CA SE S T U DY

Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

TOWARDS A MORE E Q UAL C I T Y

Surabaya:
The Legacy of Participatory
Upgrading of Informal Settlements
Ashok Das and Robin King

CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary.....................................................1
1. Introduction.............................................................4
2. The Evolution of Surabaya’s Shelter Policy...........9
3. Transformative Change through Surabaya’s
Innovative Shelter Initiatives................................... 14
4. Sustaining Progressive Shelter Planning:
Emerging Challenges and Inhibitors........................17
5. Conclusion............................................................ 22
Appendix A: List of Interviewees............................. 24
Endnotes................................................................... 25
References................................................................ 28
Acknowledgments.................................................... 31
About the Authors..................................................... 32
Highlights
►► Surabaya’s Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) innovated and
sustained in situ upgrading policies in poor, traditional urban
neighborhoods called kampung.
►► KIP became a model for in situ slum upgrading efforts both
nationwide and internationally. These community-managed efforts
brought basic infrastructure and services to the kampung and
provided affordable housing and livelihood opportunities for the
poor.
►► KIP and later settlement upgrading programs were made possible
by Surabaya’s pro-poor leadership, which supported the long-term
pursuit of urban upgrading; the city government’s support for and
collaboration with local universities; and the fact that successful
participatory upgrading earned citizens’ trust.

►► Since the decentralization of administration, planning, and

World Resources Report Case Studies contain governance in 1999, kampung-focused, community-led,
preliminary research, analysis, findings, and incremental shelter programs have been threatened by resource
recommendations. They are circulated to stimulate constraints, shifting housing policy priorities, increasing land
timely discussion and critical feedback and to
influence ongoing debate on emerging issues.
values, and overly technocratic planning. To make its pro-poor
efforts truly inclusive and equitable, Surabaya must overcome
these challenges and end the exclusionary treatment of poor
Suggested citation: Das, A., and R. King. 2019. migrants.
"Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of
Informal Settlements." World Resources Report Case
Study. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Available online at www.citiesforall.org.

Cover photo: Ashok Das

Indonesian cities have experienced rapid urbanization and on the KIP community-based approach. Due to its success,
economic growth, which make it challenging to keep up Surabaya has received several national and international awards,
with infrastructure and housing needs. The city of Surabaya and the KIP model has been implemented across Indonesia and
has responded to these challenges by pursuing interventions has informed slum upgrading efforts worldwide.
that promote affordable shelter. Its pioneering innovation, KIP,
KIP benefited from political and intellectual leadership and
led to the adoption of in situ participatory slum upgrading as
financial support. A decision during the 1960s by the mayors
a key affordable housing intervention throughout the global
of Surabaya, Jakarta, and Makassar to improve their cities’
South. This paper examines the transformative impacts of
infrastructure and services opened up the possibility of reform
Surabaya’s shelter policies and focuses on upgrading kampung,
and led the mayor of Surabaya to put Silas in charge of that city’s
which are traditional neighborhoods with mostly low-income
spatial planning. The adoption of Silas’s then unconventional
residents.
proposal to upgrade poor settlements (rather than redevelop
Indonesia’s shelter policies represent three broad phases. them) marked the inception of KIP and eventually led
During the first phase, from independence through the Old to successful citywide upgrading that demonstrated the
Order period (1945–66), cities in Indonesia, including Surabaya, importance of community involvement. Funding from
struggled to respond to rapid urbanization and the proliferation international donors (especially the World Bank) helped sustain
of informal settlements. The second phase, President Suharto’s KIP improvements for three decades, allowing KIP to be scaled
New Order (1967–98), saw the emergence of KIPs and is up and mainstreamed; the program has also been incorporated
characterized broadly by centralized (national-level) governance into Indonesia’s five-year development plans.
of both housing policies and oversight of settlement upgrading
Consistent collaboration between the city and the ITS, as
programs. The third and current phase, the Reform period,
well as intellectual guidance and policy support from the
began in 1999 when Indonesia’s housing policies and upgrading
university, enabled Surabaya to take a pro-poor approach
programs were decentralized. In Surabaya, we regard this
to informal settlement upgrading, which strengthened
phase as having two parts: first, the Comprehensive Kampung
the communitarian ethos of the city’s kampung. Pro-poor
Improvement Project (CKIP) phase (1999–2008), when the city’s
development initiatives and governance reforms initiated by
first grassroots squatter movements emerged; and second, the
the current mayor have also contributed to and benefit from the
current rusunawa (low-cost rental apartment blocks) phase,
symbiotic relationship between the city and the university.
which began during the mid-2000s. The persistence of informal
settlements and obvious lack of sufficient formal housing This unique city-university relationship does not come
options has necessitated the introduction of new housing without its challenges, however. The mayor’s strong
policies by the government, which is now trying to produce more preference for building rusunawa—public rental housing
formal housing. flats—for instance, rather than upgrading kampung as the
ITS traditionally proposed, could diminish the city’s legacy of
Johan Silas, a professor of architecture at Surabaya’s
championing inclusive shelter policies. The city’s commitment
Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology (Institut
to pro-poor shelter faces other threats as well, including rising
Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember; ITS), led the team that
land values and aggressive real estate development, inadequate
created Surabaya’s KIP. During Suharto’s New Order, Silas
public transit infrastructure, constraints on resources and
and his team pioneered programs for in situ upgrading of poor
capacity that stem from decentralization, an exclusionary bias
urban settlements that featured low-cost basic infrastructure
towards migrants, and a reluctance to engage with civil society
and services, efficient implementation, and community
groups. Likewise, a nationally mandated, inclusionary housing
participation. These programs benefited from participatory
policy has not yet been implemented because of conflicting
planning and community-managed microfinance—carried
policy priorities. Although much progress has been achieved,
forward by innovative postdecentralization efforts such as
insufficient and inadequate housing will remain a problem until
CKIP—to gradually broaden the focus from making physical
these challenges are overcome.
improvements to pursuing social and economic development.
Many of the ongoing kampung-centered initiatives are premised

2 |
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Despite its earlier innovative approaches to upgrading

informal settlements, Surabaya could now learn from other Box 1 | Abbreviations
cities that have produced more inclusive and sustainable
responses to similar or even more complex challenges. It CBO community-based organization
will take unconventional thinking to provide long-term formal
CKIP Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project
housing options to all residents of Surabaya. This will include
forging purposeful coalitions with new partners, such as CSO civil society organization
practitioners and researchers across and beyond Indonesia; local ITS Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh
and nonlocal civil society and nongovernmental organizations; Nopember Institute of Technology)
and neighboring jurisdictions. Local public officials will need
KIP Kampung Improvement Program
to boldly yet patiently support innovation and recognize that
external support can help catalyze local change. Similarly, KIPEM kartu identitas penduduk musiman (temporary
academics and students—actors who can be influential in public resident identification card)
policy decision-making spheres in Indonesia—should challenge KTP kartu tanda penduduk (resident card)
the status quo, advance critical ideas, and engage directly with
LHB Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang (Balanced
poor communities and civil society groups, which in turn should
Residential Environment)
actively advocate for the most marginalized and work closely
with local government and universities. LPP Labortarium Perumahan dan Permukiman
(Laboratory of Housing and Human Settlements)

About This Paper OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development
This case study is part of the larger World Resources
Report (WRR) Towards a More Equal City, which considers PWSS Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya (Surabaya
sustainability to be composed of three interrelated issues: Strenkali People’s Movement)
equity, the economy, and the environment. The WRR Rp Indonesian rupiah
uses equitable access to urban services as an entry point for
RT rukun tetangga (neighborhood unit)
examining whether meeting the needs of the under-served
can improve economic productivity and environmental RW rukun warga (community unit)
sustainability for the city. The case studies examine WRR World Resources Report
transformative urban change defined as that which affects
multiple sectors and institutional practices, continues across
more than one political administration, and is sustained for
more than 10 years, resulting in more equitable access to core
services and a more equal city. The goal of the WRR is to inform
urban change agents—government officials, policymakers,
civil society, and the private sector—about how transformative
change happens (and does not happen), the various forms it
takes, and how they can support transformation towards more
equal cities.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 3

Figure 1 | Surabaya at a glance

Population living in informal dwellings (%, 2016)j 15

Access to electricity (% households) k
100
Access to piped water on premises 92.6
(% households, 2014)l

Surabaya Access to flush toilet (% households, 2010)m 87

Trips by mode (%, 2010): n

Two-wheelers 71
Private cars 25
Type of jurisdiction City Public and semiformal transport (bus, minibus) 4
Population in: Average trip length (km, 2014)o 13.5
1950a 714,898
2000b 2,599,796 Average prices of urban services:
2016c 2,853,661 Septage discharge (private, per m3)p $5.97
Public transport ride (bus; minibus, per ride)q $0.23–$0.45;
Total land area (in km2, 2015)d 327 Water (per m3)r $0.30
GDP per capita, Surabaya (2014)e $10,857 Electricity (per kWh)s $0.13
$0.10
Human Development Index, Surabaya (2017)f 0.68
Average price of gasoline (per liter, 2017)t $0.56
Human Development Index, Indonesia (2014) g
0.69
Primary decision-making level for cities:
Gini coefficient, Surabaya (2014)h 0.39 City government of Surabaya (Pemerintah Kota Surabaya)
Population living below the poverty line (%, 2014) i
5.8 Type of city leader, term years, and term limits:
Mayor, 5 years, 2 terms

Notes: All prices are reported in US$ using market exchange rates for the source’s corresponding year. Surabaya does not have citywide sewerage coverage; most households use septic
tanks that are emptied by private service providers.
Sources: a. Silas, 1983; b–i. Statistics Indonesia, 2018; j. Based on authors’ personal communication with civil society activists, Surabaya, 2016; k. World Bank, 2017. l. Surabaya City
Government, 2015; m. AECOM International Development et al., 2010; n. Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012; o. Rismaharini, 2014; p. Based on authors’ analysis of costs from various private
septage removal service providers, Surabaya, 2015; q. Biaya dan Tarif, 2017; r. PDAM Surya Sembada Kota Surabaya, 2012; s. Mr Fixit, 2016; t. Surya.co.id, 2017.

1. INTRODUCTION unmatched success with in situ participatory upgrading, which

cities across the developing world have attempted to implement.
This case study examines how the sustained implementation
In a recent report on adequate, secure, and affordable housing
of innovative shelter policies in Surabaya, Indonesia, enabled
in the global South, the first of three recommended options is
wider transformative planning and governance.1 We believe this
in situ participatory upgrading of informal settlements.5 That
transformative change materialized as a result of progressive
Indonesia lacked a focused, national-level slum upgrading
pro-poor leadership, consistent low-cost upgrading of kampung2
plan or program until 2016 makes Surabaya’s experience with
(traditional neighborhoods with mostly low-income residents),
urban upgrading particularly instructive for appreciating the
extensive collaboration between the city and local universities,
transformative potential of local planning action.6
citizens’ trust in local government, and efforts to preserve kampung
as sites of both livelihood opportunities and affordable housing. Surabaya is the provincial capital of East Java and Indonesia’s
second-largest city (see Figure 1). The city covers an area of
Surabaya’s flagship urban upgrading3 innovation, the Kampung
327 square kilometers (km2), and since 2000 its population
Improvement Program (KIP), became the model for slum
has stabilized at just under 3 million.7 Its larger metropolitan
upgrading internationally.4 Box 2 describes a typical kampung
region, Gerbangkertosusila,8 boasts a population of about 9
environment that KIP targeted. Surabaya’s dedication to
million.9 After independence in 1945, Surabaya developed a
improving housing for the urban poor allowed it to achieve
significant industrial base, which accelerated in-migration and

4 |
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
urbanization, but since the 1980s the dominant employment
sector has been services (including trade, hotels, restaurants),
which contributes 44.5 percent of the city’s gross domestic
product (GDP); the manufacturing sector, in comparison,
contributes 22 percent.10 Today scores of universities and
polytechnics in the city draw students from near and far. Figure 1
provides other relevant development indicators for Surabaya.
This case study is part of the larger World Resources Report
(WRR) Towards a More Equal City, which focuses on equitable
access to core services throughout the global South. The WRR
is a series of working papers on housing, energy, the informal
economy, urban expansion, water, sanitation, and transportation
that analyze sectors and themes across struggling and emerging
cities in the global South.11 The WRR also features a series of city-
level case studies on urban transformation, of which this case
study is a part.
The WRR uses the term transformative to define urban change that
effectively addresses a seminal problem that negatively affects
many people’s lives.12 Experience suggests that when a city resolves
a seminal problem, it has the potential to generate a broader, more
virtuous cycle of transformation. Transformative change involves
multiple sectors and institutional practices, continues across more
than one political administration, and is sustained for more than
10 years. Each of the WRR city-level case studies examines how
approaches to addressing seminal problems have (or have not)
resulted in broader citywide transformation and explores how
transformative urban change occurs, under what conditions it
regresses or stalls, and whether it gets back on track. It is important
to note that every case has progressive and regressive elements,
and every city experiences difficulties, conflicts, setbacks, and false
starts. This case study explores these questions with respect to
affordable housing in Surabaya.
Surabaya’s experience suggests that rapid urbanization tends to
also increase urban informality,13 of which squatter settlements
and street vendors are commonly recognized manifestations
in cities of the global South. But much less understood is
how other contemporary spatial transformations that often
violate development regulations and planning norms—peri-
urbanization, illicit conversion of agricultural lands, mega-
developments, and new towns and gated communities,
for instance—also make informality a dominant mode of
urbanization.14 Informality adversely affects low-income urban
residents’ access to services (e.g., many informal settlements
lack piped utility water and sewage services) but also offers them
livelihood and shelter options, so it is important to both embrace
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 5
Box 2 | Kampung in Indonesia
In Indonesia’s urban context, kampung are traditional
neighborhoods that predate rapid urbanization; planned
urban development happened around and spread beyond
them. Although most kampung were legal, prior to KIP most
lacked basic infrastructure and services, and pockets of
poverty and slum-like conditions remain in some today.
Predominantly residential in use, they are characterized by
high population density; irregular lots that have minimal
or no setbacks (that is, the distance between building and
street); narrow streets and narrower alleys; and a mix of
lot sizes, tenure arrangements, building types, land uses,
and livelihood options. Kampung feature a distinctive urban
form; buildings tend to have pitched roofs and traditional
architecture (although this is changing). From the dwelling to
the settlement level, spaces for living, working, and trading
are frequently integrated, and private and public space
boundaries are flexible, so streets are vibrant, host myriad
community activities, and facilitate strong community
interaction and social cohesion.
Sources: Das, 2017; World Bank, 1995; Rolalisasi, 2018.
existing informal settlements and limit their future growth.15
This case study explains how integrating kampung upgrading
into Surabaya’s larger planning vision triggered equitable shelter
outcomes and led to broader changes in its planning milieu.
After a brief note on methodology, this paper provides an
overview of urbanization, development, planning, and
governance trends in postcolonial Indonesia. Next, it looks at
how, framed by the larger Indonesian context, shelter policy
in Surabaya evolved through distinct phases and established
urban upgrading as an effective pro-poor intervention with
far-reaching transformative impacts. It explains how specific
transformations were influenced by enabling and inhibiting
factors and discusses current shortcomings and emergent
challenges. Ongoing development trends, significant
infrastructure shortcomings that disproportionately burden the
poor, and the exclusionary treatment of poor migrants preclude
true equity and inclusivity.16 Failing to address these issues will
weaken Surabaya’s progressive reputation and squander the
transformative gains of the past.
This paper also discusses planning approaches, arrangements,
and actions needed to sustain and expand Surabaya’s pro-
poor outcomes. To achieve transformative change through
collaborative planning, local public officials should be bold
yet patient in supporting innovation; urban practitioners as
well as academics and students should challenge the status
quo, advance critical ideas, and engage directly with poor
communities and civil society groups; local civil society should
actively advocate for the marginalized and partner with local
government and universities; and all stakeholders should realize
that external support can help to catalyze local change.
Data and Methods Used
This study analyzes diverse data sources and uses multiple research
methods. We reviewed secondary literature, including published
scholarly articles and books; analyzed research and policy reports
published by national, regional, local, multilateral, and private
agencies; consulted descriptive statistics from quantitative data
produced by different state agencies; reviewed news media reports,
gathered field observations from transect walks, conversations, and
photographs; and conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews
with key informants. During July–August 2017, 20 interviews were
conducted by the first author, building on his 12 years of continued
research engagement with Surabaya. Respondents included various
stakeholders, including the mayor, planning officials, planners and
architects, academic researchers, representatives of civil society
organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs),
and informed citizens.
A Brief History of Indonesian Development,
Governance, and Planning
Indonesia is currently registering the fastest rate of urbanization
(4.1 percent) in Asia and the second-largest absolute expansion
of urban land area; by 2025, 70 percent of Indonesians will be
city dwellers. Even with this growth, Indonesia’s GDP growth
17
rate (4 percent) remains the weakest in Asia. At the same
18
time, Indonesia has recorded some of the worst rates of income
inequality in Southeast Asia, its tax collection relative to GDP is
the second worst in Southeast Asia, and its spending and quality
of basic urban infrastructure services are inadequate. It is
19
against this backdrop that Surabaya’s story of shelter upgrading
comes into sharp relief.
When the Dutch made Surabaya a municipality in 1906, the
city’s population was under 175,000.20 After independence on
August 17, 1945, Indonesian urbanization accelerated sharply
due to rural-urban migration; as a consequence,21 poverty rose,
slums proliferated, and shelter conditions worsened in Surabaya.
Public housing was scarce, and affordable options other than
self-help housing (where people build their homes themselves)
and kampung were negligible.22
6 |
Surabaya now has 31 districts and 154 subdistricts, each of
which consists of multiple community units called rukun warga
(RW), which are divided into neighborhood units called rukun
tetangga (RT) that are composed of several households. Before
decentralization in 1999—precipitated by the Asian financial
crisis of 1997—subnational (provincial and city) unit heads
were appointed to their positions; today, however, mayors, city
councillors, governors, and provincial legislators are all elected
by citizens. RT and RW heads (mostly volunteers) are almost
always chosen by neighborhood residents (see Figure 2).
Decentralization boosted local autonomy by granting local
governments significant decision-making power. Consequently,
Surabaya has seen the emergence of a unique landscape of urban
change agents (see Figure 8); although civil society is still the
weakest sector, it has grown the most in terms of agency since
decentralization started. Cities like Surabaya have leveraged their
postdecentralization autonomy to more effectively reorganize
governance and planning. Facilitated by nationally implemented
decentralization reforms, Surabaya’s current local government
structure has been rearranged through multiple regulatory
moves at the provincial and city levels (see Figure 3).23 The
contemporaneous emergence of Surabaya’s first grassroots CSOs
representing squatters and advocating for their shelter rights
exemplifies the expansion of autonomous nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and CSOs across a range of sectors.
Officially, urban planning in Indonesia is divided into
socioeconomic development planning and spatial planning, the
bifurcation of which was established by the first national spatial
planning law of 1992. Since decentralization, multiple laws have
revised, refined, and expanded the role of spatial planning.24
Today every level of government, including city and regency—
that is, a rural district within a province—as well as metropolitan
region and island, needs to produce its own Medium-Term
Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menegah;
5 years) and Long-Term Development Plan (Rencana
Pembangunan Jangka Panjang; 20 years) as well as spatial
plans (rencana tata ruang wilayah); lower-level plans need to be
coordinated with higher-level ones, and spatial plans need to
align with the development plans.25 The National Development
Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional)
guides socioeconomic planning from the helm, and a new
Ministry of Land and Spatial Planning leads spatial planning,
the implementation of which is under the Ministry of Public
Works.26
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Figure 2 | Organizational structure of government in Indonesia

Nation/Negeri
Elected by citizens
[President/Presiden]

Province/Propinsi
Elected by citizens
[Governor/Gubernur]

Urban Rural

City/Kota Elected by citizens Regency/Kabupaten

[Mayor/Walikota] [Regent/Bupati]
FORMAL GOVERNMENT

District/Kecamatan Appointed by District/Kecamatan

[Camat] city government [Camat]

Sub district/Kelurahan
Subdistrict/Kelurahan Appointed by
or Village/Desa
[Lurah] city government [Lurah or Kepala desa]
COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE

Community unit/ Community unit/

Chosen by
Rukun Warga (RW) Rukun warga (RW)
[Pak or Ibu RW]
area residents [Pak or Ibu RW]

Neighborhood unit/ Neighborhood unit/

Chosen by
Rukun Tetangga (RT) Rukun tetangga (RT)
[Pak or Ibu RT]
area residents [Pak or Ibu RT]

Note: Levels and heads (in box brackets) of government/governance; Bahasa Indonesia terms in italics.
Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 7

Figure 3 | Organizational structure of Surabaya City Government

Mayor (Walikota) + Local Legislative Council

Deputy Mayor (Wakil Walikota) (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)

Expert Staff (Staf Ahli)

Inspectorate Local Secretariat
(Inspektorat) (Sekretariat Daerah)

[Local] Units Governance Assistant

[Local] Agencies (Asisten Pemerintahan)
(Badan Daerah)
(Dinas Daerah)
• City Planning &
• Public Works, Highways, and Drainage (Pekerjaan Divisions (Bagian)
Development (Badan
Umum Bina Marga dan Pematusan)
Perencanaan dan • Governance & Local Autonomy Administration
Pembangunan Kota) • Public Housing and Settlements, Building and (Administrasi Pemerintahan & Otonomi Daerah)
Spatial Planning (Perumahan Rakyat dan Kawasan
• Financial Management • Law (Hukum)
Permukiman, Cipta Karya dan Tata Ruang)
and Local Taxes
• Organization (Organisasi)
(Pengelolaan • Health (Kesehatan)
Keuangan dan Pajak • Education (Pendidikan)
Dareah) Economy & Development Assistant
• Cleanliness and Green Open Spaces (Kebersihan (Asisten Perekonomian & Pembangunan)
• Disaster Management dan Ruang Terbuka Hijau)
and Social Protection
(Penanggulangan • Fire Fighting (Pemadam Kebakaran) Divisions (Bagian)
Bencana dan • Population and Civil Records (Kependudukan dan • Economy & Local [State-Owned] Enterprises
Perlindungan Pencatatan Sipil) Administration (Administrasi Perekonomian &
Masyrakat) Usaha Daerah)
• Communication and Informatics (Komunikasi dan
• Staffing and Training Informatika) • Construction Administration (Adminsitrasi
(Kepegawaian dan Pembangunan)
Diklat) • Food Security and Agriculture (Ketahanan Pangan
dan Pertanian) • Cooperation Administration (Administrasi
Kerjasama)
• Transportation (Perhubungan)
Reporting
• Trade (Perdagangan)
General Administration Assistant (Asisten
Formal linkage • Manpower (Tenaga Kerja) Administrasi Umum)
Coordination • Population Control, Women’s Empowerment
and Child Welfare (Pengendalian Penduduk, Divisions (Bagian)
Responsibility
Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak) • General & Protocol (Umum & Protokol)
• Culture and Tourism (Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata) • Procurement Services & Asset Management
• Social Affairs (Dinas Sosial) (Layanan Pengadaan & Pengelolaan Aset)

• Cooperatives and Small Enterprises (Koperasi dan • Public Relations (Hubungan Masyarakat)
Usaha Mikro) • Public Welfare Administration (Administrasi
• Youth and Sports (Kepemudaan dan Olahraga) Kesejahteraan Rakyat)

• Construction and Land Management (Pengelolaan

Bangunan dan Tanah) Secretariat of Local Legislative Council
(Sekretariat DPRD)
• Living Space (Lingkungan Hidup)
• Capital Investment and Single Window Integrated Divisions (Bagian)
Services (Penanaman Modal dan Pelayanan
Terpadu Satu Pintu) • General (Umum)

• Libraries and Archives (Perpustakaan dan • (Rapat & Perundang-undangan)

Kearsipan) • Information and Protocol (Informasi & Protokol)
• Local Police (Satpol PP) • Functional Positions [Professional Personnel]
(Jabatan Fungsional)

District (Kecamatan) [31]

Notes: ITS = Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology);
CSO = civil society organization. Bahasa Indonesia terms/names in parantheses.
Sub-district (Kelurahan) [154]
Source: Authors.

8 |
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
2. THE EVOLUTION OF SURABAYA’S
SHELTER POLICY
Shelter policy in Surabaya evolved through what some
researchers have identified as three key phases (seen in
Figure 7):27 the Old Order (1945–66), a period of relative urban
population explosion, meager public housing supply, and
ambivalence towards squatters; President Suharto’s New
Order (1967–98), an era of aggressive, centralized kampung
upgrading; and the Reform period (1999 onward), during which
time housing programs were decentralized. In Surabaya’s
case, we view the Reform era as comprising two phases: the
Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project (CKIP) phase,
from 1999 to 2008; and the low-cost apartments (rusunawa)
phase (from the mid-2000s, intensifying after 2009). The CKIP
phase saw a rise in a strong grassroots movement for squatters’
shelter rights. Around the transition between the latest two
phases, a new dynamic mayor of Surabaya, Tri Rismaharini
(known as “Risma”), entered the scene as the country was
experiencing larger shifts in national housing policy, the
evolution of which is outlined in the next section.
The Kampung Improvement Program,
1969–98
In 1969, Jakarta and Surabaya initiated their own versions
of KIP; with the former included as part of Indonesia’s first
national Five-Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan
Lima Tahun; Repelita I).28 This spurred a series of KIPs, which
proved to be among the most enduring and effective urban
upgrading initiatives undertaken in the world. Johan Silas, a
29
young architect at Surabaya’s Sepuluh Nopember Institute of
Technology (Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember; ITS), led a
team that designed Surabaya’s original self-funded kampung
upgrading initiative, known as W.R. Supratman KIP. The30
program’s approach was simple: provide low-cost, basic public
infrastructure in poor kampung, with community support.
For the first five years of the program, the W.R. Supratman KIP
provided only concrete slabs and gutters. Over time, however, it
evolved to include a standardized menu of eight interventions:
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 9
►► Vehicular access roads
►► Paved footpaths
►► Stormwater drainage
►► Garbage receptacles and collection
►► Public standpipes for drinking water
►► Communal washing areas and public toilets
►► Neighborhood clinics (puskesmas)
►► Primary schools
The W.R. Supratman KIP continued well into the 1990s and
increasingly focused on community members’ participation.
Communities contributed a third to more than half of the
project costs31 and participated in project implementation as
well as operation and maintenance. KIPs required hands-on
participation in the physical upgrading of housing by kampung
dwellers, exemplifying the “self-help” housing principle, as well
as incremental housing improvements rather than the often
unrealistic “all at once” upgrading plans. 32 These programs were
subsequently incorporated into several of Indonesia’s five-year
plans (see Table 1). Importantly, KIPs did not fund the building
of individual houses—they provided financing mechanisms for
community-led improvement projects on housing and urban
services like water and roads. KIPs were, in essence, the catalytic
force behind the widespread self-improvement of dwellings,
economic gains, and land tenure security for low-income urban
dwellers.
Over the course of fifteen years (1976–91), 22.7 billion Indonesian
rupiah (Rp) (US$23.63 million)33 of World Bank KIP funding for
Surabaya directly improved the lives of 1.15 million kampung
dwellers.34 No program has since matched the program’s scale,
expediency, and affordability (the program’s cost of upgrading
was $35–$75 per kampung resident).35 The success of the first
KIPs inspired the World Bank to recommend in situ slum
upgrading internationally. For more than a decade after 1974, the
World Bank generously funded the scaling up of Indonesia’s KIPs
through four urban development projects (Urban I–IV).36
Table 1 | I ndonesia’s Five-Year Development Plans
(1969–98)
Repelita I (1969–74): Supported pilot KIP in Jakarta
Repelita II (1974–79): KIP in Jakarta and Surabaya
Repelita III (1979–84): KIP in 190 cities and towns
Repelita IV (1984–89): KIP in 400 cities and towns
Repelita V (1989–94): KIP in 500 cities and towns
Repelita VI (1994–98): KIP in 125 KIP cities and towns
Note: Repelita = Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan); KIP
= Kampung Improvement Program.
Source: Based on authors’ analysis of Silas (1987) and Tunas and Darmoyono (2014).
By the early 1990s, KIPs had upgraded almost all legally
recognized kampung (the inner-city and old-town kampung
shown in Figure 4), which prevented their displacement,
demolition, and loss of character; these remain the affordable
housing options within the city. By the late 1990s, KIPs were
credited with lowering Indonesia’s urban poverty by an
estimated 70–75 percent.37 Qualitative evaluations of KIPs found
that they were responsible for significant improvements in
physical infrastructure, education and health, land and property
values, and solid waste management. Moreover, the way in
38
which KIPs encouraged community participation in Surabaya
was impressive, particularly considering that nationwide the
maintenance of infrastructure, resolution of land conflicts,
participation in decision-making, and role of women and civil
society remained weak.39 Sweat equity (self-help labor) was
common, but in Surabaya people also contributed money,
totaling more than a third of the program’s $40 million of total
expenditure during 1976–90. Some studies have ascribed
40
this level of participation to East Java’s strong communitarian
values, and almost everyone we interviewed stressed this
41
uniquely Surabayan culture. We argue that the inclusive
approach was deliberate and the sustained expansion of
Surabaya’s KIPs catalyzed local communities’ latent potential to
participate.
10 |
Joint evaluations by the city and the ITS’s Laboratory of
Housing and Human Settlements (Labortarium Perumahan
dan Permukiman; LPP), a research unit founded by Silas, strove
to continually make Surabaya’s KIPs more effective.42 By 1983,
upgrading had resolved the unclear tenure status of many
kampung households, even incorporating some squatters,
and had provided kampung residents with a strong sense of
security.43 Household access to drinking water rose from 15
percent to over 80 percent, and access to toilets improved from
less than 20 percent to more than 65 percent; likewise, 70–90
percent of kampung households enjoyed regular garbage
collection.44
Comprehensive Kampung Improvement
Project, 1999–2008
The fact that World Bank financing for KIPs was slated to end
during the late 1990s prompted city officials, the LPP, World
Bank representatives, and a private consultant to deliberate
over the future of upgrading in Surabaya, eventually conceiving
the new CKIP.45 Surabaya’s CKIP leveraged newfound local
autonomy to make urban upgrading more comprehensive (by
stressing economic, social, and environmental improvements
in kampung) and more “pro-poor” (by letting residents steer
project planning, implementation, and evaluation).46 Unlike its
predecessors' focus on physical interventions, CKIP’s primary
objectives were community economic development and
empowerment of the poorest kampung dwellers—70 percent
of its budget was for CBO-operated microfinance (revolving
funds).47 CKIP was envisioned as a wholly community-managed
venture so as to reduce the stifling grip of influential, sometimes
even venal, RT and RW officials.48 Granting community control
over CKIP decision-making and implementation was a radically
progressive move.49 It also influenced national initiatives like
the National Community Empowerment Program (Program
Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) and the Neighborhood
Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project.50
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
In each subdistrict, CKIP required the formation of three new
kinds of CBOs—a Kampung Foundation, a business cooperative,
and multiple self-help groups. The Kampung Foundation chose
the interventions, apportioned funds, and coordinated the
overall program; the business cooperative was only responsible
for managing microfinance. Each subdistrict devised its
own way to choose CBO officials. The program concept had
envisaged local NGOs as intermediaries between the city and
the communities, responsible for building the capacity of the
nascent CBOs to transform cooperative-run microfinance
into a self-propagating grassroots incubator. Yet CKIP proved
largely ineffective.51 When it ended in 2008, CKIP had reached
72 subdistricts—less than half of eligible areas; by 2012, only 20
percent had well-functioning microfinance funds, 38 percent
performed poorly, and the rest were defunct. However, CKIP
52
did introduce real participatory planning; it even inspired the
Neighborhood Upgrading and Shelter Sector Project and revived
musrenbang, Indonesia’s version of local participatory budgeting.
Indonesia’s sudden and extensive government decentralization
in 1999 revealed the major resource and capacity inadequacies
of its cities, turning them into laboratories for externally funded
development projects. CKIP was a rare exception in that it was
locally funded and managed. Although it had more autonomy
and control over the project, several factors impeded CKIP’s
success, including limited local government funding (a common
decentralization challenge), competition from better-funded
programs like the World Bank–supported Urban Poverty Project
(now the Neighborhood Community Empowerment Program),
inadequate CBO training, and unsuccessful targeting of the
poorest. The negligible role of NGOs, despite the program’s
53
emphasis on the need to involve them, also constrained the
success of CKIP. This prevented the CBOs from acquiring
54
the skills and resources necessary to effectively organize and
manage microfinance. So, heeding the LPP’s advice, in 2003 the
55
city created a much smaller CKIP clone, the Social Rehabilitation
for Slums (Rehabilitasi Sosial Daerah Kumuh) program, to target
the poorest kampung residents. Although a modest program, it
has grown both its funds and reach.56
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 11
Both Surabaya and the LPP have held discriminatory views
on urban citizenship, reflecting an improper understanding
of the interrelated dynamics of migration, urbanization, and
informality57 that has impeded genuinely inclusive planning.
More so after decentralization, migrants and undocumented
squatters came to be regarded as illegal and, therefore, were
viewed as “undeserving” of assistance. In Indonesia, a person
who moves to another city needs to obtain either a permanent
resident identification card (kartu tanda penduduk; KTP) or a
temporary one (kartu identitas penduduk musiman; KIPEM). But
poor migrants often lack a KTP, which is required to obtain all
other documentation. Furthermore, without identification
documents, migrants cannot access city-subsidized services,
including primary education, community health centers, health
insurance, social security/insurance, and microcredit.58 Lack of
access to credit is a debilitating deprivation that CKIP sought
to remedy; nonetheless, CKIP business cooperatives rarely ever
lend to migrants.59
Citywide urban upgrading practically ended with CKIP. A local
program called Kampung Unggulan (which roughly translates
to “Excellent Kampung”) was started in 2010 to promote small
enterprises, and it still runs in 10 subdistricts. However, in
the city’s poorer areas, there remains a need for substantial
upgrading.60 In terms of the quality of infrastructure and
services, about 278 hectares (ha) of its residential areas are
still considered slums; over 28 percent of households reside
in less than 7 square meters (m2) of housing space; and over
55 percent lack proper access to water.61 As CKIP waned, the
rusunawa public housing projects registered a marked uptick;
today the national government’s rusunawa program has
become Surabaya’s leading shelter policy. Critics consider this
postdecentralization retraction of city funding for inclusive
upgrading (in favor of the scarcer rusunawa option, which
induces exclusion and avoidable competition) as a neoliberal
shift that compromises Surabaya’s commitment to pro-poor
shelter and community participation.62
Figure 4 | L
 ocation and distribution of kampung in
Surabaya
Source: Shirleyana et al., 2018.
Grassroots Movement for Squatters’
Shelter Rights
In 2002 Surabaya sent eviction notices to communities squatting
on provincial government land along the Strenkali River.
That spurred unprecedented civil society action that took into
account the collective interests of squatters, pushcart vendors,
sex workers, and homeless children.63 The local secretariat
of Uplink—a network of CSOs created by the Urban Poor
Consortium, a prominent Jakarta-based NGO, brought together
hitherto unrelated groups. These included nascent NGOs,
squatters’ CBOs, and faculty and students from some local
universities who had never worked with poor communities.64 By
2005, this initial networking between civil society groups had
launched the Surabaya Strenkali People’s Movement (Paguyuban
Warga Strenkali Surabaya; PWSS), a CSO devoted to improving
squatters’ shelter security.
The PWSS forged close links with larger CSOs, including
Community Architects Indonesia and the Asian Coalition for
Housing Rights, and quickly learned the nuances of shelter
discourse—especially regarding in situ upgrading and how
to form coalitions to advance formidable political activism.65
The PWSS set about dispelling pervasive misconceptions, such
12 |
Figure 5 | L
 ocation of rusunawa in Surabaya
CITY CORE
0 2km
Source: Authors, with additional assistance by Jiwnath Ghimire.
Sources: Esri, HERE, Garmin, Intermap, increment P Corp., GEBCO, USGS, FAO, NPS, NRCAN, GeoB
IGN, Kadaster NL, Ordnance Survey, Esri Japan, METI, Esri China (Hong Kong), (c) OpenStreetMap
contributors, and the GIS User Community
as that squatters pollute rivers and cannot maintain healthy
living environments. Within just five years and with minimal
external assistance, it completely transformed the Strenkali
squatter settlement of Bratang Tangkis and made progress on
two adjoining ones. The community moved back houses located
precariously close to the river, widened access roads, paved
footpaths, ensured all houses had toilets and septic tanks, and
eliminated the discharge of human waste into the river. The
PWSS also helped residents secure water supply, pay land taxes,
manage garbage disposal, and establish a microcredit fund. It
also demonstrated how simple elevational treatments (using
different materials, colors, and textures on the external face of
the structure) can provide a stimulating built environment.66
Nearly all improvements (as well as ongoing maintenance and
repairs) were self-funded, with daily household contributions of
just Rp 1,000 (approx. $0.10).67
The PWSS helped enhance the resilience of these squatter
communities,68 even without the city’s support. Media coverage
of the group led to official recognition of Bratang Tangkis’s
informal RW and RT by Mayor Risma’s administration. This
was also possible because many long-term residents (some of
whom had lived there for 40 years) had obtained KTPs. Despite
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
progress and recognition of the PWSS, demolitions and evictions
continue.69 Bratang Tangkis residents reject any suggestions to
relocate to rusunawa because such apartments are not conducive
to running home-based enterprises, do not guarantee low rents,
and prohibit subletting. Residents also fear that moving to
rusunawa will compromise their valuable social and economic
networks and, because rusunawa are located in more remote,
less-connected, or inconvenient locations, their transportation
costs in both money and time will increase.
The Steady Rise of Rusunawa (from the
Mid-2000s)
Before Indonesia’s decentralization of the government during
the late 1990s, rusunawa construction, especially in Surabaya,
was sporadic, often a consequence of some crisis, constraint,
or nonroutine incentive (such as receiving funds from the
provincial government to relocate a specific settlement). After
its establishment in 1974, the National Housing Development
Company (Perumnas) began the effort70 to expand two types of
public housing: rusunawa (rental flats for poor households) and
rusunami (low-income ownership flats).71 A windfall from oil
revenues during the Six-Day War of 1967 between the Arabs and
Israelis led the national government to build rent-to-own-type
apartment blocks for the poor in some cities. 72
Around that same time, entrusted with the responsibility of
improving conditions in Surabaya’s kampung, Silas argued
that apartment living was unsuitable for the poor. Instead,
he advocated for improving existing kampung. The ensuing
73
KIP concept is what Surabaya pursued assiduously, with a few
notable exceptions. In 1984 the LPP designed a rusunawa in
Surabaya to house victims of a fire that gutted 83 houses near a
local vegetable market. Later, in 1989, it designed three blocks
74
of a rusunawa (150 units) in Dupak Bangunrejo, where in situ
upgrading was not feasible due to the area’s unusually dense,
squalid, and inaccessible setting. During the 1990s, following
an uprising by urban dwellers who had been evicted from the
Dupak Bangunrejo site, the city authorized the LPP to design
three blocks in the subdistrict of Penjaringansari to serve those
who had been evicted.
After decentralization, rusunami and rusunawa construction
accelerated in Surabaya. Between 2004 and 2009, the central
government built three rusunawa blocks to house squatters;
by 2016, 13 city-built projects (approximately 3,500 units)
were completed or under way.75 Figure 5 shows the location of
Surabaya’s rusunawa, whose locations are more peripheral than
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 13
those of the city’s upgraded kampung. To rid cities of slums,
Indonesia’s 1,000 Towers program—an ambitious Perumnas
initiative that began in 2007—aims to add 1 million rusunawa
and rusunami flats nationwide.76 The national government
offers tax incentives and bears all infrastructure costs if cities
provide the land—an arrangement that has attracted Mayor
Risma’s support for construction of rusunawa.77 Surabaya’s
current Medium-Term Development Plan (2016–21), a mayoral
decree, underscores the preference for rusunawa over kampung
upgrading—in fact, the latter is hardly mentioned.78
Notwithstanding Mayor Risma’s support, the supply of rusunawa
is scant, and local media reports frequently cite financial
irregularities, delivery delays, tariff hikes, and substandard
construction. Since most squatters occupy provincial or
national government land, the city is reluctant to improve their
settlements. Lately, however, city-built rusunawa have begun
accepting some squatters with proper documentation (i.e., KTP).
Surabaya’s subsidies make rusunawa rents (between $2 and
$7, monthly) the nation’s cheapest, and the LPP persuaded the
city government to abolish occupancy term limits.79 Surabaya
does not have any rusunami projects yet; those sprouting in
neighboring municipalities could house some migrant workers,
but there are not enough low-cost options for the poorest.
The 1992 national inclusionary housing regulation, Balanced
Residential Environment (Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang; LHB),
aimed to boost the supply of affordable housing with its 1:3:6
principle (i.e., for every luxury unit built, a developer needed
to build three middle-income units and six low-income units).
However, the LHB only applies to the construction of individual
homes, not apartments, and in 2011 developers’ complaints
got this requirement further reduced to 1:2:3.80 Without a
proper enforcement framework, and given the presence of
corruption and the fact that Perumnas prioritizes higher-income
housing, the LHB remains ineffective.81 Modifying the LHB’s
provisions to include apartment construction would expand
the future production of rusunawa and benefit the currently
struggling 1,000 Towers project.82 Between 2010 and 2014, the
nationwide rusunami construction exceeded that of rusunawa
by four to eight times, mainly because of their higher return on
investments. Leveraging the LHB to generate more rusunawa
projects could help to reengage local design entities like the
LPP, which has not designed any rusunawa since 2004. (The
earliest rusunawa complexes designed by the LPP re-created the
feel, versatility, and adaptability of the kampung environment
in vertical space.)83 Newer rusunawa, however, with their
standardized layouts, cramped units, smaller common spaces,
regulated use, and lack of participatory design, hardly provide
such stimulating living environments.
Around the world, inclusionary zoning and other planning
incentives are being used to boost the production of affordable
housing.84 This has not caught on in Indonesia. Fast-tracking
building permits for affordable housing is one of the few
incentives that exist for Indonesian developers, and even this is
rare. 85 Our interviews revealed that Surabaya neither plans to
collaborate with the provincial government to build rusunawa
for riverbank squatters (since they occupy provincial land) nor
does it intend to incentivize inclusionary zoning for private
developers—either because it perceives such measures to be
complicated or not urgent.
3. TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE
THROUGH SURABAYA’S INNOVATIVE
SHELTER INITIATIVES
This section discusses key triggers of change in informal
housing policy in Surabaya and explores how enabling factors
sustained positive development and strengthened coalitions
of actors working towards innovative shelter policy. Surabaya’s
unique approach to affordable urban upgrading is reflected
by its vibrant kampung, which have proved to be a resilient
asset over the decades. Upgrading kampung has contributed to
economic development, which has helped to sustain poverty
alleviation; as recently as 2009–14, poverty rates in Surabaya fell
from 8.2 percent to 5.8 percent. The kampung also provide the
86
poor with affordable housing (even in central urban locations)
and extensive livelihood options. The city’s kampung-centered
planning approach87 was bolstered by initiatives intended to
promote community participation and build the capacity of
kampung communities to actively participate in planning and
manage neighborhood-level services. These efforts earned
the city government a high degree of trust from the citizenry,
especially the poor.
Life in the Kampung after KIP
The remarkable transformation of Surabaya’s kampung is
evident in their improved physical and environmental quality
and also the strong sense of civic responsibility of kampung
residents (see Figure 6). A walk through almost any upgraded
kampung usually reveals clean streets, finished with concrete
paver blocks and speed bumps. All houses clearly display
14 |
numbers, and lanes have proper street signs. It is common
for residents to adorn lanes with green and flowering plants.
Almost all homes have toilets that are connected to individual
septic tanks; communal toilets of the early KIP days are now
rare. Houses typically have plastered brick walls, paved floors,
corrugated metal or tiled roofs, and reasonable structural
integrity—a result of steady, incremental self-improvements.
Small garbage receptacles are ubiquitously placed in front of
almost every house, and pushcart food hawkers, a characteristic
fixture of the kampung, carry their trash and/or put it in
receptacles along streets.88 Signs exhorting people to not litter
used to be pervasive but are now rare and unnecessary, which
further signals transformed civic behavior. Waste still gets
collected by uniformed, paid waste collectors in pushcarts or
pedi-carts; originally, the city assembled this crew by organizing
informal scavengers.89 Garbage from multiple kampung goes to
a large dumpster site where trucks then haul it to landfills.
Neighborhood-level waste is commonly managed by the RT-RW
structure. Since the days of KIP, the city planning agency and
other local government units persistently pursued “socialization”
to spread community awareness about health and hygiene.90 The
city utilized teams from the LPP to conduct regular evaluations;
their advice helped refine efforts to institutionalize grassroots
community participation through the omnipresent RT and RW.
The city initially trained subdistrict and district heads, and they
in turn trained and managed their respective RT and RW heads.
Over the decades, this participatory innovation was incorporated
into other interventions, such as family planning, primary health
and education, and youth programs.
Traditional community-managed revolving credit mechanisms
were also integrated into many initiatives to enhance their
financial feasibility. Initially, regional microfinance CSOs like
Women’s Devotion to Solidarity (Setia Bakti Wanita) offered
district officials and RT and RW heads training in community
engagement and managing revolving funds.91 Beginning in the
early 1980s, their district office would regularly invite residents
to various training meetings. With time, many kampung
cooperatives and CBOs emerged to engage in grassroots
community activities.92 In our interviews, the residents stressed
that their district and subdistrict officials were sincerely
committed to kampung improvement. One interviewee’s remark
particularly underscores the significant transformation in
community attitudes and consciousness specifically around
waste management:
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

We always exhorted people to dispose their household into tourist destinations. Deploying new technologies has
waste in the trash bins. But people also dumped used also improved citywide traffic management.100 Likewise, solid
diapers and sanitary napkins in the bins. . . . The waste waste management has been significantly upgraded, and some
collectors complained about handling such unhygienic kampung actively undertake recycling and composting. Another
and foul-smelling waste. So we in the cooperatives and recent innovation to combat plastic waste is the public “green
the RT/RW asked our community members to wash and bus,” which only accepts used plastic bottles for fare.101
dry diapers before disposing them in tightly secured
In 2011, responding to further decentralization of power, Mayor
plastic bags. . . . Some people are still inconsiderate, but
Risma made Surabaya the first Indonesian city to take over
the vast majority now does so.93
property tax collection, which improved collections from land
and construction taxes and land sale duties.102 Between 2010 and
Mayor Tri Rismaharini (Risma) as a 2017, local revenue generation increased from Rp 4.2 trillion to
Change Agent almost Rp 9 trillion, raising its contribution to the city budget
During the second half of the twentieth century, under the New from a fifth to a half.103 Mayor Risma’s reform measures would
Order, continued mayoral support enabled Surabaya’s kampung- likely not have been as effective without high levels of capacity
focused participatory planning to flourish. Decades of sustained and trust, developed over four decades of prior participatory
kampung upgrading strengthened the capacity of Surabaya’s development efforts, in local government departments and
city planning department, service delivery agencies, and local kampung communities.
communities to coordinate development interventions. Yet the
centralized, top-down approach characteristic of the New Order Triggers for Pro-poor Shelter Upgrading
routinized local government work and stifled innovation. When
Strong political will and support have been critical for Surabaya’s
Risma was elected as the country’s first female mayor in 2010,
success with KIPs. Johan Silas’s ideas and philosophy were a
she tried to change this by championing kampung-centered
trigger for transformative change in urban housing. Silas’s
participatory policies reminiscent of KIP and CKIP. Mayor
philosophy of kampung autonomy was likely solidified during
Risma’s policies are generally well accepted because she is seen
the mid-1970s by his personal friendship with John F.C. Turner,
as embracing a pro-poor, pro-environment, and anti-corruption
who brought international attention to self-help housing—
platform and has built a reputation as a feared taskmaster.94 Her
an underlying principle of slum upgrading.104 In addition,
administration has focused on leveraging technology to build
collaboration between the city and the ITS deepened over time
“smart” and sustainable kampung and upgrade their human
and expanded to other planning endeavors.
development levels95 while using information technology and
data analysis to enhance transparency and reduce corruption Suharto’s New Order regime and his mayoral appointee in
in city offices. Emerging scholarship on public leadership in Surabaya, Colonel Raden Soekotjo, were supportive of early
Asia attributes her popularity and the success of her pro-poor shelter upgrading plans. Colonel Soekotjo was also a close friend
measures to the fact that people sense genuine empathy in her of Silas, 105 whom he commissioned to create a master plan
actions. 96
for Surabaya.106 Silas’s visionary plan rejected mass housing
blocks in favor of preserving the kampung. The dozen mayors
Under Mayor Risma’s administration, extensive efforts have been
since Colonel Soekotjo were mostly pro-poor and supportive of
made to landscape street medians, sidewalks, and riparian edges
sustaining the form and ways of life of the kampung.107 Mayor
as well as to develop pocket parks. As a result, green open spaces
Risma, one of Silas’s most famous pupils, is the embodiment of
now cover 20 percent of city area.97 In addition, more than 250
this trend.108
km of roads have been widened or added.98 Narrow streets in
the city’s poorer neighborhoods are being widened by covering
parallel open drains with precast concrete box sections. This
and other flood control measures have reduced the city’s flood-
prone areas from 52 percent to 2 percent99 and have revitalized
once-poor traditional fishing communities (such as Kenjeran)

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 15

International and national recognition for Surabaya’s shelter
upgrading work has helped to maintain the longevity and
momentum of pro-poor housing policies in Indonesia. Since the
1980s, the city has received over 160 international and national
accolades, including the Aga Khan Award for Architecture
and the World Habitat Award.109 Surabaya was left out of
the debut editions of the annual Adipura awards (1986 and
1987), Indonesia’s most prestigious recognition for cities,110
which motivated the city to pursue zealous environmental
management.111 Thereafter, four consecutively successful
years earned it the Adipura Gold (Adipura Kencana). Risma’s
mayorship again brought home the Adipura Gold in 2015 and
2017, when Fortune magazine named her among the top 50
leaders of the world.112
Outside actors also played a large role in initiating and
supporting progressive housing policies. The World Bank’s
support for scaling up KIPs encouraged the national government
and other international donors to support such efforts as well.
Rarely do poverty alleviation programs enjoy such long periods
of uninterrupted and consistent donor assistance.
Recognition for Surabaya’s KIPs likely also inspired nonstate
actors to celebrate kampung improvement and mobilize its
Figure 6 | A typical upgraded kampung
Photo credit: Ashok Das.
16 |
citizenry. Two entities stand out: a radio show called Voice of
Surabaya (Suara Surabaya) and the local daily newspaper Jawa
Pos.113 Launched in 1983 as the first interactive radio program
for commoners to voice concerns, Voice of Surabaya continues to
popularize and criticize development initiatives. Jawa Pos, East
Java’s leading newspaper, has partnered with the city since 2005
and encourages principles of corporate social responsibility.
The paper organized the Surabaya Green and Clean initiative—a
popular annual competition that recognizes cleanliness and
environmental management in the city’s kampung.
Enabling Factors for Pro-poor Shelter
Upgrading
Political support, intellectual and pro-poor leadership,
and community trust were key enabling factors that led to
experimental innovations and allowed different institutions
to work together over long time horizons. National-level
commitment as well as long-term support from the World
Bank combined to create a supportive environment for local-
level innovation that could be scaled up over time. During
the New Order, the RT-RW governance structure allowed for
easy, on-the-ground implementation of programs. During this
period, five-year terms of multiple like-minded mayors, as well
as the absence of dissenting political voices, allowed for policy
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
continuity. The KIPs’ local transformations and their subsequent
nationwide success brought Surabaya national and international
recognition, which enabled greater community participation
and the inclusion of socioeconomic development aims in
urban upgrading. This, in turn, was enabled by the continued
strengthening of Surabaya’s unique city-university-community
coalition.
As much as Silas’s role has been pivotal, not much would have
been accomplished without the cooperation and support of the
city government and the ITS (see Figure 8). Sustained support
from various mayors and the city planning agencies provided
valuable stability and autonomy to innovate, aided by the
unique position of the LPP within the ITS. The city of Surabaya
steadily helped the LPP and the ITS build capacity and establish
intellectual credibility, visibility, and public approbation of its
shelter policy and spatial planning. The city’s use of university
resources to further policy goals was new and innovative.114
Other local universities, including Airlangga, the University of
the 17th of August (Universitas Tujuhbelas Agustus), and Petra
Christian, have stepped up to support other city participatory
initiatives, which bodes well for future coalition building around
transformative ideas.
All of our interviewees emphasized that participatory planning
tends to succeed in Surabaya because its communities are
remarkably harmonious, egalitarian, and collaborative.
Residents’ accounts suggest that since the 1970s, the
pervasiveness of small revolving-credit groups, bolstered by a
large regional network of women’s cooperatives, augmented
the capacity of kampung communities to organize and
partner in local development. 115
It is also likely that the city’s
long history of involving communities in urban upgrading
projects made the communities more receptive and proactive
to change. Local government employees’ efforts to inspire
community engagement in KIPs and other projects also built
up community capacity and deepened people’s trust, which
alludes to the importance of engaged local leadership. Since the
1980s, Surabaya’s population growth has slowed, so pressure on
housing did not surge much or suddenly, leaving some room
for the city to focus on upgrading informal settlements without
rushing to provide new housing.116
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 17
4. SUSTAINING PROGRESSIVE
SHELTER PLANNING: EMERGING
CHALLENGES AND INHIBITORS
The poor have long found affordable housing and livelihood
opportunities in Surabaya’s kampung; both in quality and
abundance, few cities boast such supportive living environments
for those of modest means. A quarter century ago, however,
researchers warned that robust economic growth could turn
the kampung into high-end commercial and residential
developments, pushing the most vulnerable residents out of
their homes.117 Indeed, by the mid-1990s, evidence showed
that land values had increased in most kampung due to rising
demand for land. This, consequently, caused some upgraded
kampung to be demolished and replaced with higher-end
development.118 Surabaya has tried to restrict the razing
of kampung to allow them to thrive even in dense, central
locations, but efforts have not been entirely effective. The
threats from increasing property values and a growing real
estate market still loom ominously over the future of the city’s
kampung-centric and pro-poor legacy.119 These emerging
challenges and complications are explained in more detail in
the next section, followed by a discussion of factors that are
inhibiting transformative change and those helping to sustain
progress.
Emerging Challenges and Complications of
Pro-poor Shelter Policies
Recent housing development trends are working against
pro-poor shelter policies such as KIPs. Private actors began
pursuing large-scale development in Surabaya during the late
1980s, putting pressure on nearby informal settlements that
depended on the availability of cheap land. The city’s first big
shopping mall, Tunjungan Plaza I, was built in 1986 in the city’s
center,120 displacing an existing kampung. In 1988 Ciputra, a
leading Indonesian developer, acquired a 809 ha spread across
Surabaya’s western fringe and the adjoining Gresik regency for
Citraland, a township whose construction began during the
1990s.121 Two other local developers, Pakuwon and Dharmalaya,
initiated similar projects nearby. Despite declining occupancy,
the number of malls had increased by a third by 2018; growth
 Figure 7 | Timeline of Surabaya's shelter policy

1945 1966 1967 1969 1974 1984 1992 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004

Orde Lama (Old

National leadership Order) under Orde Baru (New Order) under President Suharto
President Sukarno

National inclusionary housing regu

National policy Repelita I (1969–74); Repelita II Repelita IV (1984–89); Repelita V

(1974–79); Repelita III (1979–84) (1989-94); Repelita VI (1994–98)

9 appointed
mayors

City leadership Col. Raden Soekotjo 4 appointed New Order mayors 3 mayoral terms and 2 app

W.R. Supratman KIP CKIP (comprehe

Mayor Soekotjo's initiatives
City policy UKIP (urban
for urban infrastructure
focus)
improvements

City-
university
Coalitions
NGOs and academics help
form PPTS—a coalition of
riverbank squatters, informa
vendors, sex workers, and
street children

Johan Silas proposes upgrading Johan Silas–led ITS team

over mass housing for kampung designs city's first rusunawa
Triggers 1986: Surabaya's KIP awarded Aga
1983: Suara Surabaya, an interactive Khan Award for Architecture
radio show, increases awareness

Mayor Soekotjo puts Funding from World Bank and

Johan Silas in charge of other international agencies
spatial planning Uniquely strong sense
Enablers
ITS graduates stren

Poor
Inhibiting factors

18 |
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Reformasi (Reform) post-Suharto, democracy and decentralization – 5 different presidents

National Housing Development Company (Perumnas)

ulation (LHB), 1:3:6 (low:mid:high) National inclusionary housing regulation (LHB) revised to 1:2:3 (low:mid:high)
1,000 Towers program (rusunawa and rusunami) for low- and-middle income groups
National Community Empowerment Program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM urban)

1 Million Houses program

National Slum Upgrading Program

pointed mayors postdecentralization Tri Rismaharini (appointed in 2010, elected in 2016)

ensive)
Rehabilitasi Sosial Daerah Kumuh (RSDK)
Rusunawa replacing upgrading

City-university-community partnerships

p Breakaway faction from PPTS forms PWSS—Surabaya's first CSOs exclusively for squatters
al
d Emerging city–private sector–NGO partnerships for urban environmental mgt

Jawa Pos, a local newspaper, encourages

Surabaya Green and Clean campaign

e of voluntarism, cooperation, and community action in Surabaya's kampung

Local political support for preserving kampung
ngthen Johan Silas's philosophy in local planning and development agencies
Mayor Tri Rismaharini's proactive approach and popular pro-poor policies

Large-scale commercial real estate development

r public transportation and no mass transit burdens the poor
Little implementation of the national inclusionary housing regulation
Rapidly rising land values
Notes: CKIP = Comprehensive Kampung Improvement Project; CSO = civil society organization; KIP = Kampung Improvement Program; LHB = Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang (Balanced
Residential Environment); NGO = nongovernmental organization; PPTS = Paguyuban Pembela Tanah Strenkali (Riverside Community Rights Defenders); PWSS = Paguyuban Warga Strenkali
Surabaya (Surabaya Strenkali People’s Movement).
Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 19

in office space is relatively weak (partly because of the modest
services sector), yet 2016 experienced the largest single-year
addition since 1990. 122
Between 2012 and 2017, over 40 new
hotels opened in Surabaya,123 even in residential areas and
around kampung. Since then, another 50 upscale hotels have
been built or approved. A rarity just a decade ago, apartment
blocks for the higher-income groups now dominate Surabaya’s
western and eastern skylines, and their supply has risen annually
by over 200 percent.124
This “mega influx of capital” into the property market, as one
expert describes it,125 has sent land prices soaring. In 1980,
an 8 m by 20 m plot in what is now a lower-middle-income,
centrally located kampung cost about Rp 9,000 ($14.35) per
m;2 126
in 2017, it cost at least Rp 2 million ($149). 127
Land prices
have dramatically risen, and as of 2017 they have mostly
hovered between Rp 1 million and Rp 3 million ($75 and $224)
per m ; along fast-evolving, mixed-use corridors like Mayjen
2
Sungkono, prices reach Rp 60 million ($4,484) per m . 2 128
The
lucrative nature of real estate has even turned public sector
companies into housing developers if they own enough land.
One example is Jasa Marga, a public sector toll road operator
turned housing developer that has prioritized higher-end, more
profitable developments over affordable housing.129 The fact that
many state entities (the so-called “land banks”) own large tracts
of public land seriously distorts the market. 130
In some cases
developers have displaced kampung residents by unscrupulous
means, and large developments raise land and building taxes
in nearby kampung and threaten their physical integrity.131
Young people who grew up in Surabaya’s kampung are moving
to peri-urban jurisdictions in search of affordable rents, less
congestion, and more space, despite the fact that in the long run,
the perceived economic advantage is lost to costs incurred from
commuting and congestion.132
The spatial expansion of the metropolitan region has exposed
Surabaya’s grossly inadequate public transportation network as a
major impediment to sustainable and equitable development.
Buses are the only current public mode of transit, and their share
of overall trips is just 3.5 percent. (The green bus mentioned
earlier is a welcome move, but its coverage is limited and its
fare system limits access.) Sluggish private minibuses (bemo)
used to be the transportation choice for lower-middle-income
commuters until easy credit access exploded motorcycle
ownership. Public transit provision is challenged by narrow
roads, a small road network (approximately 6 percent of land
area),134 widespread high-density residential areas, and a
20 |
multinucleated concentration of jobs. This makes it hard to
provide kampung residents with easy access to urban services
like jobs, health care, and schools.
The traditional location of many kampung close to the center of
the city has helped to mitigate the negative effects of peripheral
growth and lack of good transport in Surabaya, but challenges
remain (see Figure 4). Therefore, improving transport over
the long term is necessary to improve access to urban services
for low-income residents. Low demand for transport in the
predecentralization period, along with scarce available funds
postdecentralization, have stalled any investments to improve
public transit infrastructure.135 Mayor Risma’s current plan to
reintroduce a Dutch-era tram by retracing an older route will not
alleviate the transportation deficit, either, because the proposed
short corridor is in the city’s core, which is already better served
by buses and minibuses.136 Intergovernmental conflict and
poor coordination bedevil construction of new transportation
infrastructure. Most streets are the city’s responsibility, but even
improving them can be difficult if they are owned by higher
levels of government.137 Community activists in Surabaya allege
that conflicts and disagreements among various agencies
responsible for providing infrastructure and services also hurt
the prospects of urban upgrading and resettlement projects for
squatters.138
Inhibitors to Progressive Planning
There are many factors that have inhibited progressive planning
in Surabaya. For one, rising land values and inadequate public
transit are disproportionately burdening Surabaya’s poor
by limiting the space and increasing the fiscal and political
cost of implementing pro-poor policies. The city’s few new
rusunawa are in peripheral locations or are far from main roads,
some unserved even by minibuses (see Figure 5). Also, the
misalignment of national policies with on-the-ground realities
and developers’ constraints makes the 1:2:3 ratio of luxury
133 units to middle- and low-income units for inclusionary zoning
ineffective. The current stipulation applies only to detached
homes, requiring affordable units to be built right beside high-
income units. Where land is expensive or scarce, enforcing
this has proved challenging. Surabaya has hinted at amending
the regulation but has not consulted with developers, and
participatory planning beyond the neighborhood scale is not yet
the norm in Surabaya.139
Contradictory policy objectives and a reluctance to incorporate
informal workers and housing into the city proper has
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

Figure 8 | Landscape of urban change agents in Surabaya

Universities
(primarily ITS)

Private Sector

Corporate firms

State Community

Formal
City agencies
kampung
(Planning, etc.)
communities

Sub-city units Informal

(Kecamatan, Kelurahan) settlements

Civil society

NGOs & other CSOs

= Deliberative/ = Guiding or = Oppositional, = Philanthropic

collaborative (decision- training
making) untrusting

 Solid arrow = strong relationship; Dashed arrow = weak or occasional relationship

Notes: ITS = Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology); CSO = Civil society organization.
Source: Authors.

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 21

intensified Surabaya’s affordable shelter challenge. For
example, the city is encouraging big real estate development
within its jurisdiction yet also advocates for the improvement
of access to services for the urban poor living in kampung,
making them “smart” communities that are connected to
broader city infrastructure and opportunities. It is hard to
prioritize the interests of both big real estate and poor informal
communities. Another conflict arises because cities desire
economic development but not the poor migrants that such
development attracts. Similar to administrations before hers
and in other cities, and despite the overall championing of pro-
poor policies, Mayor Risma has been generally unwelcoming to
migrant communities in Surabaya. This indicates insufficient
understanding of how urbanization and informality are linked
in a developing society. Research shows that large real estate
projects stimulate the informal sector and bring in migrant
workers.140 But because Mayor Risma has so far perpetuated
a traditional bias against informal migrant communities in
the city center, she has pushed to relocate manufacturing
units and housing to surrounding regions.141 Whereas Mayor
Risma made public high school free for Surabaya’s legal
residents, enrollment of migrant children, even in primary
schools, is greatly restricted. The city has banned informal
vendors on many streets, and it regularly conducts “sweeps”
(unannounced raids) to apprehend those squatters and vagrants
who lack identification cards. Whisked away to facilities for
the mentally ill and street children (liponsos), these persons are
fingerprinted, “reformed,” and urged to return to their families
outside Surabaya. 142
Given Surabaya’s robust administration
and transparency initiatives, it is unclear why city-level data on
slums and squatters are unavailable or inaccessible. 143
Allegedly,
the city planning department has such information144 but does
not publish it for fear of jeopardizing its status as an Adipura
awardee.145
The exclusionary treatment of migrants and squatters in
Surabaya (which is a pervasive problem across developing
countries), is partly attributable to the technocratic nature of
urban planning education. Surabaya’s planning officials are
mostly engineers and architects who have had little exposure
to social science theories of equity, justice, inclusivity, social
learning, or the nuances of civil society and governance.146
Without interdisciplinary training, progressive, pro-poor urban
planning that protects the interests of the most vulnerable city
dwellers is hard to achieve.147 Compounding this challenge is the
22 |
legacy of Indonesian planning efforts to manage development
through rigid population controls, discouraging migration as
well as forcing migrants into specific areas, usually outside
of the city center.148 Despite the inclusive nature of Silas’s
outlook—which held kampung to be an abundant, inclusive, and
affordable shelter option—few housing improvement projects
have been targeted at migrants. Progressive shelter policy has
almost never taken into account migrants and squatters because
they are generally considered illegal. Despite their ample
exposure to kampung, few ITS architecture students (many of
whom are now city practitioners) question this exclusionary
propensity.
Lasting political leadership on pro-poor shelter policies is
uncertain and threatens progressive planning. Change agents
like Silas and Mayor Risma promoted affordable housing by
preserving Surabaya’s kampung and helping their residents
thrive, and continuing this positive legacy will require new
leaders to champion pro-poor policies.
5. CONCLUSION
Surabaya’s pro-poor shelter planning has affected broader
transformations for more than 50 years. In situ participatory
urban upgrading remains one of the most viable planning
interventions for providing secure and affordable housing to
the poor in developing countries.149 Surabaya’s success with
upgrading kampung is due to multiple factors—visionary and
zealous leadership; political will and commitment; sustained,
long-term financial support; continuous city-university-
community collaboration that built institutional capacity and
intellectual credibility; and, consequently, enhanced community
capacity and trust in local government. Democratization and
decentralization in 1999 overhauled planning and governance
and yielded considerable improvements. But resource
constraints, rising land values, an expanding real estate sector,
and the absence of a comprehensive affordable housing
policy are eroding Surabaya’s pro-poor shelter commitment.
A lingering vestige of the New Order150 is the local planning
apparatus’s prejudice against poor migrants and wariness of
CSOs. Current siloed academic curricula inhibit progressive
innovation and fail to inspire students to believe that urban
planning can and should address issues of social injustice. Still,
Surabaya serves as an exemplar for developing cities faced with
the shelter challenges associated with rapid urbanization.
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
KIP—Surabaya’s famed low-cost innovation—upgraded and
sustained poor kampung through community participation for
nearly three decades. The unique partnership between Silas, the
LPP, and the city government fostered policy consistency and
innovation around KIPs and brought attention and credibility to
the program. Long-term international funding during the New
Order helped to scale KIPs, improving affordable housing across
urban Indonesia. Successive mayoral support for KIPs built
invaluable trust in kampung communities and bolstered their
capacity for participatory planning, which is reflected in their
strong communitarian ethos. Surabaya’s successful upgrading
programs have preserved abundant, centrally located kampung
that still provide affordable rental options and informal
livelihoods to most of the city’s poor, including migrants. People
of different incomes mix across varied land uses in kampung, as
do formality and informality, while regulations and norms are
flexibly enforced; yet kampung boast good infrastructure, clean
and safe environments, and cohesive and proud communities.
Unfortunately, rising property values and real estate demand
are pushing modest-income households out to peripheral
regions and are threatening the unique kampung ecosystem
and the resilience of poor communities. Unprecedented spatial
expansion, traffic congestion, and nonexistent public transit are
further burdening the poor.
Although decentralization empowers cities to design better
policies and customized implementation plans, Surabaya
experienced growing pains after the sudden change in national
governance in 1999 and received limited guidance or support
along with newfound autonomy. This explains why CKIP,
Surabaya’s postdecentralization KIP variant for community-led
economic development, was much less impactful. Upgrading
efforts have since dwindled. The incumbent mayor, Risma, is
avowedly pro-poor and pro-kampung; nonetheless, she favors
rusunawa because the city only has to provide the land and the
national government pays the construction costs. Yet demand
for these public rental housing flats far outstrips supply, and
rusunawa discourage the poor’s home-based livelihoods. The
execution of reform measures that Mayor Risma has introduced
has been aided by the existence of adequate capacity and trust
in the city’s departments and communities, due to efforts dating
back to the earliest KIPs. Still, the fact that Risma continues
to deny migrants access to rusunawa, welfare, and work, or
encourages them to move out of the city entirely, reflects an
institutional history of prejudice against poor migrants and has
proved counterproductive to the city’s progressive reforms.
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 23
Surabaya’s planners and policymakers receive a highly
technical education, with scant exposure to contemporary
planning perspectives on social justice and inclusivity; this
means that the exclusionary treatment of poor migrants
tends to go unchallenged. Planning curricula need to be
more interdisciplinary, critical, and contextual.151 Surabaya’s
participatory planning model for kampung has excluded
independent CSOs—no formal shelter initiative has ever
involved NGOs, which have mainly focused on supporting
informal settlements instead of kampung. This stymies the
innovation, efficiency, and accountability of robust state–civil
society collaboration.152 Nascent civil society efforts to generate
dialogue around urban issues are afoot, but NGOs that focus
on housing do not exist. Surabaya’s first grassroots squatter
movement, too, is dissipating. Surabaya has long been a model
for other cities; yet to broaden its pro-poor perspective to make
it more inclusive, its planners should draw inspiration and ideas
from other cities. In Surakarta, Indonesia, for instance, the
mayor led the inclusive relocation of over a thousand squatter
households and informal vendors and extended welfare services
to poor migrants.153 Likewise, in Jakarta, where even given
that city’s fraught context, thousands of the poorest kampung
households benefited from in situ upgrading and low-rise
redevelopment under the Kampung Deret program.154 Another
example comes from Thailand’s Baan Mankong program, where
participatory upgrading has included squatters and has involved
numerous civil society stakeholders.155
Charismatic individuals like Silas and Mayor Risma have
been instrumental in transforming attitudes and institutions
in Surabaya. To ensure that their transformative energy and
prowess will endure, it is important that reform-oriented
thinking and progressive leadership be institutionalized by
expanding the range of involved stakeholders. More critical
research is needed to grow the emerging scholarship on
leadership in governance and planning156—something local
universities, public agencies, and CSOs could promote locally
and nationally. With land pressures intensifying and prices
soaring, private sector development supported by government
leaders threaten the city’s admirable shelter planning legacy
and public good imperative.157 Relying solely on the KIP or
CKIP approaches may not be sufficient to respond to the
increasing complexities of today’s urban development context.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
INTERVIEW
DATE
NUMBER
1 August 10, 2017
2 August 10, 2017
3 August 13, 2017
4 August 14, 2017
5 August 16, 2017
6 August 16, 2017
7 August 16, 2017
8 August 18, 2017
9 August 18, 2017
10 August 19, 2017
11 August 20, 2017
12 August 20, 2017
13 August 20, 2017
14 August 21, 2017
15 August 21, 2017
16 August 22, 2017
17 August 23, 2017
18 August 23, 2017
19 August 24, 2017
20 August 25, 2017
24 |
POSITION AND AFFILIATION
Johan Silas, public university professor; KIP founder
City planning official
Private sector and civil society representative (architecture, urbanism)
Private citizen (upper-middle class)
Public university professor (environmental engineering)
Private sector representative (senior director with real estate developer)
Private sector representative (architect with real estate developer)
Private university professor (architecture)
Private university professor (architecture)
Civil society representative and grassroots activist
Foreign university professor (arts, architecture) and civil society representative
Civil society representative (product design, urbanism)
Private citizen (lower-middle class)
Public university researcher (architecture, housing)
Public university researcher (architecture, housing)
Private university researcher (architecture, civil society)
Tri Rismaharini, Mayor of Surabaya
Private citizen (lower-middle class)
City planning official
Public university professor and researcher (architecture, housing)
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

ENDNOTES 24. Rukmana, 2015.

25. MLIT, 2017.
1. Beard et al., 2016.
26. MLIT, 2017.
2. In the national language (Bahasa Indonesia), the word
kampung refers to formal low-income settlements, traditional 27. Das, 2018b: 244; Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014: 168.
neighborhoods, and squatter settlements, as well as village 28. Swanendri, 2002.
or hometown. Unlike the common perception of a slum, many
kampung were never illegal encroachments. However, prior to 29. World Bank, 1995.
upgrading, most had slum-like physical and socioeconomic 30. Interview 1.
conditions. We use the term kampung to denote both the singular
31. Mukoko and Supriharjo, 1996: 63.
and the plural meanings.
32. Wakely and Riley, 2011: 27.
Urban upgrading, slum upgrading, or just upgrading are similar
3. 
terms that reflect personal preferences, nuances in the literature, 33. Authors’ conversion of figures, cited by Mukoko and Supriharjo
or contextual differences. This paper uses them interchangeably; (1996: 65), using historical rates provided by the currency
unless specified otherwise, in Indonesia they imply upgrading converter FXTOP, https://fxtop.com.
kampung.
34. Mukoko and Supriharjo, 1996: 65.
4. Silas, 2016; Das, 2018b.
35. Banes, 2001: 11.
5. King et al., 2017.
36. World Bank, 1995: 13–14.
6. Inspired by Surabaya’s success, KIPs were implemented in many
37. World Bank, 1993: 61.
cities as part of national five-year development programs, but
there was no nationwide slum upgrading plan. Few cities do 38. World Bank, 1995; Patton and Subanu, 1988; and scores of
initiate a slum upgrading plan on their own, without national articles on individual projects.
support. 39. World Bank, 1995.
7. Das, 2017; Ostojic et al., 2013: 139. 40. BSHF, 2004.
8. A portmanteau term alluding to the names of Surabaya and six 41. World Bank, 1995: 20, 53.
neighboring regencies.
42. Das, 2008: 243–44; Swanendri, 2002.
9. World Bank, 2012.
43. Swanendri, 2002: 185; World Bank, 1995.
10. Dick et al., 2002; IE Singapore, 2014.
44. Swanendri, 2002.
11. Beard et al., 2016.
45. Das, 2008: 245–46.
12. Beard et al., 2016: 7.
46. Das, 2015c.
13. Mahendra and Seto, 2019; Roy and AlSayyad, 2004.
47. Das, 2015c: 260.
14. Roy, 2005.
48. Das, 2015b: 26; Antlöv et al., 2010: 434.
15. Mahendra and Seto, 2019.
49. Das, 2015a.
16. Das, 2018b.
50. Interview 1.
17. World Bank, 2016b.
51. Das, 2008, 2015a.
18. World Bank, 2016b.
52. Das, 2015a: 17.
19. Gibson, 2017.
53. Das, 2015b.
20. Silas, 1989.
54. The LPP (until 2002) and two private civil engineering/
21. Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001. construction consultants— Cipta Surya Wahana (CSW) (2003–
22. Das, 2018b; Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014. 2005) and Compagnie Vereniging Triwira Jasatama (2006–
2007)—were the only ones the city appointed as so-called NGO
23. Most recently, through the Mayoral Regulations (Peraturan Wali
facilitators (Das, 2008: 303–4). In part, this reflects Indonesia’s
Kota) of 2016 (e.g., nos. 33, 43, 44, 45, 69).
ambiguity and ambivalence about NGOs—a New Order vestige
(Eldridge, 2006).

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 25

55. Das, 2015a. 88. The traditional prototype is a yellow, lidded receptacle made of
recycled rubber tires. Concrete cubes are more common now, and
56. Interviews 14 and 15.
the use of different colored plastic bins, for organic and inorganic
57. Roy, 2005; Tacoli et al., 2014. waste, is spreading fast.
58. See Das (2017) on why it is imprudent to deny services to poor 89. Silas, 1998.
migrants who do not possess KTP.
90. Das, 2015c: 260.
59. Das, 2015c.
91. Interview 18; Das, 2015c: 262.
60. Interview 15.
92. Das, 2008: 265–66.
61. World Bank, 2016a: 47.
93. Interview 18.
62. Das, 2017; Rolnik, 2013.
94. Interviews 2, 3, and 4.
63. Das, 2017; Taylor, 2015.
95. Interview 17.
64. Interviews 10 and 16.
96. Diliani and Susanti (2015) argue that her approach is perceived
65. Interview 10. as being “motherly”; Fionna, 2017.
66. Interview 10; Das, 2017. 97. IE Singapore, 2014.
67. Interview 10. 98. Interview 19.
68. Taylor, 2015. 99. Interview 17.
69. Squatter communities were demolished on August 12, 2016, just 100. Risma personally monitors major intersections from her office
days after Surabaya hosted PrepCom3—the final deliberations using a wall of large LCD screens with live closed-circuit television
before Habitat-III in Quito, where the New Urban Agenda was feeds.
adopted.
101. Star2.com, 2018.
70. Perumnas has since built over half a million rusunawa and
102. The two main sources are the land and building tax and the
rusunami units (see http://perumnas.co.id).
property transfer tax (von Haldenwang et al., 2015).
71. Rusunawa is a portmanteau term for rumah susun sederhana
103. Based on figures provided by mayoral staff in Surabaya over
sewa, and rusunami for rumah susun sederhana milik.
multiple days, August 2017.
72. Interview 1.
104. For instance, see Turner, 1977.
73. Interview 1.
105. Interview 1. As a young, inspired architect during the mid-1960s,
74. Das, 2018b. Johan Silas and a few like-minded architects established the first
75. Das, 2018b. three architecture schools in Surabaya, including those at Petra
Christian University and the ITS. Soekotjo had appreciated these
76. Rolnik, 2013: 9–10. The aim of the program was to build 1,000 efforts and knew Silas as his firm’s civil defense volunteer with
towers by 2011; however, by 2012 only about 100 had been built the army—a mandatory requirement then.
(Pathoni, 2012).
106. Colombijn, 2016.
77. Beritasatu, 2015.
107. Interviews 1 and 5.
78. Rismaharini, 2016.
108. As an undergraduate architecture student, she successfully
79. Previously, rusunawa renters were allowed to reside for a persuaded Silas to use her as his research assistant on the
maximum of nine years, including extensions. Dupak rusunawa project.
80. Yuniati, 2013. 109. For more information on the city’s awards and recognition, see its
81. Widoyoko, 2007; Yuniati, 2013. official website, http://surabaya.go.id/id/cari?q=penghargaan.

82. Tunas and Darmoyono, 2014.
83. Rusunawa Sombo (1994), designed by a Silas-led LPP team,
exemplifies how patient community consultations and careful
design re-created kampung life in vertical space (field visit;
interviews 11 and 12).
110. Indonesia’s Ministry of the Environment initiated this competition
in 1986 to recognize cities for cleanliness and environmental
management. It stopped in 1997 and was resumed in 2002. For
details, see Dethier, 2017.
111. Silas, 1998.

84. Mukhija et al., 2015. 112. Fortune, 2015.

85. Interview 6. 113. Interview 20.

86. Das, 2017. 114. Interview 9.

87. Das, 2017; interviews 1, 5, 11, 14, 15, 19, and 20. 115. Interview 18; Das, 2008: 295.

26 |
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements

116. Surabaya’s population growth rate fell from around 3 percent 138. Das, 2017: 16; Taylor, 2015.
in 1980 to 0.65 percent in 2010 (Ostojic et al., 2013: 139).
139. Interviews 8 and 9.
Among Indonesia’s 11 largest cities, Surabaya’s projected rate of
population growth through 2025 is the lowest (see World Bank, 140. Kundu and Kundu, 2010; Rumbach, 2014.
2012: 25.) 141. Interview 17.
117. World Bank, 1995: 7. 142. Interview 17; Jawa Pos, 2017.
118. World Bank, 1995. 143. Interview 9; Das, 2017.
119. Interviews 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, and 20. 144. Interview 19.
120. Multiple Tunjungan Plaza (TP) malls have since appeared on 145. Interview 9.
adjacent sites; the latest, TP-VI, became operational in 2017. Out
146. Das, 2018a.
of 14 shopping centers and mixed-use retail projects that were to
start operating from 2016 (Salanto, 2015: 16), 5 have opened 147. Das, 2018a; Kumar et al., 2016.
and another 5 should be functional before 2021 (Salanto, 2018:
148. For a long time, Indonesia’s transmigration program (transmigrasi)
2, Retail).
relocated landless people from densely populated to sparsely
121. Interview 6. populated regions, but this also induced ethnic strife, communal
violence, and separatist movements (Fearnside, 1997).
122. Salanto, 2015: 2.
149. King et al., 2017.
123. Interview 3.
150. Antlöv et al., 2010.
124. In 2013, it was 233 percent, and in 2014 it was 207 percent (see
Salanto, 2015: 9.) 151. Das, 2018a.
125. Interview 3. 152. Das, 2018b.
126. Local currency figures were converted using the 1980 US$ 153. Taylor, 2015.
exchange rate at 627.
154. Rukmana, 2015.
127. Interview 18. Local currency figures were converted using the
155. Das, 2018b; WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities, 2016.
2017 US$ exchange rate from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) at 13,380.87. 156. Berman and Haque, 2015; Fahmi et al., 2016.

128. Interview 6. Local currency figures were converted using the 2017 157. Interview 10; Rolnik, 2013.
US$ exchange rate from OECD at 13,380.87.
129. Interview 6.
130. Pugh, 1992; Sivam, 2002.
131. Interview 9.
132. Today, a 20 km commute by car from Surabaya’s edge to
neighboring Sidoarjo takes up to three hours (interview 16).
133. Almost every key informant pointed to this as Surabaya’s key
planning lacuna.
134. Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012: 5.
135. Interviews 1, 19, and 20.
136. Interview 3; Bertaud and Bertaud, 2012.
137. The difficulty of coordinating with the national government to
expand Jl. Achmadyani, a major road, led Mayor Risma to instead
seek its approbation to acquire adjoining land to construct five
one-way lanes on either side of the existing road.⁠ However, it
is nearly impossible for pedestrians and nonmotorized traffic to
cross this 4.3 km stretch (interviews 9 and 19).

WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 27

REFERENCES
AECOM International Development, Sandec (Department of Water
and Sanitation in Developing Countries), and Eawag (Swiss Federal
Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology). 2010. A Rapid
Assessment of Septage Management in Asia: Policies and Practices
in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
and Vietnam. Bangkok, Thailand: U.S. Agency for International
Development, Regional Development Mission for Asia.
Antlöv, H., D.W. Brinkerhoff, and E. Rapp. 2010. “Civil Society
Capacity Building for Democratic Reform: Experience and Lessons
from Indonesia.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations 21 (3): 417–39.
Banes, C. 2001. Enhancing Access of the Urban Poor and
Vulnerable Groups in Vietnam to Basic Infrastructure and Services:
Review of Recent and On-going Urban Upgrading Programs.
Sevenoakes, UK: Banes Dawes Associates.
Beard, V.A., A. Mahendra, and M.I. Westphal. 2016. “Towards
a More Equal City: Framing the Challenges and Opportunities.”
Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Beritasatu. 2015. “Wali kota Surabaya tidak tertarik bangun
Rusunami,” January 31. http://www.beritasatu.com/
nasional/245257-wali-kota-surabaya-tidak-tertarik-bangun-
rusunami.html. Accessed September 15, 2018.
Berman, E., and M. Haque, eds. 2015. Asian Leadership in Policy
and Governance. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
Bertaud, A., and M.-A. Bertaud. 2012. “Note on Surabaya Mobility
and Housing Issues.” Alain Bertaud, August 23. http://alainbertaud.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/AB_Note-on-Surabaya-land-
use-and-transport_Aug_23_back_up.pdf. Accessed September 26,
2019.
Biaya dan Tarif. 2017. “Tarif angkot bus kota dan bus antar kota
Surabaya.” http://www.biaya.net/2017/02/tarif-angkot-bus-kota-
dan-bus-antar-kota-surabaya.html. Accessed September 15, 2018.
Booth, A. 2000. “Poverty and Inequality in the Soeharto Era: An
Assessment.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 36 (1): 73.
BSHF (Building and Social Housing Foundation). 2004. The
Kampung Improvement Programme, Surabaya. Coalville, UK: BSHF.
Colombijn, F. 2016. “‘I Am a Singer’: A Conversation with Johan
Silas, Architect and Urban Planner in Surabaya, Indonesia.”
Indonesia (102): 7–30.
Cybriwsky, R., and L.R. Ford. 2001. “City Profile: Jakarta.” Cities 18
(3): 199–210.
Das, A. 2015a. “Autonomous but Constrained: CBOS and Urban
Upgrading in Indonesia.” Cities 48 (November): 8–20.
28 |
Das, A. 2015b. “Participatory Slum Upgrading: Lessons from
Post-decentralization India and Indonesia.” Journal of Indonesian
Regional Development and Environment 1 (1): 15–34.
Das, A. 2015c. “Slum Upgrading with Community-Managed
Microfinance: Towards Progressive Planning in Indonesia.” Habitat
International 47 (June): 256–66.
Das, A. 2017. “A City of Two Tales: Shelter and Migrants in
Surabaya.” Environment and Urbanization ASIA 8 (1): 1–21.
Das, A. 2018a. “For an Equitable Indonesian City: Reflections
on Planning Practice and Education.” Ruang, September
18. https://www.dropbox.com/sh/9vel789n1t4lrwr/
AAA-ce5ioK3prm2cqctXH1yia/02_Digital%20
Magazine?dl=0&preview=Ruang+%2312+Edukasi+(Juli+2019).
pdf&subfolder_nav_tracking=1. Accessed October 1, 2018.
Das, A. 2018b. “Is Innovative Also Effective? A Critique of Pro-poor
Shelter in South-East Asia.” International Journal of Housing Policy
18 (2): 233–65.
Das, A.K. 2008. “Lofty Ideal, Hefty Deal: Empowerment through
Participatory Slum Upgrading in India and Indonesia.” PhD diss.
University of California, Los Angeles.
Dasgupta, A., and V.A. Beard. 2007. “Community Driven
Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia.”
Development and Change 38 (2): 229–49.
Dethier, J.-J. 2017. “Trash, Cities, and Politics: Urban Environmental
Problems in Indonesia.” Indonesia 103 (1): 73–90.
Dick, H., V.J.H. Houben, J.T. Lindblad, and T.K. Wie. 2002. The
Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of
Indonesia, 1800–2000. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Diliani, D.S.N.A, and D.S. Susanti. 2015. “A Female Leader in
Executive Service: The Case of Mayor Risma of Surabaya.” In Asian
Leadership in Policy and Governance, edited by E. Berman and M.S.
Haque, 287–304. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.
Eldridge, P.J. 2006. “Nongovernmental Organizations and
Democratic Transition in Indonesia.” In Civil Society, Globalization
and Political Change in Asia: Organizing between Family and State,
edited by R. Weller, 148–70. New York: Routledge.
Fahmi, F.Z., M.I. Prawira, D. Hudalah, and T. Firman. 2016.
“Leadership and Collaborative Planning: The Case of Surakarta,
Indonesia.” Planning Theory 15 (3): 294–315.
Fearnside, P.M. 1997. “Transmigration in Indonesia: Lessons from
Its Environmental and Social Impacts.” Environmental Management
21 (4): 553–70.
Fionna, U. 2017. Investigating the Popularity of Surabaya’s Mayor Tri
Rismaharini. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies–Yusof
Ishak Institute.
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
Fortune. 2015. “The World’s 50 Greatest Leaders: Tri Rismaharini.”
http://fortune.com/worlds-greatest-leaders/2015/tri-rismaharini.
Accessed September 20, 2018.
Gibson, L. 2017. “Towards a More Equal Indonesia: How the
Government Can Take Action to Close the Gap between the Richest
and the Rest.” Oxfam Briefing Paper. Oxford, UK: Oxfam.
IE (International Enterprise) Singapore. 2014. Surabaya City Brief.
Singapore: Singapore Government.
Jawa Pos. 2017. “Penghuni liponsos di-fingerprint,” December
5. https://www.jawapos.com/metro/metropolis/12/05/2017/
penghuni-liponsos-di-fingerprint. Accessed September 20, 2018.
King, R., M. Orloff, T. Virsilas, and T. Pande. 2017. “Confronting
the Urban Housing Crisis in the Global South: Adequate, Secure,
and Affordable Housing.” Working Paper. Washington, DC: World
Resources Institute.
Kundu, A., and D. Kundu. 2010. “Globalization and Exclusionary
Urban Growth in Asian Countries.” WIDER Working Paper
2010/070. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for
Development Economics Research.
Mahendra, A., and K.C. Seto. 2019. “Upward and Outward Growth:
Managing Urban Expansion for More Equitable Cities in the Global
South.” Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism,
Japan). 2017. “An Overview of Spatial Policy in Asian and European
Countries: Indonesia.” http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/
international/spw/general/indonesia/index_e.html. Accessed
January 15, 2019.
Mr Fixit. 2016. “Indonesian Electricity Charges 2016.” https://
www.mrfixitbali.com/electrical/electricity-supply/electricity-cost-
Indonesia-240.html. Accessed September 15, 2018.
Mukhija, V., A. Das, L. Regus, and S.S. Tsay. 2015. “The Tradeoffs
of Inclusionary Zoning: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to
Know?” Planning Practice & Research 30 (2): 222–35.
Mukoko, S., and R. Supriharjo. 1996. Low-Income Housing in
Growing Urban Economies: A Case Study of Surabaya, Indonesia.
Nagoya, Japan: United Nations Centre for Regional Development.
Ostojic, D.R., R.K. Bose, H. Krambeck, J. Lim, and Y. Zhang. 2013.
Energizing Green Cities in Southeast Asia: Applying Sustainable
Urban Energy and Emissions Planning. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Pathoni, A. 2012. “Indonesia’s 1,000-Tower Plan Falls Flat.”
Wall Street Journal, October 11. https://blogs.wsj.com/
indonesiarealtime/2012/10/11/indonesias-1000-tower-plan-falls-
flat/. Accessed September 10, 2019.
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 29
Patton, C.V., and L.P. Subanu. 1988. “Meeting Shelter Needs in
Indonesia.” In Spontaneous Shelter: International Perspectives and
Prospects, edited by C.V. Patton, 168–90. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
PDAM Surya Sembada Kota Surabaya. 2012. “Simulasi pasang
baru khusus rumah tangga.” http://www.pdam-sby.go.id/page.
php?get=tampil_simulasi_pasang_baru&bhs=1. Accessed
September 15, 2018.
Pugh, C. 1992. “Land Policies and Low-Income Housing in
Developing Countries: A Review, with Reference to Kenya and India.”
Land Use Policy 9 (1): 47–63.
Rismaharini, T. 2014. “Community-Based Solid Waste Management
as Best Practice in Surabaya City.” Paper prepared for the 5th East
Asia Summit High-Level Seminar on Sustainable Cities, Surabaya,
Indonesia, February 28–March 1.
Rismaharini, T. 2016. City of Surabaya Local Regulation Number
10, Year 2016: About Medium Term Local Development, City of
Surabaya, 2016–21. Surabaya, Indonesia: Office of the Mayor,
Surabaya City Government.
Rolalisasi, A. 2018. “Activity Space on Kampung Alleyway and
Inhabitant’s Social Capital—Case: Kampung in Surabaya.” PhD diss.,
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember.
Rolnik, R. 2013. “Official Mission to the Republic of Indonesia
Preliminary Findings: Media Statement.” Geneva: Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights.
Roy, A. 2005. “Urban Informality: Towards an Epistemology of
Planning.” Journal of the American Planning Association 71 (2):
147–58.
Roy, A., and N. AlSayyad, eds. 2004. Urban Informality:
Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America,
and South Asia. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
Rukmana, D. 2015. “The Change and Transformation of Indonesian
Spatial Planning after Suharto’s New Order Regime: The Case of the
Jakarta Metropolitan Area.” International Planning Studies 20 (4):
1–21.
Rumbach, A. 2014. “Do New Towns Increase Disaster Risk?
Evidence from Kolkata, India.” Habitat International 43 (July):
117–24.
Salanto, F. 2015. Surabaya Property Market Report. Jakarta,
Indonesia: Colliers International Indonesia.
Salanto, F. 2018. Surabaya Property Market Report. Jakarta,
Indonesia: Colliers International Indonesia.
Shirleyana, S. Hawken, and R.Y. Sunindijo. 2018. “City of Kampung:
Risk and Resilience in the Urban Communities of Surabaya,
Indonesia.” International Journal of Building Pathology and
Adaptation 36 (5): 543–68.
Silas, J. 1983. “Spatial Structure, Housing Delivery, Land Tenure
and the Urban Poor in Surabaya, Indonesia.” In Land for Housing
the Poor, edited by S. Angel, R.W. Archer, S. Tanphiphat, and E.A.
Wegelin, 211–33. Singapore: Select.
Silas, J. 1987. “Indonesia.” In Housing Policy and Practice in Asia,
edited by S.-K. Ha, 135–58. New York: Croom Helm.
Silas, J. 1989. “Marginal Settlements in Surabaya, Indonesia:
Problem or Potential?” Environment and Urbanization 1 (2): 60–70.
Silas, J. 1998. Notes on the KIP of Surabaya, 1924–2000. Kyoto:
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University.
Silas, J. 2016. Housing in the Footsteps of Paradox. Surabaya,
Indonesia: Laboratory of Housing and Human Settlements, Sepuluh
Nopember Institute of Technology.
Sivam, A. 2002. “Constraints Affecting the Efficiency of the Urban
Residential Land Market in Developing Countries: A Case Study of
India.” Habitat International 26 (4): 523–37.
Star2.com. 2018. “Used Plastic Water Bottles Will Get You a Ride
on This Bus in Surabaya,” December 11. https://www.star2.com/
living/2018/12/11/plastic-waste-recycled/. Accessed September
25, 2019.
Statistics Indonesia. 2018. “Badan pusat statistik kota Surabaya
(Statistics of Surabaya City).” https://surabayakota.bps.go.id/.
Accessed August 15, 2018.
Surabaya City Government. 2015. Laporan kinerja 2014
(Performance Report). Surabaya, Indonesia: Surabaya City
Government.
Surya.co.id. 2017. “Breaking News—Mulai besok, harga bbm non
subsidi Di Jatim naik.” Surabaya Tribune News, January 4. http://
surabaya.tribunnews.com/2017/01/04/breaking-news-mulai-
besok-harga-bbm-non-subsidi-naik. Accessed September 15, 2018.
30 |
Swanendri, N.M. 2002. “Evaluation of the Kampung Improvement
Program (KIP) and the Comprehensive KIP, Surabaya, Indonesia.”
Regional Development Dialogue 23 (1): 176–94.
Tacoli, C., G. McGranahan, and D. Satterthwaite. 2014.
“Urbanization, Rural-Urban Migration and Urban Poverty.” World
Migration Report 2015 Background Paper. Grand-Saconnex,
Switzerland: International Organization for Migration.
Taylor, J. 2015. “A Tale of Two Cities: Comparing Alternative
Approaches to Reducing the Vulnerability of Riverbank Communities
in Two Indonesian Cities.” Environment and Urbanization 27 (2):
621–36.
Tunas, D., and L.T. Darmoyono. 2014. “Self-Help Housing in
Indonesia.” In Affordable Housing in the Urban Global South:
Seeking Sustainable Solutions, edited by J. Bredenoord, P. van
Lindert, and P. Smets, 166–80. New York: Routledge.
Turner, J.F.C. 1977. Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in
Building Environments. New York: Pantheon.
Von Haldenwang, C., A. Elfert, T. Engelmann, S. Germain, G. Sahler,
and A.S. Ferreira. 2015. The Devolution of the Land and Building
Tax in Indonesia. Research Report 89. Bonn, Germany: German
Development Institute.
Wakely, P., and E. Riley. 2011. “The Case for Incremental Housing.”
Cities Alliance Policy Research and Working Papers Series 1.
Washington, DC: Cities Alliance.
Widoyoko, D. 2007. Good Governance and Provision of Affordable
Housing in DKI Jakarta, Indonesia. Loughborough, UK: Water,
Engineering and Development Center, Loughborough University.
World Bank. 1993. Housing: Enabling Markets to Work. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 1995. Indonesia—Enhancing the Quality of Life in
Urban Indonesia: The Legacy of Kampung Improvement Program.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2012. Indonesia—the Rise of Metropolitan Regions:
Towards Inclusive and Sustainable Regional Development.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
 Surabaya: The Legacy of Participatory Upgrading of Informal Settlements
World Bank. 2016a. Indonesia—National Slum Upgrading Project.
Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
World Bank. 2016b. Indonesia’s Urban Story. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
World Bank. 2017. "Access to Electricity, Urban (% of Urban
Population) - Indonesia." The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.UR.ZS?locations=ID. Accessed Oct 15,
2019.
WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. 2016. “Inclusive
City Development: City-Wide Slum Upgrading and
Housing Development—Somsook Booyanbacha.” YouTube
video, May 26. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_
continue=13&v=MJ9aAolNSDI. Accessed May 15, 2019.
Yuniati, V. 2013. “Inclusionary Housing in Indonesia: The Role of
Balanced Residential Ratio 1:3:6 in Makassar.” Master’s thesis,
Erasmus University.
WORLD RESOURCES REPORT | Towards a More Equal City | November 2019 | 31
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This case study owes special gratitude to Johan Silas—his work, insights, and
cooperation are central to its contribution. Sincere thanks also go to Andarita
Rolalisasi, Wahyu Setyawan, Gunawan Tanuwidjaja, and Gde Dwija Wardana
for sharing with us their deep knowledge of the city and their connections to
facilitate our field research. Happy Santosa, Indriana Sri Susanthi Wardhani,
Koko Prasetyo, and Prana Kemal Yudistira provided invaluable logistical
support. We will remain indebted to all the key informants we interviewed
for warmly welcoming us into their offices, homes, and communities and
spending hours sharing with us their personal experiences and opinions.
We especially appreciate the staff of Mayor Tri Rismaharini, who worked
to arrange our meeting amidst her always hectic schedule. In addition, we
salute Surabaya’s institutions, kampung communities, and squatters for their
dedication and struggle to make and keep the city a true inspiration. Mulya
Amri and the late Asrizal Luthfi deserve special thanks for providing prompt and
essential clarifications to ensure the accuracy of intricacies of Indonesian local
governance and planning.
We are grateful to Victoria Beard and Anjali Mahendra for inviting us to produce
this case study and for their astute observations and beneficial comments
throughout the process. Precise, nuanced criticism by external reviewers—
Minerva Novero-Belec, Darshini Mahadevia, Lois Takahashi, and Michael
Woolcock—as well as WRI’s internal reviewers—Ani Dasgupta, Anjali Mahendra,
Nirata "Koni" Samadhi, Henrique Evers, Hiromi Hashimoto, Emily Matthews,
and Retno Wihanesta—on draft versions greatly enhanced this report’s quality.
The shortcomings that remain are squarely ours. The case study was supported
by the WRI team in Washington, DC, including Jillian Du and Maria Hart, who
offered consistent and detailed support and communication throughout this
process. We also thank Lauri Scherer for valuable editorial assistance. We also
thank the communications team, including Tini Tran, Craig Brownstein, Schuyler
Null, Talia Rubnitz, and Veronica Linares, who helped with messaging and
outreach, as well as Romain Warnault, Billie Kanfer, and Carni Klirs for their
assistance with graphics and layout.
ABOUT THIS WORLD
RESOURCES REPORT
This is the seventh city case study of transformative urban change in a series of
case studies that, together with a set of sectoral and thematic papers, compose
the World Resources Report (WRR): Towards a More Equal City. The series
includes case studies of cities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. To obtain
electronic copies of this paper and others, and to view supporting materials,
please visit www.citiesforall.org.
FUNDERS
We deeply appreciate the following donors for their generous
financial support:
United Kingdom Department for International Development
Stephen M. Ross Philanthropies
Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Ashok Das is an associate professor in the Department of Urban and
Regional Planning, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UHM), and an affiliate
faculty of UHM’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Center for
South Asian Studies. Previously, he was an assistant professor in San
Francisco State University’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning; an
architecture and planning consultant in the United States and India; and
the chief cartoonist for Architecture+Design, India’s leading architecture
magazine. Das researches institutional challenges and innovations in
providing services and affordable shelter to ameliorate urban poverty in the
Asia-Pacific region, especially in Indonesia and India.
Robin King is the Director for Knowledge Capture and Collaboration for
WRI’s Ross Center for Sustainable Cities. Her research focuses on urban
economics, comparative urban development, and inclusive transit-oriented
development.
Copyright 2019 World Resources Institute. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
32 |
ABOUT WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE
World Resources Institute is a global research organization that turns big
ideas into action at the nexus of environment, economic opportunity, and
human well-being.
Our Challenge
Natural resources are at the foundation of economic opportunity and
human well-being. But today, we are depleting Earth’s resources at rates
that are not sustainable, endangering economies and people’s lives. People
depend on clean water, fertile land, healthy forests, and a stable climate.
Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a sustainable planet. We
must address these urgent, global challenges this decade.
Our Vision
We envision an equitable and prosperous planet driven by the wise
management of natural resources. We aspire to create a world where the
actions of government, business, and communities combine to eliminate
poverty and sustain the natural environment for all people.
ABOUT WRI ROSS CENTER FOR
SUSTAINABLE CITIES
WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities helps create accessible, equitable,
healthy, and resilient urban areas for people, businesses, and the
environment to thrive. Together with partners, it enables more connected,
compact, and coordinated cities. The Center expands the transport and
urban development expertise of the EMBARQ network to catalyze innovative
solutions in other sectors, including water, buildings, land use, and energy.
It combines the research excellence of WRI with 15 years of on-the-ground
impact through a network of more than 250 experts working from Brazil,
China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey to make cities around
the world better places to live.
More information at www.wrirosscities.org.