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Medicine, Conflict and Survival
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CAMPAIGN
Summary
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GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR 109
spending and further strengthening of United Nations and regional
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement capabilities.
The UN and its member states are failing to prevent new outbreaks of
armed conflict, and are paying high costs for this failure. The statistics are
dismaying. According to some estimates, up to 45 million people, 90 per
cent civilians, have been killed in 170 wars since the end of the Second
World War. Thirty major wars are now taking place, most inside national
boundaries. In addition to the tragic loss of life and limb, war's damage to
productive economic activity is immense. It lasts for decades, sometimes
generations, multiplying the human costs of conflict. In Lebanon, for
example, 20 years after civil war broke out, the Gross Domestic Product is
still only half of its previous level.
Despite their enormous resources, the governments of the industrialised
countries have been unable to prevent frequent outbreaks of deadly
conflict; instead, they react to them. Responding to dislocation,
destruction, and loss of production and trade, the industrial countries have
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110 J. DEAN ET AL.
spent billions of dollars on economic rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas,
humanitarian aid, refugee relief, peacekeeping forces, and in some cases
military intervention. Instead of repeatedly financing these costly forms of
remediation, which are always too little and too late, governments around
the world should be investing in the prevention of war.
Today, we have a rare opportunity to mobilize government and public
support for a comprehensive approach to war prevention. Positive
relationships among the world's top military powers (the USA, Russia,
France, Germany, Great Britain, and China) have created an unprecedented
opportunity for co-operation to reduce the global deployment, production,
and trade of weapons and to strengthen UN and regional peacekeeping
capabilities.
This may be a waning opportunity. Many military leaders believe that
over the next 10 to 20 years, we will see new forms of armed confrontation
between the most heavily armed nations (the United States, Russia, and
China); and other nations are poised to acquire new armaments that
neighbouring countries may find threatening. Today, when there is no
near-term risk of major war, is the ideal time to prevent the rise of new
military threats by reducing global arms deployment, production, and
trade, and limiting armaments to low levels not perceived as threatening.
In addition, innovative concepts for war prevention have been formed
in the crucible of the century's conflicts, ranging from the First World War
through the Cold War. These include confidence-building measures,
transparency and information exchange, mutual constraints on force
deployments and activities, negotiated reductions in standing forces, and
agreed restrictions on arms production and trade. Equally important are
new measures in the area of peacekeeping: early warning and rapid action
to prevent the outbreak of war, including diplomatic intervention,
mediation, arbitration, and preventive deployment of armed force; and
armed and unarmed post-conflict peacekeeping, peace-building, and,
occasionally, peace enforcement. Another useful innovation is the trend in
international lending toward limits on military spending.
These useful approaches to preventing war have been applied separately
and incompletely; none has been fully successful, and none is likely to be
so if they remain separate. In the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet
Union proposed plans for general and complete disarmament
supplemented by UN peacekeeping, but these plans were shelved in favour
of separate programmes for partial arms limits and reductions. For nuclear
arms, this approach worked because the many issues into which nuclear
arms control was divided - testing, bilateral reductions, non-proliferation,
ending production of fissile material, and disposing of fissile material -
were all supported by strong public rejection of nuclear weapons. For
conventional forces, in contrast, the disaggregation of disarmament into
separate projects fragmented public and government interest, dividing
support among many worthwhile measures, such as limits on arms transfers
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GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR 111
or cuts in military spending. The only areas where there was real success,
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the ban on antipersonnel
landmines, were exceptional in generating broad popular support.
Now, instead of striving for peace in fragments, it is time to bring
together these diverse approaches - conventional force reductions, limits
on arms production and trade, cuts in military spending, measures to stop
proliferation, confidence-building steps, training for peaceful conflict
resolution, and structures for peace-building, peacekeeping, and peace
enforcement - in a unified programme to prevent war, and to incorporate
this programme in a treaty that will assure its enduring implementation.
A comprehensive approach is needed to be effective and to mobilize
widespread public support; and broad public support is needed to change
government policies. A comprehensive approach will complement and
strengthen existing peacemaking and arms control programmes by building
a broader coalition of interested publics and officials to support these
programmes. Equally important, a comprehensive effort to prevent war
and reduce conventional forces will parallel and strengthen efforts to
eliminate nuclear arms, and help create the international stability needed to
make abolition feasible. In fact, one goal of this programme is to support
efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, and we believe the success of this
programme is essential to that goal.
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112 J. DEAN ET AL.
inter-national wars and genocide by strengthening the means of peaceful
conflict resolution available to the international community; and to start
reducing the longer-term risks of major regional and global wars by
building confidence in international commitment to this goal.
Phase 1 will begin with the adoption of an initial Treaty to Reduce
Conventional Armaments and Armed Conflict (TRAAC I), in which
participating nations promise to work to reduce the risk and frequency of
armed conflict through a combination of global and regional reductions in
national armed forces and improvements in the military and non-military
means available to the international community to prevent or end armed
conflict. In the near term, participants will commit themselves to provide
full transparency regarding their own armed forces, military personnel and
spending, arms inventories, production, and trade, and planned future
forces; not to increase any of these major indicators of military power for
a period of five to ten years, during negotiations on global reductions in
armaments; and to take various steps to strengthen global and regional
conflict prevention and peacekeeping, including steps to:
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GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR 113
and Armed Conflict (TRAAC II), which makes substantial global and
regional cuts in the main indicators of military power (force components,
inventories of weapon systems, military personnel, and spending), and
places commensurate limits on arms production and trade.
Aiming ultimately at low levels of armaments in all parts of the world,
TRAAC II will make proportionately larger cuts in countries with larger
armed forces. For example, countries with aggregate inventories of major
weapons (combat aircraft and armed helicopters, tanks, armoured
personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and naval ships over 1,000 tons)
numbering over 10,000 (the USA, Russia, China) might reduce their forces
by 35%, while those with inventories totalling 1,000 to 10,000 would cut
by 25%, and those with inventories under 1,000 by 15%. These global cuts
may be supplemented by additional confidence-building arms limits and
reductions in areas plagued by long-standing regional conflicts. Cutbacks in
arms production and trade will accompany the global and regional cuts in
armed forces; but since arms acquisition during reductions will be minimal,
there will be greater than proportionate cuts in production and trade and
in the size of arms industries.
Just as in Phase I, efforts will continue during Phase II to strengthen
institutions for conflict prevention and resolution, and to prevent the
outbreak of smaller civil and international wars, violent ethnic conflicts,
and genocide. These efforts will be funded by a tax of 1/1 000th of 1% of
all international financial transactions.
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114 J. DEAN ET AL.
Withdrawal from TRAAC III will not vitiate the commitments made
under TRAACs I or II, but a successful TRAAC III trial - that is, a period
of ten years with no withdrawal and no unilateral military action on the
part of nations with large or very large armed forces - will be a prerequisite
for proceeding with Phase IV.
During the TRAAC III trial, negotiations will be conducted on another
round of reductions in conventional forces and in military spending, to be
carried out in Phase IV, when there is full confidence in the effectiveness of
the international security system.
Ultimate Goals
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GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR 115
violence will be smaller and more likely to succeed. At the same time, as
expectations of peace grow, nations and national leaders will be more
comfortable with the idea of limiting their armed forces to border defences.
Eventually, the world's nations may reach a certain point of
commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the rejection of
armed force as a means of obtaining various ends - a point at which nothing
more will be required on the part of the UN or regional security
organizations than to verify adherence to defensive security limits on the
part of individual nations, and to prevent the use of violence for gain or for
political intimidation by non-state actors such as terrorists and criminal
syndicates. Meanwhile, organized non-state violence will be rare, because
general adherence to the norm of non-violence will be fostered by
consistent government commitment to exclusively peaceful means of
resolving conflicts and achieving political and economic ends.
There are many ways in which groups and individuals can help develop and
promote Global Action to Prevent War. For example:
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116 J. DEAN ET AL.
• If you are willing to publicly endorse the programme, inform Global
Action at IDDS by mail, fax, or email. (Be sure to include a return
address so that we can confirm your endorsement and send you
programme updates.)
• Make copies of the statement (or order free copies from IDDS) to give
to your friends, or circulate through organizations of which you are a
member.
• Work with local groups to hold conferences where Global Action goals
can be debated, and organize petitions and other publicity to help get
out the word.
• Last but not least, let us know what you are doing for Global Action to
Prevent War, so that we can build a stronger coalition, disseminate
creative ideas for promotion, and share important milestones of
achievement along the way.
(6 November 1999)
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