LIMITED WAR

(MAO ‘S MILITARY PRINCIPLES)

-WAR AND POLITICS-
NORAINI BT ZULKIFLI
ketika_kubersujud@yahoo.com
• War and politic cannot be separate because war comes out
from a political action- politic had their own objectives
agenda, motive, reasons and aims. To gain the objectives,
some action must be taken (eg: to remove warlords in China
1926)

• ‘War has it own characteristic and special political technique

for the realization of certain political objectives’- mean that
war is not only about go to the battle field but also using
psychology, politic and tension

• ‘When political development reached a stage and could not

proceed as usual, the war will erupt in order to wipe away the
obstacles of the political path’-mean war will take part when
both party cannot or don’t want to settle the problem in
harmony
• ‘War is the continuation of politics’-by Clausewitz- believed
that war came from politics, and politics was the mother of
war. war will always remain as long as the objective of war do
not gain

• War is made to sweep away the obstacles in the way of

politic-sometime the problem cannot be settle with the soft
way, so the war should take a part

• "The masses are like water and the army is like fish," - army
need support from the masses to still stand. The army cannot
achieve victory if lack of people support because they will not
get any aids if the situation became worst

• ‘Politic is bloodless war while war is the politics of

bloodshed’- because sometime you just have to used
psychology war to influence the people and don’t have a real
war (fighting, killed) but war forced the people to have battle
and cause a lot of damaged.
• ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ -Mao’s
meant that political power must be seized by the means of
the revolutionary armed forces-means to gain a power, some
enforcement have to do to make sure everybody follow the
rule because if not you will not gain anything

• ‘whoever wants to seize and hold on to political power must

have a strong army’- to remain in the top, you need a very
strong army because the strong army can make people obey
to you and you also can win a lot of battle

• ‘War can only abolished through war. In order to get rid of the
gun, we must first grasp it in hand’- if you really want to go to
war, you have to make sure your troops know how to win the
victory. Its not went to war without any knowledge about
fighting, tactics and strategy
The military principles for defeating Chiang Kai-Shek
( the mixed of guerilla + offensive + conventional )

1. To attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first, to

attack concentrated, strong enemy forces

2. To take small and medium cities and extensive rural

areas first, to take big cities later

3. wiping out of the enemy’s strength more important

than seizure the city because the cities will belong to
the victory side after the enemy had being defeat.
4. to concentrate absolute superior force, the armies
have to concentrate to every side so that the
enemies don’t have any chance to counter and don’t
let any escape.

5. to fight no battle unprepared, to fight no battle if

we are not sure of victory, to try to be well prepared
for each battle, to make every effort to ensure
victory in the prevailing conditions. Means that no
fight because you will lose in war.

6. to give a full play to our style of fighting, courage in

battle, no fear of scarified or fatigue and continuous
fighting
7. to wipe out the enemy through mobile
warfare at the same time paying attention to
the tactics of positional attack and capturing
fortified enemy point and cities.

8. to attack the city, resolutely to seize all weakly

defended fortified enemy points and cities. To
seize at opportune moments all moderately
defended fortified enemy points and cities if
circumstances permit. As for strong defended
fortified enemy points and cities, to wait until
conditions are ripe and then take them
9. to replenish our strength with all the arms
and most of the personnel captured from the
enemy. Our enemy’s main sources of
manpower and materiel are at the front.

10. the arrangement of time’s gap between rest,

train and consolidation must not too long.
 Evaluation
• To defeat Chiang Khai Shek-Mao used 3 stages
– 1st stage-strategic defensive (guerilla warfare)
• Communist small and weak
• Hide and seek (Attack then run)

– 2nd-strategic offensive (consolidation)

• Recruit, personnel, strategy

– 3rd-conventional army
• Face to face fighting
 Communist Revolutionary 1927-1949
• 1921-CCP aroused in China
• 1926-Chiang ‘Northern Expedition’ – to remove warlords
• 1927-Chiang order to purge CCP (from shanghai-Nanking-
Hangchow-Foochow-Canton and so on)
• 1928-Chiang appoint himself as a president of China-he do not
believe in communism b’coz it will end the traditional
confusious value
• Because of the pressure from Nationalist (KMT)
– Killed 4000 communist
– 40000 injured
• 1934-Mao decide ‘Long March’ (Fujian-Yanan)
– 100,000 joined
– Less 10,000 reached to Yanan
– 6000 km journey
• 1936- Japan invaded China-
• Chiang Kidnapped by Manchuria General, young
Marshall- ‘Sian Incident’ - the general mad because
Chang too focus to fight with CCP compared to fight
Japanese. He hate the foreign invader so much because
they had killed his father
• To him don’t have a reason to fight with the Chinese
people b’coz they were the same nation-but more
important is expel Japan who occupied their land
• 1937-KMT & CCP formed a united to defeat
Japan (Japan China war 1937-1945)
• The less focus of KMT to CCP, Mao take an advantage to
strengthen his army
• CCP also seize the Japan personnel and learn how to
use that machinery
• 1945-Japan defeat- KMT & CCP start their
battle again
• The KMT’s army became weak, fatigue and their troops
also decreased because lost in the battle
• But CCP became strong because they only use 10% of
their army to fight with foreign invader
• Another reason because the CCP base in the land and
the war with the Japan in the coastal.
• 1949-communist take control china
• Because of the advance in term of personnel, huge of
army and support from the people Mao seized power
from Chiang Khai Shek
• The strength of Mao was :
– the element of his military preparedness in term
of political, psychology, economy, social and
ideology with the emphasis on the will as the
technical excellence of machine.
– Mao’s secret weapon was psychology
disintegration where he focuses what he really
mean with his struggle so that people know.
– The tactic used ‘win the people’s heart’- give a
good image to people that communist is good
and fair to everybody
Mao maintained several elements that useful for
victory in a people’s war.
First highly organized, indoctrinate and
discipline.
Second is to gain mass support and a united
front.
Third is party’s army where the army very loyal
to the party and willing to fight.
 Fourth is the strategic base was built to
maintain the local population and the party
army. That’s also the reason why Mao leading a
Long March in 1934.
• Mao believe that the support from the own people is the
most important -"The people are like water and the army is
like fish,“-recognized the revolutionary potential of the
peasantry. Marx and Lenin had seen in their urban doctrine
the working class as the leading revolutionary force.

• The important of discipline & strong army-The army is the

chief component of the political power of the state-Clausewitz
(Gravity center)

• Sun Tzu is another scholar who influent Mao so much-read

The Art Of War – tactic and strategy to win a battle

•
• “Knowing the entire situation would facilitate the use
of its parts because the parts constitute the whole.”-
like Sun Tzu said “know the enemy and know
yourself; in the hundred battles you will never be in
peril

• “without the poor peasants there would be no

revolution. To deny their role is to deny the
revolution.” - the important of the people support

• The army must become one with the people so that

they see it as their own army. Such an army will be
invincible....
 Conclusion
• The guerilla warfare only used in the early of
Mao’s revolutionary
• After sometime the strategy had been
changed to another step, conventional army
• the high of discipline, masses support,
strategy make Mao win the revolutionary
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