CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER THE LEGAL PROFESSION Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the
Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. 1 While
respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. 2 On
September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out
that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle
the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a
counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a
powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he
rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor
the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case,
his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the
presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request
for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court
Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for
violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. –
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on
the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood
cousins" who belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of
Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms.
Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor
and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's
help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification
by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the
said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his
cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro
Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of
their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth
certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to
be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough
funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his
seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on
Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty
and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a
free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his
position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding
office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as
shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred
the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings
and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and
in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal
Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC
of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in
said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he
was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent
did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever
handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He
appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel
for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as
counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and
considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said
appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding
Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED
with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with
more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the
law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private
practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General
is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. 8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a
private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the
head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as
borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by
law.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The
respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject
land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared
open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986,
and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose
duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to
purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was
headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee
members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from
1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the
proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly
interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his personal interest
over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter
to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to
accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over
the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and
his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas
belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that
the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over
the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the
rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with
Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights
over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy,
Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that
he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct
considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not
qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the
one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third
malicious charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted
before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the
Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of
the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land
and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s
rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of
rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on
one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the
DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over
the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR
decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President,
by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him
(complainant) that the respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject
land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration
and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo,
the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant
₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted
undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the
subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in
the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in
Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject
land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter
decided to sell his rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of
his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The
respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the
respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what his father told him,
cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo,
dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel
categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant,
was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the
transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to
give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and
influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was
lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that
the complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to
1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee
on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting
documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This
office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became
the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government
service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former
associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law. 8 In this regard, the
respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the
Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24,
1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of
the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because
the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a
member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions
constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was
still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and
second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who
represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective
pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing
standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of
their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No.
6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to
observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in
the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to
put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government
lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest
to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction
extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their
private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office.
In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest,
but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest
interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the
Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in
Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who
had a pending application for visas before his office. 18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this
Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after
considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the
complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any
concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever
brought before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the
complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management
Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office
of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel
Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was
only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR
rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and
membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote,
advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat,
since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when
the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used
his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the
complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by
the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to
get the subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What
appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel
Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest
in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights
over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the
nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to
be in the respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant
presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and
influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR
Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the
alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his
farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the
respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to
another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of
Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we
cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on
the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel
Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel
Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by
corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various
sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her
affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated
the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo
were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the
respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s
claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to
Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and
Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part
of the purchase price of the subject land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence,
specifically the dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on
February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the
Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995,
showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation
that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he
obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his
separation from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance"
where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that
there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of
court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No.
6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain
restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation
from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government
lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception.
In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under
subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is
imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and
prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person
who has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must
have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public
office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the
proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously
interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was
still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to
sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 32 we specifically
described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice
of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal
representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance
was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to
prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s
favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful
conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s
allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the
respondent violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged
the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his
nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed
areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the
decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of
the President, the Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute
Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we
dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding,
among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her
defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has
proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted
in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the
respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the
Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for
violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga,
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you
of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights
and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence
the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do
not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa
& Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of
the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at
Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void
his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of
his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from
salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
 . . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered
into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and against
my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be
void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already
cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary
in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's)
mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya
of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;"
and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with
the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or
be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office
of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive
Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also
"a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint
in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court
were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as
sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound
him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his
salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court,
this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting
a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing
his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract
on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious
and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters
both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . .
prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority
and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting
in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and .
. refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, "
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
22
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T.
Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from
the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several
pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission
basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which
then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated
16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the
amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring
of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional
the
Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358;
and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal
Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases,
and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of
the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and
shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme
Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as
required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to
the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent
filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action
respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution,
the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she
posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not
painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that
accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated
her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the
checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.
Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the
nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had
been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
 so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a
person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until
further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the
Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record
of respondent.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ June 20, 2012
JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, ANGELINA P. CIOCON, MARIVIT P. CIOCON-
HERNANDEZ, and REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General
Santos City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and
Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross
incompetence and inefficiency; violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019;
violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code; violations of pertinent
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial Conduct per
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and grave
misconduct.
The Antecedent Facts
Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v.
Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed
case from the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants
alleged that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the
order. Complainants further alleged that on 30 September 2008, a copy of the order
was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which they should have received
within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that the 30-day period
within which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the
defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants
alleged that they should be deemed to have waived their right to adduce evidence and
Judge Lubao should have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6
November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision.
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda on 12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties
through registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the
plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not
receive the registry return card on the notice to the defendants. On 10 December
2008, the branch clerk of court sent a letter-request to the Post Office of General
Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent
under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. However, the court
did not receive any reply from the Post Office.
Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of
substantial justice, the defendants were given their last chance to submit their
memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same order, he directed
the plaintiffs to coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order
to the defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the branch sheriff
and the order was sent to the defendants, again by registered mail, only on 17 June
2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan)
is engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked
this Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt
for unauthorized practice of law.
Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubao’s failure to submit
his comment on time to complainants’ administrative complaint is a violation of the
existing rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards
his alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was
merely trying to evade the issues at hand.
The Findings of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) reported that a verification from the Docket and Clearance Division of its
Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous administrative complaints 1 against
judges from different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court.
In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show that
the orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith.
The OCA stated that the matters raised by complainants could only be questioned
through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an
administrative complaint. The OCA stated that Karaan could not simply assume that
the order of 12 September 2008 had been received by the defendants without the
registry return card which was not returned to the trial court.
The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear
that Karaan was engaged in the practice of law. The OCA also noted the numerous
frivolous and administrative complaints filed by Karaan against several judges which
tend to mock the judicial system.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack
of merit. The OCA further recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why
he should not be cited for contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint
against Judge Lubao for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This Court
likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
violating Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint against
Judge Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been assuming to be an attorney or an
officer of the court and acting as such without authority. He alleged that he did not
indicate any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number in his documents.
He further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against Judge Lindo was not actually
dismissed as reported by the OCA.
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for reconsideration
and compliance to the show cause order. Karaan reiterated that he never represented
himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his paralegal services,
rendered free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists
organizations which represent the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and
members of the community with limited means.
In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the motion
for reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge Lubao’s explanation that the case was
summarily dismissed by the municipal trial court without service of summons on the
defendants. Thus, Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all
parties to submit their memorandum to give all concerned the opportunity to be
heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubao’s action was judicial in
nature. The OCA found that the claim of Karaan that he could prove the receipt of
the order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was not in the records of the case
where Judge Karaan based his order.
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous
language, continually attributed all sorts of malicious motives and nefarious schemes
to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his official function but failed to
substantiate his allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is just one of the
many cases Karaan filed against various judges in other courts where the same
pattern of accusations could be observed.
The OCA found Karaan’s explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The
OCA noted Karaan’s modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then
making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would make him an agent
of the litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions with himself
as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his "clients." The OCA noted that
Karaan’s services, on behalf of the underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall
within the practice of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for
indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for 10 days at
the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of ₱1,000 with a warning that a repetition of
any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or court
employees will merit more serious sanctions.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the OCA’s recommendation that the motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s 24 November 2010 Resolution dismissing the complaint against Judge
Lubao has no merit.
Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.2 We agree with the OCA that the
remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of
their motion for reconsideration of this Court’s 24 November 2010 Resolution
dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order. As the OCA
stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants received the
copy of Judge Lubao’s order without the registry return receipt. While Karaan
claimed that he knew when one of the parties received a copy of the order, this claim
was unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of the case when Judge
Lubao issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants their last chance to
submit their memorandum. The records would also show that Judge Lubao had been
very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the
Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the
defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an
opportunity to be heard considering that the records of the case would show that the
court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the
defendants.
We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized practice
of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,3 the Court ruled that "practice of law" means any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession.4 Generally, to practice law is
to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.5 Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaan’s unauthorized
practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney
in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact.
Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings "acting for and in
his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the parties. The
fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or
any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the
fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person
"[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority," is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules,
a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank "may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or
both." If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower
court, he "may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both."
Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,6 the OCA
recommended that Karaan be cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve
an imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of ₱1,000 with
a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense
against the courts, judges or court employees will merit further and more serious
sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a memorandum be issued to all courts
of the land to notify the judges and court employees of Karaan’s unauthorized
practice of law and to report to the OCA any further appearance to be made by
Karaan. However, the records would show that Karaan is already 71 years old. In
consideration of his old age and his state of health, we deem it proper to remove the
penalty of imprisonment as recommended by the OCA and instead increase the
recommended fine to ₱10,000.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution
dated 24 November 2010 dismissing the complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao
for being judicial in nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of
indirect contempt under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000).
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance
and information. The courts and court employees are further directed to report to the
Office of the Court Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan,
Sr. before their sala.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139281 September 29, 1999
SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ., petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO SALAZAR, et al., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Considering respondents' "Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon
A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the
Petition" and said Atty. Manangan's admission at the hearing this morning,
September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines,
and that he is the same "Filemon A. Manangan" who was found by this Court in G.R.
No. 82760 (Filemon Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to
misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for
petitioners in this case, "Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres
Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he
is hereby sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to be served at the
Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until
further orders from this Court.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS,
Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
1 Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio
(Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his
company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar
Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v.
Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group)
were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. 2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for
illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their
separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically,
Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of
₱674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th
month pay.3 Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme
Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided
against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution 5 was issued to implement the June
15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise
issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and April 16, 20138 were later on issued,
directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment
award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed
as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of
the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA
guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission
of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O.
ERA and entered m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the
guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the
corporation's properties in the business establishment was conducted to implement
the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public auction
and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same
day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's
officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents,
Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to
negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of
pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to
continue with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-
offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9
Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas
went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients and
several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties.
This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant
administrative complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief,
robbery, and trespassing with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its
Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion. 14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC
and this Court sometime in February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor
case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint. 16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal
knowledge as to what transpired on November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as
the latter was not present therein at that time.18 Hence, his allegations of force, threat,
and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis. 19 In his defense,
Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from
the practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a
Special Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that
with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients
in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document
or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an
associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer
that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still on
negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own computations, which they
could respectively accept or otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a
suspended lawyer's name in a pleading considering that the same was not signed by
the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On the
other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings.
There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty.
Era in filing a pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction
and the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the
practice of law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner,
anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of
the judgment by using force, threat, and intimidation, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the
following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case23 dated
December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and
even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation 24 dated March 12, 2014,
wherein complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the
certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to
Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release
of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation with Motion
to Lift Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for Malicious Mischief,
Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating
Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in
the labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and
Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment, complainant
contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the judgment
was improperly and unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges
against Attys. Era and Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated
April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and
conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs.
Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering Atty. Era's
continuedengagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment
including pegging of interest he acted as his clients advocate instead as an agent in
view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and
admittedly summoned the complainant's children to determine the money judgment.
Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of
Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors
found Atty. Era's argument that he merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him
untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era the authority to
appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not
include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive
payment on behalf of his clients, the SP A specifically stated that said payments
should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era
had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28,
2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of
the judgment award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on
his legal knowledge in having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era
violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting
Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that
Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the alias
writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing. 34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case
were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of
June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant
administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law
during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action
against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant
this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v.
Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions
of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,
176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for
new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, 38We succinctly ruled
that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration
of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of
that purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1)
appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned
properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of
sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new
owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5)
initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in
his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of
pulling out the properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the
same may not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating
Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution,
Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the
legal effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the
judgment award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them
in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising
from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. 42 Such trained
legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims.
This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable
settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their
lawyer.43 It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty.
Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the
said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in
the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SP A cunningly
undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot
countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
years in this Court's Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts
on the same year, specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era
was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court,
which under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent
the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his
disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar,
above anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and processes. 45 Graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in
their practice despite being suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice of law for
practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise
in another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the
clear language of this Court's suspension order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding
Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the
exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's recommendation as
to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the
practice of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and,
thus, must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from
the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's
unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy,
which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified
in education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts
constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good
standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not
participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the
suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty.
Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients
during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly
was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards
Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of
willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is
likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and
Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a
commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as
members of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW
IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANJO B. MUNESES, PETITIONER.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when
he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that
on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition
were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to
wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General
Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues
with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intended to resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof
means termination of the petitioner's membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.[1] Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated
in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. [2] R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. [3]
It can not be overstressed that:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege.[4]
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true
copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual
membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued
by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of
annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,
Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law
attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and
sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is
hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath
on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11316
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,"
Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former
has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.
 The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio 2 R. Caronan, Jr. and
Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on
February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both of them
completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant
graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant
enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In
2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters. 8 Through
the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store
Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year
before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992. 10 In 1993, he
was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car
rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and
their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a
college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant
that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the
Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the
University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed
these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. 15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity
when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the
Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did
not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a
family to support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant
was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon
arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was
requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before
the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed
and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4)
records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records
from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's
University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan." 19 Complainant later
learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap
(Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit
unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter
from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished
with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him
to discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On the other hand, a fellow
church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A.
Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. 26 He also
became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced
him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an
issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board
of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and
which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C.
No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and
her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal
complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference
where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on
April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation, 38 finding
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and
academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the
allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40 On the
other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when
he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G.
Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16,
2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner,
show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take
the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and
academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained
the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069
be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 46 He also recommended that
respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a
member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the
IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-
607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent,
whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity,
and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain
a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings
when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records
showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the
one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records
from the University of Makati bearing his photograph; 53 (b) a copy of his high school
yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it; 54 and (c)
NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since
complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the
IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard
A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted
unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of
the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he
enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was
discharged in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his
college education and earn a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his
false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him
unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations
and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan
R. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his
own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to
fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years.
Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with
his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal
cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity
and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any
representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar
in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices
and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of
respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name
and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A
BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is
ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases
Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.
15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in
front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and
hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he
is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received
by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed
against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former
professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in
good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the
same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of
the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him
in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his
act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes
him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar."5
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of
the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever
may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law,
the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling"
knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in
Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may
render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar
be suspended until further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar
as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution
and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with
any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge,
officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court
or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the
form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining
whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing
the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases
against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the
forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the
occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of
the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent
therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court
declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While
one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this
case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged
to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must
not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's
faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public
office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before
the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders
from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of
appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a
Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar
is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13)
other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one
Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from
the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an
Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago.
The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact
of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the
1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take
the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that
Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten
(10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law
in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to
make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his
fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line
of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer.
He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an
arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for
admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met
at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been
admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established
 himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is
a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not
all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the
unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed
to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and
a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse
admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that
they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients,
but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit
upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest
possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid
in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to
admit no person to the practice of the law unless
he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the
proper administration of justice than legal
learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of
the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead
of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding
for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a
disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character
as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his
guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our
legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The
Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner
and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years
four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the probation.
bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
profession of the law.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate
(15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
(8) accused in the criminal case.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul,
to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the
death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not
only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and
a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day
1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his
son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to
the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of
the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the
reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency
in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is
due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of
third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at
the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the
accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent,
given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner
is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED
to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of
Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a
general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to do so on
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys
lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. 11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the
matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this
Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent
to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was
not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same
time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And,
finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath
as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from
the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who
were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the
ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having
held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this
Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability
for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under
an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point,
Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be
an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must
be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has
been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9
of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself
is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-
fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it
fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression
of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned
that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise
ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During
the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction
the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in
his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,
1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,
1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he
does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case
No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the
end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the
order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the
then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier,
that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten
days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in
1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member
of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in
good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact,
in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan,
Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by
him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact,
he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment,
not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly
insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite
his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated
April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of
the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B"
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice
of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in
his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for
the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it
is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.