Pakistan China Relations Combating Terro

PROCEEDINGS OF
One-Day International Seminar
on
PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS IN CHANGING

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SCENARIO
September 29, 2005

C O N T E N T S
I N A U G U R A L S E S S I O N
• Welcome Address................................................................................... 1
Professor Dr Lutfullah Mangi
Director,
Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro
• Address................................................................................................... 3
Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh
Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
• Presidential Address .............................................................................. 6

Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqi
Vice Chancellor and Chairman,
Board of Governors,
• Keynote Address .................................................................................... 9

Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro
Minister for Education,
Government of Sindh, Karachi
SESSION – I
PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS (SECURITY DIMENSION)
The Security Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations................................ 14

Ambassador (R) Dr Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty
Pakistan-China Relations: Combating Terrorism .......................................... 22

Naureen Memon
U.S-India Strategic Cooperation: Implications for China and Pakistan ....... 30

Professor Dr Guihong Zhang
Civilian Technology Transfer between China and Pakistan......................... 55
Professor Dr Dolla Varaprasad Sekhar
Remarks by the Chairman.............................................................................. 70

Professor Dr Zhang Li
SESSION-II
PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS (SECURITY, POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS)
Economic Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations .................................... 71

Ambassador (R) Khalid Mehmood
Sino-Pakistan Relations: Potentials, New Issues and the Emerging

Trend .............................................................................................................. 84
Pakistan – China Relations in Changing Regional Scenario......................... 96

Ghulam Murtaza Khoso
China – Pakistan Relationship is Coming to an End? ................................. 103

Professor Dr Shang Quanyu
Political Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations ..................................... 119

Ambassador (R) Javed Hussain
Remarks by the Chairman............................................................................ 135

Recommendations
Dr Abdul Latif Tunio ...................................................................................... 136
Vote of Thanks
Professor Dr Deedar Hussain Shah............................................................. 139
Conference
Rational / Schedule ...............................................................................i
Inaugural Session
Director, Area Study Centre,
Far East & South East Asia,
Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education

Honourable Mazharul Haq Siddiqui, Vice Chancellor,
University of Sindh
Distinguished Speakers and Participants
Honourable Members of the print and Electronic Media
Ladies and Gentlemen
Assalam–o–Alikum
It is indeed an honour for me to welcome you all this morning a behalf of

the Honourable Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh, the faculty of Area
Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, and on my own behalf. We are
particularly grateful to Honourable Madam Hamida Khuhro, the Chief
Guest and our distinguished Speakers of this one–day International
Seminar, who have given their valuable time to come here to contribute to
the debate on “Pakistan – China Relations in Changing Regional and Global
Scenario”.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
China has been a traditional friend of Pakistan and almost all the successive
governments since the early 1960s have put in attempts to strengthen these
relations further. Our friendship with China has been the cornerstone of
our foreign policy. Pakistan has cultural, social, economic and trade
relation with China. The friendship between both countries encompasses
defence, energy production, industrial infrastructure, space technology,
tourism, medicine and engineering. Both countries are actively engaged
exploring new avenues of bilateral cooperation particularly to boost trade
and business relations. Gwadar is an excellent example in economic
interaction between both the countries. China is prepared to join, Pakistan,
India and Iran in laying the cross border gas pipeline. China has offered
three countries to help implement the gas pipeline project on reasonable
conditions. China has also offered setting up gas stations along the
pipeline. The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Pakistan –
China, in 2001, was utilized to launch a major effort to buildup trade and
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (2)
economic cooperation between the two countries. The friendship between

Pakistan and China would further deepen with the expansion of economic
ties between the two countries.
Pakistan and China have been working together to ensure peace in the
region. Both have been working to alleviate poverty and fight terrorism
together. Beijing has been playing a positive and constructive role in
Pakistan – India Relations. China supported self–determination in Kashmir
as under the UN resolution. Today, China is urging both India and Pakistan
to resolve the Kashmir dispute through mutual dialogue and bilateral
means.
During his visit to Pakistan in April 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao assured Pakistan “Clear and unambiguous, categorical assurance to
defend Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”. In
return, Pakistan supports “China’s great cause of national reunification and
all the efforts of the Chinese government in safeguarding national
sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Pakistan support China on the issue
of Taiwan. Pakistan was the first country to support the Anti-Secession Law,
passed by China’s National People’s Congress in March this year. The
Pakistan – China friendship is a source of strength for both the countries
and contributes to stability within the region.
Despite these excellent relations, and assurances by Beijing that any

improvement of relations with India would not be at the cost of Pakistan,
how the changes at the regional and global levels affect “time–tested”,
“time–honoured”, and “all–weather” friendship between Pakistan and
China? And, is the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad grow from
“strength–to–strength” in changing circumstances or undergoing
significant changes? This forum, therefore, would permit us to discuss
these issues and share our thoughts and views.
I once again welcome our distinguished guests from home and abroad and
the participants of the seminar.
I thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh

Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences
Honorable Dr. Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education, Govt. of Sindh,

Honorable Vice Chancellor, Mr. Mazhar-ul-Haq Siddiqui,
Honorable guests from China, India and Islamabad,
Respected colleagues and Dear students,
Assalam-o-Alaikum
Today, as we all know, we live in a global village, a world that is

experiencing fast emerging changes in strategic, political and economic
alliances. These changes will have far reaching short and long-term
consequences for the countries of the world. This necessitates the need for
the political leaders of any given country to exercise greater wisdom in
choosing allies and friends in all spheres of economic and political arenas.
China, as has been repeatedly pointed out by political pundits, is one of

those nations that will emerge as a future economic and political giant that
will exercise great influence on the world stage.
Pakistan has been fortunate in the sense that it has a history of good
neighborly relations with China going back to the 1960s.
Though Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize China in

January 1950, it was only in the following decade that meaningful
relationships were established. These relationships have stood the test of
time and changes of respective governments and world politics have not
affected them. If anything they have become stronger, deeper and ever
expanding. Pakistan has always sought diversification in its foreign policy
and as such it has always sought a geo-political connection with China. The
two countries have enjoyed positive strategic relations China supported
Pakistan in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. It supported the
Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets and sent military and economic aid
to them via Pakistan. China has provided Pakistan with important support
in the areas of missiles and nuclear technology.
Pakistan and China are both situated in regions that give birth to ancient
civilizations. Today these areas alongwith the entire Central Asian region
have acquired even greatest significance with their vast mineral resources
and potentially huge economic markets. Both the countries have jointly
cooperated in the building of major projects in Pakistan, like power plants,
cement factories, ports and highways. Technical support has also been
extended by China in the exploration of mineral resources in Pakistan and
both the countries have opened their markets for the mutual import and
export of their products.
China’s has been a remarkable journey from a backward and a poor nation
suffering the ravages of war, revolution and colonialism to a strong, unified
and progressive nation – all in the span of 56 years. Pakistan has also had
its share of tribulations and upheavals and is presently in the process of
struggling to become a modern an economically viable nation. Pakistan as a
Muslim nation is favorably disposed towards China in the light of the
popular Hadith where the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) advised his
followers “to seek knowledge even if they had to go to China.”
As a manifesto for future mutually beneficial cooperation, we need to take

into consideration certain factors. Since 2001 China has recognized the
growing military and economic importance of India. China’s overtures to
improve its relationship with India have been defended on the bases of
seeking and enhancing stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s response to this
Sino-Indian thaw and increasing cooperation ought to be an expansion of
its own relationship with China beyond the military arena and further into
areas of cooperation on economic and development projects. This is made
easier by the fact that China’s economic system is in transition from a
central planning type of economy to a market economy. China’s close
physical proximity ought to entice Pakistan’s savvy business community to
invest in the Chinese economy. To date, the typical business activities
seems to be driven by small or medium – sized investors importing Chinese
goods for sale in Pakistan. A more ambitious vision of economic
cooperation and investment is needed. Therefore, a proper effort should be
launched to create a major industrial joint ventures with an aim to establish
long lasting and mutually beneficial economic relations.
Military and economic cooperation can greatly benefit from a contribution

from the academia. All major Public Sector universities should introduce
and/or enhance Chinese studies programs in their curriculum. A serious
and sustained study of Chinese history and politics should not be confined
to our think tanks and the foreign office, but should be made a part of
international relations, history and political science departments in all the
major learning institutes. The study of the Chinese language, culture, and
philosophy should also be greatly encouraged.
The growth of China’s economy has been phenomenal. In the 1980’s China
became the third largest nuclear power. China has a huge population base;
It is expanding its access to the world’s energy resources. The Chinese’s
purchase of the U.S. treasury securities places it in an important position of
impacting not only the U.S. economy but also the world economy. All these
factors point to one conclusion – that Pakistan must try to expand its
relations with China in all fields. It must expand its military and economic
relations, its cultural and diplomatic relations, and also look for capital
investment opportunities in the Chinese market. A good part of this should
be industrial cooperation, joint ventures and the like. Threats to regional
political stability must be countered with appropriate joint measures
directed not only towards symptom alleviation but also towards the root
cause of such instability. As these connections and cooperative efforts are
expanded, developed and fostered, the entire bilateral relationship shall
prosper and strengthen. It is the ultimate strength of this relationship that
will protect, enhance and secure Pakistan’s position in the overall regional
and global strategic environment. Such bilateral relationships and their
continuing sustainability and growth would usher in an era of peace and
prosperity for both China and Pakistan.
I thank you all very much.

Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui

Vice Chancellor,
Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education,

Government of Sindh,
Distinguished Speakers, Guests and Participants
Assalam–o–Aalikum
I feel great pride in according a warm welcome to our Chief Guest,

distinguished speakers and participants of this one–day international
seminar on “Pakistan–China Relations in Changing Regional and Global
Scenario”, hosted by the University of Sindh. I would like to commend the
initiatives of the faculty of Fareast and Southeast Asia Study Centre. Their
efforts in organizing today’s seminar are greatly appreciated.
One of the remarkable signs of the 21st Century is that Asia is reinventing
itself. The post–Cold War era has made a qualitative change by
transforming the gravity of world economic activities towards Asia. The
new division of economic centres is underway. It is creating new
distribution of power at regional and global levels. New alliances are in the
making. Some political analysts foresee strategic storm surfacing in Asia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has created a power Vacuum in Euro–Asia.
A new great game is on. In order to fill that vacuum several regional
countries have embarked on the task of manipulating the existing situation.
A few weeks ago, China and Russia jointly called for the withdrawal of U.S.
military bases in Central Asia. Pakistan and China are also conscious about
the need to provide Asia a new roadmap for meeting the challenges of
strategic empowerment.
The political changes are so abrupt that a vision of tomorrow is needed to

comprehend the full implications of new dynamics of change. One of the
major challenges of our time is how to manage regional differences. This

should be the crux of debate in today’s seminar.
Conflict is always the product of interests not religions or civilizations. We

need to restructure our national interests in accordance with the
imperatives of geo–economic order. The resolution of conflict must be
acquired through a just solution in the sprit of win–win situation.
China is a continental power. Her foreign policy goal of good neighbourly

relationship and development is reflection of Chinese wisdom. China has
come out with a clear policy of economic prosperity and friendship with
neighbours. It is a self-assured power. China has excelled in development
strategy and has achieved a remarkable reduction of poverty at home. It has
turned its population into national asset and developed harmonous
relations with all neighbours. The progress made by China is an example
for the world as it is based on dedication, hard work and discipline of the
Chinese people. It has not projected its power capability. China has never
exhibited “winner take all approach” in foreign affairs. Historically, China
was never a predatory state. The Great Wall signified a defensive mindset of
peaceful culture of China. The return of Hong Kong and Macao was
achieved in a peaceful manner not by use of force. On the question of
return of Taiwan to mainland, China is showing much patient on this issue.
China has achieved its targets without firing a shot. Whereas a hyper power
has failed even after waging a war, so China shows the way.
China wants the strategic stability in South Asia. It could play a significant
role in the peace process in South Asia. Asia is changing, the geo–politics of
South Asia is melting and we cannot afford bitter legacies of the past.
China and Pakistan are good friends, good neighbours and good partners.
Both countries enjoy close cooperation and hold identical views on most of
the world issues. Both also share same aspirations for peace, stability and
development. Many changes have taken place but fundamentals of Pakistan
– China relations remain same. It is a people–to–people contact which is
the real strength behind Pakistan–China friendship. The graph of

friendship and cooperation between both the countries has gone steadily
upwards. The dynamics of Pakistan – China relations are now changing
from that of an emotional and usual friendship in defence and political
fields to that of an economic and commercial one. The bilateral
cooperation of commercial trade between Pakistan and China has
expanded covering industry, energy, water and power, nuclear power,
roads, bridges, harbour and other infrastructure construction. Both
countries can further improve cooperation in joint ventures, high–tech
industry, telecom and manufacturing.
The process of normalization with India has not diminished Pakistan’s

value in China’s strategic calculation. China understands the security
concerns of Pakistan and reacted positively to non–NATO ally status to
Pakistan. The most satisfying aspect of Pakistan’s defence ties with China is
its reliability not subject to transient expediency.
How these friendly relations can be more strengthened? What is the

strategic role of Pakistan in providing the energy access to China and India?
How can these countries trickle down the benefits of their development to
all segments of society? These are open questions for the luminaries of
today’s seminar.
I am confident that the participation of the distinguished speakers and

participants will have a very successful and fruitful seminar. From this
forum we must drive home that despite changing regional and global
scenario Pakistan–China friendship will further grow and strengthen.
Finally, I would like to reiterate with the organizers my sincerest

appreciation and gratitude to Madam Dr Hamida Khuhro for honouring us
with her presence. I also would like to thank the speakers and participants
for accepting our invitation.
Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro

Minister for Education,
Government of Sindh
Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui

The Vice-Chancellor, University of Sindh,
Distinguished Delegates to the Conference,
Organizers and Participants,
Assalam-o-Aalikum
I am very grateful actually to the organizers and the Vice-Chancellor who

are thinking of me as a sort of guest for this very high powered and learned
seminar as an old faculty member of this University. It also doubled the
honor that University continues to think of me.
My specialty is not foreign relations or China relations or International

Affairs, but I am very honored still to be here to talk about the relationship
between Pakistan and one of its most valued and oldest allies. There is no
doubt as we have heard from the previous speakers that China’s friendship
is valued by Pakistan. It has been friendship from which Pakistan has
benefited greatly not only in terms of support at world forums, not only as
sort of supplier of arms or whatever but also from people of China as
example of nations, which can work so hard, which has contributed to our
highways across the Hamalia, which is contributing to our development
and even this port of Gwadar has been set. Generally, in Sindh and
wherever there has been hard work, where there has been work which
needs to be done, we have had support from China and that indeed is great
benefit. In fact a few years ago, I went to Hong Kong some surrounding
areas of China, it was obvious from the way the people worked with
dedication they had to their work, that the country which would dominate
in future would be China on the basis of shared dedication to work. It was
quite obvious this would be dominant power not because of material
sources but because of its human resources which are so well focused on
development.
For Pakistan the great window of opportunity, as far as China is concerned,

was in 1962. There was Indo-China war in the peak of Hindi China Bhai
Bhai era, in which there was great deal of friendship and then this border
incident occurred. This change in Pakistan which at that time was little bit
and was not able in first instance to make up its mind that which way to go
and then decided this is the time when we could settle at least this issue,
and this was particularly perhaps because of China’s efforts and then the
border settlement with China took place and from then on it was situation
from which Pakistan has benefited greatly in terms of International
Relations and in terms of its own development that was of course, in the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s and so on.
Now at the end of Cold War and also after the 9/11 incident, the situation of
the world has changed. After the end of the Cold War, it became very
obvious that the Western Powers were looking for some new directions in
which to go and the new direction would need an adversely antagonist and
that antagonist would be provided by the Muslim world. You have heard of
the clash of the civilization, an extremely nonsense theory, which suddenly
created a bogging of the Islamic World that was supposed to be confronting
the Western World. Now that is the situation in which the Muslim world
which is in state of decline and poverty and unable to use its wealth, unable
to focus even on using its human resources, was the world which was
suddenly made focus of antagonism from the West. This was the world
which was supposed to be aiming at destroying the West and that has been
the unwritten scripts of the world relations since then.
We find ourselves in Pakistan as one of the few countries in which there is

a chance that our educated people that is sort of elite or lets say cadre of
people who are old hands, who are experienced in International Relations
and who have traditionally looked to the West for inspiration and for
guidance and for the way of conduct.
You know since Pakistan came into being we have been faithful ally of
America. We have been looking to the West for direction in which to go and
so on. But we find that suddenly in the beginning of the 21st Century we are
enemy as Muslims and at the same time looking to the West for friendship,
support and for solutions to all our problems. If you are reading the
newspapers and if you have any idea that what Pakistan is doing, this is
still dilemma. How much can we expect from the West? How much can we
expect from US? We say we have been betrayed but we are faithful ally, we
do what they want us to do. However, at the same time we are the enemy
also and we have a very delicate position in our own region. We have China
with which no doubt the friendship was on its great height but it is in very
implicit able state of decline, so where are we now? I suggest taking all this
in mind and being realistic it is of no use to say that we are greatest friend
and we will always remain that, we won’t.
You know that foreign policies are made from national interests and these
national interests are always changing. Its of no use saying America is
going to abandon us, its of course going to abandon us, when its national
interest so desired. Europe got black immigrants as enigma. Europeans
even does not want Turkey to be a part of European Union. We need to take
a very realistic look at the world situation and see where we fit in now and
where our future is and in this situation, in this picture, I think China plays
a very important part. We cannot forget that at present if there is any big
economic power say Japan but well under control as a friend. So on it is
only China with its incredible economic progress, with its commercial
power with its goods, the way its economy is progressing that is creating
headache for the West and for US who are busy in trying to control the
import and trying to see that this does not affect them too much. China is a
factor in the World affairs which cannot be ignored, which is going to
increase its dominance and which luckily with us has a very good record of
friendship, but that is not enough because China after all is on the Pacific
Ocean and we are on the Indian Ocean, there are connections like we
expect support, we need support we get support but we need to look at this
in wider and more global manner so where are we now? We are in the
Indian Subcontinent.
Unfortunately, in the post-9/11 scenario, we have the war on terror. We

have realized that we have to adjust ourselves to the reality in our own
region. I am really happy and I fully support the peace process with India. I
think without that there is no other option to Pakistan. We have to look
after ourselves not as an appendage to America, not looking for support,

help or aid from the World Bank, IMF etc. UN is not going to get us out of
any trouble. It has to be our strength in our region, that will take us
anywhere, that will give us real support, that will make us a power, even
beyond our actual potential so this is as I see, the future of Pakistan, the
one resolving differences with India, creation of real friendship for
economic partnership, economic partnership that could bring prosperity
to Pakistan, because we have tried everything. You know the Western
investment is not really coming to us. We need to look at the region, we
need to promote trade, we need to uplift our people from poverty, they are
suffering at present and still it is perhaps the worst. Why, because we have
not invested in our human resources and we are as sub-continentals
unfortunately not hardworking like Chinese. May be we have ideas, may be
we have other strengths, hardworking is not one of those. So we need to
take a realistic approach, how we are going to face it? We have to make
relationship with India, use these relations, and get a good prosperous
respectable South Asia in the world. And this South Asia must be fully co-
operative with China.
We have to make a huge Asian Block which should be from China to

Bangladesh to Burma to India to Pakistan to Iran, and it has to be counter to
Europe. Europe makes no bones about the fact that they are European or
they are Christian civilization they are not embarrassed by the fact they say
they do not want Turkey here why should we have Turkey here in Europe,
it is Muslim, it is alien civilization so why should we be embarrassed by
saying that this has to be Asian partnership and Asian Block and Asian
Power that power will then give us our place in the world. We will earn
respectability as an equal member of this block, as a country which can go
forward in co-operation with neighbors. We can learn from each other, we
are able to educate ourselves.
The day before yesterday, the Chancellor of UK made a speech in which he

said, there are all these South Asians in the universities, these graduates are
turning out, they are threatening us. Right, the graduate of this university
that are sitting here, that are educated here you have to be good enough,
take an excellent education. You can take the West at its home, you should
take over their scientific laboratories, their hospitals, their universities.
They do not let Asian and blacks come there but we can take over the
economy and strength of those countries only if we can get ourselves some
viable block here. Where we can co-operate with each other, use our
strength and give ourselves real advantage that we have geographically,
that we have civilizationally, because we are civilizationally together with
India, with South Asia and with China. Muslims are exhorted to go to China
to educate themselves ok, we are co-operating with China, we have to make
the future focused on foreign policy of our international policy and every
one of you, every student must think not in fantasy terms what might be
but where we are, what we are and how we can improve ourselves. That
has to be the way the things are and I look forward and I hope that
Pakistan foreign office is also being realistic, that his advices being realistic,
the advice its getting from think tanks and from the house of intellects of
universities, like this University and other universities of that kind and we
look forward them to a really co-cooperative block not only Pakistan-
China-Indian, but Pakistan-India-China, Pakistan-India-Bangladesh, China,
Sri Lanka and so on, not only SAARC but wider bigger extended SAARC that
is our future which we cannot avoid.
Thank you very much.

Session – I
Pakistan-China Relations
(Security Dimension)
THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF
PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS
Ambassador (R)
Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty
INTRODUCTION
The world has been in a state of flux since the end of the Cold War. The
trend for the sole superpower to exercise hegemony was accentuated with
the accession of President George W. Bush to power from 2001. Thu US
unilateralism got an added push from the terrorist attack of 11 September
2001, which was used as a justification for the US to intervene anywhere in
the world in the name of security. Washington also claimed the right to
bring about regime change where it deemed that necessary.
The focus of US domination shifted to Asia, where it first intervened in

Afghanistan and eliminated the Taliban regime. Since the operation was a
part at the war on terror, both Pakistan and China joined it, and India also
supported it. The US established itself militarily in Afghanistan as well as
Central Asia. The next target of US war on terrorism was Iraq, though
international opinion was divided, with both China and Pakistan joining
the majority in the UN Security Council in opposing it. As President Bush
got re-elected in 2004, he perceived it as a vote of confidence by the US
electorate and continued his unilateralist policy.
Two powers that got encouraged to adopt a similar approach in their

regions were Israel and India. Prime Minister Sharon adopted an aggressive
policy against the Palestinians whom he characterized as terrorists. India
also sought to use a coercive approach against Pakistan, and concentrated
its forces along the Pakistan border for ten months from December 2001 to
October 2002. The level of repression in Kashmir was also stopped up.
Apart from identifying the Islamic world as the main source of the terrorist
threat, the US, also adopted a containment policy towards China which was
seen as the long-term challenge to US hegemony through its peaceful rise.
The Sino-Pakistan friendship, which has been called a model relationship
between neighbours having different social systems, has proved its
reliability and strength despite the major changes that have taken place in
the field of regional and global relationships at the start of the 21 Century.
While both China and Pakistan are cooperating primarily in the main task
of developing their economies to improve the life of their people, their
security relationship remains a vital component of their time-tested
friendship.
It is proposed to examine the scope and relevance of their strategic and

security cooperation to their national goals, and to place it in the context of
regional and global peace and security.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
China’s role and view of the World has to be seen in the historical
perspective, as the seat of one of the oldest civilizations, with a recorded
history of 5000 years. Until three centuries ago, China, which regarded
itself as the centre of the world, was affluent and prosperous, with an
advanced culture, and referred to the rest of the world as “barbarians”.
However, being in virtual isolation, it missed the industrial revolution, and
suffered from western colonization and exploitation, as nearly all the
industrialized countries proceeded to take advantage of its weakness
The discredited ruling dynasty was overthrown by a revolution in 191 1, led

by Sun Yat Sen but China continued to experience instability and civil war,
with warlords in control of different parts. The communist movement was
born in the 1920s and derived its support from the countryside where
peasants faced exploitation by landlords. The Japanese aggression in 1937
compounded the problems, with the nationalist regime of Chiang Kaishek
showing greater concern with communist threat than with Japanese
invasion. Ultimately, the communist party, led by Mao Zedong, prevailed in
1949, and the Nationalists sought refuge in the island of Taiwan.
Since the Revolution of 1949, China is embarked on a course of internal

reform and development, and of safeguarding China’s sovereignty and
independence. During the first quarter century, after the Revolution China
faced the hostility not only of the US, but later also that of the Soviet Union
from 1959 onwards. India sought to take advantage of the situation by
pushing for a military solution of the border dispute with China. Under
these circumstances, the emergence of friendly relations between China
and Pakistan assumed great importance and this friendship has flourished
since 1963, when they signed a Boundary Agreement.
China had launched a drive for modernization even under Premier Zhou
Enlai in the 1960s but turbulence created by the Cultural Revolution held up
real progress. It was the passing away of the old leadership in 1976 that
brought a more pragmatic leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping into Power.
From 1978, China has been launched on a course in which the primary
goal is to achieve economic modernization and development.
The basic planks of the approach are opening to the outside world, and to
introduce economic reforms, giving maximum scope to foreign investment
and technology. Even foreign policy is subordinated to the goal of
modernization, and China seeks to promote a global environment of peace
and stability, that is conducive to development. Since 1978, the progress
achieved by China is truly phenomenal. It has consistently maintained an
annual growth rate of around 9 percent, and the GDP has reached nearly $
1.6 trillion making China the fourth largest economy in the world.
Economists forecast that in twenty years, China’s economy will be the
largest in the World.1
CHINA’S RESPONSE TO POST 9/11 TRENDS
While eschewing any hegemonic ambitions, China continues to oppose

hegemonic policies by other powers, as a matter of principle. It stresses
certain principles in its foreign policy, best summed up in the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that were agreed with India and Burma
in 1954. Hegemonic ambitions are seen to be behind tensions between
powers, and produced an arms race during the Cold War. China also
opposes militarism and imperialism and believes in strengthening the role
of the UN to resolve disputes peacefully, and to promote a more just
international political and economic order. Finally, China considers itself
to be a part of the developing world, and subscribes to its goals of reform.
So far as China’s own response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks is concerned,

China has joined the US in its war against terror, which has brought the
two powers closer. However, US analysts have been seeing China as “an
obvious super power candidate for the near future”,2 after it completed two
decades of continuous growth. While China’s economic reforms made a
policy of “engagement” attractive to the West, the lingering concern over

the communist threat remains a factor in the policies of the Bus
administration that are clearly motivated by its long-term goals of
containing China. The peaceful rise of China also raises fears that it may
offer itself as a model for the developing countries, in competition with the
capitalist model.
Ever since it bunched its policies of modernization, and of opening to the

outside world, China has concentrated on its goal of catching up with the
developed world with single-minded devotion. It began this campaign by
taking such stops as abandoning any ambition to assume the leadership of
the communist movement in the world. It scrupulously followed the Five
Principles, notably on non-interference into internal affairs, and respecting
the equality, sovereignty and independence of countries great and small.
Indeed, China has gone out of its way to reassure all countries that its
development does not pose a throat, but rather “provides vast
opportunities for its neighbours and other countries through cooperation
and exchanges”.3
THE US FACTOR
China has realized since long that its most important relationship is that
with the US, both to advance its development through engagement, and to
threaten its security and survival in case of hostilities. China, therefore,
attaches the highest importance to managing this relationship in a manner
that is non–provocative, and conforms to norms of inter-state relations. At
the same time, there are certain basic principles of foreign policy which it
adheres to, as a matter of national sovereignty and independence. For
instance, it seeks to follow an independent foreign policy, based on the
principles of the UN Charter that are summed up in the Five Principles.
China also opposes hegemony, and quest for spheres of influence. China
favours the peaceful settlement of disputes, and opposes use or threat of
force. China believes in the rectification of historical wrongs, and in this
context, seeks the restoration of its sovereignty over Taiwan. It also backs
regional cooperation, and identifies itself with the developing countries.
China’s management of its foreign policy in the post 9/11 scenario

constitutes a deft and carefully thought out approach that encourages the
US to persist in the current policy of engagement that has brought

important benefits to both. China remains very careful not to be seen
damaging or undermining legitimate US interests. The key element in
China’s policy is avoiding confrontation, and showing clue sensitivity for
legitimate US interests or concerns. Even when it disapproves of any US
move, its reaction is low-key, and usually muted. At the base of this strategy
is the realistic appraisal of the strength and role of the United States, as the
richest and the most powerful country in the world.
China has tried to maintain a policy of engagement with the US, especially
in the economic field, and avoided any confrontation. Apart from joining
in the war against terror, it has recognized the importance of the role the
US plays in various parts of Asia, and sought to render diplomatic
assistance over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. However, where its vital
national interests are involved, such as in Taiwan or Tibet, it stands firm.
Is a Sino-US Cold War inevitable? China is doing all it can to avoid it.4 In
promoting long-term global balance through multi–polarity, it will not
willingly engage in a conflict with the US. However US analysts, and war
strategists appear to keep this prospect very much in mind. Their
expectation is that the theatre of global confrontation will shift to the
Pacific. The US would rely on its alliance with NATO, and base facilities for
its Navy in the Ask Pacific region to fight and contain China.5
COUNTERVAILING RELATIONSHIPS
China is also developing relations with other major countries in its vicinity,
such as Pakistan, India, Iran and Russia. China has also sought to develop
close economic and trade links with regional organizations in its
neighbourhood. It has not only joined ASEAN as a dialogue partner but also
extended free trade facilities. China has played a major role in crating the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and is showing interest in joining
SAARC, which could infuse new life into it.
China’s policy of opposing hegemony, and strengthening the role of the UN

as the best hope for a more just economic order does create difference with
the US. China also opposes ballistic Missile Defence, and the Doctrine of
Preemption. Thus it opposed the US occupation of Iraq, and would like to
see the WTO show greater concern for the interests of the developing
countries. Its remarkable economic growth may persuade some developing
countries to adopt its model. However it avoids throwing a challenge to the
advanced countries, and shows realism and modesty over its achievements,
maintaining that it requires half a century to achieve its goals.
THE PAKISTAN – CHINA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
Pakistan enjoys a close and comprehensive friendship with China, based

on shared principles and interests. Though Pakistan has again come to
have a close alliance with the US in the war against terror, it cannot afford
to compromise it all-weather friendship with China, to lake part in any
containment strategy of the lone superpower.
China has extended political, moral and material support to Pakistan ever
since the signing of the boundary Agreement in 1963 and this has been
critical to its independence and sovereignty. It has been a reliable friend
despite major regional and global changes. In response, Pakistan has also
stood by China at difficult times, particularly between 1963 and 1978, when
China was isolated. As a result, successive generation of Chinese leaders
have recognized Pakistan’s unique role even though China has emerged on
the world stage as a great power.
Until recently, Pakistan and China had no entered into a formal treaty of
friendship and cooperation. The visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
to Pakistan in April 2005 was marked by the signing of such a treaty, and
the Chinese leader stated, “The treaty and other agreements that we have
signed today mark a new stage in Sine-Pakistan friendship and it would
institutionalize the spirit of friendship of the last 54 years". This treaty is
unique in the sense that the two countries do not have such a treaty with
any other country. Commenting on the treaty, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
said it would serve as a turning point in the already strong relationship
between the two countries.6 The most significant provision of the treaty
was that both countries would support each other's efforts to safeguard
their territorial integrity. They also pledged not to allow the use of their
territory against the other.
The broad convergence on strategic and security issues continues between

Pakistan and China, who are together developing some new weapon
systems, such as the Al-Khalid Battle Tank, and the F-7 advanced fighter
(renamed JF 17 / Thunder).
Sino-Pakistan friendship is not directed against any other power, but is a

factor of security and stability in the region. The governments and the
people of the two countries attach importance to this friendship and are
resolved to maintain and consolidate it. They have an identity of
perceptions, and while they are supporting the war on terror, they favour a
multipolar order at the global level and remain opposed to hegemonic
ambitions of other powers at the regional level.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
In the present century, as the global centre of gravity shifts to Asia, the
reliance on military power for influence is likely to give way to a different
order, based on peace and international cooperation. China is already
showing the way by concentrating on development to improve the life of
its people. For this purpose, its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence points to its assuming a greater world role in the coming age
of geo-economics. Both geography and history would continue to play their
role in the maintenance of the many-sided friendship between Pakistan and
China, which serves their security and economic interests.
REFERENCES
1 M. A. Bhatty, “China’s Response to the post 9/11 Scenario” paper read at Seminar
in Islamabad on “China and the Emerging Regional Balance”. May 19–20, 2005.
2 Calleo, Daivd, P. “The US and Great Powers”, World Policy Journal Fall 1999,
page–11.
3 Shi Chunlai, “China’s Development and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co–
existence”, paper read at Seminar marking 59th Anniversary of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Co–existence”, Beijing, 13 June 2004.
4 M. A. Bhatty, the Dawn, Islamabad, August 20, 2005.
5 Kaplan, Robert D., “How We would Fight China”. Atlantic Monthly, June 2005.
6 The News, Islamabad, April 6, 2005

CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:
COMBATING TERRORISM
Naureen Memon
INTRODUCTION
All the nations of the world maintain relations on the basis of their mutual
interests. The formation of international organizations by sovereign states
and their will to accept the obligations is one of the basic features of the
contemporary world order. A state is considered to be in the mode of
multilateral relationship, when it is member of United Nations and is linked
with United Nation’s Charter. Just like that, but on limited level, some
associations of states exist which are formed without any coercive power.
This type of relationship engages a state into bilateral relationship, which
is mostly based on historical background, cultural affiliation, geographical
contiguity or community of economic interests.
The Sino-Pakistan friendship is mainly based on geographical contiguity. 1

The diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China were established on
the basis of equality, mutual respect, for territorial integrity and
sovereignty. 2 China-Pakistan relations are also based on strong footing and
have been showing continued growth over the years in all areas of bilateral
interests. The countries maintain regular contacts for adopting a common
strategy on various regional and international issues.
Terrorism puts a great effect on the bilateral as well as international

relations and becomes the cause of change in the formulation of foreign
policies of the nations. Due to changing global and regional scenario,
China and Pakistan have decided to intensify cooperation in combating
terrorism, extremism, and other trans-national crimes. An agreement took
place in March 2001, at the time of meeting between Interior Minister Faisal
Saleh Hayat and Chinese delegation, headed by Yang Huanning-Vice
Minister for Public Security in China. 3 Both have decided to adopt a joint
strategy to combat terrorism, so that peace and security is assured for their
people. The two sides have also strengthened bilateral cooperation to check
narcotic trafficking, illegal border trade and money laundering, and other
trans-border crimes. 4
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the cooperation between China and
Pakistan in combating terrorism for international peace, security and
progress. The paper suggests that the continued strategic dialogue between
China and Pakistan on security and defense issues at both governmental
and institutional levels would greatly contribute to maintaining peace in
the region and will further add to the already cordial relations between the
two countries.
WHAT IS TERRORISM?
Terrorism can be defined as”the calculated use of violence or the threat of

violence to introduce fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments
or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological.
The actions involved in terrorism include serious violence against people

or danger to life, a serious risk to public health or safety, or serious damage
to property through hostage taking, hijacking, sabotage, assassination and
indiscriminate bombings or suicide bombings.
There are rules against actions but terrorist does not recognize any such
rules, as he is the one who has lost faith in all existing systems of conflict
resolution and does not go to seek the justice by tribunal. Our region has
remained vulnerable to terrorist activities for a long time. Thousands of
people are being killed by the terrorists in this region. The complete
elimination of the terrorism from South Asia requires collective efforts by
the countries of this region. 5
CHINA’S ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM
China resolutely condemns terrorism and consistently opposes it wherever

it is, whenever it is. China maintains that the anti-terrorism actions should
have conclusive evidence and clear objectives and should be parallel with
the purposes and objectives on United Nation’s Charter and the generally
recognized principles of international law, and should necessarily maintain
world peace and stability.
Since 9/11, China has taken many measures in the field of fighting against
terrorism. First of all, it took an active role in international cooperation in
the fight against terrorism at the 6th session of the Special Committee of
General Assembly against Terrorism.
China has continued to adopt a serious and constructive attitude to

participate actively in the work of drafting a Comprehensive Convention of
International Terrorism and in International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
On regional level, China is member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

that is formed to fight terrorism, extremism, and separatism in Central Asia
and to examine the progress as well as issue of security in Central Asia
since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Along with other members of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China signed on June 7, 2002, the
Agreement of the State Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
on Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency at the Summit Conference in Petersburg
of Russia. This Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization plays a vital role in the international anti-
terrorism fight. 6
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the organization of The People’s

Republic of China and Central Asian countries namely; the Republic of
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of
Uzbekistan and Russian Federation, was signed on 15 June 2001. It has the
purpose of long-term regional cooperation such as trade, energy and
resources, economics, and joint struggle with ethno-separatism, religious
extremism, international terrorism, and transnational crimes.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is committed to strengthening ties

between its members in military areas and mutual reductions of military
forces in border regions, prioritizing regional security, and struggling
against terrorism, separatism and extremism.7
On bilateral level, China has joined hands against terrorism with the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan. On
domestic level, China has reinforced anti-terrorism measures by adopting
practical measures in the fields of finance, law, civil aviation security and
entry and exit administration to combat and prevent terrorism. 8
PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM
After September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S., Pakistan boldly decided to join

the international coalition against the war on terrorism and becoming the
frontline state in this fight. This stance gave Pakistan a significantly

positive impact on her standing in the international community and she
has earned a lot of appreciation of the international community. 9
Pakistan has waged an effective campaign to root out terrorist elements

from its territory for bringing peace. For that purpose, since September 11,
2001 Pakistan has apprehended more than 500 al-Qaida and Taliban
terrorists. For that Pakistani troops entered the area knows as Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in search of Al-Qaida operatives, which
are treacherous areas, where the government never entered for over a
century. During his visit to U.S., in June 2003, President Pervez Musharraf
said that Pakistan in trying his level best to root out Taliban by entering in
such treacherous areas and assured the world that his military will succeed
in locating Al-Qaida members hiding in those areas. 10
Pakistan, among South Asian nations, has realized that terrorism is a

shared threat and that it cannot be justified or tolerated under any
circumstances. At the same time, Pakistan remains a crucial partner in the
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. It has been helpful in rounding up Al-Qaeda
remnants, including their leadership. 11
CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT EFFORTS
Terrorism is not the problem of its victims or victim societies alone but its
impact vertebrates across the globe. A victory for terrorism anywhere in
the world is a victory for terrorism everywhere. Many individuals and
groups use terrorism for several purposes. It is used as a weapon in
creating disorder in the international system. It has become difficult for a
single state to curb terrorism alone. Hence, eradication of this requires
collective efforts by all states. 12
Friendship with China constitutes the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign

policy. With the purpose of maintaining a time-honored friendship, the
President visited China more than once in last 3 or 4 years. China besides
supporting Pakistan economically, militarily, diplomatically, fully supports
Pakistan’s policy of combating international terrorism.
In September 2001, soon after terrorist attacks on U.S., the Chinese

President sent Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Wang Yi to Pakistan as
his Special Envoy to express complete support of his Government for

Pakistan’s principled policy to assist the international community in his
fight against terrorism. 13
Both countries have held a series of high-level civil and military exchanges
in order to consult each other on the changing geo-strategic environment
in the region and forge a deeper understanding. The good examples of
these exchanges are the visits of Chinese Prime Minister Zho Rongji and
President Pervez Musharraf to each other countries in 2001. The result is
that both have reached a considerable understanding to adopt a mutually
beneficial approach in dealing with the emerging political issues, by
focusing on peace and stability in the region. 14
It was believed that continued strategic dialogue between China and

Pakistan on security and defense issues at both governmental and
institutional levels would greatly contribute to maintaining peace in the
region. For this purpose, Pakistan and China decided in July 2004, to adopt
a joint strategy to combat terrorism, so that peace and security is assured
for their people.
A joint working group of the two countries is formed to make important

anti-terrorism security arrangements that meet from time to time for
review of the arrangements. The two sides also strengthened bilateral
cooperation to check narcotics trafficking, illegal border trade and money-
laundering and other trans-border crimes. Both countries agreed to
continue to support each other for strengthening peace, security and
development and regional and international levels. Previously, the group
established under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), was supposed
to meet every year. But, then it was decided that the group will meet more
frequently because of present security conditions.15
China has provided Pakistan with economic aid and diplomatic support in
order to strengthen Pakistan against terrorism. After the September 11
attacks on the U.S., China assured Pakistan of her continued support and
provided her with more than $ 1 million emergency assistance. In addition
to this aid, China ordered the engineers and technicians, withdrawn from
Pakistan due to security concerns after September 2001, to resume work on
investment projects in Pakistan. These projects are copper mining, oil and
gas exploration and a $ 200 million project to build a highway and port in
Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. Hence, China has continued supporting
Pakistan on domestic as well as international level. 16
CONCLUSION
Terrorism can be defined as” the calculated use of violence or the threat of
violence to introduce fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments
or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological.
A wider range of specific crimes comes under the heading of terrorism. The
list includes murder, kidnapping, seizing public transport, releasing
contaminating substances and interfering with computer networks.
Terrorism is a deliberate attack by an individual or a group against a
country, its institutions or its people - with the aim of intimidating them
and damaging or destroying their political, economic or social structures.
China and Pakistan are situated in an area that has great geographical
importance and host almost half of the world population. Along with the
human resources, the area is also rich in natural material resources. The
progress and prosperity of the region requires amiable relations among the
countries of the region and their mutual cooperation against the terrorism.
Pakistan and China enjoy exemplary friendly ties, which have not only
sustained changes of governments and the ups and downs in the regional
and global situation, but, in fact, have been expanding and becoming even
deeper. And the cooperation against terrorism has become one of the
common factors in the relations between China and Pakistan.
Pakistan and China are working together to fight against ‘evil of terrorism’
in order to make the region free of this evil and make it peaceful and
prosperous. Thus, it can be concluded that both China and Pakistan
maintain, terrorism is a threat to international peace and therefore be
curbed by all means at all levels.
It is said that China-Pakistan friendship is "higher than the mountains,

deeper than the oceans," and now with addition “sweeter than the honey.”
REFERENCES
1 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Third World: New Dimensions, Quartet Books, London,
1977, p.32.
2 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy,

Counsel on Foreign Relations New York, 1960, p.315.
3 China, Pakistan Agree To More Cooperation In Campaign Against Terror,

http://abcasiapacific.com/news/stories/ asiapacific_ stories_ 939611.htm
4 Pakistan and China to Adopt Joint Strategy: Fighting Terrorism, Dawn, Karachi,
July 3, 2004.
5 Adluri Subramanyam Raju, Terrorism in South Asia: Views From India, India
Research Press, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 2-5.
6 China and the suppression of international terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls
/tyfl/2626/2627/t15472.htm
7 Pete Lentini, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia, Marika
Vicziany and et. al (eds.), Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: 9/11and After,
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Northampton, MA, USA, 2004, pp. 128-130.
8 China and the suppression of international terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls

/tyfl/2626/2627/t15472.htm
9 Foreign Policies of Pakistan, www.pakizonline.com/ pakforeign.htm
10 U.S., Pakistan Presidents Agree to Continue Fight Against Terrorism, United

States Department of Defence, October 26, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jun2003/n06242003_200306244.html
11 Hussain Haqqani, Challenges of Terrorism in South Asia, http://www.ndu.edu

/inss/symposia/pacific2003/haqqani.htm (Note: Ambassador Husain Haqqani is a
Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington
D.C. He has served as adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto
and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka)
12 Adluri Subramanyam Raju, op.cit.
13 Foreign Policies of Pakistan, www.pakizonline.com/ pakforeign.htm
14 Fazal-ur-Rehman, Sino-Pakistan Relations in a Changing Geo-Strategic

Environment, Vol XXII, Summer 2002, Number 2, The Institute of Strategic Studies,
Islamabad.
15 Pakistan and China to Adopt Joint Strategy: Fighting Terrorism, Dawn, Karachi,
July 3, 2004.
16 Charles Hutzler, China Plays Key Role in Pakistan, Pakistan Military Consortium,
An Independent Research and Analysis Forum, http://www.pakdef.info

/forum/showthread.php?t=467
US-INDIA STRATEGIC COOPERATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND PAKISTAN
FROM NATURAL ALLIES TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS
DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT
The end of Cold War saw a US security strategy of “beyond balance of

power” towards South Asia, with the characteristics of tilting towards India
and transforming from estranged to engaged democracies between
Washington and New Delhi.1 The twelve rounds of strategic dialogues
between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister for
External Affairs Jaswant Singh from June 1998 to September 2000 after
Pokaran II, though no agreement on nonproliferation was reached, did
bridge many of the gaps in understanding between the two countries,
imply the beginning of a real strategic engagement,2 and result in a US pro-
India policy in Kargil conflict in 1999.
The starting point of the US-India strategic partnership may trace back to
the US President Clinton’s historic visit to South Asia in March 2000. Bill
Clinton, the first US President to visit India since 1978, brought a
Clintonmania during his 6-day stay in New Delhi, Agra, Jaipur, Hyderabad,
and Mumbai. As one US senior official said, Clinton’s visit is “a trip more to
India than to South Asia.”3 In a communiqué entitled Indo-US relations: A
Vision for the 21st Century, the relationship between world’s two largest
democracies was deemed to have entered a new stage—continuous,
constructive in the political area and beneficial in the economic arena. It
was to form the basis for mutual strategic, economic, political and social
benefit. Moreover, both sides agreed to institutionalize bilateral dialogue
through a range of high-level meetings and working groups on various
areas of cooperation. During his reciprocal visit to US in September 2000,
Indian Primer Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee proposed the famous phrase of
“natural ally” to describe the nature of two democracies when he addressed
a joint session of Congress and was received for a state dinner at the White
House.
The Republican government inherited and materialized Clinton’s policy of

tilt towards India. When George W. Bush came to White House in January
2001, many senior officials frequently made use of “transformation” to

describe US-Indo relations.4 Three events could testify this transformation.
First, India gave a more positive support for Bush’s proposal of missile
defence than those of US allies; second, the visit of General Henry Shelton,
the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the highest ranking
US military official to India since 1998, and the reviving the meetings of the
Defence Policy Group (DPG) indicated the rebirth of US defense
cooperation with India; third, the Bush Administration was preparing to
suspend all nuclear-related sanctions on India even before 9/11. The US
Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher described the
transformation in US-Indian relations as one of an evolution from
“estranged democracies” to “engaged democracies.”5
The event of September 11 in 2001 was a significant turning point of US

security strategy and its relations to South Asia.6 India took the immediate
and unprecedented step of offering to US full cooperation and the use of
India’s bases for counter-terrorism operations. In response to this, US
rapidly waived sanctions and provided assistance to India. On September
22, 2001, Bush issued a final determination lifting the sanctions that were
imposed under the terms of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act
following India's nuclear tests in May 1998. President Bush and Prime
Minister Vajpayee presented a vision for the rapid transformation of the
relationship between the two countries at their first summit in November
2001. Since then, notable progress has come in the area of security
cooperation. It is worth mentioning that in December 2001, the US-India
Defence Policy Group met in New Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998
nuclear tests and outlined a defence partnership based on regular and high-
level policy dialogue.
In the US National Security Strategy Report of 2002, the White House

redefined India-US relations, stating that as “India’s potential to become
one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century,” the United
States would “invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral
relations with India,” and “work hard to transform our relationship
accordingly.” 7
In the context of this transforming bilateral relations, 2002-03 witnessed a

series of high-level meetings and substantial cooperation between New
Delhi and Washington from joint military exercises, visits and exchanges,
through collaboration in scientific and technical research, through a wide
variety of joint economic and social development projects, to increased
cooperation in law enforcement, and strengthened cultural and people-to-
people contacts.
The transformation was accelerated in 2004 by name of the Next Steps in

Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which was announced by the US and India on
12 January 2004 and seen as both a milestone in the transformation of the
bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress. The two
agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas (known as the
“trinity”): non-military nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and
high-technology trade. Besides, they would also expand dialogue on missile
defence. While US President Bush described it as “an important milestone
in transforming the relationship between the United States and India,”
Indian former Prime Minister, A B Vajpayee said, “The vision of the India-
US strategic partnership that President Bush and I share is now becoming a
reality.”
Just four days before Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US
president Bush met for the first time on 21 September 2004 on the sidelines
of the UN General Assembly in New York to discuss issues of terrorism and
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Washington and New
Delhi issued a joint statement announcing “major progress” in NSSP
initiative, including modifications of US export licensing policies that will
“foster cooperation in commercial space programs and …… [civilian]
nuclear facilities.” And then US Under Secretary of Commerce Kenneth
Juster and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca made
a separate visit to New Delhi to further discuss NSSP issues with top Indian
officials. Moreover, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld arrived at New
Delhi on December 8, 2004 for meeting with India’s leaders and top defense
officials about deepening military cooperation in the filed of counter-
terrorism, arms sale, Proliferation Security Initiative and missile defense,
among others.
The year of 2005 witnesses a more significant and substantial development

of Washington-New Delhi strategic cooperation. On March 15, US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice paid her first visit to New Delhi where Rice held
delegation-level talks with Indian External Affairs Minister K Natwar Singh,

and met with Indian top leaders, including Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, leader of Opposition L K Advani and the ruling Congress Party
Chairperson Sonia Gandhi. During her visit, Rice acknowledged India’s
rising global profile, regarded New Delhi as “major world power”, and
sought its partnership for maintaining the balance of power in Asia.
Despite some differences, such as Washington’s opposition to the Indo-Iran
gas pipeline project and New Delhi’s opposition to the sale of F-16 fighters
to Pakistan, her visit did give a fillip to the Indo-US strategic partnership.
On June 28, 2005 in Washington, Indian and US topmost defense leaders,

Pranab Mukherjee and Donald Rumsfeld signed the Defence Framework
Agreement, which defined the track of strategic cooperation between them
for the next ten years. Different from the Agreed Minutes of Defence
Relations signed in Delhi in January 1995, the new agreement lists the
shared security interests of both countries and identifies thirteen specific
areas of cooperation. It is a comprehensive blueprint in the process of the
materialization of strategic partnership.
On July 18, 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President
Bush reached a nuclear agreement, according to which US will provide
civilian nuclear energy and technology to India, even though the latter
remains its position out of the international nonproliferation regime.
Standing behind these busy diplomatic activities are the under mentioned
substantial economic and security cooperation.
ECONOMIC-SECURITY DUAL-TRACK RELATIONS
The 1990s saw a gradual and stable growth of bilateral trade particularly
India’s export to US (see Table 1). The US is now the largest trading and
investment partner with five billion US dollars of exports to India and 13
billion US dollars of imports from India in 2003. India’s exports to US are
on track to reach 15 billion US dollars in 2004. Meanwhile, India’s net
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2003 reached 5.5 billion US dollars, one-
third of which came from US companies.
India was one of major receivers of US foreign assistance in the Cold War
era no matter of their estranged relations.8 The assistance increased
gradually along with their transforming ties. For a long time before 9/11,
India ranked first in South Asian and second in Asian countries that
received US assistance. 9 From 1947 through 2003, the United States
provided more than 14 billion US dollars in economic loans and grants and
157 million US dollars in military assistance to India. USAID programs in
India, budgeted at 89 million US dollars in FY2004, concentrate on five
areas: economic growth, health, disaster management, environment
protection and education. Security-related assistance for FY2003 military
training and nonproliferation exports control enhancement was 2 million
US dollars. The US and India have agreed to pursue Foreign Military Sales
programs, with Indian purchases worth 138 million US dollars in FY2002
and 63 million US dollars in FY2003. The detailed items of assistance in
recent years are listed as below (see Table 2).
In June 2004, the most recent meeting of US-India Defence Policy Group
was held in New Delhi to discuss terrorism and weapons proliferation
along with plans for further joint military exercises and possible weapons
sales to India. A top US diplomat in India said in August 2004, “Without
doubt, military cooperation remains one of the most vibrant, visible, and
proactive legs powering the transformation of US-India relations.” Since
September 2001, US-India security cooperation has flourished with
numerous joint exercises and a high profile of arms sales besides of
counter-terrorism.
The joint exercises have involved all military branches, including an

advanced air combat exercise joined by the Russian-built Su-30MKI in June
2003, the joint exercise of special forces near India-China border in
September 2003, the “Cope India” joint air force exercises over Central
India in February 2004, the “Cooperative Cope Thunder” joint exercise of
air forces in Alaska in July 2004, and most recently the sixth round of joint
naval exercise named “Malabar 2004” off the India’s west coast included an
US nuclear submarine in October 2004.
As the second largest arms importer in the world, India spends huge
amount for procuring military hardware and software from abroad notably
Russia. In recent years, however, India has been more and more interested
in subscribing advanced weapons from Israel and US. India has already
purchased the Green Pine radar system and the Phalcon early warning
aircraft from Israel with US clearance for the sale. India is in talks with
Israel for its Arrow missile defence system, which is a joint US-Israel effort.
Now US itself reportedly will offer to sell India the Patriot missile defence
system. It is said that the US offer to sell P-3C Orion naval reconnaissance
aircraft is an upgraded one equipped with the latest avionics and
equipment systems. The Patriot deal will add several strategic miles to
India’s defence arsenal, making it qualitatively different from either China
or Pakistan. Earlier, The US has also offered Perry class frigates and Sea
Hawk helicopters, and India’s special operations forces is looking at
chemical and biological protection equipment from US. The purchase has
long-term political and strategic implications, as from some US and Indian
strategists’ points of views, they are looking at another version of the US-
Japan relationship in Asia.
Besides joint military exercises and arms transaction, the other basic field
of security cooperation between US and India is counter-terrorism that
started even before 9/11. Up to now, six rounds of meetings of the US-India
Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism have been held both in New
Delhi and Washington. According Patterns of Global Terrorism released by
US State Department on 29 August 2004, India suffered more “significant
terrorist incidents” than any other countries in 2003. The report also for
the first time listed two Indian “Naxalite” communist organizations, the
People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Center, as “other terrorist
groups.”
COMMON VALUES AND INTERESTS
As US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell pointed out, the US-India

transformation “has its roots in our common values and interests as
democratic societies committed to political freedom, tolerance,
representative government and the fight against terrorism.”10 Similarly,
former US Ambassador in India Robert Blackwill said earlier, “It is difficult
to think easily of countries other than India and the United States that
currently face to the same striking degree all three of these intense
challenges simultaneously: advancing Asian stability based on democratic
values; confronting daily the threat of international terror; and slowing the
further proliferation of WMD.”11
The common values are originated from Washington’s and New Delhi’s so-
called the strongest and largest democracies respectively. As US
Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) noted in 2001, “the relationship
between America and India is based on the solid foundation of a shared
commitment to democracy, individual rights, freedom of expression and
free markets. India’s democratic governing system is a beacon of hope for
the region.”12 These common values may have at least two political
implications: one, it is beneficial to have a benign political atmosphere
between New Delhi and Washington, as democracy has become another
common language beside English; two, according to democracy peace
theory, India and the United States will have no war with each other, never
and forever. At a minimum, this will help leaders of the two countries
establish basic political trust. In short, the political atmosphere and trust
constitute the political basis of the strategic partnership.
The common interests are said to include commercial freedom, counter-

terrorism and Asian stability, among others. One Indo-US relationship
observer pointed out, India and US “have vital interests in Asia, from the
Persian Gulf to East Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean. These common
interests relate to oil supplies, proliferation, ethnic disaffection,
fundamentalism, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, freedom of the seas,
safety of sea lanes, peaceful resolutions of territorial disputes, and a
balance of power.”13 If the common value provides only the possibility,
then the common interests bring the feasibility of the strategic partnership.
Still, different voices could be heard at least here in New Delhi. The former
India’s external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, criticized the UPA
government for “rushing into” the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
(NSSP)” with the US “when negotiations are still pending on about 100
sanctions (US imposed against India in the wake of Pokhran tests).” He also
said “The NSSP is being touted by this government as an achievement. It has
put the country in much greater difficulty rather than (providing) any
enhancement of facilitation.”14
Differences remain between US and India “including over the development

of India’s nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India’s economic
reforms.”15 “There remain indications that the perceptions and

expectations of top US and Indian military leaders are divergent on several
key issues, including India’s role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia,
approaches to countering terrorism, and potential US role in resolving the
India-Pakistan disputes.”16 The following issues may shadow the strategic
partnership if managed improperly.
First, Washington-Pakistan ally always worries New Delhi. US has named

Pakistan as its major non-NATO ally (MNNA) in South Asia, which will
enable Washington to sell more advanced weapons possible including F-16s
fighters to Pakistan. India questions if “Islamabad really need[s] stuff like
anti-armour and anti-ship missiles to nab Osama” and argues that
“Washington [is] pursuing a nudge-wink policy of appeasement towards
Pakistan’s military establishment.”17 An Indian government official
reportedly said that a US sale of F-16 warplanes to Pakistan would be
opposed by New Delhi as “they could be used against India” or “could spark
a weapons race in the region.”
Second, while India’s nuclear weapons programs obtain more and more
understanding and connivance from US as time passes, new factors appear
to be added to the nonproliferation issue. On 29 September 2004, the US
State Department determined that Indian scientists C. Surender and R.S.R.
Prasad were among 14 entities that violated the Iran Nonproliferation Act
of 2000 and will be sanctioned for the transfer to the Iran of WMD-related
equipment and/or technology. India, however, refused the sanctions and
argued, “no transfer of sensitive technology has taken place.”
Last, but not the least, what US concerns most regarding to India’s economy
is the scope and pace of reforms. A few US scholars along with some US
government official argue that excessive regulatory and bureaucratic
structures may constitute a hindrance to the realization of India’s full
economic potential. While US Ambassador to India David Mulford said in
Delhi in March 2004 that “the US is one of the world’s most open
economies and India is one of the most closed,” the Washington DC-based
Heritage Foundation’s 2004 Index of Economic Freedom rated India as
being “mostly unfree.” US Under Secretary of State Larson complained
recently that because of “the slow pace of economic reform in India”,
“trade and investment flows between the US and India are far below where
they should and can be.” Additionally, inadequate intellectual property

rights protection has been a long-standing issue between India and US. In
May 2004, US Trade Representative (USTR) again named India to the Special
301 Priority Watch List for its “weak” protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SINO-INDO AND SINO-US RELATIONS
The US-India strategic partnership, its warming defence cooperation in

particular, will complicate China’s relations with the two countries to some
extent and in different ways. The extent and ways of such implications are
mostly decided by the orientation of the US-India strategic partnership and
how China perceives and responses to it. While this part mainly reviews
the US and India factors in China’s relations with New Delhi and
Washington respectively, the comments on China’s perceptions and
responses will be left to the last part.
THE US FACTOR IN CHINA-INDIAN RELATIONS18
When looking back to the Cold War era, we may find the up-and-down of
Sino-India relations accompanied with US efforts to forge alliance with
either side in different periods to meet its need of containing Soviet Union.
As newly independent countries from the west colonial rule, both China
and India carried out a self-reliance and independent foreign policy. On the
one hand, India recognized People’s Republic of China in 1949 and
supported the latter’s effort to resume its permanent seat in UN security
council while neither of which the US agreed to offer, China, on the other
hand, appreciated India’s leading role in non-aligned movement (NAM)
which ran against US policy of alliance and containment. Furthermore, the
friendly relationship between China and India reached the apex when the
two jointly declared the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in 1954
and solidified the newly independent nations in various international
occasions such as the Bandung Conference of 1955. However, although
Beijing established alliance and New Delhi had close relations with Moscow
at the same time, the former two failed to align with each other, not to
mention an anti-Washington alliance. Moreover, the differences in national
interests and the geo-strategic rivalry between India and China finally led to
the dispute on the Tibet issue in 1959 and the border conflict in 1962,
which resulted in the end of the positive bilateral relationship of early and
mid-1950s. For its part, the United States regarded China as its principal
enemy in Asia, but did not saw India as an adversary, instead, appeared to
relatively tolerate India’s close ties with Washington’s global competitor
Soviet Union. In a word, “American policy toward India was never so
hostile, nor the mutual trust between China and India sufficiently great, to
permit India and China to forge a partnership against the United States.”19
During the most difficult time between China and India in 1960s, the United
States stood by New Delhi to oppose its still adversary, China. Very soon
after the outbreak of the Sino-India border war in 1962, US President John
F. Kennedy ordered to send aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal to show
American support for India, followed by a large scale and unprecedented
economic and military aid to New Delhi.20 Nevertheless, the Sino-India
rivalry did not drive India into US-led anti-China camp, partly because of
the reduction of Chinese threat with its unilateral withdrawal, Washington-
Islamabad alliance, and New Delhi’s willingness. Thus, the United States did
not see India as a necessary and reliable counterweight against China even
during the severest period of Cold War.
The 1970s and early and mid-1980s saw the dramatic shift of US position
from previous pro-India to pro-China later. In South Asia and Asia and the
world at large, the formation of US-China-Pakistan alignment vs. India-USSR
alliance based on respective national interests and broad international
environmental turned out to be clear and definite. While China and the US
came together with the help of Pakistan to counter their common No.1
threat Soviet Union, India went away from the US and moved into a close
alignment with Moscow aimed at confronting with Pakistan. In other word,
neither China’s aligned with US (and Pakistan) nor India’s aligned with
USSR was primarily target at each other, but at Moscow and Islamabad
respectively.
In general, during the Cold War era, there are enough factors and reasons
that prevent any two from establishing alignments against the other, either
an India-US alignment against China or a Sino-US alignment against India,
say nothing of a Sino-Indian alignment against the United States. As the
United States constituted an extremely important (even if not the most and
decisive like Pakistan, as someone may argue) external factor in overall

Sino-India relations, both Beijing and New Delhi had to factor Washington
in their policies toward the other side.
After the end of Cold War, the three had to adjust bilateral relations among
them, which have changed the posture of the triangle and attached the
increasing importance of the United States (the only remaining
superpower) to the relationship between China (a rising power) and India
(an emerging power). Generally speaking, while both Sino-Indian and US-
Indian relations have been significantly improved, the Sino-US ties,
however, experienced an up-and-down as China and India in the Cold War
era. The reason for this is that the United States has regarded a rising China
rather than a declining Russia or an emerging India as the principal
challenger and potential threat economically, politically and strategically,
to its hegemony. Fortunately, all prospective alignments of any two against
the other and the efforts to achieve them have been tested to be temporary,
ineffective, or even impossible. Firstly, the discussion of the possibility of
China-India-Russia triangle to resist US hegemony in early 1990s and their
“preference for constructing a new world order”21 are more idealistic than
realistic. Secondly, as a demonstration of Sino-American constructive
strategic partnership, the two issued the joint statement to condemn Indian
unclear tests of 1998 and even came up with “a strategy for preventing a
nuclear arms race in South Asia.” 22 The influence of such efforts is short-
lived and the outcome is pessimistic. Finally, the action of Indian Prime
Minister Vajpayee in his secret letter to US President Clinton cited China
threat to justify India’s nuclear tests was not a smart one and of course
unsuccessful.
9/11 substantially improved China’s strategic relations with the United
States as well as position in the triangle. From US perspective, China has
changed from “a principal challenger” to an invaluable cooperator both in
addressing long-term global challenges such as terrorism and proliferation
of WMD and in resolving critical regional issues like nuclear dilemma in
Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, the United States and China would now
share responsibility for Pakistan and therefore have more common
interests in South Asia, “[t]his was major triangular gain for China.”23
Furthermore, 9/11 also contributed to reduce Indian concerns about a
rising and threatening China while increase Chinese consensus with India
on anti-terrorism. Considering the dramatic development of the US-India
strategic partnership described in the first part, it is reasonable to say that

the United States could play an active and constructive role in Sino-Indian
relations, if their interests are equally taken into account by the Untied
States.
THE INDIA FACTOR IN CHINA-US RELATIONS24
Compared with the considerable US role in Sino-Indian relations, the India

factor is secondary in Sino-US relations during most time of the Cold War,
partly because India was relative weak in the triangle while its strategic
resources restrained by rivalry with Pakistan. Even in post-9/11 period,
“New Delhi still finds it difficult to translate economic potential into
political and strategic influence.”25 Therefore, India is yet strong enough to
have significant influence in the context of Sino-US relations. Still, India
wanted to play its relevant role in some cases both in and post Cold War
era, either positive or negative.
For example, in early 1950s, “India attempted to serve as a mediator

between Beijing and Washington during the early months of the Korean
War, conveying Chinese warnings against an American invasion of the
North.” 26 But the Truman administration firmly decided to interfere and
China’s response was strong enough to lead the first hot war in the Cold
War era. Since then, the United States tried to isolate China in international
society and regard Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to contain
China till early 1970s. In contrast, India for a long time supported China’s
permanent membership in UN Security Council and one China policy. This
is the case in which India is willing and able to play a positive and
constructive role in Sino-US relations.
An inverse and unsuccessful example happened in the very moment of

India’s nuclear tests in 1998. India cited “China Threat”, the theory of
which has been widely spreading in Washington, to justify its nuclear
option. More or less, India wanted to benefit from the rivalry between
China and US. This also could be attested from India’s approach to
Washington when Bush Administration regarded China as a strategic
“challenger”, “competitor” and “theater”, and China and US met trouble
because of American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999
and the collision between a US Navy surveillance plane and a Chinese
fighter jet in 2001. This is another case in which India could make use of
Sino-American rivalry to gain some advantage.
So far, “neither India nor the United States has been willing to create such
overtly anti-Chinese alignment,” and “neither is so immediately threatened
by the rise of Chinese power as to see the need for a strategic partnership
to counter it.”27 However, an Indian-American alignment against China
remains a possibility and will be the preference of the two whenever either
country has conflict with China.
As mentioned above, the United States did not see India as an effective
counterweight against China who tried to limit Indian influence in the
Subcontinent through Pakistan to balance it. India had no space in the
greater triangle among China, US and USSR. It was China, not India, who
was regarded by USSR as a major force to break through US encirclement in
Asia in 1950s and early 1960s, again China was considered by US as a
counterweight against USSR’s expansion in 1970s and early 1980s. The end
of Cold War and particularly after Pokaran II, however, saw an emerging
India, the dramatic development in US-India strategic partnership and thus
the rising role of India in Sino-US relations. Therefore, another role India
can and may play in future’s Sino-US relations is to follow and be played by
the United States as a “card” for balancing China whenever needed.
Whether positive or negative of the US factor in Sino-Indian relations will

depend on three factors, US policies toward the two, how they responses,
and the quality of the bilateral relations. Similarly, whether efficient or
inefficient of the India factor in Sino-US relations may rely on the
possibility of India’s economic potential being translated into political and
strategic influence on the one hand and the nature of Sino-US relations
between rivalry and engagement on the other hand. The more friendly
Sino-US relations is, the less opportunity of balance India will have, and
vice-a-versa.
CHINA’S PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES
The transformation of US-India relations after the end of Cold War and
post-9/11 in particular are mainly driven by the following factors: First,
with the demise of the Soviet Union, the principal obstacle that restrains
the US-Indian relationship suddenly disappeared; Second, India’s economic

reform and growth since early 1990s made it an important trade and
investment partner for the United States; Third, the rising role of the Indian
American community in American society attracted US political elites;
Fourth, the increasing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean required
US engaging with India; Fifth, India was seen as an emerging power with
economic potential and a bustling democracy; Sixth, US viewed India as a
potential counterweight to balance a rising China in the future; Lastly,
different from China and Russia (which have many strategic points of
divergence with US), improving relations with India could be the best way
for US to break through a possible Sino-Russian-Indian triangle from US
strategists’ perspective.
The end of Cold War witnessed the remaining superpower (the United
States), a rising power (China) and an emerging power (India). The most
significant implication of US-India strategic partnership for China is the
more possibility of strategic triangle among Washington, Beijing and New
Delhi.28 The more possible India translates its economic potential into
political and strategic influence, the greater significance of the triangle will
become. A rising China-US-India triangle has multi-levels implications.
Briefly, in South Asia, the feature of the triangle has been the most
important factor of regional stability and the future of Pakistan; in Asia
Pacific, the importance of the triangle is not less than another triangle
among China, US and Japan; In broader international arena, the triangle
will become a leading force in shaping the trends of global economy,
counter terrorism and WMD, and world order.
The convergences and divergences China have with the other about the rest
Generally speaking, there exist some common perceptions and similar

positions with regard to US between India and China. Globally, China and
India as two largest developing economies have roughly similar positions
in international trade negotiation, opposing the inclusion of labor and
environmental standards in international trade agreements which US
actively promotes; China and India as two largest developing countries
usually support for the democratization of international relations, the
equality of international society, a reasonable world order and a multi-
polar world, which is not in line with US strategic goal; China and India as
two ancient civilization strongly favor a peaceful and political means to

resolve international conflict, which is not in line with US preference of
unilateralism and preemption. Regionally, China and India as two major
Asian powers basically share common interests to prevent any non-
regional power (mainly the Unites States) from dominating East Asia and
South Asia respectively, and to establish an Asian community; China and
India are also not comfortable about US–Pakistan military alliance and
presence around them; Bilaterally, China and India as two largest
transitional societies have basically shared views of human rights, which
the United States frequently criticized them. These convergences suggest
China and India have great potential of friendship, which are unfortunately
not translated into close and substantial cooperation between them.
However, these convergences are important enough to restrict India’s
efforts to move the US-India strategic partnership far away.
China and the United States, on the other hand, also share their common
perspectives of India at one point or another. For example, on
nonproliferation issue, China and US as two of five recognized nuclear
powers are memberships and maintainers of various international
nonproliferation regimes out of which India still stands. With regard to
Pakistan and South Asia at large, there are more optimistic attitudes to
Pakistan between Beijing and Washington than New Delhi who prefers to
regard Islamabad as part of problem rather than resolution. Both China
and the United States feel it necessary and responsible to play a relevant
role in South Asian stability either related to Kashmir issue or not, while
India tries to exclude any non-regional powers from interfering internal
affairs in its backyard. Similarly on the issue of US Security Council reform,
it seems that P5 have to accept new members entry the top power center of
international society, neither China nor the United States are willing to give
a veto to the new comers including India. These points of convergences are
perhaps not sufficient enough for the formation of China-US version of
strategic partnership, but remain the significant factors that both
Washington and New Delhi have to seriously consider when they want to
promote the strategic partnership further to the direction aiming at China.
Theses convergences China enjoys respectively with India and the United
States will leave some scopes and leverages for China to prevent any
possibility of transforming the US-Indian relations from strategic
partnership to ultimately strategic ally against China.
Different perceptions and interests are apparent between China and India
with regard to their respective ties with the United States. The inborn
geopolitical fact and simultaneous rises of China and India are natural
competitors for the favor of the United States: from visible trade and
investment for their modernization to invisible cooperation and support
for their increasing international influence. Giving the fact that the United
States sees a rising China more challengeable than an emerging India, the
two Asian giants then stand different position in Washington’s strategy
agenda. At best, in Harry Harding’s phrase, the United States could “enjoy
its Indian curry and its Peking duck in the same meal,”29 which means that
Washington may stand by Beijing or New Delhi against the other whenever
necessary, and at a minimum, the United States could exploit their
differences and divergences to separate them from any possible anti-
America efforts.
The main differences between China and the United States on India are
concentrated in New Delhi’s role in Asia Pacific region. Indian Primer
Minister Manmohan Singh said on 26 October 2004 that India as “super
regional power”, its strategic footprint “covers the region bounded by the
Horn of Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, South-East Asia and beyond, to the
far reaches of the Indian Ocean.” 30 Therewith, China and the United States
may have different understandings and feelings. For China, the
implications of India’s emerging from South Asian to Asian major power
with global aspiration are very much complicated. On the one hand, China
would welcome India to play more important and constructive role in Asia
Pacific so as to partly balance the overwhelming influence and
unilateralism of the United Sates and greatly contribute to a multi-polar
Asia Pacific in which China is one of the major powers; on the other hand,
an emerging India does mean a strong competitor for China from South,
West, Southeast, Central Asia to Indian and Pacific Oceans where their
interests and influences have met or will encounter. For the United States,
the challenge of an emerging India is very limited except issues like non-
proliferation. In most Asian sub-regions mentioned above, the United States
has more closeness with India than with China. Of course, the difference
between China and the United States on India is only a small part of the
existing divergences, but is big enough when the two turn out to be tension
in which India will be an attractive and crucial counterweight both China

and the United States compete for.
The divergences China has with India and the United States suggest China
should do its best to lead the US-India strategic partnership as well as the
triangle to own favorable direction before making for the opposite one.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS
US-India strategic partnership in South Asia and Indian Ocean, and US-
Japan military ally in East Asia and west Pacific Ocean are two major
concerns for China in the new big power games in Asia Pacific region. The
increased US-India security ties provide potential counterbalance to
growing Chinese influence in the region.
Based on the convergences as well as divergences mentioned above, China

may consider its relations with Washington and New Delhi simultaneously,
or say more accurately, factor India in our America policy and US in our
India policy on some issues, and de-factor on others.
To Washington and Sino-US relations, as China is more important than

India for the United States in global and Asia-Pacific economic development
and most security issues, China should:
Ï enlarge US economic interests in China and China’s economic

influence in the United States. One experience China may learn
from India is to enhance Chinese lobby in the US government.
The purpose of this policy option is to increase, at least maintain,
Chinese weight and voice in Washington’s approach to India in
the framework of US-India strategic partnership;
Ï deepen security interdependence between Beijing and
Washington. While China and the United States continue their
collaborations in global counter terrorism and proliferation of
WMD, the focus of such an option is to seek more cooperation in
non-traditional and sub-regional security issues besides North
Korean nuclear question. The goal of this strategy alternative is
same as the above.
Ï try to be peaceful co-existence with the United States in Asia-

Pacific and world. While pursuing the United States to
accommodate China’s rise, it will be better for China to change its
strong criticism and opposition of US hegemony to
accommodation of US leading role in the region, the by product
of which will be the reduction of the opportunity and possibility
for India and the United States from strategic partnership to
alliance against china.
To New Delhi and Sino-India relations, as India’s immediate neighbor,

China has more historical, geographical and cultural linkage than the
United States. China is more essential and available for India to realize
its national goal. Therefore, China should:
Ï increase economic independence, both bilateral and (sub-)

regional economic integration. As two rising powers and
developing economies, there are many fields where China and
India have potentials of cooperation as well as competition.
India’s software and service industry and China’s hardware and
light industry are some of these fields that are waiting for
cooperation. Meanwhile, any political suspicious and security
fear should be removed from the efforts of sub-regional
economic integration. The meaning of such economic
independence for China is that, since China has less military
cooperation with either India or the United States while the two
latter have the increasingly warming defence ties, China’s strong
economic relations with both India and the United States who
have very limited economic exchanges up to now could be
Beijing’s advantage which will complement to some degree its
security disadvantage in the triangle.
Ï improve security understanding at bilateral level. Both China and

India should pay more attentions to and have better
understanding of the security concerns of the other side, such as
the Tibet issue, the Taiwan question, the Eastern Turkistan
terrorism threat for China, and the Kashmir issue, China’s
military relations with Pakistan and South Asian smaller
countries, and Northeast for India. The security understanding of

each other is highly necessary for mutual trust and will let it
impossible for the United States to make use of Sino-India
possible rivalry to serve its strategic interests and goals aiming at
either China or India.
Ï translate historical and cultural commons into substantial

economic, political and security cooperation. Economically,
China and India can exchange their experiences as well as
lessons in the process of economic development. China may
learn from the advantage of India’s organic growth model,
including healthy banking system, better institutional
framework, stronger private enterprises, higher capital
efficiency, and more active NGOs; Politically, China could
enhance political coordination and dialogue in global trade,
environment, and human right affairs; militarily, both sides must
seek the opportunity of regional cooperation besides the CBMs
along the border. The priority is to attack “three forces” leaked
from Central Asia, and to maintain the safety of sea line in Indian
Ocean. All these economic, political, and security cooperation
will contribute to the strength of a more balanced triangle among
China, India and the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
China maybe enjoy a more favorable position in a sub-regional triangle

among China, India, and Pakistan, but not so much in a greater Asian or
even global triangle among China, India, and the United States. However,
China will not be a victim of the US-India strategic partnership if it is
limited to bilateral and beneficial to the South Asian stability, but China has
to keep alert as it may also move further toward a strategic ally with target
at the third country with China most likely.
Table 1
US Trade with India
(in millions of US dollars)

Year Exports Imports Balance
1990 2,480.00 3,196.80 -710.80
1991 1,999.30 3192.50 -1,193.20
1992 1,917.10 3,779.80 -1,862.70
1993 2,778.10 4,553.70 -1,775.60
1994 2,294.00 5,309.50 -3,015.50
1995 3,295.80 5,726.20 -2,430.40
1996 3,328.30 6,169.50 -2,841.20
1997 3,607.60 7,322.40 -3,714.80
1998 3,564.40 8,237.20 -4,672.80
1999 3,687.80 9,070.80 -5,383.00
2000 3,662.80 10,686.50 -7,023.70
Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination

Branch, Washington DC, 2002.
Table 2
US Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2005
(in millions of dollars)
Program or FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005

Account Actual Actual Actual Estimate Request
CSH 24.6 41.7 47.4 48.3 43.4
DA 28.8 29.2 34.5 25.7 25.4
ESF 5.0 7.0 10.5 14.9 15.0
IMET 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4
NADR- 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7

EXBS
Subtotal 59.8 79.8 94.4 90.9 85.9
P.L.480 78.3 93.7 44.8 20.2 44.8

Title II
Total 138.1 173.5 139.2 111.1 130.7

Source: US Agency for International Development (USAID)
Abbreviations: CSH: Child Survival and Health; DA: Development

Assistance; ESF: Economic Support Fund; IMET:
International Military Education and Training; NADR-
EXBS: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and
Related – Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance
Note: P.L.480 Title II: Emergency and Private Assistance food aid
(grants)
REFERENCES
1 For a comprehensive analysis of US strategy of “beyond balance of power,” see
Zhang, Guihong. 2005. Beyond Balance of Power: US Security Strategy toward South
Asia after the End of Cold War. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Co. For more
details of US-Indian transforming relations, see for example, Harrison, Selig S. and
Geofrey Kemp. 1993. ‘India and American after the Cold War,’ Washington DC:
Carnegie Endowment Study Report. The Asia Society. 1994. ‘South Asia and the
United States After the Cold War. New York: The Asia Society. Haass, Richard N. et
al. eds. 1997. A New US Policy toward India and Pakistan. New York: The Council
on Foreign Relations. Bertsch, Gary K. Seema Gahlaut and Anupam Srivastava. eds.
1999. Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy.
New York: Routledge. Bajpai, Kanti and Amitabh Mattoo. 2000. Engaged
Democracies: India-US relations in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Har-Anand
Publications. Cohen, Stephen P. ‘ India and America: An Emerging Relationship,’ a
paper presented to the Conference on the Nation-State System and Transnational
Forces in South Asia, 8-10 December 2000, Kyoto. Talbott, Strobe. 2004. Engaging
India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.
2 For the first-hand story of the diplomacy conducted between the United States
and India after the nuclear tests, see Talbott, Strobe. 2004. Engaging India:
Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb. New Delhi: Penguin Books India. For US
responses to India’s nuclear tests, see also, Talbott, Strobe. 1999. ‘Dealing with the
Bomb in South Asia,’ Foreign Affairs, vol.78, no.2, pp. 110-22; Haass, Richard N.
and Morton H. Halperin. 1998. ‘After the Tests: US Policy Toward India and
Pakistan,’ Independent Task Force Report, sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations and the Brookings Institutions; Wojtysiak, Martin J. 2001. ‘Preventing
Catastrophe: US Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,’
Air War College, Maxwell Paper, no.25.
3 For the introduction of President Clinton’s visit to India, see Riedel, Bruce. ‘New
Directions in Indo-US Relations: President Clinton’s Visit to India,’ CASI (Center for
the Advanced Study of India) Occasional Paper, no. 11, 21 February 2000; and Bruce
Riedel, ‘ New Opportunities in US-South Asia Relations: An Assessment of President
Clinton’s Visit to India,’ CASI Occasional Paper, no.12, 9 May 2000.
4 See for example, Blackwill,, Robert D. ‘Transformation of US-India Relations
“Picking Up Speed,’” remarks delivered in New Delhi, 26 February 2002; Haass,
Richard N. ‘The United States and India: A Transformed Relationship,’ Remarks to
the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, India, 7 January 2003.
http://www.state.org.
5 Boucher, Richard, ‘New Directions in US -India Relations,’ US Department of State Press Statement,
19 June 2001. http://www.state.gov/p/sa/ci/in/3818pf.htm.
6 For a brief analysis of how US adjusted its policy towards South Asia after 9/11,
see for instance, Kraig, Michael and James Henderson. eds. 2001. ‘US Strategy for
Regional Security: South Asia,’ Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference;
Feinstein, Lee. James C. Clad, Lewis A. Dunn and David Albright. 2002. ‘A New
Equation: US Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11,’ Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Global Policy Program, no. 27; Schaffer,
Teresita C. 2002. ‘ Rising India and US Policy Options in Asia,’ A Report of the CSIS
South Asia Program; Mohan, C. Raja. 2002. ‘A Paradigm Shift toward South Asia?’
The Washington Quarterly, pp.141-55; Zhang, Guihong. 2003. ‘US Security Policy
towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese
Perspective,’ Strategic Analysis, vol.27, no.2, pp.145-71; Wisner II, Frank G.,
Nicholas Platt and Marshall M. Bouton. 2003. ‘New Priorities: US Policy toward
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan,’ Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force
Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society.
7 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
8 Before 1965, 51.7% of foreign assistance India received came from the Untied
States. See Eldridge, P.J. 1969. The Politics of Foreign Aid in India. Delhi: Vikas.
p.38. Gould, Harold A. and Sumit Ganguly. eds. 1992. The Hope and the Reality: US-
India Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan. Boulder: Westview Press. p.47.
9 Lum, Thomas. ‘US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients’,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated 10 April 2002.
10 US Embassy in India, ‘People, Progress and Partnership: the Transformation of
US-India Relations,’ September 2004.
http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhppp.html
11Blackwill, Robert D. ‘The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship,’
Remarks Delivered in Calcutta, 27 November 2002.
12 ‘Gilman Calls for Close Ties with India,’ Press Release, 6 April 2001.
13Bajpai, Kanti. 2001. ‘Add Five “E”s to Make a Partnership,’ The Washington
Quarterly, vol.24, no.3, p.83.
14 ‘Jaswant Nails Govt, Attacks America,’ The Times of India, 16 November 2004.
15 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
16 Kronstadt, K Alan. ‘India-US Relations,’ CRS (Congressional Research Service)

Issue Brief for Congress, updated 4 November 2004
17 ‘Weapons of Peace: US Should Buy Back Arms to Prevent War’, The Times of
India, 24 November 2004.
18 For a US perspective of Sino-Indian relations, see for example, Garver, John W.
2001. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Seattle:
University of Washington Press; Frankel, Francine R. and Harry Harding. Eds. 2004.
The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. New York:
Columbia University Press. For Indian perspective of Sino India relations, see for
instance, Deepak, B R. 2005. India & China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and
Conflict, New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd.
19 Harding, Harry. 2004. ‘The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India, and
the United States,’ in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, eds., The India-China
Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement. New Delhi: Oxford University Press India.
p.326.
20 See Kux, Dennis. 2000. The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted
Allies. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press. p.135. Also, ‘[t]he United States has provided 157 million
US dollars in military assistance to India since 1947, more than 90 per cent of it
distributed from 1962-1966,’ in Kronstadt, K Alan. ‘India-US Relations,’ CRS
(Congressional Research Service) Issue Brief for Congress, updated 4 November
2004.
21Garver, John W. 2002. ‘The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the
post-Cold War Era,’ in NBA analysis, vol.13, no.5, pp11-16.
22 Shirk, Susan L. ‘One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perceptions and Policies toward
India,’ in Frankel and Harding. eds. The India-China Relationship, p.84.
23 Garver, ‘The China-India-US Triangle,’ p.41.
24 For a US perspective of Sino-US relations, see for example, Harding, Harry. 1992.
A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press; Lampton, David M. 2001. Same Bed, Different Dreams
(Stanford: Stanford University Press.
25 Cohen, Stephen P. 2001. India: Emerging Power. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press India, preface, p.x.
26 Frankel and Harding. eds. the India-China Relationship, p.324.
27 Ibid. p.337.
28 Needless to say, American scholars have contributed far more on the study of
China-US-India strategic triangle than their Indian or Chinese counterparts. For the
US perspectives of the triangle, see for example, Rajamony, Venu. 2002. ‘India-
China-U.S. Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making,’ in CSIS
Occasional Report, http://www.csis.org/saprog/venu.pdf; Garver, John W. 2002.
‘The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the post-Cold War Era,’ in NBA
analysis, vol.13, no.5; Malik, Mohan. 2003. ‘US-India-China: A Tangled Triangle,’ in
Force; Harding, Harry. 2004. ‘The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India,
and the United States,’ in Frankel, Francine R. and Harry Harding. eds. The India-
China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. New York: Columbia
University Press.
29 According Harry Harding, this phrase is the modification of the quotation from
Henry Kissinger who said the United States could ‘drink its vodka and have its
maotai too’ to describe US favorable position in the triangle among the Soviet
Union, the United States, and China, see Frankel and Harding. eds. The India-China
Relationship, p.322 and 349.
30Pandit, Rajat. ‘India to “Arm” Itself for Strategic Interests,’ The Times of India. 27
October 2004.
CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN
Professor Dr Dolla Varaprasad Sekhar

INTRODUCTION
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the largest technology
transfers that the world had ever seen- a process which was essentially led
by the developed countries. Towards the end of the century the pace of this
process has been redefined largely by two factors. Firstly, the rapid
development and expansion of knowledge economies and information
societies,1 led by information and communication technology (ICT)
revolution, in the advanced countries. Secondly, a slow and steady
expansion of the same in the developing countries leading to a scenario of
narrowing the “digital divide” that exists between the advanced and
advancing countries. As a result, some of the developing countries such as
China and India are developing their home-grown technologies, some of
which are in collaboration with and assistance from the advanced
countries. They are now in a position to export these technologies to other
countries and thereby changing the nature of technology transfers2 in their
quantum and quality. Therefore, at the beginning of the twenty first
century it is imperative to know the dynamics of technology flows from
one country to another to understand the nature of these technology flows
and their impact on the international, regional and bilateral relations.
China, with its own rapid technological development in certain areas seems
to have finally arrived at a position that it can export technologies to some
of the developing countries. Pakistan being a strong ally for almost four
decades has received various kinds of technology from China which have
played an important role in improving its own technological capabilities. It
is in this broad context the present article attempts an analysis of civilian
technology transfer between China and Pakistan- two close allies that have
had one of the most consistent bilateral relations in the post-Second World
War period, despite some minor irritants, particularly in the 1950s. This
paper, however, does not touch upon nuclear technology transfers where
there are contentious debates about China’s role in the development of
Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. 2
Two preliminary facets are to be noted prior to delving into civilian

technology transfers between China and Pakistan. (i) There has been very
little research done in the area of civilian technology transfer from China
to other countries in general and to Pakistan in particular.3 Most of the
literature relating to Chinese technology transfers deals with importing
advanced technologies from developed countries.4 (ii) The nature of
relations between China and Pakistan needs to be kept in mind while
delineating transfer of technology. The relations between the two are
explained poetically as being “higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the
oceans and sweeter than honey” by Pakistani President Parvez Musharuff,
while others call their bilateral relations as an “all-weather friendship”
oriented. All these epithets do emphasize the nature and the depth of
bilateral relations between China and Pakistan Section II, the main part of
the paper, details origins, evolution and trends in, along with various
problems and future of, technical cooperation between China and Pakistan
since 1950 till 2004. Section III provides some conclusions.
CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN
The extent and depth of civilian technology transfer from China to Pakistan
is determined by two factors: the requirement and demand in Pakistan5 for
capital- intensive goods and the deepening and expansion of their bilateral
trade. 6 Pertaining to the first aspect, a glance at Pakistan’s imports7 of
machinery, transport equipment and chemicals which constitute about 50
percent of the total imports with $1.5 billion, 0.5 $ billion and $1.3 billion8
respectively shows the extent of its domestic requirements where China
can play a crucial role in meeting some of these needs. Moreover, as China
is able to increase its technological sophistication it is in a better position
to supply the technologies that Pakistan requires. This also depends on the
pace of the growth of domestic technology in Pakistan.9 Pakistan, given its
slow rate of technology development, “will continue to import basic
technology design from abroad.” 10
Relating to bilateral trade, the more the trade the more the scope for
technology transfers. In 1997 the total volume of bilateral trade between
China and Pakistan was less than US $ 1 billion dollars.11 Since then it has
been on the rise leading to better prospects for trade in technology-
intensive goods. In 2002 China was the third largest exporting country to
Pakistan with a share of 6.8 percent of the total imports.12 In 2003-2004
China and Pakistan had $ 2.5 billion dollars worth trade, which is estimated
to be 30 percent more than 2002-2003. Both countries hope to expand this

in future.
Trends in Civilian Technology Transfer
Following Charles Cooper’s broad framework of Direct and Indirect

technology transfers, China’s technology transfer to Pakistan is dominated
by the direct mode. What China has been doing in its civilian technology
transfers to Pakistan is what the erstwhile Soviet Union did to China in the
1950s in terms of building a number of industrial establishments in China.
But the difference in Sino-Pak civilian technology transfers is that the scale
is rather small in comparison primarily because of current limitations of
the Chinese technological wherewithal.
There are three major trends in the civilian technology transfer between
China and Pakistan. The first trend is that of economic aid wherein China
gave Pakistan various amounts of aid from time to time to meet some of its
economic imperatives. This was the pattern in the first decade after the
establishment of bilateral relations. The second trend is that of building
some major industrial complexes which started in the 1960s and carried
out vigorously in the 1970s and 1980s. This trend is also in operation now
in certain areas. The third trend is the rise of indirect technology transfer
in the 1990s and in the twenty first century. During this period the
technical cooperation between China and Pakistan had taken a new
dimension where the number of technologies transferred increased
substantially. As part of the indirect technology transfer there are a number
of Chinese technical experts who are working on various projects in
Pakistan. This has provided a direct contact between the Pakistani experts
and the Chinese thereby a source of enhancing their technical skills. It is
not clear as to how many Chinese scientists, engineers and other
professionals are in Pakistan training their counterparts. One estimation is
that there are at least 500 of them. Given Chinese potential, in September
2004 the Pakistani government sought Chinese assistance in boosting
vocational training system and upgradation of manpower in various
spheres.13 There are about 200 Pakistani professionals being trained in
different Chinese universities, academies and institutes such as Tsinghua
University, Beijing Institute of Technology and Fudan University.
Origins and Evolution
China and Pakistan have signed about 116 agreements and protocols
pertaining to political, economic, technical and cultural components
between 1951 and 1990.14 During this period technical cooperation
between the two had been an integral part of their economic cooperation at
least until 1975. In other words, economic and technical cooperation went
hand in hand. In all they had about 12 economic and technical agreements
between them during 1965-1976. The first ever economic and technical
cooperation agreement signed between the two was in November 1965
when China agreed to build the Taxila heavy machine project. As Anwar
Hussain Syed explains the most notable project built by the Chinese in
Pakistan is “heavy mechanical complex at Taxila, capable of producing
machines that would make cement, sugar, textiles, boilers, road-building
equipment, and railway engines.”15 Prior to that they had some sort of
barter agreement in operation wherein, for instance, in 1963 they
exchanged Chinese portland cement for Pakistani unprocessed jute. In the
same year they also signed an agreement on the transmission of picture
service between Beijing and Karachi. In 1971 China agreed to assist
Pakistan in building a sugar mill. In 1973 it was agreed that China would
help constructing the Tarbela-Wah transmission line and Tarbela cotton
spinning mill. Setting up of a fertilizer company was agreed upon in 1974.
In 1975 China supplied 41 diesel generating sets to Pakistan besides setting
up a textile mill in Punjab province. Pakistan also supplied China 10 ships
in 1978 for cash payment within five years. In 1979 China agreed to export
steel billets, tools, workshop implements, sheet and glass plates,
construction and road building machinery, agricultural implements and
telecommunications equipment. In a 1980 protocol China concurred to
provide assistance in chemical fertilizers industry, construction
technology, and biogas.
Since1976 scientific and technical cooperation came to emerge as an

independent component in their bilateral agreements. For the first time in
May 1976 they signed a specific scientific and technical cooperation
agreement. There were 16 such agreements signed from May 1976 to July
1990. Before they finalized some of the agreements on scientific and
technical cooperation they had four sessions on how to go about scientific
and technical cooperation which eventually led to the agreement on the
establishment of China-Pakistan Joint Committee for Economic, Trade

Scientific and Technical Cooperation Commission (CPJETSTCC) in 1983
which is something similar to what China and US have between them- Sino-
Us Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation.
With this comprehensive expansion of economic ties between the two they
went about specifying the number of areas in which they would cooperate.
For instance, in 1983, Pakistan agreed to cooperate in ten items on China’s
request and China offered to undertake 15 items for that year. A high –level
Chinese military delegation held talks with senior officials of the water and
power development authority in Lahore on 6th May 1985. The delegation
was informed that China’s engineers and technicians are now engaged in
installing in Guddu a 210-MW unit which is now at the last stage of
completion. It was told that in view of the shortage of electricity being
faced by Pakistan, it is necessary to carry forward Pakistan’s atomic energy
programme without any hindrance.16 Discussions were underway for a
second 210 MW project in Jamshoro.17 In 1986 Pakistan agreed to cooperate
in eight areas as proposed by China and China in turn took up seven new
programmes as proposed by Pakistan. The number of areas of cooperation
went up as the years passed by. In 1987 there were 16 areas and in 1989
about 24 areas had been identified for bilateral cooperation. This was a sure
sign of expansion of scientific and technical cooperation. Some of the areas
covered as part of the agreements are agriculture, energy, including
renewable energy, health, railway technology, manufacturing of surgical
appliances, mineral research, oil exploration,river delta survey, electronics,
marine science, industrial development, food technology. China and
Pakistan have signed 417 intergovernmental agreements in the field of
science and technology since 1976.18 This means that China and Pakistan
had 401 agreements signed between them since 1990. And in 2000 they had
their 11 th session in Beijing wherein they have pledged their commitment
to further economic and S&T cooperation in the twenty-first century.19
Cooperation in civilian technology is part and parcel of one of the four
point-proposals that undergird the bilateral relations between China and
Pakistan in the contemporary international context.20 This proposal was
later written into the China-Pakistan Joint Declaration signed on 4
November in 2003. Point four of the Third section of the Declaration reads
as follows: Guide and encourage their government departments scientific
research institutes and universities and high-tech enterprises to conduct
broad level technological cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as

telecommunication, water conservancy, electric power, aviation, space
technology, computer automation, metallurgy, IT, medicine and health,
petrochemistry, biotechnology and peaceful utilization of nuclear power.
The two parties will endeavour to transfer know-how and exchange of
information. In this context the two parties will give full play to the guiding
and coordinative role of the intergovernmental Joint Committee on
Scientific and Technological Cooperation (JCSTC).21
Civilian Technology Transfer in Various Fields since 1990
The following section would detail civilian technology transfer from China
to Pakistan in various fields. There may be other areas which have not been
ascertained due to certain problems such as secrecy involved in the whole
process of technology transfer between them.
Transportation
Cooperation in various modes of transportation has seen a rapid growth.

Aviation industry is one of the three sub-segments. Yang Chunshu,
President of China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation (CATIC) highlighted the progress of Chinese exports of
various airplanes such as Qing-5 and Qing-7p to Pakistan and expected that
more will be exported in future.22
In 2003 China signed an agreement with Pakistan to supply about 1300
railway wagons, one of the biggest consignments that China has ever
exported to any other country so far. Out of this, 420 are to be
manufactured in China and exported to Pakistan and the rest to be
manufactured in Pakistan as part of the Joint Venture package. This means
that China will have manufacturing units in Pakistan which would involve
more Chinese technical experts going to Pakistan and interacting with their
Pakistani counterparts. The supply of these wagons will be carried out by
two Chinese companies-Dongfang Electric Corporation and South China
Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Corporation.23
Several Chinese engineers are working on a project to develop Gwadar24

with an estimated cost of $ 114 million dollars as a deep -water port
comparable to the one in Karachi which could serve as a major hub for
many parts of Asia, particularly West Asia and South Asia. But the main
issue which needs attention is China’s goal of seeking “sovereign rights”
before investing such huge sum of money in the project. What is not clear
as yet is what “sovereign rights” means for Pakistan and China. It perhaps
means that China will have unhindered and full access to the port as it aims
to expand its presence in Asia in its pursuit of competing with the US as
one Chinese scholar pointed out.25
Information Technology
China and Pakistan are quite enthusiastic about strengthening cooperation
in the IT sector. There have been a number of efforts at developing this into
a full fledged area of cooperation. IT is also viewed as a potential factor in
forging stronger relations. Both countries feel that they can be mutually
benefited. Cooperation in software industry between China and Pakistan
began as early as 2002 and it is in its embryonic stage with immense
potential and some problems for cooperation. China and Pakistan have
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2002 when China
Software Industry Association (CSAI) visited its Pakistani counterpart
Pakistan Software Export Board (PSEB) at the invitation of the Pakistani
Minister of Science and Technology.26 The MoU highlights the possibilities
of joint development of their respective software industries. In fact, CSAI
went to Pakistan to explore the potential of investing in the development of
Pakistani software industry and found Pakistani software industry quite
advanced and invited Pakistani software companies to come and work with
them in their version of Silicon Valley-Zhong Guan Cun, very close to both
Peking University and Qinghua University, the two well acclaimed
universities in China trying to emulate Stanford university in establishing
start-ups. 26
Pakistan has three well developed Software Technology Parks (STPs) in

Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar. The interesting factor, like in India, is
that they are imbued with English language proficient IT professionals who
are viewed by the Chinese as probable partners in the development of their
IT industry in their efforts in developing software indigenously. Moreover,
China has a fairly advanced hardware sector which is contemplating of
setting up manufacturing units in Pakistan. And Pakistan is keen on this in
exchange for their IT professionals to work and to set up an educational
institution in China.
A number of Chinese IT companies have visited Pakistan and similarly

quite a few Pakistani IT companies have attended various international IT
exhibitions in China. This has enabled both the parties to understand and
estimate the strengths and weaknesses and accordingly formulate
appropriate policies to do business in the IT sector. One important factor
that could strengthen IT cooperation between China and Pakistan is the
change of focus that came about in Pakistan in its software exports from
the North American and European countries to China and other Asian and
African countries.
Energy
Pakistan is hopeful of increasing cooperation with China in its efforts to be

self-sufficient in its energy security, particularly in the electricity segment
besides what it had received from China before given the meteoric rise in
the demand for energy.
In March 2004 Pakistan and China signed an agreement for the

construction of a second nuclear power plant at Mianwali, Chasma, on the
banks of the Indus river in Punjab province. The power station would have
a capacity of 300 megawatts and the project would include a loan of US
$350 million from China.27 This is the second plant that China will be
constructing in Pakistan. The first one was completed in the same province
in 1999 and began functioning in the same year.
China also exports some of its solar energy technologies to Pakistan. The
irony is that while China exports its home grown solar energy technology
to Pakistan, 28 it also imports advanced solar energy production technology
from Germany.29 Chinese solar energy technology is efficient in low
temperature and it is trying to improve upon this and begin to move
towards producing tubes that can withstand high temperatures which is
why China is importing those technologies from the advanced countries.
Jiangsu Solar Energy Research Institute has agreed to supply the needed
technical assistance to Pakistan to produce solar collector tubes. China has
also agreed to build two power plants that would generate 300 megawatts of
electricity in the Sindh area of Thar.30
Telecommunications
Capital Communication of China (CCC), a Chinese telecommunication

company has recently shown keenness to manufacture telecommunication
equipment such as hand sets, CDMA, and broadband infrastructure in
Pakistan.31 This has been welcomed by Awias Ahmad Knan, Minister for
Information Technology because he believes that setting up of
manufacturing units in Pakistan would provide an interface between the
advanced technologies of other countries and the domestic technological
potential and provide the much needed fillip to enhance their own
capabilities.
Food Security
Though Pakistan had its own Green Revolution32 which had enabled it to
be more or less self-sufficient it desires that its food security to be
comprehensive. Moreover, as Bukri and Laporte argue that “Pakistan has a
rich –and still largely untapped- agricultural potential.”33 It is in this
context that China’s advancement in agricultural technology including
biotechnology and genetic engineering can be of immense use for Pakistan.
China has been helping Pakistan in its endeavours to improve its food
security by transferring some of its hybrid varieties to Pakistan and trying
to help Pakistan enhance its research capabilities in agricultural research
particularly in areas such as genetic modification. In 2004 the Pakistani
leaders wanted the Chinese to set up joint ventures in Pakistan for
formulation and production of pesticides besides learning from the
Chinese experience of seed production. 34
Problems and Future
There are certain problems that can slow the pace of civilian technology
transfers between China and Pakistan. One of them is social in nature-
terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism is a major problem that could hamper the
bilateral technical cooperation as it has demonstrated on May 3, 2004 when
three Chinese engineers were killed and nine injured at Gwadar port in
Southwestern part of Pakistan. In another incident on 14 October 2004 one
of the two Chinese engineers held hostage was killed in the rescue
operation.35 These incidents have put enormous pressure on the Chinese
engineers and technicians in going to Pakistan and work.
The other is relating to the trajectory of technology development in

Pakistan. One of the goals that Pakistan’s Executive Committee on National
Economic Council has recently set for the Pakistani economy is to be self-
sufficient in all aspects of designing, installation, construction and
operation through both product and process transfer of technology.36 It
remains to be seen how China would help Pakistan fulfill this significant
goal which would go a long way in making Pakistan self-sufficient and less
dependent on China in future.
Despite the problems enumerated above technology transfer between

China and Pakistan is likely to continue in future given the history of their
bilateral cooperation in political, cultural and other dimensions unless
some major deadlock crops up. As Pakistani technology matures with the
help of technology imports from the US, China and other countries, its
dependence on China may decline in future.
The future dynamics of civilian technology transfer between China and

Pakistan is also dependent on several factors including the way technology
develops in India and China and the way they move forward in resolving
the bilateral issues especially the border dispute. Both China and Pakistan
are watching India emerging as a dynamic technology power, particularly
in the area of software technology which will also be an important player
in supplying cheaper technologies not only to Pakistan but also to China.
Moreover, the glacial pace with which India and Pakistan are moving in
resolving their bilateral disputes will come to an end some time in future.
The day they are resolved the utility of China may see a substantial change
which in turn will redefine the relations between China and Pakistan in the
realm of civilian technology transfers.
CONCLUSIONS
With a steady economic growth coupled with a deep integration of its

economy in Asia and in the rest of the world China has slowly embarked
on the path to becoming an important player in technology generation and
transfers particularly in the intermediate and low technology end products
and processes and slowly emerging as a significant player in high-tech
products despite some problems. This has strengthened its ability to export
various kinds of technologies to Pakistan which will go a long way in
benefiting not only Pakistan but also China in the long run. In helping
Pakistan in its developmental process China facilitates the development of
its firms at home. However, there are certain problems relating to the
transfer of high-tech products wherein China’s presence is behind some of
the developed countries. It is in this realm that Pakistan will turn to other
providers. It remains to be seen how both will cooperate in the future
given the trajectory of “demand pull” and “technology push” factors.
REFERENCES
1 For more on knowledge economy and China’s place in it see Carl J. Dalhman and
Jean-Eric Aubert, ed., China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century
(Washington D. C.: World Bank, 2001).
2 A number of studies have been done on technology transfer from the North to the
South or from developed countries to the developing countries which detail
various critical issues of technology transfer from the North to the South whether
or not they are contributing to the development of the South. But few studies look
at the nature and impact of technology transfers within and among the developing
countries such as Sanjay Lall “Trade in Technology by a Slowly Industrializing
Country: India,” in Nathan Rosenberg and C. Frischtak, ed., International
Technology Transfer: Concepts, Measures and Comparisons (New York: Praeger,
1985).
3 While the US, Russia and India besides several other countries acknowledge
Chinese supplies to Pakistan, the Chinese deny that they had supplied anything of
that sort to Pakistan.
4 There are very few book length studies on China-Pakistan relations such as
Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale

(London: OUP, 1974) and numerous research papers but most of them either deal
with general bilateral relations with a strong focus on strategic and security
considerations.
5 Charles Feinstein and Christopher Howe, eds., Chinese Technology Transfer in

the 1990s: Current Experience, Historical Problems and International Perspectives
(Chetenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), Mark A. Cohen, A. Elizabeth Bang and
Stephanie J. Mitchell, ed., Chinese Intellectual Property Law and Practice (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), Yizheng Shi, Chinese Firms and
Technology in the Reform Era (London: Routledge, 1998), Samuel P. S. Ho,,
“Technology Transfer to China During the 1980s-How Effective: Some Evidence
from Jiangsu,” Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), vol. 70, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 85-106.
Rustan Kosenko, and A. C. Samli, “China’s Four Modernizations and Technology
Transfer,” in A. Coskun Samli, ed., Technology Transfer: Geographic, Economic,
and Technical Dimensions (Westport: Quorum Books, 1985) and many other
writings focus only on Chinese acquisition of technologies and there is no book
length study done on Chinese exports of its technologies to other countries.
6 See S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999); Robert E. Looney, The Pakistani Economy: Economic Growth and
Structural Reform (London: Praeger, 1997); Anita Weiss, Culture, Class, and
Development in Pakistan: The Emergence of an Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Various articles on Pakistan’s economy, along with
articles on other South Asian countries, are put together in Prema-Chindra
Athukorala, ed., The Economic Development of South Asia Vols. I-III (Cheltenham:
Elgar Reference Collection, 2002).
7 Their bilateral trade depends on two factors of evolving trade environment in

Pakistan and the global trading environment. For more on this see Asfaque H.
Khan and Zafar Mahmood, ed, Pakistan and Emerging Global Trading
Environment: Challenges and Opportunities (Lahore: Vanguard, 2000)
8 There are three major segments in Pakistan that import technology from other
countries. The government imports, private capital goods imports and private
consumer goods each with a certain quota of imports. See Stephen R. Lewis Jr.,
Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Policies (London: Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1970), p. 24.
9 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, February 2004, p. 5.
10Shahjad A. Mufti, “Science and Technology Funding System in Pakistan,” in

Proceedings from the International Forum on Science Funding System Oriented to
the 21st Century, Beijing, P. R. China, 1-3 August 2001 (Beijing: Higher Education
Press, 2002), pp. 199-205.
11 Ijaj Nabi, “The Competitiveness of Pakistani Exports,” in Sharukh Rafi Khan, ed.,
Fifty Years of Pakistan’s Economy: Traditional Topics and Contemporary Concerns
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 196.
12 Statistics from China General Administration of Customs in “Sino-Pakistan

Relations,” http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2003-
11/22/content/_1192925.htm
13 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, February 2004, p. 5.
14 “Pakistan Seeks Chinese Assistance to Boost Vocational Training System,”

PakTribune, September 17 2004, Web Edition.
15Wolfgang Bartke gives very useful details of various agreements signed between
China and Pakistan in The Agreements of the People’s Republic of China with
Foreign Countries 1949-1990, Second, revised and enlarged edition, (Munchen: K.
G. Saur, 1992), pp. 137-142. The author is very grateful to Bartke for this
compilation. This section is largely based on his compilation. Pakistan is just
behind the US and Japan in the number of agreements that China had outside the
Communist block.
16 Syed, n. 4, p. 142.
17 “Chinese Army Told of Pakistan’s Energy needs,” SWB/FE/7948/A3/7.
18 “Pakistan Prime Minister Leaves for China,” SWB/FE/8070/A3/2.
19 “Sino-Pakistan Relations,” http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/ english/200311/
22/content/_ 1192925.htm
20 http//:www.fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn / 20005 / 15 / eng / 2000515_40854.html
21 This is part of the economic, trade, science and technology cooperation. The
other three are continuing high-level exchanges, deepening non-traditional

security relations and maintaining cooperation in the international and regional
affairs.
22 See http://www.fmrc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/wzs/gjlb/2757/ 2758 /t40148.htm for

the entire document.
23 “China-Pakistan Reaffirm Air-Links,” China Daily, 10 September, 2003.
24 http//:www.thehindubusinessline.com/bline / 2003 / 02 / 24 /
stories/2003022400090601.htm
25 For more on this see Amy Waldman, “City of Fishermen in Pakistan Becomes a
Strategic Port,” New York Times, September 2004, Web Edition.
26 Shen Dingli, Concluding Comments at a workshop on “China-US-India
Triangular Relations,” Fudan University, 29 May 2004.
27 “Delegation of China Software Industry Association (CSAI) to Pakistan”
http://www.pseb.org.pk/ News/csai.cfm
28See the Chinese, not English, websites of the said universities for more on how
each university has started about 50 start-ups.
29“Chinese Engineers Killed by Bomb-Nuclear Contract with China,” Keesing’s

Record of World Events, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2004, p.46003.
30“China to Help Pakistan in Developing Solar Energy,” Pakistan Times, 26 March

2004.
31 “China Sets-Off the Biggest Solar Plant,” Pakistan Times, 17 July 2004.
32“China to built (d) Two New Powerhouses in Thar,” PakTribune, June 19 2004,
Web Edition.
33 “China to Manufacture Mobile Sets in Pakistan,” Pakistan Times, 7 July 2004.
34 Leslie Nulty, The Green Revolution in West Pakistan: Implications for

Technological Change (New York: Praeger, 1972).
35Shahid Javed Burki and Robert Laporte Jr., Pakistan’s Development Priorities:
Choices for the Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Though this has
been said in the early 1980s it is still relevant given the slow development of
Pakistan’s agriculture.
36 “Chinese Companies Interested in Investing in Pak’s Chemical Sector,”

PakTribune, May 26 2004, Web Edition.
37“One Chinese Killed and One Freed in Pakistan,” People’s Daily, 15 October
2004, Web Edition.
38 Pakistan Times, 29 July 2004.

Session-I: Pakistan China Relations (Security Dimension) (70)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
BY CHAIRMAN
Thank you everyone, thank you speakers and thanks to audience for
their questions and their cooperation who made this session
successful.
Thank you.
Session – II
Pakistan-China Relations
(Security, Political and
Economic Dimensions)
ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS
Ambassador (R)
Khalid Mahmood
Pakistan-China friendship is a unique phenomenon. Its raison d’etre could

not be ascribed to the classic elements. The two countries had nothing in
common in terms of language, ethnicity or culture. Ideologically apart, they
followed divergent models of economic and political development. The
Pakistan-China relationship even defied the logic of cold war politics when
Pakistan joined SEATO – a military alliance tailored to contain China!
However, reaching out to each other at the 1955 Bandung Conference was
just the beginning of the special relationship which proceeded step–by–
step towards establishing an “all-weather friendship” on the basis of
mutuality of interest. The relationship has not only stood the test of time
but also grown into a strategic partnership whose political fundamentals
have remained unaffected by changes at the domestic scene and radical
transformation at the global level and in the region, including the nascent
China- India rapprochement. However, bilateral economic and commercial
cooperation and people-to-people contacts do not correspond to the level
and quality of political relationship.
OVERVIEW: POLITICAL RELATIONS
Pakistan- China relations may not enjoy the uniqueness of the late 60s and
early 70s when China was isolated, but Pakistan retains importance for
China as a reliable ally internationally and a factor of security for China’s
Southern and Western periphery. The Chinese leadership has repeatedly
assured Pakistan of the special nature of Pak-China relations and that they
would not be affected by the development of China’s relations with India.
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told Pakistan Foreign Minister
Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri that China-Pakistan relations were unique and
nothing could drive a wedge between the two countries. For Pakistan,
China remains the closest friendly country and the most reliable source of
military hardware and technology, in addition to its involvement and
support for many important projects in the defense, heavy industry,
nuclear power and infrastructure sectors. China has a definite interest in
Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity. However, for the foreseeable
future modernization and development would continue to be the
overarching consideration determining China’s policies, both domestic and
external. It would avoid confrontation and conflict with its principal

neighbours and the United States.
OVERVIEW: ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
Economic Relations: Overall Pak- China bilateral economic and commercial

relations remain weak with the exception of considerable involvement of
China’s state corporations in important high visibility projects in Pakistan.
China’s emerging private sector remains shy of making significant
investment in Pakistan. Trade is low and heavily in favour of China.
China’s current commitment to various projects in Pakistan including

Gwadar Port, Thar coal mining, Chashma nuclear power plant-II, various
other power projects, contracts with Pakistan Railways is close to US$ 02
billion. This commitment does not include projects in the defense area or
those completed in the past. In addition, on commercial basis Chinese
companies have completed several projects in the power and infrastructure
sectors such as Guddu, Jamshoro and Uch power plants and Ghazi Barotha
project. Some sixty private Chinese companies are presently working on
different projects. A list of current major Chinese economic projects in
Pakistan is enclosed as annex ‘A’. The following two projects need special
mention:
CHASHMA-II
After the successful completion and coming into operation of 300 megawatt
nuclear power palnt at Chashma with Chinese financial and technical
support, financial contract for another 300 megawatt Chashma-II nuclear
power plant has been signed between Pakistan and China. The Chinese
Government will provide US $ 150 million from the Preferential Buyer’s
Credit Facility of US $ 500 million. It will also provide a concessional loan
of US $ 200 million for the Project.
GWADAR PORT PROJECT
In 2001 Pakistan and China signed a formal agreement under which

Chinese Government will provide financial support of for the construction
of the first phase of the Gwadar seaport and Makran coastal highway. The
first phase will cost a total of US$ 248 million, of which US$ 198 million are
to be provided by the Chinese and the remaining US $ 50 million by the
Government of Pakistan. The seaport will have three births, equipped with
all essential facilities for handling trade business. Its strategic significance
apart, situated near the mouth of the Gulf of Oman and about 50 miles from
Pakistan’s border with Iran, Gwadar would provide port, warehousing,
trans-shipment and industrial facilities for over 20 countries.
Trade: Current annual bilateral trade (including Hong Kong) is barely US $

2.4 billion, which is a fraction of China’s total international trade of US $
1154 billion. In comparison, China’s trade with India has touched the mark
of over US $ 13 billion which is expected to rise to US $ 20 billion by 2008.
Pakistan has experienced trade deficit with China over the years, and the
gap has been widening gradually. During July-June (2003-2004), the total
bilateral trade volume stood at US $ 2.1 billion with exports from Pakistan
valuing US $ 870.5 million and imports into Pakistan at US $ 1299.7 million,
resulting in a trade deficit of US $ 429.2 billion. The situation gets worse if
the trade with Hong Kong is excluded. During July-June (2003-2004) the
total volume of bilateral trade with mainland China was US $ 1. 44 billion
with exports from Pakistan at US $ 288.3 million and imports into Pakistan
amounting US $ 1153.5 million, increasing the trade deficit to US $ 865.2
million. A table showing the volume of bilateral trade between China
(excluding Hong Kong) and Pakistan since 1995-96 is enclosed as annex
“B”.
Pakistan’s major export items are raw cotton, cotton fabrics, cotton yarn,
wool, fish and its preparations, leather and vegetables whereas imports
from China include machinery and parts, iron and steel, sugar, tea,
chemicals, medical and pharmaceutical goods, spices, tyres and tubes,
petroleum and its products, dyeing, colouring and tanning material.
AN OVERVIEW OF CHINESE ECONOMY
China is one of the fastest expanding economy in the world which has
been growing at the rate of almost 9% for more than a decade. With its
current GDP of US$ 1.543 trillion China has the sixth largest economy in
the world. At Purchasing Power Parity it would rank as second after USA.
Chinese foreign exchange reserves are to the tune of US $ 711 billion.
Annual Foreign Direct Investment hovers around US $ 55 billion. Chinese

economy has benefited greatly from trade surpluses, high rate of domestic
savings (34 % of GDP), capital flow and technology transfer. However due
to over- heating of the economy, the country is facing acute shortage of
energy supply. Then there is great disparity in the development level
between the country’s eastern coastal areas and Central and Western China
as well as between rural and urban areas. To illustrate, as against the US $
5000 per capita of Shanghai and Shenzhen, in rural China it is less than US
$ 500, and in remote areas even less than US$ 300.
An Overview of Pakistan’s Economy
Thanks to the transparent structural reforms consistently followed by the

Government over the last six years, Pakistan’s ailing economy has made a
major turn-around. The macro-economic indicators for Pakistan are
positive. The invest climate is attractive. The exports and foreign Exchange
Reserves are healthy. Fiscal deficit is contained at 3.3%. Interest rates are
low. Across the board reforms have been undertaken in the financial and
banking sectors. Pakistan is now out of the IMF-PRGF and in fact returned
two tranches offered by the IMF. The Privatisation Programme has
progressed well. Major banks have been privatized. Telecom sector is being
deregulated. Mobile telephony has seen a quantum jump. The Government
is paying greater attention to the social sector. Education is high priority as
is agriculture. Major infrastructure projects are taking shape in the form of
new power plants, ports, roads and rail net-works, Pakistan is now well
positioned geographically to emerge as a commercial hub for landlocked
Central Asia and beyond. It is focusing on becoming an important trans-
shipment point for the flow of goods and resources especially energy.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE ECONOMIC

AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
The reinvigoration of Pakistan’s economy and the phenomenal expansion

of Chinese economy and its surplus capital offer Pakistan a valuable
opportunity to enhance its economic and commercial interaction with
China to our mutual benefit. Indeed the preservation and reinforcement of
the strategic quality of our political relationship and cooperation requires
the broadening of bilateral trade and economic cooperation.
I. Economic Cooperation: For over three decades Chinese state

corporations have been engaged in construction of large
projects in Pakistan e.g. Karakoram Highway(KKH), Heavy
Mechanical Complex(HMC), Heavy Forge and Foundry(HFF),
Heavy Electrical Complex (HEC) and Saindak Copper and
Gold Mine Project.
There has been a major shift in Chinese government’s

economic assistance policy towards Pakistan, from
‘commercial state loans to the suppliers credit’ due to China’s
changed economic compulsions. At present, Chinese project
assistance is mostly in the shape of soft loans, commercial
credits with an element of grant. It now often insists on
furnishing of sovereign guarantee while financing major
projects, backed by additional commercial bank guarantee as
well.
The issue of additional financing from China should take into

account the fact that China’s existing commitment is already
high. We should undertake partial financing when seeking
assistance for future projects say in the field of energy.
China’s future demand for oil and gas is expected to reach
incredibly high proportions. We may invite China’s interest
in offshore exploration of oil and gas in Pakistan. Pakistan
also provides the most economical transit route for
transportation of oil and gas to China.
Private sector is still in a formative stage in China. But it has

started seeking joint ventures and investment abroad mostly
in the stable markets of the West and in South East Asia. Many
private entrepreneurs and companies depend on direct or
indirect government support to do investment in projects
outside China.
Some private companies have invested in Pakistan in

electronic, telecommunication, engineering goods and
automobiles. Other potential areas for future Chinese private
investment include software development, food/beverages
processing, textiles including textile machinery, marble and

granite, jewellery and gemstones.
China has announced a US $ 500 million Preferential Buyers’

Credit to support Chinese investment in Pakistan.
II. Trade
Pakistan has so far succeeded in incremental expansion in its

exports and overall trade with China with balance still
heavily in favour of China. Our product mix is limited with
almost 80% comprising cotton yarn and fabric. Efforts to
encourage joint ventures in textiles, taking advantage of
staggard removal of qoutas in 2005 under WTO regime did not
produce any significant results. Meanwhile, conclusion of
Preferntial Tariffs Agreement leading to the establishment of
a Free Trade Area regime and conclusion of Early Harvest
Programme covering 52 items from each side on which
custom duty would be reduced to zero by January 01, 2006 as
well as quarantine accords which would allow export of
mangoes, citrus fruit and rice to China should help in
increasing Pakistan’s exports to China.
The Free Trade Area would be established in three phases

between 01 January, 2006 to January 01, 2008.The 52 item
that Pakistan would export to China duty free include bed-
linen, table linen and other home textile, terry towels,
blended fabrics, synthetic yarn, synthetic fabrics, mangoes,
oranges, dates, tarpaulin, marble articles, surgical goods,
sports goods, cutlery, certain dyes, sugar gum and medicines.
The list of Chinese export items include industrial machinery
and chemical raw material. During the first round of
negotiations on FTA held on 15-16 August, 2005 at Urumqi,
both sides agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the
negotiations which include General Principles, coverage of
FTA, Time-frame, Negotiating Mechanism etc. Views were also
exchanged on Tariff Reduction Modality and Rules of Origin
and its Operational Certification Procedure. The next round
of negotiations is scheduled to be held in November, 2005. On

the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, the
Preferential Trade Agreement shall be abolished.
Opening of Consulate in Shanghai and start of PIA service to

that commercial hub are steps in the same direction.
Some additional ideas for promotion of bilateral trade are as

follows:
§ In order to diversify our export items a compre-hensive

survey and analysis of Chinese market in goods and
services should be undertaken.
§ Pakistan can serve as a spring board for transit trade of
Chinese goods to Central Asia and the Gulf countries.
Pakistan and China should undertake discussion to work
out necessary details including construction of required
infrastructure.
§ Pakistan should consider benefiting from China’s

economic network in North East and South East Asia.
§ The Border Trade Agreement which expired long ago

should be revived to increase bilateral border trade.
§ The establishment of Special Export Processing Zone

exclusive for China should be expedited.
§ Beijing will host Olympics in 2008. We should encourage

our companies to bid for contracts for supply of sports
gear and equipment, construction material, food and
confectionary etc.
§ Business delegations should be exchanged for targeted

products like textiles, leather, garments, marble, surgical
equipment. Pakistani business houses should establish
their outlets/offices in China.
§ Participation in seminars, workshops and fairs organized

in either country should be encouraged.
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S CENTRAL AND WESTERN REGION:
On 27 December, 2000 Chinese State Council announced Development

Strategy measures to develop the country’s Central and Western regions
which have lagged behind the phenomenal development witnessed by the
Eastern parts of China. An amount of US $ 90 billion had been initially
marked for this region which covers 12 provinces, autonomous regions
and cities spanning 6.83 million square miles ( 71% of China’s total area)
with a population of 320 million people(28.4% of the total population).
Xinjiang alone has 35% of China’s oil and gas reserves and is the country’s
largest production base of cotton, fruits and other agricultural products.
This policy is of great economic and political significance not only for
China but also neighbouring countries including Pakistan which is
connected through Karakoram Highway with China’s Xinjiang province.
The potential viability of this link becomes evident when one realizes that
the distance between China’s Xinjiang area and Karachi/Gwadar ports is
just about 2500 kilometer as against its distance of 4500 kilometer from
China’s eastern seaboard. A Special Programme should be chalked out to
exploit the rapidly growing synergies between Western China and Pakistan
as a result of China’s focus on this region and the development of Gwadar.
It would require , among other things, upgradation of existing
infrastructure including the KKH for handling huge volume of goods.
QUADRILATERAL AGREEMENT ON TRAFFIC-IN-TRANSIT (1995)
An Agreement was signed in 1995 between Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzistan to promote Traffic–in-Transit among the four countries. A
number of expert- level meetings have been held to evolve consensus on
various relevant issues like transit fee, permits, custom regime, toll charges,
and development of necessary infrastructure etc. In 1996 the member
countries concluded a Protocol on Custom Procedures for Goods in Transit
and Passport Visa Regime and in 1998 regulations for implementation of
this Agreement and a Protocol on establishing the system of international
road transit permit were also signed. In spite of one dry run having been
undertaken the Agreement is still awaiting implementation. Energetic
follow-up action is required.
& nbsp;
& nbsp;
BANKING SECTOR
Unfortunately n0 Pakistani or Chinese bank has a presence in each other’s

country. China has an asset requirement of US$ 20 billion for any foreign
bank to set up a branch in China, which no Pakistani bank can meet. This
condition needs to be relaxed. This will not only facilitate routing of
normal banking business between Pakistan and China but will also provide
an excellent opportunity to Pakistani banks to enter the fastest growing
Chinese financial market where every foreign bank is aspiring to enter.
National Bank of Pakistan has a representative office in Beijing for over 20
years. It could be easily upgraded to a full-fledged branch. This will also
help resolve the issue of bank guarantees for Pakistani businessmen in
China and vice versa.
CONCLUSION
Pakistan and China have developed an exemplary state-to-state relationship

based on complete mutual trust since the establishment of diplomatic
relation on May 21, 1951. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told his
Pakistani counterpart that “ the only country in the world with which we
describe our relationship as all-weather friendship is Pakistan”. The two
countries , to quote from the ‘ Joint Declaration on the Direction of
Bilateral Relations’ signed on November 4, 2003 between President Pervez
Musharraf and Chinese President Hu Jintao during the former’s visit to
China, “are committed to develop closer bilateral relations and further
deepen their all-weather friendship and all-round cooperative
partnership.”
The leadership in both Pakistan and China is fully conscious of the glaring
discrepancy in the close partnership subsisting between the two countries
in the political, security and strategic fields and the level and scope of
economic and commercial cooperation between them. Accordingly, in
keeping with the paradigm shift from geo-politics to geo–economics in the
new century, the two sides have agreed to “ to make full use of their
political and geographical advantages and promote cooperation in the
realm of economy, trade, investment, agriculture , technology and
tourism.”
The prodigious peaceful rise of China as a powerful global economic power

and the concurrent progress and stability witnessed by Pakistan’s economy
offer promising prospect for development of robust bilateral economic
and commercial cooperation. The geographical setting of Pakistan astride
Central, West and South Asia, combined with the available facility of KKH
and upcoming Gwadar, and the focus on development of Western China
make Pakistan as a potential transit route for the international trade and
energy flow for China, besides many other countries. The Pakistan-China
Joint Committee on Economic,Trade, Scientific and Technological
Cooperation and the Pakistan-China Business Council must play their role
in accelerating this process. The growth in Pakistan- China economic and
commercial cooperation would also contribute to the promotion of
regional cooperation and economic integration serving the long term
interest of stability, prosperity and economic growth in the region.
Annex ‘A’
& nbsp;
MAJOR CHINESE ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN
Gwadar Port Project
§ Estimated cost of project is US$248 million, 198 million to be
provided by the Chinese side (60 million commercial loan, 58
million soft credit, 31 million interest free loan and 31 million
grant).
o The China has agreed to provide additional financing for new
proposals about construction of Gwadar-I Project.
o However, the Chinese side informed that financing of
Gwadar-II Project needs deep deliberations.
Chashma-II
o Financial contract for Chashma-II has been signed. The
Chinese government will provide US$ 150 million from the
Preferential Buyer's Credit Facility of US$ 500.
o The Chinese side will also provide a concessional loan of US$

200 million for the project.
Thar Coal Project
o Shenhua Group prepared the feasibility report in consultation
with WAPDA. Shenhua Group in their report stated that the
capital expenditure estimate of the project level at current
stage was higher than investment level previously predicted.
o Negotiations between the two sides are under way to settle the
outstanding issues related to the Project and to ensure early
start of work on the site. .
Saindak Copper and Gold Mine Project
o Government of Pakistan has leased out Saindak Gold Project
to M/S MCC/MRDL for a period of ten years. The life of the
project with present capacity (15810 Metric Tons (mt) blister
copper containing 1.47 tons of gold and 2.76 tons of silver) is
19 years.
o Due to recent increase in metal prices in international

market, MRDL has proposed 30-40% enhancement in
production capacity of Saindak i.e. from 15810 mt to 24000
mt per annum. This would require an investment of US $ 20
million approximately. An MOU to this effect was inked
between Chinese MCC/MRDL and Pakistan Mineral
Development Corporation (PMDC), Ministry of Petroleum &
Natural Resources during President's visit to China.
Jinnah Hvdro-power project
The project remained unimplemented because of ECNEC
o
condition calling for international bidding. ECNEC has
recently lifted this conditionality.
Railways Up-gradation
o The Pakistan Railways have signed MOUs/Contracts for
purchase of locomotives, carriages, freight wagons to be
financed with Chinese credits. The main issue for signing
future contracts under the existing MOUs will be the term of
financing, especially interest rates.
o We are facing problems on the railway engines supplied by

the Chinese side as some engines have developed cracks in
the main frame. The Chinese Government has given
assurances for repair/replacement of the defective
locomotives.
Repairs on the Karakoram Highway

o On our request, the Chinese companies have undertaken
repair of bridges along the Karakoram Highway at a cost of
US$ 6 million, which may be adjusted against available
Chinese grants.
Raising of Mangla Dam

o A Chinese company has been awarded the contract to raise
height of Mangla Dam. There were some difficulties in
implementation of the Project at early stage but now the work
is moving forward smoothly.
Annex ‘B’
PAKISTAN-CHINA BILATERAL TRADE STATISTICS:
The volume of bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong Kong)

and Pakistan since 1995-96 has been as under:-
(Value in million US$)
Year Exports Imports Total Balance
1995-96 144.60 544.37 688.97 (-) 399.77
1996-97 103.11 541.56 644.67 (-) 438.45
1997-98 160.782 511.266 672.048 (-) 350.484
1998-99 148.920 394.432- 543.352 (-) 245.512
1999-2000 180.326 471.527 651.853 (-) 291.201
20QO-2001 303.548 524.138 827.686 (-) 220.590
2001-2002 228.631 575.219 803.85 (-) 346.588
2002-03 244.591 839.056 1083.64 (-) 594.465
2003-04 288.259 1153.470 1441.729 (-) 865.211
2004-05 241.102 1250.965 1492.067 (-) 1009,863
(July- March)
SINO-PAKISTANI STRATEGIC NEXUS: NEW ISSUES,
POTENTIALS AND THE EMERGING TREND
CHINA’S SOUTH ASIA APPROACH: CHANGE AND NO-CHANGE
In recent years, as a result of dramatically changing regional and global

climate and the new fathoming several new signs of China’s South Asia
diplomacy, how to make the protracted Sino-Pak relations sustainable and
upgraded has been identified as one of hot topics of discussion at different
levels. Besides the significance of this bilateral relationship itself, the
growing necessity of maintaining and upgrading this partnership becomes
strongly justified by China’s rising interest in South Asia and Pakistan’s
irreplaceable role in the region and beyond. To ensure Sino-Pak
partnership in the volatile setting has to be considered by Beijing as one of
understandable diplomatic priorities in view of both its own strategic
interests and consistent commitment to this time-tested partnership.
Presently, China’s posture in the South Asian scenario might certainly be of

relevance to its own evolving interests, the ongoing India-Pakistan
interactions, and the substantial presence of other extra-regional big
powers. Even going farther, Beijing’s attitude toward the region does and
will affect, to some degree, the course of change. Keeping this in mind,
China becomes increasingly aware of the need of avoiding simply
balancing for or balancing against any country in the region, and prefers to
seek larger room to maneuver on the ground of its own interest
considerations. Thus it is quite natural that the mixed effects of a possible
reorganization of powers and the presumably shifting China’s South Asia
policy began to be a focus of attention and been seriously gauged.
In this context, two noticeable responses in Pakistan merit serious

discussion. According to one strong argument, it might not be a problem
for Islamabad to understand Beijing’s policy option of taking a balanced
stance in the South Asian equation and developing ostensibly symmetrical
relations with Islamabad and New Delhi. This argument recognizes China’s
sophisticated calculus of interests in this regard that becomes epitomized
by reinforcing the Beijing-Islamabad strategic nexus while being keen to
improve its relations with New Delhi. This moderate vision tends to regard
the current China’s South Asia agenda as a rational option based on
Beijing’s larger calculations, which would not necessarily undermine the

very basis of the time-tested China-Pakistan partnership. By the same logic,
it has also been confidently believed that in the foreseeable future, China’s
ties with India, especially for its political and security dimensions, still face
formidable challenges and has to be seriously constrained, by contrast with
the problem-free, time-tested China-Pakistan solidarity. For instance, the
tough border disputes have still haunted Beijing and New Delhi that seems
to mark less likelihood to witness substantial advances in their increasing
engagements despite the fact the two governments are driven to expand the
range of their relationship. It is sensibly recognized that Pakistan is, after
all, only one nation that China has called the “all-weather” and time-tested
partner.1 Thus it should not necessarily worry about any crisis of
confidence in maintaining the bilateral partnership. According to the
argument, despite recognizing a growing importance in engaging India,
Beijing has worked out a complex strategy to deal with it; and even “would
like to have a militarily strong Pakistan to keep a check of sorts on India”.2
Even Indian analysts have also continued to believe that China’s intention
that “a militarily strong Pakistan would serve their objective of keeping
India preoccupied on two fronts and thereby safeguard their national
security interests”.3 This judgment seems to be properly grounded by the
deeper interest correlations between Beijing, Islamabad and New Delhi.
The other view voices an evolving concern over the endurance of the
Beijing-Islamabad nexus in the changing setting of regional and global
balance of power. It is said that closer Sino-Indian relations and the present
China’s even-handed stance in the Subcontinent unmistakably mark its
revisionist orientation to the region that might not be in favor of
Islamabad, and it would probably undercut the “all-weather” strategic
nexus and produce unexpected implications. Also this should be regarded
as an apparent departure from Beijing’s for-Pakistan posture that last for
years. This view argues that Islamabad has to be concerned about this
development and the possible outcomes. Actually, over recent interactions
among Chinese and Pakistani strategic analysts, growing uneasiness and
grievances began to be occasionally felt and heard. To be fair, this
heightened concern is not of complete irrelevance in terms of some
seemingly uncertain factors in this context. This reminds both Beijing and
Islamabad of an imperative to cement the foundation of their special
relationship. Whether being analytical or being critical, these speculations
and articulating views seem to be grounded properly or plausibly.

Importantly, there comes a rising need of exploring how to maintain and
strengthen Sino-Pak links in a shifting scenario. Fortunately, this initiative
has begun to be shared and welcome by strategists of both countries.
A sign of readjusting China’s South Asia policy is believed to be China’s

neutral stance in the Indo-Pakistani rivalries and Beijing’s softened
approach towards the Kashmir issue. As a matter of fact, China has
developed a serious understanding of Kashmir’s critical relevance to
Pakistan and been well informed of Islamabad’s position. While having
begun to voice more discreet and more balanced concern about the
decades-long problem since the mid-1990s, Beijing still never wants to see
Pakistan to be the losing side as far as any possible formula of settling the
dispute is concerned. The reason is quite simple and clear: A strategic
vulnerable and weak Pakistan, either domestically or externally, remains
never in China’s security interest. As widely believed, China’s attitude
toward Kashmir has exerted an apparent impact, to some extent, on
Islamabad-New Delhi interaction around the problem. In this context,
Beijing’s responses to the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2002 standoff reflect
its general perceptions of the emerging developments in the Subcontinent.
During the former event, Beijing showed an even-handed stance by arguing
that both India and Pakistan ought to address all outstanding disputes
between them in a peaceful way and try best to avoid escalating the
confrontation. Beijing also articulated its fear of possible nuclear exchange
or outside intervention given the situation going worse.4 Beijing even
believed that the lasting armed conflict between Pakistan and India could
have negative implications for its own security interests.5 China’s
constructive role in the crisis was highlighted by the successive high-level
visits of South Asian leaders to Beijing, which should not be just dismissed
as being of irrelevance. Chinese leaders and the visiting Pakistani leaders
had serious and meaningful discussions on the then Indo-Pak enmity
centered on Kashmir. 6 There seemed to be several shared understandings,
if not a full consensus, between Beijing and Islamabad of the visible
necessity of seeking a way-out through peaceful endeavors. Some two years
later, China’s balanced approach is marked again during the escalating
confrontation between the South Asian neighbors in 2002. And Beijing
encouraged and thought highly of Gen. Pervez Musharraf effort to target
terrorism and stabilizing the domestic situation. By full use of its special
relations with Islamabad and of the improved Sino-Indian relations, Beijing

enlarged its constructive inputs in the two war-verging Pak-Indian rivalries
and helped relax the tensions between them. Even a close-up observation
suggests that China, compared to Washington having a glaring diplomatic
performance in that scenario, chose to contribute to defusing the conflict
in a low-keyed manner that works underneath.
If we define China’s balanced or neutral approach by referring to its

detached consideration of the then developments as well as their trend and
reacting toward them in a mediatory manner, there are several apparent
points to justify China’s “even-handed” stance in the two South Asian crises
around Kashmir. First, Beijing, in the then circumstances, had limited
choices and a realistic judgment of gravity of the situation, becoming
acutely aware that only urgent and effective bilateral endeavors could
credibly be productive. Thus China kept itself in line with other major
powers. Second, China’s neutral posturing also reflects its increasing
concern about the regional stability. Among various dangers was primarily
the haunting likelihood of going to nuclear exchange in South Asia.7
Thirdly, Beijing had sensible judgments of the situation being not in favor
of Islamabad during both 1999 and 2002 confrontations, advocating a
reconciliatory approach to insure Pakistan’s national interests. Moreover,
Beijing cautious agenda during the South Asian standoff also indicates that
it had to fathom negative implications of an all-out Indo-Pak conflict for its
own security interests.
BEIJING-ISLAMABAD COMPLEX: MUCH MORE THAN TRADITIONAL

FRIENDSHIP
For years, the Sino-Pakistani special nexus has proved to be of profound

significance. On one hand, China always values the invaluable assistance
and support it has had from Pakistan over past decades and think highly of
the importance of holding the “traditional” solidarity, which have been
repeatedly tested through fruitful diplomatic, economic and strategic
maneuvers. For instance, Islamabad’s uniquely constructive role in
bridging the reshaping Sino-US relations in the early 1970s has been part of
contemporary Chinese diplomatic achievements. That was also one of the
most meaningful pointers of establishing China-Pakistan-America strategic
correlation, which proved to be quite significant for China to better its
security situation in the late phase of the Cold War. In addition, a well-
known fact is that China has benefited greatly form the trust-based bilateral
relations in terms of its relative access to the Moslem world, which has
secured Beijing’s engagements with and leverage in the vibrant community
of global politics. As generally believed, Beijing has recognized Pakistan’s
weight and willingness to check illegal and militant flows of regional
extremists and terrorists. Beijing becomes highly concerned about
Islamabad’s initiative in terms of Chinese western province of Xinjiang’s
perceived vulnerability to those sources of threat. This increasingly urges
Beijing to expand its coordination and cooperation with Islamabad in
addressing the “three vices”: separatism, extremism and terrorism. These
significant facets of the Sino-Pak partnership are reaffirmed and
underscored in several major documents issued during Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao’s visit to Islamabad in April this year.
On the other hand, whereas the reassured Beijing-Islamabad link, by the

same logic, should no longer be an intolerant irritant for India to engage
China; and it would not remain a diplomatic burden for China to develop a
stable and healthy relationship with India, there have been not a few
uncertainties and unpredictability working in the future China-India
relations. This requires intensified the mutual efforts of building
confidence and averting confrontation in different ways, especially around
settling the boundary and territorial disputes and dealing with a probable
geo-strategic contest between them. In this context, Pakistan has been of
strong relevance to any developments no matter how the course to be
followed. Under the prevailing circumstances, the normalization and
confidence-building between Beijing and New Delhi, plus the emerging
Indo-Pak. process of reconciliation, enables China to expect a growing
understanding and changing perception by New Delhi of the sustained and
dynamic Sino-Pak. strategic partnership. Given the current regional setting,
at least from Beijing’s perspective, to keep this special connection active is
not based on the impulsion of confronting India, but primarily on broader
security and interest considerations. At the same time, the promising Indo-
Pakistani bonhomie offers China a favorable chance to clarify its position
in South Asia by redefining the nature of collaboration between Beijing and
Islamabad in defense and strategic areas, while ensuring that strategic
partnership.
It has to be recognized that several newly emerging parameters has come

into the regional security scene, especially since the September/11 attacks.
In terms of relevance to the context herein, they primarily include the
consistent Indo-Pak détente, Sino-Indian improved relations, and
increasing US political and military leverage among other. In view of these
significant factors, it seems unavoidable to see reorganization or
realignment of powers in various degrees. Also, it is quite natural to witness
the reassurance and recommitment of partnership or coalition. The role
and function of the involved nations could also be redefined. There comes
a serious question that needs answer: For China, what type of role and of
behavior might be expected in South Asia? And more importantly, can
Beijing serve as an increasingly relevant player that pursues both South
Asian stability and its own national interests? New Delhi has still guardedly
avoided extra-regional powers’ involvement in South Asian affairs,
stubbornly rejecting any formula of outside meddling in the Indo-Pak.
equation, especially the Kashmir knot. In this context, the space of Sino-
Pakistani cooperation and Sino-Indian engagements in the shifting regional
scenario would be contained.
But in the long run, some recent developments will possibly intensify
interactions among Beijing, Islamabad and New Delhi in a tri-party or
multi-party mechanism, or at least promising certain opportunities in that
direction. The phased materialization of building mutual confidence
between China and India and the reassured China-Pakistan partnership in a
volatile setting offer an attractive chance for Beijing to serve a facilitating
part in the South Asian reconciliatory process. At a broader level, India has
begun to envisage China’s positive implications for a conceived South Asian
Free Trade Zone; Also it is noticed that India becomes interested in a
tentative tri-party “common nuclear doctrine” (India, Pakistan and China
involved), despite no hope of invoking affirmative feedback from Beijing at
the present stage.8 There has been impressive rhetoric in India about
involving China into a designed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline
arrangement. Moreover, the recent entry of Pakistan, India and Iran into
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the observer members
provides a new channel to augment strategic interactions between South
Asian powers and the involved other major players in the multilateral
arrangement dominated by China and Russia. Significantly, China always
stresses that to reassess the ascent of India’s status has to be conditioned by
an evolving judgment of its performance in South Asia, and its credibility

and ability to peacefully co-exist with Pakistan in particular.9
There should be an identifiable correlation between the improved South

Asian strategic climate and China’s initiative to adapt to the emerging
setting. Also there are major areas of overlapping interests and shared
perceptions of China and Pakistan. The progress of peace process in the
Subcontinent can further promote the improvement of Sino-Indian
relations while maintaining Beijing’s special nexus with Pakistan. Beijing
might feel fewer misgivings about its all-embracing partnership with
Islamabad. Given the evolving circumstances of Indo-Pak. rapprochement
and Sino-Indian confidence-building interaction, Beijing seems to have
reasons to invite a changing perception from New Delhi of the sustained
China-Pakistan strategic relationship. Given the present relatively pleasant
climate, to keep the China-Pakistan strategic nexus working and active, at
least from China’s perspective, is primarily based larger security and
interest considerations rather than simply balancing against India.10
Moreover, the Indo-Pakistani détente enables China to clarify the nature
and scope of its collaboration with Islamabad in defense and strategic area,
thereby discouraging the lingering skepticism and bad-mouthed
exaggeration of this sensitive matter from outside. As some Chinese
analysts have suggested, to make Sino-Pak. defense cooperation more
transparent has become increasingly necessary and possible in terms of
securing the profile of both China and Pakistan as responsible players. Of
course, to do this should not undermine Beijing’s strategic partnership with
Islamabad.
TO SECURE SINO-PAKISTAN TIES: SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
As far as security considerations are concerned, there seem various

elements meriting mutual attention and shared endeavors. First of all, as a
result of realistic assessing the significance of Sino-Pakistani nexus in the
changing setting, Beijing must continue to underscore Islamabad’s weight
in bettering its own security interests. What becomes even more important
is the fact that Pakistan enjoys a unique geo-strategic merit due to its
perceived weight in South Asia, Central Asia and even West Asia, plus its
status as one of the largest and most influential Islamic countries
worldwide. These obvious advantages enable Islamabad to try a prominent
part in the regional and inter-regional security. Even today Beijing has
taken this parameter into account in designing its peripheral stability and
diplomacy toward the Islam world. China has a sensible and close-up
observation of Pakistan’s rising role in managing the regional security and
stability after the September 11 attacks. And Beijing has highly recognized
General Pervaz Musharraf’s challenging mission and daunting efforts in
stabilizing the volatile situation at both domestic and regional levels. Even
more importantly, it has become quite clear for Beijing that there is an
increasing need to substantiate the non-traditional security partnership
between them in order to guarantee China’s relative vulnerable border
areas facing Pakistan in terms of effective control of cross-border
extremists. Actually, it has been heard in both China and Pakistan that it is
the time to regularize their border security cooperation rather than merely
stressing it on paper. The recent modest scale joint training and drills along
the border areas have smacked of targeting terrorism, signaling a growing
consensus in this regard.
Many areas of converging interest and overlapping concerns have easily

been identified in security calculus. A careful observation suggests that, of
China’s strategic and security partnerships with various countries, the Sino-
Pak link is surely among ones being of more tangible and more genuine
nature, especially at the level of defense cooperation. It is reasonably
regarded as an item of substance. Even at present, while welcoming the
ongoing Pak-Indian rapprochement and trying efforts to befriend India,
China never changes a basic recognition that a security and defense capable
Pakistan remain one of requisites of both stabilizing the region and
enlarging its own strategic interests. The equation of powers in South Asia
has to be continually pondered by Beijing in securing its strategic gains,
despite doing it in more balanced way. In this context, the past years
witness sustainable interactions on this front, including gradual but steady
amplification of defense cooperation, frequent high-profile military-to-
military exchanges, transfer of defense equipment and military technology,
joint development of advanced fighters, and enhancement of dialogues and
coordination on regional hot issues. These cooperative conducts have
proved to be tremendously helpful for their respective national interests.
Many signs indicate that China will stick to the age-long policy option of
helping upgrade Pakistan’s military and defense capability, despite possibly
doing it more transparently and discreetly. It is quite significant that China

has presently developed a growing weight in supplying Pakistan advanced
military hardware and running major defense projects in that country. For
instance, jointly-developed sophisticated combat aircraft has begun to be
used by Pakistani Air Force and they will greatly help reduce PAF’s reliance
on Western arms suppliers. From Beijing’s perspective, its moderate
defense cooperation with Islamabad should not necessarily be detrimental
to its newly improved relationship with New Delhi given the consistent
dynamics of the peace process in South Asia and the prevailing Sino-Indian
confidence-building.
From Beijing’s perspective, another major aspect of the existing Sino-

Pakistani strategic connection has much to do with the fear of other extra-
regional powers’ manipulation of the regional security climate going
contrary to China’s security interests. China has felt uneasy to see the
deepened US military presence and intended political preeminence in
South Asia and Central Asia and sees it a tremendous strategic threat if not
an impending one. As widely believed in China, intensifying US strategic
presence has produced mixed effects and brought out new uncertainties as
far as the regional security environment is concerned, despite its function
as a powerful deterrent toward terrorism. To target Osama Bin Laden and
al-Qeada after September/11 terrors offered Washington a desired chance
of stretching its muscle in Central Asia. At the same time, Islamabad has
become one of US most important anti-terror allies in this context. To be
general, China understands Pakistan’s relevance to the US agenda in a
positive manner. And the implications of US military and economic aids for
managing the situation have been understandably recognized by Beijing.
While reluctantly recognizing the ostensible excuse of combating terrorists,
however, China has tended to believe that the US strategic approach toward
the region would probably be part of a broader American design aimed to
encircle or at least to outweigh Beijing. This concern has been augmented
by the explicit US willingness to reinforce or even perpetuate its presence
albeit an apparent improvement of the security situation within
Afghanistan. Having this unpleasant reality in mind, Beijing wants to
reduce its negative effect by cementing Sino-Pakistani strategic consensus
and coordination. It is still widely believed in China that, China-Pakistan
relations, compared by the volatile Islamabad-Washington ties, is really a
time-tested and interest conflict-free one.11 Thus understandably, Beijing
cannot afford to risk Islamabad’s involvement in any Washington brokered

regional security arrangement that might potentially be against China. As
rightly observed and rationally analyzed by a Pakistani strategist, “neither
Pakistan nor China has allowed their friendly relationships to become
hostage to any other set of their country’s relationships”.12 Just based on
the same consideration, both Beijing and Islamabad should consistently
upgrade their endeavor to reassure each other of the reliability of this
strategic partnership rather than taking any unexpected happening for
granted.
The economic front of China-Pakistan ties has been of apparent strategic

relevance to maintaining and upgrading this bilateral partnership. A careful
observation suggests that its efforts, either facilitating or hampering, could
determine the weight of the connection. Thus, in the right perspective, the
economic aspect of the bilateral relations should gain increasing
momentum in order to bolster a firmer basis for their strategic solidarity.
Over the past years, this significant facet of the relationship has been
regarded a regretful deficiency that constraints the confident unfolding of
an all-embracing partnership, especially in contrast with the dramatic
going up of Sino-Indian trade volume. While the trade volume between
China and Pakistan, in 2004, reached a historic record of 3 billion US
dollars, but this is still far from an expected standard of the two-way trade
in terms of the potentials and opportunities. Fortunately, both China and
Pakistan have begun to recognize that the economic basis for the special
partnership has to be solidified and that the special Sino-Pakistan strategic
nexus cannot be sustained without its economic cornerstone. In recent
years, being positive responses to this important issue, there are increasing
initiatives made by both governments and academics in the two countries;
some inspiring proposals and feasibility studies have been conducted in
various ways.
In an early phase of intensifying economic interactions, the two

governments could play a critical role in promoting the trade and
investments. Then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, during his visit to
Islamabad in 2001, proposed four-point suggestions for enlarging the
economic and trade dimension between China and Pakistan. It has proved
to work well in view of a modest trend of yearly increase of the trade
volume over recent years. There are more Chinese enterprises that show
their serious interest in expanding the market and setting up joint ventures
in Pakistan. For its part, Islamabad has made impressive endeavors to
improve the prevailing economic climate for better the situation. Last year
saw the launching of the Preferential Trade Agreement between China and
Pakistan, by which China's market economic status has been squarely
accepted by Pakistan. Potential Chinese investors and businessmen have
expected to benefit from a series of preferential arrangements in several
Pakistan’s emerging Economic Development Areas and a recent bilateral
agreement regarding the provision of $500 million preferential buyer credit
that can benefit the interested Chinese enterprises to run their business in
Pakistan. Some major Sino-Pakistani cooperative projects have been
successful, among which are the infrastructure of Gwadar Port, Santak
Copper Mine and Chashma Nuclear Power Station, and possibly the
Kalabagh Dam and they have also created a demonstrative effect on more
Chinese enterprises and their Pakistan partners. More importantly, the
significance of building the Gwadar Port has been believed to go far beyond
its economic benefits. This project promises a strategic prize for both China
and Pakistan.13 As a new development, the two nations signed the Early
Harvest Agreement during Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit, which further
promises special tariff arrangements for certain products and starts the
first stage of a free trade agreement (FTA). According to Pakistani Prime
Minister Shaukat Aziz, the FTA will be a turning point in the trade relations
between the two countries.14 Thus strategically, securing and upgraded
economic interactions between China and Pakistan will self-evidently
demonstrate its special weight for the time to come.
REFERENCES
1Javed Akhtar, “Sino-Pak Friendship and Economic Cooperation”, Linking to South
Asia, (China) No.6, May 2005
2“The strategic dimensions of Sino-Pak relations”, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/
default.asp?p...8-12-2004_pg3_1
3 B. Raman, “The India-China-Pakistan-US Quadrangle”, South Asia Analysis Group,
Paper no. 1334, April 12, 2005
4 Editorial, China Daily, June 5, 1999
5 Ding Zhenyi, “Beware of intervention”, PLA Daily, June 12, 1999
6 See People’s Daily (overseas version), June 12, June 14, & June 30, 1999
7 Michael Yahuda, “China and the Kashmir crisis”, BBC News, June 2, 2002
8 “India sets dovish tone with Pakistan, China in call for nuclear coordination”,
http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040602090246.lml74psb.html
9 Zhao Gancheng, “South Asian Scenario: The Trend and Implications”, in Lu
Xiaokun (edi.), South Asia Report, 2004-2005, Kunming: Yunnan University Press
(China), pp.275-76.
10 Zhang Li, “China and the Kashmir Knot”, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema & Maqsudul
Hasan Nuri (edi.), The Kashmir Imbroglio: Looking towards the Future, Islamabad
Policy Research Institute, 2005, p.117
11 Fu Xiaoqiang, “Pakistan’s China Policy in post-Cold War Era: Momentums and
Realistic Considerations”, Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No.10, 2004
12 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Strengthening Sino-Pak relations”, Observer, December
24, 2004
13 Hu Baoming, “Developing Sino-Pak Relations: An Examination of Its
Importance”, South Asian Studies Quarterly (China), No.1, 2005
14 “Interview: Pakistani PM says China is true friend”, People’s Daily, April 02,
2005.
PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE
CHANGING REGIONAL SCENARIO
Ghulam Murtaza Khoso

INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have changed
the intercourse of international relations, and the US strategy of ousting
Taliban with Pakistan’s help has also introduced changes in South Asian
region.
Pakistan joined American hands in the war against terrorism, therefore

became one of the frontline allies of the United States in combating
terrorism.
With this changing regional scenario how China and Pakistan resettled
their bilateral relationship? Are the two states still very close allies? That is
what I have tried to answer in my paper.
Pakistan and China relationship is considered as one of the strongest in the

world. The relationship that often called ‘deeper than the oceans, higher
than the mountains’.1 In April 2005 in a meeting with his Pakistani
counterpart Khurshed Kasuri the Chinese foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing
said, “The only country in the world with which we describe our
relationship as all weather friendship is Pakistan”.2
TRADITIONAL CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS (1950-1953)
Though Pakistan during the Korean War neither sent its military personnel
to the UN command nor participated on the resolution designed to consider
People’s Republic of China as an aggressor in the war but China still relied
on India as its main ally in the region and avoided alienating Pakistan
despite the latter’s participation in the US alliance system, but the 1960s
altered the situation.
China in the early 1960s was facing big hostility from regional as well as
from global powers. US was hostile to China in the context of Cold War
while Soviet Union due to Beijing’s refusal to accept Moscow’s hegemony in
the communist bloc. China also had a boundary dispute with India which
caused military conflict in 1962.
In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War (1962), changing US policies

towards the region, and a perceived fear of joint US and USSR encirclement,
China saw Pakistan as the only reliable partner in South Asian region.
Similarities of interests forced both countries to come close to each other
and a bilateral relationship was established. A complex dominant bilateral
relationship in which not only Pakistan was ensured for Chinese political,
economic and military support, but Beijing in return was also guaranteed a
foothold in the sub-continent and also a promise of linkages with the
Islamic world west of Pakistan.
When Prime Ministers of the two countries Chou-Enlai and Mohammad Ali
Bogra met on the sidelines of Bandung Conference of Afro Asian Nations in
1955, Pakistan assured China that Pakistan’s involvement in SEATO and
CENTO and its strategic attachment with the West is due to its security
needs against India not against China. 3
Meanwhile President Ayub Khan declared in the United States in July 1961
that Pakistan would vote for the seating of China in the United Nations and
it did so in the spring session of the UN General Assembly. 4
Though at the end of 1960s China’s relations with India began to improve
but it did not affect its relations with Pakistan. The classic example of that
was 1971 Indo-Pak War when China fully supported Pakistan both during
and after the war. However, as soon as the post-War situation began to
normalize, Beijing slowly and gradually began to experiment with its new
South Asia Policy. While keeping its tide links with Islamabad, Beijing also
moved towards a policy of improving relations with New Delhi.
CHINA- PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING REGIONAL SCENARIO
Suddenly Sino-Indian hostility changed into Sino-Indian rapprochement

and China started to explore its new South Asia Policy. China though
continued its ‘all weather friendship’ with Pakistan but it also treated India
equally.
The improvement of India China relations introduced an element of

caution in Chinese relations with Pakistan. Though the military links
between China and Pakistan continued but Beijing has been keen not to
favor Pakistan against India. Change in the Chinese policy on Kashmir is

an indication of that caution. China previously supported Pakistan’s claim
that the Kashmir issue should be resolved according to UN resolutions,5 but
it opted for a neutral stand in the post-Cold War era and urged both
Pakistan and India to settle their disputes peacefully. Such caution was
obvious in the Kargil Crisis of 1999. 6 It has also been apparent during the
post-September 11 era.
Incidentally, the Sino-Pakistan relationship has blossomed parallel to Sino-

Indian rapprochement. The latter has witnessed a gradual change in
China’s position on disputed Kashmir. From 1964 to 1979, China supported
the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination. After 1980, Chinese
officials did not endorse this position, and in fact, said that the Kashmir
issue was a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan and should be
solved peacefully.
In 1990, China declined support to Islamabad’s attempts at

internationalizing the issue. In December 1996, during then Chinese
president Jiang Zemin’s visit to India and Pakistan, China explicitly
expressed support for the Indian position of addressing India- Pakistan
disputes through ‘consultations and negotiations’. And during the Kargil
Crisis of 1999, while Jiang drew attention to China’s ‘all weather friendship’
and ‘all round cooperation’ with Pakistan, China told Pakistani leaders that
they would not support Islamabad’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue in the
UN Security Council.
China has long been involved in a triangular relationship with Pakistan and
India, and is now a reluctant and silent third party to the dispute over
Kashmir. Beijing has traditionally supported Pakistan against India, but
now in the post-Cold War era the Chinese have distanced themselves
somewhat from Pakistan in order to cultivate better relations with India.
Meanwhile, when Indian parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001

India blamed Pakistan for such kind of act. The tensions between the two
countries mounted and the alarms of war on both sides were ringing. China
has avoided giving the impression that it endorses Islamabad’s position
against New Delhi. 7 China also supported Russian President Putin’s
invitation to President Mushraf and Prime Minister Wajpaee to discuss
tensions between the two countries.8 This Chinese policy of treating both
India and Pakistan equally continued as tension declined.
Again in August 2002, when President Mushraf visited China on his way
back from Bangladesh and Srilanka, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin
expressed hope that India and Pakistan could resolve their disputes
peacefully through dialogue.9 This is another example of an equal
treatment for the two South Asian states.
From Pakistan’s end China still is treated as Pakistan’s best friend in the
region. At the very same visit of President Mushraf Chinese President Jiang
Zemin addressed the question of support from some Pakistani islamists in
Xinjiang, the Pakistani government has responded by taking steps to
control the Uighur separatists operating from Pakistan.
Though the introduction of such kind of caution does not mean that China
has completely downgraded its relationship with Pakistan .According to
reports, Pakistan remains one of the major importers of Chinese
weapons. 10 Beijing has reportedly supplied Pakistan with missile related
technologies required for missile manufacturing. China has also supplied
Pakistan some naval surface to air missile systems (CSA- N-2). 11 The two
countries Pakistan and China have also signed Memorandum of
Understanding to institutionalize their annual defense and security talks.12
An indication of the growing defense ties between the two countries is the
$12.08 million interest free loan extended by Beijing for Pakistan’s armed
forces and for training Pakistani personnel in China.13
Despite US opposition China continued to support Pakistan. The United

States showed concerns especially on the issues of supply of M-11 missiles.
During his visit to the United States in November 1997 Chinese President
Jiang Zemin stated that China would not compromise on its commitments
to Pakistan regarding transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes.14 China also morally supported Pakistan when it conducted its
nuclear tests in May 1998.
The military relationship between Pakistan and China is decades old.

Chinese fighter aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery are a major component of
Pakistan’s armory. In addition to military purchases and supplies, China
has helped Pakistan set up many defense – oriented projects, including the
heavy forge and foundry plant at Texila.
Despite these changing attitudes in Beijing’s policy toward Islamabad,

Pakistan still consider China a reliable partner. This view emanates from a
history of Chinese political and the military support for Pakistan during
and after the Indo-Pakistan Wars of 1965 and 1971. That support remains
part of the historical memory now.
It is frequently acknowledged that Washington is likely to engage and then

abandon Pakistan in line with its changing regional and global interests. In
marked contrast, China’s reliability is seen as emanating from the reality of
Geography: it is part of the region and therefore, even if willing, can not
extricate itself from the limits imposed by its physical location. Added to
this geographical reality are the history of Sino-Indian relations and the
possibility of continuing competition, if not animosity between New Delhi
and Beijing. China, therefore, is seen as being prompted by the logic of
realism that necessitates its support for Pakistan to balance the present or
future challenges from India.
The second reason relates to Pakistan’s geographic location. Situated on the

eastern flank of the Middle East/Gulf region, Pakistan remains important
for China’s Middle Eastern / Gulf Policy. This significance is no longer
limited merely to a symbolic level where support for Islamabad could be
showcased for other Muslim states as an evidence of Beijing’s reliability.
Instead as the US moves into the region, and especially after its attack on
Iraq, the regional balance of power west of Pakistan will gain more
significance for China. Concerned at the future implications of the US long
term presence in the region, China is unlikely to reduce its support for
Pakistan to a level where the latter is forced to align itself completely with
Washington without any reference to Beijing’s views. Doing so would run
the risk of denying Beijing access to the only state straddling both South
Asia and the Middle East. For the next decade, therefore, China and
Pakistan will continue to operate as partners.
CONCLUSION
Though the improvement of Sino-Indian relations resulted in China’s new

South Asia Policy, China also changed its position on Kashmir as well but
China still needs Pakistan as a strategic partner. Keeping in view the
regional and global scenario, one can say that this all weather friendship
looks still very strong. Only China currently is posing any threat to the
global hegemonic power of the United States. The Ballistic Missile Defense,
the strategic partnership developing between the United States and India
and the US security umbrella’s to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all aimed
at containing China. In this whole scenario China can not afford to loose
Pakistan, the only Chinese neighbor on whom China can rely in its
diplomacy against encirclement. No doubt Pakistan also needs China as a
friend for coming long period.
REFERENCES
1 “Pakistan, China to Boost Ties: Joint Declaration Issued”, Dawn, November 6,
2003.
2 “Chinese PM Reaffirms Close Ties”, Dawn, April 9, 2004.
3 Fazal-ur-Rehman, “China-Pakistan Relations”, Proceedings of the International
Conference on ‘ China and the Emerging Asian Century, September 27-28, 2005,
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.
4Fazal-ur-Rehman, “Pakistan’s Relations with China”, Strategic Studies, Vol.19 & 20,
No. 4 & 1, Winter and Spring 1998.
5 www.asianresearch.org/articles/2740.html
6 Quoted in Samina Yasmin, “China and Pakistan in a Changing World” in K
Santhanam, Srikanth Kandapalli (eds), Asian Security and China 2000-2010,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2004, p-310.
7 Ibid., p-311.
8 The Nation, June 7, 2002.
10 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK08Df06.html
12 http://www.afpc.org/asm/asm4.shtml
13 “China Offers $ 12m Loan for Armed Forces”, Dawn, March 24, 2004.
14 The Nation, November 2, 1997
CHINA-PAKISTAN FRIENDSHIP IS
COMING TO AN END?
Over almost half century, China and Pakistan have enjoyed a unique
relationship marked by “time tested” and “all-weather” friendship, which
hardly finds parallel in modern international relations. With the end of the
global Cold War, the regional and global context in which traditional
China-Pakistan relations were shaped has been changing drastically. Under
the new regional and global scenario in the post-Cold War era, China-
Pakistan relations have accordingly been undergoing changes and turning
into a new phase. Against these undergoing changes, question about China-
Pakistan relations arise: Is China-Pakistan friendship coming to an end?1
This paper tries to answer this question by looking at the challenges and
opportunities China and Pakistan are facing in their bilateral relations in
the new regional and global scenario.
CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: CHALLENGES
China-Pakistan relations characterized by time-tested and all-weather

friendship were shaped and conditioned under the changing regional and
global scenario in Cold War era. This relationship evolved from initial
indifference to final entente. As soon as they were born, the new China and
Pakistan suddenly found they were facing the political choice and security
challenge within the context of the new international order of the global
Cold War headed respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States.2
China adopted the foreign policy of “leaning to one side” – siding with the
Soviet Union. Pakistan chose to ally the United States, by signing a Mutual
Defense Assistance Pact with the United States and joining the US-led
alliances including the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). India and Pakistan saw each
other as main enemy and direct threat since their independence. Facing
hostile Pakistan allied with the United States and its West alliances, India
saw friendship with China as the best guarantee for the security on its
northern frontier. Against the Pakistan-America military alliance, China
and India developed close friendship which ushered their “Honey Moon”. It
was in the light of America-Pakistan alliance and America-China enmity
and India-Pakistan hostility and China-India friendship under the
circumstances of Cold War headed by hostile American and Soviet blocs
that China-Pakistan indifference came into being. This constituted the main
structure among regional and global powers throughout the most time of
1950s.3
The changing regional and global scenario relating to the changing nature
of China-India relations and China-Soviet relations in late 1950s and early
1960s brought China-Pakistan indifference to an end and China-Pakistan
entente came into being.4 With the Tibetan Rebellion in 1959 and the
China-Indian Border Dispute from late 1950s and the China-Indian Border
War in 1962, China-Indian relations gradually worsened, and finally China-
Indian friendship broke up and turned into hostility. With India as their
common enemy, it was inevitable that China and Pakistan would come
together and strengthen their cooperation against India.5 While China-
Indian relations deteriorated, China-Soviet relations were also increasingly
strained owing to the quarrel over the theory and strategy of the
international Communist movement, and finally China-Soviet relationship
of brotherhood turned into a hostile one. The US and the USSR both wooed
and supported India politically and militarily during China-Indian border
dispute and afterwards. Under this changing regional and global context,
China came to look upon Pakistan as the only reliable partner and a pillar
state in South Asia that could be relied on in balancing India and
countering the perceived US-Soviet collusion and India-Soviet alliance,
while Pakistan saw China as a more reliable anti-India partner. On this
basis, China-Pakistan relations marked by “time tested” and “all-weather”
friendship came into being. During much of the Cold War era from early
1960s to late 1980s, China-Pakistan nexus (joined by the US in the 1970s
and 1980s) vis-à-vis India-Soviet alliance constituted the basic structure
among regional and global powers.
China-Pakistan “time tested” and “all-weather” friendship were marked by

the striking features of a fruitful mutual support and cooperation in various
fields and issues, which were reflected in the following respects. Firstly,
border issue. China and Pakistan finalized their border settlement in
December 1962 and signed the formal border agreement in March 1963,
which removed the only irritant in Chin-Pakistan ties.6 Secondly, Kashmir
issue. China, giving up its initial neutral position that Kashmir was a
bilateral problem and should be solved peacefully, sided with Pakistan,
calling for respect of the Kashmiri people’s right of self-determination, and
insisting that the Kashmir dispute be settled through a plebiscite based on

the relevant UN resolutions.7 Thirdly, political affairs, China and Pakistan
maintained a consistent support to each other on international political
arena. Pakistan lent a firm hand to China in restoration of China’s
legitimate seats in UN, establishment of China-US diplomatic relations,
Taiwan issue and Tibet issue. China gave its all-out support to Pakistan in
1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan war and 1979 Afghanistan war.8 Fourthly,
economic – commercial – cultural – technological – military ties. China and
Pakistan established comprehensive cooperation ties and signed many
agreements covering economic, commercial, cultural, technological and
military fields. 9 Fifthly, high-level leaders touch. Chinese and Pakistani
high level leaders maintained frequent visit and touch throughout the
period. Nearly all Pakistani and Chinese heads of state and government
visited each other.10 China and Pakistan friendship became a shining
example of “time tests” and “all-weather” friendship which remained
unaffected by change of governments and vagaries of international
politics. 11
In late 1980s and early 1990s, the regional and global scenario changed
dramatically, which marked the birth of a new global era, i.e. Post-Cold War
era. China-Pakistan relations thus have been undergoing changes
accordingly and turning into a new phase, which confronts challenges. The
first challenge results from China’s new foreign policy, which started from
post-Mao era, i.e. Deng Xiaoping’s period and motivated by China’s
domestic reform drive which concurred with the change of regional and
global scenario.12 China for the first time in its modern history developed a
new foreign policy consisting of pragmatic relations with the two
superpowers and improved ties with all the countries on its periphery
including China and Pakistan’s common enemy India.13 Meanwhile, China-
American rapprochement in 1970s also led to India’s fear of an emerging
America-China-Pakistan axis directed against India, so India took steps to
improve India-American relations and relax China-Indian tensions. Both
China and India had the common desire to relax their tensions, which led
to the normalization of China-Indian relations in 1988. At the same time,
the Soviet Union leader Gorbachev’s new Asia policy of maintaining
friendly relations with India and normalizing relations with China created
a positive atmosphere in both China-Indian and China-Soviet relations,
which led to the normalization of China-Soviet relations in 1989. By 1989,
China had restored or established normal relations with all major powers
of the Cold War era.14 Under this context, China-Pakistan relationship has
gradually lost its original strategic meaning.
The second challenge results from the collapse of the Soviet Union, a mark
of the end of the global Cold War between the US and the USSR and the
vanishment of the bipolar structure of world power. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc in 1989, a new international
system is emerging. Although the US became the only superpower of the
post-Cold War era, its capacity for dominating the world alone is
considerably restricted. France and Germany’s stance against the US’s Iraqi
War; Germany, Japan, India, Brazil seek permanent membership in the UN
Security Council; India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests; Russia’s refusal to
easily yield to pressures from the US; China and India’s rising, etc. vividly
demonstrate the world is moving toward a multipolar power structure.
Under the context of these changes, especially with the collapse of the
Soviet Union together with its Eastern Europe bloc and the vanishment of
the bipolar structure of world power, just as India-Russian relationship has
lost its anti-Chinese implications, so China-Pakistan relationship has also
lost its original significance of countering India-Soviet alliance.15 Moreover,
on the Kashmir issue, China and the US used to support Pakistan, while the
Soviet Union supported India. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both
US and China have adjusted their Kashmir policy and adopted a neutral
stance that Kashmir issue should be resolved by peaceful negotiations at
the bilateral level, which is against Pakistan’s stance.16
The third challenge results from terrorism threat. Terrorist threat following
US’s World Trade Center and India’s Parliament building being attacked
respectively on September 11 and December 13, 2001, has produced
tremendous and far-reaching impact on international relations. China-
Pakistan relations could not completely remain intact unaffected. Over
recent years, several terrorist kidnappings and attacks have happened to
Chinese citizens working in Pakistan. These terrorist kidnappings and
attacks have claimed a number of lives, including engineers, which has
drawn the great concern from Chinese government and public.17 Moreover,
the so-called East Turkestan elements in China’s Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region have been conducting separatist activities over years.
Some of the Uighurs have been trained in religious schools within
Pakistan’s territory. Uighur separatist organizations have claimed

responsibility for several bombings in Xinjiang and even in Beijing. China’s
greatest concern is Pakistan’s inability to control terrorist organizations
that threaten Chinese citizens and China’s western provinces. According to
Susan L. Shirk, Chinese officials discuss with Indian diplomats their doubts
about Pakistan’s ability to control terrorism, a fact that reflects a certain
political distancing from their ally.18 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji during
his visit to India in January 2002 condemned the terrorist attack on India’s
Parliament building and reiterated China's position that China resolutely
opposes all forms of terrorism, no matter when, where or to whom it takes
place. 19
Under the context of these challenges, China-Pakistan relations have been

undergoing some changes and adjustments. Firstly, China adjusted its
position on Kashmir issue. Beginning in 1980s, China gradually moved
away from its Pakistan-preferred position to take a more neutral position,
by giving up endorsing a final settlement through virtually pro-Pakistan
plebiscite based on the relevant UN resolutions and advocating a formula
through peaceful negotiations between Pakistan and India rather than
through international interventions. China’s new stance on Kashmir issue
became more noticeable in 1990s. In 1991, during his visit to India, Chinese
Premier Li Peng approved that India and Pakistan should resolve Kashmir
dispute under the framework of Simla pact through negotiations. In 1996,
during his visit to Pakistan, Chinese President Jiang Zemin again clearly
expressed China’s stand on the issue. In his speech before the Pakistani
senate, Jiang suggested that Pakistan should put aside disputes with India
over Kashmir, and instead establish and develop relations in other
common fields.20 Dr. Ravni Thakur observes that China’s new position on
Kashmir issue is even more apparent amongst its think-tanks and
independent foreign policy advisors writing on Kashmir. The Chinese have
even advocated limited sovereignty to both sides of Kashmir while letting
the territory be jointly administered by Pakistan and India. An erstwhile
Chinese ambassador to India has even gone so far as supporting the
concept of soft border between the two regions of Kashmir and increased
people to people contacts.21
Secondly, China adjusted its stance on South Asia affairs. China has come to
take a more balanced and even-handed stance toward South Asia affairs,
especially with relation to Pakistan and India. This new stance is strikingly
reflected in China’s attitude on Pakistan-India Kargil conflict in 1999 and
Pakistan-India military stand-off in 2002. At the height of Kargil crisis,
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China and discussed the matter with
Chinese leaders. The official statement issued by the Chinese Foreign
Ministry urged both India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement of the
issue. China not only followed an even-handed path but also played the
role of informal mediator by hosting separate visits of the Pakistani and
Indian Foreign Ministers.22 A senior Indian official observed that during the
Kargil conflict, China public statements were almost as even-handed as the
Group of Eight’s.23 In the critical situation bringing the two nuclear rivals
to the brink of war, Pakistan again consulted with its close ally China.
President Musharraf made an overnight stay in Beijing and held in-depth
discussions with Premier Zhu Rongji. China, besides advising the tension
must be settled through a direct dialogue between India and Pakistan,
adopted multi-channel diplomacy to defuse the tension in South Asia and
stressed the need for the international community to take a more balanced
and unprejudiced approach to the problem. Chinese even-handed stand
during the India–Pakistan military stand-off gave added flexibility to
Chinese diplomacy in helping to avert a war in South Asia.24
In all, from the above we can see that China-Pakistan relations have been
undergoing changes in the changing regional and global scenario. This
changing relationship is defined as “From Indifference to Entente” in Cold
War era and “From Entente to Qualified Support” in Post-Cold War era.25
The character of this changing relationship is defined as from a selfless
“Traditional Friend” to a useful “Strategic Partner”.26 Compared with the
traditional pattern of “Entente” as a “Selfless Traditional Friend”, the new
pattern of “Qualified Support” as a “Useful Strategic Partner” is
characterized by more challenges.
CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES
Owing to the challenges and consequent changes that China-Pakistan

relations have been undergoing in the post-Cold War era, a negative and
pessimistic response and reaction have arisen from certain sections in
Pakistan concerning China-Pakistan relations.
Some strategists hold that China’s even-handed stance in South Asia and the
warmer China-Indian rapprochement unavoidably generates negative effect
on and even possibly undercuts “all-weather” China-Pakistan partnership.27
A scholar states that the post-Mao Chinese policy towards Pakistan has
changed considerably and the warmth that prevailed during the 1960s and
the 1970s has started to recede. Former Pakistan’s ambassador to China,
Sultan M. Khan, comments on the changing pattern of China-Pakistan
relations that there is however a very different China now on the
international and regional scene. China will continue to support Pakistan
but much depends upon how Pakistan itself manages to come out of its
current problems. The old intimacy and warmth, which once were the
hallmark of Sino–Pakistan friendship, is a part of history.28
Do all these imply that China-Pakistan friendship is coming to an end? The

answer would be self-evident after the following discussions and analyses
which would reveal that for China-Pakistan relations in the post-Cold War
regional and global scenario challenges have not occurred merely as
challenges but also have concurred with opportunities, and comparatively
opportunities actually overwhelm challenges.
As we have seen, the noticeable and substantial changes that have occurred
in China-Pakistan relations mainly exist in China’s new stance toward
Pakistan with regard to its dispute and conflict with India, especially on
Kashmir issue. It is no surprising and even quite understandable that this
new stance would cause the suspect from Pakistan side. But here we should
pay attention to some facts which would give us different views. Firstly, the
reduction in China’s support is not just confined to the freedom struggle in
Kashmir. China’s post-Mao policy has considerably reduced support to
revolutionary movements around the world.29 Secondly, China’s new
policy aims at uncoupling China-Pakistan relations from China-India
relations and promoting China-Pakistan friendship and China-India
friendship separately and simultaneously. Meanwhile, it also aims at
improving Pakistan-India relations. Thirdly, China’s new policy has
resulted in a positively peaceful result. The resolution of Kargil conflict and
military stand-off between Pakistan and India was partly if not totally owed
to this policy. In the contemporary international context, it is dangerously
unwise if China directly involves in any dispute between the two nuclear
powers Pakistan and India. Fourthly, the recent development of Pakistan-
India relations affirms China’s new policy and stance. During Pervez
Musharrraf - Manhohan Singh Summit in April 2005, the two leaders agreed
on that the peace process between the two countries was “now
irreversible”. On Kashmir issue the two leaders agreed on the new concept
of “soft border” and agreed to increase the frequency of Srinagar-
Muzaffarabad bus service and new routes in J&K were to be opened. This
ushered a new era of Pakistan-Indian friendship.30 Therefore, apparently
China’s new policy seems to have negative effect on China-Pakistan
relations, but substantially it is conducive to sustain and promote both
China-Pakistan relations and India-Pakistan relations in the new era in the
long run.
We can also see that the fruitful mutual support and cooperation in other
fields between China and Pakistan have remained unchanged and kept
going as before. Firstly, the high level visits and the close links have been
continuing despite the frequent change of governments in Pakistan and the
change of leadership in China. These high level visits were supplemented
by exchange of visits between senior civil and military officials of the two
states.31 Secondly, China and Pakistan have maintained close contact and
coordination on regional and international affairs, and shared a lot in
common and supplied mutual support. China appreciates Pakistan’s
precious support on the issues of Taiwan, Tibet, WTO, human rights, etc.32
Thirdly, economic-technological-military ties have also persisted. Pakistan
has become the second largest trade partner of China in South Asia region,
and the trade between two states keeps increasing steadily. The economic
cooperation has evolved from purely commercial trade into larger fields
such as mutual investing, project contracting and technology developing
etc.33 China has been considerably and consistently helping Pakistan in
defense production and peaceful use of nuclear energy whereas the
Western developed countries suspended economic and military aid and
continued their ban on the supply of sensitive technology to Pakistan in
the post-Cold War period.34
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new international
system, though resulted in the loss of the original strategic meaning of
China-Pakistan relations against Soviet-Indian alliance, have not ended
political understanding between China and Pakistan. Instead, the
emergence of new Central Asian Republics from the ruins of the Soviet
Union has opened another avenue and new opportunity for cooperation
between China and Pakistan. For example, in 1996, Pakistan, China,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan signed the transit trade treaty (implemented from
October 2003), according to which major roads from Almaty and Bishkek
would be extended to join Karakorum Highway which links China and
Pakistan. The roads are expected not only to increase trade between the
four states but also to create favorable conditions for a considerable
expansion of local trade.35 China also has established a multilateral
regional process with Central Asia Republics, formerly known as the
Shanghai Five and now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Chinese associated with the SCO talk about someday having both Pakistan
and India become members of the organization, and as a first step, Pakistan
and India together with Mongolia and Iran was granted observer status
recently at the SCO Summit in Astana in July 2005.36 Central Asian
Republics are all Islamic countries with vast resources, so cooperation with
those states within the framework of SCO may bring great benefits to China
and Pakistan as well as all other involved countries. The benefits are not
only confined to economic field, but also extended to the fields concerning
overcoming current problems such as intercultural suspicion and mistrust,
extremism, separatism and terrorism. 37
The terrorism problem China is facing, though has certain degree of

negative influence on China-Pakistan relations, motivates Chinese
government to sustain an ongoing relationship with Pakistan.38 Some
Chinese analysts also endorsed the need for China to continue supporting
Pakistan, especially Musharraf’s government. After “9.11” incident, Pakistan
cooperated with the US in an all-rounded way and supported the US anti-
Taliban effort and anti-terrorism campaign. 39 Although China realized that
Pakistan’s failure to control the Taliban had led to US forces being based in
the region, it continues to support Pakistan government. As some scholars
state, this has more to do with the concern over the risk of Pakistan falling
apart than with Pakistan’s value as a strategic counterweight to India. China
wants a moderate Pakistan government to maintain stability against rising
Islamic fundamentalism and to stem Islamic fundamentalist support of
separatist movements in Xinjiang. China has urged both US and India to
adopt a more balanced South Asia policy and not to push Pakistan toward
actions that might bring down the Musharraf government.40 Thus, while
concerned at the support from some Pakistani Islamists for Muslim
separatists in Xinjiang, China has avoided turning it into a major issue in its
relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistan Government has responded by

taking steps to control the Uighur separatists operating from Pakistan. For
example, in May 2002, Pakistan handed over a Uighur separatist, Ismail
Qadir, to the Chinese authorities.41
Moreover, despite the changes that have been undergoing in China-

Pakistan relations, the Pakistan government continues to see China as a
reliable ally. This view is not restricted to any one faction in the Pakistan
government but is shared by all. The notions of “all-weather friendship
between Pakistan and China” remain part of the official vocabulary in
Pakistan across all the spectrum of views.42 This perception of permanence
of friendship is based on several considerations. Firstly, the history of
China-Pakistan friendship. Over half century, China-Pakistan friendship of
mutual support and cooperation in a comprehensive way has withstood the
vicissitudes and vagaries of time. Chinese political and military support for
Pakistan in the 1960s and the 1970s remains part of “historical memory”
Pakistan draws upon for its view of China as a reliable partner.43 Secondly,
the non-existence of any political or territorial dispute, the strict adherence
by Pakistan and China to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and
the identical perception of the obtaining regional and international milieu.
All these constitute the important binding force between China and
Pakistan. 44 Thirdly, the history of China-India relations and the possibility
of continuing competition between China and India. A number of
complicated issues left over by history still bedevil relations between China
and India: the boundary dispute, the Tibetan issue, etc.45 These problems
cannot be resolved in a short span of time, though Wen Jiabao--Manmohn
Singh Summit in April 2005 has raised a hope for it. Besides, the recent
India-US navy joint working during the tsunami relief effort, the India-US
defence agreement signed in June 2005, and the India-US nuclear
agreement signed in July 2005, a step to help India become a world power
by the US, upgraded India-US strategic partnership.46 The US fundamental
interests in developing better relations with India are the necessary
containment of China. 47 Under these circumstances, from Pakistan
government’s perspective, the permanence of Chinese interests in the
regions to balance the present or future challenges from India would
always prompt China to retain a certain measure of interest in Pakistan.
Thus while aware of a decline in the level of Chinese support for Pakistan,
Islamabad remains convinced of the limits to this decline and continues to

see China as a reliable partner.48
On Chinese side, though China has adopted the balanced policy, it does not
mean that China has completely downgraded its relationship with Pakistan.
Chinese officials make clear that they have no intention of cutting off
Pakistan and that it remains a value ally. China has reiterated, time and
again, that the improvement in its ties with India would not come at the
cost of China-Pakistan relations, and it would not in any way affect the
traditional friendship between China and Pakistan. Some symbolic gestures
made by China to indicate that Pakistan is still treated as a special friend
are noticeable. For example, in August 2002, President Musharraf visited
China on his way back from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and his Chinese
counterpart Jiang Zemin delayed his own trip by a day to receive his
Pakistani guest.49 Also, during his South Asia tour visits in April 2005,
Premier Wen Jiabao started his trip from Pakistan instead of India though
many had expected his first trip might be to India.50 For China,
maintaining close relationship with Pakistan is in its vital interests. Firstly,
it will help to curb the threat posed by Muslim secessionists and religious
extremists in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to secure its internal
stability. Secondly, it will help to develop good relations with other Muslim
countries to secure its periphery stability. 51 Thirdly, it will help to access to
the oil-rich Middle East and the Gulf’s resources to secure its energy
security. Fourthly, it will help to counter US’s influence in Central and
South Asia as well as India’s ambitions to secure its military security.52
In all, although China-Pakistan relations have been confronting challenges

and undergoing changes in the new regional and global scenario, the
nature of China-Pakistan relations as close ally has not altered
substantially, but on the contrary has been upgraded to a new level.
Comparatively speaking, the China-Pakistan relations have gained more
opportunities than challenges in the new regional and global scenario.
China-Pakistan traditional friendship is not coming to an end, but remains
and continues to be flourishing in the new era with an upgraded character
of strategic and cooperative partnership at a global level instead of merely
bilateral level.
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1 N.B. Menon, “Will there be an end to China-Pakistan entente?”

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/00feb23/edit.htm
2 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian relations
(Maryland: University Press of America, Inc. 1994), p.79.
3 Shang Quanyu, “China-India-Pakistan in the New Global Context”, World Focus,
Vol.26, No.1, 2005, p.13.

4 As Sangit Sarita Dwivedi states, “a special warmth has been achieved in Sino-Pak
relations in the last four decades which can be only characterised as an
entente/alliance”, see Sangit Sarita Dwivedi, “Sino-Pak Entente: A Study in Nuclear
Collaboration”,
http://www.mainstreamweekly.com/issuejuly10/content/general9.asp
(Maryland: University Press of America, Inc. 1994), pp.105-112.
6Swaran Singh, China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies (New Delhi: Lancer’s
Books, 2003), p.173.
7 Ravni Thakur, “China’s Changing Policy on Kashmir”, World Focus, Vol.26, No.1,
January 2005, p.11.
8Zhu Mingzhong, “The Characteristics and Prospects of China-Pakistan Relations”,
http://www.casas-pkucis.org.cn/gerenzy /showcontent.asp?iD=6
9 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Lahore: Khan Book Company,
2002), pp.170-2.
10 Zhu Mingzhong, “The Characteristics and Prospects of China-Pakistan Relations”,
http://www.casas-pkucis.org.cn/gerenzy/ showcontent.asp?iD=6
2002), pp.169.
12 According to Susan L. Shirk, as the timing indicates, China’s diplomatic
initiatives were motivated primarily by China’s domestic reform drive, not by
changes in the international situation, although they were reinforced by the
collapse of the Soviet Union; China explains its shift toward India as driven mainly
by the end of the Cold War. See Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s
Perspectives and Policies toward India”, in Francine R. Frankel Harry Harding ed.,
The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford, 2004),
pp.79-80.
13 Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry: China’s Perspectives and Policies toward
India”, in Francine R. Frankel Harry Harding ed., The India-China Relationship:
Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford, 2004), p.80.
15 China mainly attributes its foreign policy change concerning India and Pakistan
to the end of the Cold War. This was revealed by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in
his discussions of regional foreign policy issues with US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright during 1997-1998. See Susan L. Shirk, “One-Sided Rivalry:
China’s Perspectives and Policies toward India”, in Francine R. Frankel Harry
Harding ed., The India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi:
Oxford, 2004), pp.79-80.
17 “The impact on China-Pakistan Relations caused by Chinese hostages being
killed in Pakistan”, http://www. irib.ir/worldservice/ chinese/shishifx/04-10-
18/04101801.htm

Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford, 2004), p. 92.
19Zhao Gancheng, “South Asia: Changes and Challenges”, http://www.siis.org.cn
/english/collection/gczhao.htm
20Sun Shihai, “China-Indian Relations in the 21st Century”, http://www.iapscass.cn
/xueshuwz/showcontent. asp?id=205
21 Ravni Thakur, “China’s Changing Policy on Kashmir”, World Focus, Vol.26, No.1,
January 2005, p.11. Cheng Ruisheng, “How to Solve Kashmir Issue through
Peaceful Means”, Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No.11, 2003,
http://www.cass.net.cn/yataisuo/ Bak/ddyt/0311-1.htm
22 Ghulam Ali, “Sino-Pakistan Relations: The Indian Factor”, http://ipripak.org
/journal /summer2003/sino-pakistanshtml

Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford, 2004), p.93. The Chinese daily, The
Liberation Army, was the most strident in lashing out at India: it termed India’s
Kargil operation an act of expansionism. See Ghulam Ali, “Sino-Pakistan Relations:
The Indian Factor”, http://ipripak.org/journal/ summer2003/sino-pakistanshtml
/journal/summer2003/sino-pakistanshtml
25 Samina Yasmeen, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and the Middle East”, in P. R.
Kumaraswamy ed., China and the Middle East (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999),
p.92. Samina Yasmeen, “China and Pakistan in a Changing World”, in K Santhanam
Srikanth Kondapalli ed., Asian Security and China 2000-2010 (Delhi: Shipra
Publications, 2004), p.309.
26 Pakistan newspaper The News states, "It's time that the Pakistanis change their
basic perception of China to more mature and realistic -- from its being a selfless
'traditional friend' to a useful strategic partner", See “Wen's Visit Opens New
Chapter in Sino-Pak Relations”, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/
125033.htm
27 Zhang Li, “China’s New Role in South Asia”, World Focus, Vol.26, No.1, 2005, p.6.
30Y C Halan, “Sport and Politics: A new era of Indo-Pak friendship”, South Asia
Politics, May 2005, pp.13-18. “Indo-Pak Relations: A Ray of Hope”, Competition
Wizard, June 2005, pp.20-21.
31 “China’s Relations with Pakistan”, http://www.friendship museum.com
/gb/wjfy/yz/bgst.htm
32 Lu Shulin, “Links on the Basis of Moral Principle Can Last forever”,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/wcflysg/ wzlcflshg/t188927.htm
33 “China’s Relations with Pakistan”, http://www.friendship
museum.com/gb/wjfy/yz/bgst.htm; “Establishing Closer Economic and Trade
Ties between China and Pakistan”, http://www.chnedu.net/yxsj/
yxsjd.asp?newsid=18285
34 China’s total military aid to Pakistan till 1996 has been at least worth $1.5
billions. Musa Khan Jalalzai, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Lahore: Khan Book
Company, 2002), pp.172 & 175.
35 Samina Yasmeen, “Sino-Pakistan Relations and the Middle East”, in P. R.
Kumaraswamy ed., China and the Middle East (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999),
p.98.
36Alexander Yakovenko, “Seeking multilateral regional cooperation: The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization is a new model of geopolitical integration”, The Hindu,
August 12, 2005.
37 “Analysis: Pakistan, India and Iran’s SCO Observer Status Will be Beneficial to
All”, http://cn.news.yahoo.com/050706/72/ 2dem3.html

Rivalry and Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford, 2004), p. 92.
39 Ma Jiali, “Dramatic Changes of Security Pattern in South Asia”; Wang Dehua,
“Terrorism In South Asia And Indo-Pak Relations”, http://www.siis.org.cn
/english/collection/gczhao.htm
40Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or
Conflict? (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.66.
41 Samina Yasmeen, “China and Pakistan in a Changing World”, in K Santhanam
42 Samina Yasmeen states, “Even the Islamists subscribe to the idea of Chinese
reliability. Despite the fact that the Islamist groups in the civil society have
attempted to ‘export’ Islamism to China’s Xinjiang province, those in the
government remain convinced of the need to appreciate and align with Beijing”,
Samina Yasmeen, “China and Pakistan in a Changing World”, in K Santhanam

2002), p.174.
46 Prakash Karat, “India is not a Banana Republic”, Tehelka, July 30, 2005.
47 “During the recent tsunami relief effort, the two states' navies worked together,
which helped to cement their budding military-to-military ties. The US would like
for India’s navy to serve as a bulwark against China as Beijing becomes more active
in the Indian Ocean”, See Adam Wolfe, Yevgeny Bendersky, and Federico
Bordonaro, “The Indian Ocean’s shifting balance of power” (26/07/05),
http://www.isn.ch/news/sw/details.cfm? ID=12292
50 Pakistani Premier Shaukat Aziz in his interview with Chinese press stated that
Wen Jiabao’s starting his South Asia visits from Pakistan once again testified the
special friendship between China and Pakistan. See Rong Shoujun, Zhang Lihong,
“Pakistani Premier Aziz talks about China-Pakistan friendly relations in the
interview”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-04/04/ content_2784995.htm
51Sun Shihai, “China-Indian Relations in the 21st Century”, http://www.iapscass.cn
/xueshuwz/ showcontent.asp?Id=205
52 China’s sharing of the Gwadar naval base in Pakistan “serves the Chinese
purposes in three ways: first, it serves as a tool to secure Beijing’s access to the
Gulf’s resources; second, it is a useful military base to counter Washington’s
influence in Central and South Asia; third, Gwadar functions as an excellent wedge
between India and the Middle East and as an offset against India’s naval power”.
See Adam Wolfe, Yevgeny Bendersky, and Federico Bordonaro, “The Indian Ocean’s
shifting balance of power” (26/07/05), http://www.isn.ch/news/sw/
details.cfm?ID=12292
PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS: POLITICAL DIMENSION
Ambassador (R)
Javed Hussain
Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic of China on January 4, 1950, a

few months after the establishment of the latter on October 1, 1949.
However, full diplomatic relations were established the following year
upon the appointment of Han Nieh Lung in May 1951 as China’s
Ambassador to Pakistan and of General Agha Mohammmad Raza in July
1951 as Pakistan’s Ambassador to China.
The first decade after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
two countries saw cordial relations between Pakistan and China which,
however, lacked the warmth of later years after the signing of the border
agreement between the two countries in 1963. Since then, Pakistan-China
relations have steadily gained in strength despite the vicissitudes of time
and the changes of government in both the countries. Pakistan-China
friendship is not only time-tested but has also become multi-dimensional.
The successful visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Pakistan in
April 2005, during which besides the signing of the “Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations”, 21 other agreements were
signed to boost cooperation in defense, economic and trade areas, was a
testimony to the strength of Pakistan-China friendship.
This paper would briefly cover the history of Pakistan- China relations by
highlighting the major milestones, give the political context of this
relationship, assess its strengths and weaknesses, and try to provide a
prognosis of its future course in the light of the changing global and
regional scenario.
HISTORY OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS –MAJOR MILESTONES
In September 1950, Pakistan supported the Indian resolution at the UN

seeking to replace the delegation of the Nationalist China with that of the
People’s Republic of China. But from 1953 onwards, it voted with the US to
postpone consideration of the issue. Pakistan again started supporting
PRC’s representation at the UN with effect from 1961.
In September 1954, Pakistan joined SEATO by signing the Manila Pact.

Beijing condemned SEATO which it saw as an instrument to encircle China
and to mount aggression against it. However, China’s criticism of Pakistan’s
membership of SEATO was somewhat mild. It specifically refrained from
branding Pakistan as a foe. Its criticism was limited to the suggestion that
Pakistan had allowed itself to be used as an agent to serve the United States’
sinister deigns in the region.
The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and China, that is Mohammad Ali Bogra
and Chou En-lai, held two private meetings on the sidelines of the
conference at Bandung in April 1955. These meetings led to a better
understanding of each other’s point of view. China was assured that
Pakistan would never support any aggressive action that the US might
launch against China and that it neither opposed China nor apprehended
aggression from it. There was an increased exchange of delegations
between the two countries after the Bandung conference.
Prime Minister Suhrawardy paid a 12-day official visit to China

commencing from 18 October, 1956 followed by Prime Minister Chou En-
lai’s state visit to Pakistan in December of the same year.
One might have expected a steady improvement in Pakistan-China relations

because of the two high level visits in 1956. In fact, there was some
deterioration in the relationship in 1957. Prime Minister Chou En-lai,
during a visit to Sri Lanka in February 1957, joined the Sri Lankan Prime
Minister in urging India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute
through direct negotiations and not to take it to the United Nations. He also
opposed the idea of sending UN troops to Kashmir. This position was not to
Pakistan’s liking. Prime Minister Suhrawardy, during his visit to the United
States in the summer of the same year, in an interview described the
Chinese posture as one of aggressive expansionism that threatened peace
and freedom in Asia. The Chinese were irritated by Suhrawardy’s remarks
but were again rather moderate in their reaction.
The downward trend in Pakistan-China relations continued through the

first two years of Ayub Khan’s presidency. Specifically, three issues strained
Sino-Pakistan relations: the Chinese suppression of the revolt in Tibet of
March 1959, which was not endorsed by Pakistan ( In October 1959,
Pakistan voted in favour of placing the Tibetan question before the UN

General Assembly); China’s interpretation of certain Pakistani actions and
statements as implying support of a two China policy (In 1958, when
tension was high in the Taiwan straits, Pakistani ambassador in Beijing
declined in a note of 7 October, to concede that Taiwan was a part of
China); and Ayub Khan’s proposal of 24 April 1959 for a joint defense
arrangement between India and Pakistan which irritated the Chinese.
The upswing in Pakistan-China relations began in December 1961 when it

voted in favour of seating China at the United Nations. In March 1962, more
than two years after Pakistan had first proposed negotiations, Beijing
decided to discuss the border question with Pakistan. The joint
announcement to start border demarcation negotiations was made on 3
May, 1962. The actual negotiations began on 13 October, a week before the
Chinese attacked Indian positions along the Sino-Indian border. On 26
December, China and Pakistan announced “complete agreement in
principle” on aligning their common border. The actual border agreement
was signed on 2 March, 1963. The agreement removed any possible cause
for misgivings between the two countries and laid the foundation for
durable friendship between them.
In August 1963, Pakistan and China signed an air transport agreement

allowing their airlines, PIA and CAAC, to operate over each other’s territory
with landing and other facilities.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai paid an eight-day official visit to Pakistan

commencing from 18 February, 1964. The joint communiqué issued at the
end of the visit “expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be
resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as
pledged to them by India and Pakistan”.
The Chinese Foreign Minister, during a stopover at Karachi on 30 October,

1964, stated that he favoured a plebiscite in Kashmir.
President Ayub Khan paid an eight-day visit to China commencing from 2

March, 1965. The joint communiqué affirmed that the Kashmir dispute
should be solved in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. On
the other hand, Pakistan, for the first time, joined China in criticizing the
US policy of “two Chinas”.
PM Chou En-lai paid an official visit to Pakistan commencing from 2 April,

1965.
Following the Indian attack on Pakistan on 6 September, 1965, China

condemned on 7 September India’s “criminal aggression” against Pakistan.
During the following weeks, numerous condemnations of India and
accusations of Indian violations of Chinese territory, including two
ultimatums, were issued by Beijing. China also supplied war material to
Pakistan including T-59 tanks and MIG-19 fighter planes, but they evidently
arrived too late for use in the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965.
Apparently, the Chinese were disappointed by the Tashkent Declaration of

10 January, 1966. They termed the Declaration as the product of Soviet-US
“plotting” to weaken the united struggle of Afro-Asians against imperialism.
They also alleged that the US and the Soviet Union had backed India against
Pakistan during the September war.
President Liu Shao-chi paid a five-day state visit to Pakistan commencing on

26 March, 1966.
On 21 October, 1967, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to facilitate

“overland trade” between Gilgit and Xinjiang.
President Yahya Khan paid a five-day state visit to China commencing from
10 November, 1970.
At a ceremony at Baltit in Hunza on 16 February,1971, the Karakoram

Friendship Highway built with the Chinese assistance and cooperation to
link the two countries was declared open.
Up to March 1973, China gave Pakistan a total of US$110.369 million in

grants and pledged US$220.54 million in loans as development assistance.
In addition, China supplied substantial numbers of MIG-19’s and T-59 tanks
up to 1972 for which Pakistan virtually paid little or nothing.
Pakistan played a crucial role in facilitating contacts between the US and

China leading to Henry Kissinger’s July 1971 visit to Beijing from
Islamabad.
China was moderately supportive of Pakistan during the 1971 civil war
while condemning India for its interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
Accordingly China’s support to Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war
remained subdued as compared to that in 1965.
President Bhutto paid an official visit to China beginning from 31 January,

1972.
On 25 August, 1972, China vetoed in the UN Security Council Bangladesh’s

application for UN membership.
Sino-Pakistani relations maintained their amicability throughout the period

Bhutto was in power. However, by 1977 Pakistani military authorities began
to realize that the Chinese could not supply the sophisticated weapon
systems they wished to obtain.
On 18 June 1978, the inaugural ceremony of the Karakoram Highway at

Thakot took place.
President Zia-ul-Haq continued the policy of maintaining close friendly

relations and cooperation with China during his 11-year rule of Pakistan. In
1986, Pakistan signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with China
which led to the establishment of the 300-megawatt Chashma nuclear
power plant with the Chinese assistance.
Pakistan and China maintained close friendly ties during the civilian
governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from 1988 to 1999. The
period witnessed the exchange of several high level visits between the two
countries.
The upward trend in Pakistan-China relations has been maintained since

the military coup in Pakistan in October 1999 and the assumption of power
by General Pervez Musharraf. Besides the visits of the Pakistani President
and Prime Ministers to China, there have been similar high level visits to
Pakistan from the Chinese side, the last being the visit of Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao to Pakistan in April 2005.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS
The most interesting feature of Pakistan-China relations is that after having

overcome the initial lack of warmth of the 1950’s, they have continued to
grow in strength steadily despite the changes of governments in the two
countries and the radical changes in the regional and global security
environment. This is all the more surprising since the two countries are
ideologically far apart with Pakistan being an Islamic Republic whereas
China remains wedded to communist ideology. A closer look at Pakistan-
China relations, however, reveals that they historically speaking they can
be divided into three distinct phases.
Phase I (1950-1961)
The first phase spanning the period from 1950 to 1961 was marked
by normal bilateral relations lacking the friendship and warmth of
later years. The reasons for the lack of warmth in Pakistan-China
relations for about a decade after the establishment of diplomatic
relations are not difficult to fathom. Pakistan’s very creation was
based on the Islamic ideology whereas China was committed to the
communist ideology which was, of course, atheist in character.
Secondly, Pakistan joined the Western Camp by joining the Baghdad
Pact and SEATO as well as by signing bilateral security agreements
with the US. China, on the other hand, was a strong critic of the
Western bloc whom it accused of harbouring imperialistic and
hegemonistic tendencies.
In this connection, one needs to recall that during the decade of

1950’s, the struggle for the freedom of Algeria and Vietnam from the
French occupation was still going on, many other British and French
colonies still had to gain independence, and the memories of the
Israeli, British and French invasion of Egypt of 1956(prior to which
Pakistan lent moral support to the West in its quarrel with Egypt
during the Suez crisis) were still fresh. It was, therefore, natural that
despite the cordial exchanges between the Prime Ministers of China
and Pakistan at Bandung in 1955, during the 1950’s the Sino-

Pakistani relations were marked by mutual suspicions and lacked
the depth of the later years.
In the light of the foregoing, President Ayub Khan’s proposal of 1959 to

India for joint defense ostensibly against China becomes understandable
but not defensible as it betrayed a regrettable lack of comprehension on the
part of Ayub and his advisers of the compulsions of India’s historical
animosity towards Pakistan as epitomized by the Kashmir dispute, which
precluded a defense alliance between the two countries. It was, in short, a
futile attempt to curry favour with the West which looked at China with
great apprehension especially because of its hard hitting criticism of the
former. The fact that the proposal was summarily shot down by Nehru
merely confirmed that it had been ill conceived in the first place. It was
also short-sighted as within a few years after making it, Ayub Khan
embarked upon the policy of developing close friendly relations with
China.
Phase II (1962-1980)
The second phase in Pakistan-China relations marked by close

friendship and deep warmth and cordiality began in 1962 with the
commencement of the border negotiations and continued till 1980.
During this period China extended strong political support and
generous military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
The real breakthrough in Pakistan-China relations came with the

signing of the border agreement in March 1963. Although the
agreement reflected a genuine desire on the part of the two
countries to remove any possible causes of misunderstandings
between them , there is no doubt that the growing difficulties in
relations between India and China culminating in the Sino-Indian
war of 1962 provided the much needed impetus for the speedy
conclusion of the Pakistan-China border agreement. It is interesting
to note that while China may have been persuaded by its growing
border difficulties with India to enter into border negotiations with
Pakistan, the latter was obviously motivated by several factors
including, inter alia, a desire to lessen its dependence on the West
which was getting closer to India especially after the Sino-Indian

war. Pakistan also rightly felt that its friendship with China would
counterbalance to some extent India’s growing weight in South Asia.
The events of the 1965 Pakistan-India war proved that Pakistan was
right in its calculations.
Pakistan, of course, paid a price in the form of the US pressure and even
economic sanctions for the freedom it showed in developing friendly
relations with China. It was ironical, therefore, that the same United States
later under President Nixon sought Pakistan’s help in improving its
relations with PRC. The move was a clever strategic manoeuvre on the part
of the US to isolate the Soviet Union by taking advantage of the growing
hostility between Moscow and Beijing. Pakistan’s help to Washington in
forging relations with China may have earned it Moscow’s wrath leading to
the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty which strengthened India’s
hand in its plans to dismember Pakistan in 1971.
The 1970’s witnessed steady growth in Pakistan-China relations with the

latter continuing to extend support to Islamabad politically, economically
and militarily in the aftermath of the Bangladesh crisis. During Bhutto’s
visit to China at the end of January 1972, Chou En-lai not only condemned
India’s aggression against Pakistan resulting in its dismemberment, but
China also wrote off the four loans already provided amounting to US$ 110
million. In June 1972, it was reported that China had delivered to Pakistan
60 MIG 19 fighters, 100 tanks and small arms. Later the same year, China
also blocked the admission of Bangladesh into the UN. China continued to
support the struggle of the Kashmiri people for the exercise of their right
of self-determination as stated in the joint communiqué issued after Prime
Minister Bhutto’s visit to China in May 1976. This support was reiterated
during General Zia-ul-Haq’s visit to China in December 1977.
Phase III (1980)
The third phase in Pakistan-China relations began roughly around

1980 with the emergence of a pragmatic leadership in China under
Deng Xiaoping and continues till today. With this phase, Pakistan-
China relations entered a mature phase in which the two sides,
while maintaining warm friendly relations and close cooperation in
diverse fields based on the convergence of their strategic interests,

are aware of both the potential and limitations of their relationship.
It must be mentioned here that under Deng Xiaoping, China adopted
in late 1970’s the slogans of development at home and peace abroad
as the supreme Chinese national objectives. In support of the
objective of development, China discarded the iron bowl policy of
Mao’s days and embarked upon the policy of reforms to introduce
the element of competition in the working of its economy as well as
the policy of opening to the outside world to attract foreign
investment and technology to support China’s development. These
policies resulted in China’s phenomenal economic growth which
continues even now and has made China an emerging economic
super power. For the maintenance of peace around its borders,
China undertook negotiations for the settlement of border disputes
with the Soviet Union and then India which reduced considerably
tensions in its relations with these countries. In fact, China adopted
a conscious policy of avoiding involvement in any armed conflict by
pursuing a low risk foreign policy which it continues to follow till
today. Taiwan is perhaps the only issue on which China, if pushed to
the wall, may take recourse to the use of force.
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a

cataclysmic event whose far-reaching effects are still working out in the
international system. The epic struggle of the Afghan people against the
Soviet occupation with the support of most of the international community
was crowned with success in 1989 when the Soviet troops finally withdrew
from Afghanistan. Pakistan was in the forefront of the states supporting the
Afghan jihad which was also supported by the US and other Western
countries, many Islamic countries and China. China’s support to the
Afghan jihad, which was somewhat subdued, was motivated both by
principles and realpolitik considerations in view of the Sino-Soviet
hostility.
The 1980’s saw the beginning of the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Indian talks to
defuse tensions in their relations and to resolve their respective border
disputes. The progress in these talks especially in terms of the resolution of
the border disputes was slow during the 1980’s. Nevertheless there was
considerable lowering of the tensions between India and China on the one
hand and between China and the Soviet Union on the other.
The process picked up speed during the 1990’s which witnessed
considerable growth in Sino-Indian economic and commercial relations
leading to the exchange of several high level visits, the most recent being
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005 when besides a
host of agreements aimed at enhancing mutual cooperation in various
fields, the two countries agreed to establish an India-China Strategic and
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. They also agreed to
increase the bilateral trade to US$ 20 billion by 2008. While India reiterated
its recognition of Tibet as part of China, Beijing recognized Sikkim as part
of India. The two sides also agreed to continue their talks for reaching a
fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the boundary question.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to a definite end the cold
war which had existed between the NATO and the WARSAW bloc countries
with the victory of the West and the emergence of the United States as the
sole super power. China now felt a threat to its security from the US rather
than Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, which experienced
internal turmoil throughout the 1990’s. Both China and Russia, afraid of the
growing ascendancy of the US, started gravitating towards each other. The
process has restored close friendly relations between the two countries
reminiscent of the early 1950’s and established a strategic partnership to
face the threat of global hegemonism posed by the US. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the joint communiqué issued at Moscow on July
2, 2005 after the Summit meeting between Presidents Hu Jintao and Putin
denounced “ the aspiration for monopoly and domination in international
affairs” and called for an end to “attempts to divide nations into leaders and
those being led.” In August 2005, the two countries launched their largest
joint military exercise in modern history to send a political signal to
Washington.
In this regard, the trilateral talks at the foreign minister level held among
Russia, China and India at Vladivostok in June 2005 are noteworthy. In
their joint remarks at the end of these talks, the three foreign ministers
declared that “the best and most effective way to ensure security in the
world today is the democratization of international relations, a consistent
application of the principles of multilaterality in problem settlement, and
the strengthening of the role of the United Nations. We agreed to build on

practical cooperation between the three states in the struggle against new
threats and challenges, primarily international terrorism, drug trafficking
and other forms of organized crime.” They also noted that “the dynamic
evolution of relations between Russia and China, between Russia and India,
and between China and India makes it possible to bring our trilateral
engagement to a qualitatively new level”.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization of which both China and Russia

are founding members, is not only meant to counter the threat of terrorism
but also to face the challenge posed by the US drive towards global
hegemonism and domination even in Central Asia. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the latest Summit Declaration of SCO issued at Astana on
July 5, 2005 called for the removal of the US military bases in Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan.
Pakistan-China cooperation in resisting the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan during the 1980’s brought the two countries closer together
resulting in the further strengthening of their political, economic and
military relations. The agreement for the establishment of the Chashma
nuclear power plant was signed during this period. Several other projects
for collaboration in the economic and military fields were also signed
during these years. However, there was some dilution of the Chinese
support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue which was no longer as
categorical as it used to be during the 1960’s and 1970’s. This was partly the
result of the process of détente between China and India, and partly
because of the emergence of the new more pragmatic leadership in China.
China also stopped giving grants to Pakistan on the plea that being a
developing country it could not afford to do so.
The close cooperation between China and Pakistan was maintained during
the 1990’s and the past few years of the new century despite the successive
changes of government and the coup in Pakistan of October 1999.
However, it must be noted that Pakistan’s support to the Taliban in
Afghanistan, who were suspected by China of supporting the separatists in
Xinjiang province, indirectly created some misunderstandings in Pakistan-
China relations. The change in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy and the
removal of the Taliban government following the events of 9/11 have
removed these misunderstandings. Pakistan’s admission into the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization as an observer together with Iran and India
earlier this year would not only promote regional cooperation on issues of
common interest but also strengthen bilateral relations between China and
Pakistan.
The signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good

Neighbourly Relations” during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in
April was the high water mark of relations between the two friendly
countries. Under the agreement, both countries would support each other’s
efforts to safeguard their territorial integrity. This and the 21 other
agreements signed during the visit have laid a solid foundation for the
further development of cooperation in various fields between Pakistan and
China. It must be noted that Pakistan-China bilateral trade stood at US$ 3.06
billion in2004, up by 26% over the previous year. The signing of the
agreement on early harvest programme which would bring down Chinese
tariffs on several important exportable items of Pakistan to zero with effect
from January I, 2006 will provide a further boost to the bilateral trade.
China is now involved in a large number of economic projects in Pakistan
including, inter alia, the Gawadar port project. The launching of the joint
project for the production of JF-17 thunder aircraft and the purchase by
Pakistan of four F22P naval frigates from China would boost cooperation
on the military side.
ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS:
On the basis of the foregoing, one can reach the conclusion that the real
strength of Pakistan-China relations, when shorn of verbiage, lies in the
following factors:
• The convergence of the strategic interests of Pakistan and China

perhaps has been the strongest bond linking the two countries.
This has been the case from the 1960’s till today.
• The settlement of the boundary issue.
• The strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in each

other’s internal affairs has been another source of strength to
bilateral relations between Pakistan and China which

ideologically are far apart.
• The shared interest of the two countries in strengthening peace

and stability at the regional and global levels has also brought
them closer together.
• Pakistan’s support to China on the Taiwan issue.
• China’s support to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue.
• The opposition of both Pakistan and China to global and regional

hegemonism.
• Pakistan-China collaboration in the military field.
• Bilateral economic and commercial cooperation.
There are also a few weak areas in Pakistan-China relations. The economic
and commercial relations between the two countries, though an important
dimension of the overall relationship, are not as well developed as they
should be considering their close political relationship. The level of
bilateral trade at roughly US$ 3 billion, mostly in favour of China, is far
below its potential. It is heartening, therefore, that the two countries plan
to take special measures to boost bilateral trade. Another weak area is the
extremely limited interaction between Pakistan and China in the cultural
field. The visits of scholars, students, journalists, artists, etc. between
Pakistan and China are few and far between. The same is true about people-
to- people contacts which again are virtually non-existent although both
the countries are rich in touristic attractions. The ideological differences so
far have not acted as an impediment in the development of Pakistan-China
friendship. However, the possibility that under certain circumstances this
factor may become an obstacle in the future in the strengthening of
Pakistan-China relations cannot be totally ruled out.
THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS
On the whole, Pakistan-China relations remain sound with bright prospects

for the future. This optimistic prognosis is based on the convergence of the
long-term strategic interests of the two countries. It is obvious that
notwithstanding its large and fast developing trade and economic relations
with Beijing, the US has adopted a well-calculated policy of building up
India as a counterweight to China and to contain the latter on its southern
periphery as reflected by the defense and nuclear agreements recently
signed by the US and India in Washington. Also significant is the US
declaration of March this year to help India become a “major world power
in the 21st century”. The vote by India in the IAEA Board of Governors
meeting held on 24 September 2005 in support of a resolution against Iran,
when most of the non-aligned countries including Pakistan abstained,
shows how far India is prepared to go to please the US in the hope of
securing continued US support in economic, military, nuclear and political
fields. China, therefore, is likely to view the fast growing US-India relations
with some apprehension. On other hand, Pakistan will continue to need
China’s support to face a possible threat to its security from India. This
convergence of strategic interests provides a sound basis for the further
development of Pakistan-China relations which serve their national
interests.
There is, however, no ground for complacency. Pakistan and China should
not take their friendship for granted misguided by their rhetoric about
Pakistan-China friendly relations being “all weather” and “time tested”. A
radical and unexpected change in the global and regional strategic
environment may bring this relationship under strain. Pakistan specially
needs to watch carefully the fast growing China-India relations in the
economic and commercial fields which cannot but have negative political
repercussions for Pakistan in the long run. Already India-China trade is
about five times the size of Pakistan-China trade. It is well-known that
strong economic and commercial ties inevitably have their repercussions
in the political field.
Islamabad must also watch carefully the evolving security environment in

northeast Asia marked by heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
despite their extensive economic and commercial ties, and the issue of
North Korean nuclear programme being discussed within the framework of

the six-party talks. In view of Pakistan’s friendly relations with the various
countries involved in these developments, particularly Japan which is
reemerging as a major donor of economic assistance for Pakistan,
Islamabad may have to do some tight rope walking to balance its interests
engaged in those countries. However, in handling these issues, we should
not overlook the critical importance of China to Pakistan’s strategic
interests.
There is currently extensive economic and commercial cooperation

between China and ASEAN countries despite the territorial disputes in the
South China sea. They are also cooperating with each other within the
framework of APEC and ARF. Similarly, China and the EU countries have
fast growing political and economic ties. Pakistan which maintains friendly
relations with all of these countries cannot but welcome these trends.
Pakistan should also welcome the growing entente between China and
Russia both of which recently expressed their opposition to global(US)
hegemonism in their Summit Declaration. This development fits into
Pakistan’s policy of developing relations with Russia to enhance its
diplomatic manoeuvrability.
Pakistan-US relations have their own unique importance for Islamabad.

However, we need to remember that historically speaking the US has
walked away from Pakistan several times in the past. There is no guarantee
that this would not happen again in the future despite its assurances to the
contrary. It is also obvious that the US has decided to build up a strategic
partnership with India based on long term convergence of their strategic
interests as well as for important economic and political reasons whereas
its relations with Pakistan suffer from serious limitations and uncertainties.
We should not, therefore, allow the development of our relations with the
US to impinge upon our critically important relationship with China. On
the other hand, Chinese policy makers need to take care that the fast
growing Indo-China relations do not have a dampening effect on Pakistan-
China relations.
Keeping in view the foregoing, Pakistan must pay due attention to the
development of its friendly relations and cooperation with China. We must
redouble our efforts to strengthen further our ties in the economic and
commercial fields. In addition, bilateral exchanges in political, cultural and
military fields should be encouraged to promote mutual understanding and
cooperation in these fields. Finally, the two countries need to build up
people-to-people contacts to strengthen their friendly ties while continuing
to adhere to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs. Given these efforts, one can reasonably hope that Pakistan-China
friendship will continue to gain in strength in the years to come.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
BY CHAIRMAN
Thanks to the impressed presentations by our distinguished speakers and

very active interaction between speakers and audience. I think we have
very successful session. I also express my deep and great appreciations for
your cooperation for making this session successful.
Even though we face new scenarios, new challenges, just as speakers have
mentioned, China-Pakistan relationship is entering in a new period, that is
based on more bilateral interest rather than the single party, on more
comprehensive components rather that the single one, on the more
common values and interests rather than the history and traditions. So I
may say that China should pay more attention to the Pakistan’s national
construction and we have enough reasons to say that China and Pakistan
relationship has a broader future.
Concluding Session
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S (136)
RECOMMENDATIONS
Dr Abdul Latif Tunio
The Honourable Guests and Ladies and Gentlemen,
We are in concluding session. The Inaugural Session led the

foundation of debates (specially the keynote address by Vice
Chancellor, said the discourse of deliberation in the conference).
First Session on the security was presided over by Dr. Zhang Li.
There were five speakers. Due to scarcity of time I may not do justice
with all speakers and what I will do, simply I will give sense of the
speakers.
Dr Bhatty gave a full picture of comprehensive friendship between

Pakistan and China which is based on principles.
Another speaker Naureen Nazar in her maiden speech spoke of the

combined Strategy of Pakistan and China in combating Terrorism.
She came out with a great idea that Pakistan should become member
of Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which we will adopt in
the recommendation.
Third speaker who was also main speaker, Dr Guihong Zhang

actually he identified the India factor in U.S. — China and Pakistan
relations, and to him U.S. see India a counter weight to China and
rising China is more threatening than emerging India. He
emphasized on the logic of economic interdependence to bring
peace and security in the region.
Fourth speaker, Mr Fazal ur Reliman, he came with another logic of

energy security which will make the region more peaceful and
integrated.
Then final speaker Dr Sekhar spoke on the temples of technology

and India — China and of-course Pakistan in emerging the scene. He
raised the concerns about nuclear exchanges which he believe could
cause deterioration of relations among the states.
Second session, which was more multidimensional covering the

other aspects of political, and economic. It was presided over by
Dr Ghihong Zhang. There were five speakers.
First speaker His Excellency Dr Khalid Mehmood gave the economic

dimensions of China — Pakistan relations and he stated what is
common between India and China instead of nothing common
between them, their friendship defied the Cold War logic. It is very
important so come out with solution that people-to-people
relationship should be enhanced.
Second speaker Dr Zhang Li, came with few concerns of China, and
he suggested that track-two diplomacy and people-to-people
diplomacy need be depended. He also signified the gas pipeline
importance.
Third speaker, from the Area Study Centre, Ghulam Murtaza Khoso
said that the few changes took place in Pakistan — China relations
especially after Sino-Indian rapprochement. But despite these
changes Pakistan and China are still operating like partners.
Fourth speaker, Dr Shang Quanyn, his title was very tricky and he
said traditional relations are changing the post-Cold War era. He
pointed out the different concerns of China on terrorism and nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan. Finally, he concluded that
everything is changing but nothing changes in the context Pakistan
—China relations, which remain fundamentally same.
Fifth speaker His Excellency Ambassador (R) Javed Hussain, spoke

with the same mindset what Dr Khalid Melunood has said that
people-to-people relationship will be enhanced. He was, however,
cautions that we should not be complacent on changing dimensions.
And there should be consensus between Pakistan — China that they
should not interfere in each other’s relations and we must take into
account that geo-economic realities to further the cooperation
between Pakistan and China.
Now I would Jike to read the recommendations:
1. There is unanimously agreed that in Lieu of qualitative changes

in the existing regional scenario, we should exclusively depend
on non-regional power who made, walk way in the past; only
good neighbouring policy is a viable option for sustainable
development and a stable security order.
2. It was held that trade relations between states and regions are
influenced by the anticipated benefits in order to achieve the
target of balance of trade with China, a professional attitude be
applied in accelerating the Pakistani export and attracting
Chinese private sector to invest in Pakistan. For that purpose
Pakistan has to provide law and order situation Conducive for
foreign investment.
3. The conference resolved for framing a common strategy in
responding to the challenges of global economy.
4. The conference recommends that cultural programs, trade
exhibitions and academic visits be arranged to extend people-to-
people relations between two countries.
5. It was resolved that in the wake of growing Sino-India
rapprochement and multilateral cooperation between China,
Russia and Central Asian Republics. Pakistan needs to focus on
national interests priorities in accordance with our capability
and possibility of our national power.
6. The seminar also suggests that Pakistan and China’s combine

strategy in checkmating the menace of terrorism, both countries
work together to deal with illegal flow of extremists/separatist by
undertaking counter measure on this issue.
7. The conference stress on the need to provide feedback to the

policy makers and foreign office through publishing the
proceeding of this conference.
8. The seminar also suggest for establishment of think tank with

the name of strategic forum for identifying further avenues of
cooperation.
9. The seminar underscores the importance of human recourses as

china has been doing; in this respect it was held that education is
key to solution.
10. It was proposed that, in the wake of our growing relations with
China. All leading universities should introduce courses on
Chinese studies.
11. It was approved with consensus that Pakistan status in Shanghi

cooperation (SCO) be raised from an “observer” to a full skill
member of the organization.
V O T E O F T H A N K S (140)
VOTE OF THANKS
Professor Dr Deedar Hussain Shah
Honorable Vice Chancellor, Mazhar-ul-Haq Siddiqui,

Respectable Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh,
Director Area Study Centre,
Professor Dr Lutfullah Mangi, Delegates, Students, Friends
Assalam-o-alaikum
On behalf of faculty of Far East and Southeast Asia Study Centre, University
of Sindh, I extend my heartfelt thanks to all the participants who had come
from far flung areas, and have shared their views with us. Naming them
Professor Dr Zhang Li, Ambassador (R) Dr Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty,
Professor Dr Guihong Zhang, Mr Fazal-ur-Rehman, Dr Dolla Varaprasad
Sekar, Ambassador (R) Khalid Mehmood, Professor Dr Shang Quanyu,
Ambassador (R) Javed Hussain, and our young colleagues, Ms. Naureen
Memon, and Ghulam Murtaza Khoso, all have shared with us their
expertise, their views, and have generated this lively discussion on today’s
occasion. I think their participation has given this occasion a very glorious
look.
Special thanks go to the honorable Vice Chancellor of this University, who

has cooperated with us, encouraged us, and without such cooperation this
occasion could have not been managed in such a befitting manner. He is a
man who is always encouraging, stressingly striving hard to bring this
University on the path of research oriented pattern of education and
inculcation.
I think such cooperation of our distinguished guests and delegates will

remain with us in future also to arrange such type of occasions.
Once again I thank you all.

Conference
(Rational / Schedule)
RATIONALE
he present world order although uni–polar yet the world is drifting

to regional blocks. The regional alliances are in the making. In
present scenario international relations have become multi–
layered. A change in the entire pattern of cooperation, competition and
conflict is underway that is shaping new contours of inter–state relations.
The Atlantic era is being succeeded by the Asia–Pacific development.

One of the dynamic forces of change in Asia is the rise of China. It is not
only influencing Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia but has wider implications
on the politics of South Asia. China is interested in stable South Asia. It
actively supports SAARC in regional affairs.
The mutual political and strategic need have been the basis on which
relations were established and developed between Pakistan and China in
the early 1960s. Both have been considered as traditional friends of each
other. Since then both countries have forged a comprehensive partnership
which is multidimensional and encompasses all fields. The exchange of
high–level visits have been one of the major contributing factor in
promoting trust and all round cooperation between the two countries. The
latest contributing factor in this regard is the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation, and good Neighbourly Relations, 2005, and the agreement on
combating terrorism, separatism and extremism between both countries.
The agreement and anti–terrorism would further intensify cooperation
between Beijing and Islamabad. Both countries share common positions on
various regional and international issues. Pakistan supports the Chinese
stance on Taiwan. Pakistan opposes the declaration of independence of
Taiwan. The history of our relations has testified that friendly relations
between Pakistan and China are not only in the interest of both countries
but also benefit the region.
We have been able to strengthen our political ties with China but
have failed to establish deep economic ties with Beijing. The bilateral trade
between Pakistan and China was nearly $U.S. 3 billion in 2004, up by 25
percent over the previous year. A lot needs to be done to address the
growing trade imbalance that is emerging. Pakistan – China relations are
growing slowly in economic, trade and investment areas. Both countries
will establish a tax–free trading system within next two to three years. How
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (ii)
Pakistan can learn from China’s miracle of development is a daunting

question for intellectual explanation.
In the changing regional and global scenario we must bear in mind

that China has its own legitimate long – term interests in the region. Beijing
is pursuing a balancing policy over Kashmir and encourages the parties to
avoid conflicts.
The relations between China and India have improved rapidly in

recent years. China has announced strategic partnership with India. It is
the highest level of partnership that China officially adopts. By signing the
strategic partnership with India, Beijing has prevented New Delhi, at least
on the paper, from joining an “American anti–China Coalition”. Despite
their strategic partnership there remain serious obstacles in establishing
cooperative relationship. Anti–China lobby is still strong in India. China is
seen by many Indians as “potential threat number one”.
On the other hand, U.S. has agreed to aid India’s civilian nuclear
power programme. It is an unexpected decision. The Bush Administration
sees India as an essential counterweight to Chinese ambitions in Asia. Some
analysts believe that China and India are trying to shape the new global
order based on multi–polarity.
How will growing China – India relationship on the one hand, and
their future struggle for regional hegemony, on the other, affect bilateral
Pakistan – China relations and regional power structure?
The organizers of the seminar hope that our distinguished speakers

will not only discuss and analyze Pakistan – China relations from different
perspectives keeping in view the changing regional and global scenario,
but will also recommend suggestions for further strengthening of Pakistan
– China relations which remain critically important to the regional peace
and stability.
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (iii)
Objectives:
The Seminar will provide a platform to experts of international

stature on Pakistan – China relations:
1. to evaluate Pakistan – China relations under the present

circumstances;
2. to promote research as well as educational cooperation, and;
3. to publish the proceeding and recommendations of the
conference in book form, which will be helpful for future
researchers on Pakistan – China relations.

Director
Email: lutfullahmangi_ir@hotmail.com
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (iv)
Programme
September 29, 2005
• Registration................................................ 09:30 – 10:00 hrs
• Inaugural Session ...................................... 10:00 – 11:00 hrs
o Recitation from The Holy Quran
o Welcome Address by Dr Lutfullah Mangi
Director, Area Study Centre, Fareast and Southeast Asia.
o Address by Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh
Dean Faculty of Social Sciences
o Keynote Address by Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro
o Presidential Address by Honourable Mazharul Haq Siddiqi
Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
• Declaration of the Opening of Seminar
Tea ........................................................................... 11:00 – 11:30 hrs
WORKING SESSION – I
1 1 : 3 0 – 1 3 : 3 0 h r s
(SECURITY DIMENSION)
Chair:......... Professor Dr Zhang Li
Ambassador (R) Dr Maqbool Security Dimension of Pakistan – China

A. Bhatty Relations
Ms Naureen Memon Pakistan–China Relations: Combating Terrorism
Professor Dr Guihong Zhang U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation: Implications
for China and Pakistan
Mr Fazal-ur-Rahman Pakistan–China Relations: New Dimensions in
Security Cooperation.
Professor Dr Dolla Varaprasad Civilian Technology Transfer between China
Sekhar and Pakistan.
Discussion
Lunch............................................................................. 13:30 – 14:30 hrs

Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (v)
WORKING SESSION – II
1 4 : 3 0 – 1 7 : 0 0 h r s

(SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS)
Chair:......... Professor Dr Guihong Zhang
Ambassador (R) Khalid Economic Dimension of Pakistan – China

Mehmood Relations
Professor Dr Zhang Li Sino–Pakistan Relations: Potentials, New Issues

and the Emerging Trend
Mr Ghulam Murtaza Khoso Pakistan – China Relations in Changing

Regional Scenario
Professor Dr Shang Quanyu China – Pakistan Relationship is Coming to an

End?
Ambassador (R) Javed Political Dimension of Pakistan – China

Hussain Relations
Discussion
Tea .............................................................................................. 17:00 hrs
Concluding Session ................................................................... 17:35 hrs
Recommendation by: Dr Ross Masood Hosain
Vote of Thanks
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (vi)
List of Seminar Participants
Ambassador (R) Dr Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty

Islamabad Council of World Affairs
House # 47, Street # 27, Sector F–6/2,
Islamabad.
Tel. (051) 9215545

Deputy Director
Institute of International Studies
Zhejiang University, Zhejiang,
People’s Republic of China
Email: ghzhang@hz.cnc.com
Mr Fazal-ur-Rahman
Director (East Asia)
The Institute of Strategic Studies
Sector F 5/2,
Islamabad
Tel. (051) 9204423
Dr Dolla Varaprasad Sekhar

Assistant Professor in Chinese Studies
Centre for East Asian Studies,
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, India
Email: dvaraprasad@yahoo.com
Dr Ross Masood Hosain

Consultant in International Law
International Affairs and Strategic Policy Planning
Governor, Institute of Regional Studies (IRS)
Islamabad.
Tel. (051) 2282151
Email: rossmasood@hotmail.com
Ambassador (R) Khalid Mehmood

242, Street 100, 1–8/4,
Islamabad.
Tel. (051) 9257260
Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario (vii)
Director
Centre South Asia – West China Cooperation
and Development Studies,
Sichuan University, Chengdu, 610064
Email: sawccad@163.com

Department of Politics and History Studies
Zhanjiang University, Guangdong,
Email: shangquanyu@hotmail.com
Ambassador (R) Javed Hussain

88, Main Double Road, F–10/1,
Islamabad.
Tel. (051) 9266218
Ms Naureen Memon
Lecturer
University of Sindh,
Jamshoro
Email: memonnaureen@yahoo.com
Mr Ghulam Murtaza Khoso

Lecturer
University of Sindh,
Jamshoro,
Email: murtaza_johi@yahoo.com

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PROCEEDINGS OF

One-Day International Seminar

PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS IN CHANGING

September 29, 2005

• Presidential Address .............................................................................. 6

• Keynote Address .................................................................................... 9

The Security Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations................................ 14

Pakistan-China Relations: Combating Terrorism .......................................... 22

U.S-India Strategic Cooperation: Implications for China and Pakistan ....... 30

Remarks by the Chairman.............................................................................. 70

Economic Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations .................................... 71

Sino-Pakistan Relations: Potentials, New Issues and the Emerging

Pakistan – China Relations in Changing Regional Scenario......................... 96

China – Pakistan Relationship is Coming to an End? ................................. 103

Political Dimension of Pakistan – China Relations ..................................... 119

Remarks by the Chairman............................................................................ 135

Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education

It is indeed an honour for me to welcome you all this morning a behalf of

Ladies and Gentlemen:

economic cooperation between the two countries. The friendship between

Despite these excellent relations, and assurances by Beijing that any

I thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

Professor Dr Rafia A. Sheikh

Honorable Dr. Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education, Govt. of Sindh,

Today, as we all know, we live in a global village, a world that is

China, as has been repeatedly pointed out by political pundits, is one of

Though Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize China in

As a manifesto for future mutually beneficial cooperation, we need to take

Military and economic cooperation can greatly benefit from a contribution

I thank you all very much.

Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui

Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro, Minister for Education,

I feel great pride in according a warm welcome to our Chief Guest,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The political changes are so abrupt that a vision of tomorrow is needed to

major challenges of our time is how to manage regional differences. This

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Conflict is always the product of interests not religions or civilizations. We

China is a continental power. Her foreign policy goal of good neighbourly

Ladies and Gentlemen:

the real strength behind Pakistan–China friendship. The graph of

The process of normalization with India has not diminished Pakistan’s

How these friendly relations can be more strengthened? What is the

I am confident that the participation of the distinguished speakers and

Finally, I would like to reiterate with the organizers my sincerest

Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

Honourable Dr Hamida Khuhro

Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqui

I am very grateful actually to the organizers and the Vice-Chancellor who

My specialty is not foreign relations or China relations or International

For Pakistan the great window of opportunity, as far as China is concerned,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We find ourselves in Pakistan as one of the few countries in which there is

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Unfortunately, in the post-9/11 scenario, we have the war on terror. We

after ourselves not as an appendage to America, not looking for support,

We have to make a huge Asian Block which should be from China to

The day before yesterday, the Chancellor of UK made a speech in which he

Thank you very much.

The focus of US domination shifted to Asia, where it first intervened in

Two powers that got encouraged to adopt a similar approach in their

It is proposed to examine the scope and relevance of their strategic and

The discredited ruling dynasty was overthrown by a revolution in 191 1, led