Notes on Book III

In Book II, Aristotle has established philosophy is the knowledge of truth.

Philosophy is a kind of theoretical knowledge where we know the first
principles and causes.

Let us turn to Book III. Book III has six chapters.

The first chapter outlines the reason why we must be acquainted with the
difficulties of the subject. Aristotle thinks that we must go through the
difficulties that we will encounter while dealing with the subject.

Reason 1: We cannot untie a knot that we do not know about. We cannot

solve a difficulty not known to us. We must be in a difficulty for us to solve
the difficulty.

Reason 2: If you inquire without knowing what difficulty was being

addressed then you do not know where you have to go. The destination is
not clear to us.

Reason 3: We do not know whether we have found a solution if we do not

know about what difficulty the solution is a solution to.

Reason 4: If we do not start with surveying the difficulties, the end of the
inquiry is not clear to is.

Reason 5: Those who have heard the contending arguments to a case,

must arrive at a better position of judging. Hence, knowing the difficulties
and the arguments for each side of the difficulty, makes us a better judge.

Knowing the first principles and causes must involve “knots” and
difficulties, acquaintance with which is desirable so that our knowledge of
the first principles and causes comes to us through a resolution of the
difficulties. This is an interesting fact, as knowing the aporia is somehow
necessary for us to inquire into the wisdom we seek regarding the first
principles and causes. It appears as if knowing them without the mediation
of these difficulties is not possible.
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Some commentators think that these aporia are meant as encouraging the
metaphysician to think more robustly about her subject.

APORIA (“lack of passage”)

The following are aporia because there are good arguments for both the
disjuncts that flank either…or.

Aporia 1) Whether the investigation of the causes belongs to one or to

more sciences

Aporia 2) whether such a science should survey only the first principles of
substance or also the principles on which all men base their proofs (Is
logic also to be studied along with metaphysics)

Aporia 3) if the science deals with substance, whether one science deals
with all substances, or more than one, and if more, then are all to be called
Wisdom, hence akin in nature, or only some of them

Aporia 4) whether only sensible substances exist, or others beside them,

and these others are of one kind or are there several kinds of non-sensible
substances…

Aporia 5) Should we investigate only substances or the essential attributes

of substances as well

These are the first five aporia, which are usually grouped together. Aporia 4
has clearly Platonic roots.

Aporia 6 and 7 raise questions about whether the first principles are genera
or not

Aporia 6) Are principles and elements of things the genera or is the parts
present in each thing,

Aporia 7) If the principles are genera, then are they proximate or distant
genera

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The we turn to another sort of aporia regarding whether there is anything
apart from individual things,

Aporia 8) Are there just individuals or are there things that are separate
from individuals, (and many other questions stated in either or format)

Aporia 9) are the principles limited in number or kind, both those in the
definitions and those in the material substratum (was this not answered in
book II)

Aporia 10) are the principles of perishable things and imperishable things
different or the same and are all principles perishable or they are perishable
of only perishable things (this aporia has not been found easy to locate in
the fourteen aporia when it comes to grouping)

Aporia 11) is unity or being attributed to the substance of things, or is the

substratum something else…

Aporia 12) are the principles universal or like individual things

Aporia 13) whether the principles exist potentially or actually

Aporia 14) Are numbers and lines and figures or points substances or not
and if they are substances then are they separate from individuals or
present in them?

Some scholars count 15 aporia and some less or more. I have not heard of
less than 14.

APORIA 1

Are the causes to be investigated by one science or more?

A) Argument against the study being just one science

Argument 1: The argument from contraries

Premise 1: To fall under one science, X has to possess contrary

characteristics (Contrary means that they cannot both be true together, but
they can both be false together)

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Premise 2: But the four causes do not possess contrary characteristics.
The four causes are not contradictory to each other. It seems that the
causes cannot all be not present. At least the material and the formal
cause have to be present. They cannot both be false together.

Therefore, they cannot be studied under the same science.

Argument 2: The argument from unchangeable things

Premise 1: If there are unchangeable things, then a final cause and an

efficient cause won’t apply to it

Premise 2: There are unchangeable things (like mathematical theorems)

Conclusion: Therefore, there are things to which not all causes apply.

Hence, the study of causes cannot be one science, as different objects

demand the attention of different causes.

B) The argument against there being several sciences of causes

Argument 1: The argument from Priority

Premise 1: If the science of causes are many in number, then we don’t

know which of these sciences are supposed to be the one that is to be
called Wisdom.

Premise 2: There are arguments to show that the final cause is Wisdom (as
knowing the end of something is knowledge of a higher kind) and there are
arguments to show that knowing the formal cause (why a thing is what it is)
is of the nature of the highest knowledge and there are even arguments to
show that the efficient cause is what we seek when we seek the highest
knowledge

Premise 3: The science of causes are many in number (from Premise 2).
There is nothing to show the priority of one over the other.

Conclusion: Therefore, there is no way the study of which of these causes

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would be the highest knowledge of all.

Why cannot we study them piecemeal? Well, ultimately Aristotle wants

some overarching knowledge which covers all the causes and yet remain in
one discipline. He however has produced two arguments for the causes not
being studied in one science and one argument to show that it should not
studied by several sciences, for if it were, we would be at a loss to know
which of these was the highest wisdom. The unity of Metaphysics would be
lost, something that Aristotle does not want.

APORIA 2

Whether such a science should survey only the first principles of

substance or also the principles on which all men base their proofs (Is
logic also to be studied along with metaphysics)

Does one science deal with substance and logical issues (like the law of
non-contradiction and law of excluded middle) or are there different
sciences that deal with them? If there are different sciences, then which of
these is the nature of wisdom?

A) The Argument why Logic cannot belong to one science

Argument 1) The argument from generality of logic

Premise 1: If every science uses logic, then the study of logic cannot
belong to any one science

Premise 2: Every science does use logic

Premise 3: Metaphysics is also a science. Hence, it also uses logic

Conclusion: it follows that logic cannot be the province of sophia to study

either.

Argument 2) The Argument from Collapse of all sciences into

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Metaphysics if Logic is studied with Metaphysics

Premise 1: Logic must use certain premises, about a certain subject and
prove certain attributes

Premise 2: Logic deals with all demonstrative sciences

Premise 3: If logic is to be treated as a primary science, then it will have to

have a subject and prove the attributes of that subject

Premise 4: This subject will have to contain all the sciences as well since
logic is used to prove all the attributes of all the subjects of all the sciences.

Conclusion: Hence, the primary science would contain all the sciences (an
absurd consequence)

So, Logic cannot belong to the study of first principles.

BUT,

A) Argument why Logic must be studied with first principles

If logic and metaphysics are separate subjects, which is the nature of

wisdom? Logic appears to be more general. Surely, the philosopher must
inquire into them. But the philosopher must also inquire into the first
principles and causes. But we just saw that both cannot be studied by
philosophers.

So, we are in a situation of aporia. We must study logic and the first
principles together, but it seems we cannot. If we study them separately,
that also does not stand to reason.

APORIA 3

The wording of the aporia changes from B1 to B2, where, in B2, we deal
with it afresh.

The aporia can be shortly stated like this: do all the substances fall under
one science or many sciences? There are reasons that it cannot be many
sciences and there are reasons why it cannot be one.

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1) The argument against the many sciences view

The argument about its not being many sciences is familiar. Aristotle
raises it as challenge: if all the substances are to be studied under many
sciences, then which substance is being studied under the guise of first
principles? The question is not answered. So we have to work out the
implication: either Aristotle means that we cannot figure out which of these
studies of substance is the highest wisdom or else he means that we
cannot figure out which of these substances are subject to first principles
in the first place.

So we cannot have the first principles as many sciences.

2) The argument against the science of first principles being one science

The second half of the aporia is that all the substances cannot be studied
under one science. The reason is familiar. For if the first principles studied
all substances then it would have to demonstrate the attributes of each
substance. But then this would collapse all sciences into metaphysics,
which is something that we do not want to do. We want to distinguish
between the study of metaphysics and the other sciences. So this is
basically the collapse argument again.

Here is another interpretation. Aporia 3 is a continuation of Aporia 2. Aporia

2 ended by wondering whether logic and the study of first principles are
part of Sophia.

But if indeed this is so, then Sophia would be demonstrating the attributes
of the substances as it would be a demonstrative science, because logic is
part of it. But if so, then all sciences collapse into one again.

This way of stating the argument is different, as it connect the two aporias.
Earlier, we stated the same problem without a connection.

APORIA 5

Aporia 5 is related to Aporia 3. So we do it first, as does Aristotle. Here

Aristotle raises the direct question whether the science of first principles is

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to study substances or their attributes also?

1) The argument against studying attributes with first principles

If it has to study the attributes of substances as well, then it has to be a

demonstrative science. Here Aristotle raises a different objection, instead
of the collapse argument. He says that there is no demonstration of the
essence of things. But the science of first principles must be involved in
the conjecture of the essence of things. Only by knowing the essence, can
we also talk about the necessary attributes.

2) The argument for studying attributes with first principles

Aristotle here raises a question: But if another science is to study the

attributes of substance, then what will be the science that does that job?

The meaning of this question is somewhat like this (according to me): if the
science of first principles studies substance and not the attributes, then
some other science must study all the attributes of all the substances, but
then what science can that be? Aristotle writes that he finds this a “difficult
question”.

Aristotle gives a mathematical analogy. He says that if solids are

substances, and lines and planes too, then does one subject study them all
and their attributes too or many sciences do? If one, then the science of
such a substance is a demonstrative one, and if not, it is hard to
understand what science (apart from math) will study the attributes. This
certainly sounds like a difficult question.

The aporia is: we can neither study substance with the attributes nor
study substance without the attributes.

APORIA 4

Here is the aporia: are there only sensible substances or are there non-
sensible substances too and if there are non-sensible ones, are they of
many kinds themselves?

One would expect that Aristotle will set up the aporia and tell us that there
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cannot be anything beyond sensible substances but that we also need to
posit non-sensible ones.

Aristotle however rails against the idea of non-sensible substances. He

takes the notion of non-sensible and equates them with Plato’s Forms and
also intermediates between Forms and sensible things.

1) The argument regarding Forms being eternal sensible things

Aristotle writes that these Forms are just sensible things but eternal, like
gods having human form and yet being eternal. This he finds to be
ridiculous. That is the implication of Aristotle’s comment about the
eternality of Forms.

2) The argument regarding positing of intermediates

Plato appears to posit intermediates for mathematical objects. But if that is

the case, since astronomy is one of the mathematical sciences, then
besides the heavens there will be an intermediate heaven, and the same for
the sun and moon, and these cannot even be moving as the real ones do!

3) The argument regarding explosion of intermediates

Also, the problem is that if mathematics needs intermediates then why not
the other sciences like medical science? We will have apart from health
itself, and healthy individuals, a third category of healthy intermediates.
Plato has no way to stop this explosion of entities.

4) The argument against the intermediates and Forms being part of the
Sensibles

Also, we cannot say that these forms and intermediates are in the sensible
things, for then we have to say that the intermediates are moving (which we
cannot say) and that there are two solids in the same place, the sensible
solid and the non-sensible solid.

Aristotle appears not to give any argument in favor of the idea that there
are non-sensible substances.

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However in Aporia 8, he does come back to the idea of whether merely
having sensible substances is enough or do we need something else for
Sophia to study.

APORIA 6

It is odd that Aristotle raises this aporia because he has just rejected the
idea that there are non-sensible things and genera are non-sensible. So,
why even raise the aporia? But it seems that here too there is an aporia.

Are the principles genera or the elements of things?

1) Argument for principles of things being elements

Aristotle relies on three instances: namely, what is usually thought to be the

case, second, what wise men have thought (like Empedocles) and what it is
to examine the nature of anything.

a) It is usually thought that the word must be made up of the elements of

sound that go into making it up (and not the genus “articulate sound”)

b) Empedocles describes fire, or water or air as principles of existing things,

and he does not take them to be genera

c) If we have to examine the nature of anything, we look at its parts (like

examining the nature of a bed).

2) Argument for principles of things being genera (and not elements)

This is an argument from the nature of definition

1) We know things by definition

2) Definitions are not possible without genera

3) Hence, the genera are also principles of what is being defined as well.

So, there are arguments on both sides but both sides cannot be correct at
the same time.

APORIA 7

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If the principles are genera, are they the proximate genera or the distant
ones

(like is homo sapiens the genera or is unity the genera of men).

The argument here is very complex and depends on other doctrines of

Aristotle maintained in his works on logic and his opinions regarding
predication.

1) Argument as to why distant genera like unity or being cannot be

principles

a) The very highest principles of things are unity and being

b) So, unity and being are to be predicated of the species (say, homo
sapiens) and its proper differentia (“rational” , “biped”, “having a vestigial
organ” etc)

c) The proper differentia have the properties of having being and being one.

d) But unity and one cannot be predicated of the proper differentia because
then the species will be spoken to have many beings many unities, which is
absurd

Therefore, the most distant genera cannot be the principles of things.

2) The argument that proximate genera (like “human”) cannot be a

principle

a) if the proximate genera are to be the first principles, then these must
exist separately from the individuals falling under the genera

b) but this is not possible (as we have seen from Aporia 4)

c) hence it is not possible that the proximate genera be a principle.

Hence, neither can distant nor proximate genera be principles.

This conclusion suggests that only individuals exist. And matter is their
first principle. For non-sensible things are hard to find as candidates for
first principles.
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Aristotle turns to this issue in Aporia 8

Aporia 8

Are there only individual, material things in the universe or are there other
non-sensible things?

This appears to be a repeat of aporia 4, and it is so, but with the additional
benefit of the discussion of Aporia 6 and 7.

1) Argument against there only being material individuals

If there are only material individuals, and these are infinite in number, then
we have the following consequences,

a) there would be no knowledge, as knowledge is only possible if unity,

being and universality exist and these are definitely not material individuals

b) there would be no object of thought, but only objects of sense

c) Nothing will be eternal, and hence there can be no coming to be and no

ceasing to be either (for we need something as a first cause and also as
the last term of the series)

d) substance should also exist apart from matter, for if it did not, nothing
will exist at all.

2) Argument against being non-sensible substances, principles

a) If there are non-sensible things too, then when are we to admit their
existence and when not? In all cases, they cannot exist (example, houses).

b) If the substance of somethings are one, then that is paradoxical as then

all those things will really be one and not many; but surely, it makes no
sense to say that the substances are many and different

But if neither is possible, that is one cannot just have individuals and one
cannot have also non-sensibles, then how can matter and substance come
together as one, as we see routinely?

Note on Aporia 9: I have not understood Ross’ translation. The word “kind”
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used in the aporia seems to be a difficult word to understand. So I will skip
Aporia 9 for now.

APORIA 10

This aporia is claimed to be new by Aristotle. No one has thought of it

before.

Are the principles of perishable things and imperishable things the same
or different?

1) Argument why they cannot be the same for perishable and

imperishable things

a) If they are the same, then how can perishable and imperishable things
arise from these principles. Surely, the principles themselves are
imperishable, as Empedocles also believed, and yet they give rise to what is
perishable.

b) therefore, the principles cannot be the same for both

2) Argument why they cannot be different

a) if they are different, then we have to ask whether the principles

themselves are perishable or imperishable.

b) if perishable, then these principles themselves rely on other principles,

for which the same questions will arise

c) if imperishable, then how can perishable things arise from them? This
appears to be impossible.

So, the principles cannot be the same and cannot be different.

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