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Logic and The Basis of Ethics PDF
Logic and The Basis of Ethics PDF
4
Oxford tlnioersity Press.,
GLASOOW NEW YONR TORONTO MELBOURNE 1ilELLINGTON
LO G I C AND TH E
BOMBAY CALCUMA MADRAS KMCHI CAPE TOWN IBADAX
BY
ARTHUR N. PR IOR
Lecturer in
Philosophy
Canterbury University
College, New Zealrnd
O X F O RD
A T T HE CL A RE ND O N P R
E S S
For which of you, intending to build
CONTENTS
e loz,oer,itteth not d.ownfirst, and
INTRODUCTION
counteth.the cost, whether he have
I, THE NATURALISTIC
FALLACY: THE LOGIC OF
suficimt to finish it? . ITS REFUTATION
I
account of the
2 T HE NA T U R A L IST IC F ' AL L A C Y
THE LOGIC OF ITS REFUTATION 3
fails to realize is that 'good' and some other adjective may li,
lrc thinks, to show that goodnessis not only simple,i.e.
denote or be applicable to the same things, and yet not con-
Itrlrrprrblcof analysisinto simpler parts, but unique. For
note the same quality, i.e. describe the things in the same
rvcn if we take a simplequality, such as pleasantness, we
way. The difference between identity of denotation and
lurr ;rlwaysseethat it is significant,and not a meretruism, to
identity of connotation may be brought out, as Professor
rrsrrl that what possesses this quality is good. (Despitehis
Moore shows, by the following simple consideration: If the
rh.linition of 'definition', as analysis,he slips readily into
word 'good' and, say, the word 'pleasant' apply to the same
urrlling'Goodmeanspleasant'a'definition' too.)
things, but do not attribute the same quality to them, then
'l'lris latter contentionof ProfessorMoore's is exceedingly
to say that what is pleasant is good, or that what is good is
rlillicrrltto statewith any precision. It plainly doesnot apply
pleasant,is to make a significant statement, however obvious to
llrc quality of goodnessitself-it r'sa truism to assertthat
its truth may appear to many people. But if the word 'good'
rvlnt is good is good. Nor does it apply to the quality of
and the word 'pleasant' not merely have the same application
goorlncssitself when it is merely given anothername,such
but the same connotation or 'meaning'-if, that is to say, the
run'vulue'(which is often usedassynonymouswith'goodness'
quality of pleasantness is identical with the quality of good- lry
l'rofessorMoore, as well as by many other writers). Yet
ness-then to say that what is good is pleasant, or that what
rl'rvcrnerelysaythat goodnessis not identicalwith any other
is pleasant is good, is to utter an empty tautology, or, as Mill
r;urrlity,this is itself a truism-it merelytellsus that goodness
would call it,I a 'merely verbal' proposition; for both state- in
not identical with any quality, simple or complex, with
ments are on this supposition merely ways of saying that
rvhichit is not identical. It is a little ominousthat Professor
what is pleasant is pleasant.
Moore quotes on his title-page the sentencefrom Bishop
From this considerationProfessor Moore attempts to show
lhrtler,'Everythingis what it is, and not anotherthing'. For
that the term 'good' is incapable of definition. By 'definition'
wlrowould denythis ? Eventhe man who identifiesgoodness
he means the exhibition of a quality referred to by some term
rvith pleasantness, i.e. who regards'good' as a meresynonym
as a combination of simpler qualities. And he argues that if
ol''pleasant',would not deny that it is in this sense'unique'.
we take any such combination of relatively simple qualities lior
pleasantness also'is what it is, and not anotherthing';
(such as the combination 'being what we desire to desire'),
rrrrrlto saythat goodnessis pleasantness is not, on sucha view,
the statement that what possessesthis combination of quali- to
deny that it is what it is, or to affirm that it is another
ties is good (e.g. the statement that what we desire to desire
thing-it is merelyto denythat pleasantness is 'anotherthing'.
is good) will always be found on careful inspection to be
l)rofessorMoore'srealaim, of course,is to showthat good-
a significant statement and not a mere truism (like 'What we
rrt'ssis not identicalwith any'natural' quality. This is why
desire to desire, we desire to desire'). But this is not all that Irt:
gzlls the kind of identificationwhich he is opposingthe
he claims to be able to show by this method. We may use
'rraturalistic'fallacy. But what doeshe mean by a 'natural'
that,
It is sometimespointei out bv naturalists
n;ry,pleasureand nothing but pleaJureis good, zs for
that there is
him
never more than one ethical staiement n
nrcrc truism; and that if Ethics be the attempt to deter_
which i. ,.rrd.rJ
rrrirrcwhat is in fact good, then the statementihat
trivial by a naturalistic definition of ,good;.
what is
If, for
plt'rrsant is goodis not,.strictlyspeaking,an ethicalstatement,
we use,'good'as-synonymouswith ,ionducive "_;;;;,
t, bi"lod;;i
lrrrt only a way of indicatingjust whai study is to go
survival',then, while it is a truism to say
,r.rd",
that what is condu?-iJ
tlrc nameof 'Ethics'-the stu-dyof what is attuallyileasant,
to biologicalsurvivalis ,good'in this .."r.,
i, i.rr",
ru'ithoutany pretenceof-mainiaining that pl"or,_,r"
to say that pleasureis, since it is not
ho. urry
a truism to "1r"ir*
so-yt-iat
'goorlness'beyond its pleasantness.He might
pleasureis conduciveto survival. We
add at th;
shallfi.d .h";;;;;
rirrrrrc time that he is not only not going to discussgoodness
t-r
ll:-r" a point at which this considera,i*'i, important; but lrl
ir 'non-natural'quality, but that in hi, b"li"f thlre
if ProfessorMoore's argument is regarded
is no
as a criticism of
urrt'hquality,and that this is worth shoutingfrom
the attempt to deducesignificant
the house_
fro_ a"nniiior,r,
tol)s,asit liberatesus from a transcendentaLotionwhich
this answerto it is irrelirant, ,i""""d;;;,n" .iurement which the
has
definition makestrivial is alwayspr";;;';i.
lrlunted ustoo long. (He might saythat this is what
one which it is
he really
put forward to 'prove', in a sensein
nrcansby the assertionthat ,Nothing is good but pleasurj
which it is not trivial but
Ire means, not that what is pliasan-t ulorr" porr.rr.,
significant. A man h:, defined t;;l;", ,conducive
biologicalsurvival',-lrgwith the expressprrrpo.. of establishing
ro sorn-
e other quality called ,goodrr.rr',brrt that there are
no
it as an ethical principle pri*ury'i"ip*,*..
rluitlities beyond'natural'ones suchaspleasantness
that only
to which
what conducesto surviial is .of tlrc
word 'goodness'could be applied.) Indeed,h. i,
good,*iif greatlycheered
b;;;;
by the considerationthat it ; ,rniy';iri;;rincipte
""i'fr" t o
saysomethingof this sort if he is to justify his appropriation
which the .1'the
word 'good'for the purposeto which he
definitionrendersinsignrhcant.
i"t. i,. A;J
Confrontedwith professorMoore's srrcha
man, it seemsto mef should be prepared
argument,an incon_
to state
sistentethicalnaturalisthastwo course, lris
position in an alternativeway, ,ru*ely, as
," him. He may
a denial that
clear himself of inconsistency,on the one "f.E, -ny-"n*ji"r_
tlrerers such.astudy as Ethics-he shouli'be prepared,
fr""J,
for
I Formal
tllc.s_ak:of clarity, and to further the mental iiberation,
Logic, pp. rr9_2o.
in
into the
IO T HE NA T U R A L IST IC F A L L AC Y THE
LOGIC OF ITS REFUTATION II
sources of pleasure, not Ethics, but some such name as llct there is
not. When it is said that being good means
'Fledonics'; or if he defines goodness as 'conduciveness to
promotingsurvival,rveare dissatisfied;we feel that it is still
survival', to call his substitute for Ethics'Biological Strategy'. significantto
say that promoting survival is good; and the
But how-as Mr. E. F. Carritt pertinently asksr-can we nurnething
happens with every identification that is sug-
be 'liberated' from a notion which we cannot ever have had ? gcsted;but
this is just because, in eachcase,the other mean-
For how can we have had a 'transcendental' notion of good- irrgsare
still hoveringin our minds-to say that promoting
ness if the word which is alleged to have called it up ii also srrrvivalis
good is significantbecauseit meansthat to pro-
alleged to have no meaning, or none beyond ones which are ruotesurvival
is what we desire;to say that what rve desire
not 'transcendental' at all? Even this question it is not is good is
significantbecauseit meansthat what we desire
beyond the power of a consistent naturalist to answer.
thereforereplacephilosophical.inquiry,as'therapeuticposi-
pleasant, or that it is commanded by someone,or that it is
tivists'
seemat times to think they can, trut both aid it and
customary, or that it promotes survival, or any one of a
rlcpendupon
it. If we haveother reasonsfor regardingthe
number of things; and because we use the same term to
tlistinction
betweenthe 'natural' and the 'moral' realmsas
connote all these characteristics, we think there must be
an illusory
one, then tricks of languagemay explainhow the
some other single characteristic which they all entail; but in
t For an
answer to Professor Moore along these general lines see a
I Ethieal and Folitical Thinhing, pp.
33-4. tliirlogue by
E. and M. Clark entitled 'What is Goodness ?' in the Austla-
' Systern oJ Logic, r. viii. 7; see also rv. iv. 5, v. z. lusian Journal
of Psychology and Philosoplry, tg4r.
t2 THE NA T URA L IST IC F AL L A C Y
illusion has comeabout; but it may still, as a matter of fact,
be real.
It remains true, however, that a naturalist can extricate
II
himself from ProfessorMoore's trap if he is bold enough ' l ' l l l i A U
TON OMY OF E TH IC S : ( t ) CUDWO RTH
and tough enough. And in imagining that in his refutation
of what he calls the 'naturalistic fallacy' he has refuted 'l'ttti samebroad
type of moral philosophy as Professor Moore
naturalism,ProfessorMoore hashimselffallen into a fallacy lrrrst lrrght at
Cambridge in our own time was alsotaught there
not unlike it. For if ProfessorMoore's own non-naturalism rr tlre
seventeenth century by that difficult but rewarding
is a significant belief, then it niust be possibleto formulate rllitcr Ralph
Cudworth. Cudworth is mentioned by Rash-
the naturalismwhich it contradictsin a significantway; and rlrrll' as
anticipating Professor Moore's opinion that 'good is
if naturalismitself, and not merelythe inadvertentcombina- irrtlclinable';
and, as we shall see shortly, he defended this
tion of naturalism with somethinginconsistentwith it, is opinion by the
same bad argument. But like Professor Moore
senseless, then the denial of it is trivial. A significantnon- lrc tlso had a
good argument against ethical naturalists who
naturalism,in other words, must comprisemore than mere corrld not be
quite consistent; and though it was not quite
freedomfrom the 'naturalisticfallacv'. tlrt: same
argument as Professor Moore's, it is equally worthy
ol'orrr attention,
and we shall accordingly study it, indicating
irr later studies
how it was developed by later and clearer
rvri ters.
'l'he
inconsistent ethical naturalism which Cudworth criti-
t'izcd took the
form of an identification of goodnessor right-
rrcss(as I have
already indicated, it is not necessaryfor my
prcsent purpose to
distinguish sharply between these) with
5178 H
98 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
H IS TOR Y OF ITS R EFUTATI O N ee
impose them? This also seemsto tell us no more than that are
applied, any more than agreeable and harsh', and 'our
He commandswhat He commands.
perception of right, or moral good, in actions, is that agreeable
In the middle of the eighteenthcenturythis criticism was
emotion,or feeling, rvhich certain actions produce in us: and
explicitly directed against Locke by Richard Price. 'Mr. of
wrong, the contrary'.t
Loche . . representsrect;tudeas signifying conformity of 'The
present enquiry therefore is; whether this be a true
actionsto some rules or laws; which rules or laws, he says, account
of virtue or not: whether it has or has not a foundation in
are either thesill of God,the decreesof the magistrate,or the
thenature of its object; whetherrightandu,rongare real characters
fashion of the country: From whenceit follows, that it is an
of.actions,or only qualities of. our minds; whether, in short, they
absurdity to apply rectitudeto rules and laws themselves'or denote
what actions are, or orly sensationsderived from the
'to supposethe diz,inewill to be directedby it.' 'But', he adds,
particular frame and structure of our natures.'
'it is undoubted that this great man would have detested But
there is one set of theories-'the schemes which found
these consequences;and, indeed, it is sufficiently evident,
morality on self-love, on positive laws and compacts, or the
that he was strangelyembarrassedin his notions on this, as Divine
rvill'-which may not seem to fit very well into either
well assomeother subjects.'rPricemakesa similarcriticism of
these pigeon-holes. But these 'must either mean, that
of Bishop Warburton, who 'maintains,that moral obligation moral
good and evil are only other words for adaantageous
alwaysdenotessomeobject of will and law, and implies some and
disadxantageous,willed and forbidden. Or they relate to
obliger. Were this true, it would be merejargon to mention a
different question; that is, not to the question, what is the
our being obligedto obeythe Divine will; and yet, this is as nature
and true account of virtue; but what is the subject-
proper languageas any we can use.'2 These are, of course, matter
of it.'2 If the latter is their meaning-if they mean
merehints of ProfessorMoore's argumentfrom trivialization, that
being advantageous to the agent, or being commanded
like the hint in Shaftesbury;not full anticipationsof it, like by God
or by some other authority, are the only charac-
that in Hutcheson.But the latter may be found in Pricetoo;
teristics of actions which mahe them right-then what
in fact, no other writer hasanticipatedProfessorMoore quite they
have to say has no bearing on the question as to what
so completely.3 broad
kind or category of quality 'rightness' itself is. On the
This more completeanticipationoccurs,curiouslyenough, other
hand, if the key propositions of these schemes are
in a sectionain which Price's main purposeis to state his
intended as definitions, the consequence of accepting them
differencefrom Hutcheson;though it occursthereasa digres- would
be that 'it would be palpably absurd in any caseto ask,
sion. Their differenceconcernswhat Price calls'the Founda- whether
it be right to obey a command, or wrong to disobey
tion of Morals'. On Hutcheson'sview (which Priceidentifies it; and
the propositions, obeying a command is right, or pro-
perhaps too unreservedlywith Hume's), 'moral right and ducing
happiness is right, would be most trifling, as express-
wrong, signify nothing in the objectsthemselvesto which they ing no
more than that obeying a command, is obeying a
1 Reoi.ew,p.
43; Selby-Bigge, 6o9.
command, or producing happiness,is producing happiness'.3
2 Raiew, p. 116; Selby-Bigge,684.
3 The first person to have noticed this, so far as I am arvare, was Here
rve have Professor lVloore's whole armoury-not only
Dr.
Raphael. See The Moral Sense,pp. r, r r r ff.
I Selby-Bigge, ? Ibi d.,
585. 586.
a Rasiew, t. i.
3 Ibi d.,587.
roo T HE N A T U R AL IS T IC F AL L A C Y
H IS TOR Y OF ITS REFUTATI O N IOI
actually said?
conclusions; whichconcrusions becomerii"r; we soonlearn
"na At
all events,what Paley said at this point was in part an
actionsright or wrongraccording as they agreeor
1:-111""1:,.
otsagree $'rth our rules,withoutlookingany further; and'when
unconsciousprophecy. His Moral and Poktical Philosophy
the habit is onceestablished of stoppini at ihe rules,*" first
appeared a few years after Bentham's Principles of
!o Morak
and Legislation;but Paleycrystallizedthe theological
I Life of Atchbishop
Vfihately,vol. ii, p.3r4. "*
I o.88,
ro4 T HE NA T UR AL IS T IC F A L L AC Y
H IS TOR Y OF ITS R E FUTATI O N r05
Utilitarianism of the preceding period, while Bentham's
identification of his rule and his definition was seriously
secular Utilitarianism caught the ear of the age which fol-
intended. His criticism occurs in a brief footnote,r where he
lorved it. And whereas the older school had defined virtue
argues that
as obedience to the will of God, and made the promotion of