A Pragmatic Study of speech Acts of

warning in English and Arabic

A research submitted to the Department of
English Language - Bilad Al Rafidaiyn College
to obtain a bachelor’s degree in
English language...

Done by

Ali Hindi Harby Hindi

Fatima Majid Hussein

Supervised by

Dr. Hadeer Abbas Mohammed

1445AH 2024AD

1
 ‫قال تعالى ‪:‬‬

‫( ُهَو اَّلِذ ي َأنَز َل َع َلْيَك اْلِكَتاَب ِم ْنُه آَياٌت ُّم ْح َك َم اٌت ُهَّن ُأُّم اْلِكَتاِب َو ُأَخ ُر‬
‫ُم َتَشاِبَهاٌت ۖ َفَأَّم ا اَّلِذ يَن ِفي ُقُلوِبِهْم َز ْيٌغ َفَيَّتِبُعوَن َم ا َتَشاَبَه ِم ْنُه اْبِتَغاَء اْلِفْتَنِة‬
‫َو اْبِتَغاَء َتْأِويِلِهۗ َو َم ا َيْع َلُم َتْأِو يَلُه ِإاَّل ُهَّللاۗ َو الَّر اِس ُخ وَن ِفي اْلِع ْلِم َيُقوُلوَن آَم َّنا‬
‫ِبِه ُك ٌّل ِّم ْن ِع نِد َر ِّبَناۗ َو َم ا َيَّذ َّك ُر ِإاَّل ُأوُلو اَأْلْلَباِب )‬

‫صدق هللا العظيم‬

‫سورة آل عمران – اآلية ‪.7‬‬

‫‪2‬‬
 Dedication

To whom I prefer it to myself, and why not; She sacrificed

for me She spared no effort in making me happy always
(My beloved mother)..

We walk the paths of life, and someone remains in control of

our minds in every path we take
He has a kind face and good deeds.

He did not despise me throughout his life

(My dear father)..

To my friends, and all those who stood by me and helped

me with everything they had..

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 Acknowledgements

Because whoever does not thank people does not thank God,
and because you deserve our thanks and praise, we should
thank you. Without you, our research would not have
reached the best it is now, and without your efforts, success
would not have been achieved, and the goals would not have
been achieved..

4
content list
Threads Page
Quranic verse 2
Dedication 3
Acknowledgements 4
Content list 5
1.1 Speech Act Theory 6-8
1.2 Austin’s (1962) Theory of Speech Acts 9-10
1.2.1 Austin’s Felicity Conditions of Speech Acts 10
1.2.2 Explicit and Implicit Performatives 11-13
1.2.3 Austin’s Kinds of Speech Acts 13-14
1.2.4 Austin’s Classification of Illocutionary Acts 14-15
1.3 Searle’s (1962) Theory of Speech Acts 15-17
1.3.1 Searle’s Felicity Conditions of Speech Acts 17-18
1.3.2 Searle’s Classification of Speech Act 18-19
Sources 20

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1.1 Speech Act Theory
The main function of language is to make communication
among People. This communication can be explained by spoken
language and Written language. According to this view, speech is
purposeful in that Language is used to carry out individual daily
purposes. This view is that one which is held by Austin and Searle.
Both philosophers explained the principle on which speech act
theory is based which is in saying things we are doing things.
(O'Grady,1997:59-62).

In speaking language, people want to express thoughts in the

form of linguistic utterances which follow certain rules to be
communicative. This means thatS speaks to inform H with a special
aim. S uses the conventions to make H do things and this processed
by the vocalization of certain thoughts. Depending on this notion, it is
said that speech act is a public utterance and it acquires its
consequences by being public (Mey, 2009:1015).

The speech act is considered to be public utterance because it

makes the intention of S familiar. H can infer from the content of the
utterance how the sentence is being used and what type of speech act
is performed. This means that speech acts interpret themselves.
Some speech acts have self-referential structure and this is apparent
when people use the direct speech act with verbs which denote the
illocutionary acts as in the speech act of promise by using the verb
(promise) I promise to come early. (Jeurgen; Maeve, 1991:217).

When someone performs a speech act, he is not only doing

what he says, but also makingH give up the perspective of S in favor
of that participant. This happens when S and H speak the same
language and share the same life world of a linguistic community in
order to be benefit from reflexivity of natural language and to be able

6
to base the description of an action performed with words on
understanding of the speech act (ibid).

One of the most important subjects in pragmatics is speech acts

which is initiated by Austin then discussed by Searle.This subject is
considered to be the basis on which the field of pragmatics is built.
Many definitions have been proposed to define pragmatics.

Ariel (2000:1)states that pragmatics is the field which studies

the relationship between language and rules of using it.It includes
topics like speech acts deixes, cntext, referenceconventionaland
conversationalimplicature and presupposition. Yule (2006:34)
defines pragmatics as "the study of the intended meaning of the
speaker".Griffthis(2006:4)shows that pragmatics is "the study of
utterance meaning, utterance which is unique and has been produced
by particular sender in specific situation."

Cruse (2006:136) states that pragmatic meaning is that

meaning which deals with non-truth conditional aspectswhere
context must be taken intoconsideration,meaning which deals with
the uses of meaning that is to say functions of meaning , meaning
which is worked out in particular occasions of use.

Leech (1983:13) shows strongrelationship between pragmatics

and speech acts.He explains that speech act is one of the criteria of
specifying any pragmatic phenomena. Leech states that a pragmatic
phenomenon includes information that is created by acts of using
language. He also proposes criteria by which one can specify any
pragmatic phenomena. These criteria are as follows:

1.1.1 Addresser and Addressee

Addressing is one of the criterial principles by which a
pragmatic phenomenon is determined. It explains many aspects of
the relationship between S and H. Forms of addressing indicate the
position of both S and H. Using social titles like Dr., Mr.,specify a high
position to the addressee, social distance and the absence of
solidarity between the addresser and addressee.
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 The absence of social titles, ontheother hand, indicates that the
addresser and addressee of the same rank and familiar to each other.
Such information is of great importance and canbe used as clues to a
pragmatic analysis(Eckert; MacConneltGient: 2003:161-2).

1.1.2 Context of an Utterance

Context is another criterion of pragmatic phenomena. It can be
understood in various ways.It includes everything which has an
effect on the use of language. It involves aspects of physical and social
setting. In general, context includes any background knowledge
shared by the S and Hwhich highly affects the interpretation of an
utterance(1983:14).

1.1.3 TheGoals of an Utterance

In this criterion,Leech (ibid)presents that S when using pragmatic
meaning aimed at achieving something on H. Leech uses the
term goal instead of intention because it is more neutral than
intention.The term goal will not force S to deal with motivation, but it
is used to refer to goal- oriented activities.

1.1.4 TheUtterance as a Form of Act or Activity:

Leech (ibid) proposes that to use speech from pragmatic point
of view, it must take a form of speech act. This is because grammar
deals with abstract static entities while pragmatics deals with verbal
acts or performance which occurs in particular situations.

1.1.5 The Utterance as a Product of Verbal Act

The utterance in pragmatics also refers to the product of
verbal act rather than to the verbal act itself. For example, would you
please be quite? Grammatically, it is a question but when it is used
pragmatically it is used as an indirect command to be quiet (ibid).

8
1.2 Austin’s (1962) Theory of Speech Acts
A lot of theories are proposed in this field which attracted the
interest of linguists, philosophers and psychologists. But the start of
this history is unquestionably with Austin's SAT. He searched for
ways to cope with language of importance and interest to many.
Some of the prominent theories are covered briefly in this section to
establish a general view of the similarities and differences of these
theories.

The SAT is originally developed by the Oxford philosopher J. L..

Austin in the 1930s and expounded in a series of lectures which he
gave at Harvard in 1955, published in 1962 in a book entitled How to
Do Things with Words. The SAT since its publication has aroused the
widest interest among psychologists, literary critics, anthropologists,
philosophers and linguists.

Austin (1962: 3-6) makes two important observations. The

first is that not all sentences are statements and much of
conversation is made up of questions, exclamations, commands and
expressions of wishes as in:

Are you serving?

Excuse me!
Give me the dry roasted ones.

The second observation is that even in sentences with the

grammatical form of declaratives, not all are used to make
statements as in:

I promise to take a taxi home.

I declare this meeting open.

9
 These two examples are in themselves a kind of action: by
uttering (4) the speaker makes a promise rather than describing one.
Austin calls. these sentences performatives (ibid.:6), in contrast to
descriptive statements which he calls constatives (ibid.: 3). This is the
philosophical content in which Austin first puts forward his
distinction between constatives and performatives which are being
discussed below.

1.2.1 Austin’s Felicity Conditions of Speech Acts

Austin introduces the term felicity conditions (FCs) which refer
to a set of criteria according to which performatives can be judged as
either felicitous or infelicitous. He gives the following necessary
conditions for performatives to be appropriate:

a. There must exist an accepted conventional procedure, having

a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the
uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain
circumstances.

b. The particular persons and circumstances in a given case

must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular
procedure invoked'.

c. The procedure must be executed by all participants both

correctly.

d. And completely.

Austin (1962: 16) explains that if the speech act is

unsuccessfully performed, then there is a misfire. If the act is
insincerely performed, then there is an abuse. For example, 'I bet
with no intention to pay, or I promise with an intention to break the
promise'.

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1.2.2 Explicit and Implicit Performatives
Austin made a distinction between explicit performative and
implicit performative, thus: I'll be there at six o'clock, is a primary
(implicit) performative, whereas 'I promise to be there at six o'clock'
is an explicit performative, because it is more specific and precise in
meaning, so the speaker cannot deny that he has made a promise in
the second utterance, unlike the first one which might be only a
prediction (Lyons, 1981:730). Primary or implicit performatives are
those utterances which do not contain explicit performative verb
subjected to the performative criteria to specify their illocutionary
force, consider the following:
Out!
Six pence.

None of these contain an explicit performative verb but they

can be used to perform acts. According to Parker and Riley (2005:18)
the term explicit performative describes an utterance that contains a
performative verb used in its performative sense.

Austin (1962:32-33) distinguishes between 'explicit' and

'implicit' performatives. In the case of explicit performatives, the
speech act that is being performed is specific and clear:

That is to say, they (all) begin with or include some highly

significant and unambiguous expression such as 'I bet', 'I promise', I
bequeath an expression very commonly also used in naming the act
which, in making such an utterance, I am performing for example
betting, promising, and bequeathing. (ibid.:32)

An explicit performative clause contains an explicit

performative verb, whose function is to signal a specific speech act.
Such clauses have peculiar properties, which set them apart from
non- performative verbs:
promise that I shall be there. (Explicit)

11
 In the implicit performatives the speech act is indicated by
grammatical mood, modal verbs, intonation, tone of voice, adverbs,
and connectives accompanying the utterance (ibid.: 73-77).

I shall be there. (Implicit)

Thus, in some cases the same speech act seems to be

performed in explicit and implicit performatives. None of the former
characteristics is indispensable to perform the latter. To solve this
problem, Austin (1962: 32) suggests that such type of an utterance
can be expanded to an explicit performative that identifies it as a
performative utterance.

He suggests that the problem is not too difficult because:

Any utterance which is in fact performative should be reducible
or expandable or analysable into a form with a verb in the first
person singular present indicative active... Thus out is equivalent to 'I
declare, pronounce give, or call you, ( ibid.:61-62(

The distinction between performatives and constatives are

now easily recognized; there are performatives as well as constatives
with "1+ present simple active verb" and there are performatives
without a performative verb. The distinction is carried out by the
reducing. expanding or analyzing of the utterances which are actually
performatives but do not have 1+ present active declarative verb.
The question which is imposed here is how one can decide whether
an original or transformed utterance of the form I + present active
declarative verb is performative or constative.

Go!

Here is an implicit performative, if we expand it into:

I hereby order you to go out.
The performative is now explicit.

12
 Austin (1962:79-80) suggests four tests for deciding whether
the utterance is performative or constative as paraphrased in the
following points by Coulthard (1985:17):

1. Does the saying of the words constitute the performing of an act?

This can be tested by asking 'did he really'.

2. Could the action be performed without uttering the words? One

can be sorry just as one can repent without saying anything but one
cannot apologize silently.

3. Is the action something that can be done deliberately and

voluntarily? One can be 'willing to apologize' but not 'willing to be
sorry'- one is either sorry or not'.

4. Can the utterance be literally false? Austin sees this as a

crucial distinction between constatives, which can be true or false,
and performatives, which can only be happy or unhappy. Despite
saying 'I am sorry' it needs not be true that one is sorry; if one says I
apologize', however, it cannot be false that one has apologized.

1.2.3 Austin’s Kinds of Speech Acts

Austin (1962:4f) draws a distinction between constative and
performative utterances. Constative utterances are statements whose
function is to describe some event, process or state-of-affairs, and
their propositions have the property of being either true or false as
in:
I drive my car.

Lyons (1977:726) states that Performative utterances, on the

other hand, do not describe, report or constate anything at all,
although they fall within the domain of statements; therefore, they
are neither true nor false. The uttering of them is, or is a part of, the
doing of an action.

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They are used to do something rather than to say that something is or
is not the case as in:

I advise you to stop smoking.

I name this ship 'Liberté".

These two utterances are used to perform particular kinds of

acts (act of advising, act of naming) which could hardly be performed
in any other way.

Roughly speaking, we can say that the distinction between

constative and performative utterances is based on the distinction
between saying something and doing something". Austin (1962:133)
suggests that statements, i. e., constatives, are merely one kind of
speech act, for, he argues, to state is "as much to perform an
illocutionary act (IA), say, to warn or pronounce." This denotes that
constative utterances can be used performatively.

1.2.4 Austin’s Classification of Illocutionary Acts

Austin (ibid.: 150f) classifies performative verbs into five
general classes according to their illocutionary force. They are as
follows:

1. Verdictives
This class is used to give a verdict by a jury, arbitrator, or
umpire. Examples: acquitting, assessing, characterizing, convicting,
ruling, etc.

2. Exercitives
They are used to exercise the powers, rights or influence. An
exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain
course of action, or advocacy of it. Examples: appointing, warning.
commanding, advising, ordering, etc. (ibid.).

14
3. Commissives
Austin (1962:151) states that these verbs are typified by
promising or otherwise undertaking; they commit the speaker to
doing something. The whole point of commissive is to commit the
speaker to a certain course of action. Examples: promising,
undertaking, betting, shall, adopting, etc.

4. Behabitives
Austin (1962:152) explains that this class forms a very
miscellaneous group, and has to do with attitudes and social
behaviour. It includes the notion of reaction to other people's
behaviour and fortunes and expressions of attitudes to someone
else's past conduct or imminent one. Examples: apologizing,
congratulating, condoling, cursing, challenging, etc.

5.Expositives
Austin claims that these are used in acts of exposition involving
the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the
clarifying of usages. Examples: stating, telling, asking, denying,
emphasizing, etc.

1.3 Searle’s (1962) Theory of Speech Acts

John R. Searle is the second most influential philosopher who
contributes to the development of SAT. His book 'Speech Acts
published in 1969, is regarded as an analytic modification and
systematization of Austin's theory relative to a single speech act
'promise."

Searle (1969:16) hypothesizes that speaking a language is

engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour. This means that
speaking a language is performing SAs such as making statements,
giving commands, making promises, etc. in addition, these acts are
performed according to certain rules. Regarding the reason behind
the study of SAs, he points out that all linguistic communication
involves linguistic acts.

15
The unit of linguistic communication is not the symbol, word or
sentence, or but rather the production or issuance of the
symbol... in the performance of the speech act. More precisely,
the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain
conditions is a speech act, and speech acts are the basic or
minimal units of linguistic communication.
(Searle, ibid: 16)

Searle (ibid: 19) introduces the notion of principle of

expressibility which specifies whatever can be meant can be said. He
provides "the two major types of rules: regulative rules regulate a
pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically
independent of the rules, e. g., traffic regulations, whereas
constitutive rules create an activity the existence of which is logically
dependent on rules, e. g., football or chess rules. Searle's aim, behind
the study of rules, is to describe the constitutive rules for the IA of
promising (ibid.: 33).

Searle (ibid.: 23-4) asserts that the speaker performs four distinct
sub-acts in the uttering of any utterance:

a. Utterance act.
b. Propositional act.
c. Ilocutionary act.
d. Perlocutionary act.

An utterance act is the act of uttering words, morphemes, and

sentences. A propositional act, carrying the content of an utterance,
includes the acts of reference and predication. An IA is the act of
stating. questioning, commanding, promising, etc. A PA is the results
or effects which such acts have on the actions, ideas, or beliefs, etc. of
hearers.

16
 These acts are inseparable and happening simultaneously, and
the performance of an IA means that one performs propositional acts
and utterance acts. But the same propositional acts can be common
to different IAs. Consider Searle's examples:

a) Sam smokes habitually.

b) Does Sam smoke habitually?
c) Sam, smoke habitually!
d) Would that Sam smoked habitually.

The speaker performs different SAs although these examples

have the same propositional act:(a) making an assertion, (b) asking a
question, (c) giving an order, and (d) expressing a wish.

Searle suggests that an utterance consists of two parts (not

necessarily separate), a proposition and a function indicating device
which marks the illocutionary force. He observes that illocutionary
function -indicating devices (IFID) in English include word order,
stress, intonation, contour, punctuation, the verb mood and finally
the set of performative verbs (Coulthard, ibid.: 22).

1.3.1 Searle’s Felicity Conditions of Speech Acts

Searle (1969: 57-61) suggests that SAs can be characterized in
terms of FCs and that there are four kinds of conditions that a SA
must meet in order to be felicitous or appropriate:

1. Propositional content conditions

They relate to the meaning of the utterance, i. e., the reference
and predication. For a promise, these conditions require that the
utterance predicates some future act on the part of the speaker.

2. Preparatory conditions
They relate to whether the person performing a SA has the
authority to do so. For a promise, these conditions require that the
listener wants the speaker to do that thing.

17
3. Sincerity conditions
They relate to whether the speech act is performed sincerely.
For a promise, the speaker intends to carry out the future act. But if
he does it insincerely, there will be an abuse as Austin calls it.

4. Essential conditions
They relate to the way the speaker is committed to a certain
kind of belief or behaviour. There will be a breach of commitment if
the speaker produces an utterance inconsistent with these beliefs or
intentions. For a promise, the speaker intends the utterance to count
as a promise and the hearer should know that intention.

1.3.2 Searle’s Classification of Speech Act

According to Verschueren (1999:24), Searle introduces his own
classification of IAs based on twelve criteria according to which IAs
fall into five major classes. He relies only on three criteria which are
regarded as the most important upon which Searle builds up his
taxonomy:

(a) Illocutionary point

(b) Direction of fit
(c) Psychological state.

The five classes of SAs are:

1. Assertives (Representatives)
Verschueren (1999:25) states that the illocutionary point is to
commit the speaker to the truth of a proposition. It has a word-to-
world. direction of fit, i. e., the speaker makes words fit the world to
express a belief. Examples: state, affirm, believe, conclude, deny,
report.

18
2. Directives
Verschueren (ibid.) explains that the point is to get the hearer
to do something. The direction of fit is a world-to-words. The speaker
wants the hearer to do or not to do something. Examples: request,
ask, command, warn, advice.

3. Commissives
These SAs count commitment for the speaker to engage in a
future course of action. The speaker makes the world fit the words
when he intends to do something. Examples: promise, offer,
guarantee, swear, vow, pledge (ibid.).

4. Expressives
They convey the speaker's emotional attitude about a state of
affairs, i. e., they express the speaker's psychological state. They have
no direction of fit between words and world. Examples: apologize,
congratulate, thank, welcome (ibid.:26).

5. Declarations
The illocutionary point is to bring about a change in reality, i. e,
to realize the state described in the proposition. They express no
psychological state, but make both the words fit the world and the
world fit the words. Examples: declare, baptize, appoint, resign,
name (ibid.).

19
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