COMSOC 03 Voting 3

Condorcet Winners:
Let us concentrate on some nice property.
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

22
Condorcet Winners:
Condorcet winner
A candidate who wins against all other candidates in pairwise
comparisons is called Condorcet winner.
Marie Jean Antoine

Nicolas Caritat,
Marquis de Condorcet
1743-1794

22
Condorcet Winners:
Condorcet winner
A Condorcet winner does not always exist, but is unique if it exists!
2
a
a > b > c
2
b > c > a Marie Jean Antoine
b c
c > a > b 2
Nicolas Caritat,
1743-1794

22
Condorcet Winners:
Condorcet winner
Condorcet consistency
A voting system that always selects (uniquely) the Condorcet
winner as winner (when it exists) is called Condorcet consistent. Marie Jean Antoine
Nicolas Caritat,
1743-1794

22
Condorcet Winners:
Condorcet winner
Nicolas Caritat,
Fact: No scoring-based voting system is Condorcet consistent! Marquis de Condorcet
Part of the exercise sheet! 1743-1794

22
Condorcet Winners:
Condorcet winner
Nicolas Caritat,
Fact: No scoring-based voting system is Condorcet consistent! Marquis de Condorcet
1743-1794
Question: Why is Borda not Condorcet consistent?
22
On Condorcet Winner Determination
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E

23
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
Pairs of candidates # votes: x � y # votes: y � x

(x, y ) = (S, E) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (S, H) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (E, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (W, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (W, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (A, H) 2 2

23
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
Pairs of candidates # votes: x � y # votes: y � x

(x, y ) = (S, E) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (S, H) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (E, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (W, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (W, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (A, H) 2 2
No Condorcet winner!
23
Condorcet Consistent Voting Protocols
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
Protocols that are Condorcet consistent:
Dodgson: Perform minimum number of swaps of neighboring candidates to make a
candidate a Condorcet winner...
S E W A H
2 3 3 7 5
Candidate S is the Dodgson winner.

24
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
Young: Delete a minimum number of votes to make a candidate a Condorcet
winner... S E W A H
1 1 3 3
Candidate S and E are the Young winners .

24
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
winner...
Kemeny: Determine “consensus” ranking that minimizes the “total sum of the
number of inversions” to the given rankings...

24
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E
winner...
Kemeny: Determine “consensus” ranking that minimizes the “total sum of the
number of inversions” to the given rankings...
For all three voting protocols, winner determination is NP-hard!
24
Winner Determination in Kemeny Voting
SS � EE � WW � A
A � HH
HH � EE � WW � A
A S
� S
WW � EE � SS � H
H � AA
SS � AA � HH � W
W � EE
S > A > H > W > E
Determine consensus ranking that minimizes the total sum
of the number of inversions to the given rankings...
John George Kemeny,

1926-1992.
25
Winner Determination in Kemeny Voting
SS � EE � WW � A
A � HH
HH � EE � WW � A
A � SS
WW � EE � SS � H
H � AA
SS � AA � HH � W
W � EE
Determine consensus ranking that minimizes the total sum

of the number of inversions to the given rankings...
� Two (out of 18) optimal consensus ranking with
“score” 16:
S�E�W�H�A
John George Kemeny,
E�W�S�A�H 1926-1992.
25
Kemeny Voting: KT-Distance
Kendall Tau distance (between two votes v and w )
�
KT-dist(v , w ) = dv ,w (c, d),
{c,d}⊆C
�
0 if v and w rank c and d in the same order,
where dv ,w (c, d) =
1 otherwise.

26
�
{c,d}⊆C
�
1 otherwise.
Example:
v: a � b � c
w: b � c � a

26
�
{c,d}⊆C
�
1 otherwise.
Example:
v: a � b � c Homework: Can you do it in O(m log m)?
w: b � c � a
KT-dist(v , w ) = dv ,w (a, b) + dv ,w (a, c) + dv ,w (b, c)
= 1 + 1 + 0
= 2
26
Kemeny Voting: Computing the Score
Computing the Kemeny winners
Kemeny Score Computing the Kemeny ranking

Input: An election (C , V ) and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a ranking r with Kemeny score at most k, that is, the sum of
KT-distances of r to all input rankings is at most k?

27
Kemeny Voting: Computing the Score
Kemeny Score
Input: An election (C , V ) and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a ranking r with Kemeny score at most k, that is, the sum of
KT-distances of r to all input rankings is at most k?
Applications:
Ranking of web sites (meta search engine)
Sport competitions
Databases
Bioinformatics
Homework: How would you compute a Kemeny ranking?
Can you find any exact algorithm or heuristik?
27
Kemeny Voting: Characterization
Characterization
Kemeny Voting is the only system that satisfies
[Young and Levenglick, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1978.]

28
Characterization
Neutrality: The candidate names do not influence the Kemeny ranking, that is,
given a Kemeny ranking r for an election ({v1 , v2 , . . . , vn }, C ), for every
permutation π : C → C , π(r ) is a Kemeny ranking for
({π(v1 ), π(v2 ), . . . , π(vn )}, C ).

28
Characterization
({π(v1 ), π(v2 ), . . . , π(vn )}, C ).
Consistency: Let (V1 , C ) and (V2 , C ) be two elections with disjoint vote sets, that
is, V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. If r is a Kemeny ranking for (V1 , C ) and for (V2 , C ),
then r is also a Kemeny ranking for (V1 ∪ V2 , C ).

28
Characterization
({π(v1 ), π(v2 ), . . . , π(vn )}, C ).
Consistency: Let (V1 , C ) and (V2 , C ) be two elections with disjoint vote sets, that
is, V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. If r is a Kemeny ranking for (V1 , C ) and for (V2 , C ),
then r is also a Kemeny ranking for (V1 ∪ V2 , C ).
Condorcet property: If there is a Condorcet winner, then this candidate is also ranked
first in every Kemeny ranking.
28

COMSOC 03 Voting 3

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Condorcet Winners:

Let us concentrate on some nice property.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Marie Jean Antoine

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Part of the exercise sheet! 1743-1794

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Pairs of candidates # votes: x � y # votes: y � x

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Pairs of candidates # votes: x � y # votes: y � x

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

John George Kemeny,

Determine consensus ranking that minimizes the total sum

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Kemeny Score Computing the Kemeny ranking

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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