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STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


____________________

MALINDA PEGO; ALI HOSSEIN; HASSAN Court of Appeals No. 369889


NEHME; ANN DELISLE; JESSICA
BAREFIELD; NORM SCHINKLE; and Kent County Circuit Court
WARREN CARPENTER, No. 24-00658-CZ

Plaintiffs-Appellees, Hon. J. Joseph Rossi


v

KRISTINA KARAMO,

Defendant-Appellant.
/

Jonathan E. Lauderbach (P51313) Daniel J. Hartman (P52632)


Troy M. Cumings (P63278) LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL J. HARTMAN
Matthew T. Nelson (P64768) Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Katherine G. Boothroyd (P85881) P.O. Box 307
WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP Petoskey, MI 49770
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 231.348.5100
150 Ottawa Avenue NW, Suite 1500 danjh1234@yahoo.com
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
616.752.2000 Donald D. Campbell (P43088)
jlauderbach@wnj.com Kellie Howard-Goudy (P69009)

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tcumings@wnj.com COLLINS EINHORN FARRELL PC
mnelson@wnj.com Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
kboothroyd@wnj.com 4000 Town Center, 9th Floor
Southfield, MI 48075
Donald.campbell@ceflawyers.com
Kellie.howard@ceflawyers.com

APPELLEES’ ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT-


APPELLANT’S MOTION TO STAY
INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2024, Ms. Karamo was properly removed as Chair of the Michigan

Republican State Committee (the “Committee”) pursuant to the Committee’s bylaws. Ms.

Karamo refused to concede her removal, and subsequently retaliated against Plaintiffs, members

of the Committee who removed her, by purporting to have them expelled from the Michigan

Republican Party. Unable to properly run the Committee or carry out their duties because of

Karamo’s unlawful interference, Plaintiffs sued Karamo and sought a preliminary injunction.

Karamo successfully deferred a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, asserting that

there was not particular urgency to resolving whether she was acting unlawfully. So the hearing

was pushed back a month. Now that the circuit court has issued a preliminary injunction, Ms.

Karamo believes that this Court should waive rules and drop everything to address her concerns.

More specifically, Ms. Karamo now requests to bypass the circuit court to address her motion for

a stay pending appeal and demands that this Court act immediately, without any of the necessary

materials (like an expedited transcript) to be able to do so, so that she may continue to pretend to

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be the Chair after having been properly removed.

BACKGROUND
1. On January 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a two-count Complaint asking the Court for a

declaratory judgment that Ms. Karamo, the former Chair of the Michigan Republican State

Committee (the “Committee”), had been properly removed and that all actions taken by Ms.

Karamo after she was properly removed were void. (Appl’n for Leave, Ex 4.)

2. On January 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a hearing

date was set for January 30, 2024.

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3. On January 29, 2024, Ms. Karamo filed an ex parte motion to adjourn the hearing. (Exhibit

1, Def Mot to Adjourn, filed January 29, 2024.)

4. Ms. Karamo did respond to the motion for a preliminary injunction on that date, and made

clear that, in her opinion, there was nothing urgent about the matter. Indeed, in her response, Ms.

Karamo asserted that “there is no equity or fairness in creating a false sense of urgency.” (Def.

Answer to Mot for Prelim Inj 1.) Indeed, Ms. Karamo bemoaned being required to respond to

Plaintiffs’ motion within 10 days. (Id. at 2.) Karamo explicitly stated that “[t]he claim that the

March 2 convention will somehow require urgent action fails because the caucus is run by the

district committees and not the state committee.” (Def Br in Support of Her Answer to Mot for

Prelim Inj 5.)

5. The circuit court granted to motion to adjourn, and the hearings were rescheduled for

February 20 and February 21, 2024, following a February 19, 2024 oral argument on Ms. Karamo’s

motion for summary disposition. The hearings spilled over onto an additional day, February 27,

2024.

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6. At the end of the hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench, explaining his reasoning

over the course of approximately forty-five minutes as to why he was granting Plaintiffs’ motion

for a preliminary injunction.

7. Notably, the court found that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, that Plaintiffs,

whom Ms. Karamo’s supporters had purported to remove as members of the Republican Party,

faced irreparable harm, and that the public was harmed by the confusion of dueling Republican

parties.

8. The following day, Ms. Karamo filed an application for leave to appeal, a motion to stay,

a motion to waive the requirements of MCR 7.209, and a motion for immediate consideration.

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ARGUMENT

I. Ms. Karamo should have sought a stay from the circuit court.
9. MCR 7.209(A)(2) provides that “[a] motion for bond or for a stay pending appeal may not

be filed in the Court of Appeals unless such a motion was decided by the trial court.”

10. MCR 7.209(A)(3) provides that “[a] motion for bond or a stay pending appeal filed in the

Court of Appeals must include a copy of the trial court’s opinion and order, and a copy of the

transcript of the hearing on the motion in the trial court.”

11. Ms. Karamo asserts that this Court should grant relief from MCR 7.209(A)(2) because

“[g]ive the breadth of the trial court order, there is no likelihood that a stay would be granted by

the trial court in these circumstances. (Def Mot to Waive MCR 7.209, ¶ 4.)

12. But Ms. Karamo failed to provide this Court with any support for this allegation other than

her word.

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13. Nor did she provide a copy of the transcript of the circuit court’s ruling, or make any real

effort to do so by, for example, seeking an expedited transcript of just that portion of the court’s

ruling for this Court’s review. Indeed, despite raising various arguments that the circuit court

abused its discretion regarding evidentiary issues, Ms. Karamo does not want the Court to review

the actual transcript and so asked the court reporter to prepare the transcript in the normal course.

14. Moreover, there is nothing that prevented Ms. Karamo from requesting an emergency stay

from the circuit court which, in the absence of a transcript, is best suited to consider her motion

for a stay.

15. Worse still, the “emergency” here is entirely of Ms. Karamo’s own making and contrary

to her representations to the circuit court. Whereas Plaintiffs scheduled their motion for a

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preliminary injunction for a hearing in January 2024, thereby ensuring that the parties had adequate

time for measured appellate review before any party meetings, Ms. Karamo told the circuit court

that there was no urgency and no harm. But now that the circuit court has ruled against her, Ms.

Karamo has the temerity to suggest that there’s an emergency that requires this Court and the

Plaintiffs to drop everything.

II. Ms. Karamo does not meet the standard for this Court to grant a
stay
16. The widely followed four-factor test for a stay pending appeal is as follows:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
and (4) where the public interest lies. [Nken v Holder, 556 US 418, 434 (2009); see also
DeVisser v Sec of State, 981 NW2d 30, 44 (Mem) (Mich 2022) (VIVIANO, J., dissenting).

17. Ms. Karamo does not meet the standard for a stay pending appeal in this case.

18. First, Ms. Karamo has not made a strong showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits.

After three days of hearing evidence and arguments, the circuit court determined that Plaintiffs

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were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The only error that Ms. Karamo has identified

in the hundreds of pages of documents that were entered into evidence during the hearings was

that a petition to remove Ms. Karamo as Chair was actually a petition to remove Daniel Hartman

as General Counsel. Ms. Karamo failed to raise this issue at all during the hearing. Therefore, the

issue is forfeited. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 (1999.) But had Ms. Karamo raised the

issue during the hearing, Plaintiffs would have immediately rectified the oversight and provided

the correct petition to remove Ms. Karamo, which was inadvertently swapped with his signed

petition to remove Mr. Hartman. (Ex 2, Justin Toth signed petition to remove Ms. Karamo as

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Chair.) The remaining issues raised by Ms. Karamo were addressed, and rejected, by the circuit

court in the ruling granting a preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs.

19. Second, Ms. Karamo will not be irreparably injured absent a stay. Indeed, in neither her

motion for stay nor her application for leave to appeal does Ms. Karamo identify any particular

irreparable harm she faces absent a stay.

20. Third, the issuance of the stay will substantially injure the Plaintiffs. Ms. Karamo purported

to remove Plaintiffs as members of the Michigan Republican Party at an invalid special meeting

after being removed as Chair. The circuit court concluded that the absence of an injunction would

irreparably harm Plaintiffs, particularly in their loss of their freedom of association, but also their

ability to carry out the duties of their offices for which they were elected, and their inability to

fundraise for the party during an election year cycle. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373–74,

(1976) (“[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”)

21. Fourth, the public interest lies in the denial of the stay. Given that the circuit court

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concluded that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits, Ms. Karamo’s argument that the

preliminary injunction will inject chaos into the political process is simply without merit. On the

contrary, the Circuit Court’s Order allows the Michigan Republican Party to move forward. As the

Circuit Court noted, there can be only one state central committee for the Republican Party in

Michigan, and the public interest is served by having only one group act on behalf of the Party.

MCL 168.597.

CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF


After three days of evidentiary hearings, the circuit court carefully reviewed the evidence

and concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits (i.e. that Ms. Karamo was

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properly removed as Chair), that Plaintiffs were irreparably harmed in the absence of an

injunction, and that the public interest would be served in granting the injunction. Accordingly,

the circuit court granted the injunction. If this Court reviews that decision, it applies an abuse of

discretion standard. Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 372 (1998). In her request

for a stay and in her application itself, Ms. Karamo has not shown that she is likely to prevail on

the difficult task of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, nor has she met her standard for this

Court to enter a stay. Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendant-Appellant’s Motion for

Stay.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 29, 2024 WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP

By /s/ Matthew T. Nelson


Jonathan E. Lauderbach (P51313)
Troy M. Cumings (P63278)
Matthew T. Nelson (P64768)
Katherine G. Boothroyd (P85881)
WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP

RECEIVED by MCOA 2/29/2024 12:02:33 PM


Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees
150 Ottawa Avenue NW, Suite 1500
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
616.752.2000
jlauderbach@wnj.com
tcumings@wnj.com
mnelson@wnj.com
kboothroyd@wnj.com

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