Jack Gooding

History 403
Dr. Jocelyn Hendrickson
April 20, 2023
The Development of Iberian Military Orders

Military orders have a rich history in the Iberian Peninsula and played an important role

in the reconquista. The first of these Iberian military orders were established there in the early

12th century, very soon after the first organization of this kind, the Knights Templar, was formed

in Jerusalem.1 This essay will explore the development of Iberian Military orders and argue that a

multitude of pressures, both specific to Iberia and those affecting the entire Mediterranean world,

contributed to their unique identity, different in numerous respects from military orders in the

Levant. The scope of this essay generally stays within the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries. First, it

will examine the context in which Iberian military orders were formed. Then a summary of their

history in the 12th and 13th centuries will be presented within the context of the reconquista.

Within this, I will argue that the unification or disarray of the Muslim powers of al-Andalus was

a key factor in how Christian rulers promoted the development of military orders. Next, I will

examine the influence of the concept of ribat on military orders within the context of the

historiographical debate. After weighing opposing viewpoints, I will support the argument that

the ribat was an influential factor and argue that its influence can be detected in the Iberian

military order of Calatrava in particular, more so than in the Templars which formed in the

Levant. Lastly, I will explore some of the ways in which military orders in Iberia operated

differently than those in the Levant and argue that this was due to historical trends in the

peninsula’s unique history.

1 Alan Forey, “The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century.” Journal of Ecclesiastical
History Vol. 36, No. 2, (April 1985): 175.
 In the late 11th century, the Almoravid Empire began conquering the Muslim kingdoms

of Iberia known as taifas. They received support for their annexation from both the Iberian

‘ulama’ and the Muslim peasantry through their commitment to the establishment of Maliki law,

an orthoprax system of Islam, and their strength in resisting Christian incursion. By the year

1110, the Almoravid Empire had taken defeated all of the taifa kings and taken control of

Muslim al-Andalus.2

At the same time as the Almoravid conquest of Iberia, an ideology of holy war became

established in the Christian kingdoms, including those of Iberia. In 1095, Pope Urban II implored

the warriors of Christendom to cease their intra-religious wars and reconquer the holy city of

Jerusalem from its Muslim occupiers. Taking part in this pious quest would grant absolution for

one’s sins. Urban II’s aim was achieved when in 1099, an army of Christians sacked the city.

This event should be understood in the larger context of the developing Christian West. A better

climate for agriculture led to better yields and an increasing population. The Christian lands of

Europe were becoming richer and pilgrimage, including to the Holy Land, had become much

more common. At the same time, the peasantry was increasingly concerned with apocalypticism

and the militant nobility desired the chance to conquer new lands.3

It should also be noted that the first crusade was not even the first time Christian warriors

had been promised absolution for their sins if they took part in the conquest of lands ruled by

Muslims. Earlier in the 11th century, Pope Alexander II had decreed to the Norman and

Provençal warriors that would take Barbastro in 1065 that their sins would be forgiven in return

for fighting the infidel. Both this smaller-scale assault and the first crusade can be at least

2 Brian Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith: A New History of Islamic Spain (London: Hurst, 2018), 255-256.
3 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 266-267.
partially attributed to the new direction the Catholic Church began to take in the 11th century

from the influence of the monastic order of Cluny.4

An important development in the Iberian locale is the aforementioned consolidation of

Muslim territory under the Almoravid regime. With al-Andalus now under one crown that

actively made war with Christian kingdoms, the time was ripe for a shift of perceptions that

painted Muslim powers as the enemies of Christ.

So, between the militant direction of the Catholic Church and the shadow of the

Almoravid Empire, the conditions were set for the conquest of Al-Andalus by the Christian

Iberian powers. These two influences were further merged by a letter from Pope Urban II

following his call to retake the Holy Land that specified that Iberian knights could fulfill their

vows of crusade in the Peninsula rather than abroad. This meant that from the beginning of the

12th century, the Christian rulers of Iberia could cast their campaigns against Muslim powers as

crusades and receive the benefits of the church’s financial assistance as well as attract foreign

knights to gain for themselves new lands. This is the context in which military orders began

appearing in Iberia.5

The first Iberian organization resembling a military order was the Confraternity of

Belchite which was established at Belchite in 1122 and was dedicated to permanent war against

the Muslims. It was placed there strategically due to its proximity to Zaragoza which along with

Belchite, was conquered by Alphonso I of Aragon in 1118.6 Alan Forey has argued that

although it was envisioned that some members of the confraternity may join for life, the lack of

monastic vows mentioned in the Privilege to the Confraternity of Belchite of 1136, this

4 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 239.

5 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 267.
6 Lourie, Elena. “Belchite, Confraternity Of.” Entry. In Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia, edited by E.
Michael Gerli, (London, England: Routledge, 2013), 156–57.
organization should be considered a secular confraternity rather than a military order. 7 However,

this confraternity is notable for its relation to the Muslim practice of Ribat and will be discussed

in detail later on.

The first true military order to appear in Iberia is the Order of Monreal established at

Monreal del Campo toward the end of the 1120s. Forey suggests that as this order was modeled

after the Knights Templar, which had previously been established in the newly founded

Kingdom of Jerusalem, it should be afforded the status of military order. Both this organization

and the Confraternity of Belchite seem to have disappeared by 1131.8

It was toward the end of the 1120s that the mention of the Templars first appeared in

Iberian history. Documents record them being promised numerous castles by various nobles in

the hopes that they would occupy them. The Templars however did not take a very active role in

the Peninsula during this period, choosing to focus their efforts on the conflict in the Levant. But,

not to be dissuaded, the efforts of Iberian nobles to involve the templars in the reconquista

continued. One way this was done was through offers of service such as Catalan nobles pledging

to fight with the templars for a year in exchange for their support in Iberia. Eventually, in 1143,

the Templars agreed to take arms against the Muslim enemies of Aragon and Catalonia. This turn

of events succeeded in bringing the templars into the Iberian struggle and there is evidence to

suggest that they took part in campaigns in Soure and Santarém in the later 1140s.9 The Knights

Hospitaller similarly entered into Iberian history, first by being named an heir in Alphonso I’s

will and then by active involvement beginning with their part in the siege of Tortosa in 1148. 10

7Alan Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.”
Traditio, Vol. 40 (1984): 197. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27831153.
8 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 197.
9 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 198-99.
10 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 200.
 Although these international military orders proved useful in campaigns against the

Almoravids, it was due to the rise of the Almohads that their empire was destroyed with the fall

of their capital in 1147.11 From 1146 to 1157, the Almohads took control over Al-Andalus from

the remaining Almoravid governors and the Andalusi warlords who in some cases had

overthrown Almoravid control in the twilight of their empire. Within this, they pushed back

against Christian conquest, taking Almería, which was controlled by Castille, in 1157.12

Between then and the end of the 12th century, the majority of Iberian military orders

were founded. These included the order of Calatrava in 1158, Santiago in 1170, and Mountjoy in

1173.13 Throughout this period, the Templars and the Hospitallers lost the favoritism of the

Christian monarchs. They were still given some holdings, but frequently these were not on the

frontier, with the most strategically important castles being given to Iberian orders. 14

Many battles were waged between the Christian rulers and the Almohad empire in the

late 12th and early 13th centuries, with each side experiencing victories and defeats.15 Military

orders played an important role in these wars.16 However, the reign of al-Ma’mun which began in

1228, marked the effective end of their power in Al-Andalus.17

Evidence dating to the middle of the 13th century and into the 14th indicates that the

military orders were having serious problems with funding and manpower. For example, in 1233

the master of the order of Santiago requested aid from various kings and princes, complaining

that his order’s resources were insufficient for the task of defending its strongholds. In 1250, the

next master of that order wrote a letter indicating he was sending brothers to Germany to recruit

11 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 273-74.

12 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 275.
13 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 202.
14 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 204-05.
15 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 284-285.
16 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 229.
17 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 284-85.
new members. This is significant because normally the Iberian military orders were made up

only from Iberian Christians. This departure could indicate that locals could not be recruited in a

sufficient number.18

In examining this history a pattern emerges that connects three major developments in the

history of military orders in the 12th and 13th centuries. The first of these developments is the

establishment of the first Iberian military brotherhoods and bringing of international orders into

the peninsula in the 1120s. The second development is the creation of numerous Iberian military

orders which began in 1158 and continued through the last half of the 12th century, and the third

is the increasing difficulty the military orders had in obtaining the necessary recruits and funds to

operate successfully in the 13th century. This connecting factor is the degree of unity in the

Muslim forces of al-Andalus. The first development occurred only 10 years after Almoravids had

consolidated control over Al-Andalus. The threat of the Almoravids as a united front was

disrupted by the collapse of their authority beginning in 1130 and ending in 1147.19 With the

Muslim forces disunited, there was little need for further expansion of the military order system.

However, the situation changed when the Almohad empire consolidated control over al-

Andalus and took Seville back from the Christians in 1157.20 With this reunification of the

Muslim powers, Christian nobles turned to Military orders once again. This is where the second

development of military orders begins. It was only one year after the fall of Seville to the

Almohads that the order of Calatrava was founded. The third development occurred after the fall

of the Almohad regime. In this period, the Muslim powers were disunited again and the need for

military orders was lessened. This could be the reason for the gradual decline in resources

afforded to the military orders as Christian nobility now saw supporting them as less necessary.

18 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 208-10.

19 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 273.
20 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 275.
 This argument doesn’t answer the question of why the Christian nobility didn’t continue

to rely on the Templars and Hospitallers against the Almohads as they had when facing the

Almoravids, choosing instead to form new military orders and then to give them the most

strategically important holdings.21 This could be because of the difficulty they had in obtaining

support from international orders before the 1140s as they seemed to prioritize their conflicts in

the Levant. Throughout the rest of their existence, Templars would continue to favor their

position in the Holy Land. Despite a serious lack of funding, the chapters of the organization in

Iberia did not receive any financial support from Templar holdings in other Western European

countries. These funds, as well as some from their Iberian holdings, were sent to Palestine for

use by the Templars there.22 With military orders created within Iberia and for the explicit

purpose of fighting Muslim forces within the peninsula, the nobles who donated land to them

could be sure they wouldn’t prioritize conflicts on the other side of the Mediterranean.

The role of these orders gradually decreased over time, and there is an indication that in

the later part of the 13th century and into the early 14th that the military orders were increasingly

reluctant to follow the requests of Christian rulers to engage their Muslim enemies, which could

have been due to their insufficient resources. It was in the 14th century that Iberian military

orders largely ceased to function for their traditional role of combating Islamic forces and were

increasingly involved in secular conflicts between Christians.23

There has been considerable scholarly debate over the question of the influence of ribat

on the Christian military orders of Iberia and the Levant since the 19th century. As part of this

discussion, Américo Castro argued that these orders were modeled on the ribat and adopted the

combination of ascetic principals and combat which only had precedent within Islam. However,

21 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 204-05

22 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 206.
23 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 230-33.
these perspectives were criticized extensively for their lack of evidence and countered with the

arguments that there is no need to look for Islamic influence as conditions in Palestine produced

the necessity for military order. These scholars also frequently argued that Iberian military orders

were based directly on the model of the Templars and the Hospitallers.24

T. F. Glick and O. Pi-Sunyer brought the concepts of cultural anthropology into the

debate when they argued that the development of military orders is a clear example of stimulus

or idea diffusion. According to this view, the concept of ribat filled a social and military need

experienced by Christians. However, because it was a concept originating in Islam, the concept

needed to be reinvented in a Christian form to be accepted. Importantly, they also argued that

because of this reinvention, it is unlikely that this cultural continuity would have been

documented.25

Elena Lourie was the first to apply these principles to the Confraternity of Belchite. She

argues that the similarity between this confraternity and the concept of ribat is remarkable from

the point of non-permanent service at a fixed stronghold. In this discussion, Lourie’s most

important claim is that the Confraternity of Belchite is the middle point of the process of cultural

diffusion between the ribat and military orders in that it displays a concept native to Islam,

temporary service, before this trait has been replaced by the Christian notion of permanent

service.26

Lourie’s argument on this point is sound, but the impact of the Ribat on the orders of the

Levant has been disputed. A.J. Forey has argued that the advocates of the argument that ribats

24 Elena Lourie. “The Confraternity of Belchite, the Ribat, and the Temple.” Viator, 13 (1982): 160-61.
https://doi.org/10.1484/j.viator.2.301466.
25 Thomas F. Glick, and Oriol Pi-Sunyer. “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in Spanish History.”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 11, no. 2 (April 1, 1969): 152. https://search-ebscohost-
com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.178249&site=eds-
live&scope=site.
26 Lourie. “The Confraternity of Belchite, the Ribat, and the Temple.” 169-71
influenced Levantine military orders have not demonstrated that ribats existed along the borders

of the crusader states before the founding of the Templars and if they did not, idea diffusion

could not have occurred. He also argues that the lifestyle of those engaging in ribats was not

very similar to that of the military order but more akin to the Western crusader or the knights

who fought alongside military orders but were not members. Finally, he argues that even in the

earliest incarnations of the Templar order, there does not appear to be any mention of temporary

service. Forey does admit that the Confraternity of Belchite and the institution of the ribat bear

resemblance but that this is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the ribat influenced the

Templars.27

Forey’s argument does point out legitimate discrepancies between the military orders of

the East and ribats but he does not manage to thoroughly discredit Lourie’s notions. Even if he is

correct that the lack of evidence for them indicates that no ribats existed in the early 12th century

Levant, it is still possible that the concept was transmitted on other fronts such as in Iberia. It is

almost certain that some Christians who knew of ribats in Iberia took part in the crusade in the

Levant and could have communicated information about the use of the system to the future

founders of the Knights Templar.

His claim that life in ribats does not appear to have been similar to that within military

orders is even less relevant. The argument that ribats inspired military orders through idea

diffusion necessitates the concept being reformed in a Christian guise. In both cases, the

participants were expected to live devout lives while engaging in war with the infidel, but it is

only natural that their cultural context would inform how this pious lifestyle was practiced. Glick

and Pi-Sunyer’s original hypothesis only claimed that the diffusion occurred because of a social

27 Forey, “The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century.” 178-80.
and military need, so a lack of evidence regarding specific practices does not at all disprove that

diffusion occurred.

In this light, Lourie’s argument that the Confraternity of Belchite is indicative of ideas

halfway diffused between the ribat and the military order seems probable. Another question

remains pertinent to this discussion. If Belchite does represent a halfway point between the ribat

and the military orders, are there any other similarities between it and the ribat that could signify

idea diffusion? Furthermore, have any of these concepts carried over into later Iberian military

orders? In both cases, yes.

Forey, as part of his argument, sets up a dichotomy between the Temple and the ribat.

“The [ribat] was a fortress near the borders of Islam established for the purpose of warfare

against the infidel; the Templars, however, adopted their characteristic way of life in the first

instance merely in order to afford protection to pilgrims, and they had their residence in

Jerusalem and not in a frontier castle.”28 This dichotomy may be useful in illustrating differences

between the Temple and the ribat, but its application to Belchite reveals that the confraternity

shares more with the ribat than the Templars. The Privilege to the Confraternity of Belchite

which records the rights given by Alphonso ‘the battler’ of Aragon reads: “We have determined

and established through our imperial authority a Christian knighthood and brotherly army of

Christians in Christ, in Spain at the Castle, which is called Belchite…so they may serve God

there, and thereafter for all the days of their lives subdue the pagans.”29 In the capacity of

function, Belchite mirrors the ribat as its primary purpose is the defense of a castle on the frontier

between Christian and Muslim powers.

28 Forey, “The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century.” 181.
29 “Privelage to the Confraternity of Belchite, 1136”. Translated by James. W. Brodman. In Medieval
Iberia, Readings From Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources, Second edition, edited by Olivia Remie
Constable (Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 203-05.
 This purpose is also clearly laid out in the creation of the military order of Calatrava, the

first of Iberia’s military orders in the second wave of their development. “For all your Brothers,

present and future, from the villa that they call Calatrava, so that you may have and possess it as

a donation, free and safe, by hereditary right and so on for ever, and that you may defend it from

the pagan enemies of the Cross of Christ, with His and our assistance.”30 The order of Cavaltrava

was founded to protect a particular location, much like the ribat.

Here the order of Calatrava is shown to take an element from Belchite, the notion of

protecting a particular location, that the Temple did not initially possess, indicating that the

influence of the ribat flowed through Belchite and into Calatrava. The order of Calatrava

however, did not have the notion of temporary service that Belchite did. A line from the text

commemorating the donation reads: “whoever will be members of your order and wish to serve

there forever.”31 The concept of permanent service for this order was probably adapted from the

practices of the Templars and the Hospitallers who were at this point, the only military orders in

Iberia.

In summary, the resemblances between the concept of ribat and the confraternity of

Belchite indicate that idea diffusion in all likelihood took place. The Knights Templar may or

may not have been influenced by the ribat as the connection between them is more tenuous. The

order of Calatrava took influence from the Temple, but also from Belchite and through it the

ribat. As Calatrava was the first of a new wave of military order development in Iberia, it is also

likely that aspects of it inspired later orders.

30 “Donation to Calatrava, 1158”. Translated by James. W. Brodman. In Medieval Iberia, Readings

From Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources, Second edition, edited by Olivia Remie Constable
(Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 205-06.
31 “Donation to Calatrava, 1158”, 205-06.
 The clearer influence of the ribat is not the only way Iberian holy orders differed from

those in the Levant. In Syria, many Christian rulers allowed military orders under their patronage

to dictate their own foreign policy and act on their own initiative to fulfill their purpose.

However, in Iberia, the Christian kings often attempted to maintain direct control over the

actions of military orders. They were expected to go to war when commanded to as well as

maintain peace with Muslim powers if their lord had a truce with them.32

A habit of the Iberian military orders that would be considered even more alien to those

in the Levant was their tendency to occasionally fight on the side of Muslims. In the early stages

of the 12th-century conquests, the Christian kings drew on the populations of their mountain

valleys, which were growing consistently due to the already-mentioned agricultural yields.

However, as the push southward continued, the supply of colonists dwindled. military orders

proved useful not only in defending conquered areas from Muslim reprisals but also in

administrating lands far from the crown’s direct control. Often the lands these orders were

allotted in frontier zones were populated exclusively by Muslims and in these cases, the military

orders frequently fought to protect their tenants from encroaching Christian settlers.33

In a couple of cases, this partnership was even more explicit. In 1225, brothers from the

order of Santiago and Calatrava helped the ruler of Baeza take control of castles and towns from

Seville. The rulers of both of these territories were Muslim.34 In an even more extreme example,

it was reported in 1300 that the brothers of Santiago had occupied several frontier castles, were

using aid from Muslim powers to help them oppose their superiors in the order and their

Christian neighbors, and were even threatening to surrender the strongholds to the Muslim forces

32 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 220

33 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 268
34 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 227.
if they were not granted certain land rights.35 This activity by members of military orders was

unheard of in the Levant. These instances can be attributed to the unique history and culture of

Iberia.

The majority of members of military orders in Iberia were themselves of Iberian origin

and in large part did not possess the fanatical xenophobia that many of their contemporaries in

the Levant did.36 Unlike in that theatre, Iberia had seen a long history of Christian and Muslim

powers working together to pursue their ends.37 In this context, it is no surprise that members of

military orders sometimes participated in this tradition.

The military orders of Iberia took on the forms they did from a variety of influences.

Some of these influences were localized to the peninsula while others were imparted due to its

connections to Europe, Africa, Christianity, and Islam. This essay has explored these influences

and demonstrated that like so many other aspects of its history, Iberian military orders were truly

unique.

35 Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest,” 233.

36 Forey, the military orders, 227.
37 Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith, 430-431.
 Bibliography

Catlos, Brian. Kingdoms of Faith: A New History of Islamic Spain. Hurst & Co, 2018.

Donation to Calatrava, 1158. Translated by James. W. Brodman. In Medieval Iberia,

Readings From Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources, Second edition, edited by Olivia
Remie Constable, Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

Glick, Thomas F., and Oriol Pi-Sunyer. “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in

Spanish History.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 11, no. 2 (April 1, 1969):
136–54. https://search-ebscohost-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.178249&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Forey, Alan J. “The Emergence of the Military Order in the Twelfth Century.” Journal of
Ecclesiastical History Vol. 36, No. 2, (April 1985): 175-195.

Forey, Alan J. “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and
Thirteenth Centuries.” Traditio, Vol. 40 (1984): 197-234.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27831153.

Lourie, Elena. “Belchite, Confraternity Of.” Entry. In Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia, edited
by E. Michael Gerli, 156–57. London, England: Routledge, 2013.

Lourie, Elena. “The Confraternity of Belchite, the Ribat, and the Temple.” Viator, 13
(1982): 159–76. https://doi.org/10.1484/j.viator.2.301466.

Privilege to the Confraternity of Belchite, 1136. Translated by James. W. Brodman. In

Medieval Iberia, Readings From Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources, Second edition,
edited by Olivia Remie Constable, Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.