KEITH LEHRER

REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Representation in the arts is a creative process of reconfiguring a

subject, real or imagined, to yield some original content or inten-
tional object. The first question about representation is – what is the
question about representation? Gombrich (1972), Wollheim (1980),
Goodman (1968), Walton (1990), and Lopes (1996), have offered
us diverse theories of representation in the visual arts. They all
contain interesting ideas and insights, but the diversity of theories
suggests that they may be asking and answering different questions.
Moreover, that should not surprise us at all, for the painter, as well
as other artists have diverse goals, and one of those goals is to
change our conception of representation, to modify and challenge
the conventions and constraints of representation.
Lopes (1996), for example, suggests that the fundamental form
of representation is depiction, demotic picturing, that would enable
one to recognize and identify the object depicted. We are indebted
to Lopes for this important proposal, but demotic picturing may
be opposed to artistic representation. The artist may start with the
external subject as the stimulus to find some meaning, some feeling
or emotion, some insight or idea, and so reconfigure and repattern
what he or she has seen into something that has some new internal
meaning or content. The stimulus for a painting, a model, for
example, need not be depicted or be what the painting is about The
content of a painting is one thing, and the model is something else.
A painter is sometimes indifferent to producing a demotic picture of
the model or subject, which has caused difficulties between famous
portrait painters and those they portrayed, when what interests the
artist is the reconfiguration or the reinterpretation of the model or
subject. The painter may want to create a painting that has a content
that did not exist prior to the painting. Put it another way, the painter
attempts to interpret the subject, that is, to configure the subject in
a new way that will result in a new meaning, a new content, rather

Philosophical Studies 117: 1–14, 2004.

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
2 KEITH LEHRER

than a demotic picture. Madame Pompadour thought that Boucher

did not capture her likeness well, but he represented her the way
she wanted to be represented. The content of his paintings of her
configured her, as she desired, though he was not good at demotic
representation of her.
The questions concerning artistic representation that concern me
are these. What is the content of the painting? What is it for a
painting to be about something? How does a painting represent
what the painting is about, its content? Aboutness is an intentional
notion, and so what the painting is about is an intentional object.
It is like an object of thought, and this accords well with the views
of Gombrich (1972) and Walton (1990). If a painter paints from a
model, the painting need not be about model. The great paintings of
the nude done from models are not about hired help. They are about
the object represented in the painting, which is the content of the
painting. The object may be an object or content, a god or goddess,
who has no external existence. Suppose I paint Finger Rock Canyon
in the desert. The content of my painting, what it is about, is in the
painting, not in the desert. The canyon in the desert was the model or
stimulus but not the content. Does my painting denote Finger Rock
Canyon? It does not. The words “Finger Rock Canyon” denote it.
Here is my sorting out of the matter. I distinguish what a painting
is about, the intentional object or content, from what, if anything the
painting denotes. I also distinguish the content from the external
subject or model that serves as the stimulus for the painting. A
painting need not denote the model, and the model need not be
the content of the painting. Many paintings do not denote anything,
though some, a painting whose function is the identification of some
subject, an identification painting, may denote the subject. Some
paintings may not be about anything for anybody. They are content-
less paintings. Maybe some Rothko paintings are among those, and I
shall return to this. That is the exception, however. We are inveterate
interpreters secreting content when visually stimulated. At any rate,
I am concerned with paintings that are about something. What I seek
is to explain is how a painting represents its content, what it is about.
I am not sure this is a pellucid objective, but it must do here.
We need to distinguish representation from description. Descrip-
tions have content as well as representations. The content of painting
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 3

differs, however, from the content of a description in the way in

which the content of the painting is related to the painting. The
content of the painting is specific to the particular painting in the
way that the content of description is not. There may be many
descriptions, different descriptions of the same descriptive content.
One description may be exchangeable with another with respect
to the same content. But the content of painting is not exchange-
able with the content of another painting. We could add that the
content of the painting is ineffable in the sense that no description
of the painting, however detailed, would represent the content of the
painting in the way that the painting does. The painting has a kind
of representational opacity with respect to its content. In the case of
the description, on the other hand, there is a kind of transparency
of representation. Once you grasp the content of the description,
you may ignore features of the description, the exact letters used,
for example, when contemplating the content. The transparency of
description is part of the explanation for why proofreading is diffi-
cult. You read the description to find the content of it, and, once
found, the features of the description may be ignored because of
their transparency.
The features of the painting are more directly related to the
content of the painting than the features of the description are to
the content of the description. The content of the painting is seen
in the painting, not through the painting. The sensory experience
caused by seeing the painting is part of the content. You can only
tell what the content of the painting is like by seeing the painting.
Goodman (1968), noting the difference between representation and
description, has insisted upon the importance of the analog character
of visual representation. I do not disagree that the analogue character
is important, but I do not believe that this explains the particularity
of content. A robust notion of analogue representation might have
the consequence that any feature of the sensory experience of the
painting could be relevant to the representation. That takes us a long
way toward an account of the particularity of content, but not all the
way. The reason is that analogue character, however detailed, admits
of replication. The analogue replica would have the same content
if the representation were analogue. The analogue character is a
general character and does not capture the particularity of the artistic
4 KEITH LEHRER

representation of content. The Cézanne painting of the mountain,

Saint Victoire, gives you a representation of the mountain in the
particular manner in which the painting is experienced. The differ-
ence between the representation of content in terms of the particular
sensory experience of the painting and in an analogue representation
is like the difference between a most determinate character and a
particular. They are not the same.
In addition to the particularity of content, there is something
conceptual in the content of the painting. We look at the painting
and conceive of the content. Consider a painting, those of Jack Yeats
illustrate the point very well, where there is something like a gestalt
phenomenon that occurs in the perception of the painting. There is
something you do not see at first, and then you do see it. When
you do see, for example, two men in the painting, though at first
you did not, the content of the painting is different for you. At first
you lack a conception of the content which you later perceive. It
would, therefore, be a mistake to infer from the nonexchangeability,
ineffability, opacity, specificity and particularity of the content of
the painting that the representation of the content is not concep-
tual. It is. We conceive of the content of the painting by viewing
it. The content of the painting is conceptual, and that means that
it is also general. But the generality of the content cannot exhaust
what the content is like because the content is also particular. These
points have been observed by other estheticians. Blocker (1979), for
example, insisted on the combined particularity and generality of
the content. My goal is to offer an explanation of the role of the
particular character of what the painting is like in the conception of
the generality of content.
We might formulate the problem of explanation as a paradox. On
one hand, the content of the painting is particular. On the other hand,
the content of the painting is something you conceive of. So it is
something conceptual. If it is conceptual, then it is general. Concepts
involve generalizing. The problem is to explain how the content can
be both particular and general. The solution I want to develop is
taken from Goodman (1968), though indirectly from Sellars (1963),
and more remotely, Hume (1739) and Reid (1785). It uses the
notion of exemplarization. The painting gives rise to an exemplar
used to represent the content. Goodman (1968) uses the example of
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 5

singing a song and using the singing as an exemplar to represent

a class of singings or the song. I shall say that the heard song is
exemplarized. My objective is not to deny the views of others,
though my view may be incompatible with theirs on some points,
but to advance a theory of artistic representation that connects
consciousness with visual representation and explains the emotional
content of such representation while distinguishing such representa-
tion from description.
Let me begin with an example, which may seem unrelated, from
Frank Jackson (1982) that concerns monochromatic Mary. Mary,
a scientific genius, knows from descriptive representation all that
there is to know about the physical universe but has lived in a
monochromatic room all her life and has never seen color up until
now. She leaves the room and sees something red. After Mary
sees something red, she knows what the color red is like in a
new way. My account (1997) of this is that she exemplarizes the
sensory experience, and it becomes representational. So she has a
new way of representing the color, by using the particular to stand
for a class, feature or property, depending on how you want to do
ontology concerning qualities. Exemplarization by Mary requires
attention to the particular aspect of the experience, the color, and a
generalization of it so that the particular becomes general.
Now let us consider the painting. My view is that a sensory
experience arising from the painting is exemplarized to obtain a
conception of the content. Attending to the painting yields gener-
alizing, which is a functional state that enables the observer to
conceive of what the painting is about. The observer, whether the
artist or another, might not be capable of describing the functional
state. The functional state is the source of the meaning or content
of the painting. The content of a painting, my self-portrait, for
example, is a man, the artist, but what the content is like, though
it might be described, is something a person can only know by
seeing the painting. The sensory experience arising from attending
to the painting is part of the functional state yielding the content.
Moreover, the functional state that yields the content also contains
the sensory state. The exemplarized sensory state loops back onto
itself as a constituent of the functional state yielding the content of
6 KEITH LEHRER

the painting. Sensory experience is coiled in a circle at the heart of

content.
I have spoken of the exemplarization of the sensory experience.
I should like to offer some reflections, however preliminary and
unsatisfactory, of exactly what is being exemplarized. Consider the
sensory surface of the painting, that is, the illuminated surface. Is
that what is exemplarized? A consequence of this view is that it
is the actual painting that is part of the content of the painting
and not merely the vehicle of representation. Here are some further
consequences. First, the content of the painting is destroyed with
the destruction of the painting. There is something plausible in the
idea that what the painting represents is destroyed along with the
destruction of the painting. A similar content might exist in a photo
or copy but it would not be the same. The similar copy does not
represent the exact content of the painting, the sunflowers in Vase
With Fourteen Sunflowers by Van Gogh, for example, in exactly
the same way that the Van Gogh represented them in the painting,
though the representation is similar. In fact, each Van Gogh painting
of the sunflowers represents them in a different if similar way and,
therefore, has a different content. This account of exemplarization of
the illuminated surface would explain the opacity or nonexchange-
ability of the painting in representation. But it cannot be quite right
for a simple reason. The functional state that yields the content is
a state in the mind of the observer, and the exemplarized item is a
constituent of that mental state. The illuminated surface is not a state
in the mind of the observer or a constituent of such a state.
Now consider the sensory experience of the illuminated surface
yielding sensory qualia of color and shape. The experience of the
qualia is in the mind of the observer. Moreover, these qualia are
spontaneously enriched in the phenomenology of experience. In
Yeats’ painting referred to above, there is a kind of phenomeno-
logical gestalt shift. Before the shift, one sees colors and shapes,
and after the shift one sees the face of man. It would be a mistake to
construe this as just adding a conception of the face to the sensory
experience of colors and shapes. For a person can be told that there
is a face in the painting, even be told where it is, and not see it. The
phenomenological shift requires more than adding conception to
qualia. It requires a change in the qualia to yield the new phenome-
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 7

nology. What is exemplarized then? The sensory phenomenology of

the illuminated sensory surface is what is exemplarized.
Consider a spectator, who sees what the content of the painting
is like, and tells another what the painting is like. The listener will
know something about the content. The listener might even be able
to identify the painting from the description. However, the listener
will not know what the painting is like until she sees it in just the
way that Mary does not know what red is like until she sees the
color. Could the other know what the painting is about, what the
content is, before seeing the painting? There is something she would
not know about what the content is like before seeing the painting.
The reason is that the sensory experience she lacks is part of the
functional state yielding the content. The phenomenology of what
it is like to experience the painting is a constituent of the content.
You show the person the painting and say, “It is the House of Seven
Gables like that.” The demonstrative calls attention to the sensory
state exemplarized to yield the content. You can say the content is
the House of Seven Gables and go on with the description, but there
is something more to the content of the painting than the description
supplies. There is knowing what the object represented is like in the
painting. It is similar to the case of Mary. The sensory state, the
phenomenology, is partly constitutive of the content. The content of
the painting of the House of Seven Gables for a person is constituted
in part by what the painting is like, by the phenomenology of the
sensory state the person exemplarizes in his or her experience of the
painting. The painting represents its content to the spectator in terms
of the phenomenology of the qualia it presents to him or her. It is the
House of Seven Gable like that to him or her. What that way is, what
it is like, you can only know from the phenomenology of the qualia.
A computational zombie, even an analogue zombie, would not know
something Mary knows when she looks at the painting about what
it is like. It is part of the content of the painting that it is like that.
How we exemplarize is going to be influenced by our cognitive
schemata. Some of them will be conventional, and that is the insight
of Gombrich (1972). However, some of our cognitive architecture
is innate, and some of our innate visual responses will be encapsu-
lated. The stick looks bent in water before and after the shaping
of visual representation by convention. Convention did not produce
8 KEITH LEHRER

those responses and cannot override them. Such responses support

Wollheim’s (l980) view about the primacy of psychology in visual
representation. So, it is not entirely conventional, contra Gombrich
(l972), and it is not entirely arbitrary, contra Goodman (1968).
There are encapsulated visual responses that are partly constitutive
of what the content is like because of their influence on how we
exemplarize. The phenomenology is part and parcel of the content
as we generalize from it.
Gombrich is surely right that how we ordinarily generalize and
what we see in the picture is influenced by convention, by conven-
tional schemata. However, it is the purpose of the avant-garde
artist and many of the most creative artists, to break through the
conventional way of seeing and of seeing paintings. Convention
challenging is the name of the art game. So, how are we to explain
what we see in a painting? What we see is an aggregation of vectors,
some social, some innate and some that are novel, as we exemplarize
the sensory phenomenology of qualia presented to us.
One of the advantages of the account is that it explains the
expression of feeling and emotion in the content of the painting.
The first point is that there is an encapsulated relationship between
sensory states and emotional ones. The frown evokes an innate
crying response from the baby. As adults, we do not cry when
frowned at. We may understand that no offense is intended, but
an attenuated connection with the phenomenology of the sensory
state remains. The frown feels unpleasant, as the stick looks bent
no matter what our understanding of them might tell us. Whatever
the complete psychological story of the connection between sensory
states and emotions, the connection is there. It is not always just
learned association. In some cases, the sensory state is connected
with the feelings or emotions in an encapsulated way innately. So
when we exemplarize the sensory state and see the content in the
painting, the emotion connected with the sensory state becomes part
of the content of painting. The latter contains the sensory state as
part of it, part of the functional state yielding the content. There may
be other emotions evoked or associated with the functional state, but
those encapsulated in the sensory state inevitably constitute part of
the content. Such emotional content, as Wollheim (1980) insisted, is
part of the content of the sensory state.
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 9

What is relationship of the painting to the subject or model, the

House of Seven Gables or Finger Rock Canyon, other than the
model or subject being the causal stimulus for creation? We may
have a new conception of the House of Seven Gables in Salem
from the exemplarization of the phenomenology of the sensory state
arising from the painting in Tucson. The exemplarization yields the
content of the painting. Now that content of the painting can influ-
ence how we perceive the external model or subject. We can see the
House of Seven Gables in Salem as the object in the painting. The
reconfiguration of the House of Seven Gables in the painting can
have the result that we see the House of Seven Gables in Salem
as it was painted. Thus, the resemblance between the house in
the painting in Tucson and the actual house in Salem may be the
result of the new conception, the new object, created by and in the
painting. Resemblance is resemblance in some respect, under some
conception. So the resemblance noticed may be due to our concep-
tion of the object in the painting in Tucson rather than being due
solely to the house in Salem. The house is the stimulus, but there is,
as a result of the representation in the painting, a new way of seeing
the house. The house in the painting can give the house in Salem a
new content.
A bit paradoxically put, I might ask myself what the house
represents and answer the question by painting the painting. So
the house comes to represent for me what is represented in the
painting, the content of the painting. The content is a new concep-
tion connected to a sensory state, and the new conception can be
a conception of the house in Salem that I perceive. There is a
causal stimulus, the house, which gives rise to the content of the
painting. Then, in a representational loop, the house comes to have
the content of the painting. By a kind of illusion credited to artistic
reconfiguration we think the house in the painting resembles the
house in Salem because the house in Salem is seen as the house in
the painting. If a person asks whether the similarity to the house in
Salem explains the content of the painting, or whether the content of
the painting explains the similarity to the house in Salem, the answer
is that both are explained by the way in which we exemplarize the
phenomenology of the painting to obtain our conception and content
of them.
10 KEITH LEHRER

The question that arises, and it is an important question about

the mind and the way it functions, is what determines how we
generalize. Innate and encapsulated processes are part of the story.
Convention and context are also part of the story. Peggy Brand
is repainting some famous paintings of women with a hole where
the face should be. Looking at her paintings will tell us something
about the context and conventions surrounding a take on women.
It is clear that convention and context matter. Consider medieval
paintings of Christ. Do they resemble Jesus of Nazareth? Once
we exemplarize those pictures we have a conception of Jesus of
Nazareth. We would try to see him as we conceive of him from those
paintings. Political, religious and social influences act upon us when
we generalize. That is one reason the avant-garde artist challenges
our preconceptions. He or she seeks to reconfigure. And that is why
ordinary, or as Lopes (1996) calls it, demotic representation differs
from artistic representation. Artistic representation is reconfigured
and reconfiguring representation. It adds something new to life and
reconfigures our conceptions.
Notice as an advantage of the foregoing account of representa-
tion in terms of exemplarization that a continuity between realistic
representation and abstract representation results naturally from the
account. We may be more influenced by innate and encapsulated
processes in the way in which we exemplarize realistic paintings,
while other factors of convention and context may play a greater role
in the way we exemplarize abstract painting. We may require more
education to understand the content of the abstract painting. But, as
Gombrich (1972) rightly insists, there is some convention exerting
an influence, when, as Wollheim (1980) tells us, we see something
in the painting. As the painting gets more abstract and comes to lack
images of identifiable objects, we still exemplarize what we see and
see the content of the painting. We can exemplarize a square and the
color of it to appreciate the content of Albers. It is not enough to
look at it in some cases. The person may not understand it because
they do not know how to generalize. The functional state of gener-
alizing fails and the person has no clear conception of what they are
seeing. The clear conception may be of colors in space, colors in
motion and feelings in colors. Any of this may result from the way
in which the person exemplarizes the work of art. Some paintings
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 11

may attempt to defy generalization, but once you see a few, they
are exemplarized as readily as the painting of a house. Consider the
paintings of Mondrian or sculptures of Nevelson. A person, who is
puzzled at first, gets it, and they exemplarize the reconfigured space
and spatial relations.
I do not claim that every artist has reconfiguration of concep-
tion as an intention. Some may be interested primarily in blocking
configuration and conception as a teacher of Zen meditation might
seek to do. I find the strength of Rothko to be that it so successfully
blocks conception. As I look, I am lost in the paradoxical empti-
ness and fullness of the sensory experience. To be sure, I come
away with a conception of a Rothko painting, but he succeeds in
blocking the usual conceptual responses as successfully as any artist
does. Blocking conception is a remarkable achievement, and that it
is remarkable calls attention to the fact that, unlike most art, even
abstract art, concept blocking art it is not about anything. Rothko
is a master content blocker. Even so, many viewers will find that
the paintings are about something, perhaps about the flight from
content. Paradoxically, for some of us, the content of the Rothko
painting is the flight from content into the void.
A question is pressing upon us. The account proposed, if that
is not too fancy a way to describe my suggestion, has taken us as
far as the content of a painting for a person who exemplarizes his
or her phenomenology of the painting. But don’t we want to say
that some may misunderstand the painting, fail to grasp the content
represented in the painting? Surely we do. We may regard some as
more expert in noting what the content of the painting is while others
are less competent. One may incompetently exemplarize phenome-
nology of a painting. An idiosyncratic exemplarization will yield
a content for the exemplarizing individual, but he or she may get
it wrong in some way. Someone who sees Picasso’s Quernica as a
painting of a happy country fair has gotten the content wrong. So
we still lack a complete account of the content of the painting.
What is the role of the exemplarization by the artist in the content
of the painting? Consider the artist, the painter, who, if he is like
me, is a process painter. He paints and exemplarizes as he goes.
He is a spectator, a special one, perhaps, of his or her own work
as it develops. To be sure, I have some idea of what I am trying
12 KEITH LEHRER

to paint, but the content of the painting for the painter, me in this
case, may emerge in the process of painting. Collingwood (1938)
in articulating his expressive theory noted that the esthetic object
may come to exist as it is expressed in the medium. Creation is
surely often like that; the content represented is conceived by artist,
the painter, for example, in the medium as he paints. He looks and
exemplarizes as he goes, and there is an interaction on the part of the
artist between creation and exemplarization. Of course, artists differ
in how they create. I knew a painter, Nora, who painted a painting
starting at the left hand lower corner and gradually filled the canvas.
Perhaps she had a clear conception of what she was going to paint
and then just proceeded to put it on canvas. But most of us do not
create it all in our heads first and then just put it in the medium as
we have conceived it. The artist exemplarizes the work as and even
after he or she produces it, and, therefore, his initial intentions are
not the determinant of the content.
Should we say that the content of the finished painting is the
content the artist exemplarizes from the phenomenology of it? From
my own experience, and the remarks of other artists, Matisse most
especially, who remarked that his patroness understood his art better
than he did, I would say that is too simple an account. The more
adequate account would give great weight to the content that the
artist intends and exemplarizes in his or her painting, but others may
notice what he or she did not, and thereby offer some correction or
amelioration of the exemplarization of the artist. This is especially
obvious when, as in the case of Matisse, the artist, himself or herself,
accedes to another and gives the interpretation, the meaning or the
content, found or attributed by another, greater weight than the artist
gives to his own interpretation of the content of the work.
The preceding suggests that the content of the work of art
depends on what weight people give to other people as interpreters
of the work of art, to the way in which they exemplarize. The distinc-
tion between individual content and genuine content is, in effect, a
distinction between individual content and social content. The latter
results from the way in which individuals evaluate other individuals
as interpreters of the content of the work. A close analogy is the
meaning of a word a person uses. What the person thinks his words
means is a salient but not decisive consideration. We can and do
 REPRESENTATION IN PAINTING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 13

distinguish between how a person interprets the meaning of the word

and the meaning of the word, between speaker meaning and social
meaning. The social meaning or content of a painting or a word
is determined by the weight individuals in the social group give to
other members of the group. The speaker or the artist is salient. But
some people who speak well interpret what they mean poorly just
as some artists who paint well interpret the content of what they
paint badly. They might agree. Speaking and painting are one set of
talents, interpreting meaning and content are another. A speaker can
fail to say what she intends, and a painter can fail to paint what she
intends. Some interesting speeches and paintings result from such
failures. Something influences the external product in a way that was
not supervised by reflective thought. Painting and poetry are often
like that, even at their best. So what is the social content? It is a kind
of fictional social aggregation, a weighted average of exemplariza-
tion and generalization, where the weights are the aggregation of
weights people give to each other as interpreters of art. Such an
account of meaning is developed in detail by Lehrer and Lehrer
(1995).
So which comes first the individual exemplarization or the social
aggregation? A Gombrichian might contend that the individual
exemplarization is determined by the socially determined cognitive
schemata in the mind of the individual, and there is a point to this.
But it neglects the impact of individual creativity, especially that
of the artist, on the schemata of interpretation. The schemata of
interpretation are determined by the minds of individuals shaped by
schemata that they modify to challenge convention and introduce
novelty. Artistic creativity and freedom of expression challenge
convention, however subtle and unacknowledged the challenge
might be. The flux of social schemata and the challenge of them
by the individual exemplarizations interact. Each is involved in the
explanation of the other. It is like the problem of the chicken in the
egg. What comes first? Our reply, Lehrer and Lehrer (1995), is they
fly and fry together.
14 KEITH LEHRER

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Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
USA
E-mail: lehrer@email.arizona.edu