First Edition 2012

About RVSM
Metallurgical
consequences
of the use of
alternative fuel
in gas turbine
engines

RAASA aviation
safety matters
Controlled flight
into terrain
 Message from the Director
Transformation is the key to sustainable
aviation development and prosperity
In the last edition of this publication I
was wishing you well for the festive
season. Time flies indeed! Even though
it might be a tad belated, I would still
like to wish you all the best in the year
ahead.
In this edition I would like us to ponder
on a subject that is not only at the heart
of our country’s development and
prosperity but also a subject that is very
close to my heart; and that is
transformation. Whilst transformation is
legislated in South Africa, the reality is
that this initiative still evokes different
emotions for different people.
Regrettably not everyone embraces
this concept, which seeks to correct
historical inequalities and set the
country on a collective growth path.
Certain sectors of our society and some
industries have made admirable strides
in terms of embracing transformation
principles and policies such as broad-
based black economic empowerment
and related transformation charters.
Unfortunately, the aviation industry is
among those that are trailing behind
in terms of transformation.
As the custodian of aviation safety and
security as well as the catalyst of
aviation development in the country,
the South African Civil Aviation Authority
(SACAA) is naturally expected to play
a pivotal role in facilitating
transformation in the industry. Having
said that though, credit must go to
Government, particularly the
Department of Trade and Industry as
well as the Department of Transport for
outlining, through the Integrated
Transport Sector B-BBEE Charter,
guidelines that are key in the
implementation of transformation. The
Department of Transport has further
been instrumental in elucidating
specific requirements pertaining to the
Aviation Sub-Sector Charter.
Since the last quarter of 2011, the
SACAA and the Department of
Transport have joined hands in making
accessible, “practical messages” by
hosting workshops across the country
on how to implement BBBEE as set out
in the Aviation Sub-Sector Charter.
Many of you have been part of these
workshop and we are grateful for your
commitment to this cause.
In our effort to bring about change in
our industry, the SACAA has been
guided by the principle that numbers
don’t lie. A look at the statistics on the
opposite page indicates that previously
disadvantaged groups still lag far
behind their white counterparts. The
same applies to the women tally when
pitted against that of males.
As much as these figures paint a
gloomy picture; the SACAA regards this
as a perfect opportunity to make a
difference in the areas that clearly point
to the need. At the same time, the
SACAA is aware that skills shortage,
especially in technical areas, is no
longer a looming threat but a stark
reality; especially when South African
experts are continuously lured away by
well-heeled countries for their world-
recognised training and expertise. In
this regard, the SACAA has put efforts
into training individuals in various fields,
especially those fields that were denied
to women and black citizens. This
initiative will not only help augment the
talent that the organisation has, but will
also produce experts that can fill in
voids in the industry at large. In this
regard, the SACAA is sponsoring
individuals in training institutions spread
across the country and the world. These
individuals are enrolled for training in,
among others, aeronautical
engineering, air traffic control,
commercial pilot training, mechanical
engineering, and many others.
Realistically, as the SACAA we can only
afford to help a handful of individuals;
hence we are appealing to all
stakeholders to join hands with us in
securing the future of this industry by
helping to train young talent.
The SACAA is cognisant of the fact that
total transformation of the South African
society will not come as a result of
training only. Business ownership is a
major part of the required change. In
this instance, the SACAA is keen to
2
continue to engage with all role-players
in order to find a common ground that
will turn this aspiration into reality. So far
there have been positive signs and we
are thus encouraged by the number
of stakeholders who are keen to
change their businesses’ empowerment
status. In order to accelerate this
initiative, the SACAA and the
Department of Transport have made
teams available to help companies
with their empowerment
accreditations.
This collaboration will undoubtedly
change the picture of business
ownership as it stands. At the time of
drafting this piece there was only one
airline that is black-owned. Other than
that our records showed that there was
no other black- or women-owned Air
Operator Certificate holder. However,
there is a handful of pilot and cabin
crew training schools owned by women
and other previously disenfranchised
groups. These statistics clearly indicate
that there is a major opportunity for
change.
With aviation being at the heart of the
economic development of any
country, the industry cannot afford to
be left behind as the country embarks
on a journey towards total
transformation and the eradication of
inequalities. I am very optimistic that
by joining hands we will not only be
transforming the industry but also
ensuring its development and
prosperity.
Until next time!
Zakhele Thwala,
Director of Civil Aviation (Acting)
In this edition
About RVSM - p4
Controlled flight into terrain - p6
SMS, Safety Performance
Measurement - P10
Survival Instinct: An essential element
for dealing with emergencies - p11
Metallurgical consequences of the
use of alternative fuel in gas turbine
engines - p 12
Fun and knowledge should go
hand in hand - p13
RAASA aviation safety matters - p14
3
About RVSM (Conventional Vertical Seperation Minima)
By Terrence Harris

altimeter errors increased the more an

aircraft gained in altitude, but because of
new technologies and knowledge gained
over the years, avionics and instrument
manufacturers have been able to improve
the accuracy of aircraft altimetry systems,
therefore allowing aircraft to now be
separated by 1000 ft. With this increased
accuracy came more stringent airworthiness
requirements and specialized crew training.
Most new aircraft that are capable of flying
between 29000 ft and 41000 ft are
manufactured RVSM compliant from the
production line, but older aircraft require
modifications to be carried out on the
airframe and altimetry systems. These
modifications can be either Service Bulletins
or Service Letters that the manufacturers
issue to bring the aircraft into RVSM
compliance or they could be STCs
(Supplements to the aircraft Type
Certificate).

For aircraft to be RVSM compliant, they are

RVSM is a term used in aviation to describe the reduction of
standard ICAO Conventional Vertical Separation Minima
(CVSM) required between aircraft operating between FL 290
and FL 410 inclusive from 2000 ft to 1000 ft.
RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minima) was successfully
implemented in South Africa on 25 September 2008 whereby
aircraft and operators / flight crew that are approved for
RVSM by the SACAA now fly 1000 ft (300 m) apart vertically
between and including flight levels FL 290 (29000 ft) and FL
410 (41000 ft).
required to have two independent altimeters
or air data computers, each with its own cross-coupled static
source, an altitude alerting system, an autopilot with altitude
hold function and a transponder with mode “Charlie” (altitude
reporting). If the aircraft is equipped with TCAS II (Traffic
Collision Avoidance System II) it is required to be of the version
7 or higher. This version became necessary as the aircraft
now fly closer together, therefore unnecessary “nuisance
warnings” had to be eliminated together with other technical
changes. Many older aircraft already have these systems,
but the actual altimeters or air data computers do not have
the required accuracy levels.

This has allowed an additional six

flight levels. To better understand
the distance, one can imagine
two aircraft with the Eiffel Tower
in Paris between them. That is
1000 ft or 300 m. Not much space
when you think of two aircraft
that could be flying in opposite
directions with a closing speed
of between 1600 and 2000 km/h.
There is no room for error!

Aircraft were always separated

by 2000 ft, but due to the
continuous growth of air traffic
volumes over the years, airspace
became more and more
congested, making it necessary
to bring the aircraft closer
together. This became necessary
in Europe 10 years ago, due to
the extremely high traffic volumes
on the continent.

In the past, a separation of 2000 The implementation of RVSM allowed an additional six flight levels
ft was necessary because

4
Another critical area in an aircraft’s altimetry system is the
static source or part of the aircraft that initially senses the
static pressure of the air around the aircraft. These can be
either the static ports or pressure heads (pitot heads that
sense static as well). Any dents or damage near the static
source can affect the airflow over the source, therefore
affecting the accuracy of altimeter readings. Just to give
you an idea of how critical this area is, a simple line painted
on an aircraft near the static source can influence the
accuracy. The checks of this critical area are often referred
to as “Skin Waviness Checks”.
One other very important aspect in maintaining and
monitoring the required accuracy levels of an aircraft certified
for RVSM is for the aircraft owner or operator to participate
in the regional height monitoring programme. Since the ASE
(Altimetry System Error) is invisible to the aircrew and Air Traffic
Control, it is necessary to independently measure the aircraft’s
actual altitude at an RVSM level with specialized equipment.
In Europe, there are a number of HMUs (Height Monitoring
Units) that are strategically situated in areas where the majority
of the air traffic will pass.
are added or removed from the approvals database. South
Africa accounts for 43 percent of the entire African RVSM
fleet, the largest fleet in the AFI region. Another point to take
into consideration is the fact that many foreign RVSM
approved aircraft are also maintained by AMOs (Aircraft
Maintenance Organisations) in South Africa. Virtually the
entire globe has now implemented RVSM, except for small
areas here and there due to instability or civil and political
unrest.
So, next time you are flying high above the earth at flight
levels between 29000 ft and 41000 ft in an airliner or expensive
business jet, take a minute to think of the fact that you are
now 1000 ft/300 m closer to the other guy and think of the
amount of trust that you have possibly unknowingly placed
in the approving authorities, maintenance organisations and
pilots that make RVSM safe and possible.

These HMUs are stationed on the ground and every time an

aircraft flies over it at an RVSM level, the actual height is
measured and the results are processed and sent to the
monitoring agency to ascertain whether or not the aircraft
is still capable of maintaining the required height-keeping
accuracy. In South Africa, we do not have HMUs but instead
we make use of GMUs (GPS-based Monitoring Units). These
units are placed on board the aircraft but are totally
independent of the aircraft systems. They have their own
power supplies and their antennas are placed near the
aircraft windows on the inside, so there are no modifications
required. They are also certified to be used within the aircraft
and do not affect any of the other avionics on board.

These GMUs are operated by specialists that are contracted

by the ARMA (AFI Regional Monitoring Agency) and the
results of the height monitoring are also calculated and sent
to the ARMA. RVSM approved aircraft are required to have
height monitoring conducted every 24 months or 1000 hours, Pitotstatic Probes
whichever is the longest.

Height monitoring results are sent immediately to the SACAA

for record purposes and to identify which aircraft have come
close to the 245 ft tolerance or have failed the height
monitoring. The maximum tolerance for error is +-245 ft. If an
aircraft reaches +- 180 feet the SACAA starts to flag and
monitor the aircraft very closely. It is vitally important that the
previous height monitoring results are reviewed because a
high error could be due to other reasons, like a malfunctioning
GMU or turbulence, but it becomes very clear when an
altimetry system starts to degrade.

During the investigation of large errors, the aircraft

maintenance organisations will be required to check the
aircraft’s pitot/static systems again, as well as look for any
defects or abnormalities in or around the vicinity of the critical
static source region. During the investigation, it would also
be necessary to determine whether or not the aircraft had
any modifications carried out that would affect the height
keeping capability of the aircraft, for example the addition
of winglets, antennas or even surveillance equipment that
could change the aerodynamic characteristics and airflow
over the aircraft.

At the moment South Africa has approximately 316 approved

RVSM aircraft out of a total of approximately 740 within the Static Port
African region, but this figure is constantly changing as aircraft

5
 ControlledBy MsFlight into Terrain
Bongi Mtlokwa
The aircraft collided with mountainous terrain during
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
What exactly is Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)?
CFIT is described as an accident in which an airworthy aircraft,
under control, is unintentionally flown into the ground, a
mountain, water, or an obstacle. The pilots are generally
unaware of the danger until it is too late. According to
worldwide statistics, CFIT is the major cause of loss of life in
aviation accidents. According to available SACAA data
relating to the period January 2006 to December 2010, twenty-
four (24) CFIT accidents occurred in which seventy-five (75)
occupants perished.
Both the aircraft represented above collided with terrain
during controlled flight. In both these accidents several
occupants perished. From these two accidents the
investigation teams found that the aircraft were serviceable
prior to flight.
Why does it happen?
Q Poor flight planning by the pilot/crew;
Q Lack of experience by the pilot/crew;
Q Disregard for standard safe operating procedures;
Q Poor decision–making;
Q Lack of knowledge of the area and associated weather
phenomena;
Q Deliberate VFR into IMC conditions;
Q Commercial/operational pressures.
These are but a few of the factors that should be considered
that might have played a direct or an indirect role in these
types of accidents.
Why do CFIT accidents occur?
Pilots find themselves in this situation due to various reasons,
but encountering inclement weather conditions en route to
an intended destination without taking evasive action
timeously (returning to point of departure, or an alternate
aerodrome) remains one of the main causes for these types
of accidents. In most cases poor flight planning could be
regarded as the primary cause for this type of accident,
together with the fact that the pilot was not familiar with the
6
The aircraft collided with mountainous terrain during Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) on a flight from Nelspruit
Aerodrome to Rand Aerodrome.
area and associated weather conditions/phenomena.
Another very profound cause of these types of accidents is
the ‘Get-There' syndrome; where the pilot, or in many cases
his or her passengers/cargo must be at a certain location at
a certain time, irrespective of whether safety is compromised
and regulatory requirements and procedures are not met.
Contrary to more advanced transport aircraft, aircraft in the
general aviation sector in most cases do not have terrain
awareness warning systems (TAWS) on board, which in many
cases could prevent these types of accidents if the pilot(s)
adhere to the warning command of such a device. Weather
radar is another important piece of equipment, and it is found
more commonly on general aviation aircraft than TAWS.
However, if your aircraft is equipped with all these warning
and information systems, it does not mean that a CFIT accident
will necessarily be avoided. History has shown us that from
some of the most advanced aircraft in the world to some
much less advanced aircraft, have been involved in CFIT
accidents.
The pilot/cockpit crew needs to believe and adhere to the
warning signals displayed by these warning units to avoid
these types of accidents. A very prominent aircraft accident
that occurred in South Africa with an aircraft that was
equipped with all these warning devices was the Hawker
HS748 that collided with the Outeniqua Mountains to the north
of George on 1 June 2002, in which two crew members and
well-known cricketer Hansie Cronje perished. The crew of
that aircraft received the command to ‘Pull Up’, ‘Pull Up’
several times from the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning
System) but failed to adhere to it, resulting in the tragic CFIT
accident.
The majority of flights are being flown utilizing GPS as the
primary navigational reference. In certain instances pilots will
fabricate their own let down plates based on GPS. These you
find to be more common amongst pilots who fly into known
aerodromes on a regular basis where the weather conditions
from time to time do not favour VFR flight (i.e., his/her home
aerodrome, or holiday destination, farms or game lodges,
which in most cases are unlicensed aerodromes). It is very
seldom that faulty equipment plays a role in these types of
accidents, but this cannot be ignored, nor ruled out. Human
factors remain the primary factor resulting in these types of
accidents.
Just how important is flight planning and what is flight planning?
Flight planning can be described as the process of planning
your route, it includes several aspects and is essential to ensure
a successful flight.
The pilot/crew must ensure that they obtain an accurate
weather forecast for the time and route to be flown, with
special emphasis on winds and possible inclement weather
conditions that might be encountered en route (i.e.
thunderstorms), which might require a possible deviation or
turning back.
Accurate fuel calculations are essential to ensure that the
aircraft can safely reach its intended destination with adequate
reserves for an alternate aerodrome should it be required.
Compliance with requirements/routings, which might require
extended approaches or going into the hold for some time,
can play a role.
Ensure aircraft performance criteria are not compromised (i.e.
weight and balance, centre of gravity, density altitude) and
are within the Aircraft Flight Manual limitations.
Ensure the pilot and/or crew are fit for the flight and are
appropriately licensed and rated in accordance with
regulatory requirements to perform such a flight.
Ensure the aircraft is airworthy and properly certified for the
intended flight.
CFIT accidents are mostly caused by poor flight planning and
decision making on the part of the pilot/flight crew members.
As a pilot, you need to make a decision as to whether to
proceed with the flight or abandon it prior to departure or
turn back en route and divert to an alternate aerodrome. In
recent years during provincial safety seminars that were
conducted by the accidents investigations division, pilots had
a discussion about the challenges that come with being a
freelance commercial pilot. Scenarios where fare paying
passengers, cargo, company aircraft or EMS (Emergency
Medical Services) flights need to be flown were highlighted
under these risks. Commercial operators have to look after
the financial interest of the business, while the pilot needs to
look after his credibility and ensuring that he does not
jeopardize his ‘lifeline’/employment opportunities as well as
the safety of the operation, which is of paramount importance.
It is a well-known fact that certain pilots end up being placed
under severe pressure to perform flights even if they know that
conditions are not favourable and that safety might be
jeopardised. This gets done in the interest of commercial
demands and satisfying the customers’ needs, and not in the
interest of aviation safety. Pilots end up deviating from
procedures and regulations (taking chances) to meet
commercial demands. Some pilots make it to the other side,
and in doing so develop a habit of non-compliance to
procedures and regulations, which one day when he or she
least expects it, fails to beat the odds, resulting in an accident.
As a pilot, ask yourself, how you would respond if you were
faced with such a scenario? Is the decision that you make
a safe one or not, and should you proceed?
Procedures and regulations which include adherence to
minimum heights were written and documented in the interest
of aviation safety and should be adhered to, to ensure that
7
each and every flight is being performed as safely as possible.
A disregard of these procedures and regulations could be
fatal.
Certain aircraft and certain pilots are not certified nor rated
to fly in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). They can
only fly in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). It sometimes
happens that a pilot finds himself/herself entering IMC
conditions. This is once again a decision that was made by
the pilot, a decision which in most cases is dependent on his
or her experience and knowledge of the area. This could be
very dangerous if you are not instrument rated, or if the aircraft
is not equipped to be flown under these conditions. It is
therefore of paramount importance to plan your flight properly
and avoid any fatal traps, for example entering IMC conditions
not knowing if you will be able to remain clear of terrain
ahead.
Being an instrument-rated pilot, flying an IFR certified aircraft
does not make you immune to CFIT accidents. The SACAA
has investigated several CFIT accidents where both these
requirements were met, yet the aircraft still collided with terrain.
One of the major aspects leading to these types of accidents
is failing to adhere to procedures. Example: Pilot/crew initiate
their descent prematurely, by deviating from the published
letdown procedure for a licensed aerodrome, which might
be surrounded by mountainous terrain, resulting in a CFIT
accident. You may find the same type of scenario with pilots
that create their own letdown plates and deviate from it.
Additional factors which contribute to CFIT accidents
There are unforeseen situations that do arise during flight
where the pilot or crew member might suffer from a medical
condition, or have eaten food just prior to or during the flight
that caused sudden illness (food poisoning) that could impair
his performance to such a degree that he can no longer
apply his mind to the complexity of the flight. These types of
situations, although rare, do manifest themselves from time to
time. It is therefore essential for all flight crew members to
ensure that they are in good health prior to every flight and
that a proper diet (proper eating routine) is followed, and
that situations of glucose intolerance (associated with
diabetics/fluctuating blood sugar levels) be avoided at all
costs, as an example. From a medical perspective,
cardiovascular conditions were found to have been the cause
of several CFIT accidents in South Africa, and remain the
number one medical condition resulting in accidents.
There have also been a few CFIT accidents associated with
the “Black Hole” effect. All these accidents occurred at night,
with very little or any celestial illumination or any lights on the
ground. The pilots in all of the cases were flying VFR, and
he/she lost his/her visual reference (horizon) and as a result
started to descend and collided with terrain. One such
accident occurred while the pilot was positioning for landing
and had to approach his landing zone while flying over a
lake. There was a power failure in the area and he had no
visual cues with reference to the shore/landing zone (no lights).
The pilot, however, had decided to continue with the
approach as he had flown it several times before. He
descended too low and flew into the water. He managed
to survive the accident and swam to shore.
The CAA also has on record a CFIT accident where the pilot
was found to be intoxicated during the flight. This accident
also occurred at night, resulting in inadequate terrain
clearance. Even though the aircraft was equipped with an
auto-pilot, it is believed that the hold function of the auto-
pilot ALT (altitude) was not working properly (numerous
maintenance entries in the aircraft logbook to rectify the auto
pilot ALT hold) and the aircraft was slowly descending without
proper monitoring on the part of the pilot, who failed to detect
this happening and correct it timeously.
There have been one or two CFIT accidents in South Africa
were the pilot experienced technical problems during flight,
which required him/her to divert or return to the aerodrome of
departure and in doing so, collided with terrain. These types
of situations require quick decision-making on the part of the
pilot and in most cases he becomes fixated in dealing with the
emergency instead of flying the aircraft. During such a deviation
the pilot mostly refers to the GPS (there could be more than
one unit installed in use) as his primary navigational reference.
In some instances the aircraft might be on an official flight
plan, under radar control. Being under radar control the aircraft
might be vectored to a certain aerodrome with the assistance
of the radar controller. It remains the pilot-in-command’s
responsibility to ensure that the flight is conducted safely, and
terrain clearances en route are adhered to, as terrain does not
get displayed on the controller’s screen and he/she can
therefore not advise the pilot/crew as such.
Just how many lives have we lost to CFIT?
The SACAA causal factor list for accidents in the flight crew/pilot
category (sub-heading 7 of the list) indicates that for the period
under review, 75 people have lost their lives under the CFIT
category out of the 115 fatalities on record for the entire
category (see list below). This resulted from 24 CFIT accidents.
CFIT accidents are usually associated with more than one
fatality apart from the pilot/crew. The second highest cause
on the list of high fatalities is that of stalling/failure to maintain
flying speed in an aircraft.
The survival rate associated with these types of accidents is
minimal, with only two CFIT accident survivors who lived to
share their experiences on record.
Where do CFIT accidents occur?
According to our database, we found that most CFIT accidents
occur in the Mpumalanga province followed by KwaZulu-Natal,
Limpopo and the Western Cape provinces. These are the areas
We would love to hear from you; comments and enquires can be directed to Ms Bongi Mtlokwa at ,
Tel: 011 545 1238, Fax: 011 545 1466.
8
that topographically contain the most mountainous terrain in
the country. Several South African Registered aircraft have
also been involved in CFIT accidents in countries outside the
borders of South Africa, with most of these accidents occurring
in the sub-Sahara African region.
It is interesting to note that very few of the CFIT accidents that
have occurred outside the borders of this country, involving
South African Registered aircraft, were in the general/private
aviation category. Most of these aircraft were either on a wet
or dry lease to a relief/humanitarian organisation or a licensed
operator (Part 127 or 135) in these countries.
It should be noted that CFIT accidents are not only associated
with mountainous terrain or high ground but could also occur
during an approach to land in conditions of low visibility, where
the aircraft is allowed to descend below minimum heights
before a go-around is performed. In some instances the aircraft
will collide with level terrain on the approach, and instances
have been recorded where the aircraft collided with terrain
while executing a go-around due to a deviation from the
missed approach procedure for the aerodrome in question.
Most of the medical-related CFIT accidents on record occurred
on flat open remote land or water (aircraft crashing into the
sea/lake/dam).
How to avoid CFIT Accidents
Q Conduct proper flight planning, especially with regard to
weather conditions en route, fuel endurance and alternate
aerodromes, should you need to divert.
Q Avoid VFR into IMC, especially flights being conducted
below the TMA.
Q Adhere to procedures and regulatory requirements.
Q Ensure that you (the pilot) are fit for the flight.
Q Ensure that the aircraft is airworthy and properly equipped
for the flight.
Q Do not allow commercial pressures to jeopardize aviation
safety.
Q Display sound judgment and decision-making skills.
These are but a few of the important factors to keep in mind
to ensure a safe flight.
Conclusion
Remember to put safety first. We are appealing to all pilots out
there, commercial organisations, training schools and the flying
public to put safety first. Rather be late than not arrive at your
destination. Let us be a safety-conscious
community. The Accidents Investigations
Division, together with the SACAA is hoping
that this article will bring awareness to the
flying community and also to get debate
going with regard to safety issues. You are
welcome to invite accident investigators to
share some of the lessons learned during
aircraft investigation activities.
In the next article, we will briefly discuss the
remaining causes of accidents and later
explore other safety factors uncovered during
the research activities.
Until next time!
This graph indicates fatalities per cause of the
accident. It is clear that CFIT is the leading
cause of death. It must be noted that we are
only considering accidents of which the
accident reports were approved during the
5-year period (2006 – 2010) only, meaning that
the numbers could be significantly higher.
9
 SMS - Safety Performance Measurement
By Sibusiso Ketwa
The holidays are over and it’s a new year, so it’s back to SMS.
In the last edition of the 2011 Safety Link, we looked at the fourth
component of SMS, which is Safety Assurance, and we touched
on safety performance monitoring and measurement. If you
recall, we mentioned that SMS regulations require that service
providers shall develop and maintain the means to verify that
the safety performance of the organisation complies with the
safety policy and objectives, and to validate the effectiveness
of safety risk management. In this edition we will elaborate
further on this part which deals with safety performance
monitoring and measurement.
In any system, it is necessary to set and measure performance
outcomes in order to determine whether the system is operating
in accordance with expectations, and to identify where action
may be required to enhance performance levels, to meet these
expectations. When it comes to safety, these measurements
are defined in terms of safety performance indicators and
safety targets.
The acceptable level of safety (ALoS) expresses the safety goals
of the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), an operator
or a service provider. It provides an objective in terms of the
safety performance that operators/service providers should
achieve while conducting their core business functions, as a
minimum acceptable to SACAA. It is a yardstick by which the
authority can measure safety performance. In determining an
acceptable level of safety, it is necessary to consider such
factors as the level of risk that applies, the cost/benefits of
improvements to the system, and public expectations about
the safety of the aviation industry.
In practice, the concept of the acceptable level of safety is
expressed by two measurements i.e. safety performance
indicators and safety performance targets which are
implemented by means of meeting various safety requirements.
The relationship between the acceptable level of safety, safety
performance indicators, safety performance targets and safety
requirements is as follows: the acceptable level of safety is the
principal concept; safety performance indicators are the
measures used to determine if the acceptable level of safety
has been achieved; safety performance targets are the
quantified objectives pertinent to the acceptable level of
safety; and safety requirements are the tools or means required
to achieve the safety targets.
The major bottleneck faced by organisations implementing
SMS relates to quantifying safety measurements. These
measurements should be based on information about causal
factors or specific types of incidents, so that safety performance
10
indicators associated with this type of undesirable event can
be mitigated. A large number of potential safety performance
indicators exist; however, not all of them are equally important.
In general, the importance of a safety performance indicator
can be assessed in terms of the strength of its relationship to
accident or injury occurrence, that is, if it makes a major
contribution to accidents and if it can be influenced by safety
measures or programmes.
When possible, the safety performance indicators should focus
on latent conditions and incidents, instead of accidents. In
most cases, the number of accidents can provide a good
indication of trends but may not help identify the processes
that lead to those accidents. Therefore, a good safety
performance indicator should be able to reflect a causal link
between a latent condition and possible accidents.
Safety indicators and safety targets may be different (for
example, the safety indicator is 0.5 fatal accidents per 100,000
hours for airline operators, and the safety target is a 40% reduction
in the fatal accident rate for airline operations), or they may
be the same (for example, the safety indicator is 0.5 fatal
accidents per 100,000 hours for airline operators, and the safety
target is not more than 0.5 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours
for airline operators).
For each organisation there will be different acceptable levels
of safety that will be agreed upon by the SACAA and the
individual operator/service providers. Each agreed acceptable
level of safety should be commensurate with the complexity
of the individual operator’s/service provider’s operational
context.
We need to bear in mind that establishing acceptable levels
of safety for a safety programme does not replace legal,
regulatory, or other established requirements, nor does it relieve
organisations from their obligations regarding the Convention
on Civil Aviation (Doc 7300) and its related provisions.
In short, in aviation the acceptable level of safety is generally
defined in terms of the probability of an accident occurring. It
is defined individually for each operator/service provider on
the basis of the target level of safety set by the regulator. This
is done taking into account an array of factors, like the
complexity of operations, the operational context, past safety
performance, existing safety regulatory framework, applicable
safety standards, etc.
Sources: www2.icao.int/en/ism
www.bialairport.com
Survival Instinct: An essential element for dealing with emergencies
By Des Barker
This Skyraider landed uneventfully
minus five feet of wingspan.
The ability to deal successfully with an in-flight emergency
has its basis in the individual pilot’s instinct to survive; usually
a strong human behavioural characteristic and an essential
requirement to successfully circumnavigate the intricacies of
dealing with an in-flight emergency.
Survival instinct amongst well-trained display pilots, is invariably
well honed. None so more demonstrated than in the case
of the P-51 “Big Beautiful Doll” that collided with the Skyraider
at the Duxford Flying Legends Airshow on 10 July 2011. The
Skyraider's wing cut into the Mustang's fuselage just aft of the
radiator scoop, where the elevator and rudder control cable
runs are located, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable in
pitch.
The Mustang pilot, Rob Davies, jettisoned the canopy 4
seconds after impact and was out of the aircraft 10 seconds
later; 18 seconds after impact, the aircraft hit the ground.
Such fine timing was not by accident, it was a calculated
response by an experienced pilot to the real time cues, lucid
situational awareness and an understanding of the hazards
and responding accordingly. You can fly an aircraft without
a rudder in a very rudimentary fashion, but without an elevator,
you're screwed. Close call, you bet!
Having participated in the ‘balbo’ flypast, the three-ship VIC
formation with the Skyraider on the left, Mustang 'Big Beautiful
Doll' leading the formation in the middle, and the Horsemans
Mustang 'February' on the right, were on the run-in for the
break to landing. ‘Big Beautiful Doll’ pulled up and turned
away to break out of the formation to route downwind and
then land; the Skyraider followed as briefed, 3 seconds later,
but pulled inside the turning circle of Lead and in so doing,
lost visual contact with Lead.
After colliding, the Skyraider broke away and routed
downwind to land safely, minus four feet of right wingtip. The
Mustang however, did not manage to recover from the
collision and as the aircraft pitched downwards, away from
people and property, Davies managed to bailout and open
his parachute at roughly 400 feet agl. The Cambridge News,
10 July 2011.
Pilots who fly in the display environment, gradually develop
a sense for what is survivable and what isn't survivable. In
other words when something like this happens to a pilot like
Davies, it's an instant mental evaluation that short circuits the
normal reasoning process and triggers a response, obviously
driven by the adrenaline. Through experience, pilots have
built up a list of unsurvivable scenarios in their subconscious.
11
Impact evaluation fits exactly into this short circuit trigger
response. Davies felt the impact in the Mustang and the
Spad driver felt the impact as it affected HIS aircraft. Each
felt the impact differently and each impact triggered
individual response paths. The instant Davies was hit, he
KNEW the hit was fatal. He would have immediately initiated
the process of leaving the airplane even as he was
simultaneously feeling the controls for proper response. The
only thing that would stop the process of leaving the aircraft,
would be a "felt proper” response from the controls that
indicated survival was possible. Not getting that.......and this
would be happening in scant seconds.........egress would
proceed.
The variables in a situation like this one, all come together at
once. Davies survived because he reacted, based on his
experience. A pilot with lesser experience might not have
survived the slim time line. The bottom line here is that Davies
multi-tasked his decision process rather than following a linear
series decision path. It was his ability to do this that saved his
life. In low altitude display flying of any kind, you either have
the experience to deal with something like this incident at
the instant it occurs, or you don't. Davies had that experience.
So what has display flying got to do with general aviation?
Well, next to combat flying, the next most hazardous
occupation has to be low level display flying. Why? Well,
the dynamic environment of manoeuvring at low level,
reduces the response time available to deal with any
emergencies. There is no time to deliberate on ‘what to do
now?’ The response has to be immediate, since there is very
little time to make the decision. But how does one achieve
the level of confidence required to make such a split-second
decision?
This can only be achieved by possessing adequate technical
knowledge of your aircraft and its associated systems, through
an adequate understanding of the emergency procedures
for the aircraft and why the emergency procedure listed in
the emergency checklist is in that specific order. This can
only be achieved if you have conducted the necessary
emergency training, both written quizzes and simulated
e m e r g e n c y
recoveries.
There’s a statistical
theory that implies
that every flight
that goes by
without an
emergency,
increases the
probability on the
next flight. Are you
mentally and
p h y s i c a l l y
prepared for any
emergency that
may confront you
during your flight or
do you just “get in
and go and leave
your fate to the
gods”?
A finely timed
judgement call as
Davies bails from his
crippled P-51
 Metallurgical Consequences of the Use of Alternative Fuels in Gas
Turbine Engines - By Tim Carter
Within Africa, availability of the correct recommended fuel for
aviation gas turbine engines is sometimes limited, rendering the
use of alternative liquid fuels necessary, if not either desirable
or advisable. Thus to keep aircraft in the air, from time to time
operators are compelled to use fuels other than the
recommended Jet A-1.
Whilst this may be the only alternative, the use of non-
recommended fuels carries with it a number of problems. Firstly,
and most importantly, it will void any manufacturer’s warranty
and will void any engine insurance policy, unless previously
agreed with the insurer, who may or may not agree even to a
single occurrence. The insurer is unlikely to agree to continue
cover with any extended use of alternative fuels and may
withdraw or limit cover after any use of non-recommended
fuel.
Whilst a gas turbine engine is a remarkably tolerant piece of
equipment, ground-based turbines run on many fuels, and will
function quite happily on almost any combustible liquid fuel
which can be fed into it; the use of non-approved fuels is fraught
with difficulty and danger.
Let us consider the alternative fuels available, which are usually,
but not always, designed for automotive use.
Firstly, since aircraft are usually operated from an airfield, aviation
gasoline or avgas is often available. The only avgas available
in Southern Africa and most other parts of the world is designated
“100LL”, meaning 100 octane, low lead. Don’t get the idea that
because it is designated “low lead” it doesn’t contain lead.
Avgas 100LL can contain up to 4% by weight as tetraethyl lead,
added as an anti-knock agent. Lead affects the nickel alloys
used in turbine blades by penetrating the grain boundaries and
forming low melting point compounds. This degrades the creep
properties of the alloy and will severely diminish the life
expectancy of the blade. The effect becomes more
pronounced as temperature increases and, since avgas has a
higher calorific value than Jet A-1, the engine will tend to
operate at higher temperatures, making the effects of lead
more pronounced.
Most vehicles operating on an airfield are fuelled with diesel,
thus diesel will probably be available. Diesel does not contain
lead, but it does contain up to 0.5 % sulphur, which will also
damage both the blade coating and the underlying nickel
alloy. Whilst low-sulphur diesel is available, it can be difficult to
find even in urban Johannesburg, so finding it where Jet A-1 is
unavailable is most unlikely. In addition, whilst Jet A-1 is, or should
be, almost water-free, commercial diesel is not.
12
Whilst water is fine inside a gas turbine, in addition to normal
water ingestion from rain or when washing the compressor
blades, it is used for blade cooling in many heavily loaded
engines when maximum power is required, for example in the
Rolls-Royce Pegasus, fitted to the Harrier aircraft. When so used
it is mixed with methanol to prevent freezing and is injected
separately from the fuel. When mixed with the fuel, it can freeze
at altitude and the resulting ice can block the fuel system and
cause engine failure, as happened to a Boeing 777 at London
Heathrow some time ago.
Normal automotive gasoline or “mogas” is available in two
forms in Southern Africa, unleaded and lead replacement, and
in a small range of octane values. None contain significant
quantities of either lead or sulphur, but lead replacement fuel
contains methylcyclopentadienyl manganese carbonyl as an
anti-knock agent. The effects of manganese of turbine blades
is unknown, but since none of the commonly used nickel alloys
used for turbine blades contain significant quantities of
manganese, it is probably safe to assume that its presence is
undesirable. Again, mogas is not warranted to be free from
water and may contain significant amounts.
Another possible fuel often available in rural areas is power
paraffin, sometimes known as “TVO” or tractor vapourising oil,
designed for use in low-compression spark ignition engines such
as are fitted to older tractors and other agricultural equipment.
It can contain significant quantities of sulphur which will, as we
have already discussed, cause damage to turbine hot section
components. Since it is used in relatively crude but tolerant
machinery, storage conditions can be poor and water
contamination can be a major problem.
Illumination paraffin or lamp oil contains no lead or sulphur,
both of which would be harmful when used in domestic oil
lamps. It may well, however, contain water, of which the effects
on turbine fuel systems have already been discussed.
In conclusion, therefore, whilst there are many fuels available
which will power a gas turbine engine, the use of any fuel other
than that recommended by the engine manufacturer will at
least shorten the life of the engine, requiring more frequent and
probably more expensive overhaul, and at worst will cause
blade failure and destruction of the engine. The use of non-
approved fuels is relatively easy to detect during routine
inspection on overhaul or after failure.
Don’t expect any sympathy from either the manufacturer or
from your insurer, or from the CAA, any CAA, in the event of a
reportable incident.
 Fun and Knowledge Should Go Hand In Hand
By Rob Spencer-Scarr

because they too listened and learned. Leave your ego at

home when you mix with other pilots. You have two ears and
one mouth – use them in the same ratio. Share your knowledge
and experience with others. Become old and wise.

Human beings are funny animals. They have an amazing
capacity for most things. They spend large amounts of their
time in the quest for pleasure and enjoyment and fun. They
never seem to be satisfied with what they have and strive
continuously for more, for higher, for bigger or for better.
The quest for a soft, comfortable lifestyle is driven by our
inherent laziness, but the quest for excitement and pleasure
is mostly driven by adrenalin and it is this part that stimulates
us most.
This is also the most dangerous quest. In striving for the bigger,
better source of excitement we look for higher heights from
which to jump, deeper depths which to plumb and generally
more dangerous things to do. Which idiot, for the first time,
said, “I know, let’s tie an elastic band around our ankles and
dive off this bridge!” Now it has become an industry. There
are a myriad of activities too vast in number to mention here
but, at different levels, we all enjoy some form of exciting
activity during our lives.
Now all this sounds simple enough, but how do we have the
fun in the meanwhile? This is easy. Spend time in the cockpit
with as many different experienced pilots and instructors as
you can. This does not necessarily have to be a training flight.
Pilots are “A” type personalities and they will offer all sorts of
advice freely, so just by giving an instructor a lift somewhere
or a joyride around the patch will get you bucket-loads of
advice and help for free.
Finally, we all need to understand that flying an aeroplane
is a physical, hands-on function. It cannot be done by mind
control or guess work or knowledge alone. Theory is important
and critical to assist in the decision-making process remote
control but finally, when we’re sitting in the cockpit, our hands
and feet do the work. We do not look at the clutch pedal
when we change gears in a car. This only comes about as
a result of many hours of practice that in turn gives us muscle
memory, so that our hands and feet simply do what they are
trained to do at the right time. How many times have we
switched on the wiper blades when driving a strange car
because the indicator lever is on the other side of the wheel?
Unless we concentrate, we will do it repeatedly until our hands
have been retrained to accept the new position. We need
to spend as much time as possible in the cockpit doing the
right thing over and over again.

It is a well known fact that you don’t need a parachute to If we accept the basic principles of skill, aided by knowledge
skydive. You only need a parachute if you want to skydive and the correct decisions, we should be able to have all the
again! Life is a series of trade-offs. There is always a balance fun and adrenalin-pumping excitement that our bodies and
and we always have to trade something for whatever it is we minds can stand for many years to come.
want to experience. Therefore, whenever we expose ourselves
to excitement, fun and pleasure, we are, at the same time,
exposing ourselves to danger. The greater the excitement,
the greater is the danger. It is as simple
as that. The trick, of course, is to weigh
up the danger and manage it as carefully
and properly as possible in order to avoid
paying the ultimate price. ....... Our lives!

The decision as to whether to pay the

ultimate price or not, always lies with us.
We decide how much pleasure we want
and therefore how much exposure to
danger we’re prepared to accept. These
decisions are made daily by pilots in
general, and general aviation pilots in
particular. So, in order to make the
decision that will allow us to enjoy the
pleasure and excitement and live to do
it again, we need to understand the risks
and know where the edge of the
envelope is. How do we do this?

One of my favourite clichés is, “learn from

the mistakes of others, you will never have
time to make them all yourself.”
Knowledge and experience is the key.
Learn from others. Listen to the older and
the wiser. They only became old and wise

13
 RAASA Aviation Safety Matters
- By RAASA
The Recreation Aviation Administration of South Africa (RAASA)
was designated by the South African Civil Aviation Authority
(SACAA) to perform a number of functions on its behalf. This
includes the issuing and oversight of Part 62 and 68 Pilot’s
Licences as well as Authority to Fly permits for NTCA.
Other functions relate to the approval and oversight of
Parachuting, Hang and Paragliding, Aerobatics, Model Aircraft,
Microlighting, Light Sport Aircraft and Gyroplanes as well as
Special Air Events (SAE) which include Airshows.
RAASA together with subject experts within the airshow industry
have developed a comprehensive, Special Air Event Manual
of Procedures to set guidelines and rules of conduct for the
promotion, planning and hosting of air events.
Safety at Special Air Events
The manual has been developed to set safety standards for
the aviation component otherwise known as the “airside” at
aviation events. The manual is the further evolution of the old
Aero Club Airshow Manual coupled with international best
practice.
The MOP supplies guidelines to all prospective air event
organisers, safety officers, display pilots and a host of other
role players on the planning, hosting and the management
of risk on the active airside at such events.
Some of these safety functions include the development and
mentorship of Safety Officers, Flight Directors and airside
marshals in association with Airshow South Africa (ASSA).
RAASA also appoints senior and highly experienced display
pilots to the Display Authorisation Committee “DAC” who in
turn recommend to RAASA a wide range of Display
Authorisation Examiners to validate pilots wanting to obtain
Display Authorisations.
These DAEs come from a diverse range of aviation
backgrounds, such as aerobatic champions, ATPLs working
for airlines, military test pilots and fighter pilots, to mention only
a few.
Each DAE is approved for his knowledge and experience in
a particular field or discipline of aviation, respectively they
are specialists in airliners, military fast jets, aerobatics, formation
flying, formation aerobatics, specialty acts and many other
areas.
Special Air Event Seminar
Regular seminars are held for all interested parties to inform
and disseminate important information, and to further develop
procedures and standards in an ever-changing industry.
The CEO of RAASA together with General Des Barker and Brad
Bennets recently attended the European Airshow Council’s
annual seminar, to network and establish the level of South
Africa’s standards in relation to European standards. The
feedback is that South Africa does not stand back for any of
14
the European events and that whilst many of our airshows
may be on a smaller scale than our foreign counterparts, the
standards and professionalism of displays by our South African
performers need not stand back an inch for any of the best
in the world.
However, there is a wealth of knowledge that has been
brought back to our country and many of these lessons will
be incorporated into our airshow system in the coming months.
Despite a number of accident-free airshow seasons, it is vital
that we do not get complacent as accidents will occur. RAASA
and the DAE committee are currently planning an upcoming
display pilot seminar to set the stage and present safety plans
for the upcoming 2012 airshow season.
Safety Planning does not happen by accident.
Safety Drive by RAASA, MISASA, SAGPA and EAA in cooperation
with Aero Club
As a result of recent accidents involving microlight aircraft
flying into power lines, the recreational aviation organisations,
namely the Microlight and Light Sport Association of SA
(MISASA), SA Gyroplane Association (SAGPA), Experimental
Aircraft Association (EAA) together with RAASA and the Aero
Club have started a drive to reduce irresponsible and rogue
pilot behaviour.
The message is clear; we have had enough, and these
organisations will no longer tolerate unacceptable piloting
behaviour (normally caused by a small number of individuals)
at their respective clubs, flying schools and events. A system
of peer oversight will be implemented at these airfields and
clubs. Should any pilots display poor ethics, conduct, poor
airmanship and undisciplined behaviour, they will be brought
to book by their respective organisations or club’s disciplinary
committee, or in more severe cases reported to the authorities
for further enforcement action.
Sadly, as a result of a small minority’s disobedience or poor
airmanship, the responsible majority is being tarnished, and
perceptions are being created that all recreational pilots or
their aircraft are unsafe.
The true facts, however, paint an entirely different picture.
Since RAASA has kept statistics on the number of pilot hours
flown, as well as hours logged on aircraft, it has become
evident that recreational pilots seem to fly a higher number
of hours using experimental (NTC) aircraft than light certified
aircraft.
Below are a few statistics of the average monthly hours flown
by these aircraft and pilots:
NTCA authority to fly permits

Average monthly hours flown per licence
One of the prime reasons for the growth and increased
numbers in recreational flying is the affordability of owning
and flying a wide assortment of NTCA, as well as access to
newer, more efficient and modern designs.
Many of these aircraft are production-built or assembled to
15
the highest possible standards, whilst others are lovingly and
Puzzle
painstakingly built by amateur enthusiasts who go to great
lengths to build their own aircraft with infinite attention to
detail.
These aircraft are mainly categorised in the experimental flying
group, and aviation as we know it today, owes its existence
to experimental flight. These original pioneers were responsible
for the privilege that we share today. However, there are still
those that seemingly have not learned the lessons of the great
pioneers, and continue to suffer totally unnecessary accidents.
This safety campaign has gained a lot of support from around
the country, perhaps to the dissatisfaction of those of who
disregard regulations and safety standards.
The idea is not to stop or discourage recreational pilots from
enjoying the freedom of flight. On the contrary, the purpose
is to encourage, grow and share our love of aviation, but in
a manner that reflects our passion, pride and professionalism.
We need to be mindful that as recreational pilots, we share
our airspace with others.
RAASA - Designated to serve the recreational flyer!
16