Cayetano V.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

Facts:
- Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec.
- The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Renato
Cayetano’s objection, based on Monsod’s alleged lack of the required qualification of 10
year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed gave abuse of discretion
in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
RULING 1: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court.
It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Angrava)

- The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the
term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of
Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or
talent in their respective work.

- The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that
lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors,
etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other
works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers
are involved in management policy formulation.

- Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group
from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the
CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can
be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist,
lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

RULING 2: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec
Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution.
- The power of the appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom is vested by
law. From evidence, there is no occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective
power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. Adapted
Case Digest: Ulep vs Legal Clinic, Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993), Bar Matter No. 553

FACTS:

- Mauricio C. Ulep, a lawyer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
against The Legal Clinic, Inc., a non-lawyer entity that was advertising legal services.
- Ulep alleged that the Legal Clinic's advertisements were champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar.
- Atty. Ulep, alleged that, the Legal Clinic's advertisements were champertous because
they solicited clients by promising to obtain favorable results in their cases. The Legal
Clinic's advertisements were unethical because they implied that the Legal Clinic was
staffed by lawyers, when in fact it was not.
- The Legal Clinic's advertisements were demeaning of the law profession because they
made it appear that anyone could practice law, regardless of their training or
qualifications.
- The Legal Clinic's advertisements were destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar because they created the impression that
lawyers were no longer necessary to obtain legal representation.
- The respondents admits the fact of the publication of said advertisements at its
instance.
- But claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of “legal
support services” through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic are in violation of the
Code of Professional responsibility.

RULING: - YES. Under Rule 2.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A
lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business”

- The Code of Professional responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information or
statement of facts. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skills.
- Law is a profession and not a trade. The Supreme Court noted which forms of
advertisement are allowed. The canon of the profession tells us that the best
advertisement possible for a lawyer is a well merited reputation for a professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. In this case, the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of the profession, thus, respondent Legal Clinic, Inc. is
restrained and enjoined from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition.
 - [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972, June 21, 1953 ]

- AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.

- Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

- Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule Numbered One hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations ; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number. 1a⍵⍴h!1

- Section 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

- Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

- Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534 Angeles David- author of the RA. 972

FACTS:

- Under the Rules of Court, a bar candidate is deemed to have passed if they obtain a general
average of 75% in all subjects without falling below 50% in any subject.

- The Supreme Court changed the passing average since 1946 in consideration of the varying
difficulties and the varying degree of strictness with which the papers were graded: 72% in
1946, 69% in 1947, 70% in 1948, 74% in 1949, and 75% in 1950 to 1953.

- On June 21, 1953,Republic Act. No. 972 (Bank Flunkers Act of 1953) was enacted without
Executive approval.
- Many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking
the new law’s provisions, while others who had pending motions for revision of their
examination papers also invoked the law as grounds for admission. There are also others
who simply sought reconsideration of their grades without invoking the new law.

- Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was evidenced by their failure in the exams

Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 972 or Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953 is constitutional?

RULINGS: No. The Court found Republic Act No. 972 unconstitutional. The law is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court to render
the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules. It is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the
Supreme Court on the petitions which only the Court may revise or alter, directly
violating the Constitution.

Conclusion:

Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar by the disputed law. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced
in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from
the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
 Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959
Practice of Law

FACTS:

- The petition was filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

- On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled
an examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office.

- According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination.

- The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s
holding an examination for the purpose is more than his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law.

- The respondent maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge
and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases
may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent
Office…”. Furthermore, the respondent would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations and this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents has been
questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.

ISSUE: Whether the members of the Philippine Bar can practice in the Patent office without
taking the examination by the Director of the patent.

RULING:

-YES. The court held that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office.
 - Much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application for the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of the evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to
submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office.

CANON 1 Bongalonta, petitioner vs. Castillo, respondent 240 SCRA 310 MEJO, J:

FACTS:

- In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members
of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.

-The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Criminal Case No. 7653-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also
filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal
and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty.
Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

- During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case No. 58650 for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty.
Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file
the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them
followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution
was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon.
 ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of committing falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING:

- YES. The respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in

violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

- The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again
that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court.

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

FACTS:

- On 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez sworn a
complaint against the respondent Atty. Reynario I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar,
with malpractice and breach trust.

- The complainants spouses alleged, among others, that responded had, by means of fraud
and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation.

- His knowledge of the law of their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only
residential lot of Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case
against one Reynaldo Pineda, has compromised that case without their authority.

- In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him
and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

- There are two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First is about the 4k loan obtained by the
spouses secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real a 4K. He said
that the signing of the documents was just for formality. So, they did it.

- The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3 months because of financial
reverses.
 - Consequently, Atty, Decena made a second real estate mortgage document and the loan
extended to complainants had escalated to 10,000. Again, on the assurance that it was for
formality, the spouses signed the new REM document.

- After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise
the 10k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and
instead gave them a sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to
20,400.

- The second charged against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity,
that is, done at the time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for
estafa against accused. It was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused without the consent and approval of the complainants
and that he received the amount of 500.00 as an advance payment and he did not inform the
spouses about this. And even after he confronted, he still did not turn over the money.

- The respondent denies all the allegations of complainants.

- ISSUE: Whether Decena violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Rulings:

The SC held that Atty. Decena was disbarred. Indeed deceived the spouses. He violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility under rule 1.01 that A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, Vs. VICENTE D. CHING,
applicant.

FACTS:

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Ching was born in 1964. Apparently, Ching’s father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution,
which was in effect when Ching was born, was treated as follows:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality
in La Union.

The Solicitor-General averred that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should
have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the
age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution
was in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or
14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that
the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

RULING:

No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court explained that the
original interpretation of electing Philippine citizenship “upon reaching the age of majority” was that
the person concerned must make the election within a reasonable time upon reaching the age of
majority. In one case, “reasonable time” was construed to be three years but may be extended
depending on the circumstances such as if one had always considered himself or herself a Filipino
all his/her life. Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered however. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving
this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he
belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship. He only elected Philippine citizenship in 1999 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship
is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.

SIDE ISSUE: But the 1935 Constitution was superseded by the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions
which expressly provided that Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
are also citizens of the Philippines. Did not that make Ching a Filipino citizen because his mother
was a Filipino?
HELD: No. Firstly, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition
of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new
charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

179 SCRA 680 – Legal Ethics – Moral Delinquency

FACTS:

In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two children, left
his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and Cordova had
are conciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently, Cordova still
continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman and worse,
he took one of his children with him and hid the child away from Salvacion.

In January 30, 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually,
multiple hearing ates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989,
Salvacion sent atelegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she and
her husband hasreconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her
evidence ex parte, merelyrecommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.

RULING:

NO. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been morally
reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a person can
beadmitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral character. That requirement
is notexhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirementpersists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral
delinquencythat affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages thegenerally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes “a mockery ofthe inviolable social institution or marriage” such was the case in the case at
bar.

CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA, A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004

FACTS:

The case at bar stemmed from the complaint of Salvacion Delizo-Cordova against
respondent husband for immoral conduct. In the Resolution of November 29, 1989, the
Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova from the practice of law after
finding him guilty of immorality. The Court likewise resolved to consider lifting the suspension
upon submission by respondent of proof satisfactory to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), that he has and continues to provide for the
support of his legitimate family and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.
On January 15, 1992 and February 12, 1992, respondent and complainant, respectively,
filed separate petitions with this Court praying that the suspension of respondent be lifted.
In his petition, respondent explained that the allegations of maltreatment and failure to
provide support were products of complainant's imagination and were unsubstantiated.
He alleged that his eldest daughter, Lorraine Salve, who was living with him after
complainant left their home in 1989, was enrolled in school and was provided with
material and emotional support. Respondent also submitted the affidavit of desistance
executed by complainant on December 27, 1991, attesting that he has reformed, living in
the conjugal home and provides love and paternal affection to his family. On the other hand,
complainant contended in her petition that she and respondent have reconciled, and that
respondent has given up his immoral conduct and is supporting his legitimate family.
Appended to her petition is the affidavit of respondent which was also executed on
December 27, 1991. In the Resolutions of February 13, 1992 and March 5, 1992, these
petitions were referred to the IBP for appropriate action and recommendation.

However, on March 17, 1992, complainant wrote separate letters to Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa and the IBP negating her earlier petition to lift respondent's suspension.
Complainant claimed that respondent still goes home to his live-in partner, Cita
Magallanes; does not support his family, and made it appear that he had changed his
ways so she would sign an affidavit of desistance.aw In the months following,
complainant sent two other letters of a similar tenor.aw At about the same time, Lorraine
Salve Cordova wrote the Court in support of her father's petition.

On January 30, 1998, the CBD received a Manifestation/Motion from respondent reiterating
his plea that his suspension be lifted. The court On May 29, 2000, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XIV-000-318, adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo, lifting the suspension of respondent, copy of
which was furnished this Court.

In view thereof, the Court directed complainant to comment thereon. In a letter dated
January 18, 2002, complainant expressed disappointment over the move of the Surigao
del Sur Chapter in extending assistance to respondent. She contended that the
Surigao del Sur Chapter is not in a position to know that respondent has already
reformed, and claimed that respondent is cohabiting with his mistress, Isabelita Cinciro,
with whom he has a seven-year old son. She also opined that all the allegations in
respondent's motion for early resolution were lies, and that in 1992, respondent tried to
reconcile with her so that his suspension would be lifted. Complainant thought that
respondent had turned in a new leaf but later discovered that this was not so. She also
recounted the hardships that she endured with respondent.

The Court referred this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation. In its Report dated January 13, 2003, the OBC submitted that the
Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor obliged to accept the same as a
matter of course. It also considered the protestation of respondent that the length of
his suspension is more than sufficient punishment and his insistence that he has fully
reformed are not fully meritorious since respondent has not submitted proof satisfactory to
the Court that he has met the standards imposed in the Resolution of November 29, 1989.

On January 27, 2003, upon the recommendation of the OBC, the Court required
respondent to comment on the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant and to
submit satisfactory proof that he has continuously provided for the support of his family and
that he has given up his immoral conduct. Respondent received a copy of said resolution on
March 21, 2003 but failed to comply therewith. In the Resolution of October 8, 2003,
respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
for his non-compliance, a copy of which was received by respondent on November 12, 2003.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova’s suspension be lifted on the basis that he has
morally reformed.

RULING:

NO. Considering that up to this late date, respondent has neither commented on the letter
dated January 18, 2002 of complainant by way of opposition to his motion to lift suspension
nor submitted satisfactory proof that he has continuously provided for the support of his
legitimate family and given up his immoral conduct, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion
of respondent that his indefinite suspension from the practice of law be lifted