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Bruce E. Kaufman Studies “The impossibility of a perfectly competitive labour market”
A perfectly competitive labour market requires zero transaction costs, but this condition
implies that all labour is hired as independent contractors through the product market, and thus
the labour market and the employment relationship disappear
With positive transaction costs, labour markets exist but employment contracts are incomplete
and the labour supply curve to firms is upward sloping, making the labour demand curve ill-
defined and the wage rate indeterminate.
B. Literature Evaluation
- Does the literature review seem thorough & recent (within the last 5 years)?
The literature review of this article seems to be thorough and recent. Here are some reasons: The
article cites over 100 references, most of which are from reputable journals and books in the
fields of economics, sociology, and law. The article covers a wide range of topics related to the
theory and practice of labour markets, such as perfect competition, transaction costs, institutional
economics, employment contracts, wage determination, efficiency wages, monopsony, and
industrial relations. acknowledges the contributions of heterodox traditions such as post-
Keynesian and radical economics.
- Does the content of the literature review relate directly to the research problem?
The content of the literature review directly relates to the research problem. The author uses the
institutional theory of transaction costs to show that with zero transaction costs, labour is hired as
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independent contractors through the product market, and with positive transaction costs, labour
contracts are incomplete and the labour supply curve to the firm is upward sloping, making the
labourdemand curve ill-defined. The author suggests that wage rates are not determined by the
intersection of labour demand and supply curves, but are a form of administered or bargained price
that depends on various industrial relations factors. The author also challenges the efficiency and
self-equilibrating properties of the competitive model. Therefore, the literature review is directly
related to the research problem of demonstrating the logical impossibility of the perfectly
competitive labour market model and its implications for wage determination and the core
paradigm of neoclassical labour economics.
- How was the research conducted? (The study procedure itself) & data collected
This article was conducted by using a theoretical line of reasoning based on the institutional theory
of transaction costs. The author did not collect any empirical data, but instead relied on the ideas
and arguments of previous economists, such as Commons, Coase, Williamson, and Robinson, to
demonstrate the logical impossibility of a perfectly competitive labour market..
D. Analysis
- How were the data analyzed?
The data of this article were analyzed using the institutional theory of transaction costs. This theory
compares the costs and benefits of different modes of economic organization, such as markets and
firms. The author usdoes this theory to show that the assumptions of the competitive labour market
model are inconsistent and lead to the conclusion that a perfectly competitive labour market is a
logical impossibility. The author also discusses the implications of positive transaction costs for
the existence and nature of labour markets, employment relationships, and wage determination.
The selected statistical tests do not appear appropriate for this study, as this study does not
contain any empirical data or quantitative analysis.
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- Were the results significant?
This article “The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labour Market” argues that the model
of a perfectly competitive labour market is a logical impossibility, based on the concept of
transaction costs and the institutional nature of labour contracts.
The article suggests that the theoretical problems of the perfectly competitive model have
significant implications for labour economics, such as the role of institutions, wage rigidity, and
policy interventions.
E. Results
- What were the findings of the study?
The findings of this article are:
The impossibility of a perfectly competitive labour market: The article argues that the
assumptions of the neoclassical model of a perfectly competitive labour market are internally
contradictory and lead to the conclusion that such a market is a logical impossibility.
The implications of positive transaction costs: The article also shows that positive transaction
costs, which are necessary for the existence of labour markets and employment relationships,
invalidate the predictions of the neoclassical model.
The need for institutional analysis: The article suggests that the theoretical flaws of the
neoclassical model call for more attention to models of imperfect competition and the role of
institutions in wage and employment determination, as advocated by institutional, post-Keynesian,
and other heterodox economists. The article also indicates that institutional economics can offer
not only a critique of orthodoxy but also insightful theory of its own.
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Empirical implications: They suggested that the theoretical flaws of the competitive model
compromise its empirical predictions and relevance, and that alternative models of imperfect
competition and institutional factors are needed to better explain wage and employment outcomes
in real labour markets.
Integration of institutional economics: They demonstrated that the institutional theory of
transaction costs, which originated from the work of John R. Commons and was developed by
Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and others, can offer a fruitful critique and extension of
neoclassical economics, and that the original and new versions of institutional economics can be
integrated.
Theoretical critique: The article challenges the core assumptions and predictions of the
neoclassical perfectly competitive labour market model, but does not provide a positive
alternative theory or empirical evidence to support its claims.
Scope of analysis: The article focuses on the logical impossibility of a perfectly
competitive labour market, but does not address the implications of imperfect competition
or other forms of market failure for labour market outcomes and policies.
Relevance of the argument: The article acknowledges that modern labour economics has
moved beyond the simple competitive model, and that positive transaction costs are
inevitable in reality. Therefore, the argument may be seen as a curiosum that does not affect
the main corpus of neoclassical economics or its applications.
References: The article relies heavily on older and heterodox sources, such as Commons,
Coase, Simon, and Robinson, and does not engage with more recent and mainstream
developments in labour economics, such as search and matching models, contract theory,
and behavioural economics.
The replicator has access to the same sources of literature that the author used, or can find
equivalent ones.
The replicator has sufficient knowledge of the theoretical concepts and models that the author
employed, such as transaction costs, incomplete contracts, monopsony, and efficiency wages.
The replicator can follow the logical reasoning and arguments that the author presented, and
can critically evaluate their validity and relevance.
The replicator can acknowledge the limitations and assumptions of the neoclassical and
institutional perspectives, and can compare and contrast their predictions and implications.
How do transaction costs vary across different types of labour markets and employment
contracts?
How do other factors, such as preferences, norms, and regulations, affect the choice between
employment and sales contracts? The study focuses on the role of transaction costs in
explaining the existence of the employment relationship and the labour market, but does not
consider other possible factors that may influence the decision of workers and firms to enter
into an employment or a sales contract.
How do changes in technology and the nature of work affect the transaction costs and the
optimal mode of governance for labour? The study is based on a static analysis of the trade-off
between transaction costs and production costs in determining the optimal mode of governance
for labour.