CHAPTER

Structural failures
in cast-in-place reinforced
concrete building structures
under construction
8
Manuel Buitrago, Juan J. Moragues, Pedro A. Calderón, Jose M. Adam
ICITECH, Universitat Politècnica de València, Valencia, Spain

1 INTRODUCTION
Many published studies agree that the construction phase of a structure is one of the
most critical as regards its safety [1–5]. During this phase the loads borne by the
slabs can be even higher than their design loads [6–8]. When combined with the pos-
sible failure of the shores supporting the slabs, this situation can be critical during the
construction phase of building structures [9–11].
There have been many recent cases of reinforced concrete (RC) buildings collapsing
during the construction phase, in most of which a local failure was followed by a chain
of failures that ended up with the loss of the entire structure or a large part of it. Consid-
ering the serious personal and material consequences involved in these cases, one of the
aims of the present study was to understand why building structures can collapse during
the construction phase. Another was to publicize the causes and thus avoid the same
mistakes being committed in the future, as well as to define the minimum requirements
of a building under construction to reduce the risk of potential collapses.
Diverse authors have previously followed the method used here, either by case
studies or studying the causes and proposing remedial measures. In this way it is pos-
sible to prevent or at least reduce the number of this type of accident. However, the
building world is in continual evolution, so it is essential to keep databases up to date
with the most common causes of these failures and the measures required to prevent
them. Given this need, the present paper compiles the most recent cases of structural
collapse during construction, including an analysis of their causes, and proposes a
number of remedial actions besides considering the most serious historical cases. In
short, this chapter offers the readers a review that provides them with all the informa-
tion available to date in a single document. Its principal novelty lies in the fact that
never before has such a specific or detailed study been carried out on collapses of
cast-in-place RC building structures.
This chapter is divided into six sections, starting with the introduction. The sec-
ond section briefly describes the usual construction method of buildings with RC
Handbook of Materials Failure Analysis. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-101928-3.00008-2 153
Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
154 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

structures. The third section reviews the most serious cases of historical collapses,
based on a compilation of publications by a number of authors, followed by an a­ nalysis
of the most recent cases. The fourth section reviews the causes of failure as identified
by different authors, including the most recent accidents. The fifth section proposes a
number of preventive measures designed to achieve safer construction processes, and
the main conclusions drawn from the work are given in the sixth section.

2 A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION

OF RC BUILDING STRUCTURES
The most commonly used technique for cast-in-place RC building structures is the
shoring of successive floors [12], consisting of constructing a new floor in a certain
period of time (construction cycle), in such a way that the newly cast floors are sup-
ported by one or more of the lower floors. According to the geometric and mechani-
cal characteristics of both slabs and shoring, construction live loads, atmospheric
conditions, and construction cycle, 1, 2, 3, or 4 consecutively shored floors are usu-
ally considered, which provides an appropriate load distribution and transmission.
Fig. 8.1 shows a scheme of the different elements of a shoring system: shores (also
known as props), straining pieces (also known as joists), and formwork. Fig. 8.1B
shows an example of the construction of three consecutively shored floors.
After defining the shoring system, the different operations to be carried out dur-
ing construction should be defined, of which there are three fundamental variants
[14]: shoring/striking (SS), shoring/clearing/striking (SCS), and shoring/reshoring/
striking (SRS). In the first case (SS) each floor is shored and struck, while in the oth-
ers (SCS and SRS) an intermediate operation is added. In SCS this involves clearing
or partial striking, in which 50% of the shores and 100% of the formwork are recov-
ered and can then be reused in shoring subsequent floors. In SRS the intermediate

FIGURE 8.1 Shoring operation for RC building structures.

(A) Modified sketch provided by the Alsina Formwork company [13], (B) RC building
structure during construction.
 2 A brief description of the construction of RC building structures 155

operation involves reshoring, in which 100% of both shores and formwork are first
removed and the shores are immediately reinstalled to help support future load incre-
ments in the upper floors. In this process the slabs must be able to support their own
self-weight only a few days after pouring.
The SS and SRS methods are well known all over the world, while SCS is
perhaps less so, although it is widely used in Spain and in many South American
countries. Fig. 8.2 shows a scheme of the different steps of each of the variants

FIGURE 8.2 Construction processes most often used today. (SS) shoring/striking,
(SCS) shoring/clearing/striking, and (SRS) shoring/reshoring/striking.
156 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

FIGURE 8.3 Application of SCS construction process in two buildings [15,16].

defined for the case of two consecutively shored floors, up to the casting of the third
floor. Fig. 8.3 gives an example of two buildings under construction using the SCS
process.

3 COLLAPSES DURING CONSTRUCTION

In recent years, there have been many cases of RC building structures collapsing
while under construction. The most serious cases, either due to the seriousness of the
structural failure or because they were of great interest to the scientific community
and the general population are as follows: “2000 Commonwealth Avenue” (Boston,
MA, USA) in 1971, the “Skyline Plaza” (Fairfax County, VA, USA) in 1973, and
“L’Ambiance Plaza” (Bridgeport, CT, USA) in 1987, which have been widely report-
ed [17–24]. The OSHA (Occupational Safety & Health Administration, USA) also
studied several cases of both precast and cast-in-place RC building structures: five
collapses of parking garages under construction in 2003 (Atlantic City, NJ, USA)
[25], 2007 (Jacksonville, FL, USA) [26], 2012 (Doral, FL, USA) [27], and two in
2013 (Bethesda, MD, USA, and Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA) [28,29], the “Tranquility
at Hobe Sound” building (Hobe Sound, FL, USA) in 2004 [30], and the “Hyatt Place
Hotel” (Omaha, NE, USA) in 2012 [31]. More recent cases have occurred in 2017
in Kanpur-India [32] and Mexico City, Mexico [33]. Apart from the foregoing, there
have been other incidents with less serious consequences [34].
The large number of failures that happened during the construction phase are
proof of the importance that should be given to this phase when designing structures.
In fact, approximately 50% of all building collapses occur during this stage [35]. This
is an alarming fact, since the construction period is a relatively short transitory stage
in a building’s life cycle. According to information provided by the Statistics Bureau
of the United States Department of Labor [36], 21.4% of all the deaths were under
construction and 175 deaths were in buildings under construction in the USA in 2015.
 3 Collapses during construction 157

According to these figures, and in spite of the fact that the United States is one of the
countries with the most advanced building codes in the world, there is an average
figure of approximately one fatality every two days in buildings under construction.
Over the years, reviews of failures in buildings under construction have been
carried out and this has made it possible to investigate their most common causes in
order to prevent the same mistakes being made in the future. These reviews include,
for example, Hadipriono and Wang [2,37], Eldukair and Ayyub [35], and Yates and
Lockley [38]. Although it was possible to reach interesting conclusions on the dif-
ferent causes involved in these cases, none of these reviews is actually up to date, so
that the most recent cases need be analyzed in order to deduce protective measures to
reduce the risk of similar cases in the future.
In this and the subsequent sections the period under study runs from January 2012
to April 2017, which is large enough and recent enough for an up-to-date study of
the causes of collapses of cast-in-place RC building structures during construction.
Sixty-six cases of buildings in all parts of the world that collapsed under construc-
tion were considered in the study period in: the USA, India, Chile, Brazil, Thailand,
Mexico, Argentina, Spain, Dominican Republic, Israel, Peru, Colombia, Bangladesh,
China, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, ­Kenya,
The Philippines, South Africa, Australia, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Details of the cases
are given in the next sections, including the number of collapsed floors and the num-
ber of deaths and cases of injuries involved. The subsequent sections describe the
most common causes and suggest possible measures to be adopted to reduce the risk
of failures.
Fig. 8.4 gives the number of collapsed floors in each case during the study
period; in the 66 cases analyzed, a total of 171 floors collapsed, giving an average

FIGURE 8.4 Number of collapsed floors in each failure over the period under review.
158 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

FIGURE 8.5 Cracks and excessive deflections after striking of a floor in one-way
RC slab.

of 2.6 floors per case, a value higher than 1. It can therefore be seen that when
one floor collapses, it is highly likely that other floors will be progressively in-
volved. As regards the trend of the number of collapsed floors throughout the
years of the study period, although this is quite short, the number of cases cannot
be said to be growing any fewer, nor are the consequences getting less serious.
Therefore, neither can it be said that the risk of collapse has been reduced with
the passage of time. It should also be pointed out here that only catastrophic
cases were included in the study, however, there must be a considerable num-
ber of finished buildings with deficient structures that did not actually collapse.
Such cases, which are not usually reported, evidently involve a risk of future pa-
thologies and seriously compromised service conditions. As an example, Fig. 8.5
shows a building in which excessive cracking and deflections can be appreciated
after the striking of a floor.
Figs. 8.6 and 8.7 give the numbers of dead and injured, respectively, in each of
the incidents in the period studied. There were 405 deaths and 711 cases of injuries
in the total of 66 cases under study, which underlines the high risks run by construc-
tion workers. In fact, 36.3% of those involved in these accidents died. As mentioned
earlier, the number of dead and injured has not been reduced, which shows that the
risks to those involved in the construction industry have not been reduced with the
passage of time.
 3 Collapses during construction 159

FIGURE 8.6 Number of deaths in each failure over the period under review.

FIGURE 8.7 Number of injuries in each failure over the period under review.

The reports compiled by the OSHA [25–31] can be held up as examples of

good practice in analyzing these case studies, which include the information
shown in Table 8.1 [38]. However, even though most of the necessary informa-
tion is obtained in this way, it is not quite enough for a complete and accurate
study [38].
160 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

Table 8.1 Information Provided by OSHA in Case Study Analysis

In Each Report In Several Reports

Building Meetings between parts involved in the

construction before and after failure
Address Photographs and sketches
Date and time of the failure Police reports
Inspection number Investigation reports prepared by
consulting companies or public agencies
Private or public ownership Laboratory reports
Mistakes or violations Newspaper articles
OSHA standards or regulation violated
Possible penalties
Failure description
Measures to prevent any future similar failure

Source: J.K. Yates, E.E. Lockley, Documenting and analyzing construction failures, J. Constr. Eng.
Manage 1 (2002) 8–17. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2002)128:1(8).

4 CAUSES OF FAILURES IN RC BUILDING STRUCTURES

DURING CONSTRUCTION
The study of the causes of the numerous structural collapses during the construc-
tion phase provides valuable information for the purpose of avoiding making the
same mistakes in the future and so reducing the high numbers of deaths and injuries.
Many authors have studied the different causes involved in these accidents in cast-
in-place RC structures. In 1986 Gross [39] produced the first list of the causes of ac-
cidents due to structural failures during the construction and serviceability stage. In
1987, Hadipriono and Wang [2] underlined the importance of the actions of vibration
and impacting when concrete is being poured and gave a list of causes of falsework
collapses during construction. A bit later, in 1996, Peng et al. [40] noted that “the
failures of structures during construction were related to the non-performance of
falsework during the construction process” and classified the different events that
could lead to a collapse. In 2002, Epaarachchi et al. [3] showed that one of the main
reasons for structural collapse was the failure to adequately consider construction
loads, which in many cases can be actually greater than the building’s service loads.
The same authors considered that “If the design process ignores construction loading
on the slab during construction, then a dramatic loss of structural safety can occur.”
In 2004, King and Delatte [19] also underlined the main causes of the collapse of
buildings under construction, which were later confirmed in the review carried out
by Beale [41] in 2014. Finally, in 2016, Soane [42] compiled his list of causes and
classified them as: human factors, regulations, and quality of construction.
This section gives all the causes of structural failure in buildings under construction
taken from a number of studies published since 1986. Table 8.2 contains an exhaustive
list of the causes classified by: (1) triggering causes and (2) cases/errors that increase
the likelihood of failure and can lead to a situation that triggers the collapse.
 4 Causes of failures in RC building structures during construction
Table 8.2 Causes of RC Building Structure Failures During Construction
Triggering Causes
High winds
Heavy rain or strong river current
Heavy load impacts (concrete debris,
equipment, vehicles, etc.)
Materials deficiencies. Substandard
materials
Vibration (equipment, vehicles,
excavation work, etc.)
Formwork failure (component or
connection)
Placement and anchorage length
of the reinforcement
Fire
Insufficient reinforcement (in general
and especially against punching shear)
Insufficient strength of concrete
during striking operation (due to
cold weather, pressure of time,
or weak estimation of loads during
construction)
Construction loads higher than the
critical load of shores
Inadequate design or construction
of permanent structures
Failure of some permanent structure
component
Improper installation or maintenance
of construction equipment
Inadequate reshoring
Inadequate soil foundation. Foundation
failure
Inadequate formwork design
Inadequate formwork foundation
Horizontal instability of shores
Load placement procedure
Inadequate formwork bracing
Heavy concentrated load
Insufficient slab thickness
Improper or premature formwork
removal
Failure of a wall
Insufficient consecutive shored floors
161
Causes/Mistakes That Affect Safety and
Might Start a Triggering Cause of a Failure
Inappropriate design methods
Overlooking critical factors
Misinterpretations of design drawings and
specifications
Poor workmanship in placing, connecting,
and protecting materials and members
Lack of attention to design requirements
(dead and live loads and load combinations)
Pressures of time (fast track methods of
construction)
Inadequate review of formwork design or
construction
Lack of inspection of formwork
Improper or lack of concrete tests prior to
removing formwork
Employment of inexperienced or inadequately
trained workmen
Inadequate communication between parties
involved
Change of formwork design concept during
construction
Weak or nonexisting regulations. Lack of codes
and safety
Recommendations but no enforcement
regulations
Corruption
Shoring drawings or construction sketches not
prepared or followed
Construction without permission
Errors in some reinforcement drawings
Poor visibility in construction at night
Construction of additional floors without
supervision or project
162 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

FIGURE 8.8 Importance of different triggering causes.

After studying the multiple causes that could trigger a collapse, below we give the
causes attributed to the collapse in each of the 66 cases studied in the present work
in the period between January 2012 and April 2017 to show the reasons for the most
recent cases of structural collapse during construction in cast-in-place RC building
structures. Fig. 8.8 gives the causes that triggered the collapse in these cases together
with the percentage of importance of each one. This importance is quantified in di-
rect proportion to the number of times the cause was cited in all the cases studied.
As can be seen in Fig. 8.8, more than 50% of the triggering causes are due to fail-
ures of the shoring system and the deficient design of the permanent RC structures.
In Figs. 8.9 and 8.10 these two leading causes are shown as: (1) shoring failures and
(2) deficient design of permanent RC structures.
From Figs. 8.9 and 8.10 it can be concluded that the triggering causes most likely
to occur are: (1) shore failure due to having to bear higher than the allowed loads

FIGURE 8.9 Specific triggering causes of failure of shoring systems.

 4 Causes of failures in RC building structures during construction 163

FIGURE 8.10 Specific triggering causes of deficient design of RC structures.

(20% of importance) (Fig. 8.11) and (2) failure due to insufficient anchorage length
of rebars or insufficient reinforcement against punching shear (5% of importance).
In the 66 cases of structural collapse studied other causes and errors were also
found to affect safety and could have triggered the failure. Fig. 8.12 gives the per-
centage importance of each of these causes calculated in direct proportion to the
number of times each one appeared in the different accident reports studied.
From Fig. 8.12 it can be concluded that it is vitally important to think about and
prepare the construction process by means of schemes or plans to avoid all types of
errors during this phase. It can also be stated that the inspection of work during con-
struction (including checking concrete strength before striking of slabs) is crucial.

FIGURE 8.11 Collapse of a floor due to shore failure.

164 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

FIGURE 8.12 Causes/mistakes that affect safety and might trigger a failure.

5 MEASURES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF COLLAPSE

In view of the results obtained on the failures and their causes, there is a clear need
to propose measures to minimize the risk of structural collapse during construction
of cast-in-place RC building structures. In 1974 Feld [17] was one of the pioneers
who established measures to reduce these risks, followed later in 1986 by Gross [39]
who extended the list of recommendations in both the construction and serviceability
stages. A year later Hadipriono and Wang [2] added to the list of recommendations.
Heger [22] in a 1991 case study considered it to be absolutely necessary for both the
structure and the construction process to be designed by a professional structural
engineer and that a peer review should take place during the process. A year later
Padgett [34] supported this view and considered it indisputable that the construction
process should be revised by an engineer. In 2004 King and Delatte [19] laid down
a series of measures to minimize the risk of collapse of buildings under construc-
tion. In 2007, for the first time, Friedman [43] spoke of the need to design resilient
buildings and construction processes in order to avoid disproportionate collapse, i.e.
progressive collapse of an entire building due to a local failure in one of its parts.
In 2011 Ojukwu [44] highlighted the contribution of the insurance companies in
defining strategies to improve both human and structural safety in buildings during
construction. More recently, Schellhammer et al. [20] in 2013, Beale [41] in 2014,
Ortega [45] in 2015, and Soane [42] in 2016 recommended and updated a series of
measures to be considered during building work. Finally, in 2016 Kim et al. [46]
proposed applying BIM technology (building information modeling) to identify risks
during construction and facilitate communications between those involved in order
to solve any problems.
 5 Measures to minimize the risk of collapse 165

Table 8.3 Measures to Avoid Collapses of RC Building Structures During

Construction
Measures Measures

Structural integrity: ductility, continuity, and Definition and assignment of responsibility

resilience or redundancy
Peer review (collaborative design)
Adequately trained workmen
Inspection during construction (placement
and anchorage length of reinforcement,
construction process, connections, etc.)
Design by a qualified professional structural
engineer
Monitoring
Proper control of shoring removal and
reshoring/clearing operations
Transfer and knowledge of safety
management methods between countries
Education, research, journals, associations,
and events of forensic engineering
of each part
Unified risk insurance
Proper formwork design
Particular attention to construction stage
including the inspection of construction by
designers
Adequate concrete strength (concrete tests
before striking operations)
Quality control of materials and suppliers
Analysis of individual and large samples of
construction failures
Building codes or requirements in every
country (legislating and enforcing measures)
Preconstruction meetings (communication
and definition of responsibilities)

In parallel with these proposals, in all the cases studied [18–24,34,40,43,47–49]

and the reports drawn up by public bodies [25–31,50,51], after analyzing the causes
of building collapses while under construction, certain measures can be taken to
avoid common mistakes. Table 8.3 provides a summary of all the measures proposed
in the literature designed to reduce the risk of this type of structural collapse.
After analyzing the cases of cast-in-place RC building structures of the present
study, the authors consider it necessary to add a further series of measures to the
aforementioned suggestions:

• Any loads during the construction stage, in addition to the safety coefficients
adopted during this transitory stage, should be expressly specified in the
standards in force in each country, in expectation of an international agreement,
which does not exist at the present time [52–55].
• There is a need for a standardized shoring system so that all the suppliers can
offer similar products and consequently can contribute to improving the safety
of the shoring systems used at the present time.
• It is absolutely necessary to carry out an accurate calculation of the loads
between shores and slabs [6]. There is no sense in carrying on using the
oversimplified calculation methods drawn up in the mid-20th century when
we can use the more precise simplified methods now available [12] and the
application of these new calculation methods should be specified in the design
standards.
166 CHAPTER 8 Structural failures in cast-in-place RC building structures

• In order to reduce the number of accidents due to building site collapses, all
those involved must comply with all the possible safety measures. Both research
groups and business companies should be aware of their obligation to introduce
measures to improve the resilience of the shores in order to obtain structural
redundancy and so avoid disproportionate collapse or, in other words, the
progressive collapse of an entire structure after a local failure. The concepts of
the structural resilience and redundancy of falsework should also be included in
the building standards.
• One of the measures at present being put into operation is based on the use of
load limiters on shores [56], which are equipped with a device that yields at
a specified value and redistributes the load over the neighboring shores. This
avoids the failure of individual shores, and thus, as described in earlier sections,
avoids the possible collapse of the complete shoring system.

6 CONCLUSIONS
This work is based on the analysis of the collapse of cast-in-place RC building struc-
tures during construction and contains a wide-ranging review of the current bibliog-
raphy on this type of incident, including their causes and the preventive measures that
have been proposed by various authors. Some new cases of recent accidents are in-
cluded, with an investigation on their causes and measures proposed to prevent their
being repeated. The authors believe there is a great need for the thorough analysis of
the causes of these accidents in order to reduce the frequency of their occurrence in
the future.
From the results of the study it can be concluded that:
1. In each failure an average of 2.6 floors collapsed, showing the high probability
of a progressive collapse after a local failure.
2. 36.3% of the persons involved in the recent cases were killed, which means a
local failure in any part of the permanent or temporary structure involves a high
risk to building workers.
3. The most frequent causes that trigger collapses are the failure of the shoring
system and the deficient design of the RC structure, or, more specifically:
a. Loads on shores higher than the design loads.
b. Insufficient anchorage length of rebars or insufficient reinforcement against
punching shear.
4. Other frequently found secondary causes or errors:
a. Lack of attention to or absence of shoring plan and construction process.
b. Striking operation on shores without first checking concrete strength.
c. Lack of inspection during construction.
5. Diverse authors have proposed measures to avoid collapses, such as those
described above, the most important being:
a. An international consensus is needed on the actions to be considered as well
as on safety coefficients during construction.
 References 167

b. All shoring systems should be standardized.

c. The loads transmitted between the different slabs and the falsework should
be accurately calculated and building codes should require that the new
accurate calculation methods be applied.
d. Shore resilience should be increased in order to reduce the number of
large-scale accidents and collapses.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sport for funding received under the FPU Program [FPU13/02466], to the Generalitat
Valenciana [GV/2015/063] and also to the Levantina, Ingeniería y Construcción S.L., and
Encofrados J. Alsina S.A. companies for their invaluable cooperation.

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