INTRODUCTION

In the recent past a number of buildings collapsed in the world under apparent normal

circumstances. The causes of these failures are predominantly human error within the design or

construction of the building.

Examples of this are the collapse of five balconies of an apartment building in Maastricht in

2003, and the partial collapse of a roof structure under construction of a football stadium in

Enschede in 2012. Based on these developments it is of importance to investigate the current

building practice concerning the occurrence of human error. The objective of this research is to

investigate the effect of human error within the design process on the reliability of building

structures.

Concerning the occurrence of structural failure, it can be concluded that the majority of

the failures are caused by human error (Fruhwald et al., 2007). In most researches a value of

eighty to ninety percent is mentioned (Ellingwood, 1987; Stewart, 1993; Vrouwenvelder, 2011).

Based on the researches of Fruhwald et al. (2007), Boot (2010) and ABC-meldpunt (2011) it can

be concluded that the occurrence or errors are of the same order of magnitude for design and

construction, with slightly higher frequencies for the design phase.

Designing and building an engineered structure in the Netherlands is bound to strict

building regulations. Building codes, codes of practise, education, risk control measurements,

etc., are all aimed towards minimizing the risks of structural failure. Despite these efforts,

structural collapses within the Netherlands have illustrated the inadequacy of the current building

practise. This will be demonstrated with two recent examples.

Balconies Maastricht

On the 23th of april 2003 five balconies of an apartment building collapsed

due to sudden column loss, resulting in two deadly casualties. The triggering cause of the

accident was insufficient strength in a concrete ridge, which was meant to transfer the column

forces to the building foundation. The underlying cause was a design error of the structural

engineer. Another important contributing cause of the collapse was the design of the balcony

which lacked robustness 1 as no ‘second carriage way‘ existed. (CUR, 2010).

Football stadium Enschede

On the 7th of July 2011 during construction activities for expansion of the football stadium in

Enschede, the stadium roof partly collapsed. The accident resulted in two deathly casualties and

nine wounded. The accident was (among others) a consequence of the lack of sufficient stability

element in the truss system (for the loading conditions at that moment). The accident was mainly

caused by a series of malfunctions in the building process concerning the safeguard of structural

safety (OVV, 2012). Both examples show the cause and consequence of errors in design and

construction of building structures. An interesting aspect is the presence of human error within

both examples, which is far from a coincidence. Researchers such as Ellingwood (1987),

Kaminetzky (1991), Stewart (1993), Fruhwald, Serrano, Toratti, Emilsson & Thelandersson

(2007) and Vrouwenvelder (2011) have all concluded that most of the structural failures are

caused by human errors.

STRUCTURAL FAILURE WORLDWIDE

A number of surveys on structural failures have been reported during the years. The purpose of

these studies is to quantify sources of failure and to indicate their relative importance in the

building process. A general conclusion from such studies is that failure without exception occur

due to human error (see Fruhwald et al., 2007). Fruhwald et al. (2007) cites several other

researches concerning the causes of failure. Fruhwald refers Walker (1981) on this topic:
“inappropriate appreciation of loading conditions and of real behaviour of the structure was

found to be the prime cause in almost one third of the failure cases investigated.“ From a

research of Matousek & Schneider (1976), an investigation of 800 cases of failure from different

sources, Fruhwald concludes: “[...] a majority of mistakes is related to conceptual errors and

structural analysis. Incorrect assumptions or insufficient consideration of loads and actions was

found to be a common type of error.“ The causes of failure and the phase in which the failure is

made are discussed in further detail in the following sections. The research of Fruhwald et al.

(2007) is specifically aimed at timber structures, containing 127 failure cases. The most common

cause of failure found in the investigated cases is poor design or lack of strength design (41%), in

total half of the failures were due to design errors. About 27% was caused during construction.

Wood quality, production -methods and -principles only caused 11% of the failures. The

outcomes of this research on the causes of failure are presented in table 1, together with similar

information on steel and concrete structures received from literature. From this it can be

concluded that design errors are also a common cause of failure within steel- and concrete-

structures.

PRINCIPLE OF LIMIT STATE DESIGN

Aim of a design is to see that the structure built is safe and it serves the purpose for which it is

built. A structure may become unfit for use not only when it collapses but also when it violates

the serviceability requirements of deflections, vibrations, cracks due to fatigue, corrosion and

fire. In this method of design various limiting conditions are fixed to consider a structure as fit.

At any stage of its designed life (120 years for permanent structures), the structure should not

exceed these limiting conditions. The design is based on probable load and probable strength of

materials. These are to be selected on probabilistic approach. The safety factor for each limiting
condition may vary depending upon the risk involved.

It is not necessary to design every structure to withstand exceptional events like blast and

earthquake. In limit state design risk based evaluation criteria is included. Thus the philosophy of

limit state design method is to see that the structure remains fit for use throughout its designed

life by remaining within the acceptable limit of safety and serviceability requirements based on

the risks involved.

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

Steel structure designed and constructed should satisfy the requirements regarding stability,

strength, serviceability, brittle fracture, fatigue, fire and durability. The structures should meet

the following requirements (IS 800-2007, clause 5.1.2):

(A) Remain fit with adequate reliability and be able to sustain all loads and other influences

experienced during construction and use.

(B) Have adequate durability under normal maintenance.

(C) Do not suffer overall damage or collapse disproportionately under accidental events like

explosions, vehicle impact or due to consequences of human error to an extent beyond local

damage.

The catastrophic damage shall be limited or avoided by appropriate choice of one or more of

the following:

(a) Avoiding, eliminating or reducing exposure to hazards, which the structure is likely to

sustain.

(b) Choosing structural forms, layouts and details and designing such that:

(i) the structure has low sensitivity to hazardous conditions and

(iv) Fracture due to fatigue.

(v) Brittle fracture.

( b) Limit state of serviceability:

The limit state of serviceability include:

(i) Deformations and deflections adversely affecting the appearance or effective use of structure

or causing improper functioning of equipment or services or causing damage to finishings.

(ii) Vibrations in structures or any part of its component limiting its functional effectiveness.

(iii) Repairable damage or crack due to fatigue.

(iv) Corrosion.

(v) Fire.

STABILITY CHECKS

After designing a structure for strength and stability, it should be checked for instability due to

overturning, uplift or sliding under factored loads. In checking for instability disturbing forces

should be taken as design loads and stabilizing forces may be taken as design loads (factored

loads) with lesser factor of safety (0.9).

A structure should be adequately stiff against sway and fatigue also. In the chapters to follow

now onwards, design principles are made clear from the point of limit states of strength and

deflections. In most of the buildings these are the predominant limit states, but in all important

and special buildings, a designer has to ensure that other limit states are not exceeded.

REFERENCES

The design of a Human Reliability Assessment method for Structural Engineering Johan de Haan

(2016)
Billington, David P. (1985). The Tower and the Bridge Structural Engineering, Princeton

University Press, Princeton, NJ.