Table of Contents

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

2 History of sanctions against Russia................................................................................ 2

2.1 Historic classification ............................................................................................. 2

2.2 Types of implemented sanctions............................................................................. 2

3 How do sanctions effect Russia’s role in the battle? ...................................................... 3

3.1 Influence of different sanctions .............................................................................. 3

3.2 Effectiveness of financial sanctions ........................................................................ 4

4 How Russia finances this war ........................................................................................ 8

4.1 The costs of war ...................................................................................................... 8

4.2 Russia’s economic situation related to war ............................................................. 9

5 Policy implications ....................................................................................................... 11

References ........................................................................................................................... 13

I
List of Figures
Figure 1: EU Sanctions Map……………………………………………………………….5

Figure 2: Reserves from the Bank of Russia……………………………………………….6

Figure 3: Exchange Rate of the Ruble against the US-Dollar……………………………...7

Figure 4: Inflation and GDP forecasts……………………………………………………..10

Figure 5: Estimated Exports and Imports………………………………………………….10

Figure 6: Volume of Russia’s National Wealth Fund………………………………………11

II
III
1 Introduction
Two common reasons to introduce sanctions are promoting democracy and punishing the
violation of human rights.1 In the case of Russia, the sanctions implemented by the western
world were the result of the military aggression on Ukrainian territory. The military dispute
started with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which was the year of a political reversal in
Ukraine. As a result of the Euromaidan movement, which culminated in the February 2014
revolution, former president Yanukovych was removed, and a pro-western government
established.2 The political overthrow in Ukraine resulted in a new independent movement
on Crimea. The following referendum on the 16th of March 2014 decided the inclusion to
the Russian Federation. The result was not acknowledged by the western world and
restrictions were implemented.3 Sanctions in general give room for negotiations as they
weaken both countries and create the incentive to communicate.4 Politicians argued back in
2014 that the sanctions will dry up the military conflict due to the economic pressure. 5 The
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 escalated the conflict, which existed for almost eight
years at that time. The reaction of the invasion resulted immediately. On the 24th of February,
the date of the attack, EU- external commissioner Joseph Borrell spoke about the hardest
sanctions that were ever considered by the European Union. EU- Commission president
Ursula von der Leyen explained that the sanctions are well coordinated with partners like
the USA, Australia and Japan, and they are constructed in a way to intervene in Russia’s
ability to finance this war.6 This paper will take up this aim and discusses the implications
of multilateral sanctions against Russia with view on the outcome of the war. The second
chapter explicates the history behind the western sanctions and introduces their structure.
Their effect is being elaborated in chapter three, with a focus on financial sanctions. Chapter
four explains the general costs of war and draws a line to the situation in Russia. Finally,
further policy implications will be discussed in the last chapter.

1
Kaempfer/Lowenberg 2007, P. 901
2
Dreger et al. 2015, P. 4
3
Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg
4
Kaempfer/Lowenberg 2007, P. 868
5
Dreger et al. 2015, P.2
6
Tagesschau 2022b

1
2 History of sanctions against Russia
2.1 Historic classification
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to the first sanctions from countries of the
western world against Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 7 These were mainly
shaped by blocking property and visa bans against specific persons or entities. Trade related
sanctions were just limited to the military sector, later extended to technologies for the oil
industry and restrictions on access to capital.8 The restrictions related to Crimea are still
being extended regularly by the EU, since the annexation is still not acknowledged and
sentenced as violation of the international law.9 Sanctions against Russia in relation to the
invasion began on the 21st of February 2022 by the United States and the European Union.
The United Kingdom, Australia and Japan followed in the subsequent days with their first
measures before the invasion started. It was the result of President Putin’s decrees on the
21st of February in which he recognized the independence and sovereignty of the “so-called
Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)”.10 The invasion
of Ukraine on the 24th of February was the kickoff off widespread worldwide sanctions
against the Russian Federation. Within the same month Norway, Iceland, Switzerland,
Canada, South Korea, and Taiwan either adopted multilateral sanctions or created new
individual ones. On the other hand, some countries communicated within the next weeks of
the invasion that they will not take part in these sanctions. Among them were influential
states like Mexico, Brazil, China, Argentina, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa. The
nations stated different reasons for this conclusion. Next to the economic interest due to the
trade with Russia, several countries do not see sanctions as a solution for the conflict, or
even see them as threat for a further escalation.11

2.2 Types of implemented sanctions

The adopted sanctions by the European Union and the United States can be divided into
three categories. First, the targeted sanctions, which restrict single individuals based on their
connection to Putin or their influence in general. They are usually confronted with visa bans
and asset freezes.12 The list of people sanctioned by the European Union accumulated to 118

7
Felbermayr et al. 2020
8
Dreger et al. 2015, P. 23–24
9
Council of the EU 2022, P. 1
10
Peterson Institute for International Economics 2022
11
Peterson Institute for International Economics 2022
12
Forrer 2017, P. 5

2
organizations and 1241 individuals, including President Putin and foreign minister Sergej
Lawrow.13 Second, there are sectoral sanctions against key industries of the Russian
economy.14 The financial, energy, traffic, defense, commodity and services industry are for
example faced with import and export restrictions.15 The European Union decided an export
stop for high tech, luxury goods, civil weapons, goods and technologies for the refining-,
aviation-, maritime industry and in general for goods with Dual-use, which could be used
for military operations as well.16 The last category are comprehensive sanctions, as they have
been implemented in the case of Crimea in 2014. Neither US nor EU citizens are allowed to
invest in Crimea. Imports and exports from there are also prohibited.17 Comprehensive
measures as related to Crimea in 2014 were expanded to the areas of Donetsk, Kherson,
Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. Restrictions on trade and investment were imposed in the
warzone.18

3 How do sanctions effect Russia’s role in the battle?

3.1 Influence of different sanctions
Since the war in Ukraine is still young, the impact on Russia’s finances in the long run and
its ability to finance this war, is still uncertain. Many of the named sanctions in chapter two
have a rather low impact on the war. Most of them influence the combat just in an indirect
way or not at all. Sanctions against individuals like visa bans and asset freezes are the
weakest instruments, while sectoral sanctions constitute the strongest form.19 As stated
before, individual sanctions were mainly implemented in 2014.20 Today we know that these
measurements did not stop Russia from its further aggression eight years later. Export
controls on the other side restrict Russia in its manufacturing activities. Sectors like
“manufacturing of transportation equipment, chemicals, food products and IT services”21 are
highly exposed.

Also, to produce tanks and missiles, there are imported microchips needed. A self-sufficient
economy as in times of the soviet-era will no longer be possible due to the globalization

13
Europäische Union 2022a
14
Forrer 2017, P. 5
15
Europäische Union 2022b
16
Europäische Union 2022a
17
Forrer 2017, P. 6
18
European Commission 2023b
19
Dreger et al. 2015, P. 6
20
Dreger et al. 2015, P. 23–24
21
Demertzis et al. 2022, P. 11

3
process of the last three decades. Imports amount for roughly 20% of Russian GDP. More
than for example in China with a rate of 16%.22 Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina
stated: „Today, almost all companies are experiencing disruptions in production and logistic
and in their settlements with foreign counterparties.”23 Ukrainians reported about Russian
military equipped partially with semiconductors from dishwashers and refrigerators. An
action which can be attributed to the absence of supply due to discontinued imports. Also, a
part of the existing aircrafts has been cannibalized to secure the operation of the remaining
fleet. The airline Pobeda for example grounded up to 40% of their fleet. 24 The Dutch disease
of the last 15 years was embossed by a high concentration of economic power in the oil and
gas sector and rent-seeking oligarchs. This development exacerbates the problem of omitted
imports.25 In addition to the sanctions, several foreign companies were leaving due to the
public pressure. 26

3.2 Effectiveness of financial sanctions

Comprehensive restrictions on the financial sector weigh heavily on Russia. They stopped
Russia’s ability to pay the interest on government bonds in Euro or Dollars, they must serve
these in Rubles.27 Graph two provides an overview of the EU Sanctions Map. Regarding
Russia, one can see that the financial sanctions contribute the biggest part of implemented
restrictions. This is also due to the complexity of the financial system, which requires a
differentiated elaboration of the sanctions. However, it is also due to the European intention
to exert pressure on Russia and its financial system.

22
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 18
23
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 38
24
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 43–44
25
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 19
26
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 53
27
Zeit 2022

4
 Figure 1: EU Sanctions Map Source: European Commission 2023a

To understand the effect of financial sanctions, it must be traced which measures were taken.
These measurements were largely implemented by the central banks and finance ministries
of the western economies.28 This led to the sanctioning of most financial institutions, the
exclusion from the Swift-network for most banks, and the freezing of Russian currency
reserves in Europe and the United States. Russia was decoupled from the world's most traded
currencies.29 They have accumulated a lot of reserves due to the high export of oil and gas.
It was the first time that international reserves of a big influential country were frozen
because of war. Russia did not anticipate it and did not manage to reallocate its reserves in
time.30 They could have been used to strengthen the ruble or to import goods. Imports out of
these countries decreased due to the trade restrictions simultaneously, and the reserves were
in this sense less needed, but Russia would have probably used them to support its own
currency. In January 2023, the Russian central bank sold reserves of the Chinese Yuan worth
of $47 million.31 Without the sanctions, a sale of dollars or euros would have been possible.
Furthermore, the country still has access to about half of the foreign exchange reserves of
non-western countries, as well as to its substantial gold reserves. Russia significantly
increased these in recent years.32 Figure two shows the development of accumulated reserves
during the last seven years. The blue bars show the total reserves of the Russian Federation,

28
Scherrer/Wullweber 2022, P. 2
29
Demertzis et al. 2022, P. 7
30
Pop/Fleming 2022
31
Reuters 2023
32
Scherrer/Wullweber 2022, P. 4

5
including gold. The orange curve reflects the share of gold in relation to the total reserves.
Looking at the period from December 2015 to December 2021, gold reserves have increased
from $48.5 billion to $133 billion. This corresponds to a percentage increase of more than
170%. Over the same period, total reserves increased from $368 billion to $630 billion. This
corresponds to a growth of over 70%. After the beginning of war, a declining trend can be
observed.

Bank of Russia: Amount of Reserves

700
Reserves in Billion US$

600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Reserves Gold

Figure 2: Reserves from the Bank of Russia Source: Bank of Russia 2022g

Another important indicator related to financial sanctions is the exchange rate of the ruble
against the US-dollar. The countries have a free-floating exchange rate regime, so that
import prices and exports depend on the course. Furthermore, it has a symbolic affect,
since a strong currency symbolizes the narrative that Russia manages the economic
pressure of the restrictions well.33

Several implemented sanctions decreased the demand of the Russian ruble and put
downward pressure on the currency. As shown in figure three, the ruble lost within a few
weeks almost 50% of its value. However, this remained a short-term devaluation. The share
price recovered relatively quickly.

33
Milov 2022

6
 Average Weighted Exchange Rate
140

Exchange Rate Ruble/US-Dollar

120

100

80

60

40

20

Figure 1: Exchange Rate of the Ruble against the US-Dollar Source: Bank of Russia 2023

As the exchange rate is closely related to the economic performance of Russia, the
deterioration of the Ruble reflected a positive outcome of the implemented restrictions.
Following the currency depreciation in 2014, Russia’s government revenues collapsed, the
public spending decreased, and inflation set in because of higher import prices. In this case,
the devaluation was led back mainly to the oil price development and less to the impacts of
sanctions.34

On one hand, this illustrates the importance of a stable crude oil price for economic stability.
On the other hand, this also illustrates a dependence on exports. Despite all the sanctions,
Russia has managed to avert a direct economic crisis. The banking system briefly faltered at
the beginning of the restrictions after it came to a bank run, the ruble depreciation, and a
spike in inflation. Russia’s central bank managed to avoid worse and stabilized the ruble
with extensive interventions into the financial system.35

The interest rate has been raised to 20%, 30% fees on foreign currency purchases were
implemented, the trading on the Moscow stock exchange restricted, and Russian exporters
were forced to exchange 80% of their revenues into rubles.36,37,38,39 The interest rate hike
was explained by saying that external conditions changed dramatically for the Russian

34
Dreger et al. 2015, P. 3
35
Kluge 2022
36
Bank of Russia 2022f
37
Bank of Russia 2022e
38
Bank of Russia 2022g
39
Bank of Russia 2022h

7
economy. This step was justified with the currency depreciation and related risks of
inflation.40

The ruble exchange rate was stabilized in the long term by this intervention and the
artificially created demand. In comparison to pre-war times, the rate even appreciated against
the euro and dollar. Due to the interventions of the central bank, the trading volume of the
currency has collapsed. This results in a more volatile exchange rate and a lower informative
value.41 The economist Antje Praefcke titled the trading of the ruble as a purely Russian
onshore event with the intention that it does not represent a real market price.42

4 How Russia finances this war

4.1 The costs of war
The costs of the war can be assessed from several perspectives. From a humanitarian point
of view, the vast amount of dead and injured are the highest costs. News report already more
than 100,000 dead since the beginning of the war.43 From an economic point of view, the
sanctions aim to reduce the targeted country's welfare and, as a result, influence its political
orientation. Among other things, this is achieved with reduced trade, which reduces the
welfare of both states. One of the main indicators for loss in wealth is the GDP. The
upcoming subchapter will provide a closer analysis of this in the case of Russia. The
economist Liadze estimates costs of 1% of global GDP or $1,5 trillion at purchasing power
parity exchange rates (PPP).44 In general autocrats are less concerned about the public
welfare and therefore more likely to operate in a military conflict.45 With view on the
operating costs of the war we do not have any specific numbers from Russia because they
consider these costs as a state secret.46 From the first government deficit in years it can be
derived that the war is costly for Russia.

40
Bank of Russia 2022a
41
Demertzis et al. 2022, P. 10
42
Tagesschau 2022a
43
BBC 2022
44
Liadze et al. 2022, P. 1
45
Kaempfer/Lowenberg 2007, P. 899
46
Reuters 2022a

8
4.2 Russia’s economic situation related to war
Economic publications have become rarer and more incomplete during the war. Partially,
only statistics are published that make the situation look favorable to Russia. This includes
information on the monthly production of oil and gas, FDI, central bank monetary base data
and much more.47 Capital outflows of $70 billion were indicated by the Bank of Russia in
the first quarter of 2022. This value is likely to be underestimated because of the strict capital
controls and the incentive to keep them under the radar of the authorities.48 Before the start
of the war, only information on trade in military goods, aircraft and nuclear materials were
kept secret.49

In terms of financial indicators, it can be said that the situation in Russia is recovering or that
the situation is not as bad as expected at the beginning of the war. The Bank of Russia
forecasts regarding 2022 have consistently improved over the course of the year. Figure four
shows the estimated inflation rates and the year-on-year change in GDP. Figure five
illustrates predictions of imports and exports. These can serve as an indicator of economic
development. These values are the projections from April, July, and October in 2022 for the
same year. They are the average of the range of values issued by the Bank of Russia. Official
statistics of the Kremlin should be viewed with caution, especially considering the ongoing
war.

While very high inflation of 19.05% and negative GDP of -9% were still expected in April,
the medium-term forecast at the end of October improved to 13,8% on Inflation and a
negative GDP of -3,25%.

47
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 6
48
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 57
49
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 6

9
 Estimations of Inflation and GDP
25,00%

year/ Change in GDP to previous year

Average Change in Inflation year on
20,00%

15,00%

10,00%

5,00%

0,00%
Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation GDP GDP GDP GDP
-5,00%
2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024
-10,00%

-15,00%

Apr 22 Jul 22 Okt 22

Figure 2: Inflation and GDP forecasts Sources: Bank of Russia 2022b, Bank of Russia 2022c, Bank of Russia 2022d

The latest projections for inflation in subsequent years are even below the level in 2021. It
should be noted that the inflation differed among different industries. The sectors which
depended on the global supply chains have experienced inflation of 40-60% in April 2022.50
A positive GDP year over year is not expected until 2024. A look at the trade balance shows
the large current account surplus in 2022, resulting from a sharp rise in prices for raw
materials and omitted imports. Russia will more than double its 2021 surplus of $122 billion,
according to the latest forecast. This assumes a surplus of $253 billion.

Russia: Estimated Exports/Imports

700
600
500
In Billion US$

400
300
200
100
0
Exports Exports Exports Exports Imports Imports Imports Imports
2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024

Apr 22 Jul 22 Okt 22

Figure 3: Estimated Exports and Imports Sources: Bank of Russia 2022b, Bank of Russia 2022c, Bank of Russia 2022d

50
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 45

10
Despite the large trade surplus, Russia had a budget deficit in 2022. On one hand, this was
due to the high expenses of the war. The soldier’s wages, the maintenance and production
of military equipment are expensive. On the other hand, Russia had expenses to stabilize the
economic situation. Putin supported companies so they could continue to pay wages. Also,
direct payments to “families, pregnant women, government employees, pensioners, military,
low income”51 were disbursed. The government bought for example shares of Russian
railways, the country’s biggest employer, for $4 billion. Extra revenues flowing into the
national wealth fund were suspended.52 In addition to the accumulated international reserves,
Russia has also precautioned in this way, and significantly increased the volume of the
national wealth fund over the last two years. In the following figure one can see the volume
of the fund since its opening in 2008.

Volume National Wealth Fund

16.000,00
14.000,00
12.000,00
Billion Russian Ruble

10.000,00
8.000,00
6.000,00
4.000,00
2.000,00
-
Jul 09

Jul 12

Jul 15

Jul 18

Jul 21
Okt 08

Apr 10

Okt 11

Apr 13

Okt 14

Apr 16

Okt 17

Apr 19

Okt 20
Jan 08

Jan 11

Jan 14

Jan 17

Jan 20

Figure 6: Volume of Russia’s National Wealth Fund Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russia Federation 2022

5 Policy implications
If the success of the sanctions is measured by the change in political direction, then the
sanctions were not successful. The war continues, even though Russia is no longer advancing
territorially, but rather being pushed back. However, this is also mainly due to the countless
arms deliveries to Ukraine and not necessarily because of the sanctions. The sanctions have
a rather low impact on the war effort. The financial sanctions are not yet effective, as Russia

51
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 60
52
Reuters 2022b

11
has made financial provision over the last years. Trade sanctions are also not decisive since
the country has a self-sufficient defense industry. But a large-scale wave of sanctions usually
does not lead directly to an economic crisis or a collapse under the restrictions.53 They are
supposed to weaken the targeted country by isolating it. Especially not in a country like
Russia, which has a large volume of raw materials, that are in demand worldwide.
Furthermore, Russia has made good provisions through export surpluses and has built up a
lot of reserves. It remains to be seen how the sanctions will play out in the long term and
how oil and gas prices will develop, on which Russia is extremely dependent. In 2014, a low
oil price had harmed Russia. That is why the EU has introduced the oil price cap of 60 dollars
per barrel.54 The impact of the more than 1000 companies that have cut or canceled
production in Russia, will only be felt over a long period of time.55 The decisive factor is
how successful Russia is in building a successful economy isolated from the western world.56
A trade partnership is worth considering for fewer countries, some of which do not have the
technology and production capacity to replace Russian imports.57 The sanctions would be
even more successful if there were cooperation with countries like China or India, which is
not in sight for the time being. It should remain in the back of the mind that Putin should not
be pushed too much into a corner and the danger of a nuclear conflict ignites. The targeted
country is likely to concede if the economic costs do not seem worth the political
objectives.58 Russia wants to prevent with the restricted publication of information that
further sanctions of the Western world attack there and further restrict the scope of action.
The economic situation in Russia must continue to be closely monitored and responded to
with further sanctions.

53
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 57
54
Tagesschau 2022c
55
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 55
56
Milov 2022
57
Sonnenfeld et al. 2022, P. 41
58
Pape 1997, P. 96

12
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https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-orders-new-budget-rules-boost-
russias-growth-2022-06-07/ (14.01.2023).

Reuters (2023): Russia's central bank sold $47 mln worth of Chinese yuan on Jan. 13.
URL: https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/russias-central-bank-sold-47-
mln-worth-chinese-yuan-jan-13-2023-01-17/ (27.02.2023).

Scherrer, Christoph/Wullweber, Joscha (2022): Finanzmarktpolitik in Kriegszeiten: Wie

wirkungsvoll sind die Finanzsanktionen gegen Russland? URL:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4171745.

Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey et al. (2022): Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the
Russian Economy. In: SSRN Electronic Journal.

Tagesschau (2022a): Die seltsame Stärke des Rubel. URL:

https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/finanzen/rubel-russland-sanktionen-101.html
(11.01.2023).

Tagesschau (2022b): EU plant "massive Sanktionen". URL:

https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/russland-eu-sanktionen-ukraine-
103.html.

Tagesschau (2022c): Wie sich der Ölpreis nun entwickeln wird. URL:
https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/oel-embargo-russland-faq-101.html
(27.02.2023).

Zeit (2022): Ungedeckte Schulden: Ist Russland wirklich zahlungsunfähig? URL:

https://www.zeit.de/news/2022-06/27/ungedeckte-schulden-ist-russland-wirklich-
zahlungsunfaehig (28.12.2022).

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