A Theoretical Review on Philippine Policy Making:

The Weak State-Elitist Framework and the Pluralist Perspective1

This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article published in Philippine Quarterly of Culture

and Society, (2012) vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 54-76.

Bing Baltazar C. Brillo 2

The article is a theoretical review of the studies made by scholars in policy making in the
Philippines. It begins with a discussion on the centrality of the concept of elite in analyzing
policy making and its link to particularistic policies. The elite concept is then associated to the
weak state conceptualization, where the rise of predatory elite ramifies into state weakness;
specifically, the decline in the government’s capacity to produce public regarding policies.
Political dynamics are explained in terms a zero-sum relationship, as the decrease in
government’s capacity in policy making is generally rationalized in terms of the elite-captured
state or the foreign-dominated state. Afterwards, the article elucidates the limitations of the weak
state-elitist framework, particularly in the light of the changing nature of the politics in
Philippine policy making. It closes with a discourse on the pluralist perspective and its challenge
over dominance of the weak state-elitist perspective.

The Elite Conceptualization and Philippine Policy Making

Over the years, scholars have examined the intricacies of policy making in the
Philippines. The scholarships mostly showed preference for the elitist perspective in analyzing
the politics behind the policies. Political power in Philippine society is presumed to be skewed
and concentrated in one dominant group, and that this elite controls policy making most of the
time. Among the early scholarship under this genre was the work of Carl Lande using the patron-
client framework to explain the incoherence of policies (see also Lande 1958; Lynch 1959;
Hollnsteiner 1963). Lande (1965: 1) observed that “the Philippine polity, unlike those of most
present-day Western democracies, is structured less by organized interest groups or by
individuals who in politics think of themselves as members of categories, i.e. of distinctive social
classes or occupations, than by a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of
individuals.” These dyadic relationships involve exchanges between the prosperous patrons and
their poor and dependent clients. The political elite that controls the government and its policy
making apparatus largely comes from those who can afford to be patron, that is those who have
the wealth and the position to do favors for large numbers of ordinary people. These have
profound consequences on policies, as the heavy reliance on vertical and horizontal dyadic
relationships steers policy making towards the pursuit of providing rewards (e.g., special

1The article is derived from the author’s dissertation proposal in PhD Development Studies
(Research) at De La Salle University.

2 The author is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, University of the
Philippines Los Baños.

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privileges, monopolies, or unwarranted exemptions), while offering little incentives to pursue
categorical programs. The legislative program becomes more of a personal rather than
ideological or party-based program. As the overarching intention is to satisfy clientele demands,
policy making becomes continually marred by accommodations and concessions which lead to
inconsistent or aimless policies.

Some scholars modified the patron-client framework by adopting the political machine
perspective, where material rewards rather than personal ties are the center of analysis. James
Scott (1969; 1972) declared that the traditional patron-client relation based on loyalty and
deference is being transformed into a political machine (see also Nowak and Snyder 1970;
Wolters 1984; Magno A. 1988; Magno F. 1989; Gutierrez 1994). Other scholars focused on
conflict and coercion rather than symbiotic personal ties. For instance, Benedict Kerkvliet (1977;
1995) concluded that the amiable dyadic model is deficient in explaining the uncongenial and
antagonistic relationships that exist between people of unequal status and class positions as well
as marginalized the importance of values, ideas, organizations and conflicts. While John Sidel
(1989) asserted that the patron-client framework fails to adequately account for the change and
continuity in Philippine rural politics as well as the role of coercion and the autonomy of
localities from central control. Although the means have changed, from personal ties to material
rewards or coercion, the implication on policy making is the same— the political elite controls
policy making and outcome to secure political relevance and continuity.

Other scholars used the dependency or neocolonial framework in rationalizing foreign

influence in policy making and outcome. 3 Devotees echoed that the Philippine polity must be
seen in view of the persistence of foreign influence and control over the government (see
Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973; Bello and Rivera 1977). The fundamental premise assumes
that the “American-given” Philippine independence in 1946 did not totally free country from
foreign domination; instead, neocolonialism particularly in the economy was instituted
(Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973; Stauffer 1973; Shalom 1981). By implication, the status of
Filipino political elite in shaping policies was upheld but downgraded to an accomplice of
foreign interest (especially American interest), as major policies are deemed dictated from the
outside. This interpretation presupposes a subservient domestic elite and a policy making
manipulated by external powers.

With the redemocratization after the fall of Marcos regime, the appeal of the other
frameworks faded. 4 Scholars began to embrace the elite democracy framework and its variants
which quickly became the dominant perspective in depicting Philippine politics. The strength of

3 The ascendancy of this neocolonial interpretation of Philippine politics was aided by the
global rediscovery of imperialism and the rise of dependency school, as well as the heavy reliance of
the Marcos government on economic and military assistance from the United States (Quimpo 2005).

4 For instance, scholars began to question and criticize the dependency framework, particularly
its seeming oversimplification— the absence of autonomy of the Philippine government and the
overwhelming American influence over it.

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the perspective is its inclusiveness; compared to the patron-client framework, it takes into
consideration more variables (such as corruption, fraud, coercion and violence), and compared to
the dependency framework, it acknowledges that foreign interests at times infringes on
Philippine sovereignty but it does not suggest an exaggerated view (Kerkvliet 1995; Quimpo
2005). Beginning with what is generally considered the pioneering work, Dante Simbulan (1965)
studying the socio-economic elites, contended that Philippine politics revolves around the elite
families. These elites, which profoundly benefited during the Spanish and American colonial
period, are resilient. As these families continue to hold political (and economic) power, they, in
effect, continuously monopolize policy making over the years. Simbulan’s thesis was echoed by
Benedict Anderson (1988) in Cacique Democracy, as he presented an elaborate discussion on the
continuity of the elite families from the Spanish caciquism to the American electoralism and to
the present. In particular, Anderson noted that the transformation of the caciques to political
dynasties occurred during the American colonial period when they secured the newly created
elective offices and filled the bureaucracy with their relatives and supporters, and that this so-
called “cacique democracy” continued and reached its heyday in 1954 to 1972. He further
asserted that after the Marcos dictatorship cacique democracy was restored. The traditional
families again dominated the electoral-political arena and by implication the governmental
decision making. And Alfred McCoy (1993: 10), focusing more on contemporary Philippine
politics, concluded that one of the key elements to have contributed directly to the formation of
powerful political families is “the rise of “rents” as a significant share of the nation’s economy.”5
Here, McCoy’s is suggesting that the policy decisions made in the past, specifically policies
intentionally enacted to benefit the elite families, have built up, transformed and reinforced them.
In general, the Simbulan-Anderson-McCoy’s observations on political elites are shared by many
scholars who believe that the post-EDSA politics was a reversion to the pre-Martial Law elite
democracy where political elites conveniently used elections as a relatively peaceful way of
competing and alternating political power among themselves (see Hawes 1987; Bello and
Gershman 1990; Stauffer 1990; Timberman 1991; Caoili 1993; Rocamora 1998; Teehankee
2001; Thompson 2010).

Other studies under the elite democracy genre specifically focused on the relationship
with elite rule, particularistic policies, and development. For instance, Paul Hutchcroft (1991)
contended that the powerful and conservative elites who enjoy autonomy from the state have
resisted change. Using the concept of a patrimonial state, where the political administration is
treated as a personal affair, he argued that the Philippine government is continually choked by
particularistic demands and actions coming from and on behalf of oligarchs and cronies.
Likewise, Olivia Caoili (1993, 2006a, 2006b), focusing on the Philippine Congress, pointed out
that having a legislature traditionally dominated by exclusivistic political elite has a profound
effect on substantive policy making, as lawmakers tend to be more preoccupied with local bills
or particularistic legislation. In a similar vein, Shiela Coronel et al. (2004; viii), in examining the
character of the contemporary Congress, admitted the existence of some changes in the elite-
dominated Congress (such as the entry of professionals, celebrities, media people, individuals

3
from the middle class, and incorporation of the party-list representatives), but, she stressed that
the legislature continues to be “an elite body that defends the interests of the wealthy and the
powerful while occasionally being open to demands from below.” These studies demonstrated
the adverse effect of the longevity of elite rule, as elite families tend to use political power to
benefit themselves and their supporters. In policy making, this practice translates to
particularistic policies that cater to private interests rather than collective good. As aptly
resonated by the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD): “the continued control of these families
over politics and wealth is one of the most formidable structural obstacles to democratization”
and development (Gutierrez 1994: 302).

The more recent alternative perspective— the contested democracy framework—

although it incorporates the actions of forces below (e.g., ordinary individuals, subordinate class,
marginalized communities), it still continues to acknowledge the ascendancy of the elites in
policy making (see Wurfel 1988; Kerkvliet 1995; Franco 2001; Quimpo 2005). “The oligarchs,
caciques, bosses, and trapos are still very dominant in Philippine politics, but their predatory rule
has been challenged and continues to be challenged by the poor and marginalized” (Quimpo
2005: 243). For example, Jose Magadia (2003), illustrating the unevenness and inconsistencies in
societal participation in policy making, surveyed three major social policies of the Aquino
administration—agrarian reform, labor relations reform, and urban reform policies. Although the
elitist Congress still determines national policies, he argued that the higher the level of political
catalysis (the process of accelerating state-society interaction where state and society actors send
a signal of willingness to engage each other), the greater the participation of societal
organizations in policy deliberations. More recently, Teresa Tadem (2009), discussing the
contemporary technocratic-elite control over decision-making on economic policy, noted the
continual challenge presented by civil society and social movement. As in the formulation of the
Philippine government position in the World Trade Organization (WTO)-Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA), she observed that the experience reflects the emergence of “reformist”
technocrats who are open to negotiating with civil society actors in formulating policies. These
studies suggest that, to some extent, the forces below are moderating the elite influence on
substantive policy making.

Despite the variations among the frameworks, overall, one common element shared by
them is— the centrality of the concept of the elite in Philippine policy making. Patron-client
involves a reciprocal relationship between elites (patrons) and dependent clients; dependency
comprises of the collaboration between the domestic elites and imperialist elites; contested
democracy includes the challenge posed by the poor and marginalized against an elite dominated
government; and elite democracy which fundamentally consists of the dominance, alliances, and
rivalry among the elites (see Table 1). This encompassing utilization of the concept of elites
parallels the inclination of scholars towards a weak conception of the state, as political dynamics
are generally explained in terms of the correlation between a powerful elite and a weak state. The
weak state-elitist explanation is anchored on a zero-sum relationship, where the rise of the
predatory elite results in the decline of government power, and thus, diminishing the capacity to
produce public regarding policies.

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 Table 1: The Centrality of the Concept of the Elite in Philippine Polity

Political Frameworks Depicting the “Elite”

Patron-client the reciprocal relationship between elites (patrons) and

dependent clients

Dependency the collaboration between the domestic elites and

imperialist elites

Elite democracy the dominance, alliances, and rivalry among the elites

Contested democracy the challenge posed by the poor and marginalized against
an elite dominated government

The Philippine Weak State: the Elite-Captured State and the Foreign-Dominated State

The Philippine history is characterized by powerful political oligarchies and a weak state
(McCoy 1993). The weak state-predatory elite explanation of society is encased in the broader
weak state-strong society framework and is grounded on two key variables: the centrality
powerful Filipino families (for pioneering studies, see Fox 1959; Grossholtz 1964; Simbulan
1965; Agpalo 1972; Green 1973) and a weak Philippine state. The weak state-strong society
framework was popularized by Joel Migdal (1988), as he argued that third world states weakness
can be traced to powerful social forces (commonly the dominance of elite clans) that continue to
compete with the government for authority. This makes the government ineffective in carrying
out development-oriented policies and programs. Following this logic, the Philippine weak state
is more often than not acted upon rather than being an independent actor that can initiate and
undertake reform; as important government actions, such as assignment of privileges, is largely
determined by the personal discretion of the oligarchs controlling or holding official positions
(Hutchcroft 1991; 1993; 1998).

The Philippine weak state conception has been extensively utilized by scholars. Temario
Rivera (1991) depicted the Philippine state as captured by competing societal interests which
enjoys little autonomy from dominant social classes and entrenched particularistic groups.
Francisco Magno (1992) showed the inability of the Philippine state to enforce its rules,
particularly on forest regulation policies. Patricio Abinales (1992) pointed out the role played by
distance (spatial and demographic factors) in tipping the balance for societal actors and
weakening the Philippine state. In another work, Abinales (1998: 158) opined that “the caciques
prospered well under the weak state structures.” Felipe Miranda (1992) argued that the
Philippine weak state is intertwined with a structurally strong and dominant Presidency. Jose
Almonte (1993) described a weak state as unable to intervene and democratize the economy,

5
particularly in wresting economic control from the Filipino oligarchs. Amado Doronila (1994)
argued that decentralizing the authority and resources of the central government in favor of the
local governments are creating mutually exclusive tensions that contribute significantly to the
weakening of the state. Joel Rocamora (1998: 4) characterized the weakness of the state as the
inability of the Philippine government “to formulate and implement a coherent economic
development strategy or to develop political institutions capable of providing a reliable
regulatory framework for the economy.” Hutchcroft (1998) portrayed the Philippine state as a
patrimonial oligarchic state, which is preyed upon by an economically autonomous oligarchy
that uses the government and its instrumentalities as the principal means to further accumulate
wealth and entrench their position. Herman Joseph Kraft (2003) equated the growth and
persistence of terrorism in the country as indicative of a weak Philippine state, as the government
is unable to mobilize the requisite economic and political resources needed to address the multi-
faceted challenges it currently is facing. Walden Bello et al. (2004: 4) argued that ”the American
pattern of a weak central authority coexisting with a powerful upper-class social organization
(“civil society” in today’s parlance) was reproduced in the Philippines, creating a weak state that
was constantly captured by upperclass interests and preventing the emergence of the activist
“developmental” state.” Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso (2005: 1) defined state weakness
as “the persistent inability of the state to provide basic services, guarantee peace and order, and
foster economic development” and “manifested in uncollected taxes and uncontrolled crime,
bloated bureaucracies and denuded forests, low teacher salaries, and high emigration rates.”
Abinales (2008), in his more recent work, observed that the resilience of Philippine Presidents
can be attributed to another dimension of a weak state. Although state weakness is primarily the
result of social forces expropriating state resources and programs to advance patrimonial
interests, this attitude for plunder enables the Presidents to secure support from social forces and
to "govern;" as Presidents craft mutually beneficial compromises with local political clans,
strongmen and women, warlords and bosses and make state largesse available in exchange for
fidelity to their authority. Ben Reid (2008) assessed that in a weak state dynamics where
clientelism and semiclientilism predominate, even civil society which is supposed to be a
conditioning force is ultimately absorbed by the clientelist relationships. And more recently, Alex
Magno (2009) defined weak state as transactional, as it responds to particularistic political
stimulus from specific constituencies, vulnerable to political accommodation, compromises the
integrity of policies to suit immediate contingencies, and act on constituencies that are insistently
noisy rather than ideas that are fundamentally sound. Overall, these discussions showed the
overwhelming tendency among scholars of using the weak state-elitist framework as the
preferred explanation for the “negativities” (e.g., economic debacle, bureaucratic weakness,
impotency in enforcement, inability to intervene, persistence of terrorism, and occurrence of
particularistic policies) in the Philippines (see Table 2).

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 Table 2: The Pervasiveness of the Weak State Thesis in Philippine Political Literature

Scholars Utilization of the Concept

Temario Rivera (1991)

Francisco Magno (1992) The weak state concept is generally
Patricio Abinales (1992, 1998, and 2008) used as the preferred explanation
for the many “negativities” in
Felipe Miranda (1992) Philippine polity, such as:
Jose Almonte (1993) economic debacle,
Amado Doronila (1994) bureaucratic weakness,
Joel Rocamora (1998) impotency in enforcement,
Hutchcroft (1998) inability to intervene,
persistence of terrorism,
Herman Joseph Kraft (2003) and occurrence of particularistic
Walden Bello et al. (2004) policies
Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso (2005)
Ben Reid (2008)
Alex Magno (2009)

Even in the few studies made in policy making, the trend continues to follow the weak
state-elitist framework. In general, the studies contend that the legislative process is controlled
and manipulated by coherent political elites, and as a consequence, policy outcomes reflect their
vested interest. For instance, Paul Hutchcroft (who is considered to have made the most
extensive studies under this genre), in examining the politics of preferential credit policy and
banking policy respectively, maintained a state dominated by socioeconomic elites. Hutchcroft
(1993) attributed the incoherence of the credit policy to the weak and patrimonial nature of the
Philippine state, where policy is captured by special interests resulting to the abuse of public
finances and the private banking sector. In his other work, Hutchcroft (1998) analyzing the effect
of the relationship between the state and elite families in the banking sector concluded that
because of rampant favoritism and weak state regulations, the oligarchs were able to plunder the
banking sector by abusing their loan portfolios and engaging in cartel practices. This practice, he
further asserted persists despite regime change. Moreover, Hutchcroft, applying the concept of
booty capitalism, equated the domination of oligarchic clans to the unpredictability and
inconsistency in banking policies and the dismal state of the Philippine economy. The archetypal
example here is the well documented “abuse” of the Philippine National Bank by the oligarchic
sugar bloc (Quirino 1974; McCoy 1988; Rivera 1994). In another study, Emmanuel De Dios
(1990), analyzing the Philippine political economy, noted the conspicuous continuity in
economic policy in the country despite the post-EDSA transition to democratic processes and
institutions. The continuance of policy from preMartial Law to post-1986, he explained, was due
to the persistence of the “old” political economy, where the economic and political elites
dominated the state’s policy making. Rivera (1994: 20), examining the process of
industrialization in the Philippines based on the development of the domestic sector from 1950 to
1986, observed that the persistence of protectionist policies is traceable to “the internal

7
structuring and class formation of the ISI (import-substitution industrialization) bourgeoisie— its
linkages with the export-landlord class, with foreign capital, and with the state apparatus.” He
concluded that the failure of Philippine industrialization was caused by three interlinked factors:
first, the control of the landed families over the manufacturing sector; second, the alliance
between the landed families and foreign investors; and lastly, a weak state lacking autonomy.
While Caoili (1993 and 2006b), examining the post1987 Philippine legislature, observed that the
homogeneity of the political elites resulted in the persistent conservatism of Congress and the
neglect of basic issues affecting national development.

In addressing the weak state problem in policy making, scholars usually offer a standard
prescription— the insulation of the government from the subversion of vested interests. For
example, Manuel Montes (1992) concluded that strengthening the state means building its
capacity to make economic intervention independent of particularistic interest, where the
government is capable of formulating and implementing economic policy with sufficient
autonomy from these interests. Rivera (1994) argued that only through a strong, autonomously
embedded state can the government break the continuing power of the elites, lead a social
coalition for industrial growth, and produce economic policies that could creatively respond to
opportunities in the world market. Doronila (1994) maintained that despite the tensions caused
by devolution and localism, there is a need to build a strong Philippine state to facilitate and
promote reform. Similarly, Almonte (2007: 119) stressed that “our most urgent need is to raise
the political capacity of the Philippine State— to set it free from the dominance of vested interest
groups and enable it to act— unequivocably— on behalf of the common good and the national
interest.” Here, political capacity refers to the legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions,
and insuring the autonomy of these administrative elite, that is insulating it from the importuning
of particularistic groups.

Furthermore, other scholars such as Constantino (1970), Lichauco (1973), and Bello and
Rivera (1977), early on, focused on another dimension of the weak state conception vis-à-vis
policy making. 6 These scholars associated state weakness to the susceptibility of government to
interference from external actors, such as foreign governments, international organizations or
transnational businesses, in making substantive policy decisions. This is similar to the
dependency framework’s thesis, their conception associates external influence in bringing about
particularistic policies, as foreign interests are considered taking precedence in policy outcomes.
Thus, under this circumstance, the government’s capacity to legislate public-regarding policies is
significantly impaired.

6 See discussion on the dependency framework.

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 Table 3: The Weak State-Elitist Tradition and Policy Making in the Philippines

Scholars Rationalization for Incapacity in

Legislating Public-Regarding Policy

Hutchcroft (1993)
Hutchcroft (1998)
Quirino (1974)
McCoy (1988)
Rivera (1994)
Gutierrez (1994) elite-captured state
De Dios (1990)
Montes (1992)
Doronila (1994)
Almonte (2007)
Caoili (1993 and 2006b)
Constantino (1970)
Lichauco (1973) foreign-dominated state
Bello and Rivera (1977)

In general, the weak state-elitist literature suggests that the Philippine polity’s persistent
incapacity in legislating public-regarding policy is associated with two conditions of the state:
first, an elite-captured state where coherent political elites continuously control policy making;
and second, a foreign-dominated state where the enduring external influence shapes policy
formulation and decision (see Table 3).

The Pluralist Perspective and Philippine Policy Making

In contemporary political thought, there are two dominant perspectives in interpreting

politics (i.e. the process in making political decisions)— the “pluralists” and the “elitists”
perspectives. The pluralist perspective views the government as an arena among competing
interests in society and that policies are political decisions that reflect the acceptable equilibrium
among contending groups (see Truman 1951; Bentley 1967; Dahl 1961, 1967 and 1971;
Lindblom 1977). This perspective put emphasis on diversity and competition among political
actors, as they utilize power and resources (e.g., money, supporters, expertise, information, or
connections) to influence government’s policy decisions. On the other hand, the elitist
perspective views the government as the key entity used by the dominant group in a stratified
society (i.e. the haves and the have-nots) to advance their interests; hence, policies are deemed as
political decisions intended to serve their vested interest (see Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939; Mills
1956; Michels 1962). This perspective accentuates the collaboration among the elites in
controlling the government and its policy decisions.

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 With the ascendancy of the weak state-elitist framework, scholars have shown preference
for the elitist perspective in interpreting Philippine politics. Political power in society is
presumed to be skewed and concentrated in a privileged group rather than spread across groups,
and that this coherent political elite controls policy making most of the time. This conventional
conception, however, needs validation. Particularly, in light of the few empirical studies in
Philippine policy making showing, that instead of a tight-knit political elites conspiring, there is
increasing diversity and competition among political elites. For instance, Rigoberto Tiglao
(1992), in explaining the politics of policy making during the Aquino administration, contended
that the elite fragmentation after the democratic restoration has led to intense competition for
political control. As a consequence, this propelled the government towards policies that satisfy
short-term populist demands rather than long-term development-oriented policies. Antonio Pedro
(2002), studying the legislation for the liberalization of foreign banking, focused on the existing
nature of state-society and business-government relationships. He asserted that Huchcroft’s
booty capitalism framework is incomplete, since it failed to note the changing dynamics in
policy making. He concluded that the various actors in government, business, and civil society
have acted autonomously in the legislation of the law. In a similar vein, Eric Batalla (2002),
analyzing the politics financial liberalization in the Philippines, offered insights on the nature of
state, business-government relations, and policy making. He agreed with Pedro’s findings that
the characteristics of policy making as well as the government-business relations in the
Philippines is changing. He further contended that the fragmentation among the political and
business elites has made it possible for the government to act autonomously and succeed in
making policy change or reform.

More recently, Brillo (2010), analyzing the legislation and re-legislation of the anti-
dumping law, touched on the interagency competition among the governmental actors. He
observed that executive agencies saw the repeal process as an opportunity to expand their
domain and scope of authority. The issue of jurisdiction in R.A. 7843 led to a bureaucratic battle
between government agencies (i.e. Department of Finance [DOF] vs. Department of Trade and
Industry [DTI]) which spilled over to Congress, with the House of Representatives backing DOF
and the Senate supporting DTI. In another study, Brillo (2012a), examining the legislation of the
foreign investment law, analyzed the bureaucrat-politician’s dynamics in its policy making. He
argued that contrary to the weak state thesis a different set of dynamics exist between the
bureaucrats and politicians. He noted that the bureaucrats were active, autonomous, and
dominant in policy making, as they basically determined the inputs of the discussions, the critical
content of the proposal, and most importantly, the policy outcome. On the other hand, the
politicians were passive and reactive in the lawmaking process, as they deferred to the wisdom of
bureaucrats and their participation was largely confined to fine tuning— adjustments or
refinements in the form of stipulations or exceptions to suit and placate supporters, constituents,
allies or favored interests. In the same light, Brillo (2012b), re-examining the politics of the
policy making of the foreign bank liberalization law in the Philippines, made a fine-grained
assessment of the quality of pluralism that existed among actors in the legislation of the banking
policy. He contended that the law took a conservative form since the Senate has a formidable
alliance with the bureaucracy and interest groups (i.e. The Senate-Bangko Sentral ng

10
Pilipinas[BSP],Bankers Association of the Philippines[BAP], resident foreign banks bloc), as
compared to the House of Representatives, and that the internal dynamics between the Senate
and the House of Representatives made it difficult for the former to make concession while
easier for the latter to make compromises. Summing up, these studies suggest that contemporary
policy making is better viewed from the standpoint of pluralism— a political process where a
range of autonomous actors competes in influencing and defining the policy outcome (Self 1985;
Smith 1990; Howlett and Ramesh 1995).

Concluding Remarks

In Philippine literature, the dynamics in Philippine polity, specifically, the government’s

capacity in legislating policies has been, time and again, interpreted by scholars using the
dominant weak state-elitist framework. In general, the weak state-elitist framework presupposes
that the Philippine polity’s chronic incapacity of producing public-regarding policies is deemed
the consequence of two conditions of the state. First, the elite-captured state which refers to the
enduring control of powerful, homogenous political elites over the government’s policy making
mechanism. And second, the foreign-dominated state which refers to the vulnerability of the
government’s policy decisions to external influences or interferences. In both cases— whether by
virtue of the elite-captured state or the foreign-dominated state— there is an adverse effect since
the governmental capacity in legislating public-regarding policies is considerably compromised.

A small voice among scholars has questioned the soundness and adequacy of the weak
state-elitist framework. They have pointed out that its clichéd explanation is out of sync with the
contemporary policy making experiences. By implication, the weak state-elitist view is deemed
overuse and, by taking a broad perspective, is too general to be of much analytical use in policy
making analysis (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Mikamo 1997).
These scholars suggested that pluralism better characterizes present-day Philippine policy
making since there is increasing fragmentation among political actors in legislating policies.
Here, the actors are seen as autonomous with distinct interests, resources, and power which give
rise to divergent positions across policy issues over time. Thus, in the light of the changing
nature of policy making in the Philippines, these studies imply the need to reassess the dominant
weak state-elitist framework.

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