NACLA Report on the Americas

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The Evolution Of The Farc: A Guerrilla Group’s

Long History

Alfredo Molano

To cite this article: Alfredo Molano (2000) The Evolution Of The Farc: A Guerrilla Group’s Long
History, NACLA Report on the Americas, 34:2, 23-31, DOI: 10.1080/10714839.2000.11722627

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2000.11722627

Published online: 31 May 2016.

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 REPORT ON
THE EVOLUTION OF THE
A Guerrilla Group's Long History
Downloaded by [University Paris X] at 09:10 21 June 2016
A FARC guerrillastands at a checkpoint nearSan Vicente de Cagudn in southern Colombia.
BY ALFREDO MOLANO
Colombia's largest rebel
organization is deeply rooted in a
legacy of class conflict.
ierce battles, often characterized by extreme
cruelty, marked the early twentieth century in
Colombia, as land-hungry peasants and their
reformist allies faced off against the country's land-
owning oligarchy, which was backed by the conserva-
tive hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The land own-
Alfredo Molano is a book author,journalist and a weekly
columnist for the newspaper El Espectador. His writing on
behalf of human rights, peasants and marginalized Colombian
communities earned him death threats from the paramilitary
United Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC). He is currently in
exile in Spain but continues to write his column.
Translatedfrom Spanish by NACLA.
Vol
VoL XXXIV, No 22
X)(XIV, No SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER
200023
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
COLOMBIA
FARC
ers and Church leaders, along with peasants under
their control, were organized as the Conservative
Party; other, reform-minded peasants and their allies
were known as Liberals. On the rich and violent soil
of those conflicts lie the origins of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's
most powerful present-day guerrilla group.
From 1930 to 1946, a series of Liberal Party-run
administrations, referred to in Colombian history as
the Liberal Republic, inaugurated land reform that
restricted ancestral privileges and unleashed furious
political opposition from the Conservatives. After the
internally divided Liberals fell in 1946, a new Conser-
vative government used political violence to regain the
oligarchy's lands and remain in power. Then Jorge
Eli6cer Gaitin, a charismatic Liberal and land-reform
movement leader, was gunned down in Bogotd in
1948. In response, popular insurrections broke out in
the capital and in virtually every city where the Liber-
23
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA

als were strong. The assassination unleashed a decade-
long heightening of the old conflict. The new strife
was known simply as La Violencia. Between 1948 and
1958, La Violencia took the lives of more than
300,000 Colombians.
To subdue the Liberal uprisings, the government
gave weapons to Conservative peasants throughout the
country, as well as backing from the National Police.
At the same time, thousands of Liberal peasants armed
themselves against the Conservative government. On
the eastern plains, peasants backed by the Liberal
Party, with assistance from Communist Party activists,
managed to form a 10,000-man army that inspired the
formation of small guerrilla groups throughout the
country. One peasant guerrilla who emerged from the
Liberal uprising was Pedro Antonio Marin. Later he
would come to be known as Manuel Marulanda Velez,
or "Tirofijo" ("Sure Shot"). Today he is chief com-
mander of the FARC.
In 1953, an anti-Communist military strongman,
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, came to power by
force, backed by elements within both traditional par-
ties and-significantly-by Washington. Once secure-
ly in power, the General decreed an amnesty which
was welcomed by the armed peasants of the eastern

An Interview with FARC Commander Sim6n Trinidad

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nies, especially North Americans. For

In January 1999, newly elected Colom-
bian president Andres Pastrana ceded these reasons we are the principal target
an area of southern Colombia the size of in the war against narcotraffickers. But we
Switzerland to the Revolutionary Armed aren't narcotraffickers and the
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas as campesinos aren't narcotraffickers. If the
part of an agreement to begin peace United States government really intends
talks. Although there is no cease-fire to combat narcotraffickers, all the people
agreement while the talks are being car- in Colombia know where they live: in
ried out, the Colombian Armed Forces Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla.
and the National Police have withdrawn "But [the police] confront the poor
all their forces from the region known as campesino with repression that hurts not
the Zona de Despeje (ClearanceZone). only the illicit crops, but also legal crops
On June 14, Garry M. Leech traveled to like yucca, bananas, and chickens and
Los Pozos to interview Simon Trinidad, a pigs because the fumigation kills every-
FARC commander and a spokesman for thing.
the guerrilla organization. Trinidad was Those responsible for making Colombia
a professor of economics at Jorge Tadeo Commander Sim6n Trinidad. a producer of narcotics are the people
Lozano University in Bogota for ten who have become rich from this busi-
years before joining the FARC 16 years ago. ness: the narcotraffickers. Who else benefits? The bankers
and those who distribute the drugs in the cities, universi-
Why do you think the United States is focusing on ties, high schools and discos of North America, Europe
the FARC and campesinos that cultivate coca here and Asia. Who else? The companies that make the chemi-
in southern Colombia instead of the paramilitaries cals for processing cocaine and heroin. These companies
and the narcotraffickers? are German and North American.

Because the FARC is the only political organization that is
in opposition to the Colombian oligarchy that keeps
Colombians in poverty, misery and a state of underdevel-
opment. [The FARC] will make better use of the natural
resources and provide jobs, health care, education and
housing so 40 million Colombians can live well. Who are
those that are opposed to these social, economic and
political changes? They are the people who monopolize
the riches and resources in Colombia. A small group that
monopolizes the banks, industries, mines, agriculture and
international commerce, including some foreign compa-
Garry M. Leech is the publisher of Colombia Report, a web-
based magazine that provides analysis of the Colombian civil
war. See http://www.colombiareport.org
Last year, FARC spokesman Raul Reyes claimed that
the FARC could eradicate coca cultivation in the
regions it controls in five years. However, there
have been accusations that the FARC is forcing
campesinos to grow more coca here in the Zona de
Despeje.
This is the police, army and narcotrafficker version of the
story. [The FARC] live in the country, and it is in the
country that the coca, marijuana and the poppies have
been grown for 30 years. We know the campesinos
grow illicit crops out of necessity. They are obligated to
cultivate illicit crops because of a government that has
neglected them for many years. We have made it clear
that we will not take the food out of the mouth of the

24 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

 REPORT ON COLOMBIA

plains and by many Liberals and Conservatives as
well.
In 1955, a military operation was launched against
rural regions that remained strongholds of agrarian
guerrillas who had fought in the name of Gaitdin, and
where Communist guerrillas were also concentrated.
Backed by Washington's National Security Doctrine
and a $170 million U.S. loan, Rojas Pinilla began
bombing guerrilla and opposition peasant positions.
The guerrilla movement tried to dig in and hold out
in the highlands, but was ultimately forced to retreat
to the jungles of the Andean foothills. In those
regions, Marulanda, joined by Jacobo Arenas, a
charismatic Marxist ideologue who described him-
self a "professional revolutionary," organized a
community based on economic self-management and
military self-defense. This was the first of the guer-
rilla bases that later came to be known as "Indepen-
dent Republics." When Rojas Pinilla began flirting
with the idea of prolonging his rule, however, the
Liberals, who had hoped to win the next elections,
withdrew their support. At that point anti-Rojas
Pinilla demonstrations spread throughout the coun-
try, and many were violently repressed as the gov-
ernment accused the Communists of disturbing pub-
lic order.

By GARRY M. LEECH
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poor campesinos. We will not leave them without jobs. because the FARC's Central Command said they would
They work with the marijuana and coca leaf because return to their parents all those younger than 15.
they do not have any other work. This problem is Two weeks ago I met this girl.... She said she was
caused by the economic model of the Colombian state, working in a bar from six p.m. until sunrise. I asked what
and it is the state that has to fix the problem. We are she was doing and she said, 'I attend to the customers.'
the state's enemy, not their anti-narcotics poicle. The When I asked [how], she lowered her head and started
state has to offer people employment, honest work, to cry. She is a whore. She is 14 years old. A child prosti-
and social justice to improve their lives. tute. She was better in the guerrillas. In the guerrillas we
have dignity, respect, and we provide then with clothes
What will happen if the United States Congress food and education. There are millions of others like this
authorizes increased military aid to the Colom- girl in Colombia who are exploited in the coal mines, the
bian Armed Forces and they launch an offensive gold mines, the emerald mines, in the coca and poppy
against the FARC here in southern Colombia? fields. They prefer that children work in the coca and
I don't want to think about a war in this region. War poppy fields because they pay them less and they work
will not resolve Colombia's problems. Colombia has 18 more.
million people living in absolute poverty, [without] It sounds beautiful when you say that children
electricity, water, jobs, land, education or healthcare. shouldn't be guerrillas, but children are in the streets of
Another 18 million Colombians [earn] a salary that the cities doing drugs, inhaling gasoline and glue.
doesn't cover all their necessities. We are 36 million According to the United Nations: 41% of Colombians
Colombians living poorly out of a total of 40 million. Is are children, 6.5 million children live in conditions of
the war going to resolve these problems? poverty, another 1.2 million living in absolute poverty,
There is an alliance between narcotraffickers and 30,000 live in the streets, 47% are abused by their par-
common politicians, both Liberals and Conservatives. ents, and 2.5 million work in high risk jobs. These chil-
Also, between paramilitaries and the narcotraffickers, dren meet the guerrillas and they don't have parents
everybody knows this. Will the war waged against because the military or the paramilitaries killed them,
poor campesinos solve these problems? The war won't and they ask the guerrillas to let them join. We are car-
resolve the problems for the hungry and unemployed rying out our rule that no children younger than 15
in Colombia. years of age join.
Many international human rights organizations How many women are there in the FARC, and
have demanded that the FARC stop recruiting what happens when they become pregnant?
children. Where does the FARC stand on this Approximately 30% of the guerrillas are women, and
issue? the number is increasing. Women guerrillas are treated
We recruit 15 year olds and up. Insome fronts there may the same as the men. Some FARC units have female
have been some younger, but [recently] we decided to commanders; the FARC office in San Vicente is run by a
send them back home. But what isthe cost? During the female. Some women have relationships with male
last year a girl arrived...14 years old and wanting to join guerrillas, and we provide contraceptives. But some do
the guerrilla.... In March she was sent back home get pregnant. If they don't have an abortion, they have
to leave the guerrillas. N
25
VOL XXXIV,
VOL No 22
)(XXIV, No SEPTEMBRIOCTOBER
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER
2000
2000 25
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA
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Commander Manuel Marulanda, "Tirofijo, " who with Jacobo Arenas founded the FARC in 1964.
In 1958, the Conservative and Liberal elites brought
La Violencia to an official end with a National Front
that allowed the two parties to share public offices and
alternate in the presidency. But the arrangement did
nothing to resolve the underlying land conflicts, and
violence continued in the countryside. In 1964, the
army attacked the "Independent Republics" of Maru-
landa and Arenas by land and by air with 16,000 sol-
diers, and captured the encampments. But they had
already been abandoned: Some 43 guerrillas, includ-
ing the two leaders, had fled and taken refuge in the
mountains of the southwestern state of Cauca. Later
that year, they founded the FARC in the same area.
Seeing that it would be impossible to break through
the rigid political and agrarian structures using legal
means, the opposition declared an armed rebellion.
During the same period other guerrilla forces, the
National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1964 and the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army (EPL) in 1967, were created,
and the big landowners dominated the country's econ-
omy.
In the 1970s, the National Front was still dominating
political life, and on the economic front, the govern-
ment of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974) adopted a rural
development model that aimed to eliminate all obsta-
cles to free investment in the countryside. This led to
concentration of land ownership, the undermining of
small-scale peasant producers and the rise of peasant
26
proletarianization. Because of Pastrana's program,
thousands of desperate peasants were propelled into
both organized and spontaneous invasions of rural
properties. On the Atlantic Coast, for example, peas-
ants invaded the large haciendas common to the region
and distributed the land among themselves. Property
owners, backed by the area's aggressive political boss-
es, responded with public and private force, and suc-
ceeded in recovering their land. Pastrana's economic
development model also drove many peasants to the
cities, raising urban unemployment and setting the
stage for the great National Civic Strike of 1977 and
the Draconian Security Statute of 1978 that drastically
reduced the right to protest and organize.
At the same time, there was repression of the peasant
movement, expulsion of small tenants from the lands
they cultivated and, in general, expansion of commer-
cial agriculture to less populated parts of the country,
as well as colonization of unused lands. Many of the
most popular destinations lay in the same remote areas
where the guerrillas were strong and where they con-
stituted the only authority. During this period the
FARC consolidated its influence, opened some new
areas, and focused on training military leaders. These
were the days when many students, intellectuals, work-
ers and peasant leaders joined the guerrilla struggle.
Between 1970 and 1982, the FARC grew from a
movement of only about 500 people to a small army
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA

of 3,000, with a centralized hier- cleared of the military and turned

archical structure, a general staff,
military code, training school and
political program. Meanwhile, in
the areas of colonization, the col-
onizers' situation was desperate.
Bereft of all institutional support,
they lived as permanently dis-
placed peasants. This is exactly
what led them to embrace the
profitable cultivation of coca. No
legal crop offered them the
advantages that coca still does:
the ease and economy of growing
an Andean-Amazon plant that
needs no fertilizers or pesticides, a ready market of justices. The disaster dealt a crippling blow to the
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Guerrilla lea dlers realized
that banln ing coca
would m an losing
El
peasant su pport. This
marked the abirth of the
coca-tr de tax,
into an area where meetings could
take place among representatives
of the government, the guerrillas
and civil society. The site of the
meetings, La Casa Verde, became
famous as a hopeful symbol of the
peace process. Just as the rules
and conditions of negotiation were
being agreed to, however, the
urban guerrilla group April 19th
Movement (M-19) seized the
Palace of Justice, leading to the
killing of over 100 persons,
including several Supreme Court

local traffickers, a fixed price, and constant demand. talks, which continued, but in an atmosphere of mutu-
At first the guerrillas tried to resist growing coca: al recrimination. The Palace of Justice debacle, pres-
They suspected that it represented a kind of under- sure from business associations, and the tactic of car-
ground "imperialist" invasion, and they worried that rot and stick-all came together to substantially
peasants who became prosperous would stop support- change the nature of the negotiations.
ing the revolutionary struggle. But the guerrilla leader- At the beginning of Virgilio Barco's four-year presi-
ship soon realized that banning coca would mean los- dency, in 1986, the government offered "an out-
ing peasant support to the authorities. This realization stretched but firm hand" to the guerrillas. Unlike Pres-
marked the birth of the infamous gramaje, a coca- ident Betancur, Barco tried to offer them full
trade tax that is nothing less than guerrilla-imposed participation in civil and political life if they would lay
extortion of drug traffickers and prosperous coca farm- down their weapons. The government called upon the
ers. The guerrillas' rapprochement with coca also led guerrillas to demobilize and disarm in exchange for
to the belief that they are traffickers-narcoguerrillas. political guarantees and economic compensation.
That notion is false, however. Cultivation of illegal Barco wanted to restore the legitimacy of the state,
crops was established in the colonization areas not which had been badly damaged in the peasant areas
simply because of weak army presence, but because and the territories of colonization. As violence once
the colonists were on the brink of ruin. And the guer- again escalated, the rebel groups opted to unify as the
rillas were in the colonized regions long before coca Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group (CGSB).
cultivation appeared. Their growth was due mainly to In early 1987, the army had unleashed a powerful
the repression unleased against popular protest, and by offensive against the Fifth Front of the FARC in the
the growing impoverishment of the population-not to department of Urabi at the behest of the banana com-
their participation in the drug trade. panies, who felt that the guerrillas were backing the
Since the early 1980s, the history of the FARC has banana workers union in its drive for higher wages. A
been a history of peace negotiations. At the beginning few months later the guerrillas destroyed a military
of his presidency, Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) convoy in Caqueti and killed 25 soldiers. The army
named a Peace Commission, and talks began between bombarded the region and the government ended the
the insurgents and the government. The government's truce. The Defense Minister declared that it was time
strategy was to offer to legalize the FARC's political to do away with the "myth of La Casa Verde" and that
activity and to convert their military force into a politi- the cease-fire could not be used as recourse for crimi-
cal party. In 1984, the FARC renounced kidnapping, nal activity. With national negotiations stalled, the
and the parties agreed to a general, verifiable cease- FARC, communicating through the Church, proposed
fire. This led to the formation of the Patriotic Union a regional dialogue in Caqueti, thus establishing a
(UP), a legal political party originally affiliated with precedent of using domestic locations for negotiations.
the FARC and supported by the Communist Party and Meanwhile, the paramilitary forces had been grow-
other groups on the Colombian left. The UP gained ing dramatically, in many cases financed by the head
significant parliamentary representation in the 1986 of the Medellin Cartel, Pablo Escobar, especially
elections. around the northern region of the Magdalena Medio.
Meanwhile, the Sumapaz region, about 50 miles With Escobar's financing and the army's tolerance,
south of Bogotd in the department of Meta, was paramilitaries began decimating the leftist UP with
2000
27
VoL XXXIV, No 2 No2 SEPTEMBEIOCTOBER
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000 VolXXXIV, 27
 REPORT ON
impunity. It was during Barco's subsequent adminis-
tration that most of the UP's activists were murdered.
The final days of Barco's government were notably
violent. Gunmen assassinated four presidential candi-
dates: Carlos Pizarro of the M-19 (who had just turned
in their arms); Jaime Pardo Leal of the UP, followed
closely by his replacement, Bernardo Jaramillo; and
the Liberals' Luis Carlos Galn who would certainly
have won the election.
Galdn was replaced by C6sar Gaviria, a party hack
who had been Minister of Government, and who was
elected president for the term 1990-1994. It fell to
Gaviria to advocate the writing of a new Constitution,
a process begun by Barco. The FARC had launched
the idea, and public opinion baptized it the "Peace
Constitution." Yet the still-mobilized guerrilla
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alliance, the CGSB, was offered only six of 70 seats in
the Constituent Assembly charged with drafting the
new document. This small guerrilla representation had
been the condition on which the military agreed to
permit the process of rewriting the Constitution. The
virtual absence of active guerrillas from what was
called an "agreement on the fundamentals" had two
goals: to reduce their political prominence and to
make sure that the crucial theme of military-civilian
relations did not become subject to negotiation.
The peace negotiations themselves, which by now
had been moved to Caracas, advanced rapidly. Nego-
tiators for both sides agreed to call for a cease-fire and
an end to hostilities. For the government this meant
placing the guerrillas within fixed geographical
boundaries in order to make verification of the cease-
fire possible. It also meant that the guerrillas must sus-
pend kidnappings, extortion and bombings of physical
infrastructure. The guerrillas refused to confine them-
selves geographically-since that would mean giving
up their most effective weapon-and they demanded
that the paramilitaries be disbanded. The government
insisted on guerrilla demobilization as a condition for
participation in the Constituent Assembly. For its part,
the CGSB demanded radical political reform first,
beginning with restructuring of the Armed Forces.
While the two sides could not arrive at agreement
on that point, they did concur on verification and on
the role of international oversight, neither of which
could be enacted without a cease-fire. The government
and the guerrillas also named a public-order advisory
commission, and the government further agreed to
name a civilian as Minister of Defense-a position
reserved for the military since the onset of the Nation-
al Front-and agreed to outlaw the paramilitary "self-
defense" groups. But these measures were more sym-
bolic than real, and the government demanded that the
guerrillas concentrate in 60 sites. For their part, the
guerrillas demanded 200 demilitarized municipalities,
28
28
COLOMBIA
as well as meaningfully verifiable measures against
the paramilitaries.
At this point, a failed assassination plot by guerril-
las against a prominent senator named Aurelio
Irragori led the government to suspend the negotia-
tions. Weeks later, however, the conversations
The Art of Negotiation
f'n June 24, 1988 Texas oilman Jake Gambini was
.kidnapped in Colombia by a group of guerrillas.
For the next six months-during which time the guerril-
las never revealed what political group they belonged
to-Gambini's employees and his Colombian brother-
in-law, Herbert "Tico" Braun, would engage in pro-
tracted ransom bargaining. By the time Gambini was
kidnapped, guerrilla abductions of well-heeled Colom-
bians and foreigners were so endemic that maneuver-
ing for a captive's release had become as common-
place and stylized as the give-and-take that occurs
when one buys or sells a house or a high-end used car.
Braun, a history professor at the University of Virginia,
later wrote Our Guerrillas, Our Sidewalks (University
Press of Colorado), an account of the kidnapping from
the point of view of those who represented Gambini's
interests during the bargaining. Following are excerpts
that illustrate a new institution in Colombia: the art
and science of hostage negotiating.
June 24
Jake Gambini: I thought they were workers from a ri
who were looking for me. The I saw all the guns an
knew. The leader, a bearded man told me to hurry up.
"This is a kidnapping," he said. "Quick. Nothing's
gonna happen to you.
June 26
Tico Braun: Through the oil companies in Bogota [Gaim-
bini's wife] has learned about organizations that make a
living out of negotiating with guerrillas and terrorists.
They're located in Miami. It's a good thing that the
Colombian government doesn't get much involved. This
has to be kept within the family. It's a private matter, a
financial transaction.
July 3
Braun: We are beginning to learn about the clearly
defined steps and stages that families go through. What
stands ahead is predictable. The cuernlas will ask for an
astronomical sum of money, we'll make a counter offer,
and so it will go. That's the way it works. It turns out
that families apparently end u paying around 10% of
the guerrillas' initial demand. nce a sum is settled on
and the guerrillas have their money, they return the per-
son.
July 4
Braun: Almost everybody we talk to wants to know
whether Jake has kidnapping insurance, No we answer.
The insurance company would have paid everything,
including ransom payment all our expenses and even
these professionals whom Jake Gambini's wife] is pay-
ing, [but] Jake had conclued that the insurance policy
was too expensive, somethin like $100,000 per person
er ear. Jake figured he'd ave to pay the guerrillas
less for the ransom.
July 11
Gambini: I tried to figure out what the company was
worth. They said they usually took 50% of a family's
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA
resumed, but with less trust among the parties. Now,
each arrived with proposals impossible for the other
to comply with. The guerrillas had not ended their
attacks against the oil pipelines, nor had they dimin-
ished their kidnappings or seizures of villages and
police stations. The business associations attacked the
Maneuvering for a captive's release
has become as commonplace as
buying or selling a house or a
high-end used car.
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net worth. The guy with the beard told me that. I wrote
a note authorizing [my employee] to do the negotiating.
July 30
(Gambini's employee's first meeting with a guerrilla rep-
resentative):
Guerrilla: I have been assigned to negotiate this matter,
Don't worry, this is apurely economic thing. We're a
group that has suffered a lot, and this is a struggle that
we must continue.
Gambini's employee Yes sir. We understand your posi-
tion and we know that this is a business. We also want
to solve this quickly. Please keep in mind
min that the compa-
ny is not a multinational, as the newspapers reported. It's
a small company.
Au st 2:
(Afeur the second negotiating meeting
Braun: The phone rings. It is ake Gambini's employee].
"Five," he says.
"Five what?'
"Five big ones."
Five million dollars.
"Don't worry," Nelson [a hired professional from the
hostage-negotiator company] says, almost nonchalantly.
"It's only their opening gambit.
August 4:
(Third negotiating meeting)
Guerrilla:What are your people offering?
Gambini's employee: "Eighty million pesos."
Guerrilla: "No, that's very little. I told you not to start so
far down. Our new petition is three million dollars.
Verdes. Greenbacks.
Braun: I'm ecstatic. I feel as though we've made two mil-
lion dollars.
August 13:
Braun: We qo up ten million pesos, to three hundred
thousand dollars.
August 30
Braun: They wouldn't budge from the three million [dol-
lars.
September 23
Braun. They are not moving an inch [from the three mil-
lion dollars]. I go up to 105 million [pesos]. That, I tell
VoL XXXIV, No 2 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
negotiations and demanded that the government hard-
en its bargaining position. In that context, both sides
decided to again postpone the talks.
Four months later, however, the delegations
resumed contact in Tlaxcala, Mexico. The government
named Horacio Serpa as Peace Advisor and created a
BY Tico BRAUN
him, is as far as we can go. And Iwant a quick response.
I'm not here to waste my time, I have my job [at Universi-
ty of Virginia] to return to.
September 29:
Braun: A note arrives, and a Polaroid photograph of
him. Their note insists on "the three" [million dollars].
[Nelson, the professional hostage negotiator] lets us
know that we should be glad it s a picture. He knows
of a case where the family received a finger in a box
through the mail.
October 4:
Braun: We try everything in today's call.
Guerrilla: Well look, we are going to go down to 2.8
million [dollars).
Braun: Those figures are so unreachable for us that
the difference between one and other is nonexistent. I
let him know that we might be able to go up to 115
million [pesos] ...[The professional hostage negotiator]
keeps saying that they'll come down suddenly, out of
the blue. They have to. They need us.
October 20:
Guerrilla:We want this to be settled at 150.
Gambino's employee: 150. We're talking in Colom-
bian, right?
Guerrilla: Yes. Yes. Yes. But of those 150 we want
300, ah, 300,000 dollars and the rest in pesos.
Braun: The rest was somewhere between 46 and 53
million pesos, dependinqon the exchange rate.There
is no question about it. hey want to close a deal. It
takes eight calls to work out all the details. We contin-
ue to negotiate, we can't just suddenly agree to what
they want. But the differences are not substantial.
They know they will get close to their 150 million
pesos-460,000 dollars or so.
November 7:
Gambini's employee: We flew to this small airport. It
wasn't an airport exactly, but a pretty good runway
with a hut next to it. This was their place, and you
could tell they used it a lot. One of them came up to
me. Just a kid, not more than 20 years old. I carried
the suitcase. He opened the zipper. The kid smelled
the bills. He rifled through them like he was the most
experienced bank teller in the world. He had done this
many times before. He knew exactly what he was
doing. He put the bills back in the suitcase and closed
it. He smiled.
(Hours later after the family learns that the guerrillas
have freed Gambini)
Braun: Boy, luck had been with us... No. It wasn't
luck. The rules had worked. We did everything the
way we were supposed to. We had gotten him back.
Everything was fine. U
29
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA

department of social policy man- nificantly weakened by the oppo-

dated to make "social reinsertion" Coca farmers were sition's accusations that he had
attractive to insurgents who want- received campaign contributions
ed to give up their arms. In Mexi- humanized when strike from the drug cartels. His efforts
co, the CGSB succeeded in plac- at social reform, his attempted
ing a debate about the neoliberal leaders told the media rapprochement with the guerril-
model on the agenda, and the gov- about the government's las, and his proposed political
ernment's economic team came to changes were clouded over by
the negotiations to justify the disregard of their these accusations throughout his
Washington Consensus of free four years in office.
trade and privatization. The guer-
precarious conditions. Just a few days into his admin-
rilla team questioned every aspect istration, the FARC placed con-
of the Consensus, even as business ditions on the resumption of
associations and the right com- peace talks: a military withdraw-
plained that it was unnecessary and offensive for the al from the FARC-dominated municipality of La
government to have to justify its economic policies Uribe, in the department of Meta; the demobilization
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before a group of "gangsters." For their part, govern- of paramilitary groups; and suspension of government
ment spokespeople argued that significant economic rewards for identifying kidnappers-a weapon used
changes were impossible, since Colombia was now almost exclusively against the guerrillas. Samper
part of a globalized economy that imposed its own accepted the withdrawal, limiting it to the rural areas
obligatory rules. of La Uribe. He publicly recognized the political char-
Amid this less-than-promising atmosphere, the Pop- acter of the conflict by denying that the guerrillas were
ular Liberation Army (EPL), a minority group in the simply a band of drug traffickers. And he suspended
guerrilla coalition, kidnapped and killed a former the kidnapper identification rewards.
Conservative Cabinet minister named Argelino Durin.
The talks had begun with an agreement to continue
them "come what may." But in the wake of the EPL
The extreme right led an opposition to these con-
cessions, publicizing statistics about guerrilla
action, the government once again canceled the talks, kidnappings and the guerrillas' links with drug
and they collapsed in confusion. traffickers. Six months later, General Bedoya, com-
The guerrillas emerged from the talks divided. On mander of the Armed Forces, threatened Samper with
the one hand, two different guerrilla subgroups used a military coup if the government ordered him to with-
the accords to reinsert themselves into mainstream draw from La Uribe. The President, whose space for
politics. These groups, the majority of the EPL and a maneuvering was already sharply limited, backed
split-off of the ELN, gave up their arms as well as down in the face of broad opposition led by the U.S.
their areas of control. (Immediately after they relin- Ambassador, Colombia's Archbishop Primate, the
quished their territory, it was promptly occupied by Conservative hierarchy, retired military officers, fol-
paramilitaries.) Now, divisions began growing within lowers of ex-President Gaviria, the business associa-
the CGSB. The FARC felt that the alliance imposed tions and even portions of the left.
the interests of the minority over the majority, as The guerrillas then cancelled the rapprochement and
when the EPL kidnapped Durin, which collapsed the resumed their attacks on the Armed Forces. In June
talks at Tlaxcala. For the ELN and EPL, however, the and July 1996, guerrillas mobilized in the departments
problem was that the FARC wanted to dominate the of Guaviare, Putumayo, CaquetA, Norte de Santander
coordinating group. These differences were danger- and Bolivar. At about the same time, nearly 200,000
ous. But they were kept under control, at least for a peasants felt the effect of drug eradication policies on
time, by the moderating influence of much of the their illicit crops and thus their economic well-being.
guerrilla leadership. Recent aerial fumigations against legal and illegal
The paramilitaries, meanwhile, had been growing crops, and government attempts to quell the circula-
and attracting the sympathy of the right, which argued tion of inputs for processing coca leaves by declaring
that these "self-defense groups" should be recognized the so-called Special Zones of Public Order raised the
as the third actor in the conflict. The army continued peasant growers' costs of production, and therefore, of
to facilitate paramilitary seizures of the most impor- their survival as well. The protest was repressed by
tant economic, political and military regions: Urabi, the Armed Forces in a highly publicized way, making
the banana plantation area; the Panama border; and conflicts in the areas of colonization visible and sensi-
Montes de Maria, an area of big farms near Cartagena. tizing the public to the reality of coca producers' lives.
Ernesto Samper assumed the presidency in 1994, sig- These events helped humanize coca farmers, especial-
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
30NMI1A
30 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
 REPORT ON COLOMBIA

ly when strike lead-

ers told the media
about the govern-
ment's disregard of
their precarious con-
ditions.
Over the next year
and a half, the guer-
rilla movement met
with substantial mili-
tary success, captur-
ing many army bases
and villages, and
ambushing army
patrols. These
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actions were increas-

ingly ambitious and
efficient; in August
1996 they culminat-
ed in destruction of
the army base at Las
Delicias in Caqueti
and the capture of 60
soldiers. Immediate-
ly afterward, the
FARC extended
offensive actions
through the territory, ms. The woman's scars are from a bomb blast.
FARC guerrillas washing their uniform
and Colombians
began feeling that the state had lost control of public be a decisive factor in upcoming presidential elec-
order. As the government withdrew, the vacuum was tions.
filled by the paramilitaries, who had transformed By 1998, in fact, despite furious opposition from the
themselves into an unofficial wing of the Armed right and the army, the leading presidential candidates
Forces. began to court the insurgents. The Conservative candi-
Samper was paralyzed. The military growth of the date, Andrds Pastrana, had created channels of com-
guerrillas was public knowledge, and they proposed munication with the FARC. The Liberal candidate,
releasing the prisoners they held in exchange for the Horacio Serpa, had participated in previous con-
army's further withdrawal in Cagubn. The government tentious negotiations, so he was a bit more estranged.
accepted. The soldiers were handed over in July of But both candidates stressed two fundamental promis-
1997 under the supervision of the Red Cross and inter- es: to withdraw from the five municipalities, and to
national observers from 13 countries, mainly from deal directly with Marulanda to establish bases for
Europe and Latin America. During this event, the negotiation. That implied visiting with the FARC
FARC made several demands as a prerequisite for leader in his military encampments. Pastrana succeed-
peace talks: that the army withdraw from five addi- ed in tilting the balance in his favor, and as soon as he
tional municipalities; that the guerrillas be treated with won his narrow victory, he kept his word and met with
respect; and that popular protest be decriminalized. Marulanda. They agreed then on the bases for negotia-
The government, losing prestige day by day, rejected tion: withdrawal of military authority and police
the conditions and the army mounted a large military forces from the five municipalities, formation of an
operation that--despite a massive propaganda effort-- unarmed civic corps to keep local order in the demili-
produced absolutely no results. In this small test of tarized zone, dismantling of the paramilitary groups,
strength, the FARC did rather well. The government decriminalization of popular protest, and convening of
0
and the international community recognized their mil- participation by the international community. Thus
0
4
o
itary strength, and the FARC's political presence in they began the process of negotiation. Once again,
f the country's interior began to seem as though it might peace talks are underway. N
31
Vol XXXIV,
VoL No 22
XXXIV, No SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
SEPTEMBER/OCtOBER 2000 31