being used for the transfer of products requiring a type 1 G ship.
• Bow or stern loading and unloading lines are being used for the transfer of toxic products as specified
in IGC 1.2.53, where the design pressure was above 2.5 MPa.
-
--
-
..........
-
8.6.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the use, inspection and L
testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework, and were these items in satisfactory
condition and properly fitted when in use?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
0 0 0
rwrw1�
To ensure manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework meet the
Objective required pressure rating for the cargo transfer system and will not leak at the flange face
when used.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Cargo Manifold.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with company procedures for the use and inspection of
manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.
• There are no company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces
and other portable pipework that include guidance on:
o the correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework
o provision of test certification
o suitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces
o regular inspection
o records to be maintained of inspections.
• There is no inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.
• Test certification was not available for a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework.
• There are no records available for the inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable
pipework as required by company procedures.
• Inspection of the manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework indicate that the required
inspections had either not been performed or were ineffective.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework does not have the same certified
rating (MAWP) as the fixed manifold piping to which it is connected.
• The position of handles or lugs on reducers in use during cargo transfer operations interfere with quick
acting coupling devices or the bolting of flanges.
• More than one spool piece or reducer is fitted between the fixed manifold flange and the flange
presented for connection.
• The flange face of a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework is visibly damaged,
corroded or in an unsatisfactory condition.
• Where a long reducer or spool piece is in use, it is not properly supported to prevent undue stress.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time
of the inspection is defective in any respect.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the
time of the inspection had been repaired but there is no evidence that it had been pressure tested on
completion of the repairs.
• A manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework is not made of a suitable material
compatible with the minimum cargo temperature recorded in the Certificate of Fitness.

8.6.10. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for carrying out emergency
discharge operations, and was any required additional equipment in satisfactory condition?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw��
000
To ensure the vessel will be able to discharge the cargo safely in the event of equipment
Objective
........, failure.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for carrying out emergency
discharge operations.
• There are no ship-specific company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations using
an emergency cargo pump or via pressurisation as applicable.
-
• Where carried, there are no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency cargo pump.
• Where emergency discharge procedures involve pressurisation, they do not give guidance on resetting
the cargo tank relief valves where necessary.

• Where emergency discharge procedures involve an emergency cargo pump, the pump is:
-
o not stored in the required 'dry' atmosphere.
• Where carried, there are no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency cargo pump.
-
-
-
-
.........

8.6.11. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the regular inspection
and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements, and were these
arrangements in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure cargo and vapour line insulation and expansion arrangements are regularly
Objective inspected and properly maintained.
Verification by
Human
• There are no company procedures for the regular inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour
pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements.
• Inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements had
not been carried out in accordance with the company procedures.
• A section of cargo or vapour pipeline insulation had been removed and not replaced.
• Cargo or vapour pipeline insulation is cracked or otherwise damaged.
• Icing on pipework insulation indicate a local failure of the insulation.
• There is evidence of corrosion on the pipework underneath the insulation.
• Bellows are found to be defective in some respect, e.g. mechanical damage, cracks, corrosion, pin-hole
leaks, or signs of excessive wear.
• Bellows are fitted with temporary tie-bars or constraints.
• A flexible sleeve is missing from a bellows where previously fitted.
• Pipelines are not free to move within their clamps.
• Pipe workload bearing insulating chocks are:
o constructed of the incorrect material
o wholly or partly missing.
• Cargo and/or vapour pipeline insulation arrangements are defective in any respect.
• Cargo and/or vapour pipeline expansion arrangements are defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA KPI 4.1 .1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare

8.6.12. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures relating to the safety, rescue
......... and recovery equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IGC Code, and was the equipment ready for
immediate use?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure the safety, rescue and recovery equipment required b y the IGC Code is always
ready for immediate use in the event of an emergency.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures relating to the safety equipment,
including SCBAs and/or oxygen resuscitation equipment, required by the IGC Code.
,.._ • Where annual testing of the SCBAs had been conducted by a 'competent person' who is a member of
the crew, there is no evidence that the crewmember who performed the service was in possession of a
valid manufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board.
• There are no company procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the
IGC Code, giving guidance on:
......... o stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment
-
o inspection and testing of the SCBAs
o non-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use and required rest periods
o use of the oxygen resuscitation equipment.
• Records of monthly inspection or annual inspection and testing of the SCBA are either missing or
incomplete.
• There are fewer than two/three complete sets of safety equipment on board, in addition to the four or
five sets required by the IGC for firefighting purposes.
• A set of safety equipment does not contain:
o one self-contained, positive pressure air-breathing apparatus incorporating full face mask, not using
stored oxygen, having a capacity of at least 1,200 litres of free air and compatible with those forming
part of the firefighters' outfits
o protective clothing, boots and gloves to a recognised standard
o steel-cored rescue line with belt; and
o explosion-proof lamp.
-
• For the safety equipment required by the IGC, the vessel is not equipped with:
o at least one fully charged spare air bottle for each piece of breathing apparatus
o an air compressor of adequate capacity capable of continuous operation, suitable for the supply of
high-pressure air of breathable quality; and a charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient
sp;:ire bri:>.:ithing ;:;pp;:ir;:itus air bottles for the apparatus.
• The protective suits forming part of the safety equipment are not suitable for:
o all the cargoes listed on the International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquified Gases in Bulk
o use in a flammable atmosphere
o not gastight.
,......... • The oxygen resuscitation was not in satisfactory condition and/or the oxygen bottle was not fully charged.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1 .4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo-specific hazards for all vessel

8.6.13. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures addressing the protective
equipment required by the IGC Code, and was this equipment in satisfactory condition and suitable for the
products being handled?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure crew members are protected from exposure to hazardous conditions when
Objective engaged in cargo operations.
Verification by

• The Officer in Charge of cargo operations is not familiar with the company procedures addressing the
protective equipment required by the JGC Code.
• A crew member is observed not wearing adequate protective clothing where there is a risk of accidental
• A crew member is observed wearing protective clothing incorrectly where there is a risk of accidental
• A Deck Officer or rating is unfamiliar with the selection and donning of a full set of protective equipment
including a protective suit.
• There are no company procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IGC Code that
include:
o a list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and considering
the products to be carried
o what protective equipment is required to be worn for the different types of operations on board, and
products handled, preferably in the form of a PPE matrix
o crew training in the correct use of the protective equipment
o checks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working area
o assessment of a user's fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions
o guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a chemical suit, if applicable
o how protective equipment should be cleaned and stored
o actions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment
o frequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.
• There is no chemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.
• Protective equipment in use does not provide the degree of protection specified as being required in
the SDS of a cargo being handled.
• Safety spectacles are being used as eye protection against splashes.
• Protective equipmenL i::, 11uL �LUred In an easily accessible, ventilated space, designed for the purpose.
• Protective equipment in use is stored within the accommodation in an unauthorised space or spaces.
• Items of the protective equipment required by company procedures are not available on board.
• There is no evidence that chemical suits are suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.
• An item of protective equipment in use is in poor condition.
• Gloves, boots and/or head gear are of inferior chemical resistance to that of the protective suits provided.
• Suitable protective equipment is not available in the quantity and range of sizes required to fit the crew
on board.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo-specific hazards for all vessel

-
8.6.14. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe operation and
maintenance of the reliquefaction plant, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process}
0 rw��
0 0 0
Objective To ensure the safe operation of the reliquefaction plant.
-
.......... ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Compressor Room .
Verification by

maintenance of the reliquefaction plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment.
-
• There are no company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction
plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment that include, as applicable:
o description of the reliquefaction system, its components and its functions
o procedures for start-up and shut-down of the system
o regular checks including:
- compressor lubrication oil levels
- suction filters
- reliquefaction plant liquid level during operation to prevent overfilling of receivers or condensers.
o periodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the equipment including pressure tests of the
condensers and calibration of the instrumentation
o compatibility of compressor lubrication oil with the cargoes carried
o compatibility of refrigerants with the cargoes carried and other refrigerants in use
o segregating reliquefaction systems for incompatible cargoes
o reliquefaction of inhibited cargoes
o dealing with incondensable gases
-
o prevention of overfilling of cargo tanks via reliquefication, including setting high-level alarms
o integration of the reliquefaction system into the cargo ESD system or any independent shutdown
system for the reliquefaction plant
-
o the secondary tank pressure management system to be used at sea in the event of a shutdown of the
reliquefaction system.
• Inspection, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant had not been carried out in accordance
-
• There are no records of regular checks of reliquefaction plant liquid levels during operation to prevent
overfilling of receivers or condensers.
-
• Compressor discharge temperature limits are not set in accordance with the compressor manufacturer
and cargo operation manual requirements.
• There are no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant including safety
relief valves, where fitted.
• Refrigerant in use is not compatible with the cargo.
• Compressor lubricating oil level is found to be low.
• Compressor lubricating oil is not compatible with the cargo.
• The reliquefaction plant is defective in any respect.
• Cargo is being or had been vented to atmosphere to control tank pressure without flag and/or Port
State authorisation.
-

8.6.15. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe operation and
maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure the safe operation of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Compressor Room.
Verification by
maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters,
vaporisers and condensers that include, as applicable:
o descriptions of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers, their components and functions
o pressure testing
o procedures for start-up and shut-down of the system, including tests of both cargo and water sides
for leakage and test water flow shutdowns
o ensuring the equipment in use is compatible with the cargo being handled
o identification of the alarms required to be tested to ensure the unit is protected
o the correct sequence for hot or cold phase flow
o avoiding freezing of the alarms and temperature controls
o gas detection monitoring during use
o regulating cargo flow
o the control of the cargo flow rate into direct heaters
o precautions when using sea water as the heating medium to prevent freezing and subsequent tube
damage if the cargo vapour pressure inside the vaporiser becomes too low
o the precautions when using fresh water as opposed to salt water at river berths
o flushing requirements after use.
• Inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers, including pressure
testing, had not been carried out in accordance with the company procedures.
• There are no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers
including safety relief valves. where fitted.
• There are no records of checks of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers prior, during and after
operation.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if a cargo heater, vaporiser or condenser is defective in any
respect.
TMSA KPI 6. 1. 1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and .bunkering operations are in place

8.6.16. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the filling limits (FL) and loading limits (LL) for the cargo
tanks, and was this information readily available in the cargo control room or position?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure cargo tanks are never over-filled.

-
Verification by
Human The Officer responsible for cargo planning must be familiar with filling limits (FL), loading limits (LL) and/or
reference temperatures, and their application when planning cargo stowage.
• There is no document available specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank
and product, at each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature.
• The document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at
each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature had not been approved by
the Flag Administration or the vessel's Class Society on its behalf.
,........., • The maximum liquid level in each cargo tank had not been pre-calculated for the current and/or
previous loading operation.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if a cargo tank(s) had been loaded above the specified
loading limit (LL).
TMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations
is in place for all types of vessel within the fleet. The planning procedure is specific to the vessel type and
......... cargo to be carried.
-
-
.......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 303

testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system, and was the system in satisfactory
condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
0 0 0
rwrw1� a
Objective
Verification by
testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent
mast fire suppression system that include:
o roles and responsibilities for inspection, testing and maintenance
o description of the vent mast fire suppression system, its components and its functions
o requirements for regular inspection, testing and maintenance of the equipment including checking
the level in any portable gas cylinders
o actions to be taken in the event of a fire at the vent mast, including instructions for the release of the
system.
• Inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system had not been carried out
in accordance with the company procedures.
• The Cargo System Operation Manual and/or FFA manual do not include instructions for the use of the
vent mast fire suppression system.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the vent mast fire suppression system is defective in any
respect.
TMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel. including
contractors.

8.6.18. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for detecting water leakage
into hold or insulation spaces and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in
these spaces?
Question Category
••••
Process)
,.......,
To ensure any water or cargo liquid leakage into hold or insulation spaces is safely
Objective
removed.
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the ship-specific company procedures for detecting water
leakage into a hold or insulation space and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have
accumulated in these spaces.
-
• There are no ship-specific company procedures for detecting water leakage into a hold or insulation
space and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in these spaces that
include guidance on the:
o means of detecting any water leakage into hold or insulation spaces
o pumping arrangements for removing any water leakage into these spaces
o where required, arrangements for removing any liquid cargo leakage into these spaces
o testing requirements for the water detection and pumping arrangements.
• There are no records of tests of the water detection and pumping arrangements.
• Tests of the water detection and pumping arrangements had not been carried out as required by
company procedures.
• The means of detecting any water leakage into hold or insulation spaces are defective in any respect.
• The water detection alarm system is inhibited.
• The pumping arrangements for removing any water leakage into these spaces are defective in any
respect.
-
• The arrangements for removing any liquid cargo leakage into these spaces are defective in any respect.
• A removable spool piece that formed part of the arrangements for removing liquid cargo leakage had
been left in place.
-
• Any item of portable equipment required for the pumping arrangements is not available onboard.
,.........
--
......... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 305
8.6.19. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures for the operation of the submerged
motor electric cargo pumps and the testing of their associated safety devices and alarms, and had these
procedures been followed?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
000
rwrw1�
Objective To ensure the submerged motor electric cargo pumps are always operated safely.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of:
• A low liquid level alarm and cargo pump shutdown.
• Gas-freeing operations.
• There are no company procedures for the operation of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps and
the testing of their associated safety devices and alarms that include guidance on:
o arrangements for isolating the pumps from the electrical supply and the occasions when this must be
done, e.g. during gas-freeing operations
o settings and periodic tests of the associated safety devices such as:
- low pump discharge pressure alarm
- low motor current alarm
- low liquid level alarm.
• The required safety device and alarm tests had not been completed at the frequency defined by the
company.
• The submerged motor electric cargo pump monitoring system is defective in any respect.
• The submerged motor electric cargo pumps are not fitted with arrangements to automatically shut
down the motors in the event of low-liquid level.
• The submerged motor electric cargo pumps are not capable of being isolated from their electrical
supply.
contractors.

8.6.20. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance,
testing and setting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and interbarrier space relief valves?
Question Category
Process)
-
- Objective
To ensure liquid line, hold, and insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves are properly
inspected, maintained, tested, and set.
-
Verification by
-
o the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance. testing and setting of the liquid line, hold,
insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves
o the actions to take in the event of a relief valve malfunction.
• The Officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the relief valves had not received training
in accordance with the company procedure.
,......... Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
-
• There are no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid
line, hold. insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves.
• There are no records available of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the relief valves
including:
o checks prior each loading
o six-monthly visual inspections
o annual verification of free operation using a field test kit
o five-yearly overhaul.
• Inspections, tests and maintenance of the relief valves had not been carried out in accordance with the
company requirements.
• A relief valve had been painted in a manner which might cause the valve to malfunction.
• Galvanic corrosion is evident on a relief valve.
• A liquid line, hold, insulation or inter-barrier space relief valve is defective in any respect.
......... TMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment
-
8.6.21. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures that gave guidance on cargo
tank environmental control during inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards
during tank cool-down, and the minimum cargo temperature?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
To ensure inerting, gas freeing, gassing up and tank cool-down operations are carried out
Objective
in a safe manner.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures that give guidance on cargo
tank environmental control during inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards
during tank cool-down, and the minimum cargo temperature.
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the minimum cargo temperature at which the vessel is
certified to load.
• There are no company procedures that give guidance on cargo tank environmental control during
inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during tank cool-down, and the
minimum cargo temperature, and include as applicable:
o guidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include:
- pressure in interbarrier spaces during cool-down
- nitrogen consumption/flow
- temperature
- rate of cool-down
- flammable gas levels at different levels in the tank
- oxygen content
- humidity
- removal of inert gas from the cargo tank.
o acceptable ranges for applicable parameters
o actions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range
o set points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms
o records to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the atmosphere
in the required condition
o maximum allowable temperature differential between the top and bottom of the cargo tank
o control of ice or hydrates and use of anti-freeze
o p ressurising cargo tanks to maintain the liquid temperature above the minimum permitted cargo L
tank temperature.
• There are no detailed records available for previous inerting, gassing up and cooling down operations.
• Records indicate that the parameters required to be monitored had not been met and/or maintained
during any stage of an inerting, gassing up and cooling down operation.
• There is no evidence that gas concentration monitoring is carried out at different tank levels during
inerting or gassing up operations.
Hardware

8.7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations
8.7 .1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel's Emergency
Shut Down (ESD) systems, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and
maintained?
- Question Category
(Hardware-Human
Process)
- (1@08
.......... Objective To ensure the vessel is able to execute a controlled ESD 1 or ESD 2 operation.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Bow Loading Area.
-
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems.
-
• The Responsible Officer is unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the ESD system.
• There are no company procedures that define the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of
the ESD systems.
• There are no checklists available for preparation/testing of the ESD systems.
• The ESD systems had not been tested as required by company procedures.
• The vessel's planned maintenance system does not include the ESD systems or the required inspections,
....... maintenance and tests.

• Records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out are incomplete.
• Inspection of the ESD systems indicates that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact
taken place.
• Either or both of the ESD systems are defective in any respect.
contractors.
-
-
-
-
..........

8.7.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures, including appropriate arrival
checklists, detailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried out when approaching an offshore
terminal prior to DP and/or bow loading operations, and had these procedures been complied with?
Question Category
e@oe
Process)
0 rw��
0 0 0
To ensure DP and bow loading shuttle tankers carry out all necessary checks and actions
Objective
when approaching offshore terminals.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Bow Loading Area.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures detailing the necessary
checks and actions to be carried out when approaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and/or bow
loading operations.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company checklists to use when approaching an
offshore terminal.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with any actions they are responsible for completing or
verifying within the checklists in use when approaching an offshore terminal.
• The company procedures detailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried out when approaching
an offshore terminal prior to DP and/or bow loading operations do not include appropriate arrival
checklists.
• Records indicate that arrival checklists:
o had not been utilised
o had not been fully completed.
• Checklists in use are insufficiently detailed or insufficiently ship-specific.
• There is no evidence that a defect or malfunction identified when completing an arrival checklist had
been reported to the offshore terminal and to the vessel operator as appropriate.
• Review of completed checklists indicate that, although a defect or malfunction had been identified, the
vessel had proceeded in contravention of FSOG or ASOG.
TMSA TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.

- 8.7.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the equipment for control and monitoring of the Bow loading
System (BLS), and was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the vessel's telemetry and green line systems will safely start, control and
Objective
stop cargo transfer operations.
-
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the:
........, • Functions of the green line and telemetry systems.
-
• Actions to take in the event of a green line failure.
• Input sensors to the green line system.
• FMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS.
- • There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the
equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS which set out:
o guidance on the use of the telemetry and green line systems to ensure safe start, control and stopping
of cargo transfer offshore
o the actions to take in the event of a green line failure (GLF)
o the frequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the telemetry and green line
systems, including sensors, e.g. tension monitoring load cells, and where fitted, the cargo flowmeter.
• There is no FMEA report available for the cargo-loading system and BLS.
......... • Company procedures do not include checklists for the regular testing/preparation of the following:
-
o telemetry systems
o green line systems
o GLF input sensors, e.g., chain stopper tension, hose in position, cargo system ready, DP/vessel
-
positioning, crude oil pressure high, hydraulic system pressure/accumulated pressure, hose tension.
• There is no BLS data logger fitted.
• There are no BLS data logger records available.
• The tension monitoring information is not readable from the BLS operator panel and the DP console(s).
• The tension monitoring load cells had not been calibrated as required by company procedures.
-
• There is no on-board equipment for the calibration of the tension load cells.
• Where fitted, the cargo flow control meter had not been tested/calibrated as per company procedures.
• The BLS operator panel is not installed next to the DP manoeuvring stations.
• The equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS is defective in any respect.
-
• The GLS is defective in some respect, but observation/records showed it had been overridden to allow
cargo operations to be carried out.
• The equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS is not included in the onboard planned
maintenance system.
• The BLS data logger is defective in any respect.
• The BLS data logger did not record the following:
-
o hose tension
o hawser tension
o status/operation of all equipment in the "green line" system
o all operator commands/warnings/alarms generated by the BLS control system.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each
type of vessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried.
-

testing and maintenance of the Bow Loading System (BLS), including alarms and indicators, and was the BLS
area well maintained and free from oil?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
Objective To ensure the BLS is operated safely and regularly inspected, tested, and maintained.
ROVIQ Sequence Bow Loading Area.
Verification by
testing and maintenance of the Bow Loading System (BLS).
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS,
including:
o BLS coupler valve tightness tests
o coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks
o BLS operator console alarm and indicators tests
o other test requirements
o arrangements for flushing and gas-freeing the bow cargo piping.
• There are no records, or records are incomplete, of inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS
including:
o BLS coupler valve tightness tests before each loading operation
o coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks
o BLS operator console alarm and indicators tests
o other test requirements.
• The BLS area is not free of oil.
• Arrangements for draining the manifold room are inadequate.
• The controls, alarms and/or indicators of the forward BLS operator console are defective in any respect.
• Where fitted, there is no means of monitoring and verifying the status of the pressure relief arrangements.
• Access doors to the bow loading area are not self-closing or are lashed open.
• The audible and/or visible alarms for the air lock doors to the bow loading area are defective in any
respect.
• An item(s) of the required equipment in the watchman's cabin is missing or defective, e.g. fire
extinguisher, EEBDs.
• The bow door(s) are not provided with:
o appropriate railing and securing wires for use when the door is used as a working platform
o a detachable rail installed across the opening when the door is open.
• The condition of the hydraulic room is unsatisfactory in any respect, e.g. hydraulic leaks.
• Where fitted, the condition of the electrical equipment room is unsatisfactory in any respect, e.g. L
hydraulic piping passed through the room.
• The BLS is defective in any respect.
equipment are in place for all vessel types within the fleet. Records of the tests and checks are maintained.
Comments/SMS Reference L

- 8.7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations
8.7.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the deluge system in
,......., the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested
and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that those measures specifically designed to prevent or extinguish fires in the
Objective
BLS area of shuttle tankers are effective.
- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Bridge, Bow Loading Area, Cargo Control Room.
- Verification by
-
• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the purpose and operation of the BLS deluge system.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the BLS deluge system.
• There is no company procedure for the testing, maintenance and operations of the BLS deluge system.
• Operating instructions for the BLS deluge system are not posted close to the operator panels.
......... • There is no maintenance plan for the vessel's fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and
appliances available.
do not include the BLS deluge system or the required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the BLS deluge system were incomplete.
• Inspection of the BLS deluge system indicate that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in
fact taken place.
• The BLS deluge system is defective in any respect.
contractors.
-
8.7.6. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the fixed foam fire
extinguishing system in the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was the equipment in good working order
and regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel's BLS fixed
foam fire extinguishing system.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection
• There is no company procedure for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BLS fixed foam
fire extinguishing system.
• The BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system operating instructions are not posted near the control
panel and in the space(s) containing the BLS foam system foam concentrate tanks(s) and pump(s).
• The foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required timeframe.
does not include the vessel's BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system or all the required inspections,
tests and maintenance.
• Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete, including the required
foam concentrate tests.
• The valves and/or system controls are not clearly identified to their purpose and required status
during system operation.
• The foam storage tank is not filled to the required level.
• The foam concentrate test certificate indicate that the foam was not fit for continued use.
• Inspection of the vessel's BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in the
plan had not in fact taken place.
• The BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system isolation valves or monitors are not free to move through
their full range of motion.
• The BLS fixed foam fire-extinguishing system was defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA KPI 3 .1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.

- 8.7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations
- 8.7.7. Are all items of DP equipment in satisfactory condition and are they included in the Planned Maintenance
System (PMS)?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective To ensure all DP systems and sub-systems are maintained in good working order.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
- Human

• An item of DP equipment is not included in the Planned Maintenance System .
-
• A necessary task is not included in the Planned Maintenance System, e.g., calibration of thrusters,
routine rebooting of computer systems.
• Necessary data was not included in the Planned Maintenance System, e.g., battery expiry dates.
• An item of DP equipment is defective in any respect.
• Maintenance tasks associated with DP equipment are overdue or deferred without shore authorisation.
TMSA TMSA KPI 4.1 .1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare
parts inventory which reflects the company strategy.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8. 7.8. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the vessel's DP FMEA, was the latest version available on
board, and were any modifications to the DP system included?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
0 00
To ensure that the FMEA is properly managed and that the appropriate vessel personnel
Objective are familiar with its contents.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Bridge, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (8. 7 .8)
Human T he accompanying Officer must be familiar with the FMEA, including for example:
• Actions to be taken in the event of a given DP system or sub-system failure.
• The fail-safe condition of thrusters i.e. 'fail as set', 'fail to zero thrust' or 'propeller stop'.
• Relevant failure modes associated with closed bus tiebreaker operation.
• There are no company procedures to ensure that the:
o FMEA is reviewed and updated as required due to changes in operating procedures or modifications
to DP hardware and/or software
o latest copy of the FMEA is available on board
o Master, DPOs and engineers are familiar with the content of the FMEA.
• The FMEA is not identified as a controlled document within the vessel's quality management system or
include a revision history.
• The FMEA is not written in the working language of the ship.
• The latest FMEA report and associated documents are not available on board.
• Technical queries recorded in the FMEA after proving trials had not been effectively closed out.
• On a newly delivered vessel, FMEA proving trials had not been carried out.
• Where the vessel is permitted to operate with closed bus tie in accordance with a field operators
manual or local regulations, the FMEA did not include analysis of the relevant failure modes associated
with closed bus tiebreaker operation.
• Thruster failure modes do not meet accepted requirements to 'fail as set', 'fail to zero thrust' or
'propeller stop'.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.

- 8.7.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the gas- and fire
detection systems in the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was the equipment in good working order,
-
regularly tested, maintained and calibrated?
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Bow Loading Area, Bridge, Cargo Control Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the operation and maintenance of the fire and
hydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.
-- Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fire- and
-
hydrocarbon gas-detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.
• The associated alarms and signals had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.
• The alarm activation set point of one or more gas sensors is not in accordance with company procedures.
• The gas detecting sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions at
the frequency defined by the company.
• The calibration gas used for the calibration of the hydrocarbon sensors is out of date or not appropriate
for use with the system.
__, • Flame and smoke detectors had not been tested as required by company procedures.
• One or more smoke, flame or hydrocarbon gas sensors is out of service.
-- • The gas-detecting system in the BLS area is defective in any respect.

• The fire-detection system in the BLS area is defective in any respect.
T MSA TMSA KPl 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.
,.........

maintenance and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers, and were the hatch covers in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure the cargo hold hatch-covers of combination carriers are properly maintained
Objective
and gas tight.
Verification by

L
maintenance, and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.
• The accompanying Officer is not aware of the optimum tank atmosphere pressure range to maintain
an effective hatch seal.
• The hatch-covers are not included in the vessel's maintenance plan.
• The hatch-covers are not subject to regular inspection, with the results recorded.
• The hatch-cover sealing arrangements had not been pressure tested using inert gas prior to loading a
liquid cargo.
• The sealing arrangements of the hatch-covers are not of the dual-seal type.
• There is ongoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the flanges of the PN valves fitted on top of the
hatchcovers.
• There is ongoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the sealing arrangements of the hatch-covers.
• Ongoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the hatch-covers had not been subject to risk assessment.
• There is oil leakage from the hatch-cover hydraulic system.
• There is visible cracking at the corner of a hatch-coaming or in the adjacent deck.
• There is unrepaired grab damage to the hatch-covers or coamings.

8.8. 080 / Combination Carriers
--,
8.8.2. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for changing cargo modes, including
ship-specific checklists, and were there records to show that these procedures had been followed?
-
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
-
To ensure the changeover from wet to dry and vice versa in combination carriers is carried
Objective
out safely and that all the necessary actions are completed.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for changing cargo mode
.......... from wet to dry and vice versa .
• The procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa do not include ship-specific
checklists to facilitate the changeover.
• The ship-specific cargo mode changeover checklists had not been completed as required by company
procedures.
• There are no records available of previous cargo mode changeovers.
• Records show that the company procedures had not been followed during a previous cargo mode
changeover.
• There are no records of hold inspections and corrective actions taken prior to cargo mode
changeover.
Hardware
,........., KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place
TMSA

8.99.1. Were the Master and all Officers directly involved in cargo transfer operations familiar with the
company procedure for planning cargo and ballast transfers, and were records available to demonstrate that
cargo operations had been planned in accordance with the company procedure and conducted in accordance
with the agreed plan?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure cargo and ballast transfer operations are planned and conducted in accordance
Objective
with company procedures and industry best practice guidance.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the:

• Company procedures for cargo and ballast transfer planning.
• Company requirements for maintaining records of cargo and ballast operations.
• There is no company procedure:
o that require cargo and ballast transfer plans to be prepared with defined content applicable to the
vessel type and the equipment and systems fitted
o which defines the record-keeping requirements for cargo and ballast transfer operations.
• The reviewed cargo and ballast transfer plan is:
o missing key information required by the company procedures
o missing draft, trim and stress calculations at key stages of the cargo and ballast operation
o not signed by all Deck Officers and, where required, Engineer Officers and/or was not approved by
the Master.
• Where the cargo and/or ballast sequence or operations had to be updated due to changes in
circumstances, the cargo and ballast transfer plan had not been updated and then re-approved by the
Master and acknowledged by the Officers involved in the cargo/ballast operation.
• The reviewed cargo and ballast transfer records:
o indicate that the cargo and ballast plan is not followed
o indicate that cargo-related operations are conducted which are not included in the cargo and ballast
transfer plan
o do not comply with company record keeping requirements
o do not include sufficient detail, within the aggregated cargo records, to reconstruct the progress of
-
the cargo operation and determine which tanks, pumps and lines were involved at any point during
a cargo transfer
o the cargo space venting or tank atmosphere management is not conducted in accordance with the
cargo plan.
Hardware
TMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations
is in place for all types of vessel within the fleet which will include, as applicable, vessel and cargo type .
-
- 8.99. All Types
- 8.99.2. Were the Master and all Officers with a direct responsibility for cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operations
familiar with the requirements of the ISGOTI Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, were appropriate
sections of the SSSCL in use with all applicable provisions and agreements maintained throughout?
-- Question Category
••••
-
Process)
......... Objective
To verify that there are good communications between the tanker and terminal, from pre
arrival to post departure, to ensure compliance with agreed safe operational procedures.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck, Mooring Decks.
......... Tagged Rank Master and Officers.
--
Verification by
- Human The accompanying Officer should be familiar with emergency escape means prepared for the berth.
-
• The accompanying Officer or any officer having a responsibility for cargo operations is unfamiliar
with the relevant sections of the SSSCL applicable to the vessel or any check or declaration made
therein.
• A responsible Officer had not conducted the repetitive checks required by the SSSCL Part 8 on deck
at least once during each cargo watch period.
• There is no company procedure which requires the relevant sections of a SSSCL in accordance with
ISGOTI Sixth Edition to be completed during every cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operation at a
terminal or during defined ship to ship transfer operations.
• The relevant sections of the SSSCL in use are not in alignment with the guidance provided in ISGOTI
Sixth Edition.
• The sections of the SSSCL relevant to the operation being undertaken or reviewed had not been
- completed or are not in use.

• There are open defect reports for equipment or systems relevant to the SSSCL which had not been
brought to the attention of the Terminal Representative through a documented remark in the relevant
-- sections of the SSSCL.

• Items in the relevant SSSCL checklists had been answered as "yes" when there is evidence that the item
reported on is not in accordance with the referenced guidance provided in ISGOTI Sixth Edition.
• The vessel is found to be violating any of the documented agreements identified in SSSCL Part 6, tanker
and terminal pre-transfer agreements.
• The cargo and ballast transfer plan had not been updated, where required, to reflect the documented
-
agreements reached during the tanker and terminal pre-transfer meeting.
-
• Inspection of the vessel determines that equipment or systems relevant to the SSSCL are defective and
there is neither an open defect report in the defect reporting system nor a documented remark in the
relevant sections of the SSSCL.
-
• Inspection of the vessel determines that any item included in SSSCL Part 8, repetitive checks is not
maintainG>d in the required condition.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for
each type of vessel in the fleet.
.........

8.99.3. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures which provided guidance on the
level of supervision and support for cargo/port operations, and were operations supervised and supported by
an appropriate team in accordance with the company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
rwrw1�
To ensure that there are always enough properly supervised personnel on duty for the
Objective management of cargo operations, means of access, moorings and any other planned
operations while in port or at a terminal.
Verification by

• The accompanying Officer is not familiar with the company procedures that provide guidance on
the supervision and support levels required during cargo/port operations.
• The level of supervision and support in the cargo control room and on deck is not in alignment with the
company procedures.
• The cargo operation team supervisors and/or support are observed to be involved with a conflicting
operation (SIMOPS) and distracted from their designated duties documented within the cargo/port
plans.
• Operations identified by the company procedures as requiring Senior Officer supervision, such as, crude
oil washing, commencing loading/discharging operations or completing loading/discharging operations
are not supervised as required.
• The cargo/port planning documentation does not include the level of supervision and support required
during the various stages of cargo/port operations.
• The cargo/port planning documentation is not developed in alignment with the company procedures
that provided guidance on the supervision and support levels required during cargo/port operations.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for
each type of vessel within the fleet.

-
8.99. All Types
- 8.99.4. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for checking and testing cargo and
ballast system valves, and were the valves and the remote control system in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
-
Objective To ensure that cargo and ballast system valves always operate as designed.
Verification by
,.........

• The company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.
• The emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the vessel.
• The company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves do not
......... include the:
-
o frequency of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves
o records to be kept of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves
o procedure for checking of the time taken for power operated valves to move from open to closed,
and from closed to open, and the optimum times
o verification of the accuracy of local and remote valve indicators
o procedure for testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the
-
vessel.
• There are no records of regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.
• Checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves do not include:
-
o checking and recording the time taken for power operated valves to move from open to closed, and
from closed to open
o verifying that the local and remote valve indicators were showing the correct position of the valve
o testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the vessel.
• Records indicated that power operated valves were not operating in the optimum times.
-
• A cargo or ballast system valve indicator is observed to be indicating the incorrect position of the valve.
(e.g. the valve signal is set to full open or full closed, but the valve indicator does not reflect the order
by showing an intermediate position or by continuing to flash).
-
• A hydraulically operated cargo or ballast system valve is isolated from the hydraulic system due to
suspected hydraulic leakage.
• A cargo or ballast system valve designed to be remotely operated is disconnected from the remote-
control system and is being operated manually.
• The valve hydraulic system is not maintained at normal operating pressure during cargo transfer
operations due to suspected hydraulic oil leakage in the system.
• The valve hydraulic system, or pneumatic system, is not set to automatically maintain the normal system
--
operating pressure throughout cargo and ballast transfer operations.
• There is evidence of excessive hydraulic oil loss from the valve hydraulic system.
• A cargo or ballast system valve is observed to be defective in any respect.
-
• The cargo and ballast system valve remote control system is defective in any respect.
• There is no functional emergency valve control mode local hand pump available.
TMSA TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare
-
--
8.99.5. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation, maintenance,
testing, calibration and comparison of the fixed cargo tank level gauging system, and was the system in
satisfactory condition and fully operational?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
To ensure the fixed tank level gauging system is always fully operational, reliable and
accurate.
-
Verification by

• The company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison checks
of the fixed tank level gauging system.
• The actions to take if the fixed gauging system or an individual cargo tank fixed gauging device is
defective or unreliable.
• The setting and monitoring of any level alarms built into the fixed tank level gauging system.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison
checks of the fixed tank level gauging system based on the manufacturer's instructions.
• Testing and calibration of the fixed tank level gauging system had not been performed in accordance
with the company procedures and/or manufacturer's instructions.
• There are no records available of testing and calibration of the fixed tank level gauging system.
• Fixed tank level gauges had not been regularly checked against portable equipment or secondary tank
level gauges, where practicable, and records of the comparison maintained.
• There is no procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo transfer operations in the
event of a failure of the fixed tank level gauging system.
• There are significant discrepancies in the comparison between the fixed tank level gauges and the
portable or secondary gauges.
• The fixed tank level gauging system is inoperative, or unreliable and gauging is being performed using
portable equipment.
• Level alarms built into the fixed ullaging system, if any, are permanently silenced or inhibited.
• The fixed tank level gauging system is defective in any respect.
TMSA TMSA KP! 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare
parts inventory, which reflects the company's maintenance strategy.

-
- 8.99. All Types
- 8.99.6 Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedure and manufacturer's
instructions for the periodic testing of the stability and loading instrument(s), and were records maintained
to confirm that tests had been completed in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-- 0
To ensure that the vessel's stability and loading instrument(s) provides accurate stress and
Objective
stability calculations.
Verification by
-
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures or the manufacturer's
-
instructions for testing the loading instrument.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the damage stability functions of the loading instrument.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative obseNation if:
-
• There is no company procedure requiring the periodic testing of the vessel's loading instrument.
• The vessel had not completed the periodic verification of the loading instrument accuracy in accordance
with the company procedures or the manufacturer's instructions.
• Records are not available for the periodic verification of the loading instrument accuracy.
........ • Records are not available for the verification of the loading instrument accuracy at Special Survey in the
presence of a Class Surveyor.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative obseNation if:
• The loading instrument in use is defective in any respect.
-
• The vessel does not have a loading instrument but there is no clear evidence that the vessel is exempt
from the requirement to carry such a device.
-

8.99.7 Where the vessel was subject to loading restrictions and/or intact stability concerns at any phase of
a voyage or cargo operation, had the company developed procedures to manage these restrictions and/or
concerns, and were the Master and cargo Officers familiar with the company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
000
To ensure that the vessel is never loaded in such a manner that any structural limitations
Objective
-
are exceeded due to tank filling level, or intact stability is compromised by unmanaged
free surface effect.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the loading limitations or stability concerns applicable
to the vessel, where they exist.
-
• The vessel operator had not correctly declared any loading limitations or stability concerns applicable to
the vessel through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
• The vessel is subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but the vessel operator had not
developed procedures to manage the issues onboard the vessel.
• The vessel is subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but there are no warning signs posted
to notify the Officers with cargo-related responsibilities of the issues onboard the vessel.
• The cargo plans had not been developed to address loading limitations or stability concerns where they
existed.
• Vessel records determined that the guidance provided by the company procedure to address loading
limitations or stability concerns had not been complied with.
• The vessel had undergone weight variations due to the installation of a scrubber or ballast water
treatment system. or major structural modifications, but there is no evidence that the loading instrument
and/or stability booklet had been updated to take account of the changes where appropriate.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering
operations is in place for all types of vessel within the fleet.

-
8.99. All Types
8.99.8 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing
and storage of cargo transfer hoses, and were the hoses in satisfactory condition?
.........
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
,........,
Objective To ensure ship supplied cargo transfer hoses are always fit for purpose.
....... Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the selection, inspection,
testing, storage, and retirement of cargo transfer hoses.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no:
• Record of the service history of ship supplied cargo transfer hoses.
• Valid certificate and/or documentation on board for a ship supplied cargo transfer hose.
• Documentary evidence for hydrostatic test data marked on a ship supplied cargo transfer hose.
• Record of the temporary and permanent elongation during pressure testing for each cargo
transfer hose.
........, Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• A ship supplied cargo transfer hose:
o is not clearly marked with the required information
o had not been inspected within the last 12 months to confirm suitability for continued use
o had not been pressure tested within the last 12 months to confirm suitability for continued use
o had not been retired in accordance with the company set criteria
o had visual damage as detailed in the guidance but had not been withdrawn from service
o had not been tested for electrical continuity since the last hydrostatic test
o is not compatible with the cargo being handled and/or the cargo temperature
........, o had a maximum working pressure of less than 1 MPa (approximately 145 psi or 10.2 kg/cm 2 )
-
o is stored or used with a bend radius less than the minimum bend radius (MBR) information provided
by the manufacturer.
• It cannot be confirmed if a ship-supplied cargo transfer hose is compatible with the cargo being handled
and/or the cargo temperature .
• Cargo transfer hoses are stored in unsuitable conditions or in an unsuitable manner.
........ • Cargo transfer hoses on an LNG carrier had not been pressure tested prior to each use or in accordance
with an alternative documented procedure to ensure their integrity.
• Portable cargo pump hoses are:
o damaged or in poor condition
o had not been tested and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines.
• Flow rate through a cargo transfer hose exceed the maximum permitted flow rate stated by the hose
......... manufacturer where flow rate is a limiting design factor.

• Ship-supplied cargo transfer hoses are defective in any respect .
TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that e<>ch vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts
inventory which reflects the company's maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and
machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system.
-
-
8.99.9. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for periodically verifying the
accuracy of cargo and ballast system controls and indicators, and were legible and up-to-date pipeline and/or
mimic diagrams available at the cargo control location(s) and in the pumproom(s) as applicable?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
'W'W1�
To ensure accurate information and data is available to the Officer in Charge of cargo
Objective
operations.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Cargo Control Room, Pumproom.
Verification by
Human
• There is no company procedure which ensures that:
o all cargo and ballast system pressure, temperature and level sensors are periodically verified for
accuracy
o cargo information displays and mimics are checked periodically to verify that information is being
transferred and displayed correctly
o cargo and ballast system controls incorporated into cargo information displays and mimics are
functioning properly.
• There are no records for the periodic verification of sensor, information display, or cargo and ballast
system control accuracy and/or function checks.
• Legible and up-to-date pipeline and/or mimic diagrams are not available in the pumproom(s) and/or at
the cargo control location(s).
• Pipeline and/or mimic diagrams had not been updated to reflect modifications or additions to the
pipeline systems.
• Pipeline systems are not marked/identified consistently with the cargo system's mimic diagram or
display.
• A cargo or ballast pump is being controlled from the machinery space or the main deck local control
station due to a defect in the remote-control system.
• A cargo or ballast pump speed/electrical load indicator is inaccurate or out of service.
• The draught gauges are inaccurate.
• The local and/or remote pressure sensor displays for the cargo or ballast system/plant are inaccurate.
• The local and/or remote temperature sensor displays for the cargo or ballast system/plant are inaccurate.
• The cargo system's mimic diagram or display is indicating incorrect information.
equipment are in pl.,co for all vessel typos \Nithin the fleet

-
- 8.99. Alt Types
8.99.10. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance
of the bonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines and were these
arrangements in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure the earthing and bonding arrangements for the cargo tanks, process plant
Objective and piping systems on board are maintained as required by Class rules and international
regulations.
Verification by

........
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and
maintenance of the bonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines
or the particular arrangements on board the vessel.
Process The company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for independent
cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines must be available on board.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if bonding straps or other bonding arrangements, where
-
required by the original vessel design, are:
• missing
• mechanically damaged
-
• functionally compromised by high resistivity contamination, e.g. corrosive products or paint
• coated in paint hampering effective inspection
• defective in any respect.
- TMSA TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires each vessel in the fleet to be covered by a planned maintenance system and spare
.........
-
8.99.11. Was there a procedure in place to complete an independent check of the entire cargo liquid, vapour
and venting pipeline system prior to commencement of cargo operations to ensure that valves, vacuum
breakers, sampling connections, drains and unused connections or interconnections were correctly set, and
blanked or capped, where appropriate?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that the entire cargo system integrity and line up is independently verified by a
Objective
second person before every cargo operation.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to ensure that the entire
cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system is independently cross-checked by a second person
under the control of the Responsible Officer prior to commencement of cargo operations.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no documentary evidence (records) that the
independent cargo system pipeline cross-checks had been completed before commencing cargo operations.
• The valve for a cargo pipeline drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker is not closed
during cargo operations.
• A cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker is not fitted with a
valve.
• A cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker is not capped or
blanked as necessary during cargo operations.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo-transfer operations for
each type of vessel within the fleet.

-
Chapter 9.
- Mooring and
- Anchoring
Chapter 9. Mooring and Anchoring
9.1.1. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for the testing and correct
operation of the mooring winch brakes, and were records available to demonstrate that brakes had been
tested periodically, after maintenance or when there was evidence of premature brake slippage?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that mooring winches function as designed, shedding excess load at a defined
Objective value in accordance with the Ship Design MBL.
ROVIQ Sequence Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers and Ratings involved with Mooring Operations.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation,
setting and testing of the mooring winch brakes.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Deck Officer or observed crew are not
familiar with the operation and setting of the mooring winch brakes.
Process The vessel must be in possession of a Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP) and Lines Management
Plan (LMP) which are in alignment with MEG4.
INTERTANKO has developed Guidance on both MSMP and LMP which can be downloaded from the
INTERTANKO website.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if: (records must be available)
• The mooring winch brakes had not been periodically tested in accordance with the company procedure
or the MSMP requirements.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been tested on completion of any repairs or maintenance which
affected the mooring winch brake mechanism assembly.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been retested where there had been evidence of premature brake
slippage or related malfunctions.
• The mooring winch drums are not marked with the date of the previous test, the primary brake load
capacity, the reeling direction or the brake setting torque or hydraulic brake assist setting pressure (as
applicable to the brake type).
Hardware The hydraulic pressure setting should be marked on the winches.
• The brake testing equipment is not maintained in good condition, or the hydraulic jack pressure gauge
had not been calibrated before use where brake-testing equipment is carried.
• The brake on any single mooring drum in active mooring service is observed to be incorrectly set.
• A stopper arrangement, e.g. a locking nut on the threaded end, is used on the tightening screw of the
brake to set the brake torque.
• A mooring line is reeled onto a mooring drum in the wrong direction for the correct operation of the
brake mechanism.
• Where the vessel is provided with split drums there is more than one layer of line on the tension side of
a drum.
• Where the vessel is provided with split drums there are insufficient turns of line, as determined by the
company procedure or MSMP, on the tension side of the drum.
• The mooring winch drum brake mechanisms, brake drums or brake band linings are apparently
defective on any mooring winch. This would include where brake drums had more than a light layer of
superficial surface rust.
TMSA KPI 6A.1 .2 requires that maintenance, testing and routine inspections of mooring and anchoring equipment
is included in the planned maintenance system.

-- 9.1. Mooring Equipment Management
9.1.2 Was the vessel satisfactorily moored in accordance with both the terminal mooring plan and the
mooring configurations permitted by the vessel's Mooring System Management Plan?
Question Category
• •••
........
a
Process)
- To ensure that the vessel is always moored safely in accordance with a terminal's published
Objective mooring plan and the acceptable mooring line configurations identified within the vessel's
MSMP.
.......... Tagged Rank Master and Deck Officers.
-- Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the process for comparing the published or
proposed terminal mooring plan with the mooring configurations permitted within the MSMP.
-- Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• The vessel is not provided with a MSMP which is in alignment with MEG4.
• The MSMP was not developed to include the permissible mooring configurations for optimal, sub-
optimal and alternative mooring arrangements for conventional tanker berths and, where used,
conventional buoy moorings.
-
• The MSMP is not developed to show the maximum permitted deviation from the horizontal angles of
lines to the perpendicular of the ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines.
• The vessel is moored in a pattern that is not in accordance with the published terminal mooring plan.
• The vessel is moored in a pattern that is not in accordance with the mooring configurations permitted
- by the MSMP.
• The vertical angle (in true elevation) of any mooring line exceeds the limit identified within the MSMP.
• The vessel had deployed fewer lines than required by either the published terminal mooring plan or the
mooring configurations permitted by the MSMP.
• The vessel had not utilised supplementary shore lines required by the terminal mooring plan.
• Where the vessel had been subject to a mooring analysis for the terminal or berth, the actual mooring
configuration was not in accordance with the plan developed through the mooring analysis.
• Where the vessel is double banked there is no analysis available to demonstrate that the mooring plan
had been verified as providing sufficient restraint for both the inside and outside vessels.
- Hardware
TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by vessels in the fleet.

9.1.3 Were the Master, Deck Officers and Ratings involved with mooring operations familiar with the content
of the Line Management Plan and was the plan maintained in accordance with company instructions with
mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle certificates available for each item included within the plan?
Question Category
(Hardware-Human- PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core, Rotational 1 or 2}
Process)
0 rw�� 1)@08
000
To ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are always in serviceable
Objective condition and managed to prevent failure in service.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers and Ratings involved with mooring operations.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the content of the LMP and how the information is to
be recorded and managed within it.
Ratings involved with mooring operations must be familiar with the existence of the LMP and content
relevant to their role onboard.
• The vessel is not provided with an LMP.
• The vessel had not retained manufacturer's product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails
and joining shackles onboard referenced against each item's location.
• The LMP was not developed in alignment with the sections and subsections of MEG4 table 5.2, as a
minimum.
• The LMP had not been maintained accurately. (Inspection determined that lines, tails or shackles are
in the wrong location or items are onboard which are not included in the LMP).
• Mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle inspections had not been completed and documented
in accordance with the LMP.
• A mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle had parted in service during the previous six months but
there is no incident investigation report onboard to document the causes of the failure.
• Mooring lines had not been "end for ended" or rotated in service in accordance with the LMP wear
zone management process.
• Mooring lines, mooring tails or joining shackles in use or provided as spares are in a condition that
indicate the inspection processes required under the LMP are ineffective.
• Joining shackles are fitted the wrong way around according to the shackle design.
• Mooring wires are connected to mooring tails using a cow hitch or an inappropriate shackle.
• A mooring line or mooring tail is in service beyond the stated company retirement criteria.
• A mooring line or mooring tail is in service which had suffered damage to such an extent that it should
have been taken out of service for repair or retirement.
• Splicing of mooring lines had been undertaken onboard but the resulting splices are not in accordance
with the line manufacturer's instructions.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement
of wires, ropes, tails and ancillary equipment.

9.1. Mooring Equipment Management
9.1.4 Did all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles, including those carried as spares, meet
industry guidelines?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- To ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are fit for the intended
Objective
purpose to prevent line failure in service.
Human
Process The vessel must be provided with an MSMP.
- Hardware
The vessel must have a file containing the manufacturer's product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring
tails and joining shackles carried onboard.
The Inspector will review the MSMP and identify the values for Ship Design MBL and the working load limit
(WLL) of the lines.
-
• One or more mooring lines onboard, in service mounted on a winch, or loose or carried as a spare, have
a Line Design Break Force (LDBF) that is lower than 100% of the Ship Design MBL.
• One or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a Tail Design
-
Break Force (TDBF) that is lower than 125% of the Ship Design MBL.
• One or more of the mooring joining shackles carried onboard, either in use or carried as a spare, have
a Safe Working Load (SWL) that is less than WLL for the mooring lines in use onboard.
-
• Where one or more mooring lines carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, have a LDBF
of greater than 105% of the ship design MBL, the Inspector will make a comment in the hardware
response tool describing how many lines are affected and what the actual LDBF is as a percentage of
the ship design MBL.
• Where one or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, have a TDBF
of greater than 130% of the ship design MBL. the Inspector will make a comment in the hardware
response tool describing how many tails are affected and what the actual TDBF is as a percentage of
the ship design MBL.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement
of wires, ropes, tails and ancillary equipment.

9.2.1. Were the Master and all Officers familiar with the vessel-specific emergency towing procedure, and .......
was the emergency towing equipment, where fitted, in satisfactory condition and ready for immediate use?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure that the vessel crew are familiar with the emergency towing procedure, and that
Objective the emergency towing equipment, where required to be fitted, is ready for immediate use.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Forecastle, Aft Mooring Deck.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the vessel specific emergency towing procedure (as
outlined in the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB)).
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the emergency towing equipment fitted to the vessel.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the process of deploying the emergency towing
equipment fitted to the vessel.
Process The emergency towing procedure must be based on the existing arrangements and equipment fitted on
board.
The ETB should be ship-specific and be presented in a clear, concise and ready-to-use format (booklet, plan,
poster, etc.).
The emergency towing procedure must be available on the bridge, in the ship's office or cargo control
room and in the forecastle space.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the vessel and verify that the
emergency towing procedure is aligned with the equipment provided.
He will inspect the physical condition of the emergency towing equipment and confirm that all visible and
accessible parts are functional with evidence of recent maintenance.
He will verify, by sampling, that the ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure is
present in the correct location.
• The emergency towing arrangements are defective in any respect.
• The ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure is missing, in the wrong location or
defective in any way.
• The emergency towing equipment is not ready for immediate use in any respect.

9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures
- 9.3.1. Were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with the company procedures for anchoring operations,
and were records available to confirm that recent anchoring operations had been conducted in compliance
with company expectations?
- Question Category
••••
- 0 rww�
Process)
000
To ensure that anchoring operations are conducted within the limitations of the equipment
Objective
fitted to the vessel.
- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Bridge, Forecastle.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for anchoring operations.
The accompanying Officer must be able to demonstrate how to verify that the windlass brake is correctly
adjusted.
• There are no company procedures with supporting checklists which cover the process of anchoring and
include:
o the selection of an anchorage taking into account the proximity and density of other vessels at
anchor, the quality of the seabed and the proximity of navigational dangers
- o the maximum depth of water permitted for normal anchoring operations

o the required level of supervision of the anchoring party
o the minimum composition of the anchoring party
o the maximum environmental conditions permitted for anchoring
o the environmental conditions at which the vessel would be expected to have departed an anchorage
o the checks required to be carried out for the anchoring equipment and power system prior to, and
upon completion of, anchoring operations.
• The vessel had anchored, or remained at anchor, with environmental conditions in excess of the limits
provided by the company.
• The vessel had anchored in a water depth that exceeded the limit set by the company.
• The maximum anchorage depth in metres is not either marked on the windlass or posted on the br idge.
-
• The checks required to be completed prior to and during anchoring operations had not been completed
as required.
• The anchoring procedures and information available on the bridge do not specify the windlass lifting
limitations on how many shackles with anchor they could handle.
Anchoring procedures should address windlass lifting limitations on how many shackles with anchor these
can handle.
Hardware The Inspector will inspect the windlass, anchors, chain and stoppers and verify that they were in satisfactory
condition.
• The anchoring systems (windlass, anchor, chain, stoppers, power system) are defective in any respect
• When in coastal waters and port, the anchors are not free to use in an emergency- the chain is resting
hard up against the stopper bar preventing it being lifted without the use of the windlass.
TMSA KPI 6A.2.2 requires that procedures address all aspects of anchoring operations likely to be undertaken by
fleet vessels.
-
-
9.4.1. Were the Master, Deck Officers and Ratings familiar with the company procedure that defined
mooring team supervision and composition for the various mooring and anchoring operations likely to be
undertaken, and was evidence available that each mooring workspace had been supervised and manned in
accordance with company expectations?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that mooring and anchoring operations are always properly supervised with
Objective enough personnel assigned to conduct the operations safely and efficiently at each mooring
or anchoring workspace.
Tagged Rank Master, Deck Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be able to identify the company procedure defining who
should supervise each mooring and anchoring workspace and the minimum workspace composition when
requested to do so.
Deck Officer and Ratings involved in mooring operations must be familiar with the company expectations
with regards to mooring or anchoring team composition and workspace supervision.
Process The Procedures should describe:
• The minimum number of Ratings that must form part of the mooring team(s) for the various types of
mooring and anchoring activities expected to be conducted onboard the vessel.
• The roles and responsibilities of the mooring and anchoring team members.
• How the mooring team will be informed of expectations around the mooring or anchoring operation,
for example, through the use of toolbox talks or risk assessment review.
• MSMP sections, relating to Manning and Training and Mooring Operations Plans and Procedures, had
not been developed to specify the mooring or anchoring team composition or identified the required
level of supervision at each mooring workspace.
• Review of hours of rest or other records determine that the company expectations relating to mooring
or anchoring team composition or supervision had not been complied with.
-
• Where an unlicenced crew member is permitted to supervise an anchoring or mooring workstation
there is no evidence that they had completed the training courses or the competency assessment as
required by the company for fulfilling the role.
-
Where the company procedure permits an unlicenced crewmember to supervise a mooring or anchoring
workspace, the Inspector will enter a comment in the Process response tool and describe the circumstances
in which this is permitted.
Hardware
T MSA TMSA KPI 6A.3.1 requires that procedures identify requirements for personnel involved in mooring
operations.
-
9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management
- 9.4.2 Were the Deck Officers and Ratings involved with mooring operations familiar with the safe operation
of the mooring winches and the dangers of working with and around mooring lines during mooring
operations and while under tension?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rww�
000
To ensure that vessel personnel are aware of the dangers of working with mooring
Objective
equipment and near lines under tension.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks.
Verification by
Human Deck Officers and Ratings involved in mooring operations must be familiar with the company mooring
procedure which define the considerations for operational safety during mooring operations and in areas
where there are mooring lines under tension.
Deck Officers and Ratings involved in mooring operations must be familiar with the danger of snap-back
-
and how this is communicated onboard the vessel prior to and after mooring operations.
-
• Interviews with Deck Officers or Ratings involved in mooring operations indicate that toolbox talks were
not taking place prior to each mooring operation.
• Ship personnel or visitors are observed stepping over lines under tension when there is a route which
would avoid the need to do so.
-
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are no warning signs or barriers to prevent personnel
from approaching a mooring line under tension.
--
• The mooring drums are left in gear while the drum is in active mooring service with the brake applied.
• The safety locking pins for the winch drum clutch mechanisms are missing or not used.
• The mooring winch control levers are stiff and do not return to the neutral position when released.
• The mooring winch controls are not clearly marked with the direction of heave and slack.
-- • There is evidence that mooring winch controls had been fastened in the heave or slack position at some
point in the past.
• The winch control and drum access platforms are damaged, uneven or have missing plates.
TMSA TMSA KPI 6A.1.1 requires that procedures for mooring and anchoring operations are in place for all vessel
-
9.5.1. Were the appropriate industry checklists used during STS operations, and were comprehensive records
of these operations maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
000
To ensure that all stages of an STS operation are conducted in accordance with industry
Objective best practice guidance.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for the use of checklists
during STS operations.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for the retention of records
relating to STS operations.
Process The Inspector will review the records for STS operations completed during the previous twelve months or,
where numerous operations had been undertaken, records for the previous six operations.
• There is no company procedure which require the vessel to use the checklists identified by the OCIMF
STS Transfer Guide.
• There is no company procedure which requires that comprehensive STS records are maintained onboard.
• Review of checklists in use at the time of the inspection or from past STS operations indicate that the
wrong STS checklists were used. i.e. "at sea" checklists were used for "in port" operations or vice-
versa.
• Where vapour balancing had been conducted there was no vapour balancing checklist used.
• Physical inspection of the vessel during an STS operation determined that checks required by the STS
checklists had not been accomplished.
• Repetitive checks required by the STS checklists had not been completed.
• Review of completed "in port" pre-transfer STS checklists indicating that the confirmation of checks
and signatures required from the second vessel , and the terminal where applicable, involved in the STS
operation had not been completed.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely
to be undertaken by fleet vessels.

9.5. STS Operation Management
- 9.5.2 Where the vessel was involved in an "at sea" STS operation, was an accurate Joint Plan of Operation
available onboard, were the Master and Deck Officers familiar with its content, and were operations being
conducted in accordance with its requirements?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
To ensure that each "at sea" STS operation is planned and executed taking into
___,
Objective consideration the operational and environmental requirements for the specific transfer
location, vessels and cargo transfer operations involved.
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Deck Rating,
ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation.
Verification by
......... Practical Guidelines (9.5.2)
Human The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the company procedure which require a Joint
Plan of Operation (JPO) to be developed for every STS operation.
-
The accompanying Deck Officer must be familiar with the content of the JPO.
Deck Officers and Ratings must have been briefed regarding the content of the JPO prior to the
commencement of the STS operation
-
• The vessel's STS Operations Plan.
• The JPO for the STS operation, developed by the STS service provider, the STS organiser, the STS
-
Superintendent or the Person in overall advisory control (POAC) depending on the circumstances of the
operation.
-
• The vessel does not have onboard a JPO which reflects the specific STS operation being undertaken.
• The JPO does not include all information required by the OClMF STS Guide relevant to the operation
being undertaken.
-
• The risk assessment contained in the JPO does not reflect the location or type of STS operation that is
being undertaken.
• The JPO does not address the measures in place to eliminate the potential for incendive arcing between
-
the two vessels.
• The measures to eliminate incendive arcing identified within the JPO had not been implemented.
• There is no evidence that the mandatory notifications to comply with local or government regulations
had been made.
• The vessel had continued the STS operation or cargo transfer operations despite the environmental
operating parameters being exceeded.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the vessel is not moored in accordance with the JPO.
-
9.5.3 Were the Master, Officers and Deck Ratings familiar with the vessel's STS Operations Plan?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
rwrw1�
To ensure that STS mooring & cargo operations are always planned and conducted in a
Objective
consistent manner.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Engine Control Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the location and content of the STS Operations Plan.
Deck Ratings who were onboard during a recent STS operation must be familiar with the location and
content of the STS Operations Plan.
• The vessel does not have an STS Operations Plan (irrespective of whether the vessel had been involved
in STS operations).
• Where the vessel had been involved in the STS transfer of Annex I cargo, the STS plan had not been
approved by the vessel's Administration (except where specifically exempted by MARPOL Annex I
Regulation 40).
• Where the vessel was not involved in the carriage of Annex I cargo, the content of the STS Operations
Plan is not in alignment with Annex A of the OC/MF Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.
• The onboard STS Operations Plan is found to be outdated or incomplete.
• One or more copies of the STS Operations Plan is missing from the following locations; bridge, cargo
transfer control station or engine room.
Hardware

- 9.6. Single Point Mooring
--
9.6.1. Were the vapour collection system manifold arrangements suitable for hose handling at buoy
moorings?
Question Category
••••
Process)
-
--
To ensure that vapour collection system manifolds are suitably designed and equipped to
Objective
facilitate hose handling at buoy moorings.
,......... Verification by
Human
Process
- Hardware The Inspector will review the Vessel's mooring arrangement plan.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if for a vapour return system manifold (VRSM) which is
designed for use at single buoy moorings:
• The vapour manifolds are not supported to the same strength as the cargo manifolds.
• Hose rails do not extend beyond the vapour manifolds.
-
• Hose rails serving the vapour manifolds are not:
o of the same strength and construction throughout their length
o fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft ends of the hose rails.
• The vapour manifolds are not fitted with the necessary:
-
o closed chocks fitted at the ship's side in line with the vapour manifolds
o cruciform bollards fitted in line, or nearly in line with the vapour manifolds to allow securing of the
vapour hose hang-off chain
a deck pad-eyes of a size sufficient to secure a 16-inch floating hose, one to either side of the line from
- the closed chocks to the vapour manifolds.

• The fittings for securing the vapour hose are not permanently marked with their safe working load
(SWL).
• There are no means to drain the vapour manifold to avoid risk of liquid carry-over into the floating hose.
--
--
-
-
9.6.2 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO
and were the fittings required accurately described in the HVPQ?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�u
0 0 0
To ensure the vessel is appropriately equipped and will be able to safely moor to an SPM or
Objective
F(P)SO terminal.
ROVIQ Sequence Forecastle, Documentation.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)
SO terminals, as they related to their duties.
Process The company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals must include:
• Guidance on preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
• Instructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
• Inspection and maintenance instructions for the bow stopper(s).
Records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stopper(s) must be available as well as mooring
arrangement plan(s).
• The actual physical arrangements for mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal are not as described in the
HVPQ.
• There is no certificate issued by an independent authority such as a Classification Society, available for
the:
o bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure
o closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
• The bow stopper(s) is not permanently marked with the SWL and appropriate serial number.
• The SWL of the closed bow fairlead(s) is less than the SWL of the bow stopper(s).
• There is an obstruction or fitting (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to the route of the pick-up line
or chain.
• At the 5PM or FS(P)O terminal where the inspection takes place:
o the winch stowage drum is not of sufficient size to accommodate the pick-up line
o the winch warping drum had been used to handle the pick-up line
o wedges had been used between the pin and tongue of the bow chain stopper(s)
o a Smit-type towing bracket had been used as a bow chain stopper.
• A bow stopper(s), roller lead(s) or closed bow fairlead(s) is defective in any respect.

-
- 9.7. Shuttle Tanker Mooring System
- 9.7.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,
testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals, and was the equipment in
- Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 'W��
000
-- Objective
To ensure the bow mooring system is regularly inspected, tested, and maintained, and
operated safely.
-- ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
Forecastle.
Verification by
-
testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:
· • Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.
• Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.
-
• Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the thruster(s)
/ propeller(s).
-
• There are no records, or records are incomplete, of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow
mooring system for offshore terminals.
• There are no records to show that the time taken for the chain stopper to open and close had been
tested, and that operation was within the recommended 30 seconds.
• The chain stopper is not marked with its SWL.
• The bow fairlead is not constructed of stainless steel or is not covered with a spark-free cladding.
- • The deck area between the chain stopper and the fairlead is not protected by 75mm thick hardwood,
or there are sections of hardwood missing or damaged.
• Recess studs bolts/nuts fixing the hardwood layer to the deck are not covered with hardwood plugs or
-
some of the plugs are missing.
• There is no tension monitor installed to measure the tension in the hawser during the loading operation.
• The manual brake release for the traction winch for use in the event of a power failure is not located in
-
a safe area that would protect the operator from debris during the release of the brake.
• Traction winch motors, cables, valves and pipes are not properly protected from mechanical impact.
• The traction winch is not fitted with a bolted cover to protect the brakes.
--
• The rope pulling unit is not fitted with protection devices to prevent the operator from accidentally
coming into contact with the rotating reels.
• The operator's view of the rope stowing area is obscured in some way.
-
• The bow mooring system for offshore terminals is defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.
,........
-
-
Notes ...

-
-
--
Chapter 10.
Machinery Spaces
Chapter 10. Machinery Spaces
10.1.1. Had the Chief Engineer prepared S tanding Orders, supplemented by Daily Orders, which emphasised
and reinforced the company expectations with regards to engine room management and, if so, had all
Engineer Officers signed to acknowledge their understanding of the same?
••••
Question Category
Process)
To ensure that all Engineer Officers are aware of the key expectations of both the company
Objective
and the Chief Engineer with respect to the management of the vessel's machinery spaces.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room.
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer and Engine Officers.
Verification by

• The accompanying Engineer Officer is not familiar with the content of the Chief Engineer's Standing
or Daily orders.
• The Chief Engineer had not prepared her/his own Standing Orders which were signed and dated at
the time of taking over the responsibilities as Chief Engineer.
• The Engineer Officers onboard at the time of the inspection had not signed the Standing Orders, (unless
they had only joined that day).
• The watchkeeping Engineer Officers had not signed the Chief Engineer's Daily Orders for
understanding.
• There is no company procedure defining the requirement for the Chief Engineer to prepare Standing
and Daily Orders.
• The Standing Orders do not define the Chief Engineer's expectations in respect of:
o entry into the machinery spaces during periods of UMS
o the actions to be taken when a machinery space alarm is activated, particularly when equipment
involved was identified as critical
o the actions to be taken when machinery or equipment is found to be defective
o supervision and documentation of bilge water, sludge, fuel oil and lube oils transfers and disposal
o instructions for the supervision and documentation of Incinerator use
o instructions and limitations for hot and cold work in the engine room workshop.
• Review of Engine Room Logbooks and/or other records indicate that instructions contained within
the Chief Engineer's Standing or Daily Orders had not been followed.
Hardware
TMSA None defined.

10.1. Engineering Procedures
- 10.1.2 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for testing
main propulsion, steering gear, thrusters and power generation plant prior to use and at critical points
during a voyage or operation, and were checklists and log book entries completed as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
To ensure that all machinery required for safe navigation is tested to verify full functionality
Objective
and availability at key stages of a voyage or operation.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Steering Gear.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the machinery testing process or any test or
-
check that is required to be carried out by the vessel-specific checklist.
The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the local operation of the steering gear.
• There is no documented procedure for testing and checking equipment and machinery at defined
-- points in the voyage.

• Checklists do not reflect the equipment fitted to the vessel or the tests and/or checks required to be
-
carried out at defined points prior to and within the voyage.
• Machinery and equipment tests and/or checks required by the company procedures had not been
completed and documented.
• Defects detected during the equipment and machinery, especially the critical testing process, had not
-- Hardware
been recorded as either being repaired immediately or entered into the defect reporting system.
--
........
-
10.1.3 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for periodic
machinery space rounds and monitoring of the machinery space, and were logbook entries and checklists
available to confirm that the inspections had been completed as required?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
000
1W1W1�
To ensure that the machinery spaces had been effectively monitored to manage machinery
Objective
in operation and on standby.
Verification by

Human This question will be assigned to vessels which do not have UMS notation.
The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for monitoring
the machinery spaces.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the checks required to be conducted during the
machinery space rounds.
The Inspector will review checklists and verify that Officers know how to perform machinery space rounds
and what data needs to be recorded.
• There are no vessel-specific checklists for periodic rounds of the machinery space.
• The periodic rounds of the machinery spaces had not been carried out in accordance with company
procedures.
The Inspector will review Engine room operational records and logbooks.
Hardware
TMSA None defined.

10.1. Engineering Procedures
10.1.4 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with company procedures for periodic
machinery space rounds and monitoring of the machinery space during both manned and unmanned
(UMS) periods, and were logbook entries and checklists available to confirm that the inspections had been
- completed as required?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw�u
,........ 000
-
To ensure that the machinery spaces had been monitored to effectively manage machinery
Objective
in operation and on standby while in both manned and unmanned modes.
........, Verification by
- Human
The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for monitoring
the machinery spaces during manned and unmanned operation and during the machinery space rounds.
........ Process The Inspector will review machinery space operational records and machinery space alarm records.
-
• There are no procedure and specific checklists that require periodic machinery space rounds during
manned periods and prior to unmanned periods.
• The machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode for a period exceeding that permitted
-- by company procedures and/or Class rules.

• The machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode in circumstances where company
procedures required the machinery space to be operated in the manned mode.
• Work and rest hour records are not in compliance with the operation of engine room in manned
mode.
• The vessel had been operated in the manned mode during open sea passages with no reference to
-- Hardware
engine logbook and the defect reporting system.
• The vessel had been operated in the UMS mode with equipment and/or systems required under SOLAS
- 11-1 Part E out of service or defective.

• The engine alarm system indicates off-scan alarms which are not properly managed.
- TMSA None defined

-
10.1.5 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the operation, inspection and testing of
the means provided to control propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally in the event of
failure of a remote-control system?
••••
Question Category
Process)
The vessel had been operated in the UMS mode with equipment and/or systems required
Objective
under SOLAS 11-1 Part E out of service or defective.
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer and Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the
propulsion local control systems.
All navigation Officers must be aware of the CPP failure mode, if fitted.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the means provided to
control the propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally.
• Ship-specific operating instructions for the local control systems are not posted close to the control
-
locations.
• The planned maintenance system does not include the means provided to control the propulsion
machinery locally and the required inspections and tests.
• Records of inspections and tests carried out are incomplete.
• There is no notice posted, either on the navigating bridge or the machinery space, indicating the
failure mode of the C PP, if fitted.
-
• The means of communication from any local control location is not ready for immediate use or was
defective.
• The local control systems are defective in any respect.
contractors.

--
10.2. Machinery Status
-
10.2.1. Were the Officers familiar with the starting procedure for the emergency generator and were records
available to demonstrate that the emergency generator had been tested according to company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure the emergency generator will supply alternative power when needed.
ROVIQ Sequence Exterior Decks.
-
Tagged Rank All Officers.
Verification by
- Human
Officers must be familiar with the ship-specific starting procedure for the emergency generator and
connecting it to the emergency switchboard as well as the operation/testing of the fuel quick closing valve.
All Officers must be familiar with the company procedures for the emergency generator.
• Ship-specific starting instructions are not posted adjacent to the equipment, including the operation
of the quick closing valve.
• There is no evidence that the spare starter motor (if fitted) had been tested in accordance with company
procedures.
• Electrical consumers connected to the emergency switchboard had not been put onload to verify their
continued satisfactory performance in accordance with company procedures.

• The emergency generator is not set up to start and supply power to the emergency switchboard
automatically in the event of a power interruption.
-· • The emergency generator would not start within three attempts by either the primary or secondary
means.
-
• The emergency generator or emergency switchboard is defective in any respect.
• There is no spare starter motor, where required.
• There is not enough fuel in the tank to run for 18 hours or the required level had not been established
and marked on the fuel level gauge.
• The vessel is or had been trading in sub-zero temperatures but the fuel in the tank is not designed for
use in such temperatures.
• The fuel quick closing valve does not operate correctly or is not open during the inspection.
• The fire flaps serving the space do not operate correctly.
• Electrical insulation mats had not been positioned in front and behind the emergency switchboard.
• The emergency generator exhaust piping is wasted or in poor condition, or the exhaust gases are
inserted in the space.
T MSA KPI 4A.1 .4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems
that are not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and
-
10.2.2 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for the regular
inspection, maintenance and testing of the ship's emergency batteries, and were the batteries fully charged
and in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Objective
rwrw1u
000
To ensure that the emergency source of electrical power is always ready in all respects.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the regular inspection,
maintenance and testing of the emergency battery source of electrical power and of bringing the system
online as part of a blackout simulation test.
• There are no company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency
battery source of electrical power, including:
o inspection and assessment of the condition of the batteries
o the battery retirement criteria based on either the maximum service life and/or functional condition.
-
It is considered good practice for the retirement date of batteries to be posted on site.
• There are no records of the periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system including
bringing the system on load as part of a blackout simulation test.
• The batteries had not been replaced in accordance with the company defined retirement criteria or the
batteries are not in satisfactory physical condition.
• The metal terminals of the batteries are not protected by rubber or plastic caps or other protective
devices to prevent arcing or shorting.
• The battery locker or compartment is being used for storage or contains inappropriate material.
• The batteries are not fully charged or the charger is defective.

-
- 10.2. Machinery Status
- 10.2.3 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for the
operation, calibration and maintenance of the exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS}, and were required
safety and regulatory measures being complied with?
Question Category
••••
- 0 rw��
Process)
000
To ensure the EGCS is operated safely in accordance with company procedures and
Objective
-
applicable regulations and local/national limitations.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Tagged Rank
-
Chief Engineer and Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation, calibration
and maintenance of the EGCS, including the operation of the overboard valve.
The accompanying Officer must be able to describe the routine operation of the EGCS plant with
reference to appropriate checklists and must be able to describe the action to take in case of system
failure.
• There are no company procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS, in line
with manufacturers criteria, that include:
....... o the identification of associated hazards and use of PPE and signage
o crew training requirements
o instructions for routine operations, calibration and maintenance
o actions to be taken in the case of system failure or deviation from normal operation.
,...._ • There are no risk assessments available for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.
• There is evidence that the vessel had operated the EGCS in locations where the company procedure
or local/national regulations prohibited its use.
• There is evidence that spent/waste chemicals and/or residual sludge/wastewater had not been managed
and disposed of in accordance with the company procedures and/or any applicable regulation.
-
• The chemicals and/or compressed gasses used or produced by the EGCS are not stored in accordance
with company procedures.
• The following documents are not available on board:
o Sox Emissions Compliance Plan
o EGCS Technical Manual
o Onboard Monitoring Manual
o EGCS Record Book or electronic logging system.
• The maintenance and calibration of the EGCS is not included in the planned maintenance system.
• The EGCS record book had not been maintained as required by company procedures.
- Hardware
TMSA
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the EGCS is or had been defective but there is no evidence
that notifications had been made to the relevant Authorities as required by IMO: MEPC.1/Circ.883.
KP! 3 .1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel. inch 1rlino
con ti a<.Lur�.
,...._ Comments/SMS Reference
-
-
-
10.2.4 Were seawater pipelines, sea chests and seawater pumps in satisfactory condition and free of
temporary repairs?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure there are no weak points in seawater systems that might lead to failure and
Objective
machinery space flooding.
Tagged Rank Engine Officers.
Verification by
Human
Process
Defects in the system must be raised in accordance with the Company's defect reporting system.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no evidence of class approval for a completed
-
repair to a seawater pipeline.
The Inspector may review the sea water plan to identify any unauthorised repair.
• A seawater pipeline, sea chest, storm valve, hull penetration or seawater pump is leaking or is corroded
with pitting or hard rust/scale.
• Fixed expansion joints (bellows) in a seawater pipeline are deformed.
• A series of pipe clips and/or supports in a single pipe length are heavily corroded or missing.
• There is a temporary repair on a seawater pipeline, e.g. a clamp or bandage.
• There is an unacceptable 'permanent' repair on a seawater pipeline e.g. a doubler plate or coupling.
• Flexible hose(s) had been rigged as a replacement for a failed metal pipe.
TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts
inventory which reflects the company's maintenance strategy.

-
-- 10.2. Machinery Status
10.2.5 Were the Officers familiar with the company procedure for testing the bilge monitoring devices
,........., within their area of responsibility, and were records available to demonstrate that the bilge monitoring
-
devices and associated alarms had been tested in accordance with the company procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw��
000
- Objective To ensure that the flooding detection systems fitted on board are always fully operational.
-
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Forecastle, Bridge , Cargo Control Room.
Tagged Rank Deck and Engine Officers.
-
Verification by
-- Human
Process
The accompanying Deck or Engineer Officer must be familiar with company procedures for the
testing of the bilge level monitoring devices and water level detectors within their area of responsibility.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are no records available to demonstrate that the
periodic testing of all bilge level monitoring devices and water level detectors and their associated alarms,
including any activation delay, had been completed in accordance with company procedures.
• A bilge level monitoring device and/or water level detector and/or its associated alarm is defective in
any respect.
• One or more of the following spaces is not protected by a bilge level monitor or water level detector:
o cargo pumproom
........ o ballast pumproom
-
o main machinery space
o bow thruster space
o for OBO carriers only, in ballast tanks forward of the collision bulkhead
o For OBO carriers only, in any dry or void space other than a chain locker forward of the foremost
cargo hold.
TMSA KPI 4.1 .1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts
inventory which reflects the company strategy.
.........

10.2.6 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for the
operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir, and was
the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
000
'W'W1�
To ensure the emergency compressed air machinery starting system is always ready in all
Objective
respects.
Verification by
Human T he accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection
and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.
The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the actions necessary to use the emergency air
compressor and/or emergency air reservoir to start a main generator engine .
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are no records of regular inspection and testing of
the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.
• T he emergency air reservoir is not at the required pressure.
• The emergency air compressor is defective in any respect.

--
10.3.1. Was suitable deck insulation provided to the front and rear of electrical switchboards, and was it in
good order?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
Tagged Rank
To ensure that people are protected from injury when working on or around switchboards.
Engine Control Room, Engine Room.
Engine Officers .
Verification by
- Human
- Process
-
• Switchboards are not provided with insulation matting (in good condition, not incomplete or damaged)
to the front and/or rear.
• The deck insulation matting or composite insulating deck covering provided is not suitable for the
specific voltage of the switchboard. (Certification, marking or other documentary evidence of the
rating of deck insulation must be available).
Officer.
,...._, Comments/SMS Reference
-
--
-
10.3.2 Were the Engineer Officers familiar with the purpose and setting of the insulation monitoring devices
(IMDs) provided on the primary and secondary distribution systems, and were the distribution switchboards
free of significant earth faults?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 1Wtr�
000
To ensure that any significant earth faults are promptly addressed to prevent injury to
Objective
personnel from electrical shock.
Verification by

• The accompanyin g Officer is not familiar with the company procedure that provides guidance for
the setting values for the IMDs for 11 Ov, 220v, 440v and any other voltages used for the primary or
secondary distribution systems.
• Where the vessel is only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMO, the accompanying Officer
is not familiar with the company procedure for its use.
• The accompanying Officer is not able to demonstrate the IMO alarm setting point.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if company procedures are not available.
Good practice suggests that as near to infinity as possible, but not less than 5 megohms, should be aimed
for on the IMO. This should be achievable on a 440-volt system, but on a 220-volt system 2 megohms is
acceptable due to the large number of parallel circuits.
• An IMO alarm set point had been adjusted to inhibit the generation of alarms:
o when abnormally low insulation values are detected
o when detecting insulation values lower than the guidance provided in the company procedure.
• The Insulation Monitoring Device for a 440-volt system showed an insulation resistance of less than 5
megohms.
• The Insulation Monitoring Device for a 220-volt system showed an insulation resistance of less than 2
megohms.
• An IMO is inoperative or defective.
Officer.
-
10.3.3 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for safe entry
into the machinery space(s) during unmanned machinery space (UMS) operation, including the operation
-
and testing of the dead man alarm, if fitted?
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
0 rw��
000
Objective To ensure safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Engineer Officer, Bridge, Engine Room, Engine Control Room.
-- Tagged Rank
Verification by
Engine and Navigation Officers.
Human The question will only be allocated to a vessel which is certified for UMS operations and identified by HVPQ
question 12. 1. 10 being answered in the affirmative.
-
Engineer and navigation Officers must be familiar with the company procedures for safe entry into
the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.
-
Where possible and safe to do so, the Inspector may request that the accompanying Officer manually start
the dead man alarm and note the time taken to activate the alarm.
• There are no company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation
requiring that
o during unattended periods, no-one enters the machinery spaces alone, for example to carry out final
evening checks, without first informing the bridge
o a rating should not be assigned any duty which involved them attending the engine room alone
during unattended periods
........ o where a single engineer maintains a watch, contact is maintained with the bridge or cargo control
room at frequent predetermined periods, unless a dead man alarm system is fitted
o the dead man alarm, if fitted, is regularly tested and the results recorded.
• Safe entry requirements (including dead man alarm use) are not clearly posted at the normally accessible
entrance to the machinery space.
• There is no evidence that the dead man alarm, if fitted, had been regularly tested as required by
company procedures (records of testing to be available).
• The dead man alarm activation period was observed to be greater than that specified by the company
-- procedures and/or greater than 30 minutes.

The Inspector will verify the Engine Logbook and Deck Logbook.
--
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the dead man alarm, if fitted, is defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 3.1 .4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.
-- Comments/SMS Reference
-
-
10.3.4 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the operation of the Engineers' alarm,
and was the alarm in good order, tested regularly and the results recorded?
Question Category
-
e@oe
Process)
Objective To ensure the Engineers' alarm is in good order and regularly tested.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Engineer Officer, Engine Room, Engine Control Room.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation and testing
of the engineers' alarm and its activation points.
Process Records of the regular testing of the engineers' alarm must be available.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the engineers' alarm is defective in any respect.
contractors.
362 Seafarers· Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

-
- 10.3.5 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the operation of the machinery alarm,
and was the alarm in good order, tested regularly and the results recorded?
-
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type (Core , Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
- Objective To ensure the machinery alarm is in good order and regularly tested.
ROVIQ Sequence Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Bridge, Engine Control Room.
-
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer, Engine Officers, Deck Officers.
Verification by
-
Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation
and testing of the machinery alarm.
The accompanying navigation Officer must be familiar with the separate functions on the machinery
alarm panel on the bridge.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there are no records of the regular testing of the machinery
alarm.

• The audible alarm in the engine room is not operative.
• The visual display of the separate alarm functions in the engine room is not fully functional.
-
• The audible and visible alarm on the bridge is not fully functional.
• The audible and visible alarm in public rooms and in the Engineers' cabins is not fully functional.
• The machinery alarm is defective in any respect.
contractors.
-
-

10.3.6 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection and
regular testing of watertight doors, and were the watertight doors in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
•••• -
Process)
0
Objective
000
1W1W1� a
To ensure watertight doors are regularly tested and ready to operate in an emergency.
ROVIQ Sequence Bridge, Engine Room.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection
and regular testing of watertight doors.
Ratings must be able to describe and demonstrate the local operation of a watertight door.
Process T he Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• There are no instructions for use, local control, remote control and emergency operation, clearly
posted adjacent to a sliding watertight door.
• A door or hatch cover that is required to be normally closed at sea is not clearly marked to that effect.
• Watertight doors had not been tested at least at every fire drill.
Hardware Inspector will raise a negative observation if:
• The rubber gasket on a sliding watertight door is damaged, in poor condition or missing.
• There is hydraulic oil leakage from the operating mechanism of a sliding watertight door.
• A sliding watertight door cannot be closed from the bridge.
• The local audible alarm and/or light for a sliding watertight door is inoperative when the door is remotely
closed from the bridge.
• The watertight doors open/closed indication on the bridge is not fully operative.
-
• A sliding watertight door cannot be operated using the manual and/or emergency operation adjacent
to the door.
TMSA KP! 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems
-
-
.........
10.3.7 Was gas welding and cutting equipment in good order, and spare oxygen and acetylene cylinders
stored apart in a well-ventilated location outside of the accommodation and engine room?
-
Question Category
••••
a
Process)
-
- Objective
To ensure gas welding and cutting equipment is properly installed and in satisfactory
condition.
-
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Exterior Decks.
-
Verification by
-- Human
Process

• Gas cylinders are not properly secured in their location or oxygen and acetylene cylinders are stored
together.
• The cylinder storage location is:
o subject to extreme temperatures
o exposed to salt or other corrosive chemicals.
• The cylinder storage location is not:
o well-ventilated and outside of the accommodation and engine room
o away from heavy traffic areas
o free of sources of ignition and/or combustible material
o clearly marked with suitable signage, including 'No Smoking'.
• Cylinders' valves, controls and associated fittings are contaminated with oil, grease or paint.
-
• Spring-loaded non-return valves are not fitted adjacent to the torch in the oxygen and acetylene hoses.
• Flashback arrestors are not provided in the oxygen and acetylene hoses at the low-pressure side of
regulators.
• Flashback arrestors are not fitted on both the torch and the regulator for long lengths of oxygen and
acetylene hose.
• Oxygen and acetylene distribution piping and pipe fittings are not of seamless steel or copper.
• There are bolted flanged joints in the fixed piping for the distribution of oxygen and/or acetylene.
- • There is no evidence that flashback arrestors and regulators had been:

o inspected and checked annually
-
o replaced with a new or refurbished unit five (5) years from the date of manufacture or as per
manufacturer's recommendations.
• Propane is in use in the gas welding and cutting system.
-
• The appropriate PPE is not available for gas cutting and welding operations or is in poor condition.
• Reusable worm-drive clamps are used for the connection of the acetylene and oxygen hoses.
TMSA KPI 9A.1 .1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety
Officer.
comments/SMS Reference
-
-
10.3.8 Were Engineer Officers and Ratings familiar with the safety precautions for the use of electric welding
equipment, were these safety precautions posted, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
Objective To ensure that electric welding equipment is always used safely.

ROVIQ Sequence 'Engine Room, Interview - Engine Rating.
Tagged Rank Engine Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
-
Human The Inspector will raise a negative observation if the accompanying Officer or an interviewed
appropriate Rating (i.e. a fitter) is not familiar with the safety precautions for electric welding.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if safety precautions for electric welding are not posted in
the engine room workshop or other appropriate location.
• Equipment, such as welding curtains or screens, required by the safety precautions for electric welding
are missing or in unsatisfactory condition.
• There is evidence that the ship's structure had been used as the earth return.
• In the case of a welding workstation, the earthing connection is not next to the work site with the cable
leading directly back to the welding machine.
• The electric welding power source had a direct current (DC) output exceeding 70V or an alternating
current (AC) output exceeding 25V.
• There is no local switching arrangement or other suitable means provided for rapidly cutting off current
from the electrode.
• An electrode had been left in the holder after completion of work.
• The appropriate PPE is not available for electric welding operations or it is in poor condition.
Officer.

10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems
10.4.1. Were the responsible vessel staff familiar with the company procedure for managing and using
the planned maintenance system (PMS), and was the system updated with an accurate record of onboard
-
maintenance and spare parts in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
••••
-- a
Process)
To ensure that vessel structure, machinery and equipment is maintained in accordance

Objective
with Class requirements, manufacturer's recommendations and company instructions.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Cargo Control Room.
Verification by
........ Human The accompanying responsible Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for managing
-
the PMS and its operation.
The Inspector will interview one Deck Officer and one junior Engineer Officer regarding their responsibilities
for conducting and recording planned maintenance tasks and, where the planned maintenance system is
computer-based, request that they demonstrate the records for one task assigned to them.
• Defects to structure, machinery or equipment were recorded in the PMS but were not transferred to
the defect reporting system, if not a combined system.
• Planned or unplanned maintenance tasks within the PMS are overdue, either by the original due date or
by more than the permitted grace period allowed by the company procedure, where defined, without
documented shore-based approval on a case-by-case basis.
-- • Tasks had been deferred within the PMS without documented shore management approval.
• An item of equipment required for the safe operation of the vessel is not included in the PMS.

• Spare parts inventory listed in the PMS for equipment identified as critical is less than the required
minimum stock.
• Spare parts listed in the PMS for either critical or non-critical equipment are not found in the designated
store location, or the stock levels are incorrect as compared to the stock declared in the PMS.
• PMS application is not updated or not working properly.
--
TMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a PMS and spare parts inventory which reflects
the company strategy.
-
-
-
10.4.2 Did the vessel operator subscribe to a lube oil and hydraulic oil analysis programme and was a
procedure in place to act on the results and trends identified by the analysis?
Question Category
••••
(Hardware-Human PIQ Photograph Question Type {Core, Rotational 1 or 2)
Process)
0
000
1Wrw1�
To ensure that the quality of lube oils and hydraulic oils is monitored, and action taken
Objective
when necessary to avoid machinery damage.
ROVIQ Sequence Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedure for managing the lubricating
and hydraulic oil analysis programme.
Process The Inspector will raise a negative observation if one or more oils required to be sampled and analysed had
not been landed for analysis in alignment with the programme, unless the analysis due date was during
the previous voyage or there is objective evidence that the vessel had not been able to land the samples in
previous ports/regions.
There must be evidence that the recommended or instructed actions to correct the condition of an oil
analysed with a "critical" or "warning" status had been undertaken.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if one or more oils analysed during the previous two cycles
of oil analysis had resulted in a "critical" (red) status.
T MSA KPI 4.3.3 requires that performance indicators have been developed to monitor fleet reliability. The
performance indicators are measured for both individual vessels and fleet wide.

-
- 10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management
10.5.1. Were the Master, Chief Engineer, Officers, and Ratings involved in bunkering operations, familiar
with the company bunkering procedures, and were records available to demonstrate that bunker operations
-
had been planned and conducted in accordance with the company procedure?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rww�
000
To ensure that bunkering operations are planned and conducted in accordance with
Objective
Industry best practice guidance.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Engine Room.
Tagged Rank Master, Chief Engineer, Officers and Ratings.
Verification by
.........
Human The Inspector will review a bunker plan which should identify the personnel, and their assigned roles,
required to be involved in the bunkering operation. He will want to ensure that personnel involved in the
bunkering operation were not assigned conflicting tasks during the bunkering.
• The accompanying Officer is unfamiliar with the company procedures for bunker transfer planning
and records that should be maintained.
--, • Where interviewed, an engine room Rating is not familiar with the duties assigned to her/him within
-
the bunkering plan during a recent bunkering operation.
Process The reviewed bunkering records must be sufficiently detailed to permit the reconstruction of the
bunkering operation for comparison with the bunker transfer plan.
- The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• There are no supporting checklists for pre-arrival, checks after mooring, pre-transfer conference, pre-
-
bunkering, repetitive checks or post-bunkering.
• Bunker tank ullage space atmosphere checks for flammable or toxic vapours required to be taken
before, during or after the bunkering operation had not been taken and recorded in accordance with
the company procedure.
-
• The reviewed bunkering plan is not signed by all Officers involved and/or is not approved by the Master
and Chief Engineer.
• Checklists required to be completed before, during and/or after the bunkering operation had not been
completed.
• Bunkering checklist does not include requirement to carry out H 2S monitoring of the tanks during the
operation.
Hardware
......... TMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel
type within the fleet
-- Comments/SMS Reference
-
-
Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections
---------------------- 369
10.5.2 Were the Chief Engineer and Engineer Officers familiar with the company procedures for bunker fuel
oil sampling and analysis, and were records available to demonstrate that samples had been taken and
retained or analysed in accordance with the procedure?
Question Category
Process)
8@08
To ensure that marine distillate and residual fuel oils meet the defined quality and
Objective
environmental standards for use onboard in propulsion and power generating machinery.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
Verification by
Practical Guidelines (10.5.2) ........

Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for managing fuel
oil samples, arranging fuel oil analysis and remedial actions to be taken where fuel oil quality raises
a concern.
Process The Inspector will review Oil Record Book Part 1 and verify that recent bunkering operations have been
recorded accurately.
They will also verify that bunker samples have been retained for each delivery of marine distillate and
residual fuel oil.
• Bunker delivery notes are not available and samples had not been retained for each delivery of
marine distillate and residual fuel oil.
• There is no guidance regarding the required frequency of marine distillate fuel oil analysis .
• There is no evidence that advisory notes contained within bunker analysis reports had been complied
with.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if fuel oil analysis had not been performed in accordance
with company procedure, or as required by MARPOL Annex VI, and/or the instructions from the fuel oil
analysis contractor.
T MSA KPI 6.2. 5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel
type within the fleet.

- 10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management
--
10.5.3 Were the Chief Engineer and Senior Engineer Officers familiar with the company and vessel-specific
fuel changeover procedures, and were records available to demonstrate that fuel grade changeovers had
been completed in compliance with the procedures and MARPOL regulations?
Question Category
••••
Process)
- 0 rw��
000
To ensure that fuel grade changeovers are conducted in accordance with regulations
Objective
-
while maintaining the safe and continuous availability of propulsion and electrical power.
ROVIQ S equence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office.
- Verification by
,........ Human The accompanying Engineer Officer must be familiar with the company procedures, based on risk
assessment, describing the changeover of fuel grades onboard and the vessel-specific fuel grade changeover
procedures.
Process The Inspector will review checklists and the vessel-specific procedures for changing of fuel grades for
-
main engines, generators and boilers.
• Records for changing of fuel grades are either missing or inaccurate.
• Entries had not been made in the appropriate Logbook to record the volume of low-sulphur fuel oils
-- in each tank as well as the date, time and position of the ship on:
o the completion of the fuel changeover process prior to entering an ECA
o the start of the fuel changeover process when departing an ECA.
• The vessel had been operating at any stage of the voyage in contravention of MARPOL Annex VI
regulations.
-
OCIMF/INTERTANKO: Recommendations on the Hazard Assessment of Fuel Changeover Processes (July
2013).
Hardware
TMSA KPI 10.2.4 requires that the environmental management plan includes procedures for fuel management in
........ order to ensure regulatory compliance, energy efficiency and reduced emissions .
-
--
-
-
10.6.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the LNG fuel tank
water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck, and was the equipment in good working order,
regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel's
water spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck and its maintenance plan.
The Inspector will interview the accompanying Officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and
operation of the water spray system with reference to:
• Starting the pumps.
• The purpose and location of the isolating valves and stop valves.
• The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck piping.
Process The operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-protection systems and
firefighting systems and appliances which should include the water-spray system for cooling and fire
prevention on deck.
Maintenance tasks may include:
• Periodic removal of the installed orifice plates and piping end caps and flushing any debris from the
system.
• Cleaning the in-line filters.
• Back flushing the system with fresh water.
Records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the water-spray system for cooling and
fire prevention on deck must be available.
do not include the vessel's water spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck and all the
required inspections, tests and maintenance.
• Access to the system controls is obstructed.
• The system valves and controls are not properly marked or set.
• Stop valves or isolating valves do not operate freely.
TMSA KP! 3.1 .4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including
contractors.

-
10.6. LNG Bunkering Management
10.6.2 Were the Chief Engineer, and those Officers and Ratings involved in LNG bunkering operations, familiar
with the functions of the vessel's LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering Emergency Shut Down (ESD)
-
systems, and was the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?
Question Category
••••
-
Process}
- Objective
To ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to an emergency while bunkering
-
LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer, Officers and ratings involved in bunker operations.
Verification by
,........, Human The Chief Engineer and Officers directly involved in bunker operations must be familiar with the
vessel's bunkering ESD system.
- The Ratings directly involved in LNG bunkering operations must be familiar with the location of the
manual control of the bunker ESD and the circumstances under which it should be activated.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection. maintenance and
testing of the vessel's LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering ESD system which define the:
• Functions and operation of the ESD systems.
• Actions to take in the event of an ESD system failure.
• Contingency plans in the event of non-availability of the ESD ship/shore link system. if fitted.
• Frequency and method of inspection. maintenance and testing of the ESD systems. including
preoperational checks (checklists must be available).
The fuel-handling manual may form part of these procedures.
-
• A fuel system schematic/piping and instrumentation diagram is not posted at the bunker station
or at the remote bunker control station.
-
• The fuel-handling manual does not describe the bunkering ESD system.
• There is no record of checks and tests of the bunkering ESD systems before bunkering operations
began.
-
• Instrumentation and controls at the bunker control station are not fully operative.
• The bunkering ESD system had been overridden during a bunkering operation without the documented
-
authorisation of the Master.
-
-
10.6.3 Were the Chief Engineer, and those Officers and Ratings involved in LNG bunkering operations,
familiar with the company LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering procedures, and were records
available to demonstrate that bunker operations had been planned and conducted in accordance with the
company procedures?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
000
To ensure that LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering operations are planned and
Objective
conducted in accordance with industry best practice guidance.
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Interview - Engine Rating.
Tagged Rank Chief Engineer, Officers and Ratings involved in bunker operations.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for bunkering operations of
LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel).
All persons identified as having a role or responsibility in a bunkering operation must be familiar
with the duties assigned to them within the bunker transfer plan.
Process The vessel operator should have developed LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering procedures and
suitable bunker safety checklists (e.g., ISO or IAPH), which included:
• The preparation of a detailed bunker transfer plan for each operation.
• Roles and responsibilities for personnel involved in the bunkering operation.
• Description of the bunkering system, including emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency release
systems (ERS), where fitted.
• Hazards when connecting/disconnecting hoses or hard arms.
• Pre-bunkering verification of:
o all communication methods, including ship/shore link (SSL), if fitted
o operation of fixed gas and fire-detection equipment
o operation of portable gas-detection equipment
o operation of remote-controlled valves
o inspection of hoses and couplings.
• Procedures for cooling down and if necessary, gassing up.
• Line draining method and nitrogen purging sequence/arrangements.
• Method for tank pressure control and boil-off gas (BOG) return if provided.
• Protection arrangement for the ship's side against possible leaks.
• Maximum tank filling limits, transfer rates and topping off rates.
• Manning for deck and control room operations.
• Actions to be taken in an emergency.
-
• Records to be kept.
These procedures may form part of the Fuel-Handling Manual required by the IGF Code.
-
-
10.6. LNG Bunkering Management
,........,
- Process
Bunker transfer plans must be signed by all Officers involved and must be approved by the Master and
continued... Chief Engineer.
Bunker transfer records must be strictly followed.
-
Bunkering records must be sufficiently detailed to permit the reconstruction of the bunkering operation
for comparison with the bunker transfer plan.
Checklists required to be completed before, during and after the bunkering operation must be completed.
-- The Inspector will raise a negative observation if:

• Mixed checklists (ISO/IAPH) had been completed at different stages of the operation.
-
• Bunker transfer plans did not include calculations of temperature, volume and vapour pressure of the
LNG (or other low-flash point fuel) to be transferred and/or the tank to be loaded.
• The bunkering safety checklist had not been signed by both PICs.
-
• The bunker transfer plan did not identify conditions under which bunkering should be stopped, and the
conditions to be met before the bunkering operation could be restarted.
• A pre-bunkering verification, prior to conducting bunkering operations, had not been carried out and
documented in the bunker safety checklist.
INTERTANKO's Onboard Familiarisation Checklist: Alternative Fuels is available for download on
,........, INTERTANKO's website.
-
Hardware
TMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel
-
-
10.6.4 Were the safety measures at the bunkering control station and bunkering manifold area in satisfactory
condition?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rwrw1u
0 0 0
To ensure safety measures at the bunker control station and in the bunker manifold area
Objective are in satisfactory condition.
ROVIQ Sequence Main Deck, Aft Mooring Deck.
Verification by

Human
Process
• The bunkering control location is not in a safe area.
• The bunkering control location is not equipped with one or more of the following, or one or more of
the controls or instruments is not operational:
o controls for the remote operated shutdown valve at the manifold
o controls for the remote operated valves in the water spray system
o indicators for fuel tank pressure, temperature and tank level
o overfill and automatic shutdown alarm
o audible and visual alarms for ventilation failure and gas detection in the ducting around the bunker
lines.
• CCTV of the bunkering manifold area is fitted but not operational or in use.
• At the bunkering manifold area, there is no suitable protection against cryogenic brittle fracture of the
ship's deck or structure.
• Thermally insulated drip tray(s) are not fitted where fuel leakage may reasonably be expected, e.g. at
the manifold connection.
• The water curtain protecting the ship's hull is not operational or is not being utilised during bunkering
operations.
• The bunkering manifold area is not visibly restricted to essential personnel only.
• There are no fire safety signs at the access points to the bunkering manifold area.
• Personnel working or on duty at the bunkering manifold area are not wearing suitable PPE.
TMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel
-
-
- 10.7. Fire Protection Measures
- 10.7.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose, testing and operation of the vessel's
remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves, emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick
-
closing valves, and were the systems in good working order?
Question Category
••••
- 0
Process)
rw��
000
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence Engine Room, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.
,........... Tagged Rank Master and Officers.
- Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the purpose, location and operation of the remote
-
controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and quick closing
valves.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures which define the frequency and method of
inspection, testing and maintenance of:
• The remote controls for fuel and lube oil quick closing valves.
• The emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs.
-
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if there is no maintenance plan for the vessel's fire-
protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances available.
Clear instructions with regards to the testing of quick closing valves must be available.
--
• The remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs are not
-
clearly marked and identified.
• The access to remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-
offs is obstructed.
• The remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs, or
-
quick closing valves are defective in any way.
contractors.
-
-
-
-
10.7.2 Were the Master and Officers familiar with the measures to prevent fire in the machinery spaces
caused by flammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface and, were the protective measures provided
regularly inspected and properly maintained?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0 1W��
000
To ensure fire-prevention measures relating to hot surfaces and flammable liquids in the
Objective
machinery space are understood and properly maintained.
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must understand which protective measures are required to be fitted, and to
which systems, to provide effective fire protection in the machinery spaces.
The accompanying Officer must be able to explain how and when the checks of the protective measures
are required to be conducted.
The Inspector will request the accompanying Officer to demonstrate the correct functioning of one
dedicated engine fuel oil system leakage alarm.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures that set out the actions to be taken to ensure
-
the integrity of measures in place to prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid
spraying onto a hot surface.
The procedures should require that periodic inspections of the machinery space take place to verify
fire-prevention measures remain properly fitted or applied. The inspections should be included in the
planned maintenance system as a distinct task or tasks .
An appropriate ship-specific checklist should have been developed to facilitate the inspection of the fire-
prevention measures in all machinery spaces.
Records of periodic inspections must be available.
The procedure may also include the identification of risk areas and the detection of "hot-spots" using laser-
based infrared heat tracers or therrnographic imaging.
• There is ongoing leakage from the fuel or lube oil piping systems within the machinery space.
• The outer protective skin of a fuel pump discharge line is visibly damaged or in poor condition.
• A flexible fuel hose is visibly damaged or in poor condition.
• The drainage arrangement for jacketed fuel lines is found to be disconnected.
• A dedicated engine fuel oil system leakage alarm was not functioning correctly.
• A spray shield is missing or is in poor condition around a flanged joint, flanged bonnet or any other
threaded connection in fuel oil piping systems under high pressure which are located above or near
unit� of high temperature
• Main or auxiliary engine indicator cocks are not capped with their insulated covers fitted while the
engine is running.
• Insulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines and exhaust manifolds is
missing or improperly installed.
• Insulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines and exhaust manifolds is
damaged or soaked in oil.
the company's maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be
included in said PMS.

-
- 10.7. Fire Protection Measures
- 10.7.3 Were the main engine crankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent
devices and associated alarms in good order?
-
Question Category
••••
-
Process)
- Objective
ROVIQ Sequence
To ensure the monitoring arrangements to warn of potential crankcase explosion are
always effective.
Engine Control Room, Engine Room.
-
Verification by
Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the action to be taken in the event of an alarm from
the crankcase oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device and must be able
-
to demonstrate a test of the oil mist detector or equivalent device alarm.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the
-
crankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices which describe:
• Alarm set points.
• Actions to be taken in the event of an alarm.
• Testing procedures and frequency.
These procedures may refer to the vessel's maintenance plan and/or the manufacturer's instructions
for the equipment.
The Inspector will review the records for the testing and servicing of the crankcase oil mist detectors,
-
engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices.
Where possible, he will verify that the alarm for oil mist concentration in air is set at a maximum level
-
corresponding to not more than 5% of the LEL or approximately 2.Smg/1.
• The alarm for the oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device is
-
inoperative.
• The alarm set point for the oil mist detector is set above 5% of the LEL or approximately 2.Smg/1.
• The oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device is defective in any
-
respect.
the company's maintenance strategy.
-
-
-
-
10.7.4 Where hydraulic power packs were located within the main engine compartment, were fire-protection
measures provided, and if so, where they in satisfactory condition?
Question Category
••••
Process}
0 a
To ensure the machinery space is protected from a fire or explosion resulting from a
Objective hydraulic oil mist caused by high-pressure leakage.
Verification by

Human The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the fire-protection measures associated with the
hydraulic power packs.
If fitted, and safe to do so, the Inspector will request that the accompanying officer demonstrates the
testing of the level alarm or other means of leak detection for an encapsulated power pack system.
Process If fitted, the Inspector will review records of regular testing of the oil mist detector.
If fitted, the Inspector will verify the records of regular testing of the level alarm or other means of leak
detection.
• The hydraulic power packs are located within the main machinery space, not in a specially dedicated
space, but there is either:
o no oil mist detector fitted, or
o no encapsulation of the pumps and high-pressure piping protected by a leak-detection device.
• If fitted, the level alarm or other means of leak detection is defective in any respect.
• Where a hydraulic power pack system is of an encapsulated design, parts of the encapsulation had
been removed or were damaged.
• Wire runs, kick-pipes, or other passes through a bulkhead to the specially dedicated space are not
sealed with a fire-retardant putty or similar material.
• A door to the specially dedicated space is left/tied open while the hydraulic power packs are in operation.
• There are leaks from the hydraulic power packs or associated pipework.

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Chapter 11.
- General Appearance
and Condition
Chapter 11. General Appearance and Condition
Practical Guidance for Uploading Photographs to the Photograph Repository

1. Overview
During the pre-inspection process (before a SIRE 2.0 request is submitted), vessel operators should upload a specific set
of 36 (or up to 42 depending on the ty pe of tanker) standardised vessel photographs, to the OCIMF Vessel Photograph
Repository.
All photographs will be ver ified by the Inspector during the inspection and should be representative of the general
condition of all similar areas. If the area/equipment shown in the photo (i.e., mooring winch) has been upgraded while the
remaining similar areas/equipment have not, the photograph is not considered representative, and a negative observation
will be raised by the Inspector.
Where a vessel is fitted with duplicated equipment (i.e., main engines, boilers, generators, etc.), only one representative
photo or just one item of equipment should be uploaded.
The vessel operator should upload a new set of photographs to the OCIMF database at approximately six-monthly
intervals. It is recommended that new photographs are uploaded prior to each inspection to ensure that the condition
depicted in each photograph is fully representative.
Please refer to OCIMF's SIRE 2.0 - Instructions for Uploading Photographs to the Photograph Repository
(https://www.OCIMF.org/programmes/sire-2-0) for additional information.
2. Image Criteria
• Photographs must be in colour.
• Photographs must be clear and in focus.
• Photographs must be taken in landscape orientation.
• Where possible, photographs should be digitally time and date stamped within the image.
• Photographs must not include images with people in the shot.

• Photographs must be in high-resolution.
• Acceptable file types: jpeg or png.
• Acceptable file size: maximum 10Mb.
3. Inspection Guidance
THE GUIDANCE BELOW APPLIES TO ALL CHAPTER 11 PHOTOGRAPH COMPARISON QUESTIONS.
• The vessel operator should have developed an inspection programme which provides shore management with an
accurate understanding of a managed vessel's cosmetic and physical condition at least twice a year.
• The vessel operator should have uploaded a standard set of photographs. as <;pecified by the SIRE 2.0 programme
for the ship type, at the time of requesting an inspection.
• Photographs will remain in the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database for twelve months or until they are superseded by a more
recent photograph.
• It is recommended that photographs are refreshed at approximately six-monthly intervals, but operators may leave
older photographs on the database for continued use in further inspections.
• By uploading photographs to the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database, the vessel operator is warranting that the images were
representative of the true condition of the ship at the date the photographs were taken.
• By leaving a photograph older than six months on the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database for review during an inspection,
the vessel operator is warranting that the photograph remained representative of the true condition of the ship at
the time of requesting an inspection.

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- Suggested Inspector Actions
Practical Guidance for Uploading Photographs to the Photograph Repository
• During the physical inspection of the vessel, the Inspector will review photographs provided by the vessel operator
for the locations specified and verify that they represent the condition as seen.
• In the case of more general views of the ship, the Inspector should not restrict the review of the ship's condition
to exactly what is shown in the photograph but consider the photograph to represent the average condition for all
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similar areas. Photographs that selectively show recently upgraded areas are not to be considered as representative.
Expected Evidence
-- • The appropriate photograph will be inserted in the inspection editor for review.
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• Where no photograph was uploaded to the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database, the question will be automatically entered
as 'Not Seen' in the final report.
Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The photograph uploaded for a specified location did not represent the actual condition of the vessel as it existed
at the time of the inspection.
• Where the photograph uploaded for a specified location was representative of the actual condition of the vessel
as it existed at the time of the inspection, but the condition of an item pictured was considered to warrant further
review by the user of the report, the Inspector will:
o select representative photo - item to be highlighted
o add additional photographs as considered necessary
o add a comment to identify the areas that are considered to merit further review.
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--
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11. 1 .1 to 11.1.36: All Vessels
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�� 1 ft
0 0 0
11.1.1. Was photograph No.1, bow area from dead ahead, representative of the condition as seen onboard
at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Bow area from dead ahead
Image courtesy of Westfal-Larsen Management
11.1.2. Was photograph No.2, hull forward end starboard side, representative of the condition as seen
onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Hull forward end starboard side
Image courtesy of Tsakos Shipping & Trading SA

11.1.1 to 11.1.36: All Vessels
11.1.3. Was photograph No.3, hull forward end port side, representative of the condition as seen onboard
Hull forward end port side
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Image courtesy of Westfa/-Larsen Management
11.1.4. Was photograph No.4, hull aft end starboard side, representative of the condition as seen onboard
- Hull aft end starboard side
-
-
-
-
Image courtesy of OC/MF

11.1.5. Was photograph No.5, hull aft end port side, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the
time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Hull aft end port side
Image courtesy of Knutsen OAS Shipping
11.1.6. Was photograph No.6, transom from right astern. representative of the condition as seen onboard
Transom from right astern
Image courtesy of Minerva Marine Inc.

11.1.7. Was photograph No.7, forecastle port side looking towards fairleads, representative of the condition
as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Forecastle port side looking towards fairleads
- Image courtesy of Tsakos Shipping & Trading SA
-
11.1.8. Was photograph No.8, forecastle starboard side looking towards fairleads, representative of the
condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Forecastle starboard side looking towards fairleads
........
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-
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- Image courtesy of Harren Tanker Management GmbH & Co. KG
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11.1.9. Was photograph No.9, port or starboard windlass, representative of the condition as seen onboard
Port or starboard windlass
11.1.10. Was photograph No.10, forward main deck showing condition of deck (and external framing),
representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any
areas for concern?
Forwards main deck showing condition of deck (and external frame)
---- -----.,--.--,- �--nrr:arr----------------;
Image courtesy of Harren Tanker Management GmbH & Co. KG

11.1.11. Was photograph No.11, forward main deck showing condition of piperack, representative of the
Forward main deck showing condition of pipe rack
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11.1.12. Was photograph No.12, one mooring winch including the brake setting arrangement, representative
of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
One mooring winch showing brake setting arrangement
--
- Image courtesy of Westfal-Larsen Management

11.1.13. Was photograph No.13, one hose crane with an overall view, representative of the condition as
seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
One hose crane overall view
11.1.14. Was photograph No.14, one hose crane hoisting winch, stowed wire and limit switches,
areas for concern?
One hose crane showing hoisting winch, stowed wire and limit

11.1.15. Was photograph No.15, starboard manifold looking from aft to forward, representative of the
Starboard manifold looking from aft to forward
--
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- 11.1.16. Was photograph No.16, starboard manifold looking forward to aft representative of the condition
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Starboard manifold looking forward to aft
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11.1.17. Was photograph No.17, aft main deck showing condition of deck {and external framing),
areas for concern?
Aft main deck showing condition of deck (and external framing)
11.1.18 Was photograph No.18, aft main deck showing condition of Piperack, representative of the condition
Aft main deck showing condition of pipe rack

11.1.19. Was photograph No.19, poop deck looking from midships to starboard including fairleads,
areas for concern?
- Poop deck looking from midships to starboard including fairleads
,...........
--
- 11.1.20. Was photograph No.20, aft emergency towing equipment storage arrangement, representative of
the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Aft emergency towing equipment storage arrangement
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11.1.21. Was photograph No.21, aft emergency towing equipment deployment system, representative of
the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Aft emergency towing equipment deployment system
11.1.22. Was photograph No.22, lifeboat and davit, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the
Lifeboat and davit

- 11.1.1 to 11.1.36: All Vessels
11.1.23. Was photograph No.23, the emergency generator or accumulator batteries, representative of the
condition as seen on board at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
The emergency generator accumulator batteries
,.........
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-- Image courtesy of Tsakos Shipping & Trading SA
11.1.24. Was photograph No.24, engine room general view showing top of main engine, representative of
the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and. if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Engine room general view showing top of main engine
-
-
-
-
,.........

11.1.25. Was photograph No.25, one generator engine, representative of the condition as seen onboard at
the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
One generator engine
11.1.26. Was photograph No.26, the oil filtering equipment, representative of the condition as seen onboard
The oil filtering equipment

- 11.1.27. Was photograph No.27, the incinerator, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
The incinerator
--
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11.1.28. Was photograph No.28, one boiler from the front, representative of the condition as seen onboard
One boiler from the front
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11.1.29. Was photograph No.29, one boiler from the top showing control equipment, representative of the
One boiler from the top showing control equipment
11.1.30. Was photograph No.30, purifier room general view, representative of the condition as seen onboard
Purifier room general view

11.1.31. Was photograph No.31, main engine side showing local control station, representative of the
Main engine side showing local control station
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-
--
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- 11.1.32. Was photograph No.32, steering gear room general view showing access, representative of the
condition as seen on board at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
- Steering gear room general view showing access
-
-

11.1.33. Was photograph No.33, main steering gear, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the
One boiler from the top showing control equipment
11.1.40 to 11.1.42: Addition for Crude/ Product/ Chemical/ Shuttle/ OBO
11.1.40. Was photograph No.40, IG system pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device, representative of the
IG system pressure vacuum breaking (PV) device
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KE.EP' OUR �- l AS
CLEAN
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NO SMOK.tNG
SAFf TY rmcr
• a •.�II•

- 11.1.40 to 11.1.42: Addition for Crude /Product/ Chemical /Shuttle/ OBO
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11.1.41. Was photograph No.41, IG system first non-return device (deck seal or double block and bleed
arrangement}, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was
it free of any areas for concern?
Steering gear room general view showing access
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11.1.42. Was photograph No.42, one main cargo pump and, if in pump room, including bilges, representative
One main cargo pump and, if in pump room, including bilges
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- Image courtesy of OCIMF

11.1.50 to 11.1.52: Addition for LPG (Pressurised vessel)
11.1.50. Was photograph No.SO, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve, representative
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of the condition as seen on board at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
Cargo tank liquid dome
Image courtesy of OCIMF
11.1.51. Was photograph No.51, electric motors for deepwell pumps, representative of the condition as seen
Electric motor for deep well pump
Image courtesy of Anglo Eastern Shipmanagement
402 Seafarers· Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

11.1.60 to 11.1.62: Additional for LPG (Semi-refrigerated and fully refrigerated vessels)
- 11.1.52. Was photograph No.52, compressor/ motor room, representative of the condition as seen onboard
Compressor motor room internal view
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- Image courtesy of OCIMF
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- 11.1.60 to 11.1.62: Additional for LPG {Semi-refrigerated and fully refrigerated vessels)
- 11.1.60. Was photograph No.60, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve, representative
Cargo tank liquid dome LPG Semi tank dome
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11.1.61. Was photograph No.61, electric motors for deepwell pumps, representative of the condition as seen
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LPG semi deepwell pumps
11.1.62. Was photograph No.62, compressor room internal view, representative of the condition as seen
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11.1. 70 to 11.1. 72: Additional for LNG with Membrane Tanks
11.1.70. Was photograph No.70, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve, representative
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--
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Image courtesy of Minerva Marine Inc
11.1. 71. Was photograph No. 71, a cargo tank vapour dome including cargo system relief valves, representative
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Cargo tank vapour dome
,........
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-- Image courtesy of Minerva Marine Inc

11.1. 72. Was photograph No.72, compressor house internal view, representative of the condition as seen
Compressor house internal view
Image courtesy of Minerva Marine Inc
11.1.80 to 11.1.82: Additional for LNG with Moss-type tanks

11.1.80. Was photograph No.SO, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve, representative
Cargo tank liquid dome

11.1.80 to 11.1.82: Additional for LNG with Moss-type Tanks
11.1.81. Was photograph No.81, general view of one Moss sphere, representative of the condition as seen
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Cargo view of Moss sphere
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11.1.82. Was photograph No.82, compressor house internal view, representative of the condition as seen
Compressor house internal view
--
,.........

11.1.90. Was photograph No.90, bow mooring arrangement from forward looking aft showing chain
stopper, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free
of any areas for concern?
Bow mooring arrangement from forward looking aft
11.1.91. Was photograph No.91, bow mooring arrangement from aft looking forward showing winch,
representative of the condition as seen on board at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any
areas for concern?
Bow mooring arrangement from aft looking forward showing winch

11.1.90 to 11.1.95: Additional for Specialised Bow Loading Shuttle Tankers
- 11.1.92. Was photograph No.92, general view of hose connection area, representative of the condition as
seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?
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General view of hose connection area
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--,
11.1.93. Was photograph No.93, hose coupling arrangement, representative of the condition as seen
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11.1.94. Was photograph No.94, general view forward bow thruster room, representative of the condition
General view forward bow thruster room
11.1.95. Was photograph No.95, forward bow thruster room showing one azimuth thruster, representative
Forward bow thruster room showing on azimuth thruster

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Chapter 12.
Ice Operations
Chapter 12. Ice Operations
12.1.1. Where the vessel traded in polar waters, had the Master, Chief Mate and Officers in charge of a
navigational watch undertaken the additional training required by the Polar Code?
Question Category
••••
Process)
0 rw�� --
000
To ensure that ships operating in polar waters are appropriately manned by adequately
Objective
qualified, trained and experienced personnel.
Tagged Rank All Officers.
Verification by
Human
Process This question will only be generated if the vessel has been issued with a Certificate for Ships Operating in
Polar Waters as declared through the PIQ.
The Inspector will verify training certificates and certificates of competency and advanced training.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to identify the necessary mandatory and non-
mandatory training required to be completed by each individual onboard before being assigned to a vessel
or prior to promotion.
The training for navigation Officers assigned to a vessel issued with a Polar Code certificate and operating
within waters governed by the Polar Code will include;
• Basic training for Officers in Charge of a navigational watch.
• Advanced training for Master and Chief Mate.
• The Polar Water Operational Manual does not define what additional training the Master, Chief
Mate and Officers of the navigational watch must have to comply with the company Ice Navigator
policy and the Certificate for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
• Where the Master and/or Chief Mate were not substituted they are not in possession of a certificate of
Advanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (unless the vessel was operating in open waters
only).
• Where the Master and/or Chief Mate are not required to have Advanced Training for Ships Operating
in Polar Waters, due to substitution or exclusively open water operations, the Master and/or Chief Mate
do not have a certificate for Basic Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
• T he Officers in Charge of a navigational watch are not in possession of a certificate for Basic Training
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
• The person(s) used to substitute for Master and/or Chief Mate in the role of Ice Navigator do not have
the appropriate certificate of competency and Advanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 5.3.2 requires that a formal p rogramme ensures that Senior Officers receive ap propriate shi p -
handling training before promotion to Master or assignment to a new vessel type.

12.2. Sub-zero LSA & FFA Procedures
- 12.2.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the operability of the
life-saving and firefighting systems and equipment in sub-zero temperatures, and had these procedures
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been complied with?
Question Category
••••
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Process)
To ensure the continuing operability of life-saving and firefighting equipment when

Objective
operating in sub-zero temperatures.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Exterior Decks, Main Deck.
Verification by
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Human This question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection
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questionnaire that the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:
• Is assigned an ice class notation
• Is assigned a winterisation class notation
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• Had been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate
• The vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to ensure that life-saving
and firefighting systems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
The accompanying Officer should be able to identify the locations of the drain points for the deck fire
and/or foam line.
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The accompanying Officer must also be familiar with the procedure for starting an extremely cold lifeboat
engine.
Process The Inspector will review winterisation checklists and records of periodic inspections of safety-related
systems during exposure to sub-zero temperatures.
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• There are no company procedures to ensure that life-saving and firefighting systems and equipment
remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
• There are no measures to ensure the operability of eye wash stations and de-contamination showers
during freezing temperatures.
• Periodic inspections of all safety-related systems had not been undertaken during exposure to sub-zero
temperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken.
• The procedure for starting an extremely cold lifeboat engine is not posted in the lifeboat.
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• Where fire and life-saving systems are provided with insulation and/or heat tracing, either the insulation
is missing, or the heat tracing system is not fully functional.
• Life rafts are not rated for safe operation according to the environmental conditions likely to be
experienced.
• Existing damage to a lifeboat hull would allow water ingress which, if subjected to freezing, could
cause severe damage to the boat's structure.
• During an inspection taking place when the vessel was prepared for sub-zero temperatures:
o the correct grade of oil to be added to the lifeboat engine cold starting pots was not available in the
lifeboat
o the heaters in the lifeboat engines were not being used
o the doors of an enclosed lifeboat were frozen shut
o the recirculating lifeboat engine cooling system was not protected with an anti-freeze solution
o the lifeboat spray system had not been drained
o precautions had not been taken to avoid the drinking water freezing
o there was no ice removal mallet readily available in the vicinity of survival craft
o eye wash stations were inoperable or unavailable
o water or foam fire extinguishers were exposed to freezing temperatures
o water or foam extinguishers had been removed to prevent freezing and not replaced with suitable
extinguishers
o fire and/or foam lines had not been drained from their lowest point
o drain valves to fire and/or foam lines had not been closed after draining
o monitors and hydrants were not protected by canvas covers to prevent snow/ice accumulation
o water curtain and spray systems had not been drained
o the temperature in a space containing bulk storage tanks for fixed foam systems and/or drums and
canisters of foam for portable branch pipe appliances was below zero
o any item of life-saving or firefighting system or equipment was not operable or ready for immediate
use due to freezing, snow accumulation or ice accretion
o escape routes and access to firefighting and lifesaving equipment were obstructed by snow and/or ice
accumulations.
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and
instructions cover all the activities undertaken.

- 12.3. Sub-zero Machinery Operation Procedures
12.3.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with company procedures to ensure the operability of the engine
room machinery and systems in sub-zero temperatures, and had these procedures been complied with?
Question Category
••••
- (Hardware-Human
Process)
0
000
-- rw��
To ensure the continuing operability of the engine room machinery and systems when
Objective
operating in sub-zero temperatures.
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Verification by
• is assigned an ice class notation
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• is assigned a winterisation class notation
• has been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate
• the vessel trades in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.
--
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to ensure that engine room
machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
Process Winterisation checklists must be available for use.
Company procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero
,.........., temperatures must be complied with. Checks should include:
• Prior to entering an area of low temperatures, where applicable:
o fore and aft draughts are within the limits required by the ice class notation
.......... o sea-chest strainers
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o steam heating and/or other arrangements to keep sea-chests clear of ice
o heating systems in fuel, bilge and lubricating oil tanks
o heating systems for the emergency generator
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o anti-freeze in the emergency generator cooling system
a water levels in recirculating cooling systems
o water content of stern tube oil
o suitability of oils and greases
o arrangements to ensure control air is dry.
• Arrangements to prevent the icing up of air pipes to settling and service tanks required for the operation
of the main propulsion plant and essential auxiliaries.
• While operating in an area of low temperatures:
-- o operating with the engine room manned when appropriate

o applying steam heating on sea-chests continuously
o using space heaters in engine, steering gear, emergency battery rooms and emergency fire pump
space.
• Keeping emergency generator room external vent flaps and supply fan damper closed.
• Changing over from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil prior to closing down the main engine.
• Keeping hydraulic motors. including steering motor�. running continuously.
• Operating pneumatic and manual vent flaps to keep them free.
• Adjusting engine room ventilation to maintain suitable temperatures and avoid local cooling of fuel
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systems.
• Monitoring freshwater tanks and piping for freezing.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if any system or equipment required to maintain the engine
room machinery and equipment functional in subzero temperatures is defective in any respect.
TMSA KPI 1 A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and
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instructions cover all the activities undertaken.

12.4.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the operability of the
cargo and ballast systems in sub-zero temperatures. and had these procedures been complied with?
Question Category
••••
Process)
To ensure the continuing operability of the cargo and ballast systems when operating in
Objective sub-zero temperatures.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck.
Verification by
• Is assigned an ice class notation.
• Is assigned a winterisation class notation.
• Has been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate.
• The vessel trades in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to ensure that cargo and
ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.
Process Winterisation checklists should be available for use.
Records of equipment tests and checks prior to, during and on completion of cargo operations.
Company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures
should be complied with and may include:
• Test the integrity of deck lines prior to use to ensure they are tight.
• Check ballast water salinity and exchange if necessary.
• Where fitted, operate ballast tank heating or bubbling systems in good time.
• Protect equipment on deck with canvas covers, including:
o hydraulic cargo and COW valves
o COW machines
o PN valves
o mast riser vent valve
o IG main and inlet valves
o deepwell pump motors and shafts
o ballast tank vents.
• Check that:
o valves on deck are well greased and their gearboxes free of water
o deck seal heating arrangements are operational
o anti-freeze levels in PN breaker and stripping system vacuum pumps are correct
o cargo compressors that require anti-freeze and/or a heating system are properly prepared for cold
weather.

- 12.4. Sub-zero Cargo and Ballast Operation Procedures
-
Process • Drain equipment, including:
Continued... o cargo, COW, and tank cleaning lines and valves, after testing or use
o tank-cleaning heater
o heating coils
o manifold drip-trays
o deck air-line
o ballast system, including ballast monitor
o oil discharge monitoring system
o pumproom steam lines, if not to be used.
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• Activate hydraulic cargo, COW and ballast valves frequently while in sub-freezing temperatures to
avoid freezing/blockage.
• Check PN breaker, PN valves and flame screens immediately before commencing and during cargo
operations.
• Start cargo pump and valve hydraulic systems in good time before they are needed.
• Ensure deck seal heating is functioning and checked regularly during cargo operations.
• Check canvas covers are removed from ballast tank vents before ballasting/deballasting.
Hardware
TMSA TMSA KPI 1 A.1 .1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures
and instructions cover all the activities undertaken.
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12.5.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the operability of
the deck machinery, including mooring systems, in sub-zero temperatures, and had these procedures been
complied with?
••••
Question Category
Process)
0
To ensure the continuing operability of the deck machinery when operating in sub-zero
Objective
temperatures.
ROVIQ Sequence Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Mooring Deck.
Verification by
• Is assigned an ice class notation.
• Is assigned a winterisation class notation.
• Has been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate.
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures to ensure that deck
machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.
Process Winterisation checklist and records of periodic inspections of all deck machinery during exposure to sub
zero temperatures should be available on board.
Company procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in sub
zero temperatures must be complied with, which may include:
• Ensuring hydraulic systems contain a suitable grade of hydraulic oil.
• Circulating hydraulic system oil continuously when the external temperature is below 0° C to ensure
that the fluid systems are maintained at working temperatures.
• When leaving machinery (e.g., winches) running, paying careful attention to the regular lubrication of
the equipment.
• Operating and testing cargo handling cranes prior to the vessel entering sub-zero temperatures.
• Checking heating arrangements in cranes are operational.
• Adequately covering the pneumatic or electrical motors used for raising or lowering accommodation
ladders to prevent ice accretion.
• Closing the main air valve to deck and draining the airline down.
• Protecting control boxes and motion levers for deck machinery with canvas covers.
• Protecting mooring wires and synthetic ropes with canvas covers to stop ice accretion until they are
required for use.
• Prior to arrival in port, proving winches, windlasses and anchors to be operational.
• Ensuring the continued operability of pneumatic oil spill pumps, where provided.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if periodic inspections of all deck machinery had not been
undertaken during exposure to sub-zero temperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being
taken.
Hardware The Inspector will raise a negative observation if inspection of the vessel during periods of sub-zero
temperatures determines that deck machinery and/or mooring systems required for planned or emergency
use are inoperative due to freezing and/or ice accretion.
TMSA TMSA KPI 1 A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures
and instructions cover all the activities undertaken.

-
- 12.6. Ice Navigation Procedures
- 12.6.1. Were the Master and Officers familiar with the company procedures for navigating in areas affected
by ice, and had they received suitable training?
-
Question Category
••••
Process)
- Objective To ensure the Master and officers are prepared for navigating in areas affected by ice.
Verification by
• Is assigned an ice class notation
• Is assigned a winterisation class notation
• Has been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate
The accompanying Officer must be familiar with the company procedures for navigating in areas affected
by ice.
Process The vessel operator should have developed procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice, including
-
checklists where appropriate. The procedures should include as appropriate, guidance on:
• Passage planning in areas affected by ice.
• Watchkeeping requirements in areas affected by ice.
• Pilotage in ice.
• Actions to take when ice is detected.
• Freezing spray.
........, • Navigation in pack ice.
• Position fixing in ice conditions.
• Charts and positions in remote locations.
• Radar use in ice conditions.
• Limitations of compasses in high latitudes.
• Ship-handling in ice.
• Anchoring in ice.
-
• Avoiding hull and propeller/propulsion system damage in ice.
• Berthing/unberthing in ports with ice.
• Working with icebreakers.
The passage plan of voyages affected by ice must take into account the additional factors presented by
navigation in areas affected by ice, such as:
• The limits of ice pack, ice bergs and sea ice.
• The verification of draughts to meet the min/max draughts required by the vessel's ice notation.
• The change in status of manoeuvring machinery.
• The change in status of bridge and/or machinery space manning levels.
The Inspector will raise a negative observation if records show that while navigating in an area affected by ice:
• The required bridqe/engine room team compo<;ition had not bPPn compli<>d Vvith.
• The vessel's draught had not been adjusted to meet the min/max draft required by the vessel's ice
notation.
• There are no records of crew training with regard to operating ships in ice.
- The Inspector will review the passage plan for the last voyage affected by ice, the Bridge Logbook,
checklists and records of training with regards to operating ships in ice.
-
Hardware

Notes ...

-
-
Appendices
Appendices
Indicative Assignments of Tagged Ranks

Tagged Rank Question Number Chapter 2
Master 2.2.3; 2.3.5
Master, Chief Officer 2.2.2
Master, Chief Engineer 2.3.1; 2.3.2; 2.4.2
Master, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer 2.2.1
Master, Chief Officer, Senior Officers 2.1.1
Master, Chief Engineer, Senior Officers 2.3.4; 2.4.1; 2.5.1; 2.6.1; 2.6.2; 2.6.3
Master, Senior Officers 2.3.3
Master, Deck Officers 2.3.4
All personnel on board 2.7.1; 2.7.2

Master 3.2.1; 3.3.2
Master, Chief Officer 3.1.3
Master, Navigation Officers 3.2.2; 3.2.3; 3.2.4; 3.3.1
Master and Navigational Watchkeeping Officers 3.5.3
Master, Deck Officers and Cargo/Gas Engineers 3.3.3
Master, Officers and Ratings 3.5.2
Chief Officer and all those responsible for cargo operations 3.2.5
Chief Officer and all those involved in mooring operations 3.2.7
Senior Officers 3.2.8
Chief Engineer and all Engineer Officers 3.3.4
Senior Engineering Officers 3.2.6
Key DP Personnel 3.3.5
All crew 3.1.1; 3.1.2; 3.4.1; 3.4.2; 3.5.1
All crew with assigned duties related to handling LNG or other 3.3.6
low-flashpoint fuels

Master and Navigation Officers 4.1.1; 4.1.2; 4.1.3; 4.1.4; 4.1.5; 4.1.6; 4.1.7;
4.1.8; 4.1.9; 4.1.1 O; 4.1.11; 4.1.12; 4.1.13;
4.1.14; 4.1.15; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.3; 4.2.4;
4.2.5; 4.2.6; 4.2.7; 4.3.1; 4.3.3; 4.3.4; 4.4.1;
4.4.4; 4.4.5
Engineer Officers 4.3.2
Master ana umcers 4.4.Z, 4.4. .::l(Df' & :SIIULllt: Vf.J::,. 4.:5.1 , 4.5.Z,
4.5.3; 4.5.4; 4.5.5)
-
-
-
- Tagged Rank
Senior and Junior Officers (Deck & Engine)
Question Number Chapter 5
5.1.1; 5.1.2;
-
Master and Officers 5.1.3; 5.1.4; 5.1.7; 5.1.8; 5.1.9; 5.1.10;
5.1.11; 5.1.12; 5.1.13; 5.1.16; 5.1.17;
5.1.18; 5.1.19; 5.2.3; 5.2.4; 5.2.5; 5.2.6;
-
5.2.7; 5.2.9; 5.2.1 O; 5.2.11; 5.2.12; 5.2.13;
5.2.14; 5.4.1; 5.4.2; 5.4.3; 5.4.4; 5.4.5;
5.4.6; 5.4.9; 5.5.5; 5.5.6; 5.6.1; 5.6.2; 5.6.3;
-
5.6.4; 5.6.5; 5.6.6; 5.7.1; 5.8.1; 5.10.4;
5.10.5; 5.10.6; 5.11.1
-
Master and SSO 5.1.5
Master, Officers and Ratings 5.1.6; 5.1.14; 5.1.15; 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.2.15;
5.2.16; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.4.7;
5.4.8; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.3; 5.5.4; 5.7.2; 5.7.3;
5.7.4; 5.7.5; 5.7.6; 5.7.7; 5.7.8; 5.8.2; 5.8.3;
,_, 5.8.4; 5.8.5; 5.8.6; 5.8.7; 5.9.1; 5.10.7;
5.12.1; 5.12.2
Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings 5.10.1; 5.10.2; 5.10.3
Master, Officers and galley staff 5.2.8
-
Master, Officers and Engine Ratings 5.3.5
Senior Engineer Officers 5.9.2
- Tagged Rank
Master and Officers
6.1.1; 6.1.2; 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 6.2.3; 6.3.1; 6.5.1;
- 6.6.2
-
Master and Senior Engine Officers 6.1.3
Master, Senior Deck and Engine Officers 6.1.4
-
Master, Senior and Junior Engine Officers 6.1.5; 6.6.1
Senior and Junior Engine Officers 6.1.6; 6.5.2
Master, Officers and Deck Ratings 6.4.1
-
-
Master, SSO 7.1.1
Master and Officers 7.1.2; 7.4.1; 7.5.1
Master, Officers, SSO 7.3.1
-
-
Appendices

Master and Officers (Oil) 8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.1.3; 8.1.4
(Chem) 8.2.1; 8.2.2; 8.2.3; 8.2.7; 8.2.8
(Oil & Chem) 8.3.1; 8.3.2; 8.3.3; 8.3.4; 8.3.7;
8.3.9; 8.3.10; 8.3.12; 8.3.13; 8.3.14; 8.3.15;
8.3.16; 8.3.17; 8.3.18;8.3.19;8.3.20;
8.3.21; 8.3.22; 8.3.23; 8.3.24
(LPG) 8.4.1; 8.4.2; 8.4.3; 8.4.4; 8.4.6; 8.4.7
(LNG) 8.5.1; 8.5.2; 8.5.3;8.5.4
(Gas) 8.6.1; 8.6.3; 8.6.4; 8.6.5; 8.6.6; 8.6.7;
8.6.9;8.6.1O;8.6.11; 8.6.12; 8.6.14; 8.6.15;
8.6.16; 8.6.17;8.6.18;8.6.19; 8.6.20; 8.6.21
(Shuttle) 8.7.1; 8.7.2; 8.7.3; 8.7.4; 8.7.5;
8.7.6; 8.7.7; 8.7.8; 8.7.9
(OBO) 8.8.1; 8.8.2
(All) 8.99.1; 8.99.2; 8.99.3; 8.99.4; 8.99.5;
8.99.8; 8.99.9; 8.99.10
Master and Deck Officers (Chem) 8.2.4; 8.2.5
(Oil & Chem) 8.3.6; 8.3.25
(All) 8.99.6; 8.99.7; 8.99.11
Officers and Ratings (Chem) 8.2.6
Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings (Oil & Chem) 8.3.5; 8.3.11
Master, Officers and Ratings (Oil & Chem) 8.3.8
(LPG) 8.4.5
(Gas) 8.6.2; 8.6.13
Master, Officers and Deck Ratings (Gas) 8.6.8

Master, Deck Officers and Ratings involved with Mooring Operations 9.1.1;9.1.3
Master and Deck Officers 9.1.2; 9.1.4; 9.2.1; 9.3.1; 9.5.1; 9.6.1;9.6.2
(Shuttle) 9.7.1
Master, Deck Officers and Ratings 9.4.1; 9.4.2
Master, Deck Officers and Deck Ratings 9.5.2; 9.5.3

Chief Engineer and Engine Officers 10.1.1; 10.1.2; 10.1.3; 10.1.4; 10.1.5;
10.2.2; 10.2.3; 10.2.6; 10.3.2; 10.3.4
(conv. Bunkering) 10.5.2; 10.5.3
All Officers 10.2.1
Engine Officers 10.2.4; 10.3.1; 10.3.7; 10.4.1; 10.4.2;
1 0 7 �; 1 () 7 LI.
(LNG bunkering) 10.6.4
Deck and Engine Officers 10.2.5
Engine and Navigation Officers 10.3.3
Chief Engineer, Engine Officers , Deck Officers 10.3.5
Engine Officers and Ratings 10.3.8
Master, Chief Engineer, Officers and Ratings (conv. bunkering) 10.5.1
Master and Officers 10.7.1; 10.7.2
(LNG bunkering) 10.6.1
Chief Engineer, Officers and ratings involved in bunker operations (LNG bunkering) 10.6.2; 10.6.3

-
-
- Tagged Rank
Master, Chief Engineer and Senior Officers
Verification of Photographs
- Tagged Rank
All Officers
12.1.1
Master and Officers 12.2.1; 12.3.1; 12.4.1; 12.5.1
--
-
-
--
-
--
-
-
-
-
Appendices
Question Type
Type Question Number Chapter 2
Core 2.1.1; 2.2.1; 2.3.1; 2.3.2; 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.8.1
Rotational 1 2.5.1; 2.6.2; 2.6.3; 2.8.2
Rotational 2 2.2.2; 2.2.3; 2.3.3; 2.3.4; 2.3.5; 2.6.1; 2.7.1; 2.7.2

Core 3.4.1; 3.5.1
Rotational 1 3.1.1; 3.1.2; 3.2.1; 3.2.2; 3.2.3; 3.2.4; 3.2.5; 3.2.6; 3.2.7; 3.5.2
Rotational 2 3.1.3; 3.2.8; 3.3.1; 3.3.2; 3.3.3; 3.3.4; 3.3.5; 3.3.6; 3.4.2; 3.5.3

Core 4.1.1; 4.1.2; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.3.1; 4.3.2
Rotational 1 4.1.3; 4.1.4; 4.1.5; 4.2.3; 4.2.5; 4.2.6; 4.3.3
(DP & Shuttle) 4.5.2; 4.5.3
Rotational 2 4.1.6; 4.1.7; 4.1.8; 4.1.9; 4.1.1 O; 4.1.11; 4.1.12; 4.1.13; 4.1.14; 4.1.15; 4.2.4; 4.2.7; 4.3.4; 4.4.1;
4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4; 4.4.5; 4.4.6
(DP & Shuttle) 4.5.1; 4.5.4; 4.5.5

Core 5.1.1; 5.2.1; 5.4.1; 5.4.2; 5.4.3; 5.5.1; 5.6.1; 5.7.1; 5.8.1; 5.8.2; 5.8.3; 5.8.4; 5.8.5
Rotational 1 5.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.1.4; 5.1.5; 5.1.6; 5.1.7; 5.2.2; 5.2.3; 5.2.4; 5.2.5; 5.2.6; 5.2.7; 5.2.8; 5.2.9; 5.2.10;
5.3.1; 5.5.2; 5.6.2; 5.6.3; 5.6.4; 5.7.2; 5.7.3; 5.7.4; 5.8.6; 5.9.1; 5.10.1; 5.10.7
Rotational 2 5.1.8; 5.1.9; 5.1.10; 5.1.11; 5.1.12; 5.1.13; 5.1.14; 5.1.15; 5.1.16; 5.1.17; 5.1.18; 5.1.19; 5.2.11;
5.2.12; 5.2.13; 5.2.14; 5.2.15; 5.2.16; 5.3.2; 5.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.3.5; 5.4.4; 5.4.5; 5.4.6; 5.4.7; 5.4.8;
5.4.9; 5.5.3; 5.5.4; 5.5.5; 5.5.6; 5.6.5; 5.6.6; 5.7.5; 5.7.6; 5.7.7; 5.7.8; 5.8.7; 5.9.2; 5.10.2;
5.10.3; 5.10.4; 5.10.5; 5.10.6; 5.11.1; 5.12.1; 5.12.2

Core
Rotational 1 6.1.5; 6.1.6; 6.3.1; 6.5.2; 6.6.1; 6.6.2
Rotational 2 6.1. 1; 6.1.2; 6.1.3; 6.1.4; 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 6.2.3; 6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.5.1

Core
Rotational 1 7.1.1; 7.2.2; 7.5.1
Rotational 2 7.2.1; 7.3.1; 7.4.1

-
-
-
Core (Oil) 8.1.1
(Chem) 8.2.1; 8.2.2
(Oil & Chem) 8.3.1; 8.3.2; 8.3.3; 8.3.4; 8.3.5; 8.3.6
(Gas) 8.6.1; 8.6.2
(Shuttle) 8.7.1
(080) 8.8.1
(All) 8.99.1; 8.99.2
--
Rotational 1 (Oil) 8.1.2
(Chem) 8.2.3
(Oil & Chem) 8.3.7; 8.3.8; 8.3.9; 8.3.1O; 8.3.11; 8.3.12; 8.3.13; 8.3.14
(Gas) 8.6.3; 8.6.4; 8.6.5; 8.6.6
-- (Shuttle) 8.7.2; 8.7.3; 8.7.4

(All) 8.99.3; 8.99.4; 8.99.5;
- Rotational 2 (Oil) 8.1.3; 8.1.4

(Chem) 8.2.4; 8.2.5; 8.2.6; 8.2.7; 8.2.8
(Oil & Chem) 8.3.15; 8.3.16; 8.3.17; 8.3.18; 8.3.19; 8.3.20; 8.3.21; 8.3.22; 8.3.23; 8.3.24; 8.3.25
(LPG) 8.4.1; 8.4.2; 8.4.3; 8.4.4; 8.4.5; 8.4.6; 8.4.7
(LNG) 8.5.1; 8.5.2; 8.5.3; 8.5.4
(Gas) 8.6.7; 8.6.8; 8.6.9; 8.6.1 O; 8.6.11; 8.6.12; 8.6.13; 8.6.14; 8.6.15; 8.6.16; 8.6.17; 8.6.18;
-
8.6.19; 8.6.20; 8.6.21
(Shuttle) 8.7.5; 8.7.6; 8.7.7; 8.7.8; 8.7.9
(OBO) 8.8.2
(All) 8.99.6; 8.99.7; 8.99.8; 8.99.9; 8.99.1 O; 8.99.11
--
Core 9.1.1; 9.5.1
-
Rotational 1 9.1.2; 9.1.3; 9.3.1; 9.5.2; 9.6.1
Rotational 2 9.1.4; 9.2.1; 9.4.1; 9.4.2; 9.5.3; 9.6.2; 9.7.1
- Type
Core
10.2.1; 10.2.2
- Rotational 1
Rotational 2
10.1.1; 10.1.2; 10.1.3; 10.2.3; 10.4.1; 10.5.1; 10.6.2; 10.6.3; 10.7.1; 10.7.2
10.1.4; 10.1.5; 10.2.4; 10.2.5; 10.2.6; 10.3.1; 10.3.2; 10.3.3; 10.3.4; 10.3.5; 10.3.6; 10.3.7;
10.3.8; 10.4.2; 10.5.2; 10.5.3; 10.6.1; 10.6.4; 10.7.3; 10.7.4
-
Core All questions under this Chapter

Core
--
Rot;:ition;:il 1 12.].1; 12.6.1
Rotational 2 12.1.1; 12.2.1; 12.4.1; 12.5.1

Appendices
TMSA KPI references to S1RE2.0 questions

I TMSA KPI ! Question Number ! Vessel Type
1A.1.1 5.10.5 All
5.10.6 Oil
12.2.1; 12.3.1; 12.4.1; 12.5.1 All/Ice Operations
1A.1.2 2.2.3 All
1A.1.3 3.1.2 All
1A.1.4 2.7.1 All
1A.2.2 2.7.2 All
1A.2.3 4.5.5 Oil
5.7.7 Oil, Chem, LPG
3.1.3 3.3.5 Oil

3.3.6 Oil, Chem, LPG
3.1.4 3.5.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.3; 5.2.2; 5.2.3; 5.2.4; 5.2.5; 5.2.6; 5.2.7; 5.2.8; 5.2.12; All
5.2.13; 5.2.16; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.3.5; 5.10.7; 6.5.1; 10.1.5; 10.2.3;
10.3.3; 10.3.4; 10.3.5; 10.7.1
5.1.19 Oil
8.7.1; 8.7.5; 8.7.6; 8.7.9 Oil/Shuttle ops
5.2.9; 5.2.1O; 5.2.11; 5.6.3; 8.6.17; 8.6.19 LPG, LNG
5.2.14; 5.2.15; 5.6.5; 5.6.6 Oil, Chem
5.6.4; 10.6.1 Oil, Chemical, LPG
5.12.2 Chemical, LPG
3.2.2 3.3.4 All
3.2.3 3.1.1 All
3.4.1 3.2.8 All
4.1.1 5.9.2; 8.99.4; 8.99.5; 8.99.8; 8.99.10; 10.2.4; 10.2.5; 10.4.1; 10.7.2; 10.7.3 All
8.3.15 Oil, Chemical
8.5.3 LNG
8.6.11 LPG, LNG
8.7.7 Oil/Shuttle ops
4.1.2 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.8.2 All
4.2.1 2.1.1 All
4.2.2 2.3.1; 5.6.2 Oil, Chemical
2.3.2 LPG, LNG
2.3.3; 2.3.4 All
8.4.6 LPG
8.5.4 LNG
4.3.3 10.4.2 All
4.3.4 2.3.5 All
4.4.5 3.2.6 All

4A.1.4 5.2.1; 5.4.9; 10.2.1; 10.2.2; 10.2.6; 10.3.6; 10.7.4; All

- I TMSA KPI I Vessel Type
-
I Question Number
5.1.2 4.1.1; 4.1.2; 4.1.3; 4.1.4; 4.1.6; 4.1.7; 4.1.8; 4.1.1O; 4.1.12; 4.1.13; 4.1.14; All
4.1.15; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.4; 4.2.5; 4.2.6; 4.2.7; 4.3.2; 10.1.2
4.5.1; 4.5.2; 4.5.4; 8.7.2; 8.7.8 Oil/DP &Shuttle
12.6.1 All/Ice Operations
- 5.1.3
5.1.4
5.2.2
4.1.5; 4.2.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.3; 4.3.4
4.1.9; 4.4.5
3.2.1
All
All
All
5.2.3 4.1.11 All
5.3.2 3.3.2 All
12.1.1 All/Ice Operations
5.3.3 3.2.2 All
-
5.4.1 3.2.3; 3.2.4 All
5.4.4 3.3.1 All
- 6.1.1 5.1.18; 8.3.1; 8.3.2; 8.3.3; 8.3.5; 8.3.6; 8.3.7; 8.3.11; 8.3.13; 8.3.18; 8.3.19;
8.3.20; 8.3.21
5.11.1
Oil, Chemical
All
8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.1.4; 8.8.2 Oil
-
8.2.1; 8.2.2; 8.2.4; 8.2.5 Chemical
8.2.3 Chemical, LPG
8.4.1; 8.4.3; 8.4.4 LPG
-
8.5.2 LNG
8.6.4; 8.6.5; 8.6.7; 8.6.1O; 8.6.14; 8.6.15; 8.6.18; 8.6.21 LPG, LNG
-
6.1.2 5.6.1; 6.2.3; 8.99.6; 8.99.9 All
6.2.2; 8.3.4; 8.3.8; 8.3.9; 8.3.12; 8.3.14; 8.3.17; 8.3.23; 8.3.24 Oil, Chemical
8.1.3 Oil
8.4.7 LPG
-
8.6.1; 8.6.2; 8.6.3; 8.6.6; 8.6.8; 8.6.9; 8.6.20 LPG, LNG
8.7.4 Oil/Shuttle ops
8.8.1 Oil/080
10.6.2 Oil, Chemical, LPG
6.1.4 5.12.1 All
8.2.6; 8.2.7; 8.2.8 Chemical
8.4.5 LPG
- 6.2.1
8.6.12; 8.6.13
4.4.6; 8.99.1; 8.99.7
LPG, LNG
All
8.6.16 LPG, LNG
6.2.2 8.3.25 Oil, Chemical
-
8.4.2 LPG
8.5.1 LNG
8.7.3 Oil
8.99.2; 8.99.3; 8.99.11 All
6.2.3 2.6.1; 6.3.1 All
6.2.5 10.5.1; 10.5.2 All
10.6.3; 10.6.4 Oil, Chemical, LPG
6.3.3 8.3.22 Oil, Chemical
-
6.4.1 3.3.3 All
6.4.2 3.2.5 All

Appendices
j TMSA KPI ! Question Number ! Vessel Type

6A.1.1 9.4.2 All
6A.1.2 9.1.2; 9.5.1; 9.5.2; 9.5.3; 9.6.2 All
9.6.1; 9.7.1 Oil
6A.2.1 5.12.1 All
8.2.6; 8.2.7; 8.2.8 Chemical
8.4.5 LPG
8.6.12; 8.6.13 LPG, LNG
6A.2.2 9.3.1 All
6A.2.4 9.1.3; 9.1.4 All
6A.3.1 9.4.1 All
6A.4.3 3.2.7 All
I 7.1.1 j 2.5.1 !All
8.1.1 4.5.3 Oil/DP ops

1 1 I
8.1.4 5.7.1; 5.7.2 All
9.1.4 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.3; 5.5.4; 5.5.5 All

9.2.1 5.1.6; 5.1.14; 5.10.1; 5.10.2; 5.10.3; 5.10.4 All
9.2.2 5.7.6 All
9.2.4 5.5.6; 5.7.8 All
9A.1.1 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 5.4.1; 5.4.2; 5.4.3; 5.4.4; 5.4.5; 5.4.6; 5.4.7; 5.4.8; 5.8.1; All
5.8.2; 5.8.5; 5.8.6; 5.8.7; 5.9.1; 10.3.1; 10.3.2; 10.3.7; 10.3.8
5.8.3
5.8.4 Oil, Chemical
LPG, LNG
9A.1.3 5.7.3 All
9A.1.4 5.7.4 All
9A.2.1 5.7.5 All
10.1.1 2.6.3 All

10.1.3 2.6.2 Oil
6.1.1 Chemical, LPG
6.1.2; 6.2.1; 6.6.2; 8.3.10 Oil, Chemical
6.1.3; 6.1.4; 6.1.5; 6.1.6; 6.4.2; 6.5.2; 6.6.1 All
10.2.4 10.5.3 All
11.1.1 4.4.4; 5.1.1; 5.1.2; 5.1.3; 5.1.4; 5.1.8; 5.1.9; 5.1.10; 5.1.11; 5.1.12; 5.1.13; All
5.1.15; 5.1.16; 6.4.1; 9.2.1
5.1.7 LPG, LNG
5.1.17 Oil, Chemical, LPG
12.1.2 2.2.1; 11.1.1-11.1.33 All

11.1.40-11.1 .42 Oil, Chemical
11.1.50-11.1.52; 11.1.60-11.1.62 LPG
11.1.70-11.1.72; 11.1.80-11.1.82 LNG
11.1.90-11.1.95 Oil
12A.1.1 2.2.2 All

-
I TMSA KPI I Question Number ! Vessel Type
13.1.2 7.5.1 All
- 13.1.3
13.1.5
13.2.1
5.1.5; 7.2.1; 7.2.2
7.3.1
7 .1.1
All
All
All
13.2.2 7.4.1 All
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1....-.

INTERTANKO-Seafarer's Practical Guide To SIRE 2.0 Inspections

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Chapter 2. Certification and Documentation 11

4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment 93

5.12. Safety Equipment 195

Chapter 7. Maritime Security 223

7.4. Ship Security Officer 228

-- 9.5. STS Operation Management

- Indicative Assignments of Tagged Ranks

the efforts needed to successfully trade their vessels.

I believe it to be an essential addition to the library of every tanker.

Stefanos Stylianos, Minerva Marine, Inc.

4 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 5

Layout and how to use this Document

This question is from Chapter 4 Navigation Equipment, Section 1 Navigation Equipment.

6 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 7

8 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Chapter 1. Vessel, Operator and Inspection Particulars I.-

10 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.1.1)

12 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.2.1)

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 13

Practical Guidelines (2.2.2)

,......., Tagged Rank Master.

Practical Guidelines (2.2.3)

Practical Guidelines (2.3.1)

16 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.3.2)

Practical Guidelines (2.3.3)

18 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.3.4)

To provide an objective assessment of the operational reliability of a vessel in critical areas

Practical Guidelines (2.3.5)

20 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

- Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 21

To ensure that defects affecting Statutory Certificates or Class-required equipment are

Practical Guidelines (2.4.2)

22 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.5.1)

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 23

Practical Guidelines (2.6.1)

24 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (2.6.2)

Practical Guidelines (2.6.3)

Practical Guidelines (2. 7 .1)

Practical Guidelines (2.7.2)

Practical Guidelines (2.8.1)

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 29

Practical Guidelines (2:8.2)

30 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (3.1.1)

32 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

- Practical Guidelines (3.1.2)

Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 33

Practical Guidelines (3.1.2) Continued ...

Practical Guidelines (3.1.3)

Practical Guidelines (3.1.3) Continued ...

36 Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections

Practical Guidelines (3.2.1)

........... Seafarers' Practical Guide to SIRE 2.0 Inspections 37