Review

Reviewed Work(s): Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis by Kamal Matinuddin

Review by: Ghulam Sarwar
Source: Pakistan Horizon , October 1994, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 111-115
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393506

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Pakistan Horizon

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 BOOK REVIEWS 111

Dr Dani's book is a valuable addition to the studies on Central

Asia because he has focused on many cultural, historical, and socio-
political dimensions of Central Asia in retrospect. He has made a five
analysis of its political scene, concluding that future political changes
in the region are not yet certain and will be decided in coming
decades. They will have important repercussions on Central Asia's
relationship with outside world. The last two chapters; "Pilgrimage
to Bokhara" and "Bazm-i-Dushanbe" present a tourists guide to these
important cradles of Muslim civilization showing how many changes
have come during the last seventy years so much so that people have
forgotten their culture and traditional heritage.
Mansoor Akbar Kundi

Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, by Lt. General Kamal Matinuddin,

Lahore: Majid Alis (Pvt) Ltd, 1994, pages 530, Rs. 395.00.

Prior to the breakup of Pakistan, the Bangalis had generally begun

to feel that East Pakistan had been deliberately neglected by the West
Pakistan ruling junta and they had been denied their legitimate
rights in the socio-political life of the country. They were convinced
that no sincere efforts were made by the West Pakistan rulers to
bridge the economic gap that had existing between the two wings.
This feeling of estrangement, coupled with the enemy's cunning con-
trivances, eventually led to the disintegration of Pakistan. This is the
commonly held view.

General Kamal Matinuddin, however, holds that these allegations

were not wholly true. To him, there was no deliberate move to deprive
East Pakistan of its due share. On the contrary, earnest efforts had
always been made to correct the imbalances that had existed between
the two regions. Towards that end, a well-planned policy of economic
development for the eastern wing had been evolved. To support his
contention, the author states that a number of administrative steps
had been taken both during the Ayub era and the short-lived Yahya
regime to redress the grievances of the East Pakistanis, and recounts
those measures.

The author regrets that democracy and democratic traditions had

failed to take root in Pakistan even decades elfter its independence.
Therefore, the army, having dabbled in politics in 1958, had found it
easier to conveniently step into "save" the country irom chaos and
anarchy. Some disgruntled civilians, too, had started looking up to

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 112 PAKISTAN HORIZON

the armed forces to "pu

further encouragement

General Matin then t

Marshal Ayub Khan ha
state. To aggravate ma
started indulging in co
norms. Having experie
democracy, people had
who had robbed them o
circumstances, it weis
have handed over power to the Commander-i -Chief, butito a
caretaker administrator with the mandate of holding general elections
tinder the 1956 Constitution. The army's take over was therefore,
both uncalled for, as well as unconstitutional.

Having assumed power, General Yahya, initially appeared quite

sincere in handing over power to the elected representatives.
Presumably, his assessment of the political situation was that in all
likelihood, no single political party would gain enough strength to
form the government, and as a result his position as president would
remain secure. But, subsequent events belied all such hopes.

General Matin holds that elections on the basis of one-man-one-

vote were essential to give the people a sense of participation. How-
ever, it would have been more appropriate if the 1956 Constitution
had first been restored and then elections were held under its
provisions. In that case it would have been incumbent upon Mujib-
ur-Rehman to get it passed in the National Assembly, where it would
not have been easy for him to obtain a two-third majority. Nor would,
Mr Z.A. Bhutto have been able to play the destructive role that he
did.

Next, the author observes that the mistake that had made the
transfer of power almost impossible was the indefinite postponement
of the national assembly session. This short-sighted act thwarted the
entire democratic process. To exacerlate the situation "Mr Bhutto had
driven the first nail in the coffin by refusing to attend the assembly
session in Dhaka". Yahya, too, made matter worse by going back on
his word. His hardliners in uniform were not prepared to allow him
to hand over power to the Awami League. All these developments
were suicided for the country. General Tikka's senseless and brutal
crackdown accentuated East Pakistans' hatred against the army. Mr

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 BOOK REVIEWS 113

Bhutto's spontane
had failed to for
was in the offing
gement between
loyal to Pakistan,

The author mai

Khan would have
federation as pr
case, even if the
the Centre woul
forces from the
military interven
aster.

General Matin holds that on the political plane, banning of the

Awami League and trial of Sheikh Mvyib-ur-Rehman on charges of
sedition had brought matters to a point of no return. The doors for
negotiations should not have been totally closed so that after a limited
military action, talks could have been resumed.

It is a widely acknowledged fact that India was mainly in-

strumental in the break up of Pakistan. Towards that end Mrs Indira
Gandhi had handled the East Pakistan crisis with extreme finesse.
Her principal objective was to cut off East Pakistan from its home
base, this she achieved by concocting the Ganga incident and the
subsequent banning of overflights in February 1971.

Indira's second objective was to isolate Pakistan from its Western

allies. Therefore, when Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly
session, she dexterously used her diplomatic skill to win over the
international community. She harped on the theme that democracy
had been throttled in Pakistan where the ruling military junta was
not prepared to hand over power to the elected representatives. This
theme worked well with the Western democracies.

In the Muslim countries, Mrs Indira Gandhi used the "genocide"

card, skilfully used her electronic and print media to project
"gruesome" atrocities of Pakistan army. Thus, she was able to con-
vince these rulers that the people of East Pakistan were no longer
interested in remaining within a united Pakistan, but wanted their
separate homeland i.e., Bangladesh.

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 114 PAKISTAN HORIZON

To find an excuse fo
card and trumpeted it
ment" in which Indi
a diplomatic assault,
Mukti Bahini.

Notwithstanding her successes on almost all fronts, Indira was

concerned about China, therefore, to neutralize this threat she signed
the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, which sealed her frontiers
with China. Soon after this, Indira Gandhi gave the "go ahead" signal
to General Manekshaw to finalize the plans for military action against
East Pakistan. Mrs Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States and
tweleve other Western countries in October and November 1971, was
also primarily aimed at portraying the Government of Pakistan as a
colonial power, thus isolating it from its erstwhile supporters. In this
way, she was preparing the ground to justify India's invasion on East
Pakistan.

In the chapter on Indo-Pakistan War - 1971, General Matin car-

ries out an in-depth analysis of the concepts of strategic orientation,
defence planning, operation plans of 14 Division and the deployment
of troops, with the help of maps showing the deployment of forces on
various fronts. After an exhaustive appreciation of battles fought on
these fronts, he concludes that as a result of his misconceived policies,
General Yahya had accepted the defeat of army in East Pakistan.
General Matin regrets that to place a proud army in such an adverse
situation was a criminal injustice. Those at the helm and responsible
for the higher direction of war, had miserably failed in the discharge
of their duty.

Facts, as they are, go to provide that the most significant factor

for the break up of Pakistan was the postponement of the National
Assembly session without giving a fresh date. Sheikh Mujib's uncom-
promising behaviour was another major stumbling block. Likewise,
the refusal of Chairman of People's Party to join the National As-
sembly session on 3 March had further aggravated the situation.

Analyzing the situation objectively, it was unwise on the part of

Pakistan to have relied much on the assistance of the United States
and China in the event of an all-out war with India. Having initiated
a civil war in East Pakistan, it was naive on the part of General
Yahya and his advisers to expect others to come to their rescue in
the hour of their tribulation.

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 BOOK REVIEWS 115

To conclude: In th
has examined cau
reasons for the m
on the geo-strat
thousand-mile of
progressive alien
tion, the author
Pakistan in 1971
sordid drama. Fin
berment of Paki
done well by way
dismemberment of Pakistan.
Ghulam Sarwar

This content downloaded from

111.68.99.100 on Thu, 22 Feb 2024 09:48:04 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms