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Before the close of 1869 the Supreme Court, in the case of Texas
vs. White, sustained the constitutionality of the Reconstruction acts
of Congress. It held that the ordinances of secession had been
“absolutely null;” that the seceding States had no right to secede and
had never been out of the Union, but that, during and after their
rebellion, they had no governments “competent to represent these
States in their relations with the National government,” and
therefore Congress had the power to re-establish the relations of any
rebellious State to the Union. This decision fortified the position of
the Republicans, and did much to aid President Grant in the difficult
work of reconstruction. It modified the assaults of the Democrats,
and in some measure changed their purpose to make Reconstruction
the pivot around which smaller political issues should revolve.
The regular session of the 41st Congress met Dec. 4th, 1869, and
before its close Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi had all
complied with the conditions of reconstruction, and were re-
admitted to the Union. This practically completed the work of
reconstruction. To summarize:—*
Tennessee was re-admitted July 24th, 1866; Arkansas, June 22d,
1868; North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia and
Florida under the act of June 25th, 1868, which provided that as
soon as they fulfilled the conditions imposed by the acts of March,
1867, they should be re-admitted. All did this promptly except
Georgia. Virginia was re-admitted January 25th, 1870; Mississippi,
Feb. 23d, 1870; Texas, March 30th, 1870. Georgia, the most powerful
and stubborn of all, had passed State laws declaring negroes
incapable of holding office, in addition to what was known as the
“black code,” and Congress refused full admission until she had
revoked the laws and ratified the 15th Amendment. The State finally
came back into the Union July 15th, 1870.
The above named States completed the ratification of the 15th
amendment, and the powers of reconstruction were plainly used to
that end. Some of the Northern States had held back, and for a time
its ratification by the necessary three-fourths was a matter of grave
doubt. Congress next passed a bill to enforce it, May 30th, 1870. This
made penal any interference, by force or fraud, with the right of free
and full manhood suffrage, and authorized the President to use the
army to prevent violations. The measure was generally supported by
the Republicans, and opposed by all of the Democrats.
The Republicans through other guards about the ballot by passing
an act to amend the naturalization laws, which made it penal to use
false naturalization papers, authorized the appointment of Federal
supervisors of elections in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants; gave to
these power of arrest for any offense committed in their view, and
gave alien Africans the right to naturalize. The Democrats in their
opposition laid particular stress upon the extraordinary powers given
to Federal supervisors, while the Republicans charged that Seymour
had carried New York by gigantic naturalization frauds in New York
city, and sought to sustain these charges by the unprecedented vote
polled. A popular quotation of the time was from Horace Greeley, in
the New York Tribune, who showed that under the manipulations of
the Tweed ring, more votes had been cast for Seymour in one of the
warehouse wards of the city, “than there were men, women, children,
and cats and dogs in it.”
The Legal Tender Decision.
This party, with a view to ease the rigors of the monetary panic of
1873, advocated an unlimited issue of greenbacks, or an “issue based
upon the resources of the country.” So vigorously did discontented
leaders of both parties press this idea, that they soon succeeded in
demoralizing the Democratic minority—which was by this time such
a plain minority, and so greatly in need of new issues to make the
people forget the war, that it is not surprising they yielded, at least
partially, to new theories and alliances. The present one took them
away from the principles of Jackson, from the hard-money theories
of the early days, and would land them they knew not where, nor did
many of them care, if they could once more get upon their feet. Some
resisted, and comparatively few of the Democrats in the Middle
States yielded, but in part of New England, the great West, and
nearly all of the South, it was for several years quite difficult to draw
a line between Greenbackers and Democrats. Some Republicans, too,
who had tired of the “old war issues,” or discontented with the
management and leadership of their party, aided in the construction
of the Greenback bridge, and kept upon it as long as it was safe to do
so. In State elections up to as late as 1880 this Greenback element
was a most important factor. Ohio was carried by an alliance of
Greenbackers and Democrats, Allen being elected Governor, only to
be supplanted by Hayes (afterwards President) after a most
remarkable contest, the alliance favoring the Greenback, the
Republicans not quite the hard-money, but a redeemable-in-gold
theory. Indiana, always doubtful, passed over to the Democratic
column, while in the Southern States the Democratic leaders made
open alliances until the Greenbackers became over-confident and
sought to win Congressional and State elections on their own merits.
They fancied that the desire to repudiate ante-war debts would
greatly aid them, and they openly advocated the idea of repudiation
there, but they had experienced and wise leaders to cope with. They
were not allowed to monopolize this issue by the Democrats, and
their arrogance, if such it may be called, was punished by a more
complete assertion of Democratic power in the South than was ever
known before. The theory in the South was welcomed where it would
suit the Democracy, crushed where it would not, as shown in the
Presidential election of 1880, when Garfield, Hancock and Weaver
(Greenbacker) were the candidates. The latter, in his stumping tour
of the South, proclaimed that he and his friends were as much
maltreated in Alabama and other States, as the Republicans, and for
some cause thereafter (the Democrats alleged “a bargain and sale”)
he practically threw his aid to the Republicans—this when it became
apparent that the Greenbackers, in the event of the election going to
the House, could have no chance even there.
Gen’l Weaver went from the South to Maine, the scene of what was
regarded at that moment as a pivotal struggle for the Presidency.
Blaine had twice been the most prominent candidate for the
Presidency—1876 and 1880—and had both times been defeated by
compromise candidates. He was still, as he had been for many years,
Chairman of the Republican State Committee of Maine, and now as
ever before swallowed the mortification of defeat with true political
grace. The Greenbackers had the year before formed a close alliance
with the Democrats, and in the State election made the result so
close that for many weeks it remained a matter of doubt who was
elected Governor, the Democratic Greenbacker or the Republican. A
struggle followed in the Legislature and before the Returning Board
composed of State officers, who were Democrats, (headed by Gov.
Garcelon) and sought to throw out returns on slight technicalities.
Finally the Republicans won, but not without a struggle which
excited attention all over the Union and commanded the presence of
the State militia. Following Garfield’s nomination another struggle,
as we have stated, was inaugurated, with Davis as the Republican
nominee for Governor, Plaisted the Democratic-Greenback, (the
latter a former Republican). All eyes now turned to Maine, which
voted in September. Gen’l Weaver was on the stump then, as the
Greenback candidate for President, and all of his efforts were bent to
breaking the alliance between the Greenbackers and Democrats.
He advocated a straight-out policy for his Greenback friends,
described his treatment in the South, and denounced the Democracy
with such plainness that it displayed his purpose and defeated his
object. Plaisted was elected by a close vote, and the Republicans
yielded after some threats to invoke the “Garcelon precedents.” This
was the second Democratic-Greenback victory in Maine, the first
occurring two years before, when through an alliance in the
Legislature (no candidate having received a majority of all the
popular vote) Garland was returned.
The victory of Plaisted alarmed the Republicans and enthused the
Democrats, who now denounced Weaver, but still sought alliance
with his followers. General B. F. Butler, long a brilliant Republican
member of Congress from Massachusetts, for several years
advocated Greenback ideas without breaking from his Republican
Congressional colleagues. Because of this fact he lost whatever of
chance he had for a Republican nomination for Governor, “his only
remaining political ambition,” and thereupon headed the
Greenbackers in Massachusetts, and in spite of the protests of the
hard-money Democrats in that State, captured the Democratic
organization, and after these tactics twice ran for Governor, and was
defeated both times by the Republicans, though he succeeded, upon
State and “anti-blue blood” theories, in greatly reducing their
majority. In the winter of 1882 he still held control of the Democratic
State Committee, after the Greenback organization had passed from
view, and “what will he do next?” is one of the political questions of
the hour.
The Greenback labor party ceased all Congressional alliance with
the Democrats after their quarrel with General Weaver, and as late as
the 47th session—1881–82—refused all alliance, and abstained from
exercising what some still believe a “balance of power” in the House,
though nearly half of their number were elected more as Republicans
than Greenbackers.
As a party, the Greenbackers, standing alone, never carried either
a State or a Congressional district. Their local successes were due to
alliances with one or other of the great parties, and with the passage
of the panic they dissolved in many sections, and where they still
obtain it is in alliance with labor unions, or in strong mining or
workingmen’s districts. In the Middle States they won few local
successes, but were strong in the coal regions of Pennsylvania.
Advocates of similar theories have not been wanting in all the
countries of Western Europe following great wars or panics, but it
was reserved to the genius of Americans to establish an aggressive
political party on the basis of theories which all great political
economists have from the beginning antagonized as unsafe and
unsound.
The Prohibitory Party.