Articles
Weng Yuen Kam*
Stefano Pampanin
The seismic performance of RC buildings in the
22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake
The 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) earthquake
was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically de-
signed and existing non-ductile reinforced concrete (RC) build-
ings. Some 16.2 % of 833 buildings with RC systems within the
Christchurch central business district (CBD) were severely dam-
aged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortu-
nate consequences of the complete collapse of two medium-rise
RC buildings. As with the post-Northridge 1994 earthquake, the
design performance of ”modern” structures is being scrutinized –
with the inevitable question: is ”life safety” but irreparable dam-
age still a valid performance target? This brief paper presents a
summary of RC building damage from a broad performance-
based earthquake engineering perspective. Several preliminary
lessons, not all of them surprising, and the issues that have
arisen will be discussed using case study buildings, with sugges-
tions for urgently needed research areas.
Keywords: Christchurch 2011 earthquake, reinforced concrete, seismic
performance, earthquake reconnaissance, performance-based earthquake
engineering, field damage, New Zealand
1 Introduction
The 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton)
earthquake represents one of the most severe tests of
“modern” and older non-ductile RC structures in a devel-
oped nation with a strong seismic engineering back-
ground. Some 16.2 % of 833 buildings with reinforced
concrete (RC) systems within the Christchurch central
business district (CBD) were severely damaged. There
were 182 fatalities, 135 of these due to the complete col-
lapse of two medium-rise RC buildings.
This brief overview paper discusses some preliminary
lessons learnt from the observed seismic performance of
RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The
background to New Zealand RC seismic design and the
seismic shaking of the Christchurch 2010–11 earthquakes
are also briefly discussed. A full damage report on the seis-
mic performance of RC buildings in the CBD will be avail-
able in the near future in [1].
* Corresponding author: kam.wengyuen@beca.com,
weng.kam@canterbury.ac.nz
Submitted for review: 18 September 2011
Revised: 18 September 2011
Accepted for publication: 21 September 2011
© 2011 Ernst & Sohn Verlag für Architektur und technische Wissenschaften GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin · Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4
DOI: 10.1002/suco.201100044
RC construction and design practice in New Zealand
is similar to that in many other parts of the world. There-
fore, some of the lessons learnt are directly relevant to the
international community for further research, improve-
ments to current seismic code design and performance cri-
teria, and beg the implementation of most recent and most
advanced technology.
2 Canterbury and Christchurch Earthquakes, 2010–11
2.1 The 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury)
earthquake
The 22 February 2011 earthquake was an “aftershock” of
the sequence of earthquakes triggered by the Mw 7.1
Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake of 4 September 2010.
The 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake, with
an epicentre approx. 35 km from the Christchurch CBD,
generated peak ground accelerations (PGA) of up to
0.2–0.3 g in the CBD area. This main shock resulted in
widespread liquefaction and damage to land, residential
buildings and infrastructure in the Canterbury region [2].
Preliminary research has indicated that the associat-
ed seismic demand was deemed to correspond to the ap-
proximate 400–500-year return period motions of the New
Zealand loading standards, NZS1170:5 [3] for structures
with periods of 0.3–1.0 s [4]. However, a reconnaissance
report on the seismic performance of the RC buildings in
the 4 September event [5] has indicated low to moderate
levels of damage for pre-1970s “brittle” RC buildings,
somehow contradicting the expected level of damage
given the magnitude of the earthquake and the recorded
level of PGA.
Prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake, it had
been demonstrated via a series of numerical non-linear
time history analyses and experimental shaking table tests
that the characteristics of the ground motions (recorded
signal itself) in the CBD after the 4 September event might
have not be as demanding as compatibility with the design
spectra (itself an approximate approach) would suggest
[6].
2.2 Seismicity of the 22 February 2011 earthquake
The epicentre of the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christ-
church earthquake was approx. 10 km south-east of the
Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5 km. The maxi-
223
W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

Fig. 1. Fault rupture length and aftershock sequence for the 4 September 2010, 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 events (source: GNS Science)

Fig. 2. Peak ground accelerations recorded during the 22 February 2011 Christchurch aftershock (source: EQC-GNS Geonet)

mum felt intensity was MMI IX and the maximum PGA
recorded was 0.4–0.7g in the Christchurch CBD. Fig. 1
shows the fault rupture associated with the 4 September
and 22 February events and associated aftershocks as
recorded until 29 August 2011.
A rich set of strong ground motion records were cap-
tured in these earthquakes by the EQC-GNS GeoNet seis-
mic hazard monitoring network, which has more than 50
seismic instrumentation stations within 100 km of
Christchurch CBD and four permanent recording stations
in the CBD. Fig. 2 shows a comparison of PGAs (horizon-
tal and vertical) recorded by the GeoNet seismic monitor-
ing network in the Christchurch CBD. A wide range of
(medium to very high) horizontal accelerations was
recorded, with peaks exceeding 1.6g at Heathcote Valley
and between 0.4 and 0.7 g at the CBD recording stations.
A significant peculiarity of the 22 February earthquake
was the very high vertical acceleration, in the range of
1.8–2.2 g on the hills, which were among the highest ever
recorded worldwide [7]. In the CBD, the highest value of

224 Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4

 W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

N N
1.8 EQ3:REHS 1.8 EQ3:REHS
EQ3:REHS Secondary horizontal direction
Principal direction
Spectra Acceleration / S a (g ms-2) .

Spectra Acceleration / S a (g ms-2) .

(S88E)
1.6 EQ1:CBGS
1.6
NZS1170:5 (2004) EQ1:CBGS
1.4 EQ4:CCCC (N89W)
1.4 2500−year motion
EQ4:CCCC (S01W)
Mean of 4 EQ4:CCCC EQ4:CCCC
1.2 CBD records EQ2:CHHC
1.2 EQ2:CHHC
EQ3:REHS (N02E)
1.0 EQ1:CBGS 1.0 Mean of 4
(NS64E) CBD records
0.8 EQ2:CHHC (S89W)
0.8
NZS1170:5 (2004) EQ2:CHHC (N01W)
0.6 2500−year motion 0.6
NZS1170:5 (2004) 500−year motion
0.4 0.4
0.2 NZS1170:5 (2004) 0.2 EQ1:CBGS (N26W)
500−year motion
0.0 0.0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
a) Period (sec) b) Period (sec)

Fig. 3. 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake: elastic acceleration response spectra (5 % damped) in the Christchurch CBD after the 22 February event and
the NZS1170:2004 design spectra (solid red line) for Christchurch (soil class D, R = 20 km): a) principal horizontal direction (generally east-west component),
b) secondary horizontal direction (generally north-south component) [12]

peak ground vertical acceleration recorded was between hazard model do not (yet) consider any near-fault effects
0.5 and 0.8 g. for Christchurch CBD as there was no known active fault
Comparison of the recorded ground motions with within 20 km of Christchurch CBD. The amplification of
the probabilistic hazard model and various ground mo- spectra acceleration in the 0.5–1.5 s period range and the
tion attenuation models has highlighted the peculiarity of shift of the peak spectra acceleration “plateau” is typically
the extremely high shaking of the 22 February event [8]. observed in ground motion records with forward directiv-
Preliminary seismological investigation indicates the com- ity effects [10], [11]. In addition, the soft-soil site amplifica-
plex seismic wave interaction in the deep alluvial soils un- tion observed in the response spectra is also significantly
derlying Christchurch (“basin effect”), the shallowness of higher than typical measurements for similar geological
the rupture and the directivity effects from the oblique-re- sites, which indicates that further urgent research is re-
verse fault rupture mechanism resulting in severe ground quired to quantify such site effects.
shaking within the Christchurch CBD [9]. The 5 %-damped elastic displacement response spec-
tra for the four CBD recording stations are plotted in
2.3 Response spectra of 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Fig. 4. In all period ranges, both the principal and sec-
Christchurch earthquake ondary directions of horizontal shakings were higher than
the 500-year design displacement spectra [3].
The elastic acceleration response spectra (5 % damped) of In the principal direction, there are significant dis-
the 22 February earthquake, from the four recorded placement demands at 1.0–1.8 s and 2.9–3.8 s. This sug-
ground motions from the Christchurch CBD, are com- gests RC buildings of 5–10 storeys and 15–20 storeys re-
pared with the site seismic design coefficient in Fig. 3. The spectively would experience significant displacement
NZS1170:5 [3] 500-year and 2500-year design spectra for demands and thus possibly significant damage. The prin-
the Christchurch site (Z/PGA = 0.22g), distance R = cipal direction motion exceeded the NZS1170:2004 spec-
20 km and soil class D (consistent with the four recording tra corresponding to a 2500-year return period event (con-
sites) are also plotted in Fig. 3. sidered the Maximum Credible Event, MCE) at these two
In general, it can be noted that the seismic shaking in “amplification lumps” period ranges.
the Christchurch CBD significantly exceeded the 500-year A more thorough discussion of the response spectra
motion design spectra, which is the design level in New of the 22 February 2011 earthquake in comparison with
Zealand for new buildings. The principal direction of the 4 September 2010 and 26 December 2010 earthquakes
shaking was of the predominantly east-west component. is given in [12].
The east-west components were approx. 15–30 % higher in
the periods ranging from 0 to 2.4 s, except for the period 3 RC buildings in Christchurch
range 0.35–0.6 s, where the north-south components were 3.1 Development of New Zealand seismic design
stronger. of RC buildings
The east-west components matched or exceeded the
New Zealand loading standard NZS1170:2004 [3] 2500- The first national building by-law, the 1935 Model Build-
year motion in the period range 0.5–1.75 s (approx. 5- to ing By-Law NZS95:1935 [13], was published by the New
20-storey RC buildings). Zealand Standards (NZS) in the wake of the Napier
It should be noted that the existing NZS1170.5:2004 Hawke’s Bay 1931 Mw 7.9 earthquake, which resulted in
design spectra and the underlying probabilistic seismic 256 fatalities. Unreinforced masonry buildings were dis-

Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4 225

W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

N
N Mean of 4 EQ3:REHS
1200 EQ3:REHS CBD records
900
EQ3:REHS Secondary horizontal direction

Spectra Dispacelemt / S d (mm) .

Spectral Displacement / S d (mm) .

(S88E) 800 EQ1:CBGS NZS1170:5 (2004)

1000 EQ1:CBGS EQ3:REHS
2500−year motion
NZS1170:5 700 (N02E)
EQ4:CCCC
EQ4:CCCC (2004) 2500− EQ2:CHHC
800 EQ2:CHHC
EQ1:CBGS (NS64E) year motion 600
500 EQ4:CCCC (S01W)
600 EQ2:CHHC (S89W)
400 Mean of 4
CBD records
400 300 EQ2:CHHC
(N01W)
NZS1170:5 (2004)
500−year motion
200 EQ1:CBGS
200 EQ4:CCCC (N26W)
NZS1170:5 (2004)
(N89W) Principal direction 100 500−year motion
0 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
a) Period (sec) b) Period (sec)

Fig. 4. 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 earthquake: 5 %-damped elastic displacement response spectra of four Christchurch CBD records and the NZS1170:2004
design spectra (solid red line) for Christchurch (soil class D, R = 20 km): a) principal horizontal direction (generally east-west component), b) secondary hor-
izontal direction (generally north-south component) [12]

couraged and masonry walls were required to be tied to Park and Paulay outlined many concepts of modern seis-
the floor diaphragms. mic RC design and detailing, including a rigorous design
The 1955 revision of the NZS Standard Model Build- procedure for RC frames using the capacity design philos-
ing By-Law (NZS95:1955) introduced an inverted triangu- ophy and quantification of the ductility capacity of RC
lar distribution of horizontal load with seismic coefficients beam, column, wall and joint elements.
of 0.12 g and 0 at the top and bottom of the structure re- The introduction of the NZS4203:1976 loading stan-
spectively. Explicit definitions of deformed and plain dards [23] represented a quantum change in the seismic
round bars were given, but limited bond advantage of de- load requirements. NZS4203:1976 quantified the soil am-
formed reinforcement was accounted for. The provision plification factors, with higher seismic coefficients speci-
for shear resistance of concrete elements was tightened fied for softer soils. The ultimate strength design approach
and the requirement of 135° anchorage for links was in- was codified as the preferred design method. Concurrent-
cluded. ly, the 1982 edition of the NZS3101 concrete design stan-
The NZS1900:1964 code [14], [15] was a significant dard [24] was developed and written. NZS3101:1982 in-
evolution from its predecessors. Three seismic zones with cluded now well-accepted concepts of ductile RC detailing
the maximum seismic coefficient ranging from 8 % (zone and capacity design philosophy.
C) to 12 % (zone A) were introduced to achieve a better NZS3101 was reviewed and updated in 1995 [25] and
representation of the regional seismicity of New Zealand. 2006 [26] to reflect the further knowledge gained from
The magnitude of seismic force was formed as a function research and the lessons learnt from the Loma Prieta,
of a building’s natural period. The concept of structural Northridge and Kobe earthquakes. NZS3101:1995 in-
ductility was introduced with the stated assumption of creased the requirements for minimum seating lengths for
5–10 % of damping for structural ductility of 4 for RC precast floor elements and ties between precast walls and
structures. However, no provision for ductile RC detailing floors. The column transverse reinforcement requirement
or modern capacity design considerations was included. was increased, whereas the shear reinforcement required
In the late 1960s, following the 1966 SEAOC recom- in the joint cores of ductile frames was lowered in
mendations [16] and the 1971 ACI-318 code [17], practising NZS3101:1995.
engineers in New Zealand began to develop “ductile” rein- The achievable material strain on assumed ductile
forced concrete design and detailing. J. P. Hollings intro- detailing was quantified in the 2006 revision of the
duced a step-by-step design procedure to achieve beam- NZS3101. The overstrength from slab and diaphragm con-
hinging inelastic mechanism in RC frames under seismic tributions to the beam flexural capacity was refined. Spe-
loading, which pre-dated the concept of capacity design, cific clauses relating to beam elongation and precast floor
in 1969 [18]. The 1970 Ministry of Work’s Code of Prac- detailing were also incorporated in NZS3101:2006, includ-
tice for Design of Public Buildings [19], [20] adopted many ing disallowing the use of cold-worked brittle wire mesh as
ductile detailing recommendations, including a recom- diaphragm ties into seismic elements [27]. The use of joint-
mendation for beam-column joint reinforcement. ed ductile connections (post-tensioned/rocking dissipa-
The provisional NZS3101 code, published in 1972 tive) systems has been introduced (NZS3101:2006 Appen-
[21], also adopted many parts of the 1971 ACI-318 code dix B) along with the possibility (for these special
[17] and some of the recommendations were from the structures) of designing according to a displacement-based
draft version of ref [22]. In their seminal publication [22], approach.

226 Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4

 W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

Pre-1970s RC Frame Green 1980s RC Frame Green 1990s-2010s RC Frame Unknown Age RC Frame
Yellow Green Green
Yellow 9; 18;
29; Red Yellow Yellow
Red 20; 20% 14%
25% Red Red
50; 29% 28; 26; 75;
43% 42% 56% 34; 59%
11; 27%
37; 20; 24%
32% 29%

Pre-1970s RC Wall Green 1980s RC Wall Green 1990s-2010s RC Wall Unknown Age RC Wall
Green Green
4; Yellow 2; Yellow Yellow Yellow
15% 11% Red 8; 4;
Red Red Red
24%
11; 6; 11; 29% 14; 8;
41% 32% 57% 50% 47%
12;
44% 6; 5;
21% 29%

Fig. 5. RC (wall and frame systems) building stock “damage tagging” data and distribution in terms of construction year in Christchurch CBD based on 12
June 2011 CCC Building Safety Evaluation (BSE) statistics

3.2 Damage statistics for RC buildings in Christchurch
Christchurch CBD consists of predominantly commercial
and light industrial buildings (58 %) but also a significant
number of residential buildings (42 %). The majority (ap-
prox. 81 %) of the buildings are of one and two storeys.
There are 127 buildings with at least six storeys, with the
tallest building being 22 storeys (86 m). Based on the
12 June 2011 CCC Building Safety Evaluation (BSE) statis-
tics, there are at least 3000 buildings within the
Christchurch CBD. Fig. 5 presents the summary of build-
ing damage and building type/age statistics for RC build-
ings within the Christchurch CBD.
Pre-1970s RC buildings generally performed poorly,
with about 60 % of these buildings being given yellow or
red placards to indicate restricted or unsafe buildings. As
part of this class of buildings, those relying upon RC walls
as the primary lateral-resisting system generally showed
some higher level of structural redundancy such that se-
vere damage (e.g. section 4.2) did not lead to collapse of
the buildings. Pre-1970s buildings with a significant RC
frames gravity and lateral system are observed to be more
susceptible to damage leading to structural instability (and
likely collapse).
A construction boom in the 1980s led to a large num-
ber of medium- to high-rise RC buildings in Christchurch
CBD, with precast concrete ductile perimeter frame sys-
tems being widely used. Fig. 6 illustrates some of the no-
table RC medium- to high-rise structures in Christchurch
CBD. Some of these high-rise buildings were previously re-
ported to be damaged during the 4 September 2010
Darfield earthquake [5], [29].
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, a large num-
ber of these 1980s RC buildings performed as expected of
them in a severe earthquake, with formation of plastic
hinges in the beams (section 4.1). However, unexpected is-
sues such as brittle failure of cold-worked mesh required
for diaphragm action (section 4.5), excessive residual dis-
placements, beam elongation effects (section 4.5) and col-
lapse of precast staircases (section 4.6) resulted in exces-
sively expensive repairs and consequently the need for the
demolition of a number of these buildings.
Whereas for the more recent RC buildings (built
since 1990, particularly RC-wall and high-rise buildings,
some unexpected performance such as significant lique-
faction-induced differential settlement (section 4.7) and
poor performance of “ductile” shear walls (section 4.3) was
observed.
4 Preliminary lessons and damage observed
Some of the unexpected performance and preliminary
lessons from the observed damage to RC buildings in this
severe earthquake event are discussed below. Many com-
plex issues and surprising (and unsurprising) lessons were
learned and these issues will be briefly highlighted for fur-
ther research.
Detailed discussion of the observed damage pattern
and damage statistics for RC buildings during the 22 Feb-
ruary Christchurch earthquake is presented elsewhere
[1], [28], [30]. Several preliminary observations and likely
changes to design practice have also been summarized
by the New Zealand Structural Engineering Society
[31].
4.1 Capacity design and ductile-response RC buildings
Many RC buildings were moderately and severely dam-
aged in the 22 February 2011 earthquake. A large majority
of the RC buildings, particularly those with capacity-de-
sign consideration, performed as expected of them in a se-
vere earthquake, with formation of plastic hinges in the
beams, coupling beams and at bases of walls and columns
(see Fig. 7a and 7b). Nevertheless, in many cases, the
buildings are considered too expensive to be repaired. In
addition, there are also no New Zealand guidelines for the

Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4 227

W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

Fig. 6. Notable medium- and high-rise buildings in Christchurch CBD in 1978 and 1990 [28] (photo sketch courtesy of CCC)

a) b) c)

d) e) f)

Fig. 7. Ductile-response RC systems: a) coupling beams of 1960s coupled-walls building; b) beam plastic hinges on 1980s perimeter RC frames building;
c) ductile behaviour of 1980s RC walls building and d–f) “low-damage” PRESSS post-tensioned frames building built in 2010

assessment and estimation of the residual ductility of plas- In recent years, the emerging damage-resisting solu-
tic hinges. This makes it difficult to design the repairs as tions for precast concrete structures, typically referred to
well as estimate the building capacity and safety under se- as PRESSS technology, have been successfully introduced,
vere aftershocks. further refined, developed, codified [26], [32] and imple-

228 Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4

 W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

mented in practice in New Zealand. This approach relies
on jointed ductile connections as an alternative to the
more traditional monolithic emulative of cast-in-place so-
lutions [33].
New Zealand South Island’s first PRESSS building,
completed in 2010, is a three/four storey (plus basement
parking) concrete building with post-tensioned coupled
walls in one direction and post-tensioned frames in the
other. The hospital building sustained the very severe
(and beyond design level) sequence of earthquake from 4
September, through 22 February and 13 June, with no evi-
dent structural damage [34]. Given the suddenly appreci-
ated importance of damage-control design and also the ac-
tually proven cost-efficiency of such systems, it does not
come as a surprise that such technology in precast con-
crete is likely to be one of the milestones in the post-earth-
quake reconstruction of the city.
4.2 Pre-1970s buildings brittle response
For the older RC frame buildings, the observed perfor-
mance was generally poor and the observed inelastic dam-
age pattern was typically characterized by brittle mecha-
nisms such as beam lap-splice/shear, column shear, beam-
column joint shear and/or wall shear failures (e.g. Fig. 8).
Unfortunately, pre-1970s “non-ductile” RC buildings can
respond with a binary “on – safe, off – collapse” mecha-
nism, as observed in several partially or totally collapsed
buildings in Christchurch, e.g. the Pyne Gould Corp.
building (Fig. 9). For pre-1970s buildings with significant
redundancy and regular plan form and height, generally
satisfactory behaviour was observed. The detailed analysis
of brittle and inelastic-response RC buildings remains a
challenging task, pre- and post-earthquake.
4.3 Ductile shear walls detailing and design
Prior to the NZS3101:1982 standard, walls were not de-
tailed for ductility, thus resulting in inadequate horizontal
and vertical reinforcement, particularly at critical regions
in the walls. In particular, the older walls generally have
no reinforcement to prevent brittle confinement or buck-
ling failure. Fig. 8c and 8d illustrate the typical wall dam-
age observed for pre-1970s designs.
Perhaps due to the apparent increase in sophistica-
tion in design and structural analysis in recent years, a

a) b) c) d)

Fig. 8. Pre-1970s RC buildings brittle failure mechanism: a) near collapse of a frame/wall building with beam-column joint failure, b) short column shear and
beam-column shear damage, c) lightly reinforced 1950 RC wall compression failure, d) shear/axial failure of composite RC wall/steel columns system

Fig. 9. The collapsed Pyne Gould Corp. 1950s core wall/frames building

Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4 229

W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

a) b) c)

Fig. 10. Post-1970s RC structural wall buildings collapse/damage patterns: a) nine-storey residential apartment block built in 2000–10 with severe shear fail-
ure of the long slender wall (photo courtesy of Ken Elwood), b) 14-storey residential apartment block built in 2007 with buckling of the boundary reinforce-
ment, c) seven-storey 1980s office block with significant compression failure of V-shaped RC shear wall

large percentage of the recently constructed RC walls con-
sists of thin slender walls with a minimum level of rein-
forcement and a higher level of axial load ratio. RC walls
designed for limited or nominal ductility in accordance
with NZS3101:2006 [26], with limited boundary zone con-
finement reinforcement, e.g. Fig.10b, have been observed
to fail in brittle shear-compression or premature reinforc-
ing tensile/compressive fracture, leading to irreparable
buildings.
The high number of severely damaged reasonably
new RC wall buildings (see Fig. 10a to 10c) has indicated
that the current design for slender RC walls with inade-
quate confinement steel at the non-boundary zone (possi-
bly in the core region, too), and with inter-panel grouted
lap-splice, is inadequate. In addition, many reinforced con-
crete walls suffered premature compression failure (e.g.
Fig. 7c and Fig. 10c), particularly for L-, T- and V-shaped
walls. The effects of the high vertical acceleration of the
22 February 2011 earthquake could have also amplified
the compression force demand on RC walls with already
non-negligible axial load. The lack of a distributed crack-
ing pattern in the plastic hinge zone of the RC walls is also
an unexpected observation that requires further research.
4.4 Plan and vertical irregularity
In general, buildings with significant plan and/or vertical
irregularity were found to perform very poorly. For exam-
ple, RC walls that discontinued above the basement level
were observed to induce severe damage in the transfer
slabs and basement columns and walls. Plan irregularity
as a consequence of inelastic behaviour of perimeter later-
al-resisting systems (walls or frames) leading to inelastic
torsion amplification was another problem commonly ob-
served. Further discussion of the observed damage due to
plan and vertical irregularity is presented in [1], [30].

Fig. 11. Extensive damage to floor diaphragm and loss of floor support due to the beam elongation effects of concrete frame inelastic response

230 Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4

 W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake
4.5 Displacement incompatibility, brittle diaphragm
reinforcement and beam elongation
Displacement incompatibility of lateral load-resisting sys-
tems and the “gravity” elements such as floors and transfer
beams have been recognized as a critical structural weak-
ness in recent research [27]. In particular, the adverse
elongation effect of expected ductile plastic behaviour of
lateral systems (e.g. RC frames) on the structural integrity
of the diaphragm of the precast flooring elements is well
documented [35], [36].
Fig. 11 illustrates an extreme example in which ex-
tensive floor diaphragm damage and loss of precast floor-
ing unit support occurred due to the beam elongation
effect. The use of cold-formed brittle wire mesh for the
diaphragm shear transfer has resulted in uncertainty over
the remaining structural life of the diaphragm.
Whereas Fig. 11 represents an extreme example of
brittle diaphragm behaviour, there are many buildings with
minor to moderate cracking in the slabs-to-lateral system
(beams or walls). It was found that even for residual crack
widths < 1 mm, the cold-worked mesh across the floor slab
topping (which is meant to act as the seismic diaphragm
shear transfer) could be fractured. The uncertainty of the
residual diaphragm capacity and the difficulty of assessing
the remaining strain life of the “brittle” mesh indicate that
buildings relying on cold-formed mesh for the diaphragm
action may require urgent remedial retrofits.
4.6 Precast staircases in multi-storey buildings
Severe damage and collapse of precast staircases have
been observed in many instances in the 22 February 2011
earthquake. In many buildings, staircases exhibited signifi-
cant damage in buildings where the inter-storey move-
ments of the staircases were restrained. Complete or par-
tial internal precast concrete staircases collapses have
been reported for four multi-storey high-rise buildings (e.g.
Fig. 12a). Minor to moderate levels of staircase move-
ment/damage (e.g. Fig. 12b and 12c) were observed in
many other medium- to high-rise buildings.
The staircase damage observed in multi-storey build-
ings indicates that the deformation allowance they had
a) b)
Fig. 12. Precast concrete staircases in multi-storey buildings: a) collapse, b) top landing damage, and c) bottom landing damage
been designed for (even when compatible with the code
requirements at the time) was typically inadequate to sus-
tain the very high seismic demand. Considering that stair-
cases represent a critical means of escape in buildings, it is
clear that a major reconsideration of the design philoso-
phy of staircases in multi-storey buildings (RC or other-
wise) will be needed. An interim approach to the assess-
ment and retrofitting of existing stairs has been developed
by an Engineering Advisory Group to the Department of
Building and Housing [37]. Further description of the ap-
proach to staircase design in New Zealand is given in [37],
[12].
4.7 Liquefaction, lateral spreading and building foundation
damage
Severe widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading were
observed in Christchurch and surrounding suburbs in the
4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake as well as
the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake.
However, limited or partial liquefaction manifestation was
observed within the Christchurch CBD in the 4 Septem-
ber event, whereas severe liquefaction was observed in
parts of the Christchurch CBD in the 22 February earth-
quake.
Liquefaction land damage induced differential settle-
ment of buildings, resulting in foundation damage and
building permanent tilting [38]. There is clear evidence of
building damage/tilting as a consequence of liquefaction-
induced settlements and ground movement as shown in
Fig. 13. Variable soil profiles underneath these buildings
with varying foundation designs are some of the complex-
ities, resulting in mixed (good and bad) performance of
various CBD buildings within the same segments of lique-
faction-damaged streets.
Preliminary observations indicate buildings with pile
foundations generally exhibit less differential settlement
and liquefaction-induced tilt [38]. High-rise multi-storey
buildings on shallow foundations with significant liquefi-
able soil depth generally exhibit substantial settlement
and liquefaction-induced tilt. The soil-foundation-struc-
ture interaction is a very complicated subject that remains
in the forefront of earthquake engineering research.
c)
Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4 231
W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake
a)
Fig. 13. Liquefaction-induced differential settlement resulting in significant tilting of medium- to high-rise buildings with various foundation and soil details:
a) four-storey with shallow foundation, b) six-storey with shallow foundation, c) two high-rise buildings with substantial differential settlement and tilting
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented a brief summary and overview of
preliminary lessons learnt from our observations of the seis-
mic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011
Christchurch earthquake. Due to the concise nature of the
paper, it is impossible to discuss all relevant aspects in de-
tail. Readers are encouraged to read more detailed recon-
naissance reports presented elsewhere [1], [9], [30], [31].
At the time of writing, the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission and various investigations into the
seismic performance of severely damaged and collapsed
RC buildings are ongoing. This paper has therefore re-
frained from any discussion of the buildings that form part
of this current investigation. Readers are encouraged to
read the outcomes of the inquiry at the Royal Commission
website [39].
The unique and unprecedented series of severe
earthquake events in Christchurch and the substantial
damage observed to “modern” and “well”-designed rein-
forced concrete buildings (in addition to the expected
damage to and collapse of unreinforced masonry build-
ings and older ”non-ductile” RC buildings) has prompted
the consideration that current performance criteria adopt-
ed for both new building and older building stock might
not be adequate, certainly not in fulfilling the expectations
of modern society.
Although it has to be recognized that the 22 Febru-
ary Christchurch earthquake caused particularly high seis-
mic shaking well beyond the current code design levels
and that the event was caused by an unknown blind fault,
the devastating reality of the facts is that the bar should
undoubtedly be raised (at international level).
Such a step-up can be achieved not only by obvious-
ly increasing the seismic coefficients or hazard levels, but
– and probably just as importantly – by:
– increasing the performance requirements (e.g. moving
towards a low-damage or damage-control approach even
under design-level or MCE-level earthquakes) for both
new and, to a lesser extent, existing structures, and
– favouring the implementation, and continuing the re-
search and development, of higher seismic-performance
232 Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4
b) c)
concrete technology capable of giving society what it
naturally believes was already an ”earthquake-proof”
building.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks go to the numerous professional structural
engineers, Urban Search & Rescue Teams and New
Zealand Civil Defence who assisted in various forms dur-
ing the critical emergency period of these earthquakes.
Any conclusions and inappropriate mistakes in reporting
made in this contribution are nevertheless to be consid-
ered entirely those of the authors.
The assistance and data provided by Christchurch
City Council, Dr. Ken Elwood and Dr. Umut Akguzel are
gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also given to the
FRST Retrofit project postgraduate students (Sahin
Tasligedik and Patricio Quintana-Gallo) for their contri-
butions in the field data collection.
References
1. Pampanin, S., Kam, W. Y., Akguzel, U., Tasligedik, A. S.,
Quintana-Gallo, P.: Report on the observed earthquake
damage of reinforced concrete buildings in the Christchurch
CBD on the 22 February 2011 Earthquake (not yet for public
release). University of Canterbury, Christchurch, NZ, 2011.
2. Wood, P., Robins, P., Hare, J.: Preliminary observations of
the 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquakes: An introduc-
tion. Bull. of New Zealand Soc. of Earthquake Eng., 43 (4),
2010. pp. i–iv.
3. NZS1170: NZS 1170.5:2004 Structural design actions. Part
5: Earthquake actions – New Zealand, Standards New
Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 2004.
4. Cousins, J., McVerry, G. H.: Overview of strong motion data
from the Darfield earthquake. Bull. of New Zealand Soc. of
Earthquake Eng., 43 (4), 2010, pp. 222–227.
5. Kam, W. Y., Pampanin, S., Dhakal, R. P., Gavin, H., Roeder,
C. W.: Seismic performance of reinforced concrete buildings
in the September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquakes.
Bull. of New Zealand Soc. of Earthquake Eng., 43 (4), 2010,
pp. 340–350.
6. Pampanin, S., Kam, W. Y., Tasligedik, A. S., Quintana-Gallo,
P., Akguzel, U.: Considerations on the seismic performance
of pre-1970s RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD during
 W. Y. Kam/St. Pampanin · The seismic performance of RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake
the 4th Sept 2010 Canterbury earthquake: was that really a
big one? Proc., 9th Pacific Conf. on Earthquake Eng.
7. Berrill, J.: Some Aspects of the M6.3 February 22nd Earth-
quake. The Press, Christchurch, 2011.
8. Fry, B., Benites, R., Reyners, M., Holden, C., Kaiser, A., Ban-
nister, S., Gerstenberger, M. C., WIlliams, C., Ristau, J., Bea-
van, J.: Extremely strong shaking in the New Zealand earth-
quakes of 2010 and 2011. Trans. of American Geophysical
Union, 2011 (submitted).
9. GNS: Canterbury earthquakes sequence and implications
for seismic design levels. A submission to the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission., Geological Nuclear Sci-
ence (GNS), Lower Hutt, New Zealand, 2011.
10. Somerville, P.: Magnitude scaling of the near-fault rupture di-
rectivity pulse. Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors,
137 (1), 2003, pp. 201–212.
11. Somerville, P.: Engineering characterization of near fault
ground motions. Proc., NZSEE 2005 Conf., NZSEE.
12. Kam, W. Y., Pampanin, S.: General performance of buildings
in Christchurch CBD: A contextual report prepared for DBH
Expert Panel. , University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New
Zealand, 2011.
13. NZS95:1935: New Zealand Standard model buildings by-
laws, New Zealand Standards Inst., Wellington, NZ, 1935.
14. NZS1900.8-64: NZS1900 – Model building bylaw: Chapter
8: Basic Design Loads and Commentary. Standards Assoc.
of New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1964.
15. NZS1900.9-64: NZS1900 – Model building bylaw: Chapter
9.3: Design and construction – Concrete, Standards Assoc.
of New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1964.
16. SEAOC: Recommended lateral force requirements, Structur-
al Engineers Association of California (SEAOC), Sacramen-
to, CA, 1966.
17. ACI318-71: Building code requirements for reinforced concrete
(ACI318-71), American Concrete Inst. (ACI), Detroit, MI, 1971.
18. Hollings, J. P.: Reinforced concrete seismic design. Bull. of New
Zealand Soc. of Earthquake Eng., 2 (3), 1969, pp. 217–250.
19. Megget, L. M.: From brittle to ductile: 75 years of seismic de-
sign in New Zealand. Proc., NZSEE 2006 Conf., NZSEE, 15.
20. MOW-NZ: PW81/10/1: Code of Practice, Design of Public
Buildings, Office of Chief Structural Engineer, Ministry of
Works, Wellington, NZ, 1970.
21. NZS3101:1970P: Code of practice for the design of concrete
structures NZS 3101:1970 (Provisional), Standards Assoc. of
New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1970.
22. Park, R., Paulay, T.: Reinforced concrete structures, John Wi-
ley & Sons, New York, 1975.
23. NZS4203:1976: Code of practice for general structural de-
sign and design loading for buildings. NZS 4203:1976, Stan-
dards Assoc. of New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1976.
24. NZS3101:1982: Code of practice for the design of concrete
structures NZS 3101:1982, Standards Assoc. of New
Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1982.
25. NZS3101:1995: NZS 3101:1995 Concrete structures stan-
dard, Standards New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 1995.
26. NZS3101:2006: NZS 3101:2006 Concrete structures stan-
dard, Standards New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 2006.
27. NZS3101:1995: Amendments No. 3 to 1995 Standard
(NZS3101), Standards New Zealand, Wellington, NZ, 2004.
28. Pampanin, S., Kam, W. Y.: Seismic performance of rein-
forced concrete buildings during the 22nd February 2011
Christchurch earthquakes. Seminar notes for NZCS-
NZSEE-SESOC NZTDS Building Performance in the Feb-
ruary 2011 Christchurch Earthquake Seminar. New Zealand
Concrete Society (NZCS), Auckland, N.Z., 130, 2011.
29. Galloway, B., Hare, J., Bull, D. K.: Performance of multi-
storey reinforced concrete buildings in the Darfield earth-
quake. Proc., 9th Pacific Conf. on Earthquake Eng., 11.
30. Kam, W. Y., Pampanin, S., Elwood, K.: Seismic performance
of reinforced concrete buildings in the 22 February 2011
Christchurch (Lyttelton) earthquake. Bull. of New Zealand
Soc. of Earthquake Eng., 44, 2011 (in press).
31. SESOC: Preliminary observations from Christchurch earth-
quakes., Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
(SESOC), Auckland, NZ, 2011.
32. NZCS: PRESSS Design Handbook, New Zealand Concrete
Society (NZCS), (Ed S. Pampanin), Auckland, New Zealand,
2010.
33. fib: Seismic design of precast concrete building structures,
fib Bulletin no. 27, Intl. Fed. for Struct. Concrete (fib), Lau-
sanne, Switzerland, 2003.
34. Pampanin, S., Kam, W. Y., Haverland, G., Gardiner, S.: Seis-
mic Performance of a Post-Tensioned Precast Concrete
Building (PRESSS Technology) during the 22nd Feb 2011
Christchurch Earthquake: Reality Check meets Community
Expectations. Proc., NZ Concrete Industry Conference 2011,
New Zealand Concrete Society (NZCS).
35. Fenwick, R., Bull, D. K., Gardiner, D.: Assessment of hollow-
core floors for seismic performance. Research report 2010-
02. Dept. of Civil and Natural Resources Eng., Uni. of Can-
terbury, Christchurch, NZ, 2010.
36. Matthews, J., Bull, D. K., Mander, J. B.: Hollowcore floor
slab performance following a severe earthquake. Proc., Con-
crete Structures in Seismic Region: fib 2003 Symposium.
37. Bull, D. K.: Stairs and Access Ramps between Floors in Mul-
ti-storey Buildings. A report of the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission. Holmes Consulting Group, Christ-
church, N.Z., 8, 2011.
38. Giorgini, S., Taylor, M., Cubrinovski, M., Pampanin, S.: Pre-
liminary observations of multi-storey RC building founda-
tion performance in Christchurch following the 22nd Febru-
ary 2011 Earthquake. Proc., NZ Concrete Industry
Conference 2011, New Zealand Concrete Society (NZCS).
39. Royal Commission: Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commis-
sions. Technical Reports. http://canterbury.royalcommis-
sion.govt.nz/. (1 Sept 2011).
Weng Yuen Kam
Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner Ltd, Auckland, New Zealand
Formerly Research Associate Department of Civil & Natural Resources
Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Email: kam.wengyuen@beca.com
Stefano Pampanin
Chair of the Structures/Geotechnical Cluster, Associate Professor (Reader)
Department of Civil & Natural Resources Engineering, University
of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 81240, New Zealand
Email: stefano.pampanin@canterbury.ac.nz
Structural Concrete 12 (2011), No. 4 233