Professional Documents
Culture Documents
KRISTINA KARAMO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Republican State Committee (the “Committee”) pursuant to the Committee’s bylaws. Ms.
Karamo refused to concede her removal, and subsequently retaliated against Plaintiffs, members
of the Committee who removed her, by purporting to have them expelled from the Michigan
Republican Party. Unable to properly run the Committee or carry out their duties because of
Karamo’s unlawful interference, Plaintiffs sued Karamo and sought a preliminary injunction.
Karamo successfully deferred a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, asserting that
there was not particular urgency to resolving whether she was acting unlawfully. So the hearing
was pushed back a month. Now that the circuit court has issued a preliminary injunction, Ms.
Karamo believes that this Court should waive rules and drop everything to address her concerns.
More specifically, Ms. Karamo now requests to bypass the circuit court to address her motion for
a stay pending appeal and demands that this Court act immediately, without any of the necessary
materials (like an expedited transcript) to be able to do so, so that she may continue to pretend to
BACKGROUND
1. On January 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a two-count Complaint asking the Court for a
declaratory judgment that Ms. Karamo, the former Chair of the Michigan Republican State
Committee (the “Committee”), had been properly removed and that all actions taken by Ms.
Karamo after she was properly removed were void. (Appl’n for Leave, Ex 4.)
2. On January 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a hearing
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3. On January 29, 2024, Ms. Karamo filed an ex parte motion to adjourn the hearing. (Exhibit
4. Ms. Karamo did respond to the motion for a preliminary injunction on that date, and made
clear that, in her opinion, there was nothing urgent about the matter. Indeed, in her response, Ms.
Karamo asserted that “there is no equity or fairness in creating a false sense of urgency.” (Def.
Answer to Mot for Prelim Inj 1.) Indeed, Ms. Karamo bemoaned being required to respond to
Plaintiffs’ motion within 10 days. (Id. at 2.) Karamo explicitly stated that “[t]he claim that the
March 2 convention will somehow require urgent action fails because the caucus is run by the
district committees and not the state committee.” (Def Br in Support of Her Answer to Mot for
5. The circuit court granted to motion to adjourn, and the hearings were rescheduled for
February 20 and February 21, 2024, following a February 19, 2024 oral argument on Ms. Karamo’s
motion for summary disposition. The hearings spilled over onto an additional day, February 27,
2024.
over the course of approximately forty-five minutes as to why he was granting Plaintiffs’ motion
7. Notably, the court found that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, that Plaintiffs,
whom Ms. Karamo’s supporters had purported to remove as members of the Republican Party,
faced irreparable harm, and that the public was harmed by the confusion of dueling Republican
parties.
8. The following day, Ms. Karamo filed an application for leave to appeal, a motion to stay,
a motion to waive the requirements of MCR 7.209, and a motion for immediate consideration.
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ARGUMENT
I. Ms. Karamo should have sought a stay from the circuit court.
9. MCR 7.209(A)(2) provides that “[a] motion for bond or for a stay pending appeal may not
be filed in the Court of Appeals unless such a motion was decided by the trial court.”
10. MCR 7.209(A)(3) provides that “[a] motion for bond or a stay pending appeal filed in the
Court of Appeals must include a copy of the trial court’s opinion and order, and a copy of the
11. Ms. Karamo asserts that this Court should grant relief from MCR 7.209(A)(2) because
“[g]ive the breadth of the trial court order, there is no likelihood that a stay would be granted by
the trial court in these circumstances. (Def Mot to Waive MCR 7.209, ¶ 4.)
12. But Ms. Karamo failed to provide this Court with any support for this allegation other than
her word.
effort to do so by, for example, seeking an expedited transcript of just that portion of the court’s
ruling for this Court’s review. Indeed, despite raising various arguments that the circuit court
abused its discretion regarding evidentiary issues, Ms. Karamo does not want the Court to review
the actual transcript and so asked the court reporter to prepare the transcript in the normal course.
14. Moreover, there is nothing that prevented Ms. Karamo from requesting an emergency stay
from the circuit court which, in the absence of a transcript, is best suited to consider her motion
for a stay.
15. Worse still, the “emergency” here is entirely of Ms. Karamo’s own making and contrary
to her representations to the circuit court. Whereas Plaintiffs scheduled their motion for a
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preliminary injunction for a hearing in January 2024, thereby ensuring that the parties had adequate
time for measured appellate review before any party meetings, Ms. Karamo told the circuit court
that there was no urgency and no harm. But now that the circuit court has ruled against her, Ms.
Karamo has the temerity to suggest that there’s an emergency that requires this Court and the
II. Ms. Karamo does not meet the standard for this Court to grant a
stay
16. The widely followed four-factor test for a stay pending appeal is as follows:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
and (4) where the public interest lies. [Nken v Holder, 556 US 418, 434 (2009); see also
DeVisser v Sec of State, 981 NW2d 30, 44 (Mem) (Mich 2022) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting).
17. Ms. Karamo does not meet the standard for a stay pending appeal in this case.
18. First, Ms. Karamo has not made a strong showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits.
After three days of hearing evidence and arguments, the circuit court determined that Plaintiffs
in the hundreds of pages of documents that were entered into evidence during the hearings was
that a petition to remove Ms. Karamo as Chair was actually a petition to remove Daniel Hartman
as General Counsel. Ms. Karamo failed to raise this issue at all during the hearing. Therefore, the
issue is forfeited. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 (1999.) But had Ms. Karamo raised the
issue during the hearing, Plaintiffs would have immediately rectified the oversight and provided
the correct petition to remove Ms. Karamo, which was inadvertently swapped with his signed
petition to remove Mr. Hartman. (Ex 2, Justin Toth signed petition to remove Ms. Karamo as
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Chair.) The remaining issues raised by Ms. Karamo were addressed, and rejected, by the circuit
19. Second, Ms. Karamo will not be irreparably injured absent a stay. Indeed, in neither her
motion for stay nor her application for leave to appeal does Ms. Karamo identify any particular
20. Third, the issuance of the stay will substantially injure the Plaintiffs. Ms. Karamo purported
to remove Plaintiffs as members of the Michigan Republican Party at an invalid special meeting
after being removed as Chair. The circuit court concluded that the absence of an injunction would
irreparably harm Plaintiffs, particularly in their loss of their freedom of association, but also their
ability to carry out the duties of their offices for which they were elected, and their inability to
fundraise for the party during an election year cycle. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74,
(1976) (“[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
21. Fourth, the public interest lies in the denial of the stay. Given that the circuit court
preliminary injunction will inject chaos into the political process is simply without merit. On the
contrary, the Circuit Court’s Order allows the Michigan Republican Party to move forward. As the
Circuit Court noted, there can be only one state central committee for the Republican Party in
Michigan, and the public interest is served by having only one group act on behalf of the Party.
MCL 168.597.
and concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits (i.e. that Ms. Karamo was
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properly removed as Chair), that Plaintiffs were irreparably harmed in the absence of an
injunction, and that the public interest would be served in granting the injunction. Accordingly,
the circuit court granted the injunction. If this Court reviews that decision, it applies an abuse of
discretion standard. Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 372 (1998). In her request
for a stay and in her application itself, Ms. Karamo has not shown that she is likely to prevail on
the difficult task of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, nor has she met her standard for this
Court to enter a stay. Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for
Stay.
Respectfully submitted,