Gu 1035

Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.
Well Control Principles, Practices and

Implementation
Document ID GU-1035
Document Type Guideline
Security Restricted (Information Security Classification Definitions)
Discipline Well Engineering
Owner Wells Corporate Functional Discipline Head
Issue Date November 2022
Version Version No.1
Link http://cms.portal.corp.pdo.om/Published/GU-1035.pdf (Intranet)
Keywords: A, B, C, to be filled in as key words in the Document Properties panel

This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any
part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or
otherwise) without prior written consent of the owner.
Revision: 1
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The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.
Revision: 1
Effective: Nov. 2022 Petroleum Development Oman LLC
i Document Authorisation
Authorised For Issue: Nov. 2022

Document Authorisation
Document Owner Document Custodian Document Author

MAIMANI,SALMAN UWH Rees, Daniel UWA1 Melvin, Keir UWA13
Date : 03-11-2022 12:00 AM Date : 03-11-2022 12:00 AM Date : 02-11-2022 3:24 PM
This document is a Guideline and therefore, as per FR-01 – PDO Control Framework, compliance
is not mandatory. Hence, formal management of change is not required for deviations from “shall”
statements contained in this document.
Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 3

Revision: 1
ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details
of all revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
Note that changes made as part of Document Maintenance (correction of broken hyperlinks) will
not be recorded in this Revision Table
Revision No. Date Author/ Editor Changes/ Remarks
1 November Keir Melvin, First Issue
2022 UWA13
iii Related Business Processes

Code Business Process (EPBM V.4.0)
EP.63 Design, Drill, Modify, Service and Abandon Well
iv Related Corporate Management Framework (CMF)

Documents
The related CMF Documents can be retrieved from the CMF Business Control Portal. Other, non-
CMF documents and links to information relevant to Well Engineering can be found on the Well
Engineering Documentation Page.
Contractors can access CMS documents via the PDO Extranet – “CMS Documents relevant to
Wells Contractors”. Contract Holders shall request access for named contractors to the PDO
Extranet for the contract period.
The “Simplified HSE Management System is available on the Internet through PDO’s home page,
www.pdo.co.om under http://www.pdo.co.om/hseforcontractors in the category “General” under
the title “Simplified HSE MS”.
The (Senior) Wells Engineer in charge of any work unit is accountable for ensuring that CMS
documents are accessible on the work unit, normally through access to PDO’s Intranet.
Code Corporate Management System

SP-1213 Well Control Standard
GU-899 Front Line Barrier Management
GU-576 Well Control Contingency Plan
CP-178 Well Delivery Code of Practice
PR-1444 Well Engineering Framework
PR-1034 Wireline Operations Procedure
CP-178 Lifecycle Well Integrity Management
SP-2017 Well Failure Model
SP-2392 Wellheads and Trees
SP-2150 Well Delivery Process Management of Change (MOC)

Revision: 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i Document Authorisation ......................................................................................................... 3
ii Revision History ...................................................................................................................... 4
iii Related Business Processes .................................................................................................. 4
iv Related Corporate Management Framework (CMF) Documents .......................................... 4
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 14
1.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................................... 14
1.2 Distribution/Target Audience .......................................................................................... 14
1.3 Review and Improvement ............................................................................................... 14
2 UWD Well Control Risk Identification and Management ...................................................... 15
2.1 Risk Registers Link ......................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Bowtie – Barrier Ownership ............................................................................................ 16
2.2.1 How to Generate a Good Bowtie .................................................................. 17
2.2.2 Barrier Ownership ......................................................................................... 18
2.2.3 Barrier Ownership Development ................................................................... 18
2.3 Key Well Risks – Example Illustration for Well Review / Endorsement Sessions .......... 19
2.3.1 Example for Well Construction ...................................................................... 19
2.3.2 Example for Well Intervention ....................................................................... 19
3 Roles and Responsibilities Link ............................................................................................ 20
4 Principles & Controls ............................................................................................................ 21
4.1 Shallow Gas & Artesian Waterflows ............................................................................... 21
4.1.1 Shallow well control hazard identification: .................................................... 21
4.1.2 Shallow Gas .................................................................................................. 22
4.1.3 Shallow Gas Philosophy ............................................................................... 22
4.1.1 P&D Control Points for shallow gas mitigations (**) ..................................... 23
4.1.2 Credible Shallow Hazard Assessment as per GU-873 and embedded in WPT
(*) 24
4.1.3 Pilot Hole Design ........................................................................................... 25
4.1.4 Shallow Gas Response Flow Chart .............................................................. 26
4.1.5 Operations Control Points for shallow gas mitigations (**) ........................... 27
4.1.6 Shallow Gas Dynamic Killing Critical Steps .................................................. 28
4.1.7 Shallow Gas Dynamic Kill Flow Chart........................................................... 29
4.1.8 Artesian Water flow ....................................................................................... 30
4.1.9 P&D Control Points for artesian flow mitigations and inclusion in the SDP (**)
30
4.1.10 Artesian Flow Prevention Decision Tree Example (Link to Example Decision
Tree) 31
4.1.11 Artesian Flow Mitigation Decision Tree Example ......................................... 31
4.1.12 Operations Control Points for Artesian Flow (**) .......................................... 32

Revision: 1
4.2 Mud weight selection ...................................................................................................... 33

4.2.1 Overbalance .................................................................................................. 33
4.2.2 Minimum Data Requirements ....................................................................... 33
4.2.3 Mud weight window / Margin ......................................................................... 34
4.2.4 Example description of overbalance for the drilling program (SDP) ............. 34
4.2.5 Example description of Mud Weight selection and Mud Weight Window for
CDE and DDE assurance review ......................................................................................... 35
4.2.6 P&D Control Points ....................................................................................... 36
4.2.7 Operational Control Points ............................................................................ 36
4.3 Formation Strength Tests (FSTs) ................................................................................... 37
4.3.1 Formation Strength Test Objectives ............................................................. 38
4.3.2 Formation Strength Test Requirements ........................................................ 38
4.3.4 Operations FST Planning Control Points ...................................................... 39
4.3.5 Formation Strength Test Methods ................................................................ 40
4.3.6 Formation Strength Test Procedural Control Points ..................................... 40
4.3.7 Interpreting FST Graphs ............................................................................... 45
4.4 Kick Tolerance Calculation ............................................................................................. 48
4.4.1 Swab Kick Tolerance .................................................................................... 49
4.4.2 Swab Kick Tolerance Calculation Requirement............................................ 50
4.4.3 Drill Kick Tolerance ....................................................................................... 52
4.4.4 Kick Tolerance Output Requirements ........................................................... 54
4.4.5 Layout for Description of Kick Tolerance in Endorsements Packs and
Programs 54
4.4.7 Operational Control Points ............................................................................ 55
4.5 Drilling ahead with losses ............................................................................................... 56
4.5.1 Example Illustration: ...................................................................................... 56
4.5.2 Natural Losses Environments ....................................................................... 57
4.5.3 Drilling window / Kick tolerance workflow example ...................................... 58
4.5.4 Example Kick Tolerance Calculation for a weak zone .................................. 58
4.5.5 Managing risk to drill ahead with losses ....................................................... 59
4.5.6 Losses above an Influx zone – Kick & Loss Recovery Method .................... 60
4.5.7 Losses below an Influx zone – Loss & Kick Recovery Method .................... 61
4.5.8 Tertiary Well Control Methods ...................................................................... 62
4.5.9 Prevention and Mitigation Barriers List ......................................................... 65
4.5.10 Bow-Tie (Link) ............................................................................................... 68
4.6 Drill string considerations for well control ....................................................................... 69
4.7 Drilling Setup ................................................................................................................... 72

Revision: 1
4.7.1 Alarms/Sensors, Equipment and Shut-in Readiness .................................... 72

4.8 Flow checking ................................................................................................................. 73
4.9 Tripping Setup ................................................................................................................. 74
4.9.1 Tripping Out of Hole Decision Tree............................................................... 75
4.10 Shut-in Considerations .................................................................................. 76
4.10.1 Example Shut-in Procedures for Drilling ....................................................... 77
4.10.2 Example Shut-in Procedures for Tripping ..................................................... 78
4.10.3 Example Shut-in Procedures with BHA / Drill Collars across the BOP ........ 79
4.10.4 Example Shut-in Procedures for Casing & Liner Tubulars (Non-shearable) 80
4.10.5 Example Shut-in Procedure for e-line / Slickline (Non-shearable) ............... 82
4.10.6 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with TRSSSV control line ......... 83
4.10.7 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with ESP control line ................ 84
4.10.8 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with Slickline ............................ 86
4.10.9 Example Shut-in Procedure for Slotted Liners / Wire Wrap Screens / Tubing
with Integrity Failure .............................................................................................................. 87
4.10.10 Example Shut-in Procedure for dropping a non-shearable string components
88
4.10.11 Example Shut-in Procedure with inner string and Slotted Liner ................... 89
4.10.12 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with Annulus Flow (Drilling) ... 91
4.10.13 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with Annulus Flow (Tripping) . 93
4.10.14 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with String Flow ..................... 95
4.11 String Flow, Securing and Incident Classification ......................................... 96
4.12 Volumetric Well Killing................................................................................... 97
4.12.1 With the string out of the Hole ....................................................................... 97
4.12.2 With the bit off bottom ................................................................................... 99
4.13 Combined volumetric Stripping ................................................................... 100
4.13.1 Equipment Required ................................................................................... 100
4.13.2 Volumetric Stripping Preparations of Data and Calculations: ..................... 102
4.13.3 Combined Volumetric Stripping Critical Steps ............................................ 102
4.14 Volumetric Stripping Sheet ......................................................................... 105
4.15 Guidelines for conducting a Strip Drill ......................................................... 105
4.15.1 PURPOSE: .................................................................................................. 105
4.15.2 TIMING: ....................................................................................................... 105
4.15.3 Strip Drill Example (based on a pit drill alarm):........................................... 106
4.15.4 Strip Drill Record Steet................................................................................ 107
4.16 RAM to Ram Stripping Illustration: .............................................................. 108
4.17 Displacement to Lighter Fluid ..................................................................... 109
4.17.1 P&D Control Points ..................................................................................... 110
4.17.2 Operational Control Points .......................................................................... 110

Revision: 1
4.17.3 Example Step-Up Graph link ...................................................................... 111

1.1.1 Example Step-Up with Time and Bleed Off After Displacement. link ......... 111
4.17.4 Critical Operational Phases ........................................................................ 112
4.18 Inflow Testing .............................................................................................. 113
4.18.1 Common Inflow Test Operation Types in PDO........................................... 113
1.1.2 Example Barrier Elements before and after and Inflow Test ...................... 114
4.18.2 String Position during inflow Testing ........................................................... 114
4.18.3 Inflow Testing Critical Operational Phases (Packer Type & Cemented
Completion) 115
4.18.4 Inflow Testing Critical Operational Phases (Whole Well) ........................... 118
4.19 Wait on Cement (WOC) Barrier Requirement ............................................ 119
4.19.1 Visualisation of potential drop in BHP ......................................................... 120
4.20 Intervention Well Process Safety Proposal Data Requirements ................ 121
4.20.1 Well Services Activity Manager (WSAM) Proposal Data Control Points .... 121
4.20.2 Example WSD with required Integrity Assessment Data ............................ 124
4.20.3 Kill Fluid Calculation Example ..................................................................... 125
4.21 Abandonment/Suspension Well Process Safety Data Requirements ........ 126
4.21.1 WSAM Proposal Data Control Points ......................................................... 126
4.21.2 Kill String Length Calculation based on Kill Fluid Density .......................... 128
4.21.3 Kill String and Potential Collapse ................................................................ 129
4.22 MASP vs MAASP ........................................................................................ 130
4.23 Basis of MAASP and considerations when MASP > MAASP .................... 131
4.23.1 CP-118 Appendix 2 Extract: ........................................................................ 131
4.23.2 MAASP Calculations: .................................................................................. 131
4.24 Brine Considerations as a Barrier ............................................................... 132
4.25 Brine Density and Temperature Correction ................................................ 133
4.25.1 Available Brine Densities ............................................................................ 133
4.25.2 Corrosivity ................................................................................................... 133
4.25.3 Effective Brine Density ................................................................................ 134
4.26 Well Intervention Killing Methods ................................................................ 135
4.26.1 Reverse and Forward Kill Maintenance of BHP ......................................... 135
4.26.2 Well Kill Preparations .................................................................................. 136
4.27 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Reverse Circulation ................................... 138
4.28 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Conventional/Direct Circulation ................. 140
4.29 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Bullhead Killing .......................................... 142
4.30 Acid / stimulation squeeze fluid weights and circulation procedures .......... 144
4.30.1 Operational Control Points: ......................................................................... 144
4.31 Perforation Methodology and Considerations ............................................. 146
4.31.1 Perforation Barrier Requirements ............................................................... 146

Revision: 1
4.31.2 Perforation Selection Considerations ......................................................... 147

4.32 TCP Perforation (when planning underbalanced with the rig) .................... 148
4.32.1 System Weaknesses of the “poor boy” head: ............................................. 148
4.32.2 Operational Control Points (Medium Risk Method): ................................... 149
4.33 Dynamic Kill Setup ...................................................................................... 152
4.34 Installing A Flanged Shooting Nipple and Pressure Testing ...................... 153
4.35 Setting Depths for Deep and Shallow Barriers ........................................... 154
4.35.1 Delta System Volume Illustration: ............................................................... 156
4.35.2 Risk Associated with not setting a plug as deep as possible. .................... 157
4.36 Plug Retrieval (Slickline vs. Drillpipe) ......................................................... 158
4.36.1 Slickline Plug Retrieval Illustration Link ...................................................... 159
4.36.2 Drill Pipe Plug Retrieval Illustration Link ..................................................... 159
4.37 Plug Retrieval on Slick Line ........................................................................ 160
4.38 Bridge Plug Retrieval on Drill pipe .............................................................. 161
4.39 Wireline Barrier Requirements with Newly Installed Completion ............... 162
4.40 TWCV/BPV Hanger Profile Installation and Retrieval ................................ 163
4.41 Typical AC 9 Challenges and Considerations for Well Entry...................... 164
4.41.1 Key Aspect to attend the wells: ................................................................... 165
4.41.2 Example Well Entry Checklist ..................................................................... 167
4.42 Annulus Barrier Considerations for Abandonment Operations .................. 168
4.42.1 AC 9 wells ................................................................................................... 168
4.43 Sour Well – Well Control Requirements ..................................................... 169
4.44 Casing Wear – Limitation & Monitoring ...................................................... 175
4.44.1 Casing Wear Limitation ............................................................................... 175
4.44.2 Ditch Magnet Positioning & Metal Recovery Techniques. .......................... 176
5 Well Barrier “Rules” ............................................................................................................ 178
5.1 Two Barrier Principle (Hat-over Hat Arrangement)....................................................... 178
5.2 Definition of Barrier Elements ....................................................................................... 179
5.2.1 Primary Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.38): .............................. 179
5.2.2 Secondary Well Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.47): ................. 179
5.2.3 Common Well Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.47): .................... 179
5.3 Primary Barrier Examples: ............................................................................................ 180
5.4 Secondary Barrier Examples: ....................................................................................... 181
5.4.1 Secondary Barrier Envelope Validity .......................................................... 182
5.5 Verification of a Mechanical Barrier .............................................................................. 195
5.6 Ultimate Barrier Envelope ............................................................................................. 196
5.7 Well Barrier Envelope Construction and use of eWCAT (eWCAT Quick Guide) ......... 197
6 Equipment & Controls ......................................................................................................... 198
6.1 How to verify COC ........................................................................................................ 198
Revision: 1
6.1.1 COC Example ............................................................................................. 199

6.1.2 COC Critical Checks Example .................................................................... 200
6.2 How to verify COS ........................................................................................................ 201
6.2.1 COS Example ............................................................................................. 201
6.3 Flange Make Up ............................................................................................................ 202
6.4 BOP Testing .................................................................................................................. 202
6.4.1 BOP Hydraulic Control Line Test Example Procedure ............................... 204
6.5 Shear Test..................................................................................................................... 205
6.5.1 Tubular Selection and Conditions for Shear Test ....................................... 205
6.5.2 Shear Testing Procedure (Aligned with API-16TR1) .................................. 206
6.5.3 Shear Test 2 ................................................................................................ 208
6.5.4 Shear Test 3 ................................................................................................ 209
6.5.5 Shear Test Output ....................................................................................... 209
6.6 Requirements following planned or unplanned use of shear ram ................................ 210
6.7 Accumulator Performance ............................................................................................ 211
6.7.1 API 16D (Surface Stack) requirements with charging system isolated: ..... 211
6.7.2 Accumulator Precharge and Volumetrics ................................................... 212
6.8 MOPLPS ....................................................................................................................... 213
6.8.1 MOPFLPS Testing (API 16A 3rd Edition – Annex C) .................................. 214
6.8.2 MOPFLPS Testing Output .......................................................................... 215
7 Well Control Drills ............................................................................................................... 216
7.1 Well Control Drill Key Elements: ................................................................................... 216
7.2 Well Control Drill Examples: ......................................................................................... 217
8 Standard Forms .................................................................................................................. 219
8.1 Well Control Drill Assessment Form Link ..................................................................... 219
8.2 15 step daily well control checklist ................................................................................ 221
8.3 Well Control Checklists ................................................................................................. 225
8.3.1 UWOXO - Well Control Checklist................................................................ 225
8.3.2 UWOXO - Ara Salt Checklist ...................................................................... 225
8.4 Walk the Line ................................................................................................................ 226
8.4.1 Walk the Line Example Checklist................................................................ 226
8.5 Accumulator Draw Down Test Form Form Link ............................................................ 227
8.5.1 API STD 53 Surface System Drawdown Test Notes: ................................. 228
8.6 BOP Function Test Form Form Link ............................................................................. 229
8.6.1 API STD 53 Function Test Notes: ............................................................... 230
8.7 Trip Sheets .................................................................................................................... 231
8.7.1 Example Trip Sheet for Hoists .................................................................... 231
8.7.2 Example Trip Sheet for Rigs ....................................................................... 232
8.8 Fill Up Sheets ................................................................................................................ 233
Revision: 1
8.9 Pre-Well Kill Checklist Example .................................................................................... 234

8.10 Kill sheets vertical and deviated (hyperlink to IWCF) ................................. 235
8.10.1 Surface BOP Vertical .................................................................................. 235
8.10.2 Surface BOP Deviated ................................................................................ 237
8.11 Inflow Test Horner Plot Form ...................................................................... 240
8.12 MGS Capacity Spreadsheet link ................................................................. 241
8.12.1 Existing Separator ....................................................................................... 241
8.12.2 New Separator ............................................................................................ 242
8.13 Casing Wear / Ditch Magnet Monitoring ..................................................... 243
9 Management of Risk during Change .................................................................................. 244
9.1 Risk Identification and Mitigation with the Bowtie ......................................................... 245
9.2 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for RU / working above pressured
annulus (single barrier) ........................................................................................................... 246
9.3 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for N/D Tree and N/U BOP with a
single Barrier .......................................................................................................................... 252
9.4 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for changing out SOV under single
barrier ..................................................................................................................................... 256
9.5 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for extending PCE pressure test past
21 days ................................................................................................................................... 261
9.6 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for extending PCE COS recertification
past due date .......................................................................................................................... 264
9.7 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider for wells with heavily corroded surface casing that
cannot support BOP weight but have passed SIT. ................................................................ 267
10 Learning from Historical Level 1 Well Control Events .................................................. 272
11 Well Control Incident Classification link ........................................................................ 274
12 Well Control Incident –Site Investigation Report Template link ................................... 275
13 WPS Incident Reporting & Investigation ....................................................................... 281
13.1 Summary Incident Reporting & Investigation Flowchart ............................. 281
13.2 WPS Incident Classifications ...................................................................... 282
13.2.1 IOGP WPS Classification ............................................................................ 283
13.2.2 PIM Incident Type ....................................................................................... 284
13.2.3 API-AIPS Incident Classifications ............................................................... 284
13.3 Well Engineering Related Types of WPS Incident ..................................... 285
13.3.1 Examples of different Well Engineering related WPS incident classifications
are summarised below: ....................................................................................................... 285
13.4 Subsurface Related Types of WPS Incident ............................................... 286
13.4.1 Examples of different subsurface related WPS incident classifications are
summarised below: ............................................................................................................. 286
13.5 WPS Incident Ownership ............................................................................ 288
13.5.1 Directorate Incident Ownership ................................................................... 288
13.5.2 Example 1 – Drilled Kick ............................................................................. 288

Revision: 1
13.5.3 Example 2 – Total Losses ........................................................................... 288

13.5.4 Example 3 – Formation Top Depth ............................................................. 288
13.5.5 Example 4 – Water Injection Formation Drilled Kick .................................. 288
13.5.6 Example 5 – Sour Shallow Gas Kick .......................................................... 289
13.6 Management Level Incident Ownership ..................................................... 289
13.7 Risk Assessment Matrix .............................................................................. 289
13.7.1 Incident Severity (Actual & Potential) ......................................................... 289
13.8 Reporting and Investigation Requirements ................................................. 290
13.8.1 L4 WCI - Near Miss / Potential Incidents .................................................... 290
13.8.2 WCI - Incidents With Consequences .......................................................... 291
13.9 Investigation Templates .............................................................................. 292
13.9.1 Low Potential Investigation ......................................................................... 292
13.9.2 Medium Potential Investigation ................................................................... 294
13.9.3 High Potential Investigation ........................................................................ 294
13.10 Investigation Teams .................................................................................... 295
13.11 Terms of Reference (TOR) ......................................................................... 295
13.11.1 Learning Flyers ........................................................................................... 295
13.12 Incident Review and Investigation Requirement Meetings ......................... 296
13.12.1 UWZ PIM Review Weekly Meeting ............................................................. 296
13.12.2 UWD Weekly Meeting ................................................................................. 296
13.12.3 Quarterly Meeting ........................................................................................ 296
13.13 PDO Risk Assessment Matrix ..................................................................... 297
14 Appendices ................................................................................................................... 298
14.1 Appendix 2, Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Definitions ................. 298
14.2 Appendix 3, Related Business Control Documents and References ......... 304

Revision: 1
TABLE OF FIGURES
No table of figures entries found.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 14-1, Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Definitions ................................................. 298
Table 14-2, Related Business Control Documents and References ......................................... 304
LIST OF EQUATIONS
N/A

Revision: 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
The guideline has been developed to document current well process safety practices and controls
utilized in PDO both in the design phase and execution. Guidance has also been developed for
non-routine well control operations and challenging design and operating environments.
The guidance should be used in conjunction with SP-1213 to enable risk management and control
of wells process safety.
Practices defined in this document are not a requirement, but any deviation from “should”
statements should be risk assessed to ensure activities are ALARP.
1.2 Distribution/Target Audience

The target audience of this document is for all well engineering staff, PT/PE community members
responsible for planning new wells and interventions and contractor staff responsible for well
activities.
This document is classified as restricted. Access is allowed to PDO personnel, associate
companies and contractors working on PDO projects who have signed a confidentiality
agreement with PDO.
1.3 Review and Improvement

Any user of this document who wishes to provide constructive feedback, or who encounters a
mistake or confusing entry is requested to immediately notify the Document Custodian.
This document shall be reviewed as necessary by the Document Custodian, but no less frequently
than every four years. Triggers for full or partial review of this Specification are listed in GU-463 -
Wells CMS Document Custodians and Technical Focal Points (TFPs).

Revision: 1
2 UWD Well Control Risk Identification and Management
2.1 Risk Registers Link

Risk Registers have been developed by each department in Well Engineering, covering the key
Technical, Economic, Commercial, Organizational, and Political (TECOP) risk. The risk register
should consider subsurface risk management through to work unit capability, people competency,
material availability, work unit availability and people resourcing, which may or do impact well
control effectiveness. The treats identified are ranked against the unmitigated severity and
likelihood (unmitigated risk) and then once again against the mitigated severity and likelihood
(residual risk).
Negligible 1 1 2 3 4 5
SEVERITY
Low 2 2 4 6 8 10
Moderate 3 3 6 9 12 15
Significant 4 4 8 12 16 20
Catastophic 5 5 10 15 20 25
1 2 3 4 5
Improbable Remote Occasional Probable Frequent
Likelihood
Severity Example WPS Incident Score

Catastrophic Uncontrolled HC Release WPS – L1/L2 5
Significant Failure of Equipment Barriers (2nd) WPS – L2/L3 4
Moderate Failure of Primary Barrier (if 2nd OK) WPS – L3 3
Low Failure to prove any other WC Barriers identified WPS – L4
2
in the Bow Tie for the specific activity
Negligible WPS Activities that can be improved AAR/Coaching 1
Severity Definition Score

Frequent Has happened more than once at field in year 5
Probable Has happened at field or more than once per year in UWD 4
Occasional Has happened in UWD 3
Remote Heard of In Industry 2
Improbable Never Heard of in Industry 1
Low ranked threats which feature high potential and/or actual L1/L2 WPS incidents should have
the ranking adjusted and trigger a review of existing controls/mitigations. Key threats which rank
high after mitigation should be used to identify additional controls in the business plan.

Revision: 1
2.2 Bowtie – Barrier Ownership

A Bowtie is the most effective tool to visualise and assure barriers to both prevent a top event,
such as Loss of Primary Containment, but also to prevent escalation.
A Bowtie is typically generated as part of the HSE Case to treat all credible Major Accident
Hazards. However, these Bowties are often at a high level and lack the information needed to all
a crew to make good use of them. To ensure bowties are relevant and understood by crew
members, it is important that sites develop Bowties specific to their operations and threats. Bowtie
development can be used to identify gaps in the HSE case and to sustain its use.

Revision: 1
2.2.1 How to Generate a Good Bowtie

Step Action When Responsible
Gather the full integrated team together, this
Start of
should include Petroleum Engineering, Wells Unit Team
Campaign
Planning & Operations, Unit Contractor, Lead
of unit
Service Co.
Agree the Top Event – Typically loss of

primary containment (LOPC). Bowtie
Full Team
Session
Note if Top Event is LOPC then BOP is on the
righthand side of the bowtie.
Identify the Hazard, usually this is Bowtie

Full Team
Hydrocarbon in the Reservoir Session
Identify all the threat lines that could result in

Bowtie
the HC being release from the reservoir to Full Team
Session
surface.
Identify all the Consequences that could

Bowtie
potentially happen if the release at surface Full Team
Session
escalates.
Assess the Inherent Risk of this

Bowtie Technical
Consequence, i.e. if this Consequence were
Session Safety
to materialise how would it be classified.
Add Controls (Barriers) to each Threat Line

and assess the health of this control against
recent incidents
Key information: Bowtie Accountable

 Activity Session Party
 Where this is Controlled
 Person accountable
 Criticality of the Barrier
 Owner (Operator/Contractor/Service)

Revision: 1
2.2.2 Barrier Ownership

Barrier Ownership is simply translating the Accountable information from the Bowtie to a form that
is practical per individual, ie in the example above the Tool Pusher may feature many times on
the Bowtie, but the Barrier Ownership Card for the Tool Pusher will only include their Safety
Critical Tasks and the frequency that these need to be done.
Safety Critical Tasks are not limited to Well Process Safety and the Barrier Card should include
all SCTs (for example lifting and hoisting, Drops, Road Safety, Environment, Hazardous
Substances, Electrical Safety, etc.).
2.2.3 Barrier Ownership Development

It is the responsibility of the Contractor to develop their own Barrier Ownership System that is fit
for purpose for their activity. This needs to be a collaborative effort with both PDO and the service
Companies as they will also feature withing the Bow Tie with key Accountabilities. See some
examples of barrier ownership below:
2.2.3.1 Team Assessing their Controls and Verifying prior to Job Execution
2.2.3.2 Example of Individual Cards

Revision: 1
2.3 Key Well Risks – Example Illustration for Well Review / Endorsement
Sessions
To help identify risk as such to adequately plan, design and organise key well activity mitigations,
a risk register is used. For PDO operations, many well challenges have mitigations built into ways
of working through the program and SWWIs. Complex operations or a variation on routine
activities will bring key differentiators and associated risks. The key risks should be illustrated in
the endorsement sessions (to clearly communicate risk with TAs for endorsement) and in
programs to communicate risk during execution. Link to Example Risk Register Templates
2.3.1 Example for Well Construction
Key Risks & Mitigations (XXX Well Construction)

1 Issue Artesian Flow
UNMITIGATED
Flooding on the location, with potential H2S(up to 200 ppm) and destabilization of the well pad.
Risk
While supporting the work unit.
6 3 2
Mitigation Follow the artesian flow mitigations and decision tree.
2 Issue Total Loss Zone at Habshan Level 4 1

Total losses in Habshan and destabilization of exposed shale layer, after filling the well with
Risk
water.
5
Optimise well trajectory to avoid karstic zones when possible. Adapt the casing design to case off
1 Mitigation just prior to penetrating the loss zone. Utilise the RSSto maintain verticality when drilling
through the loss zone and when drilling out cement plugs.
3 Issue H2Sin Khuff

Premature failure of well/ drilling components during a well control event and/ or premature
Risk
casing failure over the well life cycle.
Mitigation Confirm material compatibility with UEC1A and utilize sour service drilling components. MITIGATED
4 Issue Deep Heavy Casing Run
2 Risk Unable to run casing and/ or one way trip with risk of setting shallow if hole conditionsare poor.
6
Confirm unit hoisting capacity vs. calculated running load. Complete the heavy casing run checklist
3 Mitigation
prior to the run. Include hole cleaning and borehole stability mitigations in the program.
4
4 5 Issue Extreme Hard Rock Drilling at reservoir Level 2
Risk Premature bit failure, multiple runs, additional cost and loss of performance.
Optimise bit selection with UCSanalysis and follow the drilling road map. Utilise xxxx motor for
Mitigation
the optimum downhole drive performance and reliability. 6
3
5 5
6 Issue Cumulative risk – Total Loss Zone and H2S/ Hydrocarbon Zone
1
A weak zone (after curing losses in Habshan) and low/ no kick tolerance for drilling ahead to
Risk
though hydrocarbon bearing zones to the planned section TD.
Call section TD early and slim down the well when possible. Avoid drilling into gas bearing zone
Mitigation when possible. If drilling ahead the weak zone must be tested to ensure sufficient strength to
circulate out an influx prior to penetrating the hydrocarbon bearing zone.
2.3.2 Example for Well Intervention
Key Risks & Mitigations (XXX Well Intervention)

1 Issue Breach of casings at surface (A to B Annulus to Atmosphere communication)
UNMITIGATED
Risk No secondary barrier envelope available. Release to atmosphere if primary barrier fails.
Scab 5 ½” from TOL to surface, to re-establish barrier envelope before pulling the production 1
6
6 Mitigation packer and tail with plug installed. Prepare and complete emergency response drills for a release 2
5 below the wellhead.
4 3
2 Issue Production Packer not able to be verified as a barrier
1
Risk Loss of Primary Barrier as unverified and no secondary barrier envelope available
5
Fill Cellar, monitor fluid level and monitor for signs of gas percolation/ leak with gas detection and
Mitigation
thermal cameras over xxx days to confirm no leak through the production packer.
3 Issue Fractured sub-hydrostatic reservoir with connection to the Gas Cap

Risk Influx after loss of hydrostatic head, due to losses.
Mitigation Maintain dynamic kill rate with rig configuration and procedures.
4 Issue Caprock accessis limited, and length of cap rock is short. MITIGATED
Unable to abandon the well fully at caprock level and cross flow between Shuaiba and shallow
Risk
aquifer.
Abandonment plan to isolate shallow aquifer from Shuaiba reservoir. Scab Casing and then pull
Mitigation
the production packer for access to the cap rock before spotting the abandonment plug.
4
Issue Single SOV installed on A-Annulus (Cellar space insufficient for 2nd SOV) 6 1
5
4 2
Risk Failure of a single surface barrier during well operations.
Option 1: Civil to demolish cellar walls where space is insufficient and reconstruct the cellar with 5 3
Mitigation sufficient room, prior to work unit entry. (Not possible due to time constraint and does not
warrant the work, given the breach of casings below the wellhead)
2
Mitigation Option 2: Install elbow on the SOV to allow a second SOV to be installed (ACCEPTED)
6 Issue Wellhead Instability

Risk Wellhead collapse with BOPinstallation.
3
Mitigation Install wellhead clamp prior to work unit entry.

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3 Roles and Responsibilities Link

The RACI defines key WPS activities through the well delivery process from design to execution.
The RACI is used for staff to understand which controls are assigned to individuals and to support
barrier ownership.

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4 Principles & Controls
4.1 Shallow Gas & Artesian Waterflows

Shallow gas well control drilling hazards in PDO are considered to be associated with shallow
gas or water bearing formations with the potential to flow to surface, situated above the first
pressure containment string with BOP installation. There is no ability to shut in and contain
wellbore pressure, should an influx occur from these shallow zones.
“Shallow” is commonly understood by the industry to be the interval above the setting depth of
the first pressure containment string.
4.1.1 Shallow well control hazard identification:

Shallow hazard mitigation should start at the planning phase of the well pick, whereby the
subsurface environment is mapped, and the potential assessed. Governance of this assessment
and process is stipulated in GU-873 and hardwired into the well planning tool (WPT).
The output of the shallow hazard assessment is given as:

 “credible”, whereby the design, well position and/or operational mitigations are required to
allow drilling to proceed at an ALARP level.
and
 “non-credible”, whereby no additional mitigations are required.

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4.1.2 Shallow Gas

Shallow gas is typically associated with either:
 Gas which has migrated through natural or induced fractures and become trapped near
surface i.e. Marmul.
1. Gas from previous blowouts and subsurface communication i.e. Yibal.
2. Gas from well integrity issues and secondary build up i.e. Qarn Alam.
3. Intra shale sand lenses in base Shargi formation i.e. Bahja Rima / Barik / Anzauz (Near
blowout on Anzauz 17).
4. Natural fractures / well integrity issues charging silt stringers in Fiqa formation i.e. Natih.
5. Accumulation in shallower zones charged from deeper zones due to well integrity issues
4.1.3 Shallow Gas Philosophy

1. Optimize the shallow gas assessment and limit uncertainty, through subsurface assessment.
2. Avoid shallow gas where possible by re-arranging the rig position or adjusting the casing
scheme for BOP installation prior to penetration of the hazardous section.
3. Include pilot holes in the design mitigations.
4. Shallow gas with associated H2S should not be controlled with shallow gas mitigations, but
rather eliminated via relocation of the drilling location or by setting a surface casing and
installing the BOP prior to penetrating into a potential shallow gas zone.

Revision: 1
Shallow Gas Hazard Workflow

Can the risk be eliminated?
Set surface casing at or above shallowest stratigraphic seal.

Credible risk*
N Surface casing can be set below shallowest stratigraphic
(likelihood) of HC
seal under deviation after confirming there are no
above shallowest
overpressured or HC bearing formations.
stratigraphic seal?
Install BOP for subsequent sections.
Y
Can a surface casing with
sufficient shoe strength to Y Set surface casing above HC.
Install BOP for subsequent
circulate out kick with BOP
sections.
installed be set above the HC risk?
N
Drill top hole section with shallow
gas mitigations in place* *
NB - WPT needs to identify
Shallowest stratigraphic seal
4.1.1 P&D Control Points for shallow gas mitigations (**)

Step Action Responsible Document
Verify the shallow gas assessment is concluded and
1 P&D WPT
approved in WPT.
Confirm Conductor / Surface Casing setting depth is WPT
2 sufficient to contain any potential diversion of shallow gas / P&D
planned mud weight. & SDP
3 Diverter is planned and viable for the work unit rig up. P&D SDP
A Pilot hole is planned in the program with the correct size WPT
4 P&D
to allow dynamic kill. & SDP
WPT
5 LWD is assessed and planned in the program (if required). P&D
& SDP
Gas Chromatograph Monitoring is assessed and planned in WPT

6 P&D
the program (if required). & SDP
7 Kill mud volume and weight is planned in the program. P&D SDP
8 Double non-ported Float Valves are planned in the program. P&D SDP
9 Penetration rate is prescribed in the program. P&D SDP
Bit nozzles sizing, arrangement or open nozzles are planned
10 P&D SDP
in the program.

Revision: 1
4.1.2 Credible Shallow Hazard Assessment as per GU-873 and embedded in WPT (*)

Revision: 1
4.1.3 Pilot Hole Design

A pilot hole is designed to limit the severity of a shallow gas influx and improve log quality when
required. The ability to dynamically kill the well is defined by:
 The annular clearance (associated with the pilot hole size and drill string geometry)
 The flow rate (limited by the work unit capacity)
 The kill mud density
 The kill mud viscosity
The chances of an effective and successful dynamic kill are very limited; hence the drilling location
should be moved to avoid shallow gas risk when possible. The graph below illustrates the required
flowrate for dynamic kill vs. hole size
In general, it is recommended to drill 8 ½” or smaller pilot holes when there is a possibility of

encountering shallow gas.

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4.1.4 Shallow Gas Response Flow Chart

Revision: 1
4.1.5 Operations Control Points for shallow gas mitigations (**)

Confirm Conductor / Surface Casing setting depth is sufficient
1 to contain any potential diversion of shallow gas / planned WSV SDP
mud weight.
Confirm water pit is full and water supply rate is available as WSV
2 & SWWI
per program.
Mud Eng.
Confirm Kill mud stock is prepared with the required weight WSV
3 & SWWI
and volume as per program.
Mud Eng.
Confirm valid certification (COC/COS) of all Diverter WSV
4 & eWCAT
equipment.
TP
Install diverter onto the wellhead with LP riser above as per
OEM procedures.
WSV
5 Install diverter lines to designated points on location, allowing & SWWI
for a shift in wind direction. Diverter lines to be as straight as TP
possible, rated to 3,450 kPa and have a flow diameter no
smaller than 12”.
Verify diverter control unit and hoses as per SP-1213
requirements. WSV
6 Function test the diverter as per OEM procedures. & SWWI
Confirm single point actuation of control system to open TP
diverter line then close diverter.
WSV
rd
Confirm rig gas detection and alarms (and 3 party sensors &
7 TP SWWI
if required) are installed, calibrated and tested prior to spud.
&
Driller
Confirm H2S mitigation requirements if applicable and ensure WSV
8 readiness prior to spud, i.e. DWI-1,2,3 requirements as per & SWWI
SP-1190. TP
Inform LEBC of drilling activity and follow SIMOPS SIMOPS /
9 WSV / OSC
requirements and communications. MOPO
10 Confirm the pilot hole is planned as per program SWWI
WSV
requirements.
Confirm bit nozzle sizing / open nozzle as per drilling program WSV
11 & SWWI
requirements (to allow pumping LCM).
Driller
Confirm 2 x non-ported floats are pressure tested and WSV
12 & SWWI
included in the BHA (mitigate possible influx up the string).
Driller
Confirm LWD is included in the BHA if stated as a WSV
13 & SWWI
requirement in the drilling program.
Driller
Confirm Gas Chromatograph Monitoring is rigged up if stated WSV
14 & SWWI
as a requirement in the drilling program.
Mud Logger
Confirm shallow gas shut-in procedures are available,
understood and posted in the doghouse. WSV
&
15 The maximum pump rate required in the case of dynamic SWWI
TP
killing, should be include in the procedure.
&
The diverter procedure should be rig specific and the roles Driller
and responsibilities clearly communicated.
Revision: 1

WSV
&
Confirm the unit specific mud tank plan, to allow immediate
16 TP SWWI
circulation or minimise disruption to circulate kill mud.
&
Mud Eng.
WSV
Confirm the evacuation plan and communication protocol
17 & PR-1287
is understood with all crew members.
TP
Perform Diverter drill to confirm functionality of equipment, WSV
the shut-in procedures are followed, mud tank plan and
18 & SWWI
evacuation plan is adhered to. (Drill to be performed with
all crews) TP
TP
AD is not left on the brake unsupervised during all phases SOP
19 &
of the tophole section. SWWI
Driller
4.1.6 Shallow Gas Dynamic Killing Critical Steps

Step Action Responsible
At first sign of flow, the following action is required:
 Pump mud immediately at maximum pump rate.
 Open diverter valve(s) and close diverter element (accomplished on a

single actuator).
 If the well continues to flow, pump heavier mud at maximum pump rate
(11.0 kPa/m kill mud is generally recommended – TBC with program
1 requirement). Driller
It is recommended to have kill mud of at least the pilot hole content

premixed and ready for pumping. The mud should be stored in such a
way that it can be pumped immediately at maximum rate.
 If the well still continues to flow after the heavier mud has been
pumped, carryon pumping mud at maximum rate. When running out of
mud, changeover to water. Do not reduce the pump speed.
WSV
At this stage, the drilling location may need to be abandoned, depending
2 &
on the severity and type of flow and the condition of the diverter equipment.
TP
Further dynamic kill attempts may be as follows:
 Pump another batch of kill mud whilst pumping mud maximum rate, or
if not possible, pump water.
3 Driller
 Pump at maximum rate.
 Repeat sequence if dynamic killing is still unsuccessful, but do not use

excessive mud weight which could result in formation breakdown.

Revision: 1
4.1.7 Shallow Gas Dynamic Kill Flow Chart

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4.1.8 Artesian Water flow

Artesian water flow is typically with up to 500 ppm H2S with dispersion that dissipates within 2 m
from source. Artesian flow is associated with either:
 Natural flow arising from hydrostatic head
 Pressure and fluid related to shallow water disposal in the formation
The nature of Artesian flow risk and controls differ from shallow gas as the flow can often be
sustained and the inclusion of a diverter is not effective.
Artesian Flow Hazard Workflow

Can the risk be eliminated?
Credible risk
(likelihood) of N
Set surface casing based on shallow gas criteria.
Artesian Flow *
Y
Can a surface casing with
Set surface casing above artesian
sufficient shoe strength to drill Y flow risk.
ahead with BOP installed be set
Install BOP for subsequent
above the artesian risk without
sections.
significant time/cost impact.
N
Drill top hole section with artesian
flow mitigations in place* *
* 4.1.2 Credible Shallow Hazard Assessment as per GU-873 and embedded in WPT (*)
4.1.9 P&D Control Points for artesian flow mitigations and inclusion in the SDP (**)
Verify the shallow artesian flow hazard assessment is
1 concluded and approved in WPT. P&D WPT
Confirm the Surface Casing setting depth is sufficient to
contain any artesian flow / planned mud weight.
WPT
If it is not possible to set surface casing is ahead of
2 P&D &
penetrating an artesian zone; Confirm Conductor setting
SDP
depth is sufficient to avoid washout from any potential
diversion of shallow water flow.
3 Kill mud volume and weight is planned in the program. P&D SDP
4 Double non-ported Float Valves are planned in the program P&D SDP
Include the use of a LP conductor rather than returns to the
5 cellar, to limit artesian flow potential. P&D SDP
Update the Artesian flow decision trees and include in the
6 program. Ensure equipment is prepared in advance. P&D SDP

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4.1.10 Artesian Flow Prevention Decision Tree Example (Link to Example Decision Tree)
Artesian Flow Prevention (AH BLK G-A Rig 50)
Ensure 1.6” Spaghetti Prepare Initial R/U Solas. Order 3.5” drillable Cut 2 x 3” Install: Cement recipe Returns to Flow
Sufficient or PVC pipe + Spud volume Prepare GRE pipe & 3.5” Slots in •Cellar pumps to for Fast Set line while
Water Supply, Manifold to be of Muddy 50m3 of 11.8 inspected EU Landing Shakers Cement Drilling – stab
at least 80 available on Water + kPa/m Brine TBG to be used Base to allow •Cellar pumps to Waste available prior in LP riser
m3/hr, Ensure site sweeps+ as stinger for fast Access with Pit to spud + required for
Water pit is LCM materials set cement Spaghetti •3rd pump to clean chemicals for increased
full + half and Recipes Pipe cutting chute 100% excess hydrostatic with
waste pit with Prior to Spud
th
•4 pump from Water pit csg cement 2 x 6“ to 10”
WSW. to Mud tanks job+ valves to drain
Riser to be hocked with 2 lines :
• One line from water pit contingent the riser
- Fill up/ Natih line ( from WSW pit)
to be used to fill through callout for
- 2” fill up line from rig circulation system ( e.g : Kill
the raiser ( Natih\ fill up cement plug
line fitted to trip tank inlet in the riser)
line).
Spud well with Muddy Water + PHB

Sweeps
Drilling first 70 m:
 Control Flowrate as per drilling program while ensuring hole cleaning (i.e. Hydraulics simulation, sweeps program)
 Control ROP as per drilling program, Take returns through cellar by opening LP riser drain valves. This is to prevent ECD loading on first meters drilled which might induce further
complication below conductor shoe (i.e. soft formations).
 At 70 m, circulate hole clean with sweep and flow check for 15 minutes to assess losses/gains. Close riser valves and take returns through flow line
 Ensure drilling MW doesn’t go higher than 11.5 KPa/m which is higher than PPP from RUS/UER; i.e. should give better overbalance.
 Before 170m, Cont., drilling ahead and maintain the MW between 10.8-11 kPa/m. Ensure hole cleaning is achieved all the time by optimizing the parameters.
 ECDs while drilling will provide more overbalance to the expected Artesian Flow from UER starting at 180 m BDF.
 If losses are encountered continue drilling to section TD (30 m into Shargi), no plan for curing losses.
 At section TD, Spot inhibited pill on bottom across Shargi & Arada as per the TFM.
POOH:
 If losses are encountered less than 10 m3/hour ( or less than rig mixing capacity of 11 kpa/m brine) (no Artesian flow), displace the well to 11 kpa/m muddy water, then keep hole full all the
time during POOH through annulus with 11 kpa/m muddy water/brine ( using the kill line arrangement)
 If losses are encountered more than 10 m3/hour ( or more than rig mixing capacity of 11 kpa/m brine) (no Artesian flow), Keep filling during POOH through annulus with WSW and pump
10 m3 kill brine (11.8m kPa/m) frequently to prevent Artesian flow ( Filling rate should be less than the water supply rate from WSW, but not less than 0.5 m3/min.
 If losses are encountered along with Artesian flow, Pump kill brine 11.8 KPa/m through annulus or bit depending on bit depth( make sure the 11.8 kpa/m cap to be on top of UER upper),
fingerprint how long it takes for artesian flow to re-occur and pump kill brine as required, i.e. 10 m3 Kill pill every 2 hours.
 Artesian flow can be diverted through flow line, but at the first sign of H2S, immediately open the riser draining valve and divert the flow to waste pit using the cellar pump while attempting
to kill the well.
 Note that there is a less likelihood of encountering Artesian flow without losses.
4.1.11 Artesian Flow Mitigation Decision Tree Example
Artesian Flow Decision Tree (AH BLK G-A Rig 50)
Drill 23” Hole Section with WSW + PHB Sweeps
Losses Noted – Partial or Total/ Flow Noted While Drilling

Pump kill brine 11.8 KPa/m through No Losses / No Flow NO Flow
annulus or bit depending on bit
depth, fingerprint how long it takes
Displace to Kill Brine ~ 11.8 kPa/m with LCM
for artesian flow to re-occur and
pump kill brine as required Losses & Flow While POOH
Discuss the mud
Losses while POOH Drill to Section TD wt to continue Flow Flow not
drilling ( based stopped/ no stopped, then
on bit depth and losses or increase kill
Well Static while POOH
finger printing partial mud to
Top up Annulus with 10 m3 losses 13.5kpa/m
Kill Brine ~ 11.8 kPa/m and
fill up with WSW, the top up
frequency depending on Flow noted before N/D riser
the finger printing on how
long the artesian flow take
to reoccur Yes No
RIH Spaghetti / PVC pipe
RIH to 200 m with 5” down the annulus to the
At 200 mAHD, displace to Kill
open end DP, Displace loss zone at 80 ~ 100 m
Brine 11.8 Kpa/m
to Kill Brine 11.8kpa/m
No and perform top fill
This is to compensate the
Hydrostatic Head reduction due to
N/D Riser
N/D LP Riser
Ensure Ability to pump kill brine Cement to
from pits into well ( fill line/ kill line) Surface
Monitor the annulus

cement level for 30 min,
Artesian flow No Artesian, Flow noted After N/D riser and Yes then N/Up BOP and
is not or artesian prior RIH CSG continue operation
manageable flow is
manageable
Yes No
RIH with cement stinger and set Run 18 5/8” Casing and perform CMT job.
fast set cement across flow area ( - No Centralizers over top 100 m of casing to allow top fill access
use drillable GRE pipe if available) - If flow noted while running displace with 11.8 kPa/m mud.
Note: Weighted spacer to be pump before the CMT. Updated on 20/ 10/ 2021, by Ammar Al Maamari,
UWOXG21

Revision: 1
4.1.12 Operations Control Points for Artesian Flow (**)

Confirm the Surface Casing setting depth is sufficient to
contain any artesian flow / planned mud weight.
1 If it is not possible to set surface casing ahead of WSV SDP
penetrating an artesian zone; confirm the conductor
setting depth is sufficient to avoid washout from any
potential diversion of shallow water flow.
Confirm water pit is full and ½ the waste pit with WSW. WSV
2 & SWWI
Ensure the water supply rate is available as per program.
Mud Eng.
Confirm spud mud stock is prepared with the required WSV
3 & SWWI
weight and volume as per program.
Mud Eng.
WSV
4 Confirm the required volume of kill brine is prepared. & SWWI
Mud Eng.
WSV
5 Confirm LCM recipes and materials are available. & SWWI
Mud Eng.
Confirm cellar pumps are installed to divert flow and
function tested. have a back-up cellar pump rigged up, WSV
6 & SWWI
positioned close by, tested and a safe means of lowering
the inlet hose. Mud Eng.
Confirm fast Set Cement recipes are available prior to

7 WSV SDP
spud.
Spaghetti pipe or PVC pipe and handling gear to be on site WSV

8 & SWWI
prior to spud.
TP
Cut 2 x 3” slots in the Landing ring to allow access of WSV
9 & SWWI
spaghetti pipe.
TP
WSV
Confirm rig gas detection and alarms (and 3rd party &
10 sensors if required) are installed, calibrated, and tested TP SWWI
prior to spud. &
Driller
Confirm H2S mitigation requirements if applicable and WSV
11 ensure readiness prior to spud, i.e. DWI-1,2,3 & SWWI
requirements as per SP-1190. TP
Inform LEBC of drilling activity and follow SIMOPS SIMOPS /
12 WSV / OSC
requirements and communications. MOPO
Confirm 2 x non-ported floats are pressure tested and WSV SWWI

13 &
included in the BHA (mitigate possible influx up the string).
Driller
WSV
Confirm artesian flow shut-in / diversion procedures are &
14 TP SWWI
available, understood and posted in the doghouse.
&
Driller
Perform drill to confirm functionality of equipment, the
WSV
15 diversion procedures are followed. (Drill to be performed SWWI
&
with all crews). The roles and responsibilities should
TP
clearly communicated.
Revision: 1
4.2 Mud weight selection

Mud weight is typically selected to provide overbalance to formation pressure and enable the
drilling fluid act as the primary barrier element. Mud weight may also be planned with higher mud
weight for wellbore stability; however, the minimum overbalance shall be adhered to as per SP-
1213.
4.2.1 Overbalance
Minimum Pore Pressure
Well/Section Depth (m) Minimum Overbalance (kPa)
Basis
0 – 1,500 m TVD.BDF P50 (Expected Case) 350 – 700 kPa
1,500 – 3,000 m TVD.BDF P50 (Expected Case) 1,000 kPa
> 3,000 m TVD.BDF P50 (Expected Case) 1,400 kPa
 Mud weight should be planned to overbalance maximum pore pressure (HIGH CASE /
P90) to minimise the risk of a drilled or swabbed kick (If no excessive risk from losses /
differential sticking / ROP impact).
 The planned mud weight shall be evaluated against available kick tolerance (as per SP-
1213).
Minimum Pore Pressure Minimum Overbalance (kPa)

Workover with Brine
Basis
To top Perforations P50 (Expected Case) 350 – 700 kPa
4.2.2 Minimum Data Requirements

New Wells / Side-track / Abandonments
Low Offset Fluid
Expected High Low Expected High
Case FST Content &
Case PP Case PP Case FP Case FP Case FP
PP data Gradient
 For all formations across the overburden and the reservoir/s
 Data to be assured by RE TA2
Intervention
Expected High Fluid Content
Max CITHP
Case PP Case PP & Gradient
 For reservoir/s which are perforated or planned to be perforated
 For overburden zones when communication may be suspected (integrity failure) or is
planned through the intervention operations.
 Data to be assured by RE TA2
Induced pressure from field injection poses a significant well control risk and has resulted in well
control events in PDO operations, whereby the MW selection was planned below the pore
pressure (PP) due incorrect pore pressure prediction (PPP). Injection pressure shall be
considered with the PPP (as per SP-1213).
At well handover for well intervention operations where the CITHP is noted to be > than the max
CITHP stated in the program and proposal, the operation shall follow the MOC process (as per
SP-2150), whereby the PPP and primary barrier fluid gradient is reassessed prior to proceeding
with operations.

Revision: 1
4.2.3 Mud weight window / Margin
4.2.4 Example description of overbalance for the drilling program (SDP)

Revision: 1
4.2.5 Example description of Mud Weight selection and Mud Weight Window for CDE
and DDE assurance review

Revision: 1
4.2.6 P&D Control Points

1 Gather approved PPP, FPP and FST data. P&D WPT
Calculate minimum Mud Weight per section to comply with
overbalance requirements as per SP-1213. WPT
2 Consider wellbore stability for minimum mud weight P&D DDE
Consider overbalance vs. risk of losses and differential SDP
sticking.
Define mud weight selection per section and illustrate
3 overbalance compliance. P&D SDP
Define completion brine weight and properties.
4.2.7 Operational Control Points

SDP
WSV &
Build / Order mud weight (and/or Brine) as per program
1 & TFM
requirements.
Mud Eng. &
SWWI
Maintain Mud weight and mud properties as per program. WSV
Ensure the MW is measured with a pressurised mud &
balance.
2 Mud Eng. SWWI
Calibrate the mud balance and additional measuring
devices if applicable (i.e. a Coriolis meter). &
Measure mud weight to ensure correct density. Derrickman

Revision: 1
4.3 Formation Strength Tests (FSTs)

Formation strength tests are carried out to investigate formation casing and cement at the shoe
integrity as a function of borehole pressure. Tests can be divided into three categories:
 Limit tests / Formation Integrity Tests (FIT) are sometimes called casing seat tests or shoe
strength tests (also known as shoe integrity tests). The main purpose of this type of test is to
confirm the strength of the cement bond around the casing shoe and to ensure that no
communication will occur outside the casing if borehole pressures at the shoe exceed the
hydrostatic head of the mud. These tests are terminated at some predetermined pressure
less than the formation intake pressure. These tests are also recommended for brittle
formations that fracture with limited deformation and can suffer from considerable permanent
reduction in formation intake gradient.
 Leak-off tests (LOT) to investigate the capability of the formation below the shoe to support
additional pressure in order to assess the severity of the kick which can be handled safely;
hence to allow proper selection of the next casing setting depth (this aspect is particularly
important when abnormal pressures are anticipated). In this test the pressure is increased to
the formation intake pressure.
 Extended Leak-Off Tests (XLOT) to establish fracture initiation, propagation, and closure
pressures of a formation in an attempt to gain regional knowledge of these parameters. These
are rarely, if ever, performed in conjunction with drilling operations (except during
abandonment) and are normally used for well stimulation studies and not associated with well
control.

Revision: 1
4.3.1 Formation Strength Test Objectives

1. Verify the integrity of the cement at the casing shoe.
2. Verify the integrity of the formation up to the maximum pressure expected during drilling the
next section (based on the required mud weight and kick tolerance).
3. Identify the limits of the formation / formation strength gradient (FSG).
4. To gather information on the minimum in-situ stress magnitude.
5. To establish other formation properties like permeability.
4.3.2 Formation Strength Test Requirements

FST FST
At shoe prior to drilling into a hydrocarbon bearing zone
Requirement Type
Cementation as per plan (i.e. correct slurry properties, correct
pumping schedule with spacers volume and properties, no losses,
bumping the plug as per plan, correct TOC, verification of surface
samples, hard cements at shoe track drill out)
NO N/A
AND
Shoe placement as per program in a formation with a known FSG
and offset FST data.
Shoe placement in the incorrect formation with unknown FSG and/or
potentially weaker FSG YES FIT
Cementation is not as per plan and cement quality / bond is

potentially poor at the shoe. YES FIT
Shoe placement as per program in a formation with an UNCERTAIN

FSG and limited or no offset FST data. (e.g. exploration and FIT /
YES
appraisal wells or a new formation casing seat selection) LOT

1 Gather approved FPP and offset FST data. P&D WPT
Identify if casing seat selection requires FST to confirm WPT

2 kick tolerance or for subsurface data acquisition. P&D DDE
Plan the required FSTs (i.e. FIT or LOT) SDP
3 Include FSTs in program requirements P&D SDP

Revision: 1
4.3.4 Operations FST Planning Control Points

The quality of the formation strength data measured during a FST will improve with careful
planning of the operation. It is recommended to carry out the following work prior to executing an
FIT or LOT.
Estimate the Surface LOT / FIT Pressure:
1 WSV SWWI
Predicted FPG x Depth (TVD)
Calculate Surface Limit Pressure:
2 Surface Pressure = (Predicted FSG – Mud Weight) x WSV SWWI
Depth (TVD)
Estimate the Volume of Mud to be Pumped and
Determine the Increment Volume:
V test = V hole × C well × P surf
Where:
V test = volume of mud required for P surf (m3)
3 WSV SWWI
V hole = total volume of mud in drill pipe, annulus and
pocket below the shoe (m3)
C well = combined compressibility of mud, and hole (1/psi;
1/kPa)
P surf = surface test pressure (kPa)
Typical Values for Mud Compressibility

Fluid Compressibility (1/kPa) Compressibility (1/psi)
-6
Water and WBM 0.45 × 10 0.31 × 10-5
Base oil 0.69 × 10-6 0.47 × 10-5
OBM 0.80 × 10-6 0.55 × 10-5
Confirm the casing burst rating (using the required design

4 factor for casing burst) is greater than the planned test WSV SWWI
pressure.
Prepare the FST spread sheet to plot the test results.
5 Draw the expected volume and pressure line and the WSV SWWI
surface limit pressure and casing burst pressure in the
same plot.

Revision: 1
4.3.5 Formation Strength Test Methods

The Step-Wise Method should be considered for use in situations with very soft, incompetent
formations where the leak-off point is already very difficult to determine and an actual leak-off
value is absolutely required (such as for a minimum requirement to drill ahead or rock mechanics
data purposes).
The Step-Wise Method should also be used in brittle formations with natural or induced fractures
such as carbonate, again where the actual point of leak-off can be misleading because the point
of leak-off can be at or near the point of injection into a fracture and the data is absolutely required.
Continuous Pumping Method may be considered for all limit or formation integrity tests that will
not exceed a maximum pressure determined prior to the test, the dynamic LOT should be used
when there is no risk of breaking down the formation (brittle or soft) if the pressure is kept below
the expected fracture pressure. This applies to most shoe tests.
Continuous pumping LOTs are faster but require much more diligence to avoid over
pressuring the formation and causing irreparable damage.
4.3.6 Formation Strength Test Procedural Control Points

WSV
Calibrate the mud balance to confirm the gauge
1 & SWWI
accuracy.
Mud Eng.
WSV
Drill shoe track + 3 m of new formation and circulate
2 hole clean. Cuttings load in the annulus will give & SWWI
spurious results.
Driller
Circulate the hole clean. Cuttings load in the annulus
3
will give spurious results.
Condition the mud to an even consistency at the
program mud weight.
If the mud is badly out of condition when the shoe is
drilled out, it should be conditioned before drilling the WSV
new hole.
4 & SWWI
All FSTs should be carried out with the lowest drilling
Driller
fluid density necessary to overbalance the expected
formation pressure at the shoe. Weighting-up drilling
fluid to combat anticipated higher-pressure gradients
further down the hole should be done after the FST.
5 Circulate choke and kill lines to the same mud as in the
Driller SWWI
hole.
6 Pull the bit back into the casing shoe. Driller SWWI
Confirm calibration and selection of a pressure gauge WSV
7 with a pressure range that corresponds to the expected & SWWI
pressures. Driller/Cementer

Revision: 1

Hold PJSM prior to performing Formation Strength Test. WSV
Discuss rig up, individual role, job procedures, hazards,
&
risks and controls.
8 TP SWWI
 Lifting and handling of tubular, pinch points and hand
& finger hazards. &
 High Pressure Testing Driller
Line up the cement unit and standpipe manifold to pump
through the drilling BHA and annulus via the kill line or the Driller
9 choke line. & SWWI
If pumping down the kill line, ensure Non-Return Valve Cementer
(NRV) in the kill line is locked open.
10 Fill up and ensure annulus, drill string and kill line is full. Driller SWWI
Flush the surface lines from the cement unit to the rig floor
and confirm correct line up.
WSV and driller to walk the line and confirm line up with WSV
reference to the P&ID. &
11 Establish circulation with the cement unit at minimum Driller SWWI
pump speed (20 - 40 LPM) and record the surface
pressure and pump rate. (Allow sufficient time for the pump &
and returns to stabilize). Cementer
Note down and record the hydrostatic head between the
rig floor and the cement unit from the cement unit gauge.
Make PA announcement. Ensure correct barriers are in TP
place around cement unit, cement standpipe manifold and
high-pressure surface lines. &
12 Pressure test the surface lines from cement unit to rig floor Driller SWWI
against the to __________ kPa for 10 minutes (Planned &
FST surface Pressure + 10%). Bleed off the pressure from
the lines. Cementer
WSV
Close in well on BOP annular or pipe ram. &
13 Driller and WSV to ensure that the cement unit is correctly Driller SWWI
lined up to pump down through the string and kill line or
the choke line. &
Cementer
Assistant driller to open the wellhead side outlet valves (on
the annulus between the last and previous casing strings) Driller
if possible, to prevent charging this annulus in case if a bad
14 & SWWI
cement bond and allow the pressurised casing to balloon
during the test. Monitor for pressure from the pressure AD
gauge.
Slowly pump down the drill string and annulus (20 to 40
LPM) until surface pressure approaches approximately WSV
15 100 psi (700 kPa). & SWWI
Compensate pressure readings for the elevation between Cementer
the cementing unit and the drill/unit floor.

Revision: 1
4.3.6.1 STEP-WISE Method

 Perform LOT or FIT in STEP-WISE method with the
cement unit.
 Pump uniform increments of volume (15 to 40 ltr), at

20 to 40 LPM then stop and wait two minutes for
pressure to stabilise. For each increment, note down:
o Cumulative volume pumped

o Pressure immediately after pumping ceases (final
pumping pressure)
o Static pressure after two minutes (final static
pressure)
 Plot the cumulative volume pumped against both the

dynamic and static pressures on a graph.
WSV
16 & SWWI
 WSV to supervise. WSDE to plot and record the
results. Cementer
 Record and plot the pressure vs volume.
 Min FST EMWG required to drill ahead is _________
kPa/m.
 Expected surface pressure is___________ (kPa).
 Expected __________ m³ of mud (including mud
compressibility) for formation test.
 Monitor for pressure from the annulus pressure gauge.
Inform driller and WSV immediately if pressure is
observed in the gauge.
 Compensate pressure reading recorded in step 7 for
the elevation between the cement unit and rig floor.
Pressure test value MUST NOT EXCEED the maximum

allowable grey cement test value of __________ psi. This
is to prevent damaging the casing cement sheath.
Stop pumping immediately upon observing deviation or
when the required EMWG is achieved, whichever occurs
first. WSV will advise.
WSV
 If the pump pressure suddenly drops, stop pumping
17 but keep the well shut in. A sudden pump pressure & SWWI
drop indicates a leak in the system, cement failure or
Cementer
formation breakdown. Record the pressures every
minute until they stabilise. If the drop in pressure is
related to formation breakdown, this data can be used
to derive the minimum in-situ stress.
Monitor and record the pressure decay to stability. Allow
WSV
sufficient time to confirm that a stable pressure has been
18 obtained. & SWWI
If the required EMWG is achieved, consider monitoring the Cementer
pressure for 30 minutes. WSV will advise.
Inform SWE and operations engineer if min EMWG is
19 WSV SWWI
not achieved.

Revision: 1

Bleed off the pressure, via the cement unit, from the
annulus to the previously Step 15 recorded pressure. Take WSV
returns back into cement displacement tank. Record
20 & SWWI
volume returned.
Cementer
Take care that the volume returned is not supplemented
by mud draining from the lines.
WSV
After confirmation of correct mud return, bleed off pressure
21 & SWWI
to zero.
Cementer
Open BOP annular or pipe ram.
22  Ensure pressure is Zero and there is no trapped Driller SWWI
pressure below closed BOP ram or annular.
Re-configure surface line up for drilling mode.
Reinstate wellhead, choke and kill valves to the normal
23 position before resuming drilling operations. Driller SWWI
 Meanwhile, flow check well on the trip tank for 15

minutes.
24 Take and record down SCRs. Driller SWWI
WSV to ensure that the Formation Strength Test report is
25 WSV SDP
created in the Open-Wells report.
4.3.6.2 CONTINUOUS Method

 Perform LOT or FIT in CONTINUOUS method with the
cement unit.
 Pump continuously, while recording pressures at

equal increments of volume – 20 to 40 LTR and
simultaneously plot the pressures and volumes.
 WSV to supervise. WSDE to plot and record the

results.
 Record and plot the pressure vs volume. WSV
 Min FST EMWG required to drill ahead is _________
16 & SWWI
kPa/m.
 Expected surface pressure is___________ (kPa). Cementer
 Expected __________ m³ of mud (including mud
compressibility) for formation test.
 Monitor for pressure from the annulus pressure gauge.
Inform driller and WSV immediately if pressure is
observed in the gauge.
 Compensate pressure reading recorded in step 7 for
the elevation between the cement unit and rig floor.
Pressure test value MUST NOT EXCEED the maximum
allowable grey cement test value of __________ psi. This
is to prevent damaging the casing cement sheath.

Revision: 1

Stop pumping immediately upon observing deviation or
when the required EMWG is achieved, whichever occurs
first. WSV will advise.
 If the pump pressure suddenly drops, stop pumping WSV
17 but keep the well shut in. A sudden pump pressure & SWWI
drop indicates a leak in the system, cement failure or
formation breakdown. Record the pressures every Cementer
minute until they stabilise. If the drop in pressure is
related to formation breakdown, this data can be used
to derive the minimum in-situ stress.
Monitor and record the pressure decay to stability. Allow
sufficient time to confirm that a stable pressure has been WSV
18 obtained. & SWWI
If the required EMWG is achieved, consider monitoring the Cementer
pressure for 30 minutes. WSV will advise.
Inform SWE and operations engineer if min EMWG is
19 WSV SWWI
not achieved.
Bleed off the pressure, via the cement unit, from the
annulus to the previously Step 15 recorded pressure. Take WSV
returns back into cement displacement tank. Record
20 volume returned. & SWWI
Take care that the volume returned is not supplemented Cementer

by mud draining from the lines.
WSV
After confirmation of correct mud return, bleed off pressure
21 & SWWI
to zero.
Cementer
Open BOP annular or pipe ram.
22  Ensure pressure is Zero and there is no trapped Driller SWWI
pressure below closed BOP ram or annular.
Re-configure surface line up for drilling mode.
Reinstate wellhead, choke and kill valves to the normal
23 position before resuming drilling operations. Driller SWWI
 Meanwhile, flow check well on the trip tank for 15
minutes.
24 Take and record down SCRs. Driller SWWI
WSV to ensure that the Formation Strength Test report is
25 WSV SDP
created in the Open-Wells report.

Revision: 1
4.3.7 Interpreting FST Graphs

Results should be plotted and interpreted on the large-scale volume instead of pressure plot
during the test. Leak-off is a downhole event, indicated in the leak-off graph by the first deviation
from the trend of either the initial or the final static pressure. In many cases, leak-off can only
be positively identified if two points on the curve deviate from the trend. The surface leak-
off pressure is the interpolated value of the initial static pressure at the first indication of leak-off.
In a successful limit test, no leak-off is observed when the initial static pressure reaches the
surface limit pressure (pressure limit surface). This confirms that the borehole is strong enough
to hold this additional pressure without formation breakdown.
4.3.7.1 FST Graph Indicating Adequate Formation Strength

Revision: 1
4.3.7.2 FST Graph Indicating Leak Off (For a hard, impermeable formation such as shale)
The pressure increases linearly with volume and leak-off is easy to identify:
4.3.7.3 FST Graph Indicating Leak Off (For a permeable formation with an ineffective mud
cake)
The mud leaks away slowly, the graph is slightly curved and the final static pressure curves away
from the initial static pressure. Leak-off can be identified either by the change in curvature or the
increasing difference between initial and final static pressures

Revision: 1
4.3.7.4 FST Graph Indicating Leak Off (For Unconsolidated Formation)

In non-consolidated, plastic, lose or highly permeable formations where even low-test pressures
cause loss of mud, exactly determining the leak-off point is difficult. The initial static pressure will
always be considerably higher than the final static pressure and the graph will be curved
considerably. Leak-off can be established only approximately from the leak-off graph.
4.3.7.5 FST Graph Indicating Formation Breakdown

Formation breakdown during a limit or LOT should be prevented because a fracture may
permanently impair the wellbore's ability to withstand pressure. However, any breakdown that
occurs should be treated as an opportunity to derive real formation strength parameters.
Formation breakdown is indicated by a sharp pressure drop on surface
The highest pressure recorded immediately before the pressure drop is the surface formation
breakdown pressure.
If formation breakdown occurs, pumping should be stopped, but the well should be kept shut-in
and the pressure decay curve should be recorded. Fracture closure is indicated by stabilisation
of the pressure decay curve to a constant pressure value. The fracture closure pressure can be
determined from the surface fracture closure pressure. If formation breakdown occurred during
the test, losses in well operation can be avoided by keeping the pressure at the shoe lower than
the fracture closure pressure.

Revision: 1
4.4 Kick Tolerance Calculation

The kick tolerance calculation is dependant several elements, but primarily on the hydrocarbon
bearing zone and whether the openhole section can support additional pressure imposed from
the kick and during the circulation to remove the influx from the wellbore. Typically, the weakest
point in the openhole is assumed to be at the shallowest openhole point in the well (i.e. the
previous casing shoe), however this may not be the case in all scenarios and a calculation may
be required for a weak/loss zone and/or recalculated after penetration of an unplanned loss zone.
Kick tolerance is required for each section whereby the BOP is installed and there are potential
or known hydrocarbons in the section. Overburden hydrocarbon bearing zones are as critical as
the reservoir section and may play a critical role in casing seat selection and well design.
Kick tolerance calculation and compliance is mandated as part of SP-1213. Kick tolerance
calculation may be performed with the use of Wellplan or WellCat software packages, but hand
calculations are not permitted in PDO. WellPlan is the preferred method of calculation as
circulation pressure is considered in the kick tolerance output.
Two Conditions shall be considered for kick tolerance calculations (as per SP-1213):
 A Swab Kick
 A Drill Kick

Revision: 1
Minimum kick tolerance volumes without the need for further mitigations, are stipulated in SP-
1213 as:
Hole Size Swab Kick Tolerance Drill Kick Tolerance
> 16” 3.5 m3 8.0 m3
8 3/8” – 12 ¼” 5.0 m3 4.0 m3
< 6 ¼” 3.5 m3 3.5 m3
Minimum kick tolerances should be reviewed by operations teams, given historical performance
of shut-in capability. If additional time is required to close in the well, for a given work unit then
the minimum kick tolerances should be increased appropriately.
4.4.1 Swab Kick Tolerance

Swabbing is a reduction in wellbore pressure caused by a piston-like effect of moving the drill
string upwards. There are two main types of swabbing which vary in degree, indications, and
potential hazard. They are identified as "Low Volume" and "High Volume" swabbing.
4.4.1.1 "Low Volume" swabbing

When the drill string is pulled out, to some extent there will always be a reduction in wellbore
pressure due to the internal friction between the mud, the pipe, and the borehole wall. The mud
“clings” to the pipe being raised, creating an effect that is the opposite of ECD while circulating.
A system that has high ECD will have high swab pressure. This reduction must never be allowed
to exceed the original overbalance over the formation pore pressure, otherwise formation fluid will
enter the well bore from a permeable formation. Pressure reduction takes place along the entire
length of the drill string so it is possible to swab-in a formation above the bit.
4.4.1.2 "High Volume" swabbing

Swabbing can also be caused by pulling full gauge or balled-up tools that restrict the passage of
fluid in the annulus. This creates a piston effect and the volume below the tool would be filled by
the fluid inside the drill string, causing a large drop of the fluid level in the drill string and
consequent dangerous reduction in hydrostatic head. In these situations, it may be advisable to
pump out of the hole, especially if the rig is fitted with a top drive. "High Volume" swabbing is
therefore especially dangerous in large diameter holes.

Revision: 1
4.4.2 Swab Kick Tolerance Calculation Requirement

Regardless of “High Volume” or “Low Volume” swabbing, the pressure induced in the well will be
the same during removal of an influx. For both cases with the bit back on bottom, BHP will be
maintained in relation to the original mud weight by keeping drillpipe pressure constant during
circulation as per the drillers method and thus the following inputs are required:
 Pore Pressure = Mud Weight (at the point of tripping out of hole)
 Fracture Pressure = Weakest Zone (at previous shoe and/or weak formation)
 Influx Point = at deepest prognosed hydrocarbon bearing zone
 Influx Gradient = Gas Gradient if hydrocarbon content is unknown (or oil/water if known)
 Bit Position = on bottom at deepest prognosed hydrocarbon bearing zone
 Drillstring Geometry = as per planned drillstring design
 Borehole Geometry and Trajectory = as per plan
 Mud Properties = as per plan (density and rheology)
 Drillers method of circulation
4.4.2.1 Swab Kick Pressure vs. Depth Description (Shell DLP Extract)

Revision: 1
4.4.2.2 Swab Kick Tolerance with High Mud Weight

In some planned sections, the mud weight is defined by wellbore stability requirements, rather
than purely for overbalance (for example: Shargi, Nahr Umr and Gharif formations). These
formations may be combined in a section with hydrocarbon bearing zones. The likelihood of
swabbing is reduced with the high overbalance utilised for wellbore stability, however the adverse
effect of high mud weight is that a resultant kick BHP will be related to the mud hydrostatic head.
Regardless of the swab kick phenomenon (low or high volume), the influx will be circulated out
with the bit on bottom at BHP related to the mud hydrostatic head in the drillstring.
The resultant swab kick tolerance when using high mud weight, may be lower than required in
SP-1213. To manage the swab kick scenario and mitigate a potentially low kick tolerance:
1. Consider pumping out of hole.
2. Model swabbing tendency and control pulling speed with the model outputs.
3. Model Torque and Drag and corelate the drag sheet for signs of overpull and possible
swabbing.
4. Confirm no swabbing with a short roundtrip followed by circulating bottoms up before pulling
out of the hole.
5. Calculate the available stands prior to a “high volume” swabbing condition allowing influx.
a. Ensure 2 stands can be pulled without underbalance caused by string level drop
b. Monitor and maintain the string fluid level at each connection
c. Observe for overpull
d. Observe trip tank for level discrepancy.
Example calculation of potential string level drop and resultant drop in BHP with MW=12 kPa/m:
Open Hole Drill pipe Calculated DP level drop Calc. drop in
Hole Size
Capacity (m3/m) Capacity (m3/m) for pulling 2 x stands (m) BHP (kPa)
17.5” Hole 0.15514 0.00926 850 10205
16” Hole 0.1269 0.00926 702 8425
12.25” Hole 0.07602 0.00926 390 4670
8 3/8” Hole 0.01749 0.00811 183 2193
5 7/8” Hole 0.00565 0.00565 113 1357
Reduced kick tolerance acceptance including mitigations listed in this section, shall be controlled
with an approved eMOC deviation to SP-1213 minimum kick tolerance requirements.

Revision: 1
4.4.3 Drill Kick Tolerance

Drill kick tolerance is required to confirm safe drilling through hydrocarbon zones with tolerance
for uncertainty on the pore pressure prediction. Mud weight selection may be based on several
factors and the drill kick tolerance will be dependent on this.
4.4.3.1 Kick Intensity

For a simplistic case, the drill kick tolerance will be based on a kick intensity of 0.59 kPa/m above
the high case pore pressure prediction, however this may need to be translated into planned
scenarios for a realistic kick tolerance output:
Example Example
Kick Intensity
Scenario High Case PP MW
(kPa/m)
(kPa/m) (kPa/m)
Mud weight is selected for wellbore
Drill Kick Scenario
stability, rather than PP. 11.5 13.0
Not Possible
MW > “high case” + 0.59 kPa/m
Mud weight is selected on High Case plus KI = 0.29
12.5 12.8
Overbalance (12.5 + 0.59) – 12.8
Mud weight is selected to balance the
14.0 14.0 KI = 0.59
High Case
Mud weight is selected on Expected Case KI = 0.89
12.5 12.2
plus overbalance (12.5 + 0.59) – 12.2
Mud weight is selected based on the High
KI = 2.5
Case, but an extreme high case P99 18.0 18.5
(21-18.5)
pressure is possible at 21 kPa/m

Revision: 1
4.4.3.2 Drill Kick Tolerance Calculation Requirement

The following inputs are required:
 Pore Pressure = High Case Pore pressure prediction + Kick Intensity (as described above)
 Fracture Pressure = Weakest Zone (at previous shoe and/or weak formation)
 Influx Point = at deepest prognosed hydrocarbon bearing zone
 Influx Gradient = Gas Gradient if hydrocarbon content is unknown (or oil/water if known)
 Bit Position = on bottom at deepest prognosed hydrocarbon bearing zone
 Drillstring Geometry = as per planned drillstring design
 Borehole Geometry and Trajectory = as per plan
 Mud Properties = as per plan (density and rheology)
 Drillers method of circulation
4.4.3.3 Drill Kick Pressure vs. Depth Description (Shell DLP Extract)

Revision: 1
4.4.4 Kick Tolerance Output Requirements

Once the kick tolerance calculations are performed, the outputs should be reflected in the CDE /
DDE and program to confirm the following design compliance:
1. Casing seat selections

2. Maximum safe drilling depths
3. MAASPs (in relation to the shoe and a weak zone/s if present)
4. FST (FIT / LOT) requirements
5. Available Kick Volume Tolerances
6. Mud weight selections
7. Additional mitigation requirements (e.g. EKDS)
Any output of kick tolerance calculations which deviate from the generic drilling program (GDP),
need to be listed in the specific drilling program (SDP). Minimum kick tolerance volumes and
MAASPs should be described for each relevant section on the SDP front sheet.
4.4.5 Layout for Description of Kick Tolerance in Endorsements Packs and Programs
Type of Kick Data:
Example:
Drill Kick from Khuff (deepest hydrocarbon zone) with low MW and weak zone
Max PP + Zero KI = 11.21 + 0.59 = 11.8 kPa/m. MW = 11.0 kPa/m
FPG Predicted MAASP
Shoe / Weak Zone Formation MW (kPa/m)
(kPa/m) (kPa)
Casing Size
(Depth m TVRT)
Kick Tolerance
PPG
Hydrocarbon Zone Formation KI (kPa/m) Calculated
(kPa/m)
Volume (m3)
(Depth m TVRT)
SP-1213 Minimum KT Volume requirement = ____ m3 for a ____ kick in ____ hole size
WellPlan / WellCat output

Revision: 1

1 Gather approved PPP and FPP data P&D WPT
New Design: Utilise Kick Tolerance Calculations to define
2 P&D CDE
casing seat selection.
Existing Design: Utilise Kick Tolerance Calculations to
3 P&D DDE
confirm casing seat selection.
Minimum kick tolerance volumes and MAASPs to be listed
in the SDP front sheet.
Kick Tolerance calculation inputs for TA review to be
4 included in the CDE/DDE and GDP/SDP. P&D SDP
If specific well kick tolerances are in line with GDP inputs,
the outputs can be listed on the SDP front sheet without
recalculation.
Include requirements for Formation Strength Tests (FSTs),
5 if required to confirm sufficient kick tolerance, in the P&D SDP
program.

Confirm kick tolerance calculations are included in the
1 WE OPS SDP
SDP and comply with SP-1213 minimum volumes.
Confirm minimum kick tolerance volume match with work
2 WE OPS SDP
unit close in capability.
WSV
Communicate and understand minimum kick tolerances & SDP
3 TP &
volumes and MAASPs.
& SWWI
Driller
WSV SDP
4 Utilise MAASPs and maintain and an up to date kill sheet. & &
TP SWWI
WSV
& SDP
5 Perform FSTs as per program requirements. TP &
& SWWI
Driller
In the case of unplanned change, i.e.:
 Losses Event
 Kick Event
 Failed FSTs,
 Mud Weight change WSV
 BHA change &
6 MOC
 Trajectory change TP
“Variation”
 Casing Seat Depth change &
Driller
 Casing Seat Formation change
or further adjustment to the plan; pause the operations and
communicate the change to confirm kick tolerance via the
MOC process.
Revision: 1
4.5 Drilling ahead with losses

In PDO, particularly within Deep Gas Exploration & Development Fields in the North of Oman
there are well designs which combine weak zones with hydrocarbon bearing zone to a planned
section TD. Coverage of the weak zone (for example: Habshan, Jubaila, Khuff Formations) with
an additional casing or liner will impact well complexity and cost. The risk of a kick and loss or
loss and kick scenario should be addressed in the planning stage of these wells and approved
with the CDE and DDE, as well as with an approved deviation to SP-1213.
4.5.1 Example Illustration:
This section will help to outline the controls to review and present for TA approval with CDE/DDE
endorsement. The controls should outline the decision points for when to drill ahead or when to
section TD early and if/how a contingency liner and hole section will be included in the plan.
Section TD early and slimming down the well is considered when:
1. Losses cannot be completely cured
2. The fracture strength of the cured zone is insufficient to sustain the minimum kick tolerance.
3. The well is planned to penetrate a known or potential hydrocarbon bearing zone prior to
section TD.
Revision: 1
4.5.2 Natural Losses Environments

Revision: 1
4.5.3 Drilling window / Kick tolerance workflow example

Identify karstic and/or thief zones in the Proposal. Gather
1 PPG and FPG data for the section and the prognosed mud P&D WPT
weight window with the loss zone exposed.
Gather fluid content prognosis data to identify oil and gas
2 P&D WPT
bearing or potentially bearing formations.
Calculate kick tolerances with respect to the shoe and the DDE
3 P&D &
hydrocarbon bearing zones.
SDP
Calculate the kick tolerances with respect to the weak
zone/s and the hydrocarbon bearing zones. DDE
4 P&D &
A minimum formation strength should be calculated, to be
SDP
used as a cut of for when to continue drilling ahead.
4.5.4 Example Kick Tolerance Calculation for a weak zone

Example Type of Kick Data:
Drill Kick from Gharif (deepest hydrocarbon zone) with low MW and weak zone
Max PP + Zero KI = 11.8 + 0.59 = 12.09 kPa/m. MW = 11.8 kPa/m
Predicted
Shoe / Weak Zone Formation FPG (kPa/m) MW (kPa/m)
MAASP (kPa)
Weak Zone
Habshan 12.9 11.8 1481
(Depth = 1880 m TVRT)
Kick Tolerance
PPG
Hydrocarbon Zone Formation KI (kPa/m) Calculated
(kPa/m)
Volume (m3)
(Depth = 3150 m TVRT) Gharif 11.5 0.59 4.2
SP-1213 Minimum KT Volume requirement = 4.0 m3 for a Drill kick in 12 ¼” hole size
WellPlan / WellCat output

Revision: 1
4.5.5 Managing risk to drill ahead with losses
By drilling ahead with losses, the effective kick tolerance is zero and a kick could result in
complex well control recovery operations and/or loss of containment in subsurface or at surface.
To allow this practice to drill ahead, the CDE/DDE and Program should illustrate the risk and
recovery mitigations to satisfy TA1 approval from P&D and Operations and the Well Control
Manager.
Minimum kick tolerances stipulated in SP-1213 shall be adhered to. Non-compliance to minimum
kick tolerance can be managed through a NFF to cover multiple wells for a specific field and
scenario, or on a well-by-well basis with a specific MOC deviation.
Considerations for a NFF and/or MOC include:

1. The risk of a kick loss scenario vs. the impact of slimming down a well (The business risk).
2. The well is static without circulation, with a minimum mud weight to overbalance the high case
PPP.
3. An ECD test performed after curing losses to simulate the required FPG for minimum KT and
the loss rate is < 8 m3/hr.
a. The 8 m3/hr loss rate figure is selected as this relates to the rigs mixing capacity (in
most cases) to ensure the hole is kept full and the drilling fluid level is maintained as
a primary barrier, to avoid an influx. If the rig mixing capacity is less, then the
accepted loss rate should be reduced.
4. The risk of cross flow does not present a WRFM risk, subsurface contamination risk or
potential for breach to surface.
5. The impact of a loss and kick or kick and loss scenario is reduced by making ready recovery
mitigations. Mitigations should include (LCM recipes and BHA selection, cementation via the
BHA recipes and plans, Gunk pills and barite plugs).
6. The unmitigated and residual risk should be described with the RAM as per the example
below:

Revision: 1
4.5.6 Losses above an Influx zone – Kick & Loss Recovery Method
The scenario described in this section is of losses above a pressurised zone. The approach to
recovering well control can utilise a dual kill gradient approach with use of a heavy slug below the
loss zone:
1. Pump water or low-density mud down the annulus
 Mud Weight to be < fracture pressure

 This keeps gas out of the casing / prevents full evacuation to gas and reduces surface
pressures
2. Keep the drillstring full if possible, to:
 Increase the BHP and reduces the influx rate

 Prevents bit nozzles plugging
 Prevents ingress of gas into drillstring (In case of float failure)
3. Attempt to cure losses by pumping LCM
 Consider pumping gunk down annulus & water down string
4. If unable to cure the losses, prepare heavy mud to displace the string and openhole between
the bottom of the hole and the loss zone.
 Calculate the heavy mud density to provide sufficient hydrostatic between the loss
zone and influx zone, to kill the well.
 Pump heavy mud down the string, meanwhile keep filling the annulus with light
mud/water to avoid gas ingress above the loss zone
 This should kill the well
5. With the well static the losses should be cured and then isolated prior to drilling ahead.

Revision: 1
4.5.7 Losses below an Influx zone – Loss & Kick Recovery Method
The scenario described in this section is of losses below a pressurised zone. The approach to
recovering well control in the well to gain a base on the well (cure losses), in order allow the mud
to be weighed up and the primary fluid barrier hydrostatic head to be re-established.
1. On observing losses:
 Keep the annulus full if possible
 Pump mud to maintain a fluid level first, then use water if required
 Keeping the hole full will reduce the drawdown on influx interval
2. Attempt to cure losses down the drillstring with LCM

 Pump LCM via the circulating sub if installed
 Avoid plugging the bit nozzles
3. If LCM is unsuccessful consider:

 A gunk pill
 A fast setting cement plug
 Cement & LCM plug in combination
4. After curing losses:

 Remove any remaining influx out of the well and establish static conditions
 Set a cement plug across / above the loss zone
 Set a contingency casing or liner to isolate the hydrocarbon zone

Revision: 1
4.5.8 Tertiary Well Control Methods

In most loss and kick events, the priority should be gain a base on the well (cure losses) without
allowing any release to atmosphere, in order allow the mud to be weighed up and the primary
fluid barrier hydrostatic head to be re-established.
Consider the five options to reduce the loss rate and allow or drop the mud weight. This will
provide stability to drill ahead or trip. The following are put in the order they should be utilised:
1. Conventional LCM < 10 m3/hr) loss rate.
2. Course LCM ~ 20 m3/hr loss rate.
3. Gunk squeeze ~ 15-30 m3/hr loss rate.
4. Cement >30 m3/hr loss rate
5. Barite Plug. >30 m3/hr loss rate
Wellbore strengthening options should be applied at the loss zone, typically with the Bit / BHA at
the proximity to the loss zone. In the case of the bit on bottom and the loss zone positioned higher
up in the well, the placement of cement and gunk will be challenging.
4.5.8.1 Gunk Pills

The gunk is a mixture of Bentonite mixed in Base Oil (use fina green in WBM environments). It is
pumped down hole to the loss zone, then simultaneously mixed with water (which then hydrates
the Bentonite into a strong gel) and squeezed into the fractures. Cement can be included to
provide a higher compressive strength, known as a BOB2C pill.
It is not advisable to pump Gunk through a directional BHA as the chances of plugging the BHA
are high. A Multi functioning circulating tool can be used however the gunk will be placed
around the drill string creating a high potential of stuck pipe. If the risk of gains / losses is high
then using a simple ‘dumb iron’ BHA will allow swift, multiple remedial pills to be pumped.
The planning and execution of a gunk squeeze must be rigorous from the lab and site as there
are many serious risks with this operation. The following steps should be used as a guide:
Have quantities of Magna set and gunk squeeze additives at rig site prior to drilling the kick zone
(at least enough for one pill).
A series of pilot tests should be conducted using rig samples of chemical, varying the ratio of
additives to determine the optimum gunk recipe.
Prior to mixing the gunk pill ensure the cement unit, batch tank, transfer / mix lines and cement
standpipe / hose have been thoroughly flushed with base oil to ensure there is no risk of
contamination with water.
Ensure all water lines are isolated and locked off.
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE ALLOW WATER TO COME INTO CONTACT WITH THE GUNK
PILL IN THE SURFACE LINES.
No concurrent operations should be undertaken during the mixing of gunk chemicals. If a crew
change is expected the operation will be suspended until a full and detailed handover has been
conducted.

Revision: 1
4.5.8.2 Cement Plugs

The last option, in the event the gunk squeeze does not work then the next option to consider
should be to plug, abandon and sidetrack. If this is being contemplated, then the well will be
extremely unstable. To set a plug in this environment is not easy and requires unconventional
techniques. In the dynamic situation it is imperative that the plug is allowed to set undisturbed.
Even with a cement stinger being pulled out of the hole can cause swabbing and not allow the
plug to set. To eliminate this risk a fibre glass stinger can be used. A balanced cement plug can
be set and the stinger left in hole to allow the cement to set undisturbed. The slurry should have
an extremely fast set to minimise contamination. The cement plug length should be limited to
avoid excessive additional hydostatic, or restric access in the case an additional plug/s is required.
4.5.8.3 Barite Plugs

A barite plug is a slurry of barite mixed in a low viscosity carrier liquid This may be either water
(fresh, sea or brine) or diesel oil whichever is compatible with the mud system. The slurry is
displaced through the drill string to form a balanced plug on bottom. Ideally, if conditions allow,
the string is then pulled up above it. The barite settles out rapidly and should form an impermeable
mass, capable of isolating the problem zone.
Barite plugs are most commonly used when a well reaches a point where there is no longer any
margin between mud hydrostatic gradient on bottom and formation breakdown at a weaker zone
higher in the hole. This situation can arise from either:
 Weighting up to counteract increasing pore pressure.

 Weighting up to kill a kick.
 Mud loss from fracturing.
In each case the well may be quite safe with the bit on bottom. The well not flowing and not shut
in. Typically, there are no static mud losses but there are dynamic losses. The entire mud system
cannot be weighted up enough to provide a safe trip margin because of the losses. If attempts to
seal the loss zone have failed and there is insufficient vertical height between the pressure zone
and the loss zone to counteract the pressure with a conventional heavy slug, a barite plug can be
set. This can seal off the bottom hole productive zone with a relatively short plug to enable the
drilling assembly to be pulled and casing to be run and cemented to isolate the loss zone. It may
even be possible to wash down the casing through the plug.
The effectiveness of a barite plug derives from the high density and fine particle size of the
material, and its ability to form a tough impermeable barrier. It can be pumped through the bit and
offers a reasonable chance of recovering the drill string. In addition, the material to mix it is
normally available on site and the plug can be drilled/washed easily after casing is set.
To be effective the slurry must:

 Be made with good quality barite with a low clay content.
 Have a high density. The density must be at least 3.5 kPa/m greater than the mud density.
 Have a rapid settling rate.
 Have a high water loss.
The main disadvantage is the risk of settlement and consequent plugging of the string if pumping
has to be stopped before the slurry has been completely displaced. The string must be pulled
above the plug immediately on cessation of displacement. Barite plugs are not suitable in
situations where there is any flow that could keep the barite in suspension.

Revision: 1
4.5.8.3.1 Example Operational Steps
1. Place the bit about 2 m above the loss zone.

2. Line up the kill line to pump mud down the annulus with the rig pumps. Line up the standpipe
manifold to allow 1 pump to displace down the annulus through the kill line and 1 pump
conventionally down the drillstring.
3. Pump the following down the drillstring:
4. Hi Vis spacer- Base oil spacer- Gunk Pill- Base oil spacer.
5. Note: Pump all gunk related fluids from the cement unit.
6. With pills in the drillstring, displace with Hi-Vis mud behind, continue to displace the pills with
mud using the rig pumps.
7. With the lead Fina Green spacer at the bit slow displacement to ensure no losses.
8. Shut the annular and continue to displace lead base oil spacer into the open hole.
9. Close choke and simultaneously pump down the drillstring and annulus at the mixing ratio
defined in the pilot test.
10. Continue to displace gunk pill into the open hole / annulus. Over displace Fina Green tail
spacer by 1 m3 to ensure all gunk is in the open hole.
11. If an increase in pressure is seen with the gunk pill in the drillstring continue to displace until
clear of string,
DO NOT increase the pump rate as shear will accelerate the setting process. If pre-setting is
suspected continue to pump at the same rate, allowing the pressure to increase to maximum to
ensure clear of drillstring.
1. Hold the squeeze pressure for 30 minutes (squeeze pressure based on Kick pressure and
formation break down pressure).
2. The pill should set up as soon as mixing starts due to the bentonite hydrating.
3. Bleed off trapped pressure if present in 50psi (3.5 bar) increments to 0 psi, if well is static,
open up and flow check for 30 minutes.
If the well is static break circulation with the ECD guidelines. If unacceptable losses are
encountered at minimal flow rates then pump a further pill.

Revision: 1
4.5.9 Prevention and Mitigation Barriers List
4.5.9.1 Kick & Loss Preventative Barriers (Lefthand side of the Bowtie)
Threat Barrier Responsible Document Bowtie
Weak Casing Seat Selection: CDE/DDE
Zone
and Plan the previous casing shoe to cover P&D & LH
movable Hydrocarbons zones and unstable clays above
the loss zone. SDP
HCs
Weak Contingency Casing/Well Design:

CDE/DDE
Zone If loss zone cannot be cured and strengthened,
and consider a contingency liner or expandable to P&D & LH
movable cover the weak zone prior to drilling into SDP
HCs hydrocarbon bearing zones.
Weak Drilling Window:

CDE/DDE
Zone PPP & FPP is assured and the drilling window is
and sufficient to combine the weak zone and P&D & LH
movable hydrocarbon zone with the kick tolerance SDP
HCs requirements as per SP-1213.
Weak
Hydraulics and ECDs: CDE/DDE
Zone
and ECD simulations to be performed and confirmed P&D & LH
movable to be within the drilling window. SDP
HCs
Weak Wellbore Strengthening:

P&D CDE/DDE
Zone Materials and techniques to strengthen the
and weak zone are planned and assured in & & LH
movable accordance with UIK (i.e. particle size and UIK SDP
HCs distribution of LCM and/or cement recipe)
Weak
BHA & Drill string Selection: CDE/DDE
Zone
and BHA geometry optimised to minimise annular P&D & LH
movable pressure loss and ECD. SDP
HCs

Revision: 1
4.5.9.2 Internal/External Blowout Mitigation Barriers (Righthand side of the Bowtie)

Consequence Barrier Responsible Document Bowtie
Casing and Wellhead Design:
The Casing, Wellhead and BOP are
Cratering P&D CDE/DDE
capable of containing full evacuation to gas
Fluidisation
in relation to pressure and material & & RH
or breach at
compatibility.
surface UEC1A SDP
Note: Khuff is prognosed with 80,000 ppm
H2S in some areas
Formation strength:
Cratering P&D CDE
Fluidisation Formation strength, calculated MAASP and
local faults and mapped to ensure crossflow & & RH
or breach at
surface will not result in formation breakdown or an Geomech.. WPT
eventual leak path to surface.
Cement strength:
Cratering PP CDE
Fluidisation Cement strength / quality is confirmed to
ensure crossflow will not result in cement & & RH
or breach at
surface breakdown at the shoe and an eventual UIK WPT
leak path to surface.
Sustained Crossflow / Underground Blowout: P&D CDE/DDE

Internal The risk of cross flow does not present a & & RH
Blowout / WRFM risk and/or subsurface
Crossflow Asset NFF/MOC
contamination risk.
Sustained Water: P&D SDP
Internal
Water supply and pit capacity is sufficient to & & RH
Blowout /
maintain hole fill and mud mixing.
Crossflow WSV TFM
Chemicals:
Sustained UIK SDP
Internal Chemicals for mixing and mud and LCM
treatment are available and present at the & & RH
Blowout /
Crossflow wellsite or within close proximity for prompt WSV TFM
call off.
Dual Mud Gradient Kill:
Sustained The theoretical dual mud gradient scenario P&D DDE

Internal and the heavy mud gradient requirement
should be planned to ensure the required & & RH
Blowout /
Crossflow weight is achievable, weighting material is UIK TFM
available and a recipe is prepared in
advance.
Heavy Slug:
Sustained P&D DDE
Heavy slug recipe should be prepared in
Internal
conjunction with UIK, considering rig mixing & & RH
Blowout /
and circulating capacity.
Crossflow UIK TFM
Materials to be confirmed as available.

Revision: 1
Consequence Barrier Responsible Document Bowtie

BHA & Drill string Selection:
 Utilise a dumb iron BHA where possible
 Remove bit nozzles to allow large TFA
for LCM and/or cement.
 Include 2 x floats (flapper type) in the
string.
Sustained  Include PBL sub in the string (below CDE/DDE
Internal floats – ensure PBL activation balls can P&D & RH
Blowout / pass).
Crossflow  Consider ID restrictions and optimise to SDP
allow slickline cutter access as deep as
possible.
Material compatibility for complex well
control recovery. SS drillpipe ultilised in the
case where sour application is required in
line with SP-2193.
Slickline Cutter:
Cutter options to be available (i.e. string
Sustained shot/cutter and colliding tool) with access P&D DDE
Internal as deep as possible. & & RH
Blowout /
Crossflow The surface PCE configuration to be WSV SDP
agreed, practical and available (i.e. PCE
stack up, height and crossover to the
string).
LCM Recipes: P&D
Sustained A variety of LCM recipes and decision tree & DDE
Internal should be prepared in conjunction with UIK,
UIK & RH
Blowout / considering BHA restrictions with recipe
Crossflow and deployment. & TFM
Materials to be confirmed as available. WSV
P&D
Gunk Pills:
Sustained & DDE
The gunk pill recipes should be prepared in
Internal
conjunction with UIK, considering BHA UIK & RH
Blowout /
restrictions with recipe and deployment.
Crossflow & TFM
WSV
P&D
Barite Plugs:
Sustained & DDE
Barite Plugs recipes should be prepared in
Internal
Blowout /
restrictions with recipe and deployment.
Crossflow & TFM
WSV
P&D
Cement Plug:
Sustained & DDE
Internal Cement recipes should be prepared in
Blowout /
Crossflow restrictions with recipe and deployment. & SDP
Materials to be confirmed as available. WSV

Revision: 1
4.5.10 Bow-Tie (Link)

Revision: 1
4.6 Drill string considerations for well control

Shall statements in this section reflective of SP-1213 and SP-2193 requirements.
Component Considerations Responsible Document
The FOSV is used to shut-off flow up the string
while tripping. Three Tested Full Opening Safety
Valves (FOSV) for each size of drill pipe in use to be
available.
1. One to be used below the kelly or top drive
during drilling operations.
2. One to be on the drilling floor complete with
removable handles for easy stabbing and
connection.
3. One as a spare.
The hexagonal wrench / Allen key used to
operate the FOSV shall always be available on
the rig floor. The FOSV shall be functioned daily.
Crossovers shall be available for all pipe and
thread combinations being run.
If this is not possible or practical, alternate methods
to control the well should be available, understood
and practised (e.g. shearing the pipe or dropping the
string).
A method of shearing and dropping the string should
be possible in all cases as a redundancy method, if
the safety valve cannot be stabbed owing to location
WSV SWWI
of connection (above the drill floor) or excessive
& &
FOSV flow. See section String Flow, Securing and Incident
TP Work unit
Classification definition of flow and guidance.
& SOP
The valve shall always be in the full-open Driller
position until installed and made up.
The valve is closed after being made up and before
the BOP is closed. The FOSV is opened after
installing the drill pipe NRV (Gray valve) before
stripping.
Do NOT attempt stab in with a closed ended
lifting cap on top of the FOSV.
Stabbing of the valve and cross-over assembly must
be facilitated by either limiting the size and weight,
such that it can be easily man-handled or with the
use of an un-powered mechanical means such as a
counterweight device.
FOSVs for use in a drilling stand (FOSVs place in-
between singles) is considered as a potential leak
path in the case of shut-in with an influx. The shut-in
procedure shall consider the position of the FOSVs
above the closed BOP for secondary well control
operations.
FOSVs shall be pressure tested as per SP-1213
requirements to MASP or RWP and serviced /
functioned as per OEM requirements.

Revision: 1

A 'Gray-type' inside BOP NRV with the appropriate
connections for the drill string in use, to be on the
drill floor at all time and ready for immediate use.
It is always made up above the FOSV when stripping WSV SWWI
is required. & &
Gray Valve TP Work unit
Once the Grey Valve is installed there is no longer
wireline access to the drill string below it and neither & SOP
can pump-down devices be used. Driller
Gray Valves shall be pressure tested as per SP-
1213 requirements to MASP or RWP and serviced /
functioned as per OEM requirements.
Drillpipe size shall be compatible with variable and WSV
fixed pipe ram (VBR and FPR) configuration. & SWWI
TP &
Drillpipe shall be compatible with shearing capacity
& Work unit
of BOP and accumulator with shut-in pressure equal
Driller SOP
Drill pipe to MASP.
Drillpipe material grade selection to be compatible
with downhole conditions to avoid failure during
normal and well control operations (e.g. SS pipe for P&D SDP
H2S applications).
PBL subs may provide a leak path for a string WSV

influx if left open. &
PBL Subs TP SWWI
Position PBL subs between 2 x Float valves (flapper &
type to allow activation ball dropping). Driller
Float valves are NOT considered as a Barrier,
due to potential degradation with downhole
condition.
Float valves should be pressure tested to the MASP
or RWP of the valve prior to each RIH.
Top hole: 1 x float valves shall be included in the
drill string.
Top hole (potential shallow gas prognosed): 2 x
(Non-Ported) float valves shall be included in the
drill string. WSV
Float &
Reservoir / Hydrocarbon section: 2 x float valves TP SWWI
Valves
shall be included in the drill string. &
HP Reservoir Section: 2 x (Non-Ported) float valves Driller
are to be included in the drill string.
Losses Section: 2 x float valves shall be included in
the drill string.
Dynamic Kill: 3 x float valves shall be included in the
drill string.
Ported floats: provide an orifice to transmit pressure
and allow SIDPP to be measured during shut-in with
an influx.

Revision: 1

Non-Ported floats: do not allow SIDPP to be
measured during shut-in with an influx, however
these can fully isolate the string and circulating
system from wellbore pressure and fluids.
Non-ported floats are required for top hole and
reservoir sections where the SIDPP may approach WSV
Float or exceed the RWP of the circulating system (e.g. &
Valves TDS, rotary hose and standpipe) TP SWWI
&
Plunger type floats: are typically more robust than
Driller
flapper types, however access for ball activation is
obstructed.
Material compatibility: for sour environments should
be compliant (i.e. NACE Sour Service and NOT Sour
Trim) as per API Spec 7-1.
Consider as non-shearable item when running WSV SWWI
across the BOP. & &
Shut-in procedure including procedure to drop the TP Work unit
Stabilisers string to available and understood (by the Driller) at & SOP
this point Driller
Consider the stabiliser blade design to optimise
hydrodynamic profile and avoid balling to reduce the P&D SDP
risk of swabbing.
Consider as non-shearable item when running
across the BOP.
Slick drill collars may increase the risk of differential WSV
sticking and limit mud weight overbalance selection, SWWI
&
Drill Collars increasing the risk of a kick. Spiral drill collars may &
TP
inhibit sealing capability of the annular. Work unit
&
SOP
Shut-in procedure including procedure to drop the Driller
string to available and understood (by the Driller) at
this point.
Consider as non-shearable item when running WSV SWWI
across the BOP. & &
TP Work unit
Shut-in procedure including procedure to drop the
& SOP
string to available and understood at this point.
Driller
MWD Flow area should be considered in conjunction with
planned LCM pills to avoid plugging and for
consideration of PBL sub inclusion. P&D SDP
& &
Well Trajectory / Positioning to be maintained to
UIK TFM
allow a relief well/s to intersect as per the well control
contingency plan (WCCP).
Consider as non-shearable item when running WSV
across the BOP. SWWI
&
&
Motor / Shut-in procedure including procedure to drop the TP
Work unit
Turbine / string to available and understood (by the Driller) at &
SOP
RSS this point. Driller
Flow area should be considered in conjunction with P&D SDP
planned LCM pills to avoid plugging and for & &
consideration of PBL sub inclusion. UIK TFM
Nozzle size and TFA should be considered in P&D SDP
Bit conjunction with planned LCM pills to avoid plugging & &
and for consideration of PBL sub inclusion. UIK TFM
Revision: 1
4.7 Drilling Setup

The active system volume and return flow shall be continuously monitored for any signs of influx,
through the rig PVT / flow show system (As per SP-1213).
Alarms shall be turned on and should be set as tight as practical to minimise the response time
from an influx and shall allow response within the design kick tolerance. A second PVT/ flow
show system may be maintained by the Mud loggers (common practice on exploration wells) with
clear expectation communicated to the service provider on the limits (for alarm setting) and the
communication protocol. A PVT system should be operational for all tanks involved in mud level
monitoring, including reserve pit(s) when these are used for fluid transfer during drilling. The TP,
Driller and AD should be fully conversant with the system.
The hole should always be kept full, except when applying a dynamic fluid column.
4.7.1 Alarms/Sensors, Equipment and Shut-in Readiness

Component Set-up / Calibration Responsible Document
Flow Show = +/- 5% at drilling flow rate
EKDS = Calibrate at low and high drilling flowrates. Well
3 Control
PVT = +/- 1 m WSV
Checklist
Alarms and &
Mud Gas Analyser = calibrated &
Sensors TP
Work Unit
Gas Sensors = calibrated &
SOP
Mud Logger
Actual alarm configuration to be defined by the &
operations teams based on the well activity and SWWI
work unit capability.
WSV Well
BOP stack shall be as per SP-1213 minimum & Control
BOP
requirements and the position of valve set (Annular TP Checklist
Configuration
and Rams open and the outer Choke and Kill line & &
and Line up
valves closed). Driller Work Unit
SOP
PDO adopts the hard shut-in method. A shut-in WSV
Shut-in procedure relevant to the current operation must & Well
Procedure be posted in the doghouse and understood by the TP Control
Driller. & Checklist
Driller
As per SP-1213, well control subs shall have valid
Well Control certification and testing and be available on the rig WSV Well
Subs floor for all required pipe sizes and connections & Control
(Crossovers are to be pre-made if required). A TP Checklist
(FOSV &
method of handling and installing well control subs & &
Gray Valves)
should be available and ready (i.e. a T-Clamp). Driller SWWI
Slow pump test rates should represent anticipated

kill rates:
 Perform and record slow pump data (for at
Work Unit
least two pumps).
SCRs SOP
 Take pressures on the gauges used for killing Driller
&
operations (pressure readings to be verified
SWWI
with the second gauge)
 Ensure that cuttings in hole do not affect slow
pump data.

Revision: 1
Kill sheet to be filled in by 2 x independent sources WSV

(WSV & TP) and the Mud logger if available. Kill & Well
Kill Sheet TP Control
sheet to include all drillstring and well geometries
and trajectory data. & Checklist
Mud Logger
Pressurised Daily calibration of pressurised mud weight WSV Well

Mud Balance balance is performed and witnessed. & Control
Mud Eng. Checklist
Sufficient barite to weight up the entire active

system to the maximum expected PP equivalent
plus 2.5 kPa/m (0.1 psi/ft, 2 ppg).
The amount of weight material required per m3
(kg/m3) can be calculated as N1:
P&D
1000 × 𝑑𝑊 × (𝜌2 − 𝜌1 ) & SDP
Minimum 𝑁1 =
𝑔 × (𝑑𝑊 − 𝜌2 ) WSV &
Quantity of & Well
Barite dW = The weighting material gradient (kPa/m) TP Control
ρ1 = Original mud weight (kPa/m) & Checklist
Mud Eng.
ρ2 = New mud weight (kPa/m)
g = 9.807 m/s2
Additional chemicals required to build mud weight,
are also be required.
4.8 Flow checking

Operation Set-up / Calibration Responsible Document
As per SP-1213, the well shall be flow checked
for a minimum of 15 minutes preferably with slow
pipe rotation after any drilling break or any
indications of a kick. As a minimum flow checks
should be performed on all trips out of the hole:
• On bottom Work Unit
Flow SOP
Checking • In the shoe of the last casing string Driller
&
SWWI
• Before starting to pull the BHA through the BOP.
Remember: A negative flow check means that the
permeable zones in the well are apparently
balanced by the mud column. It does NOT mean
that there is NOT an influx in the hole.

Revision: 1
4.9 Tripping Setup

To ensure the well is stable during tripping and the trip sheet is valid and in use, the WSV and/or
TP should supervise the first 10 stands (as a minimum) when tripping out of hole.
Trip Tank Sensor = level as per trip sheet Well

Control
Flow Show = No additional flow WSV
Checklist
Alarms and &
EKDS = No additional flow &
Sensors TP
Work Unit
PVT = level as per trip sheet &
SOP
Mud Logger
Gas Sensors = Calibrated &
SWWI
Trip Tank fluid level set. Trip Tank pump running
(for trip out). Well
Trip Tank WSV
Control
Trip Sheet to be available, with theoretical pre- &
& Checklist
calculated hole (Fill or Returns) per Stand and TP
&
Trip Sheet Cumulative for all dimensions of drillstring. Both &
Work Unit
Scenarios for pulling wet and dry are to be Driller
SOP
available.
Well
BOP stack up to be as per SP-1213 minimum WSV
BOP Control
requirements and the position of valve set &
Configuration Checklist
(Annular and Rams open and the outer Choke and TP
and Line up &
Kill line valves closed). &
Work Unit
Driller
SOP
PDO adopts the hard shut-in method. A shut-in
procedure relevant to the current operation must
WSV
be posted in the doghouse and understood by the
Shut-in & Well
Driller.
Procedure TP Control
Minimum Closing pressures and friction for the & Checklist
annular to be available in case stripping is Driller
required.
Well Control subs to be available on the rig floor
Well Control (with valid certification and testing) for all required WSV Well
Subs pipe sizes and connections (Crossovers are to be & Control
pre-made if required). TP Checklist
(FOSV &
& &
Gray Valves) A method of handling and installing well control
Driller SWWI
subs should be available (i.e. a T-Clamp).
Well
WSV
Stripping surge bottle pressure set at the required Control
Stripping &
pressure (typically 50% of the required annular Checklist
Bottle TP
closing pressure). &
&
Work Unit
Driller
SOP
The Strip Tank should be calibrated with markings WSV Well
Strip Tank for a stand of closed end displacement (CED) of & Control
the rigs drillpipe. TP Checklist

Revision: 1
4.9.1 Tripping Out of Hole Decision Tree

Revision: 1
4.10 Shut-in Considerations
Element Action Responsible

The Shut-in Methodology must be assessed for each application
and the procedure understood by the work unit crew. Unless
otherwise assessed and approved, with TA1 approval, the shut-in
procedure shall follow the SP-1213 requirement:
The hard-shut-in method shall be used.
This is a simple, fast way to shut in the well and thus minimise
influx volume. WSV
Shut-in &
Hard Shut In:
TP
Method
“To close in a well with the BOP, having the choke or choke line &
valve closed.” Driller
Source: IADC UBO / MPD Glossary, December 2011. Global
Standards
API RP 59 Extract: “With the exception of the choke(s) itself and
one choke line valve located near the BOP stack, the choke line
valves are aligned such that a flow path is open through the choke
system.”
The Shut-in procedure shall be displayed in the doghouse for the WSV
relevant operation and reviewed with the crew to ensure &
Procedure understanding and roles. TP
Examples of shut-in procedures for display in the doghouse are &
listed further in this section and at this Link . Driller
Shut-in If primary well control is lost, the well must be closed-in
immediately followed by assessment of well conditions in Driller
Responsibility
preparation for secondary well control techniques.
Personnel placed in positions of responsibility for Well Control
must be assessed as competent for the job. WSV
Competency &
The WSV & TP are to ensure the shut-in procedures and roles
and responsibilities are understood by all designated crew TP
members.
The crew are to participate in regular drills to ensure familiarity
and competency with kick warning/indication signs and the
relevant shut-in procedures for the work unit operations.
Examples include:
Shut-in while Drilling
Shut-in while Tripping
Shut-in while BHA Handling (non-shearable is across the BOP) WSV
Drills &
Shut-in while Running Casing/Liner Tubulars & Centralisers
TP
Shut-in while Logging
Shut-in while Out of hole
Shut-in with Pressure exceeding the Annular / Leaking
Shut-in with Requirement to drop the BHA
Shut-in with Completion and control line
The correct line up and condition of Secondary well control
Walk the Line equipment shall be checked prior to the start of operation and at Driller
each start of tour as per SP-1213.
Revision: 1
4.10.1 Example Shut-in Procedures for Drilling
DRILLING
Shut in Procedure – Hard Shut In
= open
Annular = closed
Remote Control closed
Top Piperams Choke 14 17

Blind/Shear Rams Cuttingtank
HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
Bottom Piperams Poorboy
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Stop Drilling
2. Raise string off bottom.
 -ensure that no tool joint or upset is opposite any BOP ram.
3. Stop the pumps
4. Close annular preventer
5. Open HCR (valve 7)
 Driller: Stay on rigfloor.
 Ass Driller: Inform TP, DSV.
6. Observe and record pit gain, Pdp and Pcsg.
 Note: Pdp may be masked by floats. Pumping open floats to be performed
with TP& DSV supervision.
7. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible annular leakage
8. Confirm that the choke is closed and check all surface systems for any leaks.
9. Close pipe ramsif Pcsg reaches MSWP of annular preventer.
10. If Pdp reaches surface equipment MSWP and/or pop off valve setting -> close IBOP.
Date: Checked by Approv ed by: Approv ed by:
Rev.: 1 WSV & TP Rig Manager SWE

Revision: 1
4.10.2 Example Shut-in Procedures for Tripping
TRIPPING
= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Set slips below a DP tooljoint

2. Install RH FOSV in open position and close it.
 If unable to install FOSV (strong flow) -> make up topdrive.
 Driller: Stay on rigfloor
 AssDriller: Inform TP,DSV
5. Make up topdrive and open FOSV
6. Observe and record pit gain, Pdp and Pcsg
 Note: Pdp may be masked by floats. Pumping open floats to be
performed with TP & DSVsupervision.
9. Close pipe ramsif Pcsg reaches MSWP of annular preventer.
10. If Pdp reaches surface equipment MSWP and/or pop off valve setting -> close IBOP

Revision: 1
4.10.3 Example Shut-in Procedures with BHA / Drill Collars across the BOP
BHA / Drill Collars across the BOP

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Set slips below a connection with Dog Collar Installed

2. Install Crossover and RH FOSV in open position and close it.
5. Strip in hole to place a joint of DP across the BOP:
 Make up the Gray valve and a single and connect the TDS
 Open the FOSV & Remove the Dog Collar
 Lower the annular closing pressure to allow stripping and set stripping bottle
pressure. (Consider MAASP and ability to maintain BHP constant while stripping)
 Strip in hole to space out and allow closure with the UPRs
6. Observe and record pit gain, Pdp and Pcsg
 Note: Pdp may be masked by floats. Pumping open floats to be performed with
TP & DSV supervision.
9. Close the UPRs and follow steps 6, 7 and 8.

Revision: 1
4.10.4 Example Shut-in Procedures for Casing & Liner Tubulars (Non-shearable)
CASING & LINER TUBULAR RUNNING

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Set slips below a casing coupling

2. Install open RH kelly cock with matching X/O to casing thread and close it.
3. Close the annular preventer
9. Close casing rams if Pcsg reaches MSWP of annular preventer (IF casing rams are
installed).

Revision: 1
4.10.4.1 Casing shut-in Considerations

If an influx is observed while running casing, it may be required to strip to bottom. To allow
stripping to bottom the tensile yield strength of the drillpipe in use must be checked in relation to
the weight of the casing. Deep wells with 9 5/8” or 9 7/8” casing may exceed the drillpipe yield
strength beyond a certain length of casing. In this situation whereby volumetric kill may be
required, it is recommended to install casing rams prior to the casing run, to allow an alternative
shut-in function.
Example of casing weight vs. drillpipe Yield Strength:

5”, 25.6#, G105, Yield Strength (For Preiium Pipe) = 258 kdaNs
9 5/8”, 53.5# (79.64 kg/m), and a Bouyancy factor of 0.839:
(258 × 1.02 × 103

= 228,835 𝑘𝑔 (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒)
1.15
Length of casing before reaching DP yield:

228,835
= 3425 𝑚
79.64 × 0.839
Revision: 1
4.10.5 Example Shut-in Procedure for e-line / Slickline (Non-shearable)
E-LINEAND SLICKLINEWITH OVERBALANCEFLUID

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Close the annular preventer (Complete Shut -Off “ CSO“ Element is required)
3. Observe and record pit gain and Pcsg.
4. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible annular leakage.
6. IF the annular is not sealing:
 Position cable cutter on cable as close as possible to the point of entrance to the
well. Slack Off the cable weight against the annular asbest aspossible.
 Clear the area where the cable may pass after being cut including where it may
fall after passing through the upper sheave wheel (Drill floor) when cut.
 From a remote position (i.e. the doghouse), cut the cable with the hydraulic
cable cutter.
7. Close the BSRs and follow steps 3, 4 and 5.
 Once the downhole part of the cable has disappeared and surface part of the
cable has stopped moving, recover the cable to the WL drum.
Date: Checked by Approved by: Approved by:

Revision: 1
4.10.6 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with TRSSSV control line
COMPLETION WITH CONTROL LINE

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Lower completion string and set slips below the coupling.

2. Bleed off any pressure applied to the control line
3. Cut control line above coupling.
4. Install RH FOSV in open position with matching X/O to tubing thread and close it.
10. IF the annular is not sealing: Consider to shear the string or strip in a single. To Strip
in hole:
 Open the FOSV
11. Close the UPRs and follow steps 7, 8 and 9

Revision: 1
4.10.7 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with ESP control line
COMPLETION WITH FIBREOPTIC CABLEOR ESP CABLE

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Lower completion string and set slips below upper coupling.
2. Slack Off the cable weight against the last cable clamp.
3. Position cable cutter on cable as close as possible above the coupling
4. Clear the area where the cable may pass after being cut including where it may fall
after passing through the upper sheave wheel (Drill floor) when cut.
5. From a remote position (i.e. the doghouse), cut the cable with the hydraulic cable
cutter.
6. Install RH FOSVin open position with matching X/O to tubing thread and close it.
12. IF the annular is not sealing: Consider to shear the string or strip in a single. To Strip
in hole:
 Open the FOSV
13. Close the UPRsand follow steps 9, 10 and 11

Revision: 1

Revision: 1
4.10.8 Example Shut-in Procedure for completion with Slickline
COMPLETION WITH SLICKLINEOPERATIONS

(WITH KNOWN OVERBALANCE AND SHEAR TEST OF COMPLETION WITH SLICKLINE)
= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Clear the area where the cable may recoil and pass after being cut including
where it may fall after passing through the upper sheave wheel (Drill floor)
when cut.
2. Cable will be cut under tension!!
3. Close the BSR
6. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible Ram leakage.
Note: The BOP Shear and Seal Capability is to be confirmed with a shear test
inclusive of slickline (internally) and control line (externally) for this
configuration and shut-in method to be accepted.

Revision: 1
4.10.9 Example Shut-in Procedure for Slotted Liners / Wire Wrap Screens / Tubing with
Integrity Failure
SLOTTED LINERS/ WIREWRAP SCREENS/ TUBING WITH INTEGRITY FAILURE

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Set slips below a casing coupling.
 IFflow is excessive, confirm spaceout and Shear the string.
 IFflow is managable, then follow the shut -in procedure:
2. Install matching X/O to casing thread and close it.
3. P/U a joint of DPand RIH.
4. Set slips below the DPconnection
5. Install open RH kelly cock and close it.
9. Close casing rams if Pcsg reaches MSWP of annular preventer (IF casing rams are
installed).

Revision: 1
4.10.10 Example Shut-in Procedure for dropping a non-shearable string components
DROPPING NON SHEARABLESTRING COMPONENTS

= open
Annular = closed

HCR
20
21
K BPV 8 6 5 7
13 22 15 18
12 10 9 11 23
1 3 4 2
16 19
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Lower the string with elevators at rig floor level 1 2

2. Close the annular BOP and adjust closing pressure to the
maximum for the tubular
3. Slack off the string weight and open the elevators to release
from the string.
4. Open the annular BOP to drop the string
5. Close the Blind/Shear Ram
5. Observe and record pit gain, Pcsg.
6. Monitor fluid level above the closed shear rams via the trip
tank.
7. Confirm that the choke is closed and check all surface
systems for any leaks.

Revision: 1
4.10.11 Example Shut-in Procedure with inner string and Slotted Liner
SLOTTED LINERS/ WIREWRAP SCREENSWITH INNERSTRING

= open
= closed
Annular Choke 14 17
Cuttingtank
10
Top Piperams 21
Blind/Shear Rams
HCR 9 12 13 18
Poorboy
K BPV 8 6 5 7
11
1 3 4 2
15 16
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Set the inner string slips below an inner string tubular coupling.
2. Close the Blind/Shear Ram
6. Monitor fluid level above the closed shear rams via the trip tank.
7. Confirm that the choke is closed and check all surface systems for any leaks..
This op erati on incl udes t he use of a false r otary table for ha ndl ing the i nner string.
Operati ons t o secu re the str ing with a FOSV wi ll b e impe ded a nd de layed by the fal se
rotary and thus imediate shear is the required securing method.
Note: The BOP Shear and Seal Cap ability shoul d be confirmed with a shear test
inclusive of equivalent tubing and inner string installed inside.
Due to t he l imitat ion s set by t he inner str ing co nfigurat ion on t he BOPs secur ing
capability, this operation should be avoided on medium and high-risk wells

Revision: 1

Revision: 1
4.10.12 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with Annulus Flow (Drilling)
DYNAMIC KILL WITH ANNULUSFLOW DURING DRILLINGOPERATIONS

= open
RCD Flow Show & Flow Line
= closed
Fill Up Line
BPV Natih Spool Remote Control closed
Annular Choke 14 17
Cuttingtank
10
Top Piperams 21
Blind/Shear Rams
HCR 9 12 13 18
Poorboy
K BPV 8 6 5 7
11
1 3 4 2
15 16
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
1. Stop Drilling
2. Raise string off bottom.
 Ensure that no tool joint or upset is opposite any BOP ram.
3. Stop the pumps
4. Close the pipe rams (as the closing time is less than the annular preventer)
 Note: Pdp may be masked by floats. Pumping open floats to be performed with TP
& DSVsupervision.
5. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible pipe ram leakage
7. Bullhead the well with 3 x annulus volume (if infectivity). Start Bullheading through
the kill line at the required rate (as per SP-1213) for the well geometry. Continue
with dynamic fill.
8. Bullhead 3 x string volume. Meanwhile maintain dynamic fill on the annulus.
9. Confirm the well is dead, maintain dynamic fill and observed the well for 30 mins
prior to resuming operations.
If the well cannot be secured at any stage, ensure space-out and shear the string.

Revision: 1

Revision: 1
4.10.13 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with Annulus Flow (Tripping)
DYNAMIC KILL WITH ANNULUSFLOW DURING TRIPPINGOPERATIONS

= open
= closed
Fill Up Line
Annular Choke 14 17
Cuttingtank
10
Top Piperams 21
Blind/Shear Rams
HCR 9 12 13 18
Poorboy
K BPV 8 6 5 7
11
1 3 4 2
15 16
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed
 If unable to install FOSV (strong flow) -> shear the string.
For dynamic Kill wells, string flow will intensify quickly and installing a barrier on
the string is usually not possible in a safe manor
3. Close the pipe rams (as the closing time is less than the annular preventer)
4. Install RH FOSV in open position and close it.
6. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible pipe ram leakage
8. Bullhead the well with 3 x annulus volume (if infectivity). Start Bullheading through
the kill line at the required rate (as per SP-1213) for the well geometry. Continue
with dynamic fill.
9. Instal the Gray valve on the string and make up the TDSto the string. Open the FOSV
and Bullhead 3 x string volume. Meanwhile maintain dynamic fill on the annulus
If the well cannot be secured at any stage, ensure space-out and shear the string.

Revision: 1

Revision: 1
4.10.14 Example Shut-in Procedure for Dynamic Kill with String Flow
DYNAMIC KILL WITH STRING FLOW DURING OPERATIONS

= open
= closed
Fill Up Line
Annular Choke 14 17
Cuttingtank
10
Top Piperams 21
Blind/Shear Rams
HCR 9 12 13 18
Poorboy
K BPV 8 6 5 7
11
1 3 4 2
15 16
Choke
Triptank
Manual Choke closed

 Close BSRs and shear the string.
For dynamic Kill wells, string flow will intensify quickly and installing a barrier on
the string is usually not possible in a safe manor.
6. Send crew member to flow line to check for possible BSR leakage
8. Bullhead the well with 3 x well volume (if infectivity). Start Bullheading through the
kill line at the required rate (asper SP-1213) for the well geometry. Continue with
dynamic fill.

Revision: 1
4.11 String Flow, Securing and Incident Classification

In events where string flow has been observed the flow out has hampered FOSV installation in
some occasions (even in the open position) with significant risk to personnel as the FOSV is
projected away. Stabbing into the string while gas is releasing can also pose an ignition risk. The
table below provides a rational for which method to use to secure the string in relation to amount
and type of flow observed.
Crew
Member
Height
~ 1.8 m
Securing
Minor Flow Moderate Flow Major Flow Significant Flow
Operation
Possible with 2
Stab FOSV Yes No No
persons.
Possible if no
Stab TDS Yes Yes No
sign of gas
Shear
Yes Yes Yes Immediately
Allowed
Shear
Approval No No No No
Required
Incident Classification
MSE to define
MSE to define
AIPS LOPC LOPC Tier
Tier Classification
Classification
WCI Possible L3 L3 Possible L2 L2
Note: If the Well Risk dictates, i.e. the possibility of H2S or immediate likelihood of
significant flow (Dynamic fill environment, by penetrating gas cap), then the Driller /
Operator should be fully aware of this risk and Well Securing techniques to be agreed
upfront by PDO/Contractor.
Revision: 1
4.12 Volumetric Well Killing

On some occasions an influx can be present in the well and the there is no ability to circulate on
or close to bottom. With an influx of lighter density (e.g, gas) the influx can have the tendency to
migrate to surface and if left unattended pressure in the well will increase. If the string is on bottom
and Drillpipe pressure (DPP) can be observed, but circulation is not possible, then the shut-in
casing pressure (SICP) pressure can be bled off to maintain DPP constant and thus BHP
constant.
When the string is off bottom and/or DPP on bottom is not observable. the volumetric method
provides a method of controlled bleed offs as the influx migrates, allowing gas expansion while
maintaining BHP constant. When the gas reaches surface, it is bled off and replaced by kill fluid
in steps known as “lubrication”. Lubrication pressures and steps are limited/dictated by MAASP.
4.12.1 With the string out of the Hole

Close in the well and record SICP.
Determine the volume of the influx if possible and the reason for the kick
1 Driller
.
Calculate Volumetric method Outputs and tabulate / graphically illustrate
step up and step-down pressures vs volume:
Pann = SICP before the second build up
 PCH1 = Pann + Pw + Ps
Pw = Working Pressure (typically 750 kPa) to be measurable and within
MAASP
Ps = A Safety Margin (typically 1500 to 3000 kPa). MAASP to be
2 considered. WSV
𝑂𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃
 𝑉1 = 𝑃𝑊 × 𝜌1
ρ1 = Mud Gradient (kPa/m)

OHCAP = Openhole capacity (m3/m)
Note: If ID change is significant (i.e., above a liner) calculate a new V2:
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐶𝐴𝑃
 𝑉2 = 𝑃𝑊 × 𝜌1

Revision: 1
Let the gas migrate upwards and allow SICP to rise to PCH1 WSV
3 &
PCH1 = Pann + Pw + Ps TP
WSV
4 Bleed off drilling fluid volume (V1) whilst maintaining Pann &
TP
Let the gas migrate upwards and allow Pann to rise to PCH2 WSV
5 &
PCH2 = PCH1 + Pw
TP
Repeat the steps until the gas is inside Casing: WSV
6 &
 Bleed of V1
 Let gas migrate to new PCH = PCH(previous) + Pw TP
Repeat the steps until the gas is at surface
WSV
7  Bleed of V1 &
 Let gas migrate to new PCH = PCH(previous) + Pw TP
With Gas at surface, start to “lubricate”:
 Pump in V2 to the well (or V1 of V2 is N/A) – Note Pann will rise slightly
 Allow Mud to drop
 Bleed off Pressure (Pressure Increase while lubricating + Pw)
Illustration of mud replacement with lubrication. Note: V1 and V2 in the

illustration below are not related to the working volumes for pumping into
the well with lubrication.
WSV
8 &
TP
Repeat the steps until the gas is removed from the well
WSV
9  Pump in V2 to the well (or V1 of V2 is N/A) – Note Pann will rise slightly &
 Allow Mud to drop TP
 Bleed off Pressure (Pressure Increase while lubricating + Pw)
If required to reduce surface pressure to a minimum of the original SICP
(after initial build up), which should be ~ Pw + Ps. WSV
10 &
Note: reducing the pressure below the original SICP will invite a further
TP
influx.

Revision: 1

End of Volumetric Method. Prepare to strip in hole.
Note: with the string out of hole, it is imperative to check if the weight of
the first stand is sufficient (“pipe heavy”) to strip in hole:
11 WSV
Mas surface Pressure = (Buoyed weight of 1st stand / cross sectional
area).
This does not include additional friction while stripping through the BOP.
4.12.2 With the bit off bottom

Only 2 differences are required for the step-up and down calculations:
𝑉 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
 𝑃𝑠 = (𝑂𝐻.𝐷𝐶
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
− ) × (𝜌1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥 )
𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑂𝐻𝐶𝑎𝑝
𝑂𝐻/𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑃
 𝑉1 = 𝑃𝑊 × 𝜌1
Replace the calculated values above with those for with a string out of hole and follow the same
steps.

Revision: 1
4.13 Combined volumetric Stripping

Combined volumetric stripping is required when an influx occurs with the bit off bottom (e.g. with
swabbing while tripping out of hole). The method allows BHP to maintained while running in hole
(avoiding further influx or well pressures exceeding MAASP) to allow conventional kill operations
with the string on bottom.
Link to Combined Volumetric Stripping Video
Link to Volumetric Stripping Course Material
4.13.1 Equipment Required

Revision: 1
Component Set-up Responsible
Choke The choke manifold outlet should discharge in the top of the trip WSV
Manifold tank. &
TP
Accurate pressure gauges of the right pressure range on the choke WSV
Gauges &
manifold.
TP
The trip tank is required to have a drain-line to a calibrated tank
(“the stripping tank”) for stripping.
Example Trip Tank volume vs. Level to be Known: WSV

Trip Tank &
Dimensions = 1.5 m diameter x 2.5 m high. TP
Volume per cm = ((πD2/4) x H) / 2.5 x 100
= 0.0177 m3/m = 17.7 ltr/cm.
= Total volume = 4.42 m2
A calibrated tank (stripping Tank) should have calibrated level
indicators for the closed end displacement (CED) of the common
drillpipe in use for the work unit, e.g. 3 ½” and 5: DP stands.
Example: Strip Tank volume vs. Level:

Stripping WSV
Tank Dimensions = 1.2 m x 1.2 m x 1.2 m &
Volume per cm = (1.2 x 1.2 x 1.2) / (1.2 x 100) TP
= 0.0144 m3/cm = 14.44 ltr /cm
CED per stand Example = 28 m x 13 ltr/m

CED per stand = 364 ltr/m
Strip Tank level per stand = 364/14.44 = 25.3 cm
Annular The annular preventer operating pressure is required to be WSV
Preventer & adjustable via a regulator, to allow stripping. The regulator should &
Regulator be adjustable between 100 and 3000 psi. TP
As per SP-1213, a surge bottle shall be installed in the closing-line WSV

Surge Bottle &
of the annular preventer, as close as possible to the preventer.
TP
Well Control
Subs A FOSV that fits the drill string. WSV
&
(FOSV & An operational gray valve that fits the drill string.
TP
Gray Valves)
Revision: 1
4.13.2 Volumetric Stripping Preparations of Data and Calculations:
 𝑃𝑐ℎ = 𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 𝑃𝑠 + 𝑃𝑤
 𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑛 = Initial closed in pressure before 2nd build up.
𝑉 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
 𝑃𝑠 = (𝑂𝐻.𝐷𝐶
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
− ) × (𝜌1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥 )
𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑂𝐻𝐶𝑎𝑝
 𝑃𝑤 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 (𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 ~ 350 𝑘𝑃𝑎)
 𝑉1 = 𝑃𝑊 × 𝜌1
 Volume to bleed to strip tank per stand = Drillpipe CED x stand length
4.13.3 Combined Volumetric Stripping Critical Steps

Close in the well and record SICP.
Determine the volume of the influx if possible and the reason for the kick
1 Driller
.
Calculate Volumetric method Outputs and tabulate / graphically illustrate
step up and step-down pressures vs volume:
 PCH1 = Pann + Pw + Ps
 𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑛 = Initial closed in pressure before 2nd build up.
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥
2  𝑃𝑠 = (𝑂𝐻.𝐷𝐶 − ) × (𝜌1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥 )
𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑂𝐻𝐶𝑎𝑝 WSV
 𝑃𝑤 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 (𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 ~ 350 𝑘𝑃𝑎)
𝑂𝐻
 𝑉1 = 𝑃𝑊 × 𝐷𝐶𝜌𝐶𝐴𝑃
1
 Volume to bleed to strip tank per stand = Drillpipe CED x stand
length

Revision: 1

Insert an IBOP (Gray valve) on top of the FOSV.
3 Driller
Open the FOSV and check that the IBOP is not leaking
Adjust the closing pressure on the annular preventer to a minimum but
4 avoid leakage.
Driller
Whilst reducing closing pressure check continuously for flow.
Open ball valve to the surge-bottle. Verify the surge bottle pre-charge is
set at 50% of the closing pressure to enable stripping.
5 TP
(if Cameron D-preventer is fitted, remove the vent-plug on opening)

6 Line-up choke manifold to the trip tank. AD
7 Empty trip tank to 30 % (to enable proper measurements) AD
Pick up and make up a stand of drillpipe, remove tong dies and grease
8 Driller
the tool joint upsets (bottom side).
Let the gas migrate upwards and allow SICP to rise to PCH1
PCH1 = Pann + Pw + Ps
Alternatively, the string can be stripped in to increase pressure to PCH1.

WSV
9 &
TP
IF Pch is too high, bleed off a volume equivalent to the ΔP
 𝑉∆ = 𝑃∆ × 𝜌1
After the bleed off, New PCH1 = Pnew.ann + Pw + Ps

1. Strip in hole, while maintaining PCH constant with the choke.
 The volume will increase in the trip tank as BHP is reducing by

a maximum of Pw and allowing the gas to expand in a controlled
method. WSV
10 &
2. After the strand is stripped in hole, TP
 Close in the well at the choke.

 Drain the CED of 1 x stand, from the trip tank to stripping tank.
Make up a stand of drillpipe, grease tool joint upset (bottom side),
11 Driller
remove tong-die marks.
Revision: 1
Step 1. Action Responsible


a maximum of Pw and allowing the gas to expand in a controlled WSV
method. &
12 TP
3. After the strand is stripped in hole, &
Driller
 Drain the CED of 1 x stand, from the trip tank to stripping tank.
WSV
&
13 Repeat steps 10,11 & 12 until: The trip tank increase is equal to V1. TP
&
Driller
Let the gas migrate upwards and allow Pann to rise to PCH2
WSV
14 PCH2 = PCH1 + Pw &
Alternatively, the string can be stripped in to increase pressure to PCH2 TP
Make up a stand of drillpipe, grease tool joint upset (bottom side),

15 Driller
remove tong-die marks.

a maximum of Pw and allowing the gas to expand in a controlled
method. WSV
16 &
2. After the strand is stripped in hole, TP

Drain the CED of 1 x stand, from the trip tank to stripping tank.
WSV
&
17 Repeat steps 14,15 & 16 until: The trip tank increase is equal to V1. TP
&
Driller
Let the gas migrate upwards and allow Pann to rise to PCH2
WSV
18 PCH3 = PCH1 + Pw &
Alternatively, the string can be stripped in to increase pressure to PCH2 TP
WSV
&
19 Repeat steps 15,16, 17 & 18 until the bit is on bottom: TP
&
Driller
End of Combined Volumetric Stripping.
20 WSV
Prepare to kill the well with the Drillers method.

Revision: 1
4.14 Volumetric Stripping Sheet

Fill out a stripping sheet with calculation in preparation for combined volumetric stripping. See the
following example Link to example sheet:
4.15 Guidelines for conducting a Strip Drill

Strip drills should be held in the casing, before drilling out the shoe-track.
4.15.1 PURPOSE:
The purpose of the strip drill is to:
a. Training of personnel to obtain routine and familiarity, including communication aspects.
b. Check on proper functioning of equipment (rigs and contractors).
c. Determination of the required annular closing pressure and strip-in resistance.
4.15.2 TIMING:
The strip drill should be held in casing, prior to drilling out the shoe-track. It can be combined with
a pit drill.
Revision: 1
4.15.3 Strip Drill Example (based on a pit drill alarm):

1 Hold PJSM with the crew and review crew R&R and duties. TP & WSV
2 Install FOSV and close same, then Install gray valve, open FOSV. Roughneck
3 Open choke-line valve (HCR), close annular preventer. Driller
4 Close choke and valve behind choke. Driller
Pressure up annulus to 3000 kPa via kill-line.
 Prepare and fill out the Strip Drill Record Sheet
5  Note: Determine in advance whether there is a risk of drillpipe Driller
collapse or casing burst and include pressure limits in the strip drill
instruction.
6 Reduce operating pressure of the annular preventer to a minimum,
Driller
whilst avoiding preventer leakage.
Open ball valve to the surge-bottle. Adjust surge bottle pre-charge to
7 50% of the closing pressure to enable stripping. Driller
(if Cameron D-preventer is fitted, remove the vent-plug on opening)
8 Line-up choke manifold to the trip tank. AD
9 Empty trip tank to 30 % (to enable proper measurements) AD
10 Pick up and make up stand of drillpipe, remove tong-die marks and
Driller
grease tooljoint upsets (bottom side),
Driller
11 Strip-in, choke-man keep, PCH = PAnn = 3000 kPa &
TP
12 When the stand is stripped in, close the choke at PAnn = 3000 kPa Driller & TP
Drain the closed-end displacement of the stand from the trip tank into a
13 TP
calibrated tank (stripping tank).
Driller
14 Check the trip tank for volume gain (influx expansion). &
WSV
Strip in another 2 to 3 stands.
 Check the good working of the fill-up line on the rig floor.
15  Record actual values of annular closing pressure and strip-in Driller
resistance.
Resistance = loss of weight on MD to overcome the friction in the
annular preventer).
End of strip drill (if Cameron D-preventer is fitted, re-fit the vent-plug).
 Release the pressure from the well.
16  Open the annular preventer. Driller
 Close HCR
 Adjust the annular closing pressure to normal
 Adjust stripping bottle pre-charge to normal
Fill-up stands with original mud. Pull stripped-in stands, close kelly-cock,
remove gray valve, open kelly-cock and remove same
17 Driller
Note: Check for trapped pressures under gray valve and kelly-cock
before removal.
End of stripping exercise: WSV
18 &
Discuss the exercise with drill crew, TP and WSV.
TP

Revision: 1
4.15.4 Strip Drill Record Steet

Strip Drill Record Sheet
Revision: 1
4.16 RAM to Ram Stripping Illustration:

Stripping ram to ram is less preferable due to the additional complexity of the operation and likely
wear on the ram sealing elements. This operation may be required in the case where the annular
is damaged or SICP > Annular RWP or where the annular is not designed for stripping.
Ram to Ram Stripping Operation 1 Ram to Ram Stripping Operation 2
Upper Rams CLOSED with the Tool Joint just above the Upper Rams Bottom Ram CLOSED
10 11
Pressure bled off Upper Ram OPEN and Drill Pipe stripped to just above Bottom Ram
12 13
Upper Ram CLOSED and Ram Cavity pressure is balanced via the Kill Line OPEN the Lower Ram and Drill Pipe stripped in until next Tool Joint is near
14
the Top Rams 15

Revision: 1
4.17 Displacement to Lighter Fluid

During well operations, there may be instances whereby the wellbore fluid in use to maintain a
primary barrier, needs to be exchanged with lighter fluid, for example:
1. A new hole section with lighter mud weight requirement.

2. Displacement from mud to completion brine.
3. Inflow testing for barrier verification.
4. Stuck pipe events.
5. Loss events where MW reduction is required and overbalance is reduced.
During the process of displacement to lighter fluid the BHP SHALL be maintained (as per SP-
1213). To maintain the BHP pressure the operations should be done under “controlled conditions”.
The term, controlled conditions is a method whereby returns are taken via a choke manifold during
the displacement, with application of additional surface pressure via the choke, to maintain BHP
constant and to maintain volume control.
Displacement to lighter fluid under controlled conditions SHALL be done when reducing BHP,
regardless if:
1. The mud weight reduction is minimal (i.e. 0.1 kPa/m).
2. The mud weight was used to drill the section previously and weighed up later, then a decision
made to reduce mud weight.
3. The mud weight reduction is still above the high case PPP.
4. The formation pressures have been sampled and show PP < the selected mud weight.
5. The hole is cased off.
6. A deepset barrier is in place.
An exception to mud weight reduction across the choke under conventional “controlled
conditions” may be accepted for Greater Birba operations when a mud weight reduction inside
the previous shoe is not possible. This operation should be controlled with an approved eMOC,
with the mud weight reduction controlled in steps to reduce by the ECD amount (i.e. ~ 0.5 kPa/m).
Revision: 1

Confirm max surface pressures during displacement and
plan the operation within RWP / surface system limitations,
i.e. pop-offs.
Consider a staged mud weight reduction to reduce surface
1 pressures. P&D SDP
For a typical 10K BOP stack and 5K circulating system; a
typical maximum static differential surface pressure is set
at ~ 20,000 kPa to allow margin circulating pressures and
surface equipment.
Identify risks associated with mud weight reduction and list
2 these in the program. Define mitigations in the program to P&D SDP
avoid and control associated risk.
Plan and describe mud weight reduction plan and
3 P&D SDP
operation

Confirm pit plan to accommodate returns and maintain
1 WSV SWWI
volume control during displacement.
Confirm equipment pressure limitations and ability to
maintain pressure control through the operation:
 Surface circulating System RWP WSV
 Mud Pump Liner size and operating output
2  Mud Pump Pop-off Setting and operating margin & SWWI
 BOP RWP and latest subsequent test pressure TP
 FOSV RWP
 If applicable: Cement unit and temporary pipework
RWP.
Build light fluid and make ready in the pits for
3 Mud Eng. SWWI
displacement.
4 Confirm lighter fluid density Mud Eng. SWWI
Confirm the BHA and drillstring components are as per
5 WSV SWWI
program.
WSV
Confirm rig sensors and mud logger sensors are set to
6 & SWWI
monitor the operation.
TP
7 Poorboy to be filled with heavy mud Driller SWWI
Prepare kill sheet with step up graph to monitor pressures
8 WSV SWWI
during Phase 1 and 2 of the circulations.

Revision: 1
4.17.3 Example Step-Up Graph link
1.1.1 Example Step-Up with Time and Bleed Off After Displacement. link
Revision: 1
4.17.4 Critical Operational Phases

TP
1 Hold PJSM with the crew and review crew R&R and duties. &
WSV
Set the drillstring position as per program and confirm space out to allow
2 Driller
BOP closure.
In preparation for a horner plot after displacing under controlled conditions,
3 Install a side-entry sub + lo-torc above and below a FOSV and make up the Driller
string to a TDS or circulating head to HP pumping unit.
1st Phase: Circulate string contents to light fluid with open BOP and
Driller
maintain volume control.
&
BHP will be maintained naturally with additional circulating pressure as the
4 light fluid enters the string. Observe the step-up graph to ensure no leak in Mud Eng
the drillstring during circulation.
&
Note: the operations team may opt to circulate phase 1 via the choke and
Mud Logger
a closed BOP.
2nd Phase: Circulate Annulus contents to light fluid with closed BOP and
maintain volume control. WSV
Stop circulation and close the BOP UPRs. Open the HCR and line up &
returns via the choke to poor boy and then pits.
TP
Continue displacing annulus to lighter fluid by maintaining SPP constant
with constant flowrate by adjusting choke pressure: &
5 Driller
 Add 1000-2000 KPa safety margin to SPP (FCP)
 Maintain choke pressure constant while starting circulation &
 Once pressure is stable, maintain SPP constant until the annulus is
Mud Eng
fully displaced, by adjusting choke pressure.
&
Note:
Mud Logger
 For any abnormal pressures in casing or drillpipe or unexpected rise in
PVT; stop – close in choke & analyse situation
3rd Phase: Bleed down pressure in controlled stages.
Once the lighter fluid is observed returning from the annulus, stop pumping, WSV
shut-in the well and record the time.
&
Record shut-in pressure and line up to bleed off in steps via the choke
6 manifold to the trip tank: TP
 Bleed off in 3,500 kPa steps. &

 Record volume returned and stabilised pressure. Driller
 Monitor for pressure build up – if pressure build up is observed, stop
the operation and consider circulation to kill fluid with a MOC.
Once the pressure is fully bled off, confirm the well is static, via:
1. A horner plot (IF) the displacement to light fluid is required for a fixed Driller
7 well barrier verification (i.e. when displacing to completion brine) &
2. An extended 30 min flow check if the displacement to light fluid is to Mud Logger
drill a subsequent section.

Revision: 1
4.18 Inflow Testing

Well Barriers should be tested in the direction of flow with an inflow test. For the inflow test to be
valid a differential pressure must be present across the barrier element. To provide a differential
pressure, the workstring/well above the barrier must be displaced to underbalance fluid. Sub-
hydrostatic wells can be displaced to nitrogen to provide underbalance.
Displacement to lighter fluid of known and even density SHALL be under controlled conditions
(as per SP-1213). If displacing the entire well, optimize the displacement by pumping at maximum
allowable rate under controlled conditions, keeping the BHP constant.
During an Inflow Test, flow from the well is monitored to verify the barrier envelope or identify a
leak. An inflow test is usually the final test on the barrier envelope prior to removing the BOPs
and therefore presents the final opportunity to identify a problem with the barrier. It is a process
safety critical step to prove that the well is safe.
Using the Horner plot provides an opportunity to optimise inflow testing by reducing, as much as
possible, the subjective nature of the "reducing trend”. It allows the data to be projected forward
in time to see whether flow is predicted to cease (i.e. only thermal effects), or whether there will
still be some residual flow (i.e. a leak). As a guide the horner plot can take between 4 and 8 hours
to complete, but this varies depending on the well conditions. The test should be continued until
a definitive trend has been established. An early termination of an inflow test may lead to an
inconclusive result
4.18.1 Common Inflow Test Operation Types in PDO
Revision: 1
There are two main methods to for inflow testing:
1. Packer-Type: Run a retrievable packer with a tailpipe on a work string. Partially displace the
work string under controlled conditions, set the packer.
o Advantages: Only a relatively small amount of light fluid required, well can be quickly
brought back under control in case of an influx by unsetting the packer and reverse
circulation.
o Disadvantages: Requires an additional trip to run the packer, doesn’t test casing
connections above packer, circulation may be restricted past packer during
displacement and bottoms up, potential to place very large drawdown on casing and
packer if packer is set too shallow.
2. Whole Well Displacement: Displace the string and annulus under controlled conditions.
o Advantages: Tests entire barrier envelope, easier to circulate bottoms up after test to
check for gas, may not require additional trip.
o Disadvantages: Large volume to pump, inefficient displacement (limited flowrate

through choke) may result in U-tube effects during test.
This method is typically used in in UWOXO operations where the differential pressure during
displacement is great and the full well volume including the production liner must be displaced to
light completion fluid. Differential pressure may also exceed the packer differential pressure rating
in some circumstances.
3. Cemented Completion: A common design in PDO is a cemented completion. The completion

is displaced to completion brine as part of the cement displacement plan and in some
operations this fluid is planned as underbalance to formation pressure. In such circumstances
the floats in the shoetrack are inflow tested before further operations (i.e. slickline work).
Note: a WOC period will commence in parallel to establish primary barrier elements in the
annulus and shoetrack, before N/D the BOP
1.1.2 Example Barrier Elements before and after and Inflow Test
Phase Primary Barrier Secondary Barrier
Circulating to a Lighter Fluid: Mud column Closed BOP
Mud column heavy and lighter fluid

During and after Completion of plus appropriate backpressure to
maintain BHP constant as original Closed BOP
Circulating to a Lighter Fluid
(both annulus and string)
Inflow tested barrier (e.g. liner lap,

After a Successful Inflow Test casing/liner shoe or cement plug) Closed BOP
4.18.2 String Position during inflow Testing

Any inflow test, with or without packer, will be performed with the bottom of the string as close as
possible to the point of potential inflow. This will facilitate removing the influx without having to
strip to bottom or instigate volumetric procedures in case of a leak.

Revision: 1
4.18.3 Inflow Testing Critical Operational Phases (Packer Type & Cemented Completion)
TP
WSV
WSV
&
1 RIH the test string (completion or packer or cleanout string).
TP
Note: for a packer type test, the string must be run without floats.
&
Driller
2 Install a side-entry sub + lo-torc above and below a FOSV and make up the
Driller
string to a TDS.
WSV
&
3 Identify the well shut-in procedure, should the test fail, and discuss with the
TP
crew. Assign shut-in roles and responsibilities.
&
Driller
WSV
Displace the well to lighter fluid (follow displacement to lighter fluid
&
4 guidelines in the previous section).
TP
After circulating to a lighter fluid under controlled conditions there will be
&
back pressure held on the string (or the well).
Driller
Bleed off back pressure (on the string) in stages to bring the well into an
underbalanced condition.
Note: For a packer-type test the packer must be set first.
It is important everyone involved with the operation is aware that with the
surface pressure bled off, the well is now underbalanced.
WSV
&
5 TP
&
Driller
Revision: 1

CONTINUOUSLY measure return flow.
 Record the volume collected in each 10 minute time interval.
 Use accurate measuring cylinders/jugs. Have plenty available in
different sizes
6 WSWE
 For a packer-type test, monitor the annulus above the packer on the
trip tank for leaks past the packer (in either direction). This also avoids
confusion due to ballooning from thermal effects in the annulus.
 Plan for crew breaks and shift changes. The data collection method
must be consistent no matter who is taking the measurement.
Plot data on a Horner Plot, by Filling out the Horner Plot Spreadsheet
On the Y-axis, plot rate of flow (l/min or bbl/hr) on a linear scale

On the X-axis, plot Ln[Horner Time] on a linear scale
7 Where, Ln[Horner Time] = Ln[(DT + T)/DT] WSV
And, T = time from last circulation to start of inflow test (mins)

DT = time since start of inflow test (mins)
Note: As DT approaches ‘infinite time’, Horner Time = 1, and Ln[Horner
Time] = 0
Use the trend line to determine if the acceptance criteria have been met.
8 Early data can be ignored in the trend line, but most recent data points must WSV
be included (minimum 1 hr). (This is automatically done for you in the
attached spreadsheet). DO NOT omit spurious points.
Inflow Testing Duration

The duration of an inflow test is influenced by several factors including hole volume, geothermal
gradient, fluid type, initial temperature of the fluid and displacement rate. As a rule of thumb, the
time required to gather sufficient data to give a reliable and defendable result will typically be:
a. >4 hours for a water-based fluid
b. >6 hours for an oil-based fluid
c. Longer for an HPHT well
The test should be continued until a definitive trend has been established. Early termination of an
inflow test may lead to an inconclusive result. However, if the trend is clear and meets the test
criteria sooner than expected then it is possible to conclude the test earlier. The SWE Operations
TA3 is responsible for final review and approval of the successful inflow test.
The plot above is based on data from a real case. As depicted, early data can be erroneous for
various reasons and therefore excluded from the trend line. The inflow test should be continued
for as long a period as necessary until a definite trend is observed; this trend should be indicative
of either flow from the well (FAIL), or thermal expansion (PASS).
When using oil-based fluids, the Horner plot method may not provide full assurance in gas or high
GOR wells (gas may go into solution). Therefore, the final results of such tests will be a
combination of a successful Horner plot AND a gas-free bottoms-up circulation afterwards (under
controlled conditions).

Revision: 1

Acceptance Criteria
There are two acceptance criteria which should be met:
1. Trend line over sample interval period (at least 60 mins) will need to have
positive x-axis intercept for at least 3 consecutive intervals.
2. Last 3 measurements are to consistently go down.
9 WSV
Approval of the Test Result

It should be agreed in advance who is responsible for approval of the inflow
test result. This should be agreed and documented in the well programme.
The test should not be stopped until approval has been given.
The final, approved graph and test data should be added to the wells daily
report (EDM) and be included in the End Off Well Report.
What if the test fails?
If the test shows a clear fail and there are indications of a leak the well must
be secured and the barrier (fluid column) reinstated. Consideration should
be given as to where the hydrocarbon influx will be in the well and/or drill
string when reinstating the fluid barrier.
The Horner Plot is only a tool. It is meant to provide acceptance criteria and reveal a meaningful
trend earlier than by looking at flow rate vs. time only. The Horner plot may therefore allow earlier
identification of whether a barrier is leaking or whether the flow will eventually reduce to zero,
optimising the rig time required for the test. However in some situations the inflow test may require
a very long time, until the result is conclusive. Engineering judgement will need to be applied to
the acceptance of the barrier.
Revision: 1
4.18.4 Inflow Testing Critical Operational Phases (Whole Well)

1 RIH the test string (inclusive of floats in the string). Driller
Displace the well to lighter fluid (follow displacement to lighter fluid WSV
guidelines in the previous section). &
3 TP
After circulating to a lighter fluid under controlled conditions there will be &
back pressure held on the string (or the well). Driller
Bleed off back pressure (on the well) in stages to bring the well into an WSV
underbalanced condition. &
4 TP
It is important everyone involved with the operation is aware that with the &
surface pressure bled off, the well is now underbalanced. Driller
5 With the BOP rams closed, line up returns from BOP choke line, to choke
manifold and back to the trip tank or EKDS dumpline.
WSV
This line up should be used rather than monitoring via open SOVs as the &
BOP choke line HCR can be used for remote shut-in (and not manual TP
closure of Wellhead SOVs). &
Driller
Identify the well shut-in procedure, should the test fail, and discuss with the
crew. Assign shut-in roles and responsibilities.
CONTINUOUSLY measure return flow.
 Record the volume collected in each 10 minute time interval.
 Use accurate measuring cylinders/jugs. Have plenty available in
different sizes
 Continuously monitor P-choke (annulus pressure). This should remain
6 at 0 kPa. If it builds pressure, this may indicate a plugged string. The WSWE
inflow test should only be accepted if it has been verified that P-choke
did not build during the test.
 If possible, circulate the trip tank over well and monitor the level to
check for any leaks past the BOP (in either direction).
 Plan for crew breaks and shift changes. The data collection method
must be consistent no matter who is taking the measurement.
Follow steps for (Packer Type & Cemented Completion) inflow testing from
7
step 7 onwards.

Revision: 1
4.19 Wait on Cement (WOC) Barrier Requirement

Cement forms a critical part of the barrier envelope of the well. In some phases of the construction
or intervention phase of the well, the cement forms the primary barrier element rather than a fluid
column (perhaps due to placement of underbalance fluid or as the fluid column can no longer be
monitored). These phases are typical with cemented completion when N/D the BOP and with
spool type wellheads when adding a spool after casing off and cementing a section with the
presence of hydrocarbons.
Cement completion Additional spool Installation
During setting the cement transitions from a fluid state to solid state, whereby Hydrostatic
Pressure changes during the process, from:
 Hydrostatic Head related to the slurry density
to
 Hydrostatic Head related to the slurry Base Fluid density
The Result of this process is a drop in BHP and the potential for influx into the wellbore. To combat
this the cement should be designed in accordance with API 65 requirements:
 API 65: Design slurry such that CGSP is < 45 mins
 API 65: Design the slurry to consider CSGS > 500 lbf/100 ft2 CSGS Calculation Example
 API 65: minimum WOC period until the cement reaches a minimum of 50 psi
compressive or sonic strength.
CSGS = Cement Static Gel Strength. “experimental data has shown that gas cannot freely
percolate through cement that has a static gel strength ranging from 250 to 500 lbf/100 ft2 or
more”
API-65: “cement shall be considered a physical barrier element only when it has attained a
minimum of 50 psi compressive or sonic strength”.
 CSGS and WOC are to be designed & planned in accordance with UIK
Revision: 1
4.19.1 Visualisation of potential drop in BHP
4.19.1.1 Condition on bump
4.19.1.2 Condition during setting of cement

Revision: 1
4.20 Intervention Well Process Safety Proposal Data Requirements

To allow the Intervention to be Categorised in alignment with CP-178, planned adequately, the
correct materials to be available and the correct work unit assignment; the following data
collection should be provided as a minimum:
4.20.1 Well Services Activity Manager (WSAM) Proposal Data Control Points
Topic Action Responsible
Follow CP-178 requirements and compare to the scope PT
Category assigned to the unit. When contingency scope is planned with
&
A, B, C the proposal which of greater complexity, then Category will
reflect the most complex scope. WE
Define the well risk classification in line with SP-1213
Well Risk WE
designation for Low / Medium and High Risk wells.
Risk
Include key project risks and mitigations PT
Register
The well background and history should be included. The history
of interventions and challenges / known obstructions or failures PT
Well History should be described. &
The key risks should be described, given the well history and WE
planned scope.
Include attachments of the current WSD and planned WSD.
The current WSD is used to visualise the placement of well
Well Status components, adjacent formations, well integrity failures, cement
Diagram quality and TOC data and any known obstructions in the well. PT
(WSD) The planned WSD is used to visualise new components in
relation to well integrity issues and critical formations (i.e.
production packer at or below cap rock level).
PT
Corrosion logs are to be assessed and/or organised as pre-
Corrosion &
entry scope to identify the optimum intervention plan.
WI Eng.
Leak paths are to be identified and illustrated. Fluid samples and PT
Leak Paths pressures are to be analysed prior to intervention, to identify the &
optimum intervention plan. WI Eng.
Obstructions are to be identified and illustrated. Restriction to PT
well access is to be identified in the risk assessment and
Obstructions &
mitigations included in the plan. Walk away scenarios are to be
listed in a decision tree. P&D / WE
MAASPs MAASP data to be included for All Annuli PT
WI
WIT & SIT Include the latest WITs and SITs data.
Engineer.
If the well is planned for conversion (i.e. producer to injector or
ESP producer to gas lift producer or slimming due to scabbing) PT
the asset should follow the MOC process to ensure the &
Well conversion well function specifications (WFS) are compliant with
the well functional requirements (WFR). P&D
Conversion
Change in materials and/or produced fluid which are not &
reflected in an approved well type, will need to be approved with UEC1A
UEC1A.
Revision: 1

PT
Well Integrity Proposal to include a list of well failure types and the overall
&
Status action code.
WI Eng.
Wellhead Include details of current and planned wellhead and Tree
PT
& Tree details, including size, RWP, material and SAP numbers.
PT
Include the completion details and position for all existing and
Completion &
new components, including the jewellery.
P&D
The requirement for a production packer should be assessed
and included in line with CP-118 and SP-2017.
All free flow wells are to include a primary mechanical barrier
which may take the form of cement, a TBSA or a production PT
Production packer.
&
Packer
The position of the new production packer should be included
P&D
in the well proposal and this should consider the packer depth
vs. caprock and future abandonment. It is recommended to
place the production packer as deep as possible to simplify
abandonment.
When Annuli are known to have sustained annulus pressure,
the condition of the cement should be included in the proposal,
with potential leak paths identified. Cement bond quality log
Cement PT
should be planned ahead of the intervention to simplify the
abandonment or if not possible prior, then to be included with
the proposal scope and plan.
Include data for exposed formations and potentially / planned
exposed formations:
Formation Name: _________
RE
Depth (TVD.BDF): ___________ (m)
Pore
&
Pressures Fluid Content: __________ (Gas/Oil/Water)
PT
Fluid Gradient: __________ (kPa/m)
P50 (Expected Case) Pore Pressure: ____________ (kPa)
P10 (High Case) Pore Pressure: ____________ (kPa)
The kill fluid gradient and type of fluid should be identified, to
ensure the correct unit selection and weighting material is
Kill Fluid available. P&D / WE
Downhole temperature and the thermal gradient should be
included to enable brine density correction.
Include Max CITHP (Based on P10 high case pore pressure &
fluid gradient). Note:
Max CITHP
MASP = Max Anticipated Surface Pressure
& PT
MASP = Max CITHP + Bullhead Margin (BHM)
MASP
Bullhead Margin = 3,450 kPa (Development Wells)
Bullhead Margin = 6,900 kPa (Exploration Wells)

Revision: 1

Include the well name of neighbouring water injectors which
may impact the intervention activity and the requirement for
Nearby water shut-in and duration prior to operations. PT
Injection
Include the contact details for the WI associated production
programmer and the area authority.
RE
Include H2S data for fluid content from exposed formations and
H2S potentially / planned exposed formations. Well DWI &
designation will be defined from this data.
PT
CITHP and Annuli Pressures to be included.
Sustained
Sustained well pressure (Tubing and A-Annulus) may define PT
Pressure/s
the scope as live well entry under HWU or Coil activity.
Include data for reservoir and overburden formations:
Formation Formation Name: _________

PG
Data Top Depth (TVD.BDF): ___________ (m)
Top Depth (AHD.BDF): ___________ (m)
PT
NORM / LSA Anticipated NORM/LSA should be indicated in the proposal. &
P&D
Trajectory Include the well trajectory data WE
Single Barrier Deviation requirements are to be identified at the P&D
proposal stage and the MOC to be approved prior to proposal
MOC &
approval and unit mobilisation. This is to avoid delay and
ensure appropriate mitigations can be executed. WE
Repair options (mainly scabbing) should include an
PT
assessment of re-entry and abandonment feasibility and
Re-entry &
complexity. Further loss of integrity behind a scab may greatly &
Abandonment
increase the future well entry complexity and negate the return
P&D
generated from additional production.
The well life as per the basis of design vs. the current age and PT
Operating condition should be assessed to determine the value of
&
Life intervention and prognosed extension to well life, with a
monitoring plan in line with the WFM requirements. WI Eng.
The installation of suspension plugs should be considered in
conjunction with risk to future access to the well and additional
complexity, i.e. abandonment.
Suspension plugs may be disallowed if the ability to kill the well
in future is compromised.
Suspension
Plugs
The material selection and rating should be compatible with the
well conditions (e.g. gas, H2S, CO2)
Plug installation should follow the requirements as per GU-

1035 section Qualification of a Mechanical Barrier
Revision: 1
4.20.2 Example WSD with required Integrity Assessment Data

Revision: 1
4.20.3 Kill Fluid Calculation Example

In some interventions, the access may be restricted / not allow kill fluid placement deep in the
well. Kill fluid density may be required to be increased to provide sufficient hydrostatic head with
a column of kill fluid above the reservoir formation fluid. Overbalance for intervention is also to be
included with the kill fluid gradient calculation. See the example below for an illustration:
Max CITHP
Punch Depth
Plug Depth
Filled with completion

Brine at 10.2 kPa/m Reservoir Depth
Revision: 1
4.21 Abandonment/Suspension Well Process Safety Data Requirements

To allow the Intervention to be Categorised appropriately, planned adequately, the correct
materials to be available and the correct work unit assignment; the following data collection is
adhered to as a minimum:
4.21.1 WSAM Proposal Data Control Points

Category Follow CP-178 requirements and compare to the scope
assigned to the unit. When contingency scope is planned with PT
A, B, C &
the proposal which of greater complexity, then Category will
reflect the most complex scope. WE
Define the well risk classification in line with SP-1213

Well Risk WE
designation for Low / Medium and High Risk wells.
Include H2S data for fluid content from exposed formations and RE
H2S potentially / planned exposed formations. Well DWI designation &
will be defined from this data. PT
Risk
Include key project risks and mitigations PT
Register
Well PT
Proposal to include a list of well failure types and the overall
Integrity &
action code.
Status WI Eng.
Include attachments of the current WSD and planned WSD.
The current WSD is used to visualise the placement of well
Well Status components, adjacent formations, well integrity failures, cement
Diagram quality data and any known obstructions in the well. PT
(WSD) The planned WSD is used to visualise abandonment plugs in
relation to critical formations, annuli cement, critical obstructions,
basis for plugs and any waiver requirements.
Include details of current and planned wellhead and Tree details,
Wellhead including size, RWP, material and SAP numbers. Planned
wellhead and tree details are not applicable if full abandonment PT
& Tree
is stipulated.
For lower abandonment and well suspension, include the PT
Completion completion details and position for all existing and new &
components, including the jewellery. P&D
The kill string rating should be checked for the material
compatibility and the possible kill load, should a reservoir
abandonment plug or bridge plug fail during the suspension and
monitoring period.
Kill String In some cases, the tubing may be at risk of collapse when PT
circulating out a kick with the kill fluid displaced along the kill &
Specification
string and hydrocarbons/light fluid in the annulus with high P&D
surface pressures. Alternatively, if reverse circulation is planned
for killing, the tubing burst load should be considered.
See this load case illustrated at the end of this section.
The kill string depth should be included in the proposal with PT
Kill String
consideration of the maximum kill fluid density (as illustrated at &
Length
the end of this section. P&D

Revision: 1

The requirement for a production packer should be assessed
and included in line with CP-118 and SP-21017. A production
packer is mostly required when monitoring above a dynamic kill
Production zone.
PT
Packer for The position of the new production packer should be included &
Suspension in the well proposal and this should consider the packer depth P&D
vs. caprock and future abandonment. It is recommended to
place the production packer as deep as possible to simplify
abandonment.
The condition of the cement should be included in the proposal,
with potential leak paths identified. Cement bond quality log
Cement should be planned ahead of the intervention to simplify the PT
abandonment or if not possible prior, then to be included with
the proposal scope and plan.
Include data for exposed formations and potentially / planned
exposed formations:
Formation Name: _________
Depth (TVD.BDF): ___________ (m) RE
Pore
Pressures Fluid Content: __________ (Gas/Oil/Water) &
PT
Fluid Gradient: __________ (kPa/m)
P50 (Expected Case) Pore Pressure: ____________ (kPa)
P10 (High Case) Pore Pressure: ____________ (kPa)
The kill fluid gradient and type of fluid should be identified, to
ensure the correct unit selection and weighting material is
Kill Fluid available.
P&D / WE
Downhole temperature and the thermal gradient should be
included to enable brine density correction.
Include Max CITHP (Based on P10 high case pore pressure &
fluid gradient). Note:
Max CITHP
MASP = Max Anticipated Surface Pressure
& PT
MASP = Max CITHP + Bullhead Margin (BHM)
MASP
Bullhead Margin = 3,450 kPa (Development Wells)
Bullhead Margin = 6,900 kPa (Exploration Wells)
Include the well name of neighbouring water injectors which
Nearby water
may impact the intervention activity and the requirement for PT
Injection
shut-in and duration prior to operations.
CITHP and Annuli Pressures to be included.
Sustained
Pressure/s Sustained well pressure (Tubing and A-Annulus) may define PT
the scope as live well entry under HWU or Coil activity.
PT
MAASPs MAASP data to be included for All Annuli &
P&D
Corrosion Corrosion logs are to be assessed and/or organised as pre- PT
entry scope to identify the optimum intervention plan. &
WI Eng.
Revision: 1

Leak Paths Leak paths are to be identified and illustrated. Fluid samples PT
and pressures are to be analysed prior to intervention, to &
identify the optimum intervention plan. WI Eng.
Include data for reservoir and overburden formations:
Formation Formation Name: _________

Data PG
Top Depth (TVD.BDF): ___________ (m)
Top Depth (AHD.BDF): ___________ (m)
Obstructions are to be identified and illustrated. Restriction to
well access should o be identified in the risk assessment and PT
Obstructions &
mitigations included in the plan. Walk away scenarios are to be
listed in a decision tree. P&D / WE
Single Barrier Deviation requirements are to be identified at the

proposal stage and the MOC to be approved prior to proposal P&D
MOC &
approval and unit mobilisation. This is to avoid delay and
ensure appropriate mitigations can be executed. WE
4.21.2 Kill String Length Calculation based on Kill Fluid Density

The determination of maximum kill fluid density is stipulated in SP-1221. The maximum kill fluid
density can be used to determine the shallowest kill string length, however a decision to deepen
the kill string may be advantageous to mitigate additional well risks and to simplify killing
operations and unit selection, should this be required. Consider brine cost and mixing capacity of
hoist vs. rig.
Max CITHP
WEG Depth
Reservoir Depth

Revision: 1
4.21.3 Kill String and Potential Collapse

As illustrated below, for simplicity consider if the pumps were stopped at the point kill mud is
displaced to the WEG. At this point Zero tubing pressure is present and high annulus pressure is
maintained to control BHP ≥ Reservoir pressure. At this point the high annulus pressure could
collapse the string if it exceeds the tubing collapse rating.
Revision: 1
4.22 MASP vs MAASP
MAASP = Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure (See next section for further details)
MASP = Maximum Anticipated Surface Pressure
CITHP = Closed in Tubing Head pressure
It is vital that both Well Engineer and Petroleum Engineers use the same terminology when it
comes to classifying the risk of a well. The risk should always be considered from the potential of
the open reservoir, OR any reservoirs behind casing with known integrity issues
MASP is calculated from the bottom up, based on the Pore Pressure of the identified zone of
interest (PPHigh), with the reservoir fluid gradient to surface CITHP is an observed pressure noted
at surface. This varies depending on what fluid is in the well and which zone the pressure is
associated with.
So MASP = (PPHigh – (TVDres x Fluidres Gradient)) + Bullhead Margin

Revision: 1
4.23 Basis of MAASP and considerations when MASP > MAASP

The Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure (MAASP) calculations are to follow CP-118
Appendix 2. The A-Annulus MAASP calculation can provide inconsistency in relation to the
Maximum Anticipated Surface Pressure (MASP) on some wells, where MASP > MAASP. This is
generally where the MAASP calculation is driven by Tubing collapse (Label 5 below).
4.23.1 CP-118 Appendix 2 Extract:
4.23.2 MAASP Calculations:

For the scenario / load case of tubing collapse listed in CP-118, the MAASP value cannot be
attributed to reservoir pressure (as the tubing must be evacuated to atmospheric pressure),
however it may be relevant to induced pressure (i.e. back up pressure applied prior to a frac).
The MAASP calculation should be provided for the relevant scenarios and listed in the proposal,
to confirm the barrier envelope prior to well intervention. Typically, the Production casing burst
scenario for Hot or Ambient kill, with tubing leak at surface, provides the limiting factor for MAASP
and this is confirmed in the well type’s casing design envelope.
For intervention the load case scenarios need to be confirmed with relevant wall thickness
reduction, to calculate the current MAASP values.
1 Calculate MAASP values PT
2 Confirm MAASP > MASP (MASP = Max CITHP + BHP) PT
IF MAASP < MASP, review scenarios and provide relevant MAASP PT
3 outputs. WellCat modelling to confirm MAASP from relevant load cases &
and wall thickness reduction. P&D
Revision: 1
4.24 Brine Considerations as a Barrier

Non-particulate fluids such as brine cannot be said to be an independent barrier under most
circumstances. The brine can only be said to provide a true barrier if its level can be observed
continuously to ensure maintenance of the hydrostatic head. In practice this is not normally
possible, especially when an upper mechanical barrier encloses the brine column.
1. Generally, Brine is only considered as a primary barrier when LCM held in place against the
reservoir by the overbalance hydrostatic column of brine. In addition to this, the brine column
must also be capable of maintenance and monitoring.
2. Brine supported by a plug can only be considered as a single pressure barrier since the brine
is completely dependent on the plug not leaking.
3. Under some circumstances (generally low permeability or heavy oil reservoirs) a column of
brine alone (no LCM) may act as a viable barrier. However, this capability should never be
assumed, and brine alone should only be used based on local experience.

Revision: 1
4.25 Brine Density and Temperature Correction

Irrespective of the applied salt, brine density will change due to temperature and to a lesser extent,
pressure. Like most substances, brines are subject to thermal expansion, i.e. at increasing
temperature the volume increases while the density decreases.
4.25.1 Available Brine Densities
4.25.2 Corrosivity
Although the combination of dissolved oxygen and high electrolyte content of concentrated brines
is conducive to corrosive attack, actual corrosion during workovers or completions is normally of
minor importance, at least in brines which do not contain zinc.
Exposure time to the fluids during completions and workovers is usually in terms of a few days,
too short to cause a significant corrosion effect. Moreover the solubility of oxygen (O2) decreases
with increased salt concentration and if the brine is not circulated during the completion, i.e. not
O2 is not replenished, O2 present in the brine will quickly deplete and corrosion rate will
consequently decrease.
The application of an oxygen scavenger when circulating low-saline brine in a well can be
considered with the inherent problem that the (normally bisulphite - HSO3- - based) chemical will
be consumed in the reaction with O2 and needs to be added continuously and closely monitored.
A good measure to minimise corrosion is by increasing the brine pH to 8.5, if possible.
Revision: 1
4.25.3 Effective Brine Density

Consider the effect of temperature on the effective brine density when planning brine density to
provide sufficient overbalance. Brine density correction can be confirmed with UIK and/or the
brine supplier, in line with the graph below.

Revision: 1
4.26 Well Intervention Killing Methods

Well killing operations are typically required for well intervention prior to well entry, to allow access
to the well (N/D Tree & N/U BOP) and to perform well operations with a primary fluid barrier in
place. To kill the well there are 4 main methods to consider:
Method Advantage Disadvantage
 High casing pressures
avoided  Possible debris (rust / solids)
 Tubing pressure quickly from annulus falling on top of
reduced to zero. plug.
Reverse Kill
 Hydrocarbons can be routed  Plugging of flow path
into production facility –  Higher ECD than conventional
reduced risk of spill or loss of circulation (normally)
containment.
 Tubing contents go into
annulus.
 If annular contents are not
known or could contain  High casing pressures (gas
Forward Kill into annulus).
debris.
 Easy kill graph  Gas migration quicker than kill
fluid is pumped. Gas rises
back up the tubing.
 Reservoir damage /
 Simple.
impairment
Bullhead Kill  Easy kill graph.
 High pressures.
 No hydrocarbons to surface.
 Losses
Used when:
 No circulation can be
Lubricate and Bleed achieved.
 Time Consuming
(Volumetric Method)  Low permeability.
 Gas migration is a problem
to forward kill.
4.26.1 Reverse and Forward Kill Maintenance of BHP

The well is circulated with back pressure maintained on the to keep a slight overpressure on the
formation thereby preventing inflow of any unwanted fluids from the formation. It is normal practice
to add 700 kPa (Safety Margin) to the original CITHP as overpressure, gradually reducing this
pressure during the pumping operation to maintain BHP constant as the kill fluid fills the tubing.
The choke manifold should be used to maintain the required over pressure. The amount of this
added pressure, or safety pressure, is related to the P.I. of the well, because excessive over
pressure in a well with high permeability will result in excessive fluid losses into the formation.
As the killing fluid circulates through the conduit at the base of the well (punch/SSD), it creates a
greater hydrostatic head on the bottom hole due to its higher specific gravity (higher gradient)
than the original well fluid. The THP, therefore must be reduced accordingly.
Note: Excessive pressure can result in severe compromise of the well integrity. Cumulative
pressures should not exceed the maximum rating of the weakest part (formation strength gradient,
tubing, casing and other components). Components should be suitably de-rated, depending on
their (expected or established) state of integrity.
Revision: 1
4.26.2 Well Kill Preparations

For all well killing methods it is important to define the correct kill weight and to establish a foot
on the well for optimum operational success.
Step Calculation Responsible
Calculate the Reservoir Pressure:
Method 1: use PLT or downhole gauge data to determine the static
reservoir pressure.
Method 2: use the CITHP and fluid columns in the tubing.
𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑠 = 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐻𝑃 + [(𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝜌𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 ) + (𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑜𝑖𝑙 × 𝜌𝑜𝑖𝑙 ) + (𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑔𝑎𝑠 × 𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑠 )]
P&D
1 &
OPS WE
Note: The challenge of a well kill after flowing the well is that neither
the lengths of the oil, water and gas columns are known and it is rare
that a reliable value of Pres.
Permanent down hole pressure gauges can be useful – if working.
Similarly, a slickline run into the well will normally be able to identify
the top of the oil phase below a gas phase due to a sudden drop in the
tool weight as it drops into the oil.
Production logs can also pick up this interface as well as the oil – water
interface, however it is rare for such a log to form the early stages of
a workover

Revision: 1

Plan for a mechanical base for kill fluid when possible:
To allow efficient circulation to a uniform kill fluid and well killing a
mechanical base should be installed (this may not be required to be leak
tight, i.e. a leaking plug or packer, but to be sufficient to restrict
communication between the reservoir and associated fluids with the kill
fluid).
Kill fluids can be contaminated by reservoir fluid during killing operations,
reducing the fluid density and impeding the ability to establish an
overbalance fluid.
P&D
&
2 WE Ops
&
WSV
Calculate kill weight to the point of circulation:

Include overbalance. Overbalance requirements to be as per SP-1213.
Correct kill fluid density for thermal effects – density at surface will need
to be higher than the density required in the well.
P&D
Note: The kill weight must be calculated to the point of circulation (e.g.
3 SSD or tubing punch) and not to the plug or to the reservoir. &
OPS WE
𝐵𝐻𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐻𝑃 + 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (kPa)
𝐵𝐻𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔

𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (kPa/m)
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑇𝑉𝐷 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
Revision: 1
4.27 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Reverse Circulation

The reverse circulation method of well killing is achieved by pumping kill fluid into the tubing-
casing annulus, with the required pressure gradient to maintain well control, displacing the
existing fluid to surface up the tubing via the tubing shoe in packerless completions, or via an
SSD, pump-in plug etc. or a perforation above the packer.
Calculate the Step Down Kill Graph:
The site supervisor is responsible for preparing a final step-down ‘kill
graph’ in advance of the killing operation.
Example Illustration of Kill Graph:
P&D
&
1 WE Ops
&
WSV
Reverse Circulation Equipment Layout:
WSV
2 &
TP
Reverse circulation techniques usually allow for reservoir fluid to be

displaced from the production conduit to appropriate disposal systems
through a choke manifold via the production flowline.
If pumping to the Flow Station is considered, then all relevant parties
should be informed and communication should be maintained
throughout all relevant steps of the operation.

Revision: 1

3 Make sure the tree has been inflow tested or pressure tested WSV
Rig up kill pump and surface line to the A-Annulus SOVs. Rig up a
return line from the FWV to the choke manifold.
WSV
2 x tested and functional SOVs on each side of the wellhead annulus
4 &
used for circulation should be installed.
TP
All surface equipment Xmas tree, lines, valves and manifold should be
pressure tested to MASP.
WSV
Ensure there is sufficient kill fluid on location for 1.5 times the volumes
5 &
of tubing & annulus
Mud Eng.
If applicable make sure TRSSSV or SSSV are open, and isolate ESD
6 WSV
and or PSD system
TP
WSV
WSV
&
Pressures test all surface equipment & valves for 15 minutes to working
8 TP
pressure, then bleed off pressure.
&
Driller
9 Open tree valves and the FWV Driller
If H2S or CO2 is applicable monitor area and use gas detectors (Refer
to SP-1190-2.
10 WSV
H2S returns should be routed to the station or flare stack and not to
atmosphere.
11 Slowly open the annulus SOV. WSV
Begin pumping kill fluid down the annulus, taking returns through kill
FWV open choke and hold over pressure on the choke. Continue
pumping at a slow rate (40 LPM). As the WHP decreases, refer to kill
graph, carefully monitor returns for losses. WSV
&
The operator at the choke manifold should use this graph to adjust the
12 TP
THP in relation to the programmed pumping time, which is calculated in
advance based upon the tubing volume and the pumping rate. &
A slow circulation rate is advisable for gravel-pack wells due to normally Driller
high permeability as too high an over pressure or too high a pumping
rate will result in losses.
13 Close all tree valves and observe well, for one hour. Driller
WSV
&
14 If well is dead, rig down and secure well head area TP
&
Driller
Revision: 1
4.28 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Conventional/Direct Circulation

The same criteria applies to this method as with the Reverse Circulation method detailed above.
The difference is that instead of pumping kill fluid down the annulus and up the tubing as in
Reverse Circulation, the rig up is such that the kill fluid is pumped down the tubing and up the
annulus.
Plan for a mechanical base for kill fluid when possible:
Kill fluids can be contaminated by reservoir fluid during killing operations,
reducing the fluid density and impeding the ability to establish an
overbalance fluid.
P&D
&
1 WE Ops
&
WSV
Calculate the Step Down Kill Graph:

The site supervisor is responsible for preparing a final step-down ‘kill
graph’ in advance of the killing operation.
Example Illustration of Kill Graph:
P&D
&
2 WE Ops
&
WSV

Revision: 1

TP
WSV
4 Make sure the tree has been inflow tested or pressure tested WSV
Rig up kill pump and surface line to the KWV. Rig up a return line from
the A-Annulus SOVs to the choke manifold.
WSV
2 x tested and functional SOVs on each side of the wellhead annulus
5 &
should be installed.
TP
All surface equipment Xmas tree, lines, valves and manifold should be
pressure tested to MASP.
WSV
Ensure there is sufficient kill fluid on location for 1.5 times the volumes
6 &
of tubing & annulus
Mud Eng.
If applicable make sure TRSSSV or SSSV are open, and isolate ESD
7 WSV
and or PSD system
WSV
&
Pressures test all surface equipment & valves for 15 minutes to working
8 TP
pressure, then bleed off pressure.
&
Driller
9 Open Annulus SOVs Driller
to SP-1190-2).
10 WSV
H2S returns should be routed to the station or flare stack and not to
atmosphere.
11 Slowly open the KWV. WSV
Begin pumping kill fluid down the tubing, taking returns through kill
Annulus SOVs, open choke and hold over pressure on the choke.
Continue pumping at a slow rate (40 LPM). As the WHP decreases, refer
to kill graph, carefully monitor returns for losses. WSV
&
The operator at the choke manifold should use this graph to adjust the
12 TP
THP in relation to the programmed pumping time, which is calculated in
advance based upon the tubing volume and the pumping rate. &
A slow circulation rate is advisable for gravel-pack wells due to normally Driller
high permeability as too high an over pressure or too high a pumping
rate will result in losses.
13 Close all tree valves and observe well, for one hour. Driller
If the well is dead, rig down and secure well head area. WSV
&
14 TP
If well is not dead, consider the remaining pressures in the well (THP and &
Casing pressure) and follow the MOC process.
Driller
Revision: 1
4.29 Well Kill prior to Intervention – Bullhead Killing

Before commencement certain disadvantages are present in bullheading operations and these
should be taken into consideration.
 If there are several formations present, the bullheaded fluid will go to the most permeable
formation.
 There is a potential risk of fracturing the formation anywhere along the open hole which can
lead to an internal blowout.
Note: Severely weakened (downhole) components may fail at high bullhead pressures because
of erosion of corrosion.
TP
WSV
2 Pressures test all surface equipment for 15 minutes to working pressure. Driller
WSV
3 Ensure 1.5 times of hole volume kill fluid is on location. &
Mud Eng.
WSV
Ensure max pump pressure is within tubing limitations. Set PRVs to 80%
4 &
of the tubing burst limit (considering any loss of wall thickness).
TP
5 From well history file if available, obtain injectivity rate WSV
WSV
6 &
to SP-1190-2).
TP
WSV
7 Shut in the well and allow to stabilise determine the CITHP &
Production
Ops
Prepare a pressure chart; start with 0 strokes and CITHP at head of the
chart.
8 WSV

Revision: 1

9 Connect the kill pump to the tubing KWV, close the flow line wing valve Driller
WSV
Open SSV if applicable and isolate ESD and or PSD system, open tree
10 &
valves.
Driller
Slowly bring up the pump pressure to the CITHP then just enough to
11 Driller
overcome the CITHP
12 Perform injectivity test. And compare with step 4 WSV
WSV
Slowly increase the pump rate to an acceptable level as discussed with
13 &
the pump crew
Driller
WSV
Carefully monitor the amount of fluid pumped and the THP. &
15 As the tubing volume is being displaced the THP will decrease due to Driller
the hydrostatic head. &
Mud Eng.
Bullhead 1.5 times the tubing volume
16 The well cannot be considered dead until the kill fluid replaces the old Driller
fluid.
Observe the well for one hour to confirm that the well is dead and safe
to work.
WSV
17 If wellbore pressure is still observed, it could mean gas is migrating faster &
than the pumping rate or the kill fluid is the wrong weight or viscosity.
Consider the remaining pressure and follow the MOC process, before Driller
repeating the bullhead operation.
Revision: 1
4.30 Acid / stimulation squeeze fluid weights and circulation procedures

Prior to running the completion, the reservoir may be stimulated with acid, to reduce
skin/impairment caused during the drilling phase or as stimulation to enhance reservoir
properties. Acid is placed in openhole and allowed to soak for a defined period. During this
operation it is important to manage the HSE risk of handling acid and to maintain well control
while displacing a new fluid in the well.
When drilling with mud weight either dictated by wellbore stability or by PPP, the HCL should be
equal or greater than the mud weight. If HCL density is lower, then the displacement SHALL (as
per SP-1213) be performed under controlled conditions to maintain BHP constant and a controlled
bleed off later performed. When spotting acid in a horizontal section, the acid will not reduce BHP
during spotting, but must be considered when displacing it out as a lighter fluid.
4.30.1 Operational Control Points:
Step Operation Responsible
TP
WSV
R/U pump unit lines. Pressure Test the pumping unit and lines before the
1 IPC
start of the job (value as per program requirement).
With the bit on bottom, ensure a FOSV is installed on the tool joint above
2 Driller
the rotary table.
Install a circulating head on the string above the FOSV and connect a IPC
3 line to the IPC unit. &
Pressure test surface lines (value as per program requirement). Driller
Revision: 1

If the Well is on Losses & MW ≤ 10.1 kPa/m, Pump acid as follows:
Partial Losses:
Keep filling the well with 10.1 kPa/m brine and use the same for acid
displacement and record losses.
Total Losses (no level possible at surface despite max fill rate)
 Keep filling the well with WSW down annulus and record losses.
Partial or Total Losses:

 IPC to pump xxx m3 of 15% HCl with 1% clay stabilizer and displace
with xxx m3 of brine with IPC unit @ rate of xxx lpm.
(Volumes, flowrates and HCl properties as per program)
 Flow check and POOH to the casing shoe. WSV

&
4  Soak acid for xxx hours. and flush all surface lines.
IPC
In case of a loss rate increase > xxx m3/hr then POOH to surface. &
If the loss rate increase < xxx m3/hr then run to bottom and circulate Driller
out the spent acid.
Perform a 2nd acid job the loss rate increase was < xxx m3/hr
with xxx m3 of brine with IPC unit @ rate of xxx lpm.
(Volumes, flowrates and HCl properties as per program)
 Flow check and POOH to the casing shoe.
 Soak acid for xxx hours and flush all surface lines.
In case of a loss rate increase > xxx m3/hr then POOH to surface.
If the loss rate increase < xxx m3/hr then run to bottom and circulate
out the spent acid.
If the Well is Static & MW ≤ 10.1 kPa/m, Pump acid as follows:
with xxx m3 of brine with IPC unit @ rate of xxx lpm. Maintain BHP WSV
while the light acid is circulated into open hole and up the annulus.
&
(Volumes, flowrates and HCl properties as per program) TP
5 &
 Flow check and POOH to the casing shoe. IPC
 Soak acid for xxx hours. and flush all surface lines. &
Driller
 Run to bottom and circulate out the spent acid via the choke
manifold, maintaining BHP while the light acid is circulated up the
annulus.
6 POOH to surface and flush all surface lines Driller
Revision: 1
4.31 Perforation Methodology and Considerations

The typical perforation methods adopted in PDO include pipe conveyed (TCP) or wireline
conveyed. Both methods are considered high risk operations and should be performed offline
from the rig/hoist, with the X-mas Tree installed, when possible.
4.31.1 Perforation Barrier Requirements

Perforation with the rig or hoist requirements shall follow SP-1213 section 9.10
Perforation Method Conditions Barrier Requirements
 Overbalance fluid
Allowed for Low-medium risk sections, column
with a known overbalance.  Drilling BOP (Annular
Wireline with CSO capability)
Overbalance If perforating in brine, use a density equal Or
to the mud weight used to drill and secure  Wireline PCE
the section. connected to a flanged
shooting nipple
Wireline
Underbalance Not allowed N/A
 Overbalance fluid
TCP Overbalance Allowed column
 Drilling BOP
Allowed for low-risk sections (DWI-1 &
DWI-2). DWI-3 wells to include provision
for handling sour hydrocarbons, i.e. flare
stack or sending returns to the flow line.
 Hydrocarbon Fluid
Mitigations for sour wells to be in place as Column (if low risk)
per SP-1190-2.  Tubing
TCP Underbalance  Flow back connection to
(with packer) Not recommended for medium-high risk the string
sections. If performed, follow the TCP  Choke manifold
perforation Controls.  Flow loop to well test
package or flow line.
Free flow potential wells should include a
downhole surface controlled (annulus
pressure) ball valve and circulating
device.
 Tubing and downhole
packer (when
applicable)
Permanent TCP Allowed
 Tubing hanger & Well
head
 Xmas Tree
* Primary Barrier Element (Blue) / Secondary Barrier Element (Red)

Revision: 1
4.31.2 Perforation Selection Considerations

Perforation Method Advantage Disadvantage
 Well Control Primary Barrier  Possible losses

TCP Overbalance
is maintained.  Wellbore impairment / Skin
 Flow into the wellbore must
be considered
 Hydrocarbons brought to
 Removal of skin / debris and
TCP Underbalance surface
well productivity
improvement.  Flowback configuration from
the string to choke manifold
and well test/ station should
be considered.
 Perforation is possible in
underbalance, allowing direct
clean-up of perforations and  Debris left in hole
Permanent TCP flow to the station or well test  Future Access may be
package. impeded
 Single trip with the
completion.
 No string in the hole in case
 Well Control Primary Barrier of an influx or losses
Wireline Overbalance
is maintained.  Possible losses
 Wellbore impairment / Skin
 Tree installation required and
full PCE above
 Removal of skin / debris and  Guns size limitation
Wireline Underbalance well productivity
improvement.  Access limitation (i.e. ESP
completion)
 Well Deviation limitation
Revision: 1
4.32 TCP Perforation (when planning underbalanced with the rig)

Underbalance TCP perforation should not be performed on rigs or hoists on high-risk well control
sections. High risk well control sections should be perforated on TCP with overbalance or with full
containment (i.e. standalone wireline through the xmas tree).
Medium free flow wells may be perforated with TCP and underbalance, given the job is planned
to contain the influx with perforation and the influx is circulated out conventionally via the choke
manifold and vacuum degasser or to a flaring package and stack.
For underbalance perforation, the TCP guns should be run on tubing rather than drillpipe to
facilitate flow from the well. Tubing connections should be selected for flowing conditions (i.e.,
gas tight), however note that underbalance perforation on high-risk well control wells (gas wells)
is not allowed.
Low risk non-free flow wells, while not capable to provide sustained flow, with underbalance TCP
will invite an influx into the tubing. The influx may be reverse circulated out via a “poor boy” head,
to the choke manifold and vacuum degasser or to a flaring package and stack. The “poor boy
head” should consist of:
Alternatively, low risk non-free flow wells may be circulated out after perforation conventionally in
the same method stated for medium risk wells.
4.32.1 System Weaknesses of the “poor boy” head:

1. The absence of gas tight certification on FOSV valves.
2. The lack of a fail-safe mechanism
The “poor boy head” shall not be used for reverse circulation on DWI-3 wells.

Revision: 1
4.32.2 Operational Control Points (Medium Risk Method):

TP
WSV
Driller
2 Pick up and make up the TCP Perforation gun as per design. &
TCP Eng.
Driller
Position over the hole and lower the gun into well until the upper
3 &
connection is at the desired height. Set in slips.
TCP Eng.
Driller
Pick up, make up firing head and one tubing joint, and fill it up with filtered
4 &
brine.
TCP Eng.
Driller
5 Pick up and make up required number of tubing joints & production valve. &
TCP Eng.
Pressure Test the differential sub (indicative test). Close the Annular Driller
6 BOP and pressure up the annulus to 1,000 kPa - Confirm no leaks on &
Differential Sub via the open-ended tubing. TCP Eng.
Pick up and make up:
 the TCP packer & RA marker (PIP tag) Driller
 1 stand of tubing/ drill pipe at least &
7
 Fill up the string with filtered brine.
TCP Eng
Note: Do not fill up while RA marker at surface. Keep all crew away from
radioactive source.
Continue RIH and filling up string every 10 joints from pipe rack to
perforation depth and as per pipe tally.
 Do not use pumps to fill. Sustain moderate flow to fill the tubing
effectively with low air bubbles. Driller
8
 Sudden up/downward movement of string must be avoided to
minimize fluid movement in string. Note that fluid movement can
cause ceramic disc or glass disc inside the differential pressure sub
to weaken or break.
 Stop filling in tubing once desired underbalance is achieved.
Rig up e-line Gamma RAY/SLB and Casing Collar Locator (CCL) as per
E-line procedures.
Wireline
9 Eng.
 Wireline PCE is required to be installed on the tubing string. A FOSV
side entry sub (with 2 x lo-torqs) and pack-off may be used.
Wireline
10 Run in hole with E-line logging tools to RA marker depth.
Eng.
Perform upward logging as per pre-determent length of logging pass Wireline
11 based on original logs. Eng.
Revision: 1

Calculate the exact length required to space out the TCP guns based on WSV
logged depth of RA marker. &
 Ensure all parties; WSV, TCP engineer and E-line engineer agree Wireline
12 on required length need to be added/subtracted to match logged Eng.
depth of RA marker with actual bottom hole assy.
&
TCP Eng.
POOH E-line GR-CCL logging tool to surface and rig down the toolstring Wireline
13 and PCE. Eng.
Space out the string by adding or removing required length to have guns WSV
exactly at perforation interval.
&
14 TCP Eng.
 WSV and TCP team to be on the rig floor to witness the amount of
&
pipe added or subtracted into/out of the hole to have to top shot on
required depth. Driller
Set TCP packer as per TCP service company procedures. Close the
Annular BOP and pressure test the packer to 3000-5000 kPa (TBC with TCP Eng.
15 program requirements). Bleed off the pressure in annulus to 1,000 KPa. &
Driller
 Ensure all pressures are outlined in vendor TCP program.
Rig up the TCP “poor boy head”
Low risk wells with planned reverse circulation to include a hard line from Driller
the side-entry sub to the choke manifold (as per the illustration).
16 &
TCP Eng.
Medium risk wells with conventional circulation planned should include a
lo-torq attached to the side-entry sub and a gauge connected to the lo-
torq (without the need for hard piping downstream).
Drop the firing bar to break the Ceramic disc or Break the plug at the
Production Valve and detonate the guns in sequences.
Wait for any indication on surface:
17 - String Vibration TCP Eng.
- Sound with the acoustic device
- Fluctuation of casing pressure
If there is no indication of firing, follow the MOC process.
WSV
&
Monitor the TBG & CSG pressure changes for 15 minutes to confirm
18 Driller
the formation influx.
&
TCP Eng.
Bleed off CSG pressures to zero, pick up string to open the packer
bypass as per TCP engineer’s instructions.
WSV
&
Confirm the CSG pressure reads zero. If pressure is observed, the brine
19 Driller
weight may not be sufficient as a kill fluid and the killing operations will
be require higher density brine. &
TCP Eng.
Note: if the by-pass is not activated, then unseat the packer.

Revision: 1

Circulate out the influx and continue to 150% of the well volume, via the
choke manifold, maintaining overbalance to the reservoir with the
required back-pressure.
Medium Risk (Conventional Circulation): A step down graph for

circulation of the tubing contents should be followed for the killing WSV
operation.
&
TP
Low Risk (Reverse Circulation): Casing Pressure to kept constant as the
20 kill brine is already present in the annulus. &
Driller
 Continue circulation through choke manifold towards poor boy &
degasser until clear brine is returned at surface with no more gas/oil Mud Eng.
& contaminated brine. Hydrocarbons and contaminated returns are
to be directed to a specific tank and NOT dumped in the waste pit.
 Circulation rates to be limited to the lowest limitation from either:
o The poor boy degasser handling capacity.
o The maximum allowable pump rate through the packer bypass.
Flow check the well and monitor on trip tank. Ensure well is static or on
21 Driller
losses and establish filling rate.
22 POOH the TCP guns and running string. Driller
Driller
23 Lay down RA Marker, PKR and all downhole tools as per the BHA. &
TCP Eng.
Continue POOH and L/down TCP assembly until 60 m of tubing/DP is Driller
24 below the surface. &
TCP Eng.
WSV
&
TP
Stop, space out tool joints, set slips and tie off. Check fluid level and
25 close BOP pipe ram. &
Driller
&
TCP Eng.
Hold PJSM with the crew and review crew R&R and duties. Discuss the WSV
details of laying down the BHA, disarming the guns. &
26 TP
Erect barriers and make a PA announcement, to ensure all non-essential &
personnel are well away from the rig floor, cellar and the BOP areas.
TCP Eng.
Open BOP pipe ram and POOH slowly to avoid handling shocks.
28 Driller
The BOPs can still be closed to control the well.
Remove the last tubing/DP joint and remove the drop bar. Observe the Driller
29 brass indent for the mark. &
TCP Eng.
POOH and L/down all perforation guns one by one and complete the job.
30 TCP Eng.
Visually check the perforated gun condition to confirm shots are fired.
Revision: 1
4.33 Dynamic Kill Setup

The dynamic well control set up shall incorporate the requirements stipulated in SP-1213, and
the illustrations below provides an overview of the basic setup.
Natih Hardware Setup - Rigs

P Diesel Pump
“Flo-show” “Blooie” Line
Butterfly valve
Rotating Head
NRV Fill-Up
Spool
2” Line
4” Natih Line
4” Line Flow Line
Annular
Preventer
6” Line
Flow meter
Variable Pipe
Rams
6” Line 2” Line
Blind / Shear
P Rams
Trip
P Tank
Water Supply Water
P
Tank
To Rig
Pumps
Continuous Flow of up to 100m3/ hour
Water Pit required to keep gas down

Revision: 1
Natih Hardware Setup - Hoists

Water supply
Flow line with Flo-Show straight to Waste Pit. 6” line
Optional T-off to Circ Tank
No valve to waste pit
Circ Water Water Water
Tank Tank Tank Tank
Rotating Head
Annular Flow rate Lined

depends on Water
Preventer P
Hole Size
Pit
VBR
Kill Line Choke Line Flowmeters

Shear Rams Lined
Waste
NRV NRV Pit
4.34 Installing A Flanged Shooting Nipple and Pressure Testing

An API flanged shooting nipple type is inherently more robust than a conventional shooting nipple.
It is also noted that there are no implications or possibilities of this design affecting the integrity
of the BOP.
It is noted that the installation of this type of shooting nipple is more suited to Hoist operations.
Drilling rigs require a full circulating system to be available and thus a Bell nipple is required to
divert returning fluid.

Revision: 1
1 Ensure the ring groove is clean & in good condition. Driller

2 Lower riser section complete with flanged connection. Driller
3 Install (Nipple-Up) riser section onto annular preventer. Driller
4 Run a Test Plug or TWCV into the wellhead/Tubing hanger. WSV
Wireline
5 Install appropriate wireline pressure control equipment.
Supervisor
Pressure test initial rig-up to MASP.
6 Note: the MASP is limited by the rating of the shooting nipple or the BOP Driller
whichever is the lower.
Remove test Plug or TWCV.
The connection that is broken should be provided with an external test port Wireline
7
facility to enable re-test of the connection once made up again (Quick Test Supervisor
Sub).
Install wireline toolstring
Wireline
8 Toolstring length should be accommodated above the BOP Blind/Shear Supervisor
rams.
Note: To install a flange type Shooting nipple on a drilling rig, it would require the removal of the
Bell nipple and the installation of a flanged adapter. This would present the following operational
risks:
• Bell nipple installation/removal is a hazardous operation.
• The top Annular ring groove may be in poor condition and /or may get damaged.
4.35 Setting Depths for Deep and Shallow Barriers

Barriers are installed and verified to allow entry and exit to the well, as part of the primary and
secondary barrier envelopes. The plugs are often referred to as deep and shallow plugs/barriers,
however the depth is not a strict requirement and rather the placement is based on:
1. A deep plug set sufficiently deep to allow placement of overbalance fluid above the plug. Note
the BOP is only considered effective as a secondary barrier when the plug is set deep with a
monitored fluid column above it.
2. One barrier sufficiently deep and the second one sufficiently shallow to achieve the maximum
possible distance between the two barriers so that it is possible to confirm their individual
integrity by measuring the volumes pumped during the pressure test.
The delta test volume between plugs is calculated from:

The system volumes The Fluid Compressibility The Test Pressure
Test Vol (shallow) = System Vol.(shallow) x Test Pressure x Compressibility
Test Vol (deep) = System Vol.(deep) x Test Pressure x Compressibility
Delta test vol. = Test Vol (deep) - Test Vol (shallow)
Typical Values for Mud Compressibility

Fluid Compressibility (1/kPa) Compressibility (1/psi)
Water and WBM 0.45 × 10-6 0.31 × 10-5
Base oil 0.69 × 10-6 0.47 × 10-5

Revision: 1
OBM 0.80 × 10-6 0.55 × 10-5
An Example Calculation is shown below:

Tubing ID Shallow Plug Depth Fluid Type Compressibility Pressure Test Value
2.992 in 10 m Water 4.50E-07 7500 kPa
Delta Test Vol. (ltr)
Delta Test Vol. (ltr)
4500.00
4000.00
3500.00
3000.00
Distance between Plugs (m)
2500.00
2000.00
1500.00
1000.00
500.00
0.00
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00
Delta Test Volume (ltr)
Revision: 1
4.35.1 Delta System Volume Illustration:

Revision: 1
4.35.2 Risk Associated with not setting a plug as deep as possible.

Preferably the deepset plug should be placed in the tail of the completion below the production
packer. It may not be possible to set plugs deep in all circumstances, for example due to the well
trajectory, or tubing integrity/condition. Where possible the plug setting depth, is set as deep as
possible is to:
1. Avoid/limit the amount of tubing and jewellery required as part of the primary barrier envelope.
This is to mitigate the risk of possible future tubing failure.
2. Allow overbalance fluid to be placed on top of the deepset plug.
3. Enable pressure testing and verification of the subsequent shallow set plug
Revision: 1
4.36 Plug Retrieval (Slickline vs. Drillpipe)

In PDO operations plug retrieval is routinely performed to allow access to the well after N/U or
N/D Tree or BOP and the barriers are no longer required. Plug retrieval should be performed
under the premise that pressure exists below the plug (unless this can be ruled out by
measurement).
The method to provide full containment with the presence of pressure / hydrocabons below a
plug, is with slickline and PCE (or coil and HWU or CWI live well entry operations). Full
containment should be utilised in all cases, unless an alternate method with drill pipe is fully risk
assessed.
Operation Justification Risk

Allows full containment in the
event of pressure below the plug
Shallow Plug with Slickline N/A
and controlled bleeding and or
resetting of a plug if required
If losses exist below the
plug the tensile load may
Allows full containment in the exceed the slickline
event of pressure below the plug working load during
Deep Plug with Slickline unseating.
and controlled bleeding and or
resetting of a plug if required Note: Plug and Prong use
rather than a bridge plug
will remove this risk.
Risk assessed and planned with Possible pipe ejection if
Shallow Plug with DP considerations stated in the Plug pressure exists below the
retrieval on drill pipe section. plug. WPS L3 Incident IRC
If losses exist below the plug, the
drill string tensile rating allows
safe plug retrieval without the risk
parting slickline. If over pressure exists
which is greater than the
Deep Plug with DP Allows circulation on bottom to
hydrostatic head above,
kill the well.
the well will flow.
Risk assessed and planned with
considerations stated in the Plug
retrieval on drill pipe section
Shallow or Deep plug retrieval on wells with normally pressured or overpressured reservoirs
should always be performed with full containment (i.e. slickline/wireline with PCE or Coil or HWU
setup for live well entry).

Revision: 1
4.36.1 Slickline Plug Retrieval Illustration Link
4.36.2 Drill Pipe Plug Retrieval Illustration Link
Revision: 1
4.37 Plug Retrieval on Slick Line

Well Barrier Schematic Requirements Responsible
Plug retrieval should be performed P&D / Ops
under the premise that pressure exists WE
below the plug (unless this can be ruled &
out by measurement). WSV
To contain any potential wellbore
pressure below a plug, wireline PCE
should be rigged up on top of a flanged
shooting nipple or a landing joint (a
conventional shooting nipple shall
require an MOC as per SP-1213). P&D / Ops
WE
Note: A dual pack-off should NOT be
&
considered for this operation when
WSV
there is a deep-set plug below a
cemented shoe track or other restriction
which may impede bullheading, as the
wireline toolstring cannot be retrieved in
the situation with wellbore pressure.
PCE and the shooting nipple (or landing
WSV
string connection should be pressure
&
tested to MASP.
Driller
Note: the MASP is limited by the rating &
of the shooting nipple or the BOP Wireline
whichever is the lower. Eng.
WSV
A quick sub should be used to retest the &
broken connection to rig up and rig Driller
down wireline toolstrings. &
Wireline
Eng.
A Work over valve (flanged shooting WSV
nipple) or FOSV (landing string) should &
be installed below the wireline BOP to Driller
allow rigging down wireline toolstrings &
and/or the wireline BOP. Wireline
Eng.
WSV
A pump-in sub (with 2 x lo-torq valves &
attached) should be installed below the Driller
wireline BOP to allow bullheading &
and/or circulation. Wireline
Eng.
When Pressure is known to exist below WSV
a plug, equalise the pressure above, &
before engaging the wireline retrieval Wireline
tool and pulling the plug or prong. Eng.

Revision: 1
4.38 Bridge Plug Retrieval on Drill pipe

Well Barrier Schematics Requirements Responsible
Plug retrieval should be performed under the P&D / Ops
premise that pressure exists below the plug WE
(unless this can be ruled out by &
measurement). WSV
To contain any potential wellbore pressure
below a plug, the Annular should be closed Driller
during equalisation and un-setting the plug.
The potential pressure trapped below the
plug should be considered from the High
Case reservoir pressure and reservoir fluid P&D / Ops
gradient between the plug and reservoir. WE
&
Note: U-tubing or gas migration (without
WSV
expansion) may also provide a pressure
source to consider for pressure equalisation.
The pressure equalisation needs to account
for the effective load across the plug,
considering the effective diameters across
the plug: P&D / Ops
WE
&
WSV
Example Calculation
Critical Well control points:

1. RIH with the retrieval tool to above the
bridge plug.
2. Close the annular and apply the
required surface pressure to equalise
the load across the plug. WSV
3. Engage the bridge plug and confirm &
pressure equalisation. TP
&
4. Release the plug with overpull and strip Driller
out ~ 2 m to confirm the plug is retracted.
5. Bleed of applied well pressure gradually
and monitor for pipe movement.
6. With all pressure bled off, open the
annular and POOH.
Revision: 1
4.39 Wireline Barrier Requirements with Newly Installed Completion

Newly installed wells require slickline work to perform gauge cutter runs and to install plugs or
wireline CBL logging. Surface PCE requirements are described in this section for clarity.
The operations and requirements consider that the completion and shoetrack are un-perforated,
pressure tested and inflow tested (with a horner plot) and as such the primary barrier elements
are verified - The fluid in the well may be underbalance in this case. Overbalance brine is not
defined as a secondary barrier as it is considered as a dependant barrier (i.e. if the shoetrack fails
the overbalance brine level may drop and a level may not be sustainable).
GC / CBL & Plug GC / CBL & Plug Plug Retrieval Plug Retrieval
(with WL PCE) (without WL PCE) (with WL & PCE) (Rod Lubricator)
Operation Requirements
Gauge Cutter run Secondary Barrier envelope, fulfilled by Wireline PCE
CBL Log OR
Bridge Plug Installation A Drilling BOP, with a Shear Test on an equivalent landing
joint tubular with wireline on the inside (and if applicable:
TWCV/BPV Installation control line on the outside).
Plug retrieval should be performed under the premise that
Shallow Plug Retrieval pressure exists below the plug.
(Hanger profile or set in tubing) Plug retrieval should be performed with containment by
means of Slickline with PCE or with a lubricator and rod.

Revision: 1
4.40 TWCV/BPV Hanger Profile Installation and Retrieval

TWCV or BPV installation in the hanger profile should be installed in an “H” thread profile which
is in good condition (i.e. recently inspected or in new condition). SP-1213 barrier requirements in
relation to well control risk profile shall be followed, i.e. “A TWCV may be used on High-Risk wells
with a New or OEM inspected H profile”, but should only used as a barrier for testing (e.g. the
Tree.)
If the well is secured with a deep barrier and a monitored fluid column on top (establishing no
flow), the TWCV or BPV may be installed manually with a rod and T-Bar, without surface
containment as zero well pressure is established.
During retrieval of the TWCV or BPV, the pressure below a plug is no longer visible/measurable
in most scenarios. In this case the TWCV or BPV should be retrieved with containment when
possible (i.e. with use of a rod lubricator or slickline with PCE). PR-1475 provides the procedure
for running and retrieving TWCV/BPV with a lubricator.
As per Cameron procedure, there is provision to retrieve a plug when no suspected trapped or
sustained pressure is below (i.e. a TWCV above a newly installed completion, with brine filled
tubing contents and isolation from the reservoir via verified deep primary barrier elements). This
method should be controlled, and risk assessed prior to the task and is not preferred over the
retrieval with containment. A requirement to control risk with this operation is illustrated in the L3
WPS incident (PIM I.D. 1110937) and the Lateral Learning outcomes
If sustained flow is observed during pressure equalisation, the pulling tool should be backed out
to secure the well and the plug later retrieved with containment (rod lubricator) once the well
condition is understood and secure.
As a rule of thumb for all plug retrieval: Always assume pressure is trapped below the plug
and take the appropriate action to allow controlled release of trapped pressure and/or subsequent
containment.
Revision: 1
4.41 Typical AC 9 Challenges and Considerations for Well Entry

AC 9 wells typically required single barrier well entry due to integrity failure/s. Production casing
failures will also impede the ability to verify a primary barrier envelope. A common AC 9 event is
caused by shallow external corrosion and communication is observed from Annulus to adjacent
annuli and to atmosphere.
This failure mode is common where the cement behind surface and intermediate casings is poor
(mainly due to UeR which is a highly fractured, vugular carbonate that accepts losses during
cementation). Failure very close to surface (4-10 m below GL) can be caused by ground water
presence and/or rain water entry behind the surface casing due to low TOC. Failure modes slightly
deeper (20-100 m) are more likely attributed to corrosive fluid present from the UeR formation,
and poor cementation in associated annuli.
For this failure mode, pipe corrosion begins to work on the outer string(s) of casing and slowly
moves inward to the production tubing. Surface annular indicators may be non-existent as the
UER is normally pressured.

Revision: 1
If no action is taken, the wellhead may collapse leading to a loss of containment or the casing
may degrade to an extent, whereby access into the well is no longer possible and the only
remedial option available is a relief well to restore the natural barrier/s at cap rock level/s.
Remedial solutions often include repairs with scab casings or liners, rather than abandonment;
The scab will not tackle the root cause of failure (external corrosion) and a monitoring plan should
allow early attendance while the well is still accessible, to repair or abandon in the future.
4.41.1 Key Aspect to attend the wells:

Step Requirements Responsible
Assess the credible leak paths. Take sample and ensure LEL / H2S values
are within working limits in the cellar and surroundings. PT
1 &
Consider the use of a thermal camera to observe leaks and leak paths.
WI Eng
Consider filling the cellar to observe leaks and leak paths.
Assess the wellhead condition and plan for a base plate and landing clamp
2 WE Ops
to be installed as wellhead support as a precaution.
PP
Assess/collate corrosion logs and use the data to calculate production
3 &
casing capacity vs. the BOP axial loading in WellCat.
P&D
Assess the cellar condition and organise repairs if required.
Consider the number, condition and accessibility of SOVs (considering
sustained casing pressure). Cellar modification may be required to allow
additional SOVs and VR lubricator access, prior to work unit entry.
Example:
PT
&
4 Civil
&
WE Ops
Confirm the pad location is not damaged and can support the unit WE Ops
5 (consider location boring). Perform pad compaction in advance of the unit &
entry. Civil
WE Ops
Consider ditch construction to divert return from the cellar to the waste pit
6 &
if required.
Civil
Revision: 1

Monitor pressure on tubing and annulus for build up to verify deep barriers
7 PT
through extended flow checks.
Assess the wells flow potential (low risk non free flow) or medium risk.
Single barrier well entry under a deviation carries a lower risk profile then
with a medium risk well. RE
8 PPP to be verified by a RE TA 2 &
Consider any shallow hydrocarbon bearing zones with the PPP as these PT
may be exposed during the intervention and should be known to well
engineering to plan the operation accordingly.
Identify associated neighbouring injectors which can affect PP. Where
applicable, close in relevant water injectors. RE
9 &
Cessation of Injection may be critical to stop the free flow potential of the
and will be a key mitigation to allow attendance of well. PT
Identify the credible repair and/or abandonment plan/s and describe the
selection criteria in a decision tree.
The basis of any plan and discussion should prioritise reservoir isolation PT
as deep as possible (“get a foot on the well”) prior to hoist entry. In the
case of low risk, this may be accepted as the reservoir fluids column, &
10 however in the case of a medium risk well, this will be a mechanical WI Eng
barrier (and should not be a dynamic fill column). &
The requirement to gain a foot on the well should take precedence over P&D / WE
repair options even when it leads to likelihood of abandonment. Ops
Repair options should consider future abandonment possibility and ease.
For example, leave space above packers to set plugs across caprock.
Identify any long lead items which may delay well entry or prohibit optimal P&D / WE
11
operations (i.e. a scab casing and/or hanger availability). Ops
Once all the Aspects have been evaluated and the civil remedial work closed out, the work unit
allocation can be triggered to attend the well. AC 9 wells have a 2 week attendance window
otherwise the asset will need to seek a waiver. The Asset evaluation and civil work needs to
be accelerated to meet the timeline and allow safe work unit well entry.

Issue and Sign-off a WSAM Proposal and assign the work unit.
12 Feedback the integrity failure to the P&D WE, to record against the well PT
type for design optimisation in the future.
Seek single barrier well entry/s approval via a deviation in the MOC tool
(for both slickline slickline scope and rig/hoist scope). P&D
13
Include visualisations of barrier schematics for key phases, using the CWI / WE
wellbarrier software.
14 Install tubing plugs as barrier elements and verify barriers via testing. PT / CWI
P&D
Prepare the workover / abandonment program.
15 &
Follow CP-178 TA1 approval requirement for AC 9 well activities.
WE Ops

Revision: 1
4.41.2 Example Well Entry Checklist
ATTEND THE WELL – W ORK SITE HAZARD ASSESSMENT Yes No Responsible

The Single Barrier Well Entry Deviation (MOC) is WSV
1 approved, and the mitigations are understood with the
signed declaration.
The Intervention program has been approved and WSV
2 understood by the site team.
3 The location and well handover has been completed WSV
Confirm LEL / H2S values are within working limits in the
4 cellar and surroundings. WSV
5 Confirm well pressures as per program WSV

Check and confirm the condition of the landing clamp,
6 cellar and pad WSV
7 Install additional SOVs as per program WSV

Pressure test all wellhead and tree components and
8 confirm all well barrier verifications. WSV
9 Confirm cellar pumps are installed and working WSV

Perform evacuation muster in preparation for single barrier
10 operations WSV
Confirm emergency response communications (numbers
11 available and lines/mobile/Thuraya phones charged and WSV
working).
Communicate with LEBC prior to operation (and maintain
12 a daily call). WSV
13 Cease any Simops operations as per MOPO agreement. WSV

N/D the tree, Install the BOP and attend the well as per
14 program. WSV
Revision: 1
4.42 Annulus Barrier Considerations for Abandonment Operations

During abandonment operation the natural barrier is re-instated. For rock-to-rock isolation, the
annulus/ annuli may need additional cement placement after section milling, perforation, or multi
cuts. At this moment the well will communicate with the annulus, and it is important to understand
possible communication with the reservoir or hydrocarbon bearing formations. The mud weight
selection should provide overbalance to this formation.
This consideration is particularly critical in Ara Salt wells when planning to abandon shallow
across salt, with a possible deep floater in communication and an assumed gas gradient from
floater depth to the cut depth.
4.42.1 AC 9 wells
AC9 wells can pose and additional risk whereby the integrity below the wellhead is lost and a leak
path from the A-Annulus to adjacent annuli and atmosphere is present. If an influx is observed
while milling / cutting / perforating a casing or liner, the secondary barrier envelope is ineffective.
An example of this challenge is illustrated below Link:
Option 2 Option 3
Can the cement in this annulus be considered as a
barrier to safely allow: cut, perf, cement and squeeze
operations?
(knowing we have no ability to close-in on an influx

due to loss of integrity below the wellhead.)
Multi-
cut
+ Perf
9
m
4
m
10
m
3 options were considered:
1. Accept the cement condition as a barrier in the 5 ½” liner annulus and allow operations to cut,
perf, cement and squeeze under a single barrier.
2. Run a scab to provide an additional mechanical barrier at surface (material not available for
the tubular sizing in this well).
3. Accept the 4 m isolation in Shammar and apply for a waiver to SP-1221. Only spot cement
inside the casing.
Scabbing provides compliance to SP-1213. Acceptance of cement as a barrier when < 30 m

should be risk assessed and deviation raised to list the controls to limit escalation.

Revision: 1
4.43 Sour Well – Well Control Requirements
Component Set-up / Requirement Responsible Document
The work unit allocation for sour well construction or

intervention should be assessed prior to sequence
allocation for sour service compliance of rig contract
Work Unit P&D SDP
equipment. Non-compliant equipment should be
identified and replaced (i.e. rental drill pipe or rental
BOP) for the sour activity.
The well design shall have material selection compatible
for the prognosed fluid environment.
Well P&D CDE/DDE
Design UEC1A are to verify all capital well components (i.e. & &
wellhead and tree, casings and liners, completion and UEC1A SDP
packers) are compatible.
The optimal way of handling an H2S influx may be to
P&D
bullhead to avoid exposure of components in the
Well & SDP
wellbore and handling / exposure of H2S at surface.
Control SWE Ops &
Recovery Bullheading may not be an option in all circumstances & Well
Methods and the equipment both downhole and at surface should WSV Control
be available to handle conventional or reverse & Checklist
circulation during killing operations. TP
Drilling fluid to be treated to cater for potential H2S
contamination. Treatments options include:
 Zinc Oxide UIK TFM
Drilling
 Zinc Carbonate & &
Fluid
 Zinc Chelate Mud Eng. SDP
 Ironite Sponge
 HR-2510
 SOURSCAV
All drill pipe shall be suitable for sour service, in line with
SP-2193 requirements (Lint to SP-2193):
SP-2193
&
WSV SDP
Drill pipe & &
TP Well
Control
Checklist
Revision: 1
Exposure control should be managed for all sour service

(Region 1 to 4):
a. pH of mud > 10.0
b. Scavengers to treat H2S SP-2193
c. Density of drilling fluid maintained sufficiently high so &
that only drilled gas is permitted to enter annulus WSV SDP
Drill pipe & &
TP Well
Hardness level should be: Control
Checklist
a. Checked prior to sour drilling
b. Re-checked after any significant re-work
c. Meet the procedures and levels as per IRP Volume 1
Crossovers SP-2193
All crossovers and pup joints shall follow the same WSV &
& requirement as drill pipe and be suitable for sour service, & Well
in line with SP-1293 requirements TP Control
Pup Joints
Checklist
SP-2193
All HWDP shall follow the same requirement as drill WSV &
HWDP pipe and be suitable for sour service, in line with SP- & Well
1293 requirements. TP Control
Checklist
Drill collars and BHA (excluding float valves) are not
required to be sour service, as:
1. These components are at the bottom of the drill string WSV
Drill collars and their failure during drilling would have little negative & SP-2193
impact on well control capability. TP
2. These components are not highly stressed during
tripping and would not likely fail.
SDP
Float Downhole floats should be made of H2S resistant WSV &
Valves material meeting NACE MR 0175/ISO 15156. & Well
TP Control
Checklist
FOSVs and Gray Valves shall follow the same
requirement as drill pipe and be suitable for sour service,
in line with SP-1293 requirements: SDP
Well WSV &
Control The body and internal working parts of FOSVs and Gray & Well
Subs valves should be made of H2S resistant material TP Control
meeting NACE MR 0175/ISO 15156. Checklist
Note: Sour “Trim” is not fully sour service.
“Where there is a reasonable expectation of
encountering H2S (hydrogen sulfide) gas zones that
could potentially result in the partial pressure of the H2S API-53
BOP Body exceeding 0.05 psia (0.00034 MPa) in the gas phase at WSV &
Material the MASP, the BOP and wellbore-wetted metallic & Well
equipment, excluding shear ram blades, shall be TP Control
manufactured from H2S resistant material in accordance Checklist
with NACE MR0175/ISO 15156”

Revision: 1
Equipment shall be designed with materials that meet

the requirements specified in Table 3.
API-6A Extract Link:
Material WSV Well

Class & Control
TP Checklist
For material classes DD, EE, FF, and HH, the

manufacturer shall meet the requirements of NACE
MR0175/ISO 15156 for material processing and
material properties (e.g. hardness).
Material classes DD, EE, FF, and HH should include as
part of the designation and marking, the maximum
allowable partial pressure of hydrogen sulfide (H2S).
Operating conditions (pH and partial pressure) should
be compatible with the Partial Pressure material
designation.
NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 Extract Link:
Material WSV Well

Class & Control
TP Checklist
As per API-6A For Items manufactured from 2018,

where no H2S limit is defined by NACE MR0175/ISO
15156 for the partial pressure, no partial pressure shall
be marked.
Revision: 1
MR0175/ISO 15156-2:2009 Extract:

The high-strength steels used for blowout-preventer
(BOP) shear blades can be susceptible to SSC. The
suitability of shear blades that do not comply with NACE
MR0175/ISO 15156 is the responsibility of the
equipment user.
Rams manufactured in quenched and tempered, Cr-Mo NACE
WSV
Shear Ram low-alloy steels (UNS G41XX0, formerly AISI 4IXX, and MR0175 /
&
modifications) are acceptable if the hardness does not ISO
TP
exceed 26 HRC. 15156
If the hardness of these alloys exceeds 22 HRC, careful
attention shall be paid to chemical composition and heat
treatment to ensure their SSC resistance. SSC testing,
as agreed with the equipment user, shall demonstrate
that the performance of the alloy meets or exceeds that
of field proven material.
The equipment user shall confirm that the elastomer
items below are in accordance with NACE MR0175/ISO
15156 and SP-2193.
 Annular preventer and ram rubbers API-53
 Ram shaft seals &
BOP  Bonnet and door seals WSV SP-2193
Elastomer  Packing for BOP secondary seals & &
Material  Choke and kill valve elastomeric components TP Well
Control
If the BOP has been activated and shut in for an
Checklist
emergency event during a sour well drilling operation,
the elastomeric elements shall be replaced or inspected
and tested in accordance with the equipment owner's
maintenance system.
SP-2193 Elastomer Guide Extract Lint to SP-2193
BOP WSV Well

Elastomer & Control
Material TP Checklist

Revision: 1
BOP manual and hydraulic actuated valves and BPVs

BOP shall be manufactured from H2S resistant material in WSV Well
accordance with NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 and SP- & Control
SOVs
2193. TP Checklist
Primary flow wetted valve components Performance
Requirement (PR) and Product Service Level shall
follow SP-1213 and API-6A requirements. A minimum of
PR2 and PSL 3.
API-6A Extract Link:
PSL WSV Well

& & Control
PR TP Checklist
Choke Line Choke lines (including coflex hoses) and choke SP-2193
& manifolds shall be manufactured from H2S resistant WSV &
material in accordance with NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 & Well
Choke TP Control
Manifold and SP-2193
Checklist
Ring gaskets shall be manufactured from H2S resistant SP-2193
material in accordance with NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 WSV &
Ring and SP-2193.
Gaskets & Well
Carbon steel is not accepted and ring gaskets should be TP Control
manufactured from SS 316L material. Checklist
The body and internal working parts of inside BOP's SP-2193
shall be manufactured from H2S resistant material in WSV &
iBOP & Well
accordance with NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 and SP-
2193. TP Control
Checklist
Revision: 1
A dispersion model in relation to the worst case well H2S MSE/Asset WPT
Dispersion
release should be available. The related EPZ radius & &
Model
should be included in the drilling program. P&D SDP
EPZ SP-1190-2
EPZ requirements will be dictated by the well’s
& maximum dispersion and/or surrounding activities. WSV &
Requirements for H2S Gas Detection, PPE, flaring and & Well
H 2S TP Control
Mitigations evacuation as per SP-1190-2 shall be followed.
Checklist
As per SP-1213 and SP-1190-2, when subsurface
zones are prognosed with H2S; flare lines & igniter shall
be rigged up prior to the well activity / phase.
If bullhead killing is confirmed as feasible and is planned
as the primary means of well killing the flare lines & SP-1190-2
Igniter may be omitted under an approved deviation. &
Flare Lines WSV SP-2193
& Igniter & &
Flare lines are required to divert returns in a well control TP Well
operation away from the rig to a safe distance where Control
hydrocarbons inclusive of H2S can be safely ignited. Checklist
Flare lines bodies and elastomer seals (in the case of
temporary pipe work) shall be manufactured from H2S
resistant material in accordance with NACE
MR0175/ISO 15156 and SP-2193.
The position of flare pits should allow safe ignition of SP-1190-2
hydrocarbons inclusive of H2S away from the rig site and WSV &
Flare Pits at multiple locations to enable flexibility in case of a & Well
change in wind direction. The requirements for flare pit TP Control
design and location are included in SP-1190-2 Checklist
A dump line to the far end of the waste pit and gas
sensors placed between the outlet and rig should be WSV Well
Dump Line & Control
made ready in advance (in case sour water /
incombustible returns during well control circulation) TP Checklist

Revision: 1
4.44 Casing Wear – Limitation & Monitoring

Casing wear is predominantly caused by drillpipe rotation. By comparison the effect of tripping
and wireline work is minor. The key factors contributing to wear severity are the type and surface
finish of tooljoint hardfacing, the magnitude of the contact forces exerted by tooljoints (related in
turn to wellbore trajectory, particularly dogleg severity) and the number of revolutions of the
drillpipe inside casing.
Rig-site personnel have a critical role in both limiting and monitoring casing wear.
4.44.1 Casing Wear Limitation

Topic Set-up / Requirement Responsible
Minimise dog-leg severity by taking action to eliminate angle build

tendency when exhibited by an assembly, e.g. reduce WOB,
increase rotary speed, change assembly configuration. To prevent
wear hot-spots being formed in the 9.5/8" casing this action is most
critical in the 17½" and 12¼" hole sections. P&D
DLGS &
WSV
On wells where casing wear is deemed critical, drilling practices
should be tailored to minimize dogleg severity, particularly in the
upper 2000m of the borehole. (Limiting the dogleg severity to < 0.5
deg/30m will eliminate most “hot spots”).
Ensure proper alignment of the mast, rotary table, BOP and
wellhead. Misalignment can cause rapid wear of the casing near
Work Unit surface, where a failure has the most immediate and potentially WSV
severe consequences. Misalignment may be evident from difficulty &
Alignment
engaging the bushings in the rotary table, or by observed wear on TP
the kelly saver sub or wear bushing.
Visually inspect all drillpipe hardfacing. Tooljoints with obviously
rough hardfacing should only be used in open hole until smooth.
Particular attention should be paid to any rental pipe used.
The following type of pipe should be used:

Hard  pipe without hard-facing; or
 pipe with Arnco 100XT/200XT/300XT type 1 and 2 hard-facing; WSV
Facing
or &
(Type)  pipe with Arnco 150XT (crack-free) TP
 pipe with Armacor-M hard-facing with surface roughness less
than 50 microns
 Postalloy Duraband NC (crack-free)
 TCS Titanium Hardbanding (crack-free) from NOV Tuboscope
For additional hardbanding options, see NS-1
The hard-facing should be applied as smoothly as possible and WSV

Hard
may be applied proud (1/32” to 3/32”). Any deviation from this &
Facing
requirement should be immediately reported to the Senior Well TP
(Condition) Engineer. &
Driller
String Avoid unnecessary rotation in the casing. When motor or turbine P&D
Rotation drilling, use the minimum practical rotary speed. &
Driller
Drilled Minimise the accumulation of drilled solids in the mud as they can WSV
contribute to accelerated casing wear through three-body abrasive &
Solids wear. Aim to have low gravity solids under 5%. Mud Eng.
Revision: 1
Component Set-up / Requirement Responsible
Avoid rotation of the drillstring in the casing when the wellbore fluid P&D
Drill Fluids is brine or water. Milling operations inside production casing should &
always be carried out in mud to avoid rapid "galling" of the casing. UIK
Drill pipe
Consider the use of rotating drill pipe protectors (such as Hi-tech) P&D
Protectors
4.44.2 Ditch Magnet Positioning & Metal Recovery Techniques.

The objective is to remove as much metal from the mud system as possible, such that the quantity
of metal recovered is directly proportional to the quantity generated in the wellbore.
The magnets should be cleaned every 12 hours. The recovered metal should be weighed and, if
wear is a critical issue, tabulated against rotating hours through the casing. Observe the
appearance of the metal cuttings and specifically check for swarf (long curled slivers). If present,
notify the Senior Drilling Engineer immediately.
Note: Experience indicates that trend breaks are a more important indicator of casing wear than
actual rates of steel recovered.
The wear bushing should be regularly inspected for signs of wear with special attention to
orientation and the depth of any possible groove present (which may indicate misalignment of the
wellhead BOP and rig substructure).
The number of magnets used is dependent on the available

Quantity of space in the header box and the ease of removal/positioning WSV
Ditch when the metal is recovered. As a minimum, a ditch magnet for &
Magnets each shale shaker header box should be used (as per rig TP
contract).
Magnets should be positioned in the header box upstream of the
shale shakers. If possible the magnets should be connected to a
pulley system so that removal and repositioning can be
Positioning of WSV
accomplished safely by a man working alone. Easing the task of
Ditch &
removal and repositioning will contribute to a more conscientious
Magnets TP
approach in monitoring metal recovery. Rig modifications to
facilitate this set-up should be performed as part of the rig
acceptance.
To achieve the objective of collecting the full amount of metal,
the magnets should be checked every 12 hours at consistent
times. These times should correspond with the tabulation of
rotating hours and revolutions in casing i.e. if rotating hours are WSV
Collection tabulated from 00:00 to 24:00 then metal should be recovered at &
Frequency 24:00 as a minimum. If metallic "hair" growth exceeds 3/4", then TP
collection frequency should be increased. Beyond this length,
any additional metal will be washed past the magnets by the mud
stream.
Metal Remove ditch magnet from header box, scrape and collect metal
Removal from magnet using a plastic trowel ensuring that there is no Derrickman /
from spillage. Collect the metal in a mud sieve arrangement with a Mud Man
Magnets coarse sieve above a fine sieve.

Revision: 1
For consistent and accurate reporting of metal weight, immerse

the sieve arrangement in ShellSol and swirl lightly, removing
Cleaning and some of the mud which has been collected with the metal.
Weighing Repeat until most of the mud is dispersed to the lower sieve. Put Derrickman /
Metal the sieve onto shaker, where vibration will remove remaining Mud Man
mud. It may be necessary to repeat the preceding steps a few
times to remove all of the mud from the metal. Decant metal into
cuttings bag and weigh using an accurate scale.
Inspection of
Observe closely and report the appearance of the recovered
Cuttings from Derrickman /
metal, i.e. small particles, larger fragments or swarf (longer
Metal Mud Man
curled slivers).
Recovery
It is expected that adherence to the above procedures will result
Interpretation in a substantial increase in the amount of metal recovered, to the
of Results point where the quantities being recovered are indicative of the WSV
severity of wear.
The following table may then be used as a rough guide for casing wear severity:
Daily Metal
Wear
Recovery Action
Severity
[kg/day]
Continue monitoring and reporting. Unlikely to be significant
0 - 0.5 Normal wear if magnets are working efficiently and recommended
recovery technique is employed.
Consider application of wear limiting measures such as
Moderate DP/Casing protectors or motor drilling. Check lateral loading
0.5 - 1.0 with WfW model.
Consider intermediate logging with USIT. Apply wear limiting
> 1.0 Serious measures. Look for causes such as rough DP hardfacing, worn
wear bushing, high doglegs.
Log Analysis
After rotating the string for approximately 1 million revolutions inside a casing string, possible
wear “hot spots” should be logged with a USIT. The level of contact forces should be the primary
indicator of “hot spots” The Senior Well Engineer may omit USI logging after 1 million rotations if:
 Previous experience with that particular drill string and well configuration (after 1 million
rotations) indicates acceptable wear; and
 The metal recovery trend is as expected
 There is a large degree of wear tolerance built into the casing design
This experience may be based on USIT logs or positive pressure tests of the casing (confirming
integrity after drilling).
Revision: 1
5 Well Barrier “Rules”

Well Barrier Elements should be displayed for each critical phase of well operations to adequately
plan and visualise double barrier compliance during all operations. Well Barriers should be
visualised with the online tool (Link to wellbarrier software: WELLBARRIER). Visualisation of
barrier should be performed with the use of the wellbarrier tool, to:
• Avoid accidents.
• Ensure everyone has a common understanding of what is in place to protect them through
easy-to-read visualization.
• Give a clear description on barrier element verification and monitoring.
• Help document a robust well/activity design.
• Allow verification of the well barrier definitions and requirements, via the verification function.
• Give a consistency in illustrations.
5.1 Two Barrier Principle (Hat-over Hat Arrangement)

Revision: 1
5.2 Definition of Barrier Elements
5.2.1 Primary Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.38):
“The first well barrier that prevents flow from a potential source of inflow”
5.2.2 Secondary Well Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.47):
“The second well barrier that prevents flow from a potential source of inflow”
5.2.3 Common Well Barrier Element Definition (NORSOK 3.1.47):

“The barrier element that is shared between the primary and secondary well barrier”
Revision: 1
5.3 Primary Barrier Examples:

The primary barrier (envelope) and well barrier elements are those components that are in direct
contact with the pressure source. Examples of barrier elements are illustrated below:
1. Overbalance Drilling Operation:
 Overbalance Fluid Column
2. Closed in well:
 The Casing Shoe (cement & formation strength)
 The Liner
 The liner Top Packer
 The Completion Tubing
 The SSSV (inflow tested with zero leak rate)
3. Live Well Entry with Wireline

 The Liner
 The liner Top Packer
 The Production Casing
 The Tie-Back packer
 The Tie-Back String
 The Hanger
 The Xmas Tree and valves (KWV & FWV)
 The Wireline BOP
4. Well Abandonment
 The Formation strength
 The Cement Plug

Revision: 1
5.4 Secondary Barrier Examples:

The secondary barrier (envelope) consists of those elements that are your last line of defence
(Not the second line of defence). Examples of barrier elements are illustrated below:
1. Overbalance Drilling Operation:
 The Casing
 The Hanger
 The Drilling BOP, BOP SOVs & Shear Ram
2. Closed in well:
 The Casing
 The Hanger
 The Wellhead & SOVs
 The Xmas Tree and UMV
3. Live Well Entry with Wireline

 The Casing
 The Hanger
 The Wellhead & SOVs
 The Xmas Tree and valves (KWV & FWV)
 The Wireline BOP Shear/Seal Ram
4. Well Abandonment
 The formation strength
 The Cement Plug
Revision: 1
5.4.1 Secondary Barrier Envelope Validity

A secondary barrier envelope should only be considered as valid when containment can be
controllably achieved in the case of primary barrier failure.
The secondary barrier envelope should follow the process safety principles of:
1) “Keeping Hydrocarbons in the pipe”, i.e. any flow from the well will not result a release of
hydrocarbons to atmosphere or crossflow to a subsurface formation/s.
2) “Staying within the operating window” i.e. any influx or uncontrolled flow can be contained in
the well within the BOP closing capability and well design kick tolerance.
Loss of primary containment, should be secured with the secondary barrier envelope without
resulting in:
 The release of hydrocarbons

 Ejection of well fluid or equipment which actually or potentially places persons in the line of fire.
 Ejection of well fluid or equipment which actually or potentially impedes well containment.
Note: when relying on a drilling BOP, the BOP shall be capable of closure prior to the potential
for ejected equipment, otherwise it is not considered as part of a valid envelope.
Examples of Valid and Invalid secondary barrier envelope scenarios are illustrated in this section
to provide guidance for common & complex well activities.

5.4.1.1 Drilling into reservoir
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Scenario of failed Scenario of failed
Well Barrier Schematic Envelope Well Barrier Schematic Envelope
primary barrier primary barrier
Validity Validity
Effective: Nov. 2022
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
YES
Pipe ram is
Flow is observed closed against
Flow is observed Space out
from the well. a Tool Joint.
from the well. correct and
The well is
the rams
The well is closed in NOT secured
The well is closed are closed
with the drilling within the
in with the drilling against the
BOP without space planned kick
BOP considering pipe body
out. tolerance
spacout.
volume.
Drilling
BOP
Drilling BOP
Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation

Effective
Petroleum Development Oman LLC
Ineffective.
Page 183
5.4.1.2 Tripping drill pipe with failed string float
Secondary Secondary
Page 184
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
YES
Flow is observed Flow is observed
from the well. Unable to from the well.
FOSV
secure the
Installation
FOSV NOT string FOSV
& Drilling
available at the drill Installed on the
BOP
floor. Drilling BOP is drill string.
Effective

Ineffective
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
5.4.1.3 Drilling with Dynamic Kill
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
Immediate
Fill rate is not
Fill rate is not release via the
maintained during
maintained during a drill string
a connection. YES
connection. when breaking
a connection
Influx unable to String floats
An Influx entered to making up
enter the drill Effective
the drill string due an additional
string due to
to failed floats. stand.
floats.
Drilling BOP

Ineffective
Page 185
5.4.1.4 BOP Test with reservoir exposed and RTTS installed
Secondary Secondary
Page 186
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
YES
NO String
weight is
Mud degradation
While sufficient.
below the RTTS
Mud degradation retrieving the
with a drop in
below the RTTS RTTS, the String depth
hydrostatic and
with a drop in influx below is sufficient
an influx below.
hydrostatic and an the packer to circulate
influx below. results in a a kill fluid.
RTTS set deep
pipe light
with a long work
RTTS set shallow scenario Annular is

string. The
with a short work and/or release closed to

Annular is closed
string. of well fluids. prevent an
while unsetting
uncontrolled
the RTTS.
Drilling BOP release.
Ineffective
BOP is
Effective
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
5.4.1.5 Deep plug retrieval with pipe
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
The annular is
closed while
Immediate
unsetting the
release from
plug.
the well when YES
unsetting the
Trapped gas below Trapped gas
packer. Driller Pipe weight
the plug and flow below the plug
reaction time is sufficient
occurs after and pressure
and BOP and the
unsetting the plug. communication
closing time is Drilling
occurs after
too slow to BOP is
releasing the plug
avoid a Effective.
release
The well is

secured with the

Drilling BOP
annular closed
Ineffective
Page 187
5.4.1.6 Shallow plug retrieval
Secondary Secondary
Page 188
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
Annular BOP
is closed
YES
during The well is
unsetting the secured with a
Trapped
shallow plug; closed system
pressure
however the using slickline
below the
Trapped gas below pipe weight is PCE.
plug is
the plug and flow insufficient to
contained
occurs after overcome the Trapped gas
by slickline
unsetting the plug. upward force below the plug
PCE during
of trapped and pressure

unsetting.
pressure. communication

occurs after
Slickline
Pipe ejection releasing the
PCE is
and release as plug.
Effective.
a result.
Drilling BOP
Ineffective
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
5.4.1.7 Completion Retrieval with a plug set in the completion (dynamic kill, string barrier requirement)
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
Gas is trapped
below the plug
set in the tubing
in the remaining
NO tail of completion.
Gas is trapped
below the plug set Trapped gas is Slickline with
in the tubing in the released PCE is used.
YES
remaining tail of immediately Bullheading of
completion. before the trapped gas is
Slickline
BOP can be performed with
PCE is
Once the closed. containment.
Effective.
connection is The plug is then
broken the trapped Drilling BOP shifted to a
gas is released Ineffective deeper position in

the string to avoid
further trapped
gas while pulling
the remainder of
completion.
Page 189
5.4.1.8 Plug retrieval with well integrity failure
Secondary Secondary
Page 190
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
2 x RBP set deep

above deep. One
set above the
reservoir and a
NO second set obve
the casing failure
RBP is set deep Annular BOP point adjacent to
and the RTTS set is closed the shallow YES
shallow for 2 x during reservoir.
“assumed” barriers unsetting the
Trapped
while Pressure shallow plug; RTTS set shallow pressure
Testing the BOP. however the 2 x barriers while below the
pipe weight is Pressure Testing plug is
The well has an insufficient to the BOP. contained
integrity failure overcome the
by slickline
between the RBP upward force The well has an PCE during
and RTTS. of trapped integrity failure unsetting.

pressure.

between the
Gas is trapped RBPs. Gas is Slickline
below the RTTS Pipe ejection trapped below the PCE is
due to production and release as RBP due to Effective.
casing integrity a result. production casing
failure integrity failure.
Drilling BOP
Ineffective Slickline with
PCE is rigged up
with a flanged
shooting nipple to
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
retrieve the RBP.

5.4.1.9 Retrieving tubing above a deep set plug
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
YES
NO
The deep set plug
has been set just In the case
While POOH if
above top of plug
The deep set plug the plug fails,
perforation. The failure, the
has been inflow the response
plug has been overbalance
tested with time may be
pressure tested fluid will
underbalanced insufficient to
with result in
fluid. Underbalance secure the
overbalanced losses
fluid remains in the well without a
fluid. rather than
well and monitored release of well
Overbalance fluid flow from
while POOH fluids. Drilling
remains in the the well.
completion. BOP
well and
Ineffective
monitored while Reaction
The plug fails while
POOH time is
POOH with If the plug
completion. sufficient to

completion and the failure occurs
secure the
well flows. while pipe
The plug fails well.
light, the
while POOH with
drilling BOP is
completion. Drilling BOP
Ineffective.
is Effective.
Page 191
5.4.1.10 Retrieving the liner hanger running tool after cementing and setting the liner
Secondary Secondary
Page 192
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
NO
While POOH if YES

The shoetrack
the shoetrack
and/or liner lap
and/or liner lap In the case of
The shoetrack has been inflow
fails, the shoetrack
and/or liner lap has tested with
response time and/or liner
been inflow tested underbalanced
may be lap failure, the
with underbalanced fluid. The well is
insufficient to overbalance
fluid. Underbalance then displaced
secure the fluid will result
fluid remains in the back to
well without a in losses
well and monitored overbalance fluid
release of well rather than
while POOH the and remains in
fluids. Drilling flow from the
liner hanger running the well and
BOP well.
tool. monitored while

Ineffective
POOH the liner

Reaction time
The shoetrack hanger running
If the is sufficient to
and/or liner lap fails tool.
shoetrack secure the
while POOH and
and/or liner lap well.
the well flows. The shoetrack
failure occurs
and/or liner lap
while pipe Drilling BOP
fails while POOH.
light, the is Effective.
drilling BOP is
Ineffective.
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
5.4.1.11 Retrieving parted tubing and hanger
Secondary Secondary
Revision: 1
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
Printed 03/11/2022
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
YES
A deepset plug In the case of

set as a primary plug failure,
NO barrier and inflow the
tested. The well is overbalance
A shallow plug set The BOP displaced to fluid will result
as a primary barrier cannot be overbalance fluid in losses
and inflow tested. closed in time above the rather than
to avoid a deepset plug. flow from the
Failure of the release of well well.
primary barrier will fluids. If the plug fails
result in immediate the overbalance Reaction time
flow/release. BOP is fluid will result in is sufficient to
Ineffective. losses rather than secure the

flow from the well. well.
Drilling BOP
is Effective
Page 193
5.4.1.12 Slickline plug installation with failed tubing and sustained A-Annulus pressure
Secondary Secondary
Page 194
Barrier Barrier
Validity Validity
(YES/NO) (YES/NO)
YES
Low risk gas lift
Low risk gas lift well well with tubing Well fluid is
NO
with tubing failure. failure. accepted for
Low Risk
Failure of
Sustained A- A-Annulus Wells as a
primary barrier
Annulus pressure pressure has Primary
envelope will
due to residual gas been bled off and Barrier.
result in an
lift injection gas injection
immediate
pressure. supply isolated The wellhead
release.
The wellhead and from the well. The and A-

A-Annulus SOVs well is unable to Annulus

Single Barrier
form part of the free flow and zero SOVs form
Deviation
primary barrier pressure is noted part of the
required.
envelope. on the A-Annulus secondary
and THP. barrier
envelope.
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
Revision: 1
5.5 Verification of a Mechanical Barrier

Mechanical barriers installed in the well as a part of a temporary or permanent barrier envelope,
should not only be verified through ΔP across the barrier for a specified duration, but should also
include verification of condition and installation as per procedure.
Examples of downhole mechanical barriers
1 Casing and Tubing
2 Liner hanger packers / Expandable seal
3 Bridge Plugs
4 Retrievable Testing, Treating and Squeeze tool (RTTS)
5 Annulus Casing Packer (ACP)
6 Tie Back Seal Assembly (TBSA)
7 External casing patch (ECP)
8 Casing Patches
9 Tubing Plugs
10 Subsurface Safety Valves (SSSVs)
11 Two Way Check Valve / Back pressure Valve (TWCV / BPV)
12 Tubing and Casing hanger seals
Qualification Requirement Yes No Responsible

Prior to installation, the condition of the
Condition equipment should be as per OEM Equipment
requirements. i.e. correctly maintained and/or Owner
dressed with appropriate seals.
Installation of equipment should be installed
as per OEM procedure such that the
setting/anchoring and sealing elements have Equipment
engaged effectively. Owner
Installation
The equipment owner should verify and sign-
off that the correct installation procedure was
WSV
followed, and this should be recorded as an
attachment in EDM and the BVP in eWCAT.
Pressure Pressure testing as per SP-1213

Test requirements and recorded as an attachment WSV
in EDM and the BVP in eWCAT.
Inflow testing as per SP-1213 requirements

Inflow Test and recorded as an attachment in EDM and WSV
the BVP in eWCAT.
WSV Owner Name:

Equipment Owner Name:
WSV Owner Position:
Equipment Owner Position:
WSV Owner Signature:
Equipment Owner Signature:
Revision: 1
5.6 Ultimate Barrier Envelope

When illustrating the barrier envelope, for barrier verification per phase the secondary barrier
should depict the final shut in scenario as this describes the last line of defence to secure the well.
Well Killing Shut-in with Shear Ram

Revision: 1
5.7 Well Barrier Envelope Construction and use of eWCAT (eWCAT Quick
Guide)
Develop the Wellbarrier illustrations for the critical phases of WellBarrier
1 WE
the well operations. This should include changes to the &
P&D
barrier envelope with any activity. SDP
Verify the wellbarrier schematic
WellBarrier
SWE
2 &
P&D
SDP
Create the well barrier plan in eWCAT and attach the well
barrier illustrations.
WE
3 eWCAT
WE Operations to translate the critical barrier verifications Ops
listed in the program into eWCAT, including:
 Section TD criteria and acceptable variance
 Minimum TOC
 Cement Quality Verification
 Casing/Liner setting depth and acceptable variance
 Formation Strength Testing
 Casing/Liner/Tubing verification testing (i.e. pressure test
value and time)
 WH & Tree components verification testing
 Hanger seal verification testing
 Production packer and TBSA verification testing
4 Verify the well barrier plan in eWCAT. SWE Ops eWCAT
Enter the well barrier verification data & evidence and accept
5 WSV eWCAT
the well barrier report in eWCAT.
Revision: 1
6 Equipment & Controls
6.1 How to verify COC
Step Detailed Instructions Responsible
Check the Serial Numbers between the component and certification are
1
corresponding.
Check the COC has been issued by the OEM or formally OEM licensed
2
facility (name & location).
Check the applicable standards / design specifications are referred to on the
certificate: Statement of conformance with the relevant specification.
 API SPEC 6A Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment
 API SPEC 8A Drilling and Production Hoisting Equipment
 API RP 16ST: Coiled Tubing Well Control Equipment Systems
 API STD 16 AR Standard for Repair and Remanufacture of Drill-through
Equipment 1st
 API SPEC 16C: Specification for Choke and Kill Systems Equipment
Owner
3  API RP 16D: Control Systems for BOP and Diverters
 API RP 64: Recommended Practice for Diverter Systems Equipment 2nd
WSV to
and Operations walk the line
 API STD 53: Standards for Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for and spot
check
Drilling Wells equipment
 API 16 RCD: Drill Through Equipment - Rotating Control Devices and/or fullfill
Well Control
When relevant, confirm a statement that equipment has been Checklist
(re)manufactured or repaired in conformance with original product definition,
including latest OEM recommended design modifications. 3rd
WE / SWE
Check the OEM has a valid API Monogram in relation to the applicable API L3 Audit to
standard (at the time of certification): confrim
4
health of
https://mycerts.api.org/Search/CompositeSearch equipment
Check reference to product type / number or equipment specifications which and
define the operating envelope. certification
5  Rated working pressure
 Rated temperature
 Environmental limits/additional endorsements (e.g. H2S, NACE)
Check reference to unique number of specific assembly and parts: Part &
6
Serial number and Description.
7 Check the certificate is correctly signed & dated.
8 Check the component is within the validity period of the certificate.
9 Check there is an auditable trail with authentic material, manufacturing,
repair, inspection and /or testing reports, is available (MDB & PHF).
10 Check all current equipment on location, has valid certification and is
entered into eWCAT.

Revision: 1
6.1.1 COC Example
Revision: 1
6.1.2 COC Critical Checks Example
Manufacturer
1 5 COC 9 Serial Number 13 Signature
Name / Logo
Manufacturer PSL / RSL / PR
2 6 Declaration 10 14 Date
Facility (if applicable)
Relevant Sour Service
3 Facility License 7 11
Standard (if Applicable
Certificate Operational
4 8 12 Equipment Detail
Number Limitation
Revision: 1
6.2 How to verify COS

1 Issued by recognized technical authority or operator (name & 1st Equipment Owner
location).
Clear reference to have been maintained to OEM requirements 2nd
2 WSV to walk the line
and records are available.
and spot check
Clear reference to unique number of specific assembly and parts equipment and/or
3 which is identical to unique number on equipment name plate fullfill Well Control
and in eWCAT. Checklist
4 Certificate is correctly signed / dated.
3rd
5 Valid COC, Statement of Compatibility or deviation in place. WE / SWE L3 Audit to
Auditable trail with OEM documentation, work orders executed, confrim health of
6 spare parts (OEM origin!) replaced, work history, inspection, test equipment and
reports, is available certification
6.2.1 COS Example
Revision: 1
6.3 Flange Make Up

Preparations:
 Identify the correct make up torque values
 Identify the correct calibrated torque wrench (hydraulic or manual)
 Confirm torque wrench calibration
OEM
1  Confirm correct nuts and bolts (bolts marked with B7 and nuts with
2H in sweet services and in sour services in line with the pipe class:
And/Or
bolts marked with B7M and nuts marked with 2HM)
 Confirm the correct flange gasket, type, rating and material Equipment
specification. Owner
Make-Up:
 Confirm OEM make-up procedure
 Make up the flange as per OEM procedure
2
Additional Information form Industry Standard: API-6A
Additional PDO information: SP-2020 (Note: This is not a wells standard)
6.4 BOP Testing

Step Set-up / Calibration Responsible Document
The drawdown test shall be conducted on each well after
the initial BOP installation or after repairs on the
accumulator banks not exceeding 6 months (as per SP-
1213). TP
Drawdown &
The drawdown test is performed to confirm that the Work Unit
Test WSV
number of bottles and hydraulic volumes and energy SOP
&
available is sufficient to perform all the BOP functions Driller
necessary whilst achieving the required final pressures
in an emergency situation where all power is lost. The
minimum functionality is related to API STD-53.
Each unit should have a BOP test procedure to help
optimise the BOP testing process and ensure each
component is tested. The test procedure should be a
work unit SOP and should provide a visualisation of each TP
test and respective valve positions. &
Test Work Unit
Procedure The SOP should be attached with the pressure test WSV
SOP
graphs and signed and dated by the WSV and TP. The &
test data evidence should be attached to EDM and Driller
updated in eWCAT. BOP Test Procedure ExampleError!
Hyperlink reference not valid.Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.
The stump test is used to optimise the initial BOP testing TP
Stump time on the critical path and typically allows pressure &
Work Unit
Test testing to RWP. The 21 day test validity commences from WSV
SOP
the stump test date and not BOP installation on the well. &
Driller
The ram locks should be functioned during the BOP test
period. The hand wheels should be installed and the TP Work Unit
locks engaged with the number of turns recorded. & SOP
Ram Lock
Test If pressure testing against Ram locks to RWP, close the WSV &
Ram with the required closing pressure + MOPFLP & WC
applied (this may be > 1,500 psi manifold pressure) and Driller Checklist
then engage the lock. Once the ram locks are engaged,

Revision: 1
bleed off manifold pressure and prepare to pressure test

against the Ram with locks engaged.
Step Set-up / Calibration Responsible Document
The purpose of this test is to confirm integrity of all
control unit pipe work, control valves, closing and
opening control hoses to the BOP stack and the BOP
hydraulic systems to the maximum operating pressure.
The accumulator hydraulic control lines should be
pressure tested with the BOP test SOP. The control lines
should be installed with secondary retention and
maximum pressure applied for each function applied and
recorded for each line, i.e.
Annular: Apply 1,500 psi manifold pressure for 5 mins
Rams: Apply 3,000 psi manifold pressure for 5 mins
See BOP Hydraulic Control Line Test Example TP Work Unit
Control Procedure for details. Hydraulic lines should NOT be & SOP
Line Test disconnected after the pressure test. WSV &
& WC
See example of secondary retention at the connection: Driller Checklist
TP Work Unit
If the BOP test has been performed on the stump, a & SOP
Connector
connector test and function test should be performed as WSV &
Test
a minimum. & WC
Driller Checklist
The maximum interval between BOP tests as per SP-
1213 is stated as 21 days. To avoid inefficiency and/or
exposure to openhole during a test the interval should be
planned as optimum as possible. A required trip prior to
Work Unit
21 days may trigger the BOP test to avoid a dedicated
14-21 Day SOP
POOH for a BOP test.
BOP WSV &
During BOP testing the monitoring and particularly WC
maintenance of mud properties is not ideal. Deep gas Checklist
and deep exploration wells should consider the period
without circulation and BOP testing to limit this exposure
(try to plan cased hole BOP testing when possible).
Testing of well control subs (FOSV and Gray Valve) and Work Unit
Offline Floats should be tested in the direction of flow. To TP SOP
testing of optimise BOP test time and improve HSE exposure an & &
subs Engineered offline test stand is recommended. WSV WC
See an example industry test stand at the Link Checklist
Revision: 1
For additional information on how best to prepare and Maintain BOP equipment, see the Harweel
BOP Practice Guide provided by UWOXO.
6.4.1 BOP Hydraulic Control Line Test Example Procedure

Step Set-up / Calibration Responsible
1 Complete the function test.
Adjust the manifold regulator pressure to 1,500 psi (10,350 kPa) and
2
ensure the regulator bypass is in the closed position.
Confirm the start position: annular open, all pipe rams open, BSRs open
3
and HCR valve closed.
Open the manifold regulator bypass valve, which will pressure all pipe rams
4 open, BSRs open and HCR valve closed lines to 3,000 psi (20,700 kPa).
Check for leaks for 5 minutes after opening the valve.
Close the manifold regulator bypass and confirm manifold pressure
5
reduces to the regulated 1,500 psi (10,350 kPa) value.
Close BSRs and open HCR valve. Open the manifold regulator bypass
valve, which will pressure the BSRs close line and HCR valve open line to
6
3,000 psi (20,700 kPa). Check for leaks for 5 minutes after opening the
valve.
Close manifold regulator bypass valve. Confirm manifold pressure reduces
7
to the regulated 1,500 psi (10,350 kPa) value.
8 Open BSRs and close HCR valve.
9 Run pipe across pipe rams.
10 Close pipe rams. TP
&
Open the manifold regulator bypass valve, which will pressure all pipe rams Driller
11 close lines to 3,000 psi (20,700 kPa). Check for leaks for 5 minutes after
opening the valve.
Close manifold regulator bypass valve. Confirm manifold pressure reduces
12
to the regulated 1,500 psi (10,350 kPa) value.
13 Open pipe rams.
Increase annular preventer regulator opening pressure to maximum
14 allowable operating pressure. Check for leaks for 5 minutes after
increasing the pressure.
Reduce the annular preventer regulator opening pressure to working
15
operating pressure.
16 Close the annular preventer.
Increase the annular preventer regulator closing pressure to maximum
allowable operating pressure. This will pressure the annular close line
17
(including the stripping surge bottle) to the maximum allowable operating
pressure. Check for leaks for 5 minutes after increasing the pressure.
Reduce the annular preventer regulator closing pressure to working
18
operating pressure.
19 Open the annular preventer and remove pipe.

Revision: 1
6.5 Shear Test

As per API-16A “Each preventer equipped with blind-shear rams shall be subjected to a shearing
test. A shear test may be performed on site or at the OEM / approved OEM vendor test facility.
The preference is to perform the test off site to avoid operational delay and allow testing in a
controlled environment. The shear test shall follow the requirements set out in API-16TR-1.
Once performed, the shear test has permanent validity, given the BOP, the Ram type, the Control
System and pipe type remain in use. Any changes to these components will necessitate an
additional representative shear test.”. Shear test reports are logged in eWCAT.
6.5.1 Tubular Selection and Conditions for Shear Test

Select a tubular/s form the work string batch in use, with the most severe shear conditions for the
planned normal work scope:
Tubular Type Requirement Remarks

Shear Achieved Test Required for the largest and
and strongest type of drill pipe in use.
Drill pipe
Actual Shear Pressure For Example: 5”, 25.6#, G-105 DP
< Theoretical Pressure and NOT 5”, 19.5#, G-105 DP
Designate as non-shearable and control
HWDP Not Required the risk with a dedicated shut-in
procedure.
Designate as non-shearable and control
Drill Collar Not Required the risk with a dedicated shut-in
procedure.
Shear Achieved Test Required for the largest and
and strongest type of tubular in use.
Completion Tubular
Actual Shear Pressure For Example: 5 ½”, 20#, L80
< Theoretical Pressure and NOT 4 ½”, 11.6#, K55
Shear Achieved Only required when running external
cable / line.
Completion Tubular with and
external Cable / Line* Actual Shear Pressure Attach external line to the tubular with
< Theoretical Pressure the shear test (e.g. TRSSSV control line
or ESP cable or fibre optic cable).
Only required when running slickline or
Shear Achieved wireline inside completion without
respective PCE on top of the BOP or
Completion Tubular with and landing joint.
Internal Cable Actual Shear Pressure
< Theoretical Pressure Attached internal cable to the tubular
with the shear test (e.g. slickline or
braided cable).
Only required when running external
Shear Achieved cable and slickline or wireline inside
Completion Tubular with completion without respective PCE on
and
Internal and External* top of the BOP or landing joint.
Cable Actual Shear Pressure
< Theoretical Pressure Attach internal & external cables to the
tubular with the shear test.
Wireline / Electric line* Shear Achieved
* Use rig floor remotely operated cutting device when the BSR cannot provide this functionality
Note: the minimum BOP functionality as per API-16D for surface stacks is listed in section 5.11.2:
“shear the drill pipe or tubing and seal the wellbore (for surface stacks with shear rams)”
The definition of tubing above describes completion tubing (not casing or liner tubulars)
Revision: 1
6.5.2 Shear Testing Procedure (Aligned with API-16TR1)
6.5.2.1 Shear Test 1

Preparations
 Record all pre-shear details for the Ram Type Preventer, BOP Operator,
Interlocking “Shear Rams” (ISR) and Test Instruments, BOP Control
Unit and the Shear Pipe Sample, on Pre-Shear, Data Sheet
 Perform pre-shear visual and NDE inspections of the BOP Operator,
1 Operating Piston Buttons, and Shear Rams. Perform pre-shear visual
inspection and hardness verification of the Shear Ram Elastomers.
 Install Ram Type Preventer w/ BOP Operator, and any required Spacer
Spools/Adaptors onto a Test Stump, per the configuration outlined in the
Shear Stack Drawing.
 Install the Centralizing Adaptor into the Test Stump, Box Connection
and record location relative to the shear zone.
Control Function Test
 Connect the BOP Control Hoses to the BOP Operator, Actuator Ports.
Fix one (1) Pressure Transducer at the BOP Operator, Close Port and
one (1) at the BOP Operator, Open Port.
 Perform hydraulic pressure tests on BOP Operator, Open and Close
hydraulic chambers at 500 psi for 5 Minutes and 3,000 psi for 15
2 Minutes.
 Dress, and install Shear Ram Blocks into the Ram Type Preventer.
OEM
Make-up BOP Operator, Bonnet Bolts and adjust BOP Control Unit,
Manifold Pressure to 500 psi. Function the Rams Open and Closed,
And/Or
confirming the Ram Cavity and Shear Rams are free from obstruction.
Stalling of the Shear Rams with 500 psi Operating Pressure should be
Shear
considered excessive dragging and will require further investigation
Test
before proceeding with the Shear Seal Testing.
Center
Pressure Test
 Connect the HP-Pressure Test Line to the Test Stump and fix one (1)
Pressure Transducer at the Test Stump, Test Port.
 Fill the Shear Stack wellbore with water, above the Shear Ram Cavity.
 Set the Hydro-Electric Pressure Switch to 3,050 psi,
 With zero pressure on the BOP Control Unit; Isolate three (3) BOP
Control Unit, Accumulator Banks leaving one (1) aligned with the BOP
Control Unit, Manifold. Move the Bypass Valve into Bypass Position and
the aligned Selector Valve into the Closed Position.
 Using the Electric Triplex Pump, perform three (3) Open and Close
3 cycles on the Shear Rams. Upon completion of the final Close cycle,
increase the Hydraulic operating pressure to 3,000 psi and hold for 5
Minutes. Repeat for the final Open cycle.
 Position the BOP Control Unit, Bypass Valve into low bypass, and set
the Manifold Regulator to. MOPFLPS(Pwb
MOPFLPS(Pwb) = Elastomer Seal Pressure + (Wellbore Pressure /
Closing Ratio)
 Function Shear Rams closed and conduct a low wellbore pressure test
of 250-350 psi for 10 Minutes. No visual leak is allowed during the test.
 Conduct a high wellbore pressure test to RWP psi for 10 Minutes. No
visual leak is allowed during the test. Upon completion, bleed wellbore
pressure to zero and function the Shear Rams open.

Revision: 1
Shear Preparations
 Prepare Shear Sample, per Shear Stack Drawing

 Perform dimensional and hardness verification survey, and record in
Pre-Shear, Data Sheet. Stencil Shear Pipe Sample with relevant
technical detail and highlight intended shear zone.
 Install Centralizing Plate onto the upper connection of the Ram Type
Preventer and record the device location relative to the shear zone.
4  Suspend Shear Pipe Sample from the Crane Hook, positioning within
the Shear Stack wellbore, ensuring the Shear Pipe Sample is engaged
within both Centralizing Devices and the shear zone aligns with the
Shear Rams
Control Unit, Accumulator Banks leaving one (1) aligned with the BOP
Control Unit, Manifold. Move the Bypass Valve into Bypass Position and
the aligned Selector Valve into the Closed Position.
Shear Test
 Utilising the Electric Triplex Pump, close the Shear Rams shearing the
Shear Pipe Sample in a single operation. The pressure at which the
Shear Pipe Sample is sheared will be obvious from the rapid pressure
change at the instant of shearing.
OEM
 Conduct a low wellbore pressure test of 250-350 psi for 10 Minutes. No
visual leak is allowed during the test.
And/Or
 Conduct a high wellbore pressure test to RWP for 10 Minutes. No visual
leak is allowed during the test. Upon completion, bleed wellbore Shear
5
pressure to zero. Test
 Position the BOP Control Unit, Bypass Valve to low bypass, set the Center
Manifold Regulator to 500 psi and function the Shear Rams open.
Note: If the shear test is unsuccessful, then consider centralizing with the
annular for the second test. This is to verify if the annular must be closed
prior to shear to centralize pipe. If the centralization is required for shearing,
this must be clearly stated in the shear test report and communicated with
the equipment owner. Shearing procedures for the respective unit shall
include centralization when it is required.
Post Inspection
 Remove upper Shear Pipe Sample and the Centralizing Plate. Function
BOP Operators open and remove Shear Rams. Photograph the Shear
Rams and BOP Operator, Operating Piston Buttons before cleaning.
Retrieve the lower Shear Pipe Sample from the Shear Stack.
 Perform post-shear visual and NDE inspections of the BOP Operator,
Operating Piston Buttons and Shear Rams. Perform post-shear visual
6
inspection and hardness verifications of the Shear Ram Elastomers.
Visually inspect the Ram Type Preventer, Ram Cavity. Photograph and
document the condition of the Operating Piston Buttons, Shear Rams,
Ram Elastomers and Ram Cavity. Record inspection results in Post-
Shear, Data Sheet.
 Perform a post-shear visual and dimensional assessment of the upper
and lower Shear Pipe Samples. Photograph the Shear Pipe Samples
and record dimensional results in Post-Shear, Data Sheet.
Revision: 1
6.5.3 Shear Test 2

Dress Shear Rams
 Dress, and install Interlocking “Shear Rams” into the Ram Type
Preventer. Make-up BOP Operator, Bonnet Bolts and adjust BOP
Control Unit, Manifold Pressure to 500 psi. Function the ISR Rams
Open and Closed, confirming the Ram Cavity and Shear Rams are
1
free from obstruction. Stalling of the Shear Rams with 500 psi
Operating Pressure should be considered excessive dragging, and
will require further investigation before proceeding with the Shear
Seal Testing.
 Fill the Shear Stack wellbore with water, above the Shear Ram
Cavity.
Pressure Test
 Set the Hydro-Electric Pressure Switch to 3,050 psi,

Control Unit, Accumulator Banks leaving one (1) aligned with the
BOP Control Unit, Manifold. Move the Bypass Valve into Bypass
Position and the aligned Selector Valve into the Closed Position.
 Using the Electric Triplex Pump, perform three (3) Open and Close
cycles on the Shear Rams. Upon completion of the final Close cycle,
increase the Hydraulic operating pressure to 3,000 psi and hold for 5
2 Minutes. Repeat for the final Open cycle.
 Position the BOP Control Unit, Bypass Valve into low bypass, and OEM
set the Manifold Regulator to MOPFLPS(Pwb
MOPFLPS(Pwb) = Elastomer Seal Pressure + (Wellbore Pressure / And/Or
Closing Ratio)
 Function Shear Rams closed and conduct a low wellbore pressure Shear Test
test of 250-350 psi for 10 Minutes. No visual leak is allowed during Center
the test.
 Conduct a high wellbore pressure test to RWP for 10 Minutes. No
visual leak is allowed during the test. Upon completion, bleed
wellbore pressure to zero and function the Shear Rams open.
Shear Preparations
 Prepare Shear Sample, per Shear Stack Drawing. Perform

dimensional and hardness verification survey, and record in Pre-
Shear, Data Sheet. Stencil Shear Pipe Sample with relevant
technical detail and highlight intended shear zone.
 Install Centralizing Plate onto the upper connection of the Ram Type
Preventer and record the device location relative to the shear zone.
 Suspend Shear Pipe Sample from the Crane Hook, positioning within
the Shear Stack wellbore, ensuring the Shear Pipe Sample is
3
engaged within both Centralizing Devices and the shear zone aligns
with the Shear Rams.
 Calculate Shear Seal Test 2, Shear Pressure by taking the highest
shear pressure observed during Shear Seal Test 1 and adding 10%.
 Set the Hydro-Electric Pressure Switch to the adjusted shear
pressure
Control Unit, Accumulator Banks leaving one (1) aligned with the
BOP Control Unit, Manifold. Move the Bypass Valve into Bypass
Position and the aligned Selector Valve into the Closed Position.

Revision: 1

Shear Test
 Utilising the Electric Triplex Pump, close the Shear Rams shearing
the Shear Pipe Sample in a single operation. The pressure at which
the Shear Pipe Sample is sheared will be obvious from the rapid
pressure change at the instant of shearing. Should the Shear Rams
fail to shear the Shear Pipe Sample, increase operator pressure in
100 psi intervals until the Shear Pipe Sample is sheared or the BOP
Operator maximum working pressure is reached.
 Conduct a low wellbore pressure test of 250-350 psi for 10 Minutes.
No visual leak is allowed during the test. Should the Shear Rams fail
4
to seal, increase the closing pressure until a leak-free seal is
achieved or the BOP Operator maximum working pressure is
reached. Record the operating pressure at which a seal is achieved.
 Conduct a high wellbore pressure to RWP for 10 Minutes. No visual
leak is allowed during the test. Upon completion, bleed wellbore
pressure to zero. Should the Shear Rams fail to seal, increase the OEM
closing pressure until a leak-free seal is achieved or the BOP
Operator maximum working pressure is reached. Record the And/Or
operating pressure at which a seal is achieved.
 Position the BOP Control Unit, Bypass Valve to low bypass, set the Shear Test
Manifold Regulator to 500 psi and function the Shear Rams open. Center
Post Inspection
 Remove upper Shear Pipe Sample and the Centralizing Plate.

Function BOP Operators open and remove Shear Rams. Photograph
the Shear Rams and BOP Operator, Operating Piston Buttons before
cleaning. Retrieve the lower Shear Pipe Sample from the Shear Stack.
 Perform post-shear visual and NDE inspections of the BOP Operator,
Operating Piston Buttons and Shear Rams. Perform post-shear visual
5
inspection and hardness verifications of the Shear Ram Elastomers.
Visually inspect the Ram Type Preventer,
 Ram Cavity. Photograph and document the condition of the Operating
Piston Buttons, Shear Rams, Ram Elastomers and Ram Cavity.
Record inspection results in Post-Shear, Data Sheet
 Perform a post-shear visual and dimensional assessment of the
upper and lower Shear Pipe Samples. Photograph the Shear Pipe
Samples and record dimensional results in Post-Shear, Data Sheet
6.5.4 Shear Test 3

A 3rd shear test may be required, if during the 2nd test the manifold pressure is increased > 110%
of the previous test output for shear and/or seal is not achieved.
An additional test may be performed if the 3rd test does not meet the test criteria. A 4th and 5th
test is unlikely unless data recording is inaccurate or there is a flaw in the procedure or equipment.
6.5.5 Shear Test Output

Operation Pass Fail
Pipe Sheared with 3,000 psi manifold pressure Yes No
Shear and Seal with manifold pressure ≤ OEM theoretical value Yes No
Revision: 1
6.6 Requirements following planned or unplanned use of shear ram

Equipment Requirement Responsible Document
Post shearing a tubular as part of a planned
operation or as part of secondary well control shut-
in the Ram body and seals need to be inspected as
per OEM requirements at the earliest secure
opportunity.
The inspection will typically include non-destructive
examination (NDE), using liquid penetrant per
ASTM E165 or magnetic particle inspection per
ASTM E709, as a minimum.
Replacement of seals, additional inspection or max
shearing operation prior to scrap should be defined
by the OEM and followed.
Shear Example of Rams retrieved from BOP for inspection TP
OEM
Ram Body subsequent to shearing operation: & Maintenance
& Seals Manual
WSV

Revision: 1
6.7 Accumulator Performance

Accumulator performance is used to ensure correct availability of redundant power supply (stored
energy), in the case of a power failure at the work unit during a well control event. API 16D defines
the BOP pre-charge and accumulator volume requirements for redundant hydraulic power supply.
6.7.1 API 16D (Surface Stack) requirements with charging system isolated:
Method A Method B Method C

Real gas, NIST data, Real gas, NIST data,
isothermal adiabatic
Has been withdrawn effective
with the third edition of API 1.4 volume design factor for
16D and shall not be used volume-limited condition, Fv 1.1 volume design factor for
for accumulator calculations 1.0 volume design factor for both volume and pressure-
in control system design. pressure-limited condition, limited conditions, Fv and Fp
Fp
Drawdown Test Drawdown Test Shear / Seal Requirement
rd
(No longer Valid) (API 16D 3 Edition) (API 16D 3rd Edition)
Close 1 x Annular
Close 1 x Annular Close 1 x Annular
Close Shear Ram
Close all Pipe Rams Close all Pipe Rams
Open Choke HCR Open Choke HCR
* BSRs accumulator
Open Kill HCR Open Kill HCR performance is derived from
Method C
After completion of above
operations, the remaining
accumulator pressure is After all functions, provide a Shear object (heaviest
greater than the Minimum wellbore seal with all ram planned tubular) and provide
operating pressure (MOP). valve preventers against Max a wellbore seal against Max
Anticipated Surface Pressure Anticipated Surface Pressure
MOP is derived from the (MASP). (MASP).
output of Method B & C
calculations.
Actual Accumulator Output
Method B Method C
Value to be > than the MOP.
The calculation of Accumulator volume and pressure requirements should be verified by the
equipment owner but may be performed by a third party either by hand or with proprietary
software.
Revision: 1
6.7.2 Accumulator Precharge and Volumetrics

Gather Input data:
Annular:
RWP (psi) =
Opening Volume (gal) =
Closing Volume (gal) =
Closing pressure against RWP (psi) =
MOPFLPS =
Upper & Lower Pipe Rams:

RWP (psi) =
Closing Ratio =
Blind Shear ram:

CH
RWP (psi) =
&
SWE
1 Closing Volume (gal) =
&
Closing Ratio =
Rig
Shear Ratio =
Manager
MOPFLPS =
PShear (Theoretical Calculation or provided by OEM) =
Choke & Kill Valves:

RWP (psi) =
Closing pressure against RWP (psi) =
Accumulator:
RWP (psi) =
Precharge Gas =
Ambient Surface Temperature = ~ 30 °C
Minimum Temperature = ~10 °C
Maximum Temperature = ~ 50 °C
Method B & Method C Calculation of: CH
&
1. Accumulator Precharge SWE
2
2. Accumulator Volumetric requirements and respective bottles &
Rig
Input data into the Calculator Manager
CH
&
Continue entry of NIST data in the calculator (see Guide for how to extract
SWE
3 the data from the web tool: Thermophysical Properties of Fluid Systems
&
(nist.gov))
Rig
Manager
Review Method B and Method C calculation outputs
 Adjust if required and confirm Accumulator Precharge as per API-16D

WSV
 Confirm Accumulator Volume and bottle bank is compliant as per API-
4 16D &
TP
Note: The equipment owner should verify the data and calculation in
compliance with API-16D and API STD-53.
Revision: 1
6.8 MOPLPS
The “minimum operator pressure for low pressure seal” (MOPFLPS) is the pressure required to
obtain a wellbore seal between the BOP elastomer element/s (and the pipe for all rams).
MOPFLPS = Elastomer Seal Pressure (Linked to the Ram Seal Force)
MOPFLPS(Pwb) = Elastomer Seal Pressure + (Wellbore Pressure / Closing Ratio)
This sealing pressure must be considered in addition to the closing pressure required for the BOP
function against well pressure. The MOPFLPS will also increase with wellbore pressure.
MOPFLPS are important as the Pipe Rams and Shear Rams will not seal without inclusion of
MOPFLPS for the seal force and accumulator actuation pressure. This may lead to inadequate
manifold pressure, when using a standard 1,500 psi manifold operating pressure to close and
seal against rated working pressure (RWP) and/or MASP. The shut and seal value required must
be understood and applied when closing a BOP function to avoid any leak, for example:
2 7/8" x 5" VBR

Min seal Max seal
Pipe Max manifold Operating
press press Min
BOP ram Min pressure Manual
BOP (F1-biggest (F1-smallest manifold
SWP Closing closing (psi) manifold
type pipe size) pipe size) pressure
(psi) Ratio pressure pressure
Min Max (psi)
(CR) MOPFLPPWB (psi)
MOPFLP MOPFLP
xxxx 10,000 6.8 1470.6 1,000 1,500 2,471 2,971 1,500
The MOPFLP must also be considered when Pressure Testing the BOP and has been noted as
a likely cause of leaks during testing to high values, i.e. RWP. When locking rams, the correct
manifold pressure must also be applied prior to engaging the locking mechanism.
MOPFLPS can be determined in 2 ways:
1. Use the OEM values (Preferred, when this includes fatigue performance)
2. Testing (May not represent elastomer fatigue performance)
Revision: 1
The MOPFLPS for the maximum and minimum pipe sizes covered by the annular and VBR may
be significantly different and may require adjustment of the closing pressure to seal against
MASP.
Different annular and VBR designs have different MOPFLPS characteristics for various pipe
sizes. It is essential that users are aware of the unique/specific operational performance and
procedural requirements of different Well Control Equipment regarding sealing against MASP.
If testing is not performed there is no evidence that the BOPs in will seal on-demand on the pipe
sizes deployed and may lead to a process safety incident.
MOPFLPS values may alter over time, given use and wear.
6.8.1 MOPFLPS Testing (API 16A 3rd Edition – Annex C)

Perform the MOPFLPS offline on the BOP test stump. WSV
MOPFLPS to be performed prior to the planned stump test. &
MOPFLPS to be performed for the Annular and Pipe Rams (FPRs & VBRs) TP
1 on a minimum of the:
&
 Largest OD planned drillpipe
 Smallest OD planned drillpipe Driller
Connect opening and closing lines to BOP. Connect line from the high-
2 Driller
pressure test pump to the stump or BOP side outlet.
The opening, closing and wellbore pressure lines should each be equipped,
as minimum instrumentation, with a pressure transducer. All transducers
3 Driller
should be connected to a data acquisition system which provides a
permanent record.
Install a new set of ram rubber goods onto the blocks. Durometer
4 Driller
measurements on the ram rubber face seal should be made and recorded.
Install test mandrel in the BOP for pipe ram tests. Driller
5
No test mandrel is used for blind/shear ram tests.
6 Close the rams using manufacturer's recommended closing pressure Driller
Initially apply 3,45 MPa (500 psi) wellbore pressure and then reduce the Driller
closing pressure slowly until a leak develops. If rams do not leak at zero
7 closing pressure, slowly increase opening pressure until a leak occurs or &
maximum recommended opening pressure is attained. Note the operating TP
pressure at which the leak occurs.
Reapply the recommended closing pressure, increase the wellbore Driller
pressure by 3,45 MPa (500 psi) above the previous step, and again reduce &
8
the closing pressure (or increase opening pressure) until a well leak occurs.
Record the operating pressure at which the leak occurs. TP
Repeat Step 8 until the wellbore pressure equals the rated working Driller
pressure of the preventer. The wellbore pressure increment should be 3,45
9 MPa (500 psi) until the wellbore pressure exceeds 34,45 MPa (5 000 psi). &
Thereafter the wellbore pressure increment should be 6,89 MPa (1 000 TP
psi).

Revision: 1
Ram closure against elevated wellbore pressure

Driller
Install the preventer on the test stump. Connect opening and closing lines
10 &
to the BOP. Connect line from the high-pressure test pump to the stump.
TP
The closing line and wellbore pressure line should each be equipped, as
Driller
minimum instrumentation, with a
11 &
pressure transducer. All transducers should be connected to a data
TP
acquisition system to provide a permanent record.
Install test mandrel in the BOP. Install a test flange to close the top of
preventer. The piping out of the top flange should include a bleed vent,
pressure transducer, 75 l to 150 l (20 gal to 40 gal) capacity of accumulator
bottles, and a pressure regulator. Fill the preventer test assembly with
Driller
water until no more air comes out the bleed vent.
12 &
TP
NOTE: When the wellbore fluid volume difference between closing position
and opening position of the BOP is less than 40 l (10 gal), use a 75 l (20
gal) accumulator system; when the difference is greater than 40 l (10 gal),
use a 150 l (40 gal) accumulator system.
With the accumulator bottle precharge set at about one-half of the wellbore
Driller
pressure to be applied for this test step, close the vent and then apply the
13 &
test-step wellbore pressure [initially the wellbore pressure is 3,45 MPa (500
TP
psi)].
Driller
Close preventer with manufacturer's recommended closing pressure
14 &
(adjust upward if required).
TP
Driller
Check that the top flange system pressure is equal to the wellbore pressure
15 &
and adjust if necessary.
TP
Driller
Increase the wellbore pressure by 3,45 MPa (500 psi) above the level in
16 &
step 13.
TP
Driller
17 Confirm a wellbore pressure seal. &
TP
Lower the closing pressure until a leak develops, as monitored by fluid Driller
18 discharge from the top flange &
regulator. TP
Driller
19 Bleed off wellbore and top flange pressures and open preventer. &
TP
Repeat Step 5 through step 19, increasing the wellbore pressure in steps
until it equals the rated working pressure of the preventer. The wellbore Driller
20 pressure increment should be 3,45 MPa (500 psi) until the wellbore &
pressure exceeds 34,45 MPa (5 000 psi). Thereafter the wellbore pressure TP
increment should be 6,89 MPa (1 000 psi).
6.8.2 MOPFLPS Testing Output

MOPFLPS (psi)
Output: MOPFLPS(Pwb) (psi)
Minus (Pwb / CR)
MOPFLPS(Pwb) at 200 (psi)
MOPFLPS(Pwb) at MASP (psi)
MOPFLPS(Pwb) at RWP (psi)
Revision: 1
7 Well Control Drills

Well written drill procedures are the foundation for evaluation of crew performance. This is a
critical requirement in facilitating human performance and understanding the thought process
behind actions taken in response to events. It is critical that the technical and non-technical
proficiencies of participating individuals are understood by the relevant supervisors.
7.1 Well Control Drill Key Elements:

Element Details Responsible
The types of drill programs should be suited to the operations
undertaken by the work unit, to maintain effective capabilities of
personnel and equipment. The drill programs are under the
responsibility of the Work Unit Owner (RM/TP) and should be reviewed
by the WSV.
The drill programs should include:

1. Established learning objectives (what are the issues being
addressed in this drill). RM/TP
Drill
2. Execution in the most realistic environment possible, practically &
Programs and safely.
WSV
3. Promotion of reliable human performance under stressful
conditions
4. Evaluation of participants on their abilities to identify and resolve
the issues included in the drill.
5. Evaluation of the crew’s ability to handle the unexpected.
6. Recording and analysis of drill used to identify areas for continued
development.
7. Measurement of key performance indicators.
A Drill Guide documents the instructions and expectations for
Drill planning, briefing, execution and debriefing of the drill. The Work Unit
RM/TP
Guide Owner should maintain a drill guide and ensure supervisor personnel
are proficient with it.
The type, frequency and outcome of drills should be planned and
recorded. Performance during drills should be used to identify
additional frequency requirements to maintain capabilities of
personnel and equipment.
Frequency of drills
Drills should be conducted at regular intervals, as defined by the
organisation. Drills should be linked to the actual risks which could be
encountered and the competency of the entire team which could need RM/TP
Drill
to respond. &
Plan
Drills are an “administrative control” or “barrier” in prevention of a well WSV
control incident and as such need to be integrated based on risk in all
well execution activities.
Frequency of drills at a minimum should be one drill weekly for each
crew and more should be performed if the crew performance is less
than satisfactory. The drills should be selected based upon the current
or upcoming operation to help the rig team maintain situational
awareness and coordination between a senior rig contractor
representative and the lead Representative of the operator.

Revision: 1
7.2 Well Control Drill Examples:

IOGP
Details Responsible
Example
Hole Monitoring Procedures While Drilling or Milling/Circulating.
A rig-specific procedure and protocol for monitoring the hole for signs
of an influx while drilling or milling/circulating, including the roles and
responsibilities of all involved crew members. The procedure should
include actions to take in response to alarms, positive kick indicators,
possible kick indicators, and communications from rig crew or third-
party personnel relating to possible or positive kick indicators,
specifically when to conduct a flow check and when to immediately RM/TP
D.1 invoke shut-in procedures. The procedures/protocols should include
and assign responsibilities for following setting alarms and monitoring
the Flow Indicator (Flo-Sho), identifying drilling breaks and other
possible kick indicators, monitoring the cuttings on the shakers for
potential warning signs, communications between the driller and
shaker hand and/or mud engineers, prior to and during any fluid
transfers or operations which may impact pit volumes, and
communications between driller and the mud logger if the service is
provided.
Hole Monitoring Procedures While Tripping.
A rig specific procedure for monitoring the hole for correct fill-up and
displacement during tripping operations to include a standard trip log
to be utilised on all trips and retained on site for the duration of the RM/TP
D.3
well or other period as specified by rig contractor. The procedure
should also clearly define how abnormal fill-ups or displacements are
differentiated from a normal fill-up or displacement and the protocol
to communicate and respond to an abnormal fill-up or displacement.
Hole Monitoring Procedures During Wireline Operations.
D.4 A rig specific procedure for monitoring the hole for correct fill-up and RM/TP
displacement during wireline operations.
Hole Monitoring Procedures While Out of the Hole.
D.6 A rig specific procedure for monitoring the hole when pipe is out of RM/TP
the hole.
Hole Monitoring Procedures While Running Casing or Tubing.
A rig specific procedure for monitoring the hole for correct
displacement while running casing/tubing or fill-up while pulling
casing/tubing including a standard trip log to be utilised and retained
D.5 RM/TP
on site for the duration of the well or other period as specified by the
rig contractor. The procedure should also clearly define how abnormal
displacements are differentiated from a normal displacement and the
protocol to communicate and respond to an abnormal displacement.
Shut-in Procedures.
Rig-specific shut-in procedures for drilling (Milling/Circulating for
Cased Hole), tripping (with drill pipe and drill collars across the BOP
D.2 RM/TP
stack), wireline operations, running casing and tubing, and when out
of the hole. The procedures should clearly define roles and
responsibilities for all rig crew involved in the shut-in procedures.
Revision: 1
IOGP
Details Responsible
Example
Well Kill Procedures.
A rig specific well kill procedure that includes a BOP element to be
used during the well kill procedure, choke outlet to use if multiple
D.7 options available and choke manifold line-up, monitoring mud gas
& RM/TP
D.8 separator, special considerations such as pipe hang-off and pipe
movement, and communications protocol. The procedure should
clearly define roles and responsibilities for all rig crew involved in the
well kill procedure.
Stripping Procedure.
D.12 RM/TP
All rigs should have a rig specific procedure for stripping operations.
Connection Trend Analysis Procedure.
A rig specific procedure to monitor and record flowline drain back
N/A RM/TP
during connections in order to establish a normal trend and identify
abnormalities to normal drain back.
Mud Gas Separator Monitoring Procedure.
A rig specific procedure to monitor the Mud/Gas Separator (MGS)
during well kill operations utilising the MGS including the maximum
D.7 RM/TP
allowable pressure on the MGS to prevent gas, the method utilised on
the rig to monitor the MGS pressure, and the action to take when the
MGS pressure limit is approached or exceeded.
Divert Procedures.
All rigs equipped with a Diverter should have a rig-specific divert
D.9 RM/TP
procedure that also clearly define roles and responsibilities for all rig
crew involved in the divert procedure.
Well Control Procedures for Non-Shearables.
Rigs equipped with Shear Rams or Blind Shear Rams should have well
D.11 control procedures for operations when non-shearable tubulars are RM/TP
across the stack and a shear matrix (tubular shearing table) identifying
non-shearable tubulars should be posted at the driller’s station.
IOGP Example Drill Programs, detailed drill steps and assessment questions can be found
in IOGP Report 628 at this link.
The IOGP Example reference (D.1, D.2, etc..) are related to the Appendices in IOGP Report 628.

Revision: 1
8 Standard Forms
8.1 Well Control Drill Assessment Form Link
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
8.2 15 step daily well control checklist

The checklists in this section should be performed by the WSV on a daily basis as a part of FLBM
and Well Control readiness/assurance.
Find the spreadsheet version at the link here
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
Revision: 1

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8.3 Well Control Checklists
8.3.1 UWOXO - Well Control Checklist
8.3.2 UWOXO - Ara Salt Checklist
Revision: 1
8.4 Walk the Line

Walking the line is performed to physically confirm the system is ready for the intended activity
(e.g. valve positions, line up of relief devices, etc). Up-to-date documentation (e.g. Piping and
Instrumentation Diagrams) that accurately reflect installed systems and equipment is used for
physical verification.
Confirmation of correct system setup or corrective requirements should be feedback to the area
supervisor. Any corrective requirements should be resolved prior to commencement of planned
operations.
By performing the 15 daily checks for Well Control the pipe work related to Well Control is
included.
8.4.1 Walk the Line Example Checklist
Verification Types Responsible

Line up configuration, valve positions and Instrumentation:
1
Cross check against the approved P&ID for the operation. Example P&ID
2 Gauges Installed, working and at correct scaling.
3 Certified equipment (valid COC & COS) – And uploaded into eWCAT
4 Pressure Rating
5 Material Compatibility (e.g., sour service)
WSV
6 Tested Equipment (Pressure Test Graph Record and Acceptance)
&
7 Correct flanging practice
TP
8 Signs of leakage
9 No worn out / damaged equipment
10 Secondary retention / restraints in place
11 PRV settings
12 Adequate support for piping and valves (i.e. BOP SOV supports)
13 No go zone designations implemented
Verification Items Yes No Responsible
1 Mud Pumps
2 Pressure Relief Valves (Pop-Offs)
3 Pipe work (permanent)
4 Standpipe valve configuration
5 iBOPs (Actuated and Manual)
6 FOSVs and Gray Valves
7 Wellhead (Including SOVs)
8 BOP Connector
9 BOP Rams
10 BOP Spacer Spool
11 BOP SOVs WSV
12 BOP BSRs &
13 BOP Annular TP
14 Choke Line/s and flexible choke hose/s
15 Remote Choke Panel
16 Mud Gas Separator
17 Cement Line
18 Temporary Pipe work
19 Flare Lines
20 Cement unit
21 Dynamic kill pumps
22 Natih Line
23 Flow Meter
24 Rotating Head
Revision: 1
8.5 Accumulator Draw Down Test Form Form Link
Revision: 1
8.5.1 API STD 53 Surface System Drawdown Test Notes:

 Closing time shall not exceed 30 seconds for annular BOPs smaller than 18 3/4 in. nominal
bore, and 45 seconds for annular preventers of 18 3/4 in. nominal bore and larger.
 Closing times should be recorded and compared against the initial and each subsequent test,
as an indicator of potential problems in the system.
 The times for the drill cannot be used to determine the actual closing times during normal
operations due to the reduced operating pressure that the system has after the first and all
succeeding functions have occurred.
 Closing times should be measured from the moment the function is activated to the initial
moment the readback pressure gauge returns to its full operating pressure.
 When performing the accumulator drawdown test, wait a minimum of one hour from the time
you initially charged the accumulator system from precharge pressure to operating pressure.
Failure to wait sufficient time may result in a false positive test.
 Because it takes time for the gas in the accumulator to warm up after performing all of the
drawdown test functions, it is acceptable to wait 15 minutes after recording the pressure, if
the pressure was less than the MOP (minimum operating pressure). If there is an increase in
pressure, indications are that the gases are warming and there is still sufficient volume in the
accumulators. If the MOP has not been reached after 15 minutes, an additional 15-minute
wait may be required due to ambient temperatures negatively affecting the gas properties.
After 30 minutes from the time the final pressure was recorded, if the MOP has not been
reached, then it may be necessary to bleed down the system and verify pre-charge pressures
and volume requirements for the system.

Revision: 1
8.6 BOP Function Test Form Form Link

BOP Function Tests are to follow API STD 53 requirements.
BOP Tests should be recorded in eWCAT
Revision: 1
8.6.1 API STD 53 Function Test Notes:

 Prior to deployment, all control stations shall be function tested. The operability of individual
control stations shall be confirmed
 All well control components (excluding hydraulic connectors and shear rams) of the BOP
stack shall be function tested to verify the component’s intended operations at least once
every seven days or as operations allow. Pressure tests qualify as function tests.
Casing shear and blind shear rams shall be function tested at least once every 21 days.
 Actuation times (and volumes, if applicable) shall be recorded in a database for evaluating
trends.
 Subsequent function tests shall be performed from one BOP control station weekly. These
tests shall rotate through all control panels where all BOP functions are included. All possible
redundant control possibilities are not required every seven days.
 A function test schedule shall be developed for rotating control stations (excluding remote
panels on a weekly rotation).

Revision: 1
8.7 Trip Sheets

Click here for the link to Trip Sheets as Excel Spreadsheets (edit as required). Examples are
also included in the link.
8.7.1 Example Trip Sheet for Hoists
Revision: 1
8.7.2 Example Trip Sheet for Rigs

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8.8 Fill Up Sheets

Click here for the link to Trip Sheets as Excel Spreadsheets (edit as required). An Example is
also included in the link.
Revision: 1
8.9 Pre-Well Kill Checklist Example
PLAN – W ORK INSTRUCTIONS & HAZARD ASSESSMENT Yes No Responsible

Determine circulation rate constraints on Mud Gas Separator,
1 choke and surface equipment. WSV
Determine maximum pump output and pressure, and
2 pressure relief valve setting. WSV/TP
3 Determine the well kill method, agreed by office. WSV

4 Develop mud weighting up plan. WSV
5 Verify that kill sheet is updated. WSV
Verify the stock level of material for weighting material, LCM,
6 Cement, Glycol, etc. Plan for extra material call out. WSV
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES – FOLLOW STANDARDS AND
Yes No Responsible
PROCEDURES OR GET APPROVAL TO DEVIATE
7 Confirm MAASP is not exceeded. WSV
8 Subsurface team notified. WSV
Ensure competent people with clear roles and
9 TP
responsibilities for killing well
10 Develop scheme for surface mixing system. Mud Eng.
11 Develop scheme for surface killing system. TP
COMMUNICATE – TOOLBOX QUIZ? PERSONAL & PROCESS
Yes No Responsible
SAFETY, CHANGE MANAGEMENT & MOC
Communications equipment checked and in good working
12 TP
order
What-if scenarios discussed with all parties, agreed and
13 documented, for example losses, wash out on surface, WSV/TP
blowout.
WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT – KNOW YOUR WELL CONTROL
Yes No Responsible
EQUIPMENT AND CONFIRM IT’S CERTIFIED AND TESTED
Confirm both rig and mud logger Kick detection equipment is Mud logger
14
in good condition. / TP
Confirm that the Accumulator unit is in good working
15 TP
condition.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE – TEST YOUR EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Yes No Responsible
AND CONDUCT REGULAR DRILLS
16 Ensure fire-fighting system is in good condition. TP
Site rescue team stand by. Ensure Breathing Apparatus (BA)
17 TP
sets charged and ready for use.
Escape equipment inspected and working well (Vehicles
18 TP
condition and quantity and Escape Hoods).
Perform Emergency Drill scenarios and test emergency
19 WSV/TP
response time
LEBC to be notified of the well killing operation – follow the
20 WSV
MOPO for SIMOPS Activity requirements
Stop all hot work and SIMOPS activities throughout well kill
21 WSV/TP
operations.
Stop all hot work and SIMOPS activities throughout well kill
22 WSV/Driller
operations.
WALK THE LINE – “W ALK THE LINE” ON TEMPORARY RIG-UPS AND
Yes No Responsible
CONFIRM SETUP LAYOUT DRAWING
23 Ensure the back-up mixing lines to mixing system are clear. Mud Eng.
Walk the line as per scheme ensure mixing system and killing WSV/TP
24
system in correct line up.
25 Warning signs and barriers in place. TP

Revision: 1
8.10 Kill sheets vertical and deviated (hyperlink to IWCF)
8.10.1 Surface BOP Vertical

https://www.iwcf.org/download/542/
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
8.10.2 Surface BOP Deviated

https://www.iwcf.org/download/557/
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
Revision: 1
8.11 Inflow Test Horner Plot Form

Click here for the Horner plot spreadsheet.

Revision: 1
8.12 MGS Capacity Spreadsheet link
8.12.1 Existing Separator
Revision: 1
8.12.2 New Separator

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8.13 Casing Wear / Ditch Magnet Monitoring

Casing wear should be recorded in open wells in the Daily Operations Fluid Section, Other
Properties:
To display a trend following the ditch magnet recovery, a tracker sheet is available at the link and
illustrated below:
Revision: 1
9 Management of Risk during Change

Change could lead to a weakened or failed barrier (a well control barrier or other risk control).
Change can take the form of a deviation, a variation or a deviation and variation. The control of
risk for well control is governed by Well Engineering standards, primarily the Well Control
Standard (SP-1213), well design standards (CP-178, SP-2410, SP-2392, SP-2315, SP-2169) and
industry standards (e.g. API-53, 16D, 16C, etc). Industry standards are typically reference in SP-
1213.
Deviations are raised when a shall or SHALL statement is not possible with a planned operation,
typically due to the well environment and/or equipment or people constraints. Control of risk
should follow PDOs hierarchy of controls and the ultimate acceptance of risk shall be assessed
at the relevant TA approval level defined by the “Unmitigated Risk” described in the RAM for each
Consequence; People, Asset, Environment & Reputation (PEAR).
TA approval level is based on unmitigated risk assessed as per the RAM:
The RAM rating should be assessed based on unmitigated risk. The risk assessment and related
controls or “mitigations” should demonstrate that the residual risk is ALARP.
Deviation of SHALL statements

As starting point a deviation against a SHALL statement should be RAM Red or 5A/B risk rating
(note: a SHALL requirement is defined as needed to manage a Process Safety risk, i.e. typically
taking out one of the well barriers). A lower RAM rating could be true in a specific case, due to
the absence of the (process safety) hazard.
Deviation of shall statements

As starting point a deviation against a shall statement should be RAM Yellow risk rating. A lower
or higher risk could be true in a specific case, due to the absence or inclusion of (process safety)
hazard/s.

Revision: 1
9.1 Risk Identification and Mitigation with the Bowtie
A risk assessment for managing risk can should ask and answer 4 whats?:
1. What can go wrong (and how bad will that be)?
2. What can cause it to go wrong?
3. What must I do to prevent it from going wrong?
4. What should I do when it goes wrong?
Revision: 1
9.2 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for RU / working

above pressured annulus (single barrier)
MOC Title RU / working above pressured annulus (single barrier)
Well Name Well ID Work Unit
MOC No Field Date
Initiator Position Indicator
Activity Details
Activity Type Workover
Activity Slickline operation to install plugs for well suspension.
Well Type Gas Lift Completion (Oil Producer)
Well Control Risk Classification Medium Risk MASP 5,000 kPa
H2S DWI Classification DWI-2 Concentration 600 ppm
Management of Change (MOC)
MOC Type Deviation
CMS Document SP-1213
SHALL / shall Statement SHALL
TWO Barrier Deviation (YES/NO) YES
Document Section / Statement 4.3.1 Operational Minimum Risk Based Barrier Elements
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 5B
MOC Description / Justification

The well has been identified as having sustained A-Annulus pressure with a suspected tubing
failure. Slickline intervention scope is planned to isolate the reservoir ahead of further hoist activity
to recomplete the well.
A single SOV is installed on the A-Annulus on both sides. To follow SP-2392 and SP-1213, the
slickline rig up over the well must be performed with 2 x SOVs and VR plugs installed during lifting
operations:
1) To install the additional SOVs and VR plugs, the operation must be performed under a
single barrier (the closed, single A-Annulus SOVs).
2) Performing slickline operations with a live A-Annulus must be performed under a single
barrier (the production casing, wellhead and A-Annulus SOV connections).

Revision: 1
Well Schematic and Barrier Envelope
Revision: 1
Current Wellhead and Tree Schematic

Risk Assessment
Revision: 1
Unmitigated
Risk Recovery Measures
Cause / Consequence Control / Mitigations Action
# Threat
Printed 03/11/2022
Scenario / Impact (Lefthand side of the Bowtie) Party
(Righthand side of the Bowtie)
Severity
Risk Type
Likelihood
Ensure the gauge is installed Utilise gas detection at the wellhead and cellar
WH
and functional to accurately area while installing 2nd SOV and VR plugs.
1 Install fixed gas sensors during well activities.
inflow test the gate valve. Maint
P 5 B
Cessation of hot work and follow zone 0

electrical equipment requirements.
Ensure the gate vale is inflow WH
tested prior breaking off the end 2
Maint Utilise BA sets (H2S PPE) during tasks at the
test flange.
wellhead and cellar.
Release of E 4 B
hydrocarbons
Define the maximum dispersion output and
and toxic gas Lock Out Tag Out the inner
Release ensure muster areas are out with the
SOV gate to atmosphere, SOVs while removing the test
due to dispersion EPZ radius.
failure when while personnel flange from the SOVS and
1 primary are in the line 3 WSV
installing 2nd installing the VR lubricator. Limit personnel on location and at the
barrier of fire.
SOV. wellhead / cellar area, while performing the
failure LOTO to be controlled through
PTW. activity.
Possible A 4 B

ignition due to Perform evacuation drill prior to
release. Follow flanging procedure as commencement of work. Confirm muster

WH areas are identified and clear. Confirm
per OEM and API-6A, to remove 4
the test flange from the SOVs. Maint evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
condition.
Confirm communication protocols are effective
with LEBC and advise area authority of the
R 4 B Utilise the VR lubricator when WH planned activity.
5
Page 249
installing the VR plug. Maint In the event of release, follow PR-1287
emergency response protocols and GU-576
well control contingency plan.
Risk Assessment
Page 250
Unmitigated
Risk
Cause / Consequence / Control / Mitigations Action Recovery Measures
# Threat
Scenario Impact (Lefthand side of the Bowtie) Party (Righthand side of the Bowtie)
Severity
Risk Type
Likelihood
Utilise gas detection at the wellhead and
cellar area while installing 2nd SOV and VR
plugs. Install fixed gas sensors during well
P 5 B Install 2nd SOVs and VR plugs WH activities.
for heavy lifting operations. 5
Maint
Utilise BA sets (H2S PPE) during tasks at

the wellhead and cellar.
Dropped Release of E 4 B
object on the hydrocarbons Define the maximum dispersion output
SOV while and toxic gas to Install protection over SOV and ensure muster areas are out with the
Release during heavy lifts of the SOVs
rigging up atmosphere, dispersion EPZ radius.
due to and during operations (install WSV
slickline while personnel 6
2 primary sandbags and/or protective
equipment are in the line of Limit personnel on location and at the

barrier scaffolding frame)
and PCE on fire. wellhead / cellar area, while performing

failure
to the top of the activity.
the x-mas Possible ignition A 4 B
tree. Perform evacuation drill prior to
due to release.
commencement of work. Confirm muster
areas are identified and clear. Confirm
evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in
good condition.
Pressure test the wellhead x
SOV flange connection against WH Confirm communication protocols are
the VR plug, prior to lifting and 7 effective with LEBC and advise area
Maint
R 4 B well entry operations. authority of the planned activity.
In the event of release, follow PR-1287
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
emergency response protocols and GU-

576 well control contingency plan.
Revision: 1
Authorisation
Name Position TA Level Authorisation Date & Time Comments
SWE TA3 Review
TL TA2 Support
WC Manager TA1 Support
WE Manager TA1 Approve
MOC APPROVAL IS DEPENDANT ON COMPLETION OF ACTIONS AND DECLARATION
Actions
1 WH Maint. N/A Completed
7 WSV N/A Completed
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications
Name Position TA Level Authorisation Date & Time
Attachments with Supporting Evidence and Controls

Updated Procedure/s
Engineering Design Evidence/s
Wellhead & Tree Schematic
Updated Well Functional Requirements
Updated Subsurface Data
Revision: 1
9.3 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for N/D Tree and
N/U BOP with a single Barrier
MOC No Field Date
Activity Details
Activity Type Workover
Activity Hoist to replace the completion due to suspected packer leak
Well Type ESP Completion (Oil Producer)
MOC Type Deviation
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 5B

The well has been identified as having sustained A-Annulus pressure with a suspected packer
failure. Hoist Intervention is planned tore-complete the well with a new packer.
To allow N/D the tree and N/U the BOP, 2 x barriers SHALL be in place as per SP-1213. The
tubing has a deep set plug and shallow set plug set and verified (2 x independent and verified
barriers).
The Annulus has a shallow barrier envelope verified by testing the hanger seals, HOWEVER the
Packer / Annulus deep barrier envelope cannot be verified due to a suspected packer leak. The
trapped Annulus pressure has been bled off and the fluid level is now maintained by filling water
with a leak rate of 3 m3/hr.
To allow the N/D the BOP under a single barrier, the Annulus fluid level will be maintained and
monitored at all times.
Revision: 1
Risk Assessment
Page 254
Unmitigated
# Threat
d
Severity
Likelihoo
Risk Type
Ensure the tie-down bolts are Utilise gas detection at the wellhead and cellar
not manipulated during the area while replacing the SOV. Install fixed gas
operation, to ensure the tubing 1 WSV sensors during well activities.
P 5 B hanger barrier element is
maintained. Cessation of hot work and follow zone 0
The well is Install protection over the SOVs
capable of free and fill lines (scaffold / If fill rate is lost or cannot be maintained, shut
flow. sandbags) to ensure the line is WSV
Failure of the 2 in the well at the A-Annulus SOVs and stop
Hydrocarbon protected in the case of drops
single barrier the operation.
containment in (i.e. Tree or BOP) and that the
the well is will result in the E 4 B
fill rate is not compromised.
reliant on a release of Define the maximum dispersion output and
Release single barrier. hydrocarbons ensure muster areas are out with the
and toxic gas Ensure sufficient kill fluid volume dispersion EPZ radius.
due to is available and that the fluid
1 primary to atmosphere,
level is continuously monitored WSV
barrier while personnel 3 Limit personnel on location and at the

Work scope to and maintained/visible at
are in the line wellhead / cellar area, while performing the

failure N/D the tree surface via the trip tank.
of fire. activity.
and N/U the A 4 B
BOP could Perform evacuation drill prior to
compromise Possible Ensure 2 x SOVs on the A- commencement of work. Confirm muster
the hanger ignition due to Annulus are installed and tested WSV
4 areas are identified and clear. Confirm
seals, tiedown release. to MASP. evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
bolts and/or condition.
SOVs.
Ensure the Cellar is manned at Confirm communication protocols are effective
all times and communication with LEBC and advise area authority of the
method in place (i.e. radio) to
R 4 B 5 WSV planned activity.
allow closure of the SOVs if the
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
fill rate is not In the event of release, follow PR-1287

maintained/monitorable. emergency response protocols and GU-576
Revision: 1
Authorisation
SWE TA3 Review
TL TA2 Support
Actions
1 WSV N/A Completed
2 WSV N/A Completed
3 WSV N/A Completed
4 WSV N/A Completed
5 WSV N/A Completed
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications

Updated Procedure/s
Revision: 1
9.4 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for changing out

SOV under single barrier
MOC No Field Date
Activity Details
Activity Type Wellhead Maintenance
Activity WITS and SITS
Well Type ESP Completion (Oil Producer)
MOC Type Deviation
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 5B

During wellhead maintenance activities the A-Annulus SOVs were tested, and the waste pit side
valve was found to be leaking. The well has a packer completion which will provide the main
primary barrier component during the SOV change out. A-Annulus Pressure is noted as 0 kPa.
The SOV must be replaced under a single barrier while removing the SOV test flange and installing
the VR lubricator.
After the SOV is replaced, additional outer SOVs will be installed to comply with the Well Failure
Model (SP-2017) and the Wellhead and Tree standard (SP-2392).

Revision: 1
Revision: 1

Risk Assessment
Revision: 1
Unmitigated
# Threat
Printed 03/11/2022
Severity
Risk Type
Likelihood
Ensure the gauge is installed Utilise gas detection at the wellhead and cellar
and functional to accurately WH
area while replacing the SOV. Install fixed gas
inflow test and pressure test the 1 sensors during well activities.
Maint
P 5 B production packer and A-
Annulus.
Ensure the production packer electrical equipment requirements.
and A-Annulus is inflow tested WH
and pressure tested prior 2 Utilise BA sets (H2S PPE) during tasks at the
Maint
breaking off the end test flange. wellhead and cellar.
Release of E 4 B
hydrocarbons
Define the maximum dispersion output and
Production and toxic gas Prod.
Release ensure muster areas are out with the
tubing to atmosphere, Shut-in the well and isolate the Sup.
due to dispersion EPZ radius.
and/or while personnel ESP power supply with Lock out
1 primary are in the line 3 /
production Tag Out. LOTO to be controlled Limit personnel on location and at the
barrier of fire.
packer through PTW. Area wellhead / cellar area, while performing the
failure
failure. Auth activity.
Possible A 4 B

ignition due to Perform evacuation drill prior to
release. Follow flanging procedure as commencement of work. Confirm muster

WH areas are identified and clear. Confirm
per OEM and API-6A, to remove 4
the test flange from the SOVs. Maint evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
condition.
Confirm communication protocols are effective
with LEBC and advise area authority of the
R 4 B Utilise the VR lubricator when WH planned activity.
5
Page 259
installing the VR plug. Maint In the event of release, follow PR-1287
emergency response protocols and GU-576
Revision: 1
Authorisation
SWE TA3 Review
TL TA2 Support
Actions
Prod. Sup. /
3 N/A Completed
Area Auth
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications

Updated Procedure/s

Revision: 1
9.5 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for extending PCE

pressure test past 21 days
MOC No Field Date
Activity Details
Activity Type Drilling & Completion
Activity Running 4 ½” cemented completion
Well Type Exploration (Condensate / Gas)
Well Control Risk Classification High Risk MASP 55,000 kPa
H2S DWI Classification DWI-3 Concentration 7,500 ppm
MOC Type Deviation
SHALL / shall Statement shall
TWO Barrier Deviation (YES/NO) NO
Document Section / Statement 7.16 Pressure & Function Test Frequency
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 3C

During running the completion the running time was delayed due to NPT events. The BOP testing
frequency is expected to reach 22 days by the time the BOP is N/D after completion.
BOP test frequency will exceed the max BOP test frequency by 1 day.
Note: the last BOP function test was performed 3 days prior to the end of the 21-day BOP pressure
test frequency.
Risk Assessment
Page 262
Unmitigated
# Threat
d
Severity
Likelihoo
Risk Type
Confirm the previous BOP inspection
was reviewed for signs of wear and Define the maximum dispersion output and
dimensional checks showed ensure muster areas are out with the
P 0 A acceptable tolerance. Confirm the BOP dispersion EPZ radius.
equipment has evidence of no prior WSV
failures.
1
Ensure the function test validity is Perform evacuation drill prior to

present or repeat the test (excluding commencement of work. Confirm muster
BOP closure the BSRs).
ineffective with areas are identified and clear. Confirm
initial shut-in E 0 A evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
Monitor the BOP / primary flow wetted
WC equipment after closure to identify condition.
Time to shut-in any leak immediately (as per WSV
Damage to procedure) and close redundant 2
BOP is increased
upstream valves / BOP functions in
Loss of sealing and with it the the case of a leak. Confirm communication protocols are effective
1 BOP elastomers resultant influx with LEBC and advise area authority of the
redundancy and/or volume. planned activity.

Ensure the spaceout and shut-in

flange A 3 C procedure allows for redundancy with 3 WSV
connections Increase in kick optional ram or annular closure. In the event of release, follow PR-1287
volume results emergency response protocols and GU-576
in further well control contingency plan.
complexity to Perform drills to consider leak
scenarios with the monitoring and 4 WSV
well control
back-up close in requirements.
operations.
Pressure Test Well Control Subs
Offline 5 WSV
In the event of an underground blow out,
follow GU-576 and tertiary well control
R 1 C
Review the risk of swabbing with swab procedures.
SWE
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
analysis and consider pumping out of 6

hole as further mitigation. P&D
Revision: 1
Authorisation
SWE TA3 Review
TL TA2 Approved
Actions
1 WSV N/A Completed
2 WSV N/A Completed
3 WSV N/A Completed
4 WSV N/A Completed
5 WSV N/A Completed
6 SWE P&D TA3 Completed
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications
WC Manager TA1 N/A
WE Manager TA1 N/A
Updated Procedure/s Shut-in Procedure
Engineering Design Evidence/s Last BOP Test Report, Last Function Test
Report
Wellhead & Tree Schematic N/A
Updated Well Functional Requirements N/A
Updated Subsurface Data N/A
Revision: 1
9.6 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider in deviation for extending PCE

COS recertification past due date
MOC No Field Date
Activity Details
Activity Type Drilling & Completion
Activity Drilling 8 3/8” Reservoir Section
Well Type Appraisal (Gas)
Well Control Risk Classification High Risk MASP 55,000 kPa
H2S DWI Classification DWI-3 Concentration 7,500 ppm
MOC Type Deviation
SHALL / shall Statement shall
3.3.4 COS
Document Section / Statement “All primary and non-primary flow-wetted well control
equipment shall be subject to a COS on an annual basis”
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 3C

The current well operation is behind plan due to losses and extensive NPT in the previous hole
section. The well activity cannot be completed in time to allow for the planned annual WC
equipment servicing and inspection (COS).
The planned operation is no planned to end 1 week after the expiry of WC equipment. Expired
equipment will include:
Annular BOP, Double Ram BOP, Spacer Spool, Choke and kill line valves (manual and HCR),
Choke line coflex hose and the choke manifold

Risk Assessment
Revision: 1
Unmitigated
# Threat
Scenario / Impact Party
Printed 03/11/2022
(Lefthand side of the Bowtie)
d
Severity
Likelihoo
Risk Type
Confirm the previous BOP
inspection was reviewed for signs Define the maximum dispersion output and
of wear and dimensional checks ensure muster areas are out with the
P 0 A showed acceptable tolerance. dispersion EPZ radius.
Confirm the BOP equipment has 1 WSV
evidence of no prior failures.
Ensure the function test and
BOP closure pressure is valid. Perform evacuation drill prior to
ineffective with commencement of work. Confirm muster
initial shut-in. E 0 A areas are identified and clear. Confirm
Monitor the BOP / primary flow evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
Time to shut-in wetted WC equipment after
condition.
is increased closure to identify any leak
Damage to immediately (as per procedure) 2 WSV
Loss of BOP and/or and with it the
and close redundant upstream
1 BOP primary flow resultant influx
valves / BOP functions in the case Confirm communication protocols are effective
redundancy wetted WC volume.
of a leak. with LEBC and advise area authority of the
components planned activity.
Increase in kick A 3 C
Ensure the spaceout and shut-in
volume results procedure allows for redundancy 3 WSV In the event of release, follow PR-1287

in further emergency response protocols and GU-576
with optional ram or annular

complexity to closure. well control contingency plan.
well control
operations. . Perform drills to consider leak
scenarios with the monitoring and 4 WSV
back-up close in requirements.
In the event of an underground blow out,
R 1 C Review the risk of swabbing with follow GU-576 and tertiary well control
swab analysis and consider SWE procedures.
Page 265
pumping out of hole as further 5 P&D
mitigation.
Revision: 1
Authorisation
Name Position TA Level Authorisatio Date & Time Comments
n
SWE TA3 Review
TL TA2 Approve
Actions
1 WSV N/A Completed
2 WSV N/A Completed
3 WSV N/A Completed
4 WSV N/A Completed
5 SWE P&D TA3 Completed
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications
Authorisatio
Name Position TA Level Date & Time
n
WC Manager TA1 N/A
WE Manager TA1 N/A
Updated Procedure/s Shut-in Procedure
Engineering Design Evidence/s Last BOP Test Report, Last Function Test
Report, Last COS for all relevant equipment
Wellhead & Tree Schematic N/A
Updated Well Functional Requirements N/A

Revision: 1
9.7 Minimum MOC mitigations to consider for wells with heavily corroded
surface casing that cannot support BOP weight but have passed SIT.
MOC No Field Date
Activity Details
Activity Type Well Intervention
Activity Well Abandonment
Well Type Gas Lift (Oils Producer)
MOC Type Variation
CMS Document N/A
SHALL / shall Statement N/A
Document Section / Statement N/A
MOC Validity Period
RAM Potential 3E

The well intervention activity is planned subsequent to a corrosion log which defined 50% metal
loss in the top 15 m from surface of the production casing and surface casing. The planned activity
is required to abandon the well. Intervention to avoid re-occurrence of similar incident as occurred
on: L-256 wellhead tilted investigation final (post-MDIRC).pdf
The A-Annulus has been pressure tested to MASP and is holding pressure, however the reduce
wall thickness indicated the Wellhead may become unstable with additional weight provided by
the BOP required for intervention.
The intervention activity is non-standard due to the condition of the casings which cannot support
the BOP.
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
Risk Assessment
Page 270
Unmitigated
# Threat
d
(Righthand side of the Bow-Tie)
Severity
Likelihoo
Risk Type
Install and verify a deepset plug
in the tubing with slickline to Civil
install a deepset primary barrier, 1
P 4 B prior to hoist/rig entry.
Perform evacuation drill prior to
Collapse / tilt Pressure test and verify the commencement of work. Confirm muster
results in a loss primary barrier envelope, areas are identified and clear. Confirm
of the deepset tubing plug and evacuation vehicles are sufficient and in good
secondary production packer. 2 WSV condition.
BOP barrier E 0 B
installed for envelope and Overbalance fluid to be place
well loss of well above tubing and annulus
intervention. access. barriers
Wellhead Confirm zero pressure on the
and casing Well will 3 WSV
1 tubing and A-Annulus prior to
require re-
collapse or Additional N/D xmas tree.

tilt weight heading to

placed on regain access A 3 E Install base plates and a base
the and until this is landing clamp to provide 4 Civil
wellhead completed, the additional support for the BOP Confirm communication protocols are effective
and casings well will be weight. with LEBC and advise the area authority of the
reliant on planned activity.
deepest well Support the weight of the BOP
barriers as a In the event of release, follow PR-1287
with BOP substructure cranes 5 WSV
single barrier emergency response protocols and GU-576
while installing and during
envelope. well control contingency plan.
operations
R 1 E
Install a ditch from the cellar to
03/11/2022
Revision: 1
divert flow to the waste pit, in 6 Civlil

the case of flow to atmosphere.
Revision: 1
Authorisation
SWE TA3 Review
Well Examiner TA2 Support
TL (P&D) TA2 Support
TL (Ops) TA2 Support
WE Manager
TA1 Approve
(Ops)
Actions
1 Civil N/A Completed
2 WSV N/A Completed
3 WSV N/A Completed
5 WSV N/A Completed
Declarations
WSV N/A Declaration
Notifications
WC Manager TA1 N/A
WE Manager
TA1 N/A
(P&D)
Updated Procedure/s BOP Installation and support with BOP crane procedure.
Engineering Design Evidence/s Basi Landing Clamp Installation
Updated Well Functional N/A
Requirements
Revision: 1
10 Learning from Historical Level 1 Well Control Events

Asset Integrity – Process Safety Management (AIPSM)
1. Connect to AIPSM-Learning Knowledge Base (pdo.om)
2. Add Filter and select UWD
3. Select Date Range of interest
4. Download LFI / HSE Flash etc

Revision: 1
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11 Well Control Incident Classification link

Revision: 1
12 Well Control Incident –Site Investigation Report Template link
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
Revision: 1

Revision: 1
Revision: 1

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13 WPS Incident Reporting & Investigation
13.1 Summary Incident Reporting & Investigation Flowchart

Subsurface related WPS Incident With Consequences (IWC) or
WPS Near Miss (NM) or WPS Unsafe Act/Condition-Potential Incident (PI) occurs
Site Supervisor reports IWC / NM / PI in PIM (Section) within 24 hours

Site Supervisor selects relevant WPS incident level: WCI / API-AIPS / LOPC in PIM (Section)
NB - Office staff can enter PI for high-risk findings during the planning phase (Section)
Site Supervisor reviews incident with well engineering office team and selects asset or wells Incident Owner
of suitable authority in PIM (Section)
Incident Owner enters RAM Potential & Actual (for IWC) in PIM (Section)
UWZ / WPSFP review incident details in Thursday afternoon / Sunday morning meetings. WPSFP inform
SSPSFP of any subsurface related WPS incidents. Meet to discuss as required.
UWZ proposal for Directorate IRC or MDIRC discussed and agreed in Sunday UWD HSE meetings with Wells
LT & UWA1. Initial guidance is based on GU-612 requirements.
Requirement for Directorate IRC or MDIRC to be confirmed by MSE team.
NM / PI IWC
IWC
(WCI L4 Event) IWC (WCI L1/2/3
(WCI L2/3 Event) Low (WCI L2/3 Event)
Event) High Potential
Investigation Potential or Actual
Medium / High & RAM 4-5 or Actual
requirements as RAM 0-2
Potential & RAM 1-3 RAM 4-5
per Section or Actual RAM 3
Investigation
Investigation
requirements as per
Investigation requirements as per
Section
requirements as per Section
Section
TOR required
TOR optional
PSFP leads creating and distributing alerts/flyers within the relevant community (WE/PE)
SSPSFP and WPSFP meet on quarterly basis to update overview of WPS incident trends, investigations
completed, corrective actions and identify potential thematic reviews.
SSPSFP and WPSFP present to UWA1 / UWA13 / UPG / UWOE to give WPS incident trend update and get
steer / approval for any required thematic reviews.
Revision: 1
13.2 WPS Incident Classifications

There are 3 different classifications required for a WPS incident in PDO:
1. IOGP WPS Classification – L1 / L2 / L3 / L4
2. PIM Incident Type – Incident with Consequences / Near Miss / Potential Incident
3. API-AIPS Tier Classification – Tier 1 / Tier 2 / LOPC
These 3 different classifications are required due to different company scorecard KPIs. There is
a link between the IOGP Incident Classification and PIM Incident Type (a L4 WCI is always a PI
or NM). Similarly for a PI or NM there should be no Tier Classification as there has not been an
incident (leak). The table below summarises the relationship between the 3 different
classifications:

Revision: 1
13.2.1 IOGP WPS Classification

PDO follows the IOGP WPS incident classification, Well Control Incident (WCI) definitions.
WCI
The relevant type of WPS incident flag should be marked in PIM.
Revision: 1
13.2.2 PIM Incident Type

The Event Type as summarised below should be used:
Event Type WCI Level & Type Example

Incident With
1/2/3 - Incident As per table section 3.2.1
Consequences
Something that physically happens but does not
cause loss or primary and/or secondary barrier.
Near Miss
ie XPT measured pore pressure is outside of WPT
(Incident
4 - Near Miss range but the mudweight was still overbalanced. On a
without
similar upcoming well this pore pressure will result in
consequence)
an internal blowout and an immediate design change
is required.
Something that did not physically happen but could

potentially have caused an incident.
Unsafe
ie Approved well proposal incorrectly missed 2
Act/Condition 4 - Potential
formations which was identified by wellsite geologist
(Potential Incident
and corrected via eMOC before drilling commenced.
Incident)
These formations are high sour and the well would not
have been able to be perforated and produced.
13.2.3 API-AIPS Incident Classifications

In the event that fluid (either mud or reservoir fluid) containment from the wellbore is lost the
incident will also be classified as an API Asset Integrity Process Safety (AIPS) Event.
GU-612 section 2.2.3 details the flowchart and mass flowrate thresholds for classification of
whether the leak is a Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) / Tier 2 / Tier 1 event. There are some
additional criteria not related to leaks that can also trigger a “Tier” classification such as fire /
explosion / injury.
MSE8 provides support for API-AIPS incident classification.
A WPS event can occur without any loss of containment. There is no direct correlation between
WCI L1 or L2 or L3 events and Tier 1 or Tier 2 events; they have to be independently assessed.

Revision: 1
13.3 Well Engineering Related Types of WPS Incident

Examples of WPS incidents which can occur during drilling and CWI operations where well
engineering activities are the primary cause, include but are not limited to:
 Training / Competency Non-Compliance
 Well Control Equipment Failure
 Well Design Specification Error leading
 Well Execution Procedural Error
13.3.1 Examples of different Well Engineering related WPS incident classifications are
summarised below:
Well
Engineering WCI L1 WCI L2 WCI L3 WCI L4
Aspect
Inability to  Training expired
Kicks and
monitor and without an approved
losses due to
Blowout due to maintain deviation
Training / inability to
incorrect well volume
Competency secure the well  Inadequate
killing control while
non-compliance and the Supervision
execution. tripping,
resultant influx >  Failure to conduct
leading to a
kick tolerance.
swab kick. drills
 Well Control
Leaking well Equipment
control Incompatibility
Pressure equipment  Well Control
observed during during a well
equipment is not
a well control control event,
Blowout due to event has but an maintained and/or
Well Control failure of exceeded the additional certification has
Equipment equipment RWP of well valve was expired
Failure during a well control closed  Use of uncertified
control event. equipment, upstream to Well Control
however no loss isolate the Equipment
of containment leak and re-
occurred. establish the  Failure to verify BOP
barrier condition via
envelope. function testing /
pressure testing
Incorrect casing
seat selection
and kick
Loss of tolerance BHA design
containment design, leading and swab  WDP not followed
Well design and release to a kick and analysis was  Incorrect well barrier
Specification during well loss scenario. not verification
production, as performed,
Error  Installation of
the design load Well trajectory leading to
and associated Anti-collision swabbing incorrect capital well
casing design check incorrect. tendency and equipment
was incorrect. Neighbouring a swab kick.
well intersected
resulting in a
kick.
Revision: 1
Well
Engineering WCI L1 WCI L2 WCI L3 WCI L4
Aspect
Program / SOP not  Program not

approved at the
followed during well Failure to
Mud weight point of
intervention, which secure the well
not maintained execution.
results in removal of as per
a primary barrier procedure. as per  Failure to follow
Well Execution
Procedural Error program the MOC
and the BOP is and the
leading to a process which
ineffective, resulting resultant influx
kick may/does
in uncontrolled > kick
release and loss of tolerance. weaken WPS
asset and/or life(s). controls
13.4 Subsurface Related Types of WPS Incident

There are several types of incidents that can occur during drilling and CWI operations where
subsurface discipline related input can be a primary or contributory cause.
Examples of this include but are not limited to:
 Formation top depth outside of formation top range prognosis.
 Drilling into an unexpected formation.
 Pore pressure outside of pore pressure range prognosis.
 Different formation fluid fill (weight and / or type ie oil / water / gas) to prognosis.
 Different formation fluid composition to prognosis ie higher H2S ppm.
 Fracture pressure outside of fracture pressure range prognosis.
 Encountering unexpected losses.
13.4.1 Examples of different subsurface related WPS incident classifications are

summarised below:
Subsurface
WCI L1 WCI L2 WCI L3 WCI L4
Aspect
Blowout due to Kick circulated out

Encountered
drilling into of well as per
Kicks and losses formation top
Formation hydrocarbon routine drills /
due to drilling into shallow outside
top outside bearing formation training due to
high pressure of formation top
of formation outside of drilling into high
formation outside range prognosis
top range formation top pressure formation
of formation top but no loss of
prognosis range prognosis outside of
range prognosis. primary barrier
without BOP in formation top
or kick taken.
place. range prognosis.
Encountered
High pressure kick unexpected
Kick circulated out
Blowout due to from unexpected formation
of well as per
drilling into formation that outside of
Drilling into routine drills /
unexpected but requires freezing geological
unexpected training due to
known high drillpipe to install prognosis but
formation. drilling into
pressure high pressure no but no loss
unexpected
formation. circulating lines to of primary
formation.
kill the well. barrier or kick
taken.
Revision: 1
Subsurface
WCI L1 WCI L2 WCI L3 WCI L4
Aspect
Encountered pore
pressure outside
Kick circulated
Pore Kick circulated out of pore pressure
Subsurface out of well as
pressure of the well and range prognosis
crossflow due to per routine drills
outside of BOP rated working but no loss of
pore pressure / training even
pore pressure was primary barrier or
outside of pore though pore
pressure exceeded (but did kick taken.
pressure range pressure was
range not leak) due to Typically this will
prognosis. outside of WPT
prognosis. high pore pressure. be from XPT
range prognosis.
pressure
sampling.
Blowout due to Casing minimum
taking gas kick design factor, Encountered fluid
Different Kick bullheaded
where oil kick wellhead working fill gradient
formation as per routine
expected and pressure and BOP outside of WPT
fluid fill drills / training
having insufficient working pressure range but no loss
(weight and even though
shoe strength to exceeded but did of primary barrier
/ or type ie fluid fill weight
contain kick not leak whilst or kick taken.
oil / water / was outside of
resulting in shoe circulating out a Typically this will
gas) to WPT fluid fill
breaking and gas kick where be from XPT /
prognosis. prognosis.
breaching to only oil was MDT / welltest.
surface. expected.
Kick bullheaded Encountered fluid
Different Blowout due to
Requirement to as per routine fill composition
formation completion and
snub in sour drills / training outside of WPT
fluid casing failure from
drillstring in order even though range but no loss
composition Sulphide stress
to kill well fluid fill of primary barrier
to cracking due to
evacuated to sour composition was or kick taken.
prognosis ie unexpected H2S
fluid which was not outside of WPT Typically this will
higher H2S content and non
prognosed in WPT. fluid fill be from MDT /
ppm. sour well design.
prognosis. welltest.
Subsurface Losses observed
Losses
crossflow due to due to fracturing
observed after
fracturing shoe casing shoe whilst
fracturing the
whilst circulating circulating out kick Encountered
shoe with drilling
out kick with kick with kick ECD < unexpected
Fracture ECD < WPT
ECD < WPT WPT expected losses due to
pressure expected
expected fracture fracture pressure. fracturing
outside of fracture
pressure. Unable Extensive kicks formation. ECD
fracture pressure. Kick
to isolate and losses event less than fracture
pressure subsequently
crossflow. String only able to be pressure range in
range taken but able to
backed off and solved by pumping WPT. No loss of
prognosis. be bullheaded
hole abandoned barite plug or primary barrier /
and then shoe
above crossflow cement through kick taken.
strength
leaving active drillstring. Risk not
increased by
internal crossflow identified in
pumping LCM.
system. program.
Risk identified in
proposal / Risk not identified
Risk not identified
Shallow gas event program. in program. High
in proposal /
results in Shallow gas % of gas
Shallow Gas program. Shallow
extensive flow and event with measured in mud
Kick Event gas event
loss of asset standard returns. No
managed without
and/or life(s). procedures shallow gas
loss of life/asset.
preventing event.
excessive flow.
Revision: 1
13.5 WPS Incident Ownership
13.5.1 Directorate Incident Ownership

The directorate employing the team lead which has the most authority, control or most influence
over the work/area/service provider involved in the incident owns the incident as per GU-612
section 2.2.7.
For subsurface WPS incidents this broadly means that the relevant asset team owns the incident
if the primary direct cause of the incident is a subsurface related aspect outside of the WPT /
WSAM proposal range or risk assessment. Similarly, the relevant well team owns the incident if
the primary direct cause of the incident is a wells design or wells operations related aspect and
the well conditions were within the WPT range / risk assessment profile.
Examples of similar incidents with different causes and incident owners are listed below:
13.5.2 Example 1 – Drilled Kick

Owned by asset team – A kick is taken whilst drilling. The calculated pore pressure from the kick
is higher than the WPT maximum prognosed pore pressure.
Owned by wells team – A kick is taken whilst drilling. The calculated pore pressure from the kick
is between WPT expected and maximum pore pressure. Due to risk of differential sticking in
shallower formations the approved mud weight was overbalancing expected pore pressure and
less than maximum pore pressure.
13.5.3 Example 2 – Total Losses

Owned by asset team – Total losses are encountered in formation C resulting in a kick from
formation B. The risk of losses in formation C was not identified or documented in the WPT. The
pore pressure observed in formation B is within WPT range.
Owned by wells team – Total losses are encountered in formation C resulting in a kick from
formation B. The risk of losses in formation C was documented in the WPT. The pore pressure
observed from formation B is within WPT range.
13.5.4 Example 3 – Formation Top Depth

Owned by asset team – A section is planned to TD 20m into hydrostatically pressured formation
G. The shallowest depth of high pressure formation H is 40m below top of formation G. After
drilling 15m into formation G a high pressure kick from formation H is observed. The risk of high
pressure in formation H is documented in the WPT.
Owned by wells team – A section is planned to TD 20m into hydrostatically pressured formation
G. The shallowest depth of high pressure formation H is 40m below top of formation G. The driller
does not follow the work instruction and drills 50m below top formation G resulting in a drilled kick
from formation H. The risk of high pressure in formation H is documented in the WPT.
13.5.5 Example 4 – Water Injection Formation Drilled Kick

Owned by asset team – A drilled kick is taken in a water injection formation. The calculated pore
pressure from the kick is higher than the WPT maximum prognosed pore pressure. The water
injectors listed in the WPT have been shut in and bled off in the required number of days prior to
drilling and to the required residual wellhead pressure.
Owned by asset team – A drilled kick is taken in a water injection formation. The calculated pore
pressure from the kick is higher than the WPT maximum prognosed pore pressure. The WSV
informed the station to shut in the water injectors listed in the WPT with sufficient notice but the
station did not close in the wells and/or bleed them off to the required pressure.

Revision: 1
Owned by wells team – A drilled kick is taken in a water injection formation. The water injectors
listed in the WPT have been shut in and bled off in the required number of days prior to drilling
and to the required residual wellhead pressure. The calculated pore pressure from the kick is
within WPT range. Due to risk of losses in shallower formations the approved mud weight was
overbalancing expected pore pressure and less than maximum pore pressure.
13.5.6 Example 5 – Sour Shallow Gas Kick

Owned by asset team – A sour shallow gas kick is taken. The WPT does not identify that there is
a risk of a sour shallow gas kick.
Owned by wells team – A sour shallow gas kick is taken. The WPT clearly identified the risk of a
sour shallow gas kick.
13.6 Management Level Incident Ownership

As per GU-612 section 2.2.7.7 once the directorate owning the incident is determined, the
required management authority level for the incident ownership within that directorate should be
based on the RAM assessment as per below table:
RAM RAM
PIM Incident Owner Example
Actual Potential
Asset Director - OND, OSD, GD High Potential

Director 4/5
Wells Director - UWD (Red)
Asset Petroleum Engineering Manager - Medium
Manager ONP, OSP, GGP 3 Potential
Wells Delivery Manager - UWOX (Yellow)
Asset Team Lead - ONPX, OSPX, GGPX Low Potential
Team Lead 0/1/2
Wells Delivery Team Lead - UWOXO (Blue)
The incident owner is encouraged to lead the investigation to demonstrate commitment, however
the role can be delegated as per the limits detailed in GU-612 section 2.2.8.8.
13.7 Risk Assessment Matrix
13.7.1 Incident Severity (Actual & Potential)

The criteria in GU-612 section 2.2 and 2.2.4 should be used to confirm the actual, and potential
incident severity, respectively. The RAM matrix and definitions are shown in the PDO Risk
Assessment Matrix.
The impact from contained WPS incidents is typically driven by the Asset consequence which is
the disruption to operation ie time off the plan / critical path to rectify the issue.
In the event of a fluid release at surface or crossflow subsurface the environmental consequence
may be the highest actual severity rating.
The WCI classification summary in should also be used for determining minimum potential rating
vs well section risk profile.
WPS Incident WCI Level 1/2/3/4 is an independent classification to the RAM assessment. For
example there can be a WCI L2 WPS incident with very low financial cost or a WCI L4 WPS
incident with a very high financial cost (stuck pipe / sidetrack etc).
Revision: 1
13.8 Reporting and Investigation Requirements
13.8.1 L4 WCI - Near Miss / Potential Incidents

PDO encourages WPS near miss and potential incident reporting as it allows trends to be
analysed and potential threats to be identified before incidents occur. It also gives an indication
of pro-activeness and awareness of WPS risk.
Due to the large, expected volume of subsurface related L4 WCI’s only high potential or high
learning value NM/PI shall be reported in PIM.
For subsurface related findings ie non expected sour formation (with no kick), incorrect pore
pressure prognosis that would have resulted in severe kick identified by well site geologist after
prognosis approved and prior to drilling. The required level of investigation should be advised by
the Incident Owner and reviewed by the WPSFP and SSPSFP.
A quarterly review of all subsurface related WCI L4 WCI shall be done between WPSFP and the
SSPSFP. A thematic review can then be conducted based on any historic or emerging trends.
The following checks may feature as useful related L4 WCI thematic reviews if they are not
already tracked as KPIs:
Well Engineering
 Training and competency inadequate / expired
 Well Control Drills not performed to required frequency
 Leaking WC equipment during testing
 Use of uncertified well control equipment
 WDP non-compliance
 Failure to follow the MOC process
Petroleum Engineering:
 Actual formation top depths vs prognosis.
 Actual formation top depths vs uncertainty range.
 Actual logged formation top depths vs wellsite cuttings interpreted formation tops.
 Actual pore pressure vs prognosis.
 Actual pore pressure vs uncertainty range.
 Actual fracture pressure vs prognosis.
 Actual fracture pressure vs uncertainty range.
 Actual hazards by formation vs prognosis.

Revision: 1
13.8.2 WCI - Incidents With Consequences

As per GU-612 section 2.2.11.1 and 2.2.12 the level of the incident investigation, reporting and
requirement for (director-MD) IRC depends on the incident’s level of potential and actual severity:
Low Potential, Medium
High Potential or
Requirement or Actual RAM Potential or
Actual RAM 4-5
0-2 Actual RAM 3
Notification in PIM X X X
Incident notification form X X X
PIM investigation module X X X
Low potential/minor
X
investigation report
Medium Potential
X
Investigation report
High potential Investigation
X
report
Director IRC presentation X
MDIRC presentation X
Lateral learning
UWD Knowledge Base X X
AIPSM Knowledge Base
Revision: 1
13.9 Investigation Templates

The incident investigation templates referenced above from GU-612 section 2.2.11 are not
suitable for investigating and reporting WPS incidents. The below covers suitable investigation
requirements for WPS incidents:
13.9.1 Low Potential Investigation

The minimum details of the incident should be noted in the PIM incident description including:
Information /
Type of
Example Include in the Investigation Documents to
Incident
Attach
 Accurately list date and institution of
last well control qualification.
 Confirm if contractor is tracking
Relief driller IWCF certification.
Personnel without valid  Confirm why the personnel did not 1. Well control
Certification IWCF have certification (i.e. failed exam / certificate
certificate forgot to arrange course / etc).
 Include feedback from both the direct
person and the contractor office
management
 List equipment description (i.e.
Cameron 13 5/8” 10k type U 5” fixed
pipe ram) / PN / SN. 1. COC
 List operating history prior to the 2. COS (if >1year
failure (any repairs / age / operating since COC)
conditions i.e. mud & temperature). 3. Correspondence
 List how the failure was identified (i.e. with OEM
leak during 21-day BOP test). 4. Failure
 Describe any observations after notification to API
comparing drilling contractor if design or
Leaking BOP manufacturing
Equipment operating practices vs drilling
during BOP issue.
Related contractor and OEM procedures
test
 Describe any observations after 5. OEM operating
comparing drilling contractor manual
maintenance vs their PMS 6. OEM
programme & OEM maintenance maintenance
requirements. requirement
 Detail what was done to rectify the 7. Contractor SOP
failure.
8. Contractor
 Describe what caused the failure to maintenance plan
occur (wear and tear / incorrect use
/ incorrect maintenance / etc).

Revision: 1
Information /
Type of
Example Include in the Investigation Documents to
Incident
Attach
Water Water supply  Summarise the names of the water
Supply stopped due wells that had supply interruption.
to failed water 1. Anything of
pump on  Describe what caused the supply
interruption (i.e. water well pump relevance
WSW123
failed / incorrectly shut off by station
/ etc).
2. Drilling
Contractor
 Summarise differences between procedure
DPT/WWI/Contractor 3. OEM
instructions/Contractor procedures. procedure
Incorrect mud
4. Drilling
weight  List personnel involved and level of
Procedural Programme
pumped competency.
relevant
downhole
 Describe what caused the failure to sections
happen (i.e. procedure not issued / 5. WWI
incorrect procedure / etc). 6. Trip / Fill
sheets
7. Mudlog Data
 Summarise differences between
WPT/DPT/WWI/Contractor
instructions vs the actual operation. 1. Well Proposal
2m3 drilled
relevant
kick taken  Describe what caused the failure to
sections.
Subsurface and circulated happen (actual subsurface
2. Drilling
Related out with parameters outside of proposal /
programme
drillers etc).
relevant
method
 If known, include the cause of the sections.
failure ie error in WPT / production
operations opened water injector etc.
It is important to record these details so that if the incident is found to be re-occurring in one area
or occurring across PDO in different operations, a meaningful thematic review can be conducted.
The RAM (likelihood) of the incident will also be ranked higher if it is occurring in multiple areas
of PDO.
Revision: 1
13.9.2 Medium Potential Investigation

If a Directorate IRC is requested, then the MSE IRC process will be followed as per GU-612
section 2.2.11 and 2.2.12 requirements. The MSE IRC template will be used for the investigation
reporting. If the incident resulted in an API-AIPS event (loss of containment or Tier 1/2) the AIPS
IRC template will be used (use latest version from MSE3 homepage).
For non-Directorate IRC incidents, WPSFP and SSPSFP should review the potential value of
completing a detailed investigation for the incident as opposed to the above minor investigation.
If there is significant value to be learned WPSFP and SSPSFP should approach the incident
owner to discuss completing a detailed investigation.
A word document template is included at this link for investigating medium potential incidents.
Where required or preferred an incident investigation terms of reference can be written to assist
the investigation team. (TOR Template)
13.9.3 High Potential Investigation

If an MDIRC is required then the MSE IRC process will be followed as per GU-612 section 2.2.11
and 2.2.12 requirements. The MSE IRC template will be used for the investigation reporting. If
the incident resulted in an API-AIPS event (loss of containment or Tier 1/2) the AIPS IRC template
will be used (use latest version from the MSE3 homepage).
There should be an approved incident investigation terms of reference. (TOR Template)
All High Potential Incidents should be investigated through PDO as the lead investigator
and NOT under the responsibility of the Contractor.

Revision: 1
13.10 Investigation Teams

The Incident Owner should create his investigation team led by an investigation team leader
based on the expertise of his personnel.
The requirements for team members / positions and team lead of the investigation team is
determined by the incident RAM potential severity and is detailed in GU-612 section 2.2.8.9. The
incident owner is encouraged to lead the investigation to demonstrate commitment, however they
can delegate this role as per the limits detailed in GU-612 section 2.2.8.8.
For subsurface related WPS incidents the investigation team will include relevant subsurface
asset team members as well as members from the well engineering operations and planning and
design team.
The requirement for specific expertise from UWA1 team / subsurface discipline functions /
SSPSFP should be reviewed for each investigation. The roles and responsibilities of the
investigation team members should be clear in the terms of reference.
13.11 Terms of Reference (TOR)

A TOR is required for all high risk potential incident investigations. Where required it can also be
used for medium potential investigations.
The roles and responsibilities of the investigation team members should be clear in the TOR.
The subsurface (UPG) and wells function (UWA1) should be active in the initial framing and TOR
of the investigation to ensure early alignment and should review the TOR.
The TOR should be made by the investigation leader and approved by the incident owner.
An example TOR for subsurface related WPS incidents is at this link.
13.11.1 Learning Flyers

The SSPSFP should take a lead in creating and distributing incident alerts/flyers within the PDO
Petroleum Engineering community.
Revision: 1
13.12 Incident Review and Investigation Requirement Meetings
13.12.1 UWZ PIM Review Weekly Meeting

WPSFP and SSPSFP should attend the Thursday afternoon and Sunday morning UWZ PIM
review meetings to review the incident and agree the following:
1. Directorate Incident Owner
2. RAM Actual
3. RAM Potential
4. WPS Incident Level classification
5. Investigation Requirements
WPSFP should take MOM and send to SSPSFP / UWZ team cc UPG / UWA1 and directly discuss
any medium or high potential incidents with UWA1.
13.12.2 UWD Weekly Meeting

UWA1 should attend the UWDLT meeting on Sunday mornings. Any significant WPS incidents
are discussed in this meeting and requirements for directorate IRC or MDIRC are reviewed.
13.12.3 Quarterly Meeting

WPSFP and SSPSFP should prepare an overview of subsurface related WPS incident trends,
investigation and corrective actions and proposed thematic review options.
WPSFP and SSPSFP should then present this to UWA1 / UWA13 / UPG / UWOE to give a
general update of trends and for steer / confirmation on any required thematic reviews. Thematic
reviews might be undertaken by WPSFP / SSPSFP or by other teams / disciplines.

Revision: 1
13.13 PDO Risk Assessment Matrix

CP-122 (Section 31. Risk Matrix Qualitative Risk Assessment & Evaluation)
Revision: 1
14 Appendices
14.1 Appendix 2, Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Definitions
Table 14-1, Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AAR After Action Review
AC Action Code (Well Failure Model well code)
ACP Annulus Casing Packer
AD Assistant Driller
AHD Along Hole Depth
AIPS Asset Integrity Process Safety
AIPSM Asset Integrity Process Safety Management
AISI American Iron and Steel Institute
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
API American Petroleum Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BA Breathing Apparatus
BDF Below Drill Floor
BHA Bottom Hole Assembly
BHM Bullhead Margin
BHP Bottom Hole Pressure
BOP Blow Out Preventer
BPV Back Pressure Valve
BSR Blind Shear Ram
BVP Barrier Verification Plan
CBL Cement Bond Log
CCL Casing Collar Locator
CDE Concept Design Endorsement
CED Closed End Displacement
CFDH Corporate Functional Discipline Head
CGSP Critical Gel Strength Period
CH Contract Holder
CITHP Closed In Tubing Head Pressure
CMF Corporate Management Framework
CMS Corporate Management System
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COC Certificate of Conformance
COS Certificate of Service
CP Code of Practice (CMS Document)
CR Closing Ration
CSG Casing
CSGS Critical Static Gel Strength
CSO Complete Shut-Off
CWI Completion & Well Intervention
DD Directional Driller
DDE Detailed Design Endorsement
DLGS Dog Leg Severity
DLP Distance Learning Package
DP Drill pipe
DPP Drill pipe Pressure
DPT Drilling Program Tool
Revision: 1
Acronym Definition
DSV Drilling Supervisor
DT Delta Time
DWI Drilling and Well Intervention
ECD Equivalent Circulating Density
ECP Electrical Submersible Pump
EDM Engineers Data Model (Landmark Software)
EKDS Ealy Kick Detection System
EMWG Equivalent Mud Weight Gradient
EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
ESD Emergency Shut Down
ESP Electric Submersible Pump
eWCAT electronic Well Control Assurance Tool
FCP Final Circulating Pressure
FIT Formation Integrity Test
FOSV Full Opening Safety Valve
FP Fracture Pressure
FPG Fracture Pressure Gradient
FPP Fracture Pressure Prediction
FPR Fixed Pipe Ram
FSG Formation Strength Gradient
FST Formation Strength Test
FWV Flow Wing Valve
GC Gauge Cutter
GD Gas Directorate
GDP Generic Drilling Program
GGP Gas Directorate - Petroleum Engineering
GL Gas Lift
GOR Gas Oil Ratio
GR Gamma Ray
GU Guideline (CMS Document)
HC Hydrocarbon
HCL Hydrochloric Acid
HCR Hydraulic Control Relay
HP High Pressure
HPHT High Pressure High Temperature
HSE Health Safety and Environment
HSO3 Hydrogen Sulphite
HWDP Heavy Weight Drill pipe
HWU Hydraulic Workover Unit
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors
IBOP Inside Blowout Preventer
ID Internal Diameter
IOGP The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
IPC Integrated Petroleum Services Company
IRP Industry Recommended Practice
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISR Interlock Shear Ram
IWCF International Well Control Forum
KI Kick Intensity
KPI Key Performance Indicator
KT Kick Tolerance
KWV Kill Wing Valve
LCM Loss Control Material
LEBC Local Emergency Base Controller
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
Revision: 1
Acronym Definition
LFI Learning from Incident
LH Lefthand
LOPC Loss of Primary Containment
LOT Leak-off test
LOTO Lock Out Tag Out
LP Low Pressure
LPM Litre per Minute
LSA Low Specific Activity (Radioactive Material)
LTR Litre
LWD Logging While Drilling
MAASP Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure
MASP Maximum Anticipated Surface Pressure
MD Martin Decker
MD Measured Depth
MD Managing Director
MDIRC Managing Director Incident Review Committee
MDT Modular Formation Dynamics Tester
MGS Mud Gas Separator
MOC Management of Change
MOM Minutes of Meeting
MOP Minimum Operating Pressure
MOP Margin of Overpull
MOPFLPS Minimum Operating Pressure For Low Pressure Seal
MOPO Matrix Of Permitted Operations
MPD Managed Pressure Drilling
MSE Corporate HSE Directorate
MW Mud Weight
MWD Measurement While Drilling
NACE National Association of Colleges and Employers
NDE Non-Destructive Examination
NFF Note For File
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NM Near Miss
NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material
NOV National Oilwell Varco
NPT Non-Productive Time
NRV Non-Return Valve
OBM Oil Based Mud
OD Outer Diameter
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OHCAP OH Capacity
OND, Oil North Directorate
ONP, Oil North Petroleum Engineering
OPS Operations
OSC On Scene Commander
OSD, Oil South Directorate
OSP, Oil South Petroleum Engineering
PA Public Announcement
PBL Multiple Activation Bypass System
PCE Pressure Control Equipment
PCH Choke Pressure
PDO Petroleum Development Oman
PE Petroleum Engineer
PEAR People Environment Asset Reputation
PG Petroleum Geologist
Revision: 1
Acronym Definition
PI Potential Incident
PIM PDO Incident Management
PIP tag A radioactive tag or marker
PJSM Pre Job Safety Meeting
PKR Packer
PLT Production Logging Tool
PMS Preventative Maintenance System
PN Part Number
POOH Pull Out Of Hole
PP Pore Pressure
PP Petrophyisicist
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PPG Pore Pressure Gradient
PPP Pore Pressure Prediction
PR Procedure (CMS Document)
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
PS Safety Margin Pressure
PSD Production Shut-Down
PSL Product Service Level
PT Production Technologist
PTW Permit to Work
PVC Polyvinyl chloride
PVT Pit Volume Totalizer
RA Radioactive
RAM Risk Assessment Matrix
RBP Retrievable Bridge Plug
RCD Rotating Control Device
RE Reservoir Engineer
RH Righthand
RIH Run In Hole
RM Rig Manager
ROP Rate of Penetration
RSL Repair Service Level
RSS Rotary Stearable
RTTS Retrievable Testing, Treating & Squeeze Packer
RU Rig Up
RWP Rated Working Pressure
SCR Slow Circulation Rate
SDP Specific Drilling Program
SICP Shut-In Casing Pressure
SIDPP Shut-in Drillpipe Pressure
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
SIT Subsurface Integrity Test
SLB Schlumberger
SN Serial Number
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOV Side Outlet Valve
SP Specification (CMS Document)
SPP Standpipe Pressure
SS Sour Service
SSC Sulphide Stress Cracking
SSD Sliding Side Door
SSPSFP Subsurface Process Safety Focal Point
SSSV Subsurface Safety Valve
SSV Surface Safety Valve
Revision: 1
Acronym Definition
STD Standard
SWE Senior Well Engineer
SWP Safe Working Pressure
SWWI Standard Written Work Instruction
TA Technical Authority
TBC To be Confirmed
TBSA Tie Back Seal Assembly
TCP Tubing Conveyed Perforation
TD True Depth
TDS Top Drive
TECOP Technical Economic Commercial Organisational Political
TFA Total Flow Area
TFM Total Fluid Management (Fluids Program)
TFP Technical Focal Point
THP Tubing Head Pressure
TL Team Lead
TOC Top of Cement
TOR Terms of Reference
TP Toolpusher
TRSSSV Tubing Retrievable Sub-Surface Safety Valve
TVD True Vertical Depth
TVRT True Vertical Depth from Rotary Table
TWCV Two Way Check Valve
UEC Corrosion and Materials Directorate
UER Umm er Radhuma (Formation)
UIK Production Chemistry Department
UMV Upper Master Valve
UPG Production Geology & Seismology Discipline
UPR Reservoir Engineering Discipline
USIT UltraSonic Imager tool
UWA Wells Assurance Department
UWD Well Engineering Directorate
UWDLT Well Engineering Leadership Team
UWH Well Human Resource Department
UWOE Wells P&D Department
UWOX Well Engineering Exploration Department
UWOXO Well Engineering Oil Exploration Department
UWZ Well Engineering HSE Department
VBR Variable Pipe Ram
VR Valve Removal
WBM Water Based Mud
WC Well Control
WCCP Well Control Contingency Plan
WCI Well Control Incident
WDP Well Delivery Process
WE Well Engineer
WEG Wireline Entry Guide
WFM Well Failure Model
WFR Well Functional Requirements
WFS Well Functional Specifications
WH Wellhead
WHP Wellhead Pressure
WI Well Ingegrity
WIT Wellhead Integrity Test
WL Wireline Entry Guide
Revision: 1
Acronym Definition
WOB Wait ON BIT
WOC Wait on Cement
WPS Wells Process Safety
WPSFP Wells Process Safety Focal Point
WPT Well Planning Tool
WRFM Wells Reservoir Facility Management
WSAM Well Service Activity Management
WSD Well Status Diagram
WSDE Well Site Drilling Engineer
WSV Wells Supervisor
WSW Well Site Water
WSWE Well Site Well Engineer
WWI Written Work Instruction
XLOT Extended Leak-off test
XPT Formation Pressure Test Log
Term/Abbreviation Definition
May Indicates one possible course of action
Should Indicates a preferred course of action
Shall Indicates a mandatory course of action
Revision: 1
14.2 Appendix 3, Related Business Control Documents and References

Table 14-2, Related Business Control Documents and References
Document Co. Remark
1. CMF Business Control Portal PDO
2. Well Engineering Documentation Page PDO
3. PL-01-11, PDO Policies PDO
4. SP-1213 Well Control PDO
5. SP-2150 Well Delivery Process Management of Change (MoC) PDO
6. SP-1190-2 H2S & SO2 Management PDO
PR-1287 Emergency Procedures part III Contingency Plans, vol
7. PDO
II Well Engineering Operations
8. CP-178 Well Delivery COP PDO
9. SP-2410 Casing and Tubing Design PDO
GU-980 Wells Casing Selection Road Map for Environmentally
10. PDO
Assisted Cracking Resistance
SP-2193 Materials Selection & Corrosion Control for Well Control
11. PDO
Components
12. SP-2392 Wellheads and Christmas Trees PDO
13. SP-2169 Limited Kick Well Design in South Ara Salt Wells PDO
SP-2439 Drilling 15k Tight Gas Wells with 10k Pressure Control
14.
Setup
15. GU-902 Cemented Completion Guideline PDO
16. SP-2315 PDO Cementing Manual PDO
17. SP-1215 Surveying and Anti-Collision Specification PDO
18. GU-899 Frontline Barrier Management PDO
19. PR-1444 Well Engineering Management Framework PDO
20. CP-118 Lifecycle Well Integrity Management PDO
21. SP-2017 Well Failure Model PDO
22. GU-576 Well Control Contingency Plan PDO
PR-1475 Back Pressure Valve & Two-Way Check Valve PDO
23.
Operation (Visual procedure)
24. SP-1220 Simultaneous Operations PDO
25. SP-1221 Well Suspension and Abandonment PDO
26. CP-222 PDO SCSSSV CoP PDO
PR-1448 WE Procedure Shell Global Standard for Temporary PDO
27.
Pipework
28. PR-1047 Well Integrity Maintenance PDO
GU-912 Preventive Well Maintenance of Wellhead related PDO
29.
Surface Equipment
30. PR-1098 Well Activity Co-ordination & Control Procedure PDO
31. CP-237 Petroleum Engineering Process Safety Code of Practice PDO
GU-975 Fracture Gradient Prediction Guidelines for PDO’s Well PDO
32.
Planning and Drilling Operations
GU-908 Pore Pressure Prediction Guidelines for Drilling PDO
33.
Development Wells, Well Intervention and Abandonment
34. SOP-617 PPP in Development Wells PDO
35. CP-206 Management of Change
36. CP-122 Health, Safety, and Environment Code of Practice

Revision: 1
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Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Well Control Principles, Practices and

Document Type Guideline

Security Restricted (Information Security Classification Definitions)

Discipline Well Engineering

Owner Wells Corporate Functional Discipline Head

Issue Date November 2022

Version Version No.1

Link http://cms.portal.corp.pdo.om/Published/GU-1035.pdf (Intranet)

Keywords: A, B, C, to be filled in as key words in the Document Properties panel

This page was intentionally left blank

Page 2 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

Authorised For Issue: Nov. 2022

Document Owner Document Custodian Document Author

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 3

iii Related Business Processes

iv Related Corporate Management Framework (CMF)

Code Corporate Management System

Page 4 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 5

4.2 Mud weight selection ...................................................................................................... 33

Page 6 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

4.7.1 Alarms/Sensors, Equipment and Shut-in Readiness .................................... 72

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 7

4.17.3 Example Step-Up Graph link ...................................................................... 111

Page 8 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

4.31.2 Perforation Selection Considerations ......................................................... 147

6.1.1 COC Example ............................................................................................. 199

8.9 Pre-Well Kill Checklist Example .................................................................................... 234

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 11

13.5.3 Example 2 – Total Losses ........................................................................... 288

Page 12 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

No table of figures entries found.

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 13

1.2 Distribution/Target Audience

1.3 Review and Improvement

Page 14 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

2 UWD Well Control Risk Identification and Management

2.1 Risk Registers Link

Severity Example WPS Incident Score

Severity Definition Score

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 15

2.2 Bowtie – Barrier Ownership

Page 16 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

2.2.1 How to Generate a Good Bowtie

Agree the Top Event – Typically loss of

Identify the Hazard, usually this is Bowtie

Identify all the threat lines that could result in

Identify all the Consequences that could

Assess the Inherent Risk of this

Add Controls (Barriers) to each Threat Line

Key information: Bowtie Accountable

Printed 03/11/2022 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation Page 17

2.2.2 Barrier Ownership

2.2.3 Barrier Ownership Development

2.2.3.2 Example of Individual Cards

Page 18 Well Control, Principles, Practices and Implementation 03/11/2022

2.3.1 Example for Well Construction

Key Risks & Mitigations (XXX Well Construction)

2 Issue Total Loss Zone at Habshan Level 4 1

3 Issue H2Sin Khuff

2.3.2 Example for Well Intervention

Key Risks & Mitigations (XXX Well Intervention)