UPH 2105 Introduction to Logic

1.0 Introduction

In this unit lets introduce ourselves to the meaning, main focus and subject
matter of logic. Attention will be made to the fact that logic is not just a
subfield of philosophy but an indispensable tool of knowledge acquisition,
hence essential for every human person.

2.0 Objectives

It is expected that at the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Clearly understand the distinctive subject matter of logic and the principles
of reasoning that are part of logic;

2. Analyse arguments into its premises and conclusion and their roles in an
argument;

3. Identify the premise(s) and conclusion identifiers in any given argument.

3.0 Main Content

3.1 What is Logic?

Logic, in its most basic sense, deals with sensible rational thought, that is,
how ideas reasonably fit together. In other words, when you apply logic, you
must be concerned with analyzing ideas and arguments by using reason and
rational thinking, not emotions or mysticism or belief. As an academic
discipline or field of study, however, logic is conventionally and historically,
regarded as one of the major subfields or core divisions of philosophy. Logic
is thus primarily an integral part of philosophy.

Notwithstanding, however, the fields of mathematics and computer science

provide professional training in logic. Indeed, all academic disciplines employ
logic: to evaluate evidence, to analyze arguments, to explain ideas, and to
connect evidence to arguments. One of the most important uses of logic is in
composing and evaluating arguments.

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As a subfield of philosophy, logic stands on the same pedestal with the other
core philosophic specialisms, namely metaphysics, epistemology and
axiology. In this context, logic is held to be ultimately concerned with the
question of truth and on this score, is usually associated with epistemology;
both deal with ultimate truth. But there is a current in philosophy according
to which logic is not, properly speaking a subdivision of philosophy. The best
way of stating the relationship, according to this current, is to say that logic
is a propaedeutic to philosophy, that is, a preliminary study that helps to
prepare the way. It is argued, in this connection, that logic is the beginning
(more aptly put, the soul) of philosophy, indeed of knowledge as a whole; for
if we do not get logic right, we shall get nothing else right. "If truth is to be
sought in every division of knowledge", we must, Sextus Empiricus say,
"before all else, possess truth-worthy principles and methods for the
discernment of truth." And for him, logic is the only endeavour that both
consciously and primordially includes ―the theory of criteria and proofs, so it
is with this that we ought to make our beginnings‖. The point here is that logic
is prior to all aspects of knowledge. Before embarking on the study of any
science, one should, Aristotle says, receive some training in logic. This is what

Aristotle meant, when he called logic an Organon1 (that is instrument). It is

an instrument of knowledge. Logic is, thus, central not only to philosophy, it
is an indispensable ingredient of philosophy, indeed of knowledge acquisition.
Gottlob Frege echoes this point when he avers that ―to discover the truth is
the task of all sciences; it falls on logic to discern the laws of truth.‖ It is also
unarguable that nothing indeed can be learned in the colleges and
Universities than the principles of good reasoning and how to acquire and
process information intelligibly; no matter what we claim to know it is only
useful if we are able to communicate such knowledge systematically and

1 The Organon is the standard collection of Aristotle's six works on logical analysis and
dialectic. Aristotle’s “Organon” is the method or instrument to be used by men in the pursuit
of philosophical knowledge. Aristotle teaches this method through six books, which were
called “the Organon“, as the 73 books of Sacred Scripture are called the “Bible”. The books
included in the Organon are:
I. Aristotle, Categories
II. Aristotle, On Interpretation
III. Aristotle, Prior Analytics
IV. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics
V. Aristotle, Topics
VI. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations

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coherently. Notably, it is only logic that deals in its subject matter with
consistent, systematic and logical reasoning. Logic in its primordial sense has
to do with the universal laws of reasoning, which can be applied to the
particular arguments of all the sciences.

Indeed and remarkably, logic with grammar and rhetoric (the trivium)
constituted the core liberal arts, that is, subjects or skills that in classical
antiquity were considered essential for a free person (liberalis, "worthy of a
free person") to know to take an active part in civic life, hence compulsory for
everybody in the ancient programme of higher education in Western history.

3.2 Etymology of the word Logic

Etymologically, the English word logic comes from the Greek word "logos"
usually translated as "word". In essence, the terms ―logic‖ and ―word‖ have
the same Greek root, logos and when we take what the New Testament Gospel
of John 1:1-4 says, to wit: ―In the beginning was the Word, and the Word
was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with
God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made
that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men” we discover
that really logic and God are synonyms, both have the implication of an
underlying structure or purpose. God, in most revealed religions, is usually
introduced as an underlying structure for all that is. Correspondingly, logic is
an ordered and systematic facility, an underlying structure that gives
coherence and consistency to ourmanifold and fragmentary experiences.
When therefore Aristotle says that logic is an Organon, what is meant is that
logic is an instrument of thought, that is, that human experiences are
organized, analyzed and sustained by a certain intrinsic constitutive element.
This element has a logical nature since it guarantees a homogeneous,
coherent, systematic and ordered conception of reality.

As an activity that deals with the consistency and coherence of our ideas, logic
is commonly defined as the principles of correct reasoning. This is a
provisional definition, because how logic should be properly defined is
actually quite a controversial matter. However, for the purpose of this

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introductory course, we consider it useful to give at least some rough idea as
to the subject matter that we will be studying.

3.3 Logical Reasoning vs the Psychology of Reasoning.

One thing to note however about the definition we have given above of logic
as studying the principles of correct reasoning is that studying the correct
principles of reasoning is not the same as studying the psychology of
reasoning. Logic as a discipline deals with the former; it tells us how we ought
to reason if we want to reason correctly. Whether people actually follow these
rules of correct reasoning is an empirical matter, something that is not the
concern of logic.

The psychology of reasoning, on the other hand, is an empirical science. It

tells us about the actual reasoning habits of people, including their mistakes.
A psychologist studying reasoning might be interested in how people's ability
to reason varies with age.

But such empirical facts are of no concern to the logician.

One might ask so what are these principles of reasoning that are part of logic?

There are many such principles, but the main (not the only) thing that logic
is concerned primarily with is the correctness of the completed process of
reasoning. Logic is interested in whether certain conclusions follow from
some given assumptions; that is, whether the reasons (in logic parlance,
premises) provided for our claims (conclusion) are adequate or suitable (good
reasons) for making such claims? If the reasons provide adequate information
or grounds for the claim, that is, asserting the

reasons (premises) to be true does warrant asserting the claim (conclusion) to

be true, then the reasoning is correct (valid). If on the other hand, asserting
the premises to be true does not warrant asserting the conclusion to be true,
then the reasoning is incorrect (in logic parlance, invalid).

3.4 Conclusion

Logic as an integral part and branch of philosophy we have seen deals with
the study of reasoning.

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Sometimes it’s referred to as the science of reasoning.

Now having understood the subject matter of logic now in your casual talks
you can be able to identify correct or good reasoning from the bad one.

Unit 2. Subject matter of Logic and its Components

3.0 Introduction

4.0 Intended Learning Outcomes (ILO‘s)

3.1 Subject matter of Logic and its Components

3.2.1 Arguments

3.2.2 Premises and Conclusion

3.2.3 Inferences

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3.2.4 Inference Identifiers

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

7.0References/Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

Dear students this study unit will introduce you to the various subject matter
of logic and its components.

In this part our main focus is on: arguments as the distinctive subject matter
of logic, premises and conclusion as the components of an arguments and on
the words or phrases that help in identifying the premises and conclusion of
an argument.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes

It is expected that at the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. analyze arguments into its premises and conclusion and their roles in an
argument;

2. identify the premise(s) and conclusion identifiers in any given argument.

3.1 Subject matter of Logic and its Components

From our discussion last time, it was clearly stated that Logic is concerned
with the correctness of argumentation. This means that the distinctive subject
matter of logic is arguments. Indeed in its creative usage and for all practical
and intellectual purposes and usages, logic is concerned with arguments. And
it is remarkable that argument is central to our existence as human beings.
At home, in the market places, in our offices and at school, indeed in everyday
life, argument is one of the main ways we exchange ideas with one another.
Suffice it to say that all people, including you, make arguments on a regular
basis. When you make a claim and then support the claim with reasons, you
are making an argument. Academics, business people, politicians, scientists,

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and other professionals all make arguments to determine what to do or think,
or to solve a problem by enlisting others to do or believe something they
otherwise would not. Not surprisingly, then, argument dominates everything
we do as humans hence essential for our training in life engagements
especially as learners.

3.2.1 Arguments

In everyday life, we often use the word "argument" to mean a verbal dispute
or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in logic. When
people disagree each person ordinarily attempts to convince the other that his
or her viewpoint is the right one. Unless he or she merely resorts to name
calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her
position. In this context, that is, in logic, "arguments" are those statements a
person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present
reasons for accepting a given position. An argument is thus not the same thing
as a quarrel. The goal of an argument is not to attack your opponent, or to
impress your audience. The goal of an argument is to offer good reasons in
support of your position, reasons that all parties to your dispute can accept. Nor
is an argument just the denial of what the other person says. Even if what your
opponent says is wrong and you know it to be wrong, to resolve your dispute
you have to produce arguments. And you haven't yet produced an argument
against your opponent until you offer some reasons that show him to be
wrong. Therefore, to argue means to put forward or proffer reasons for or
against something (idea, opinion, view). An argument is, thus, said to have
taken place whenever one constructs a chain of reasoning(s) in support of a
viewpoint or position. In consequence, an argument or argumentation
involves the provision of reasons in support of a viewpoint. What is clear from
this standpoint is that an argument, in a formal or technical sense, is not
understood in the pedestrian sense, according to which the term connotes in
its meaning disagreement, controversy, or even verbal quarrelling. An
argument is accordingly defined as any set of statements (propositions)
some of which (the premises) purport to provide reasons for accepting
one of them (the conclusion).

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That is, in an argument we usually have a set of statements (propositions)
constructed in such a manner that one follows from or implied is by the
other(s). When we use the word "argument" here, therefore, its use has
nothing to do with quarreling, fighting, or disagreement. An argument is
simply a set of statements, one of which is designated as a conclusion and the
remaining statements, called premises, are offered as evidence or justification
that supports or implies the conclusion.

It is also instructive to distinguish an argument from a debate. A debate is

really a series of arguments usually, but certainly not always, about a single
topic or a set of related topics. A debate may be a formal debate such as the
presidential debate or the debate held between two scholastic debating teams.
A debate may be an informal debate during, for instance, a dinner party or a
public hearing where rules of debate are not enforced. The point is that a
debate always involves argumentation but an argument itself is not and does
not involve a debate.

3.2.2 Premise and Conclusion

The statements (propositions) that are used to proffer reasons which support
or provide evidence on the basis of which, we are enabled to assert a position
or another proposition are called premises.

In the sense of this characterization, in arguments such as:

(a) All lawyers are liars

(b) All liars are unreliable

(c) Therefore, all lawyers are unreliable

Statements (a) and (b) are premises; they provide the information on the basis
of which statement (c) is arrived at.

Statement (c) is called the conclusion or main claim; it is arrived at or its truth
is established by statements (a) and (b). The conclusion (of an argument) is,
therefore, the proposition that is affirmed or asserted based on the
information or reason(s) provided by the premises. In effect, in making
arguments, propositions are patterned into premises and conclusion such
that the premises provide evidence, reasons or support for the conclusion that

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is main claim; the conclusion is affirmed or asserted based on the evidence or
reasons provided by the premise. This is to say that the propositions identified
as the premises of an argument are the reasons for accepting the conclusion
of the argument.

Arguments may be as short as a single sentence or as long as a book. Every

argument, however, must (by definition) have a conclusion. The conclusion is
the claim that is argued for. Both premises and conclusion must be
statements, that is, claims that are either true or false (whether or not we
know which). Questions, in particular, cannot be premises or conclusions. In
the sense of "argument" and "arguing" (offering an argument) we are using
here we would not say "John was arguing whether God exists"--or at least if
we did say this we would not be identifying the conclusion of his argument.
"Who caused the world?" is not going to be a premise or conclusion of any
argument, because it is not a statement. Nor is a question of the form "Who
is to say that ...?" Premises are claims that support the conclusion. Questions
may be used to suggest claims, of course. Indeed this is so often done for
effect in debate that such questions are known as "rhetorical questions." Thus
a debater might say "Would you want to be governed by the military? Well,
then you should support a strong defense." But insofar as there is an
argument here, the premise is not the question ―would you want to be
governed by the military? but the answer that the debater is presuming you
would offer (silently) in reply to the question, namely that you would not want
to be governed by the military.

In an argument, the conclusion, which is the main claim is normally

supported by its two or more premises. In this sense, the premises are reasons
or statements of support for the main claim. It is this support provided by the
premises that make the conclusion something more than mere assertions. In
this regard, the premises or reasons are statements in an argument that pass
two tests:

1. The answers to the hypothetical challenge to a claim: ―Why do you say

that? ―What reason can you give me to believe that?, and

2. A link to the claim, an indication of the reason (usually using the word
because or its equivalent).

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If the premise fail to address the hypothetical challenge or the 'because' tests,
there is something wrong with the logic of the argument. The import here is
that the reasons or premises of arguments themselves need to be supported
in a number of ways.

Here are some ways that the premise of an argument itself can be supported:

(1)Assumptions: Eventually, all support for premises can be traced back to a

set of beliefs which the person making the argument considers to be self-
evident, and therefore not in need of further support or analysis. These may
be called assumptions, presumptions, suppositions, or, in certain situations,
postulates and axioms. Such assumptions serve as the premises for
supporting arguments and, in general, any premise can be called an
assumption.

(2) Evidence: A premise can be made more acceptable when it is supported

by various kinds of evidence: statistical studies, historical information,
physical evidence, observations, or experiments, eyewitness accounts, and so
on. Statistics include raw numbers (3 million girls go every year to the middle
east), averages (seminarians drink less beer compared to other boys),
statistical probabilities ('travelling by train reduces chances of accident by
70%'), and statistical trends (killing women has risen 60% over the past three
years'). Generally, statistics have the advantage of seeming objective,
authoritative, and factual, but critical audiences will want to know about the
sources and methods for determining your statistical evidence.

The relative strength of evidence is determined by how reliable a person

believes it to be. Almost no evidence is beyond dispute – we might challenge
the methodology of a study, the accuracy of the information, the manner in
which physical evidence was collected, and the eyesight or motivation of an
eyewitness. And remember that the evidence only supports the premises–
evidence cannot be an argument itself.

(3)Testimony from an Eyewitness. Eyewitness or first-hand testimonies are

reports from people who directly experience some phenomenon. If, for
example, one is arguing about toxic waste dumps, a quotation from someone
living next to a dump would fall into this category. First-hand testimony can

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help give the audience a sense of being there. Experts may also rely on direct
experience, but their testimony is also backed by more formal knowledge,
methods, and training. Supplementing the neighbor's account with testimony
from an environmental scientist, who specializes in toxic waste sites, is an
appeal to expertise or authority.

(4) Authority: Sometimes, we are not in a position to judge supporting

evidence for ourselves: there may simply be too much of it, or it may be too
technical in nature, or it may not be directly available to us. In those cases
we often rely on the judgments of others, authorities whom we believe to be
more likely to come to an accurate evaluation of the evidence than we are
ourselves. Though we tend to think of such expertise in scientific, medical, or
other scholarly fields, authority in arguments can also come from religious
teachings, folk wisdom, and popular sayings – anything or anyone that we
accept as somehow able to reach a more accurate evaluation. The relative
strength of an authority in an argument depends on how willing a person is
to accept the judgment of that source, but even in the strongest of cases, use
of an authority merely supports a premise, and does not make an argument
by itself. In fact, when using expert testimony in arguments, you should
always make sure the authority you are appealing to is in fact qualified to
speak on the topic being discussed.

(5) Explanations and Anecdotes: Sometimes, we are more willing to accept

a premise if we are given background information or specific examples. Such
explanations and accounts are not given the importance of evidence or
authority in an argument.

Anecdotal evidence, for example, is by definition less statistically reliable than

other sorts of evidence, and explanations do not carry the weight of authority.
But both anecdotal evidence and explanations may affect our understanding
of a premise, and therefore influence our judgement. The relative strength of
an explanation or an anecdote is usually a function of its clarity and
applicability to the premise it is supporting.

(6) Specific instances include examples, case studies, and narratives.

Each can be an effective mode of building support for a reason or claim.
Specific instances offer a way to see an idea illustrated in a particular case.

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To be effective, specific instances need to be representative of the broader
trend or idea they are supporting. With an example as evidence, someone
arguing against seat belt use might say "Last year my cousin crashed her car
off a bridge and would have drowned if she were wearing her seatbelt" as
evidence (the answer to "Why do you believe that?" question.) An opponent
might challenge whether this example was a representative one: surely there
are many more car crashes that do not end in water, so this one instance is
not a fair gauge of the relative safety of not wearing.

The various sorts of support for a premise supporting arguments,

assumptions, evidence, authority, and explanations and anecdotes etc. –
interact in what we might call a hierarchy of support or evidence, in which
one sort is given priority over another. In a murder trial, for example, the
prosecution is usually based on the assumption that the court's hierarchy of
evidence will have at the top physical evidence (fingerprints, blood samples),
especially as explained by technical authorities (forensic pathologists,
ballistics experts), followed by eyewitness accounts, then by other sorts of
authorities (psychologists, sociologists), and finally by explanations and
anecdotes (character witnesses, personal histories). If the prosecution is right,
their strong physical evidence and eyewitness accounts will outweigh the
defendant's character witnesses, because of their relative placement in the
court‘s hierarchy of evidence. However, because that hierarchy is determined
by the judge on a case-by-case basis, one can never be totally sure how any
one piece of support will be accepted.

Propositions, premises and conclusion are however, the basic components of an

argument. Both premises and conclusion are themselves propositions, which
are, however, distinguished by virtue of their role(s) in an argument; premises
are those propositions which are used to provide reasons in and for an
argument, while the conclusion is the proposition asserted, warranted or
established by the reasons provided in the premises. Premises and conclusion
are accordingly integral parts of an argument. In the following arguments:

i. (a) All Centre-leftists are radicals

(b) All radicals are democrats

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(c) Therefore, all Centre-leftists are democrats.

ii. (a) If Uganda is an oil-producing country, then Uganda is wealthy

(b) Uganda is an oil-producing country

(c) Therefore Uganda is wealthy

Note; (a) and (b) of i and ii respectively are the premises and (c) in each
instance is the conclusion, that is, (c) is the inference drawn from the earlier
propositions in both arguments. In both examples, also, propositions (a) and
(b) respectively, which are identified as the premises are the reasons for
accepting the conclusions.

However, the point is important that arguments are not always patterned as
per examples 1, 2 and 3. In some cases, the conclusion of an argument may
occur as the first proposition. The conclusion may also occur in the middle of
an argument. There are also arguments, which are such that they consist of
several premises from which a single conclusion is drawn. The point that
comes to a relief here(s) or the conclusion of the argument. The determination
as to which propositions are the premises or the conclusion is a function of
identifying which set of propositions that provide support or reasons, and
which of them are asserted or follows from the reasons or evidence provided.

3.2.3 Inferences

The reasoning process which is employed in evaluating arguments such that

one moves from the information provided by or in the premises to assert
certain claim or information in the conclusion is called inference. In this
sense, inference rightly is what enables us to make propositions about the
unknown using the known as their foundation; it is inference that allows us
to transit from the premise, (which constitute the evidence for the
establishment of) to, the conclusion.

We may infer from the dressing and conduct of lady that she is a religious
sister; we may infer from a person‘s dressing and attitude that he/she is a
priest a seminarian; we may infer from a man's hands the nature of his
occupation. Inferences may be carefully or carelessly made. They may be

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made on the basis of a broad background of previous experience with the
subject matter or with no experience at all. For example, the inferences a good
mechanic can make about the internal condition of a motor by listening to it
are often startlingly accurate, while the inferences made by an amateur (if he
tries to make any) may be entirely wrong. But the common characteristic of
inferences is that they are statements about matters which are not directly
known, statements made on the basis of what has been observed."

Consider the following example:

Suppose that at home your sister has a baby and at home you have a dog
(probably a German Shepherd). It happens that your sister left you to keep
for her the baby as she went to the market briefly. So you are home alone with
the dog and the baby. You leave the dog to keep safe the baby and then you
go to draw water from the Bore hole. Now on coming back you find the bed of
the baby in chaos, upside down, you don’t see the baby but only the dog.
Looking close to eat it’s full of blood on the skin and looking satisfactorily
tired.

Now when you get out your phone to call your sister to rush home, which
reason do you give her to rush back home?

The ordinarily inference is that the dog has eaten the baby.

In the above example, although the fact that the dog has eaten the baby is
not given; the inference is drawn consequent upon the reasoning based on
the observed state of affairs, that is, the given in experience.

Inference is thus the endpoint of reasoning; it is the process that enables us

to arrive at (infer) a conclusion on the basis of the premises which constitute
both the starting point of the process and the evidence for the establishment
of the former proposition.

However, there is no doubt that inference as a process of reasoning is an

important category in evaluating arguments, but the logician‘s interest is not
in the process of inference. The logician is interested in the propositions that
are the initial and endpoints of that process, and the relationships between
them. Inference is thus not a component or part of an argument; it is only a
process to which corresponds an argument.
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If you examine our example above, you understand that "making an inference"
is a psychological process, yet an inference is the reasoning process by which
a logical relation is understood. The logical relation is considered valid (good)
or not valid (not good) even if we do not understand the inference right away.
In other words, it is convenient to consider the logical relation as not being
dependent for its validity on the psychological process of an inference. In this
manner, logic is not considered as "the science of reasoning." It is prescriptive,
as already adumbrated. So, this logical relation between the premises and
conclusion of an argument holds regardless of whether we pay attention or
not.

This logical relation that exists between the premises and the conclusion of
an argument is called an entailment. An entailment is a logical relation
between or among propositions such that the truth of one proposition is
determined by the truth of another proposition or other propositions, and this
determination is a function solely of the meaning and syntax of the
propositions concerned.

Another way to remember the difference between an inference and an

entailment is to note that people infer something, and propositions entail
something.

3.2.4 Inference Identifiers

The language in which an argument is presented often contains words or

phrase to help identify its parts, especially its premises and conclusion. These
words and phrases are identifiers of the function played in the argument.
Unfortunately, identifiers are only as precise as the persons using them, and
both the individual making an argument and the one evaluating it are liable
to make mistakes by inexact or sloppy use of identifiers. Since the purpose of
an argument is to communicate an idea clearly, the careful use and
interpretation of identifiers is an important skill for critical thinking.

The following are some of the most common premise and conclusion
identifiers:

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Premise identifiers

since for because

in that seeing that given that

may be inferred from the reason is that as indicated by

inasmuch as as owing to

by reason of follows from may be derived from

supposing that may be deduced from in view of the fact that

as shown by supposing that for the reason that

Conclusion identifiers:

therefore thus so

as a result consequently we can conclude that

it follows that hence accordingly

In consequence wherefore whence

which means that as a result we may infer that

proves that it must be that the upshot is that

implies that which allows us infer conclude that

In conclusion which implies that which points to

which shows that entails that for that reason

Though our list is not exhaustive, it is notable that while these words and
phrases may help in spotting an argument, yet it is instructive that not all
conclusions are preceded by these conclusion indicators, and not all
statements preceded by these words and phrases are conclusions. Again, not
all premises are introduced by premise indicators, and these same words and
phrases sometimes serve functions other than introducing premises.
"Because" frequently appears in explanations, and there is a use of "for" as a
preposition, a use more common than its use as a premise indicator.

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Similarly, "since" commonly functions as a preposition concerning duration
of time rather than as a premise indicator. Notice also that "for" not only
indicates that a premise is coming, but that what has just been stated (before
the word "for") is the conclusion (whether intermediate or final). Some of these
words can also appear within the context of an argument, but without
indicating an inference. "So," for example, have several meanings, only one of
which is a synonym for "therefore."

Sloppy usage may also produce confusing identifiers. A common answer to

the question, "What would you think if the sky suddenly clouded up and
turned very dark," is "I would assume it was going to rain." Yet "it is going to
rain" here is a conclusion, not an assumption or premise. "If" and "then" are
often used to identify premises and conclusions, respectively. However, "if"
and "then" are also used to introduce the two halves of a conditional premise.
In either usage, ―then is sometimes omitted; or it has other meanings, as
well. An identifier may not immediately precede or follow the word or phrase
whose function it is indicating. For example, in the sentence "Thus, whenever
the sun rises, the rooster crows," there are two claims: a premise, "the sun
rises," and a conclusion identified by "thus" (but not immediately following it),
"the rooster crows." In cases where there are no identifiers, the most frequent
order is conclusion first, followed by one or more premises. If more (say two)
premises are given, they are often conjoined with "and" or "but." For example,
"I like Handel. I like most classical composers, and Handel was a classical
composer."

Because arguments are attempts to provide evidence or support for a certain

claim, they often contain these ―indicators" which no doubt aid in the task of
identifying the conclusion of the argument, which often comes last in the
series of statements making up the argument, as we have illustrated in our
examples above, but which we have noted earlier can also come first, or even
in the middle, such as in these examples:

Amarachi is the most qualified person for the job. This is because she has the
best academic credentials and proven track record of competence of all the
candidates, and she will not place the interests of trade unions above those
of the establishment.

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Callisto orbits Jupiter. Hence, it is not a planet, because something must orbit
a star in order to be a planet.

In the examples above, the italicized statements are the conclusions. The
other statements are offered as reasons or justifications for these claims.

4.0 Conclusion

Argument is the distinctive subject matter of logic. It is a set of proposition

that can be structured into two parts, namely premise and conclusion. The
premise is that which provides reason(s) for the acceptance of the conclusion,
which is the claim in the argument. Thus, the premise(s) contained
information or grounds that makes the conclusion to be either true or false.

5.0 Summary

The distinctive subject matter of logic is argument and the components of

arguments are premises and conclusion. Whereas the premises provide
support or reasons for the main claim of an argument, the conclusion (which
is the main claim) is asserted based, or follows from, the reasons or evidence
provided by the premises. The psychological process which though not part
of the argument but enables us to transit from the premises to the conclusion
is called inference and there are words and phrases whose role in the
argument helps to identify the premises and the conclusion of the argument.

18
 The Structure of an Argument

The chief concern of logic is the structure of an argument. Every argument in

logic has a structure, and every argument can be described in terms of this
structure.

From a logical point of view, the expression of strong feeling is termed emotive
discourse, not argumentative discourse. So the definition of "argument" in
this text, which indeed is a technical meaning of the term, is considerably
narrower than its lexical definition indicates.

It has been highlighted that in logic, by "argument," we mean a demonstration

or a proof of some statement, not emotional language; that is any group of
statements of which one is claimed to follow logically from the others. E.g.,
"That bird is a crow; therefore, it's black."

The argument structure is the sum and substance of logic. The first element
of the structure of an argument is called proposition or statement (we will use
these words interchangeably). In defining it, a Statement is a verbal
expression that can be regarded as true or false (but not both). Hence, a
statement or a proposition is a sentence with a truth-value. We can still regard
a sentence as a statement even if the truth-value of the statement is not
known.

It is notable that logic is just concerned with those statements that have truth
values.

Consider the confusion that would result if we considered the following

sentences as statements:

1. "Good morning." (What's so good about it?)

19
2. "You are looking good today." (Well, I just saw my doctor and ...)

3. "What is so rare as a day in June? Then, if ever, come perfect days..." (Well,
I don't know about that.)

26

4. To a waiter: "I'd like a cup of coffee." (Yeah, but I think Bigger; I'd like a
BMW.)

Thus, phatic communication, greetings, commands, requests, and poetry,

among other uses of language, are not meant to be taken as statements.

Sometimes logicians are thus wont to make a distinction between a

sentence token (the ink, chalk marks, or pixels) and a sentence type (the
meaning of the marks). It is also important to note that every statement comes
with an implicit time, place, and reference and of course the distinction
between a sentence and a statement assumes that adequate synonymy of
expression and translation between languages is possible.

We also must remark that one statement can be expressed by two different
sentences.

For example, the sentence:

"This logic class is half-empty" expresses the same statement as

"This logic class is half- full‖.

Further, a sentence can express different statements at different times. For

example, the sentence ―M7 is a Soldier and M7 is President of Uganda" .

A sentence can also express an argument composed of several statements.

For example, the sentence

"The graphical method of solving a system of equations is an approximation,

since reading the point of intersection depends on the accuracy with which
the lines are drawn and on the ability to interpret the coordinates of the point"
can be interpreted as two or three different statements depending on how we
wish to

20
analyze it.

It is remarkable that both premise and conclusion of an argument must be

statements, that is, claims that are either true or false (whether or not we
know which).

Questions, in particular, cannot be premises or conclusions. In the sense of

"argument" and "arguing" (offering an argument) we are using here we would
not say "John was arguing whether God exists‖ – or at least if we did say this
we would not be identifying the conclusion of his argument. "Who caused the
world?" is not going to be a premise or conclusion of any argument, because
it is not a statement. Nor is a question of the form

"Who is to say that ...?" Premises are claims that support the conclusion.
Questions may be used to suggest claims, of course. Indeed this is so often
done for effect in debate that such questions are known as "rhetorical
questions." Thus a debater might say "Would you want to be governed by the
military? Well, then you should support a strong defense."

But insofar as there is an argument here, the premise is not the question
―would you want to be governed by the military?‖ but the answer that the
debater is presuming you would offer (silently) in reply to the question, namely
that you would not want to be governed by the military.

Some of the indicator words we have seen already above may be present in
some statements even though no argument is taking place. Some of these
words, it is true knowledge, have more than one meaning and do not always
identify conclusions and premises. "It is raining because a storm is passing
through" is not an argument even though the indicator word "because" is
contained within the sentence.

It can sometimes be difficult, however, to determine whether some passage in

written or spoken material is a genuine argument. Some written or spoken
material may offer explanations which look like arguments, but are not
genuine arguments. There may even be "reasons" given to explain something.

21
The best way to deal with these is to ask yourself what the primary intention
of the writer or speaker is. If the intention is simply to explain, it is probably
not an argument.

But if something is being asserted (a conclusion) and reasons are given to

justify the assertion, then it is an argument.

Many times people fall into the trap of arguing over what are called value-
claims.

Value-claims must be distinguished from fact-claims. A conclusion that is a

value-claim may appear like an ordinary conclusion in an ordinary argument,
but it is not. A conclusion in a genuine argument is always a fact-claim. What
is the difference between a value-claim and a fact-claim?

A value-claim never has the element of objective truth in it because it does

not deal with a fact. It is a matter of taste, not of objective truth. For instance,
if I prefer

Heineken beer and you prefer extra smooth stout, we are expressing matters
of taste. It is useless to attempt to argue about our preferences regarding beer
brand. In fact, no real argument is possible.

A fact-claim has the element of objective truth or, as may be the case, it can
be shown to be false. A fact-claim can be argued about. There is a way to
determine whether a fact-claim is true or false, although sometimes we may
not be entirely able to do so at a given point in time. Ethical or moral claims
present a special problem. And we probably spend a great deal of our time
"arguing" over moral issues. The status of ethical "arguments" is controversial.
Some authorities have argued that ethical and moral claims are merely a
matter of "taste," "personal preferences," or "feelings." Others have argued that
at least some moral claims can be expressed as fact-claims

This calls for the distinction in logic between claims that are thought to be
verifiable, and those that are presented as evaluative. In this sense, verifiable
claims are those that can be confirmed either by observation or by reference
to established sources, such as books. Evaluations are statements of taste
and interpretation. Notice that opinions can be expressed sometimes as

22
statements of verification and sometimes as statements of evaluation.
Consider the following claims:

"Kasumbi thinks that's a shade of blue."

"Kasumbi thinks that's a lovely shade of blue."

"That's a shade of blue."

"That a lovely shade of blue."

The first two are clearly opinions, but they are expressed as statements of
verification, because the issue is whether that is what Kasumbi thinks, not
what the color is.

The third one is a statement of verification, because (for most people) "blue"
is something ascertainable by observation. But the fourth claim is a statement
of evaluation, because what is "lovely" is a matter of taste. And it doesn't
matter whether the claim is true or false – that is, a false statement of
verification is not a statement of evaluation. All four of our examples can be
false – Kasumbi might think otherwise, for the first two, and the color might
be red, for the second two – but they are nevertheless three statements of
verification, followed by a statement of evaluation.

Advocatory claims are a little different from verifiable or evaluative claims, in

that the latter discusses what was, is, or will be, while the former describes
what ought to have been or ought to be. Thus, "Nkalubo is a free man" is a
claim of verification, "Nkalubo is a good man" is a claim of evaluation, and
"Nkalubo ought to be a free man" and "Nkalubo should be a good man" are
both advocatory statements. Advocatory claims usually include the word
"should" or "ought" (though not all claims with "should" or "ought" in them
are advocatory). The advocatory form is used for statements about morality,
ethics, duty, and so on.

The point of categorizing statements into verifiable, evaluative, and advocatory

is to understand better the arguments in which they appear. Knowing if a
statement is one of verification, evaluation, or advocacy helps ensure a
consistency of argument, because if the conclusion is a statement of

23
verification, it must be supported by at least one premise that is a verifiable
claim; and so too with conclusions of evaluation and advocacy.

Types of Arguments
Introduction
So far we have learnt what arguments are and how to determine their
structure, including how to distinguish arguments from its look-alike. But
what makes an argument good or bad?
Now let’s introduce ourselves to the methods of reasoning and how to evaluate
arguments, so that we can check our own arguments and evaluate the
arguments of others. Here first and foremost we are going to study to classify
arguments into its major types: deductive and inductive arguments and then
their characteristics, strength and weakness of both deductive and inductive
arguments.

Classification of Arguments into Types

Inferences are assessed in terms of the relationship that is held to exist
between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. Since all arguments
involve the claim that their premises provide reasons (or evidence) on the
basis of which the conclusion is arrived at, that is, the premises provide some
grounds for the truth of their conclusions, it is this relationship between the
premises and conclusion that determines whether an argument is correct or
not.
In evaluating arguments or making inferences two distinct procedures or
methods have been identified. These reasoning procedures are ordinarily
called the deductive and inductive procedures. It is, however, a notable fact
that in discussing these procedures the locutions: deductive and inductive
inferences and deductive and inductive arguments are often used
interchangeably. Although this does not really do any harm, it is nevertheless
important to remark that a basic distinction exists between an argument and
an inference. An argument both generally and primarily involves the provision
of reasons in support or against a viewpoint or position, while inference is the
process that corresponds to this. In other words, whereas an argument is
simply a group of propositions in which it is claimed that one or more
propositions (called the conclusion) follow from the other propositions (called
the premises); an inference is the transition from those group of propositions
called the premises to the group of proposition(s) called the conclusion.

24
It is instructive to note that traditionally, ―deduction‖ is defined as reasoning
from the general to specific and "induction" as reasoning from the specific to
the general.
While this usage is still sometimes found even in Logic texts, it is misleading
and erroneous. For example, according to the more modern definitions given
below, the following argument, even though it reasons from the specific to
general, is deductive, because the truth of the premises guarantees the truth
of the conclusion:
The members of the Kasagga’s family are John, James and Andrew.
Andrew wears glasses.
John wears glasses.
James wears glasses.
Therefore, all members of Kasaga’s family wear glasses.
Moreover, the following argument, even though it reasons from the general to
specific, is inductive:
It has rained in my village every 1st January in recorded history.
Therefore, it will rain in my village this coming 1st January.
The difference between deductio, a leading down and inductio, a bringing in
does not lie in reasoning from the general to specific and reasoning from the
specific to the general. In deduction, we begin with statements that function
as principles and we argue from them. In induction, we begin with statements
that do not function as principles but rather lead to them in conclusions.
Deductive Argument
The inferential procedure or method of evaluating arguments called deductive
inference is that in which the relationship between the premises and
conclusion of an argument is such that the premises provide adequate or
sufficient reason(s) for asserting the conclusion, that is, the information
provided by the premises is such that once they are accepted it would be
inconsistent or self –contradictory to deny the conclusion. In other words in
evaluating a deductive argument the inference is such that the premises
necessitate or logically imply the conclusion. The point here is that some
proposition (the conclusion) follows with strict necessity from other
propositions (the premises).
This is what we mean by deduction; the noun "deduction" refers to the process
of advancing a deductive argument, or going through a process of reasoning
that can be reconstructed as a deductive argument, that is, the conclusion of
an argument is deduced from its premises.
Because the premises of deductive arguments provide conclusive
information/evidence for their conclusion, the truth of the conclusion of such
arguments therefore necessarily follows from the truth of the premises; this

25
is the exact meaning of the premises necessitating the conclusion. Little
wonder, therefore, the claim that in deductive arguments inference does not
go beyond the information provided in the premises, it simply make part of it
explicit. The point is that the premises of deductive inference necessitate the
conclusion precisely because the conclusion says nothing that is not at least,
implied, if not actually stated, by the premises. This underscores why
deductive arguments are said to be demonstrative and empty. The
conclusions of deductive arguments do not give new knowledge or
information; the truth of the conclusion is "contained within" the truth of the
premises; i.e., the conclusion does not go beyond what the truth of the
premises implicitly requires. For example, in
All sound academics are intellectually honest premise
All philosophers are sound academic premise
Therefore, philosophers are intellectually honest conclusion
The conclusion, for certain, says nothing that is not already expressed in the
premises.
In deductive arguments the conclusion follows from the premises because of
the agreed meaning of the syncategorematic words used to express the
argument.
Syncategorematic words are connector words, such as 'if', 'or', 'not', and 'all',
rather than content-bearing words. For example, in an argument of the form
"All A are B and all B are C, so all A are C," the argument is valid primarily
because of the concept of class inclusion expressed in the words "all...are..."
Because deductive arguments turn upon the meaning of words, the
conclusion of a valid deductive argument follows from the premises by
definition. The premises, in effect, stipulate that the conclusion is true. It is
for this reason as we have noted that deductive reasoning gives us no new
information about the world; but this also makes deduction the most powerful
type of reasoning.
Given the truth of the premises, the conclusion must also be true.
Because deduction rhymes with reduction, you can easily remember that in
deduction, you start with a set of possibilities and reduce it until a smaller
subset remains.
For example, a murder mystery is an exercise in deduction. Typically, the
detective begins with a set of possible suspects — for example, the gateman,
the maid, the business partner, and the widow. By the end of the story, he or
she has reduced this set to only one person — for example, "The victim died
in the bathtub but was moved to the bed. But, neither woman could have
lifted the body, nor could the gateman with his war wound.
Therefore, the business partner must have committed the crime."

26
It needs be remarked that logic allows you to reason deductively with
confidence. In fact, it's tailor-made for shifting through a body of factual
statements (premises), ruling out plausible but inaccurate statements (invalid
conclusions), and getting to the truth (valid conclusions). For this reason,
logic and deduction are intimately connected.
Inductive Argument
The second type of argument, called induction, involves the inferential process
called inductive inference; it is a reasoning process in which the relationship
between the premises of an argument and its conclusion is such that the set(s)
of information provided by the premises do not necessarily warrant the
conclusion, that is, the premises does not give conclusive evidence or
information for the establishment of the conclusion. This is not to say that
the premises of an inductive argument do not provide some support for the
conclusion, the point is that the support is not adequate; this is why it is said
that the premises do not entail the conclusion. In other words, inductive
arguments are those whose premises do not necessitate, but only render
probable their conclusion. Inductive reasoning as such does not provide
conclusive evidence for the truth of a given conclusion. In such reasoning, we
merely want the evidence to show that it is more probable than some other
conclusions we might have reached. Because the premises of inductive
argument provide only some support, for the establishment of the conclusion,
it is therefore possible, in inductive inference for the premises of an argument
to be true and the conclusion false. In this connection, inductive inferences
deal with cases of probability and the theory of confirmation, but not with the
rules of correct reasoning in the sense of conclusive or valid reasoning.
Inductive logic as such is concerned with the soundness of those inferences
for which the evidence is not conclusive; it deals with inferences, which are
probable, given as evidence the truth of certain inferences upon which they
are based. For example, in the two inferences below:
All members of the National Assembly from the South Eastern and South South
geo-political States elected under the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party
were not democratically chosen.
All members of the National Assembly from the South Western, North Central
and
North Eastern geo-political states elected on the platform of the People‘s
Democratic
Party (PDP) were not democratically chosen.
Therefore, all members of the National Assembly from the all geo-political Zones
elected under the platform of the People‘s Democratic Party were not
democratically chosen.

27
Most radical Student Union Leaders are Marxists
Red Drum is a radical Student Union leader
Therefore, Red Drum is a Marxist
The premises of the arguments only render the conclusions probable; they do
not entail the conclusion. This explains why it is said, concerning inductive
reasoning that the premises of the argument lead to what may be true, rather
than what must be true. In effect, there is no logical necessity between the
truth of the premises and the truth of the conclusions. The upshot is that one
can accept the truth of the premises of the arguments and still deny the
conclusion without any (formal) contradiction. This in a more general sense
is what we mean by saying that an inductive argument does not involve the
claim that its premises entail the conclusion; it only claims that the premises
provide some evidence for the conclusion.
The point that sticks out here is that no matter the weight of evidence of an
inductive premise(s), the conclusion of such an argument is only probable.
Nevertheless, a distinction between strong and weak induction has been. A
strong induction in this sense is an argument in which the truth of the
premises would make the truth of the conclusion highly probable, but not
definite. But when the link between the premises and the inductive conclusion
is weak, a weak induction is said to apply. For example:
My teacher always award bonus marks.
My teacher has been assessed as a good teacher.
Therefore: All teachers who award bonus marks are good teachers.
Assuming the premises to be true, this example is built on the certainty that
because my teacher always award bonus marks and my teacher has been
assessed as a good teacher" leading to the generalization that ―All teachers
who award bonus marks are good teachers.". However, the link between the
premises and the inductive conclusion is weak. No reason exists to believe
that just because my teacher awards bonus marks and he is assessed as a
good teacher that there are no other ways for teachers who do not award
bonus marks to be assessed as good teachers, or that other people cannot be
assessed as good teachers unless they award bonus marks. Indeed, not all
those assessed as good teachers award bonus marks; moreover, not all
teachers who award bonus marks are assessed as good teachers. The
conclusion cannot be strongly inductively made from the premises. Using
other knowledge we can easily see that this example of induction would lead
us to a clearly false conclusion. Conclusions drawn in this manner are usually
overgeneralizations; the probability link is weak, in fact unwarranted.
Many ripe oranges are sweet.

28
Therefore: All ripe oranges are sweet.
In this example, the premise is built upon a certainty; however, it is not one
that leads to the conclusion. Not every ripe orange is sweet. In other words,
unlike "The sun rises every morning", there are plenty of examples of ripe
oranges that not sweet.
Therefore the conclusion drawn can easily be true or false, and the inductive
logic does not give us a strong conclusion. In both of these examples of weak
induction, the logical means of connecting the premises and conclusion (with
the word "therefore") are faulty, and do not give us a strong inductively
reasoned statement. If we take strong induction we have such an argument
as:
All observed humans die.
Therefore: All humans are mortal.
This exemplifies the nature of induction: inducing the universal from the
particular. However, the conclusion is not certain. Unless we can
systematically falsify the possibility of humans not dying, the statement
(conclusion) may actually be false. For example; one could examine to find
whether it's possible to pinpoint humans who didn‘t die. In doing so, we could
discover that there are records of humans who didn‘t die (such examples as
Elijah, Enoch). Even if we change the definition of "human" to require
mortality, the original question of the possibilities for immortality would
stand, semantically only hidden.
A strong induction is thus an argument in which the truth of the premises
would make the truth of the conclusion highly probable, yet not definite. An
inductive argument is intended to provide only probable support for its
conclusion, being considered strong if it succeeds in providing such support
and weak if it does not.
The point is that, in inductive arguments whether weak or strong, the
premises do not afford sufficient guarantee for its conclusions. This is why it
is said that in inductive reasoning, the relationship between the premises and
conclusion is not a matter of necessity but of probability; even if all the
premises of an inductive argument are true, it would still not be sufficient to
assert that the conclusion is true. This is what we mean when we said that
the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument whose premises are true
could be denied without involving any contradiction.

Standards of Tests for Argument

Now let’s introduce ourselves to the four main standards of test for
arguments, two of which – validity and soundness – are for deductive
arguments and the other two –reliability and strength – are for inductive

29
arguments. It teaches the learner the distinction between truthfulness and
falsity, on the one hand, and validity and invalidity, on the other.
We are also going to learn how to distinguish between a valid argument and
a sound argument and between sound and unsound arguments; and how to
apply the terms sound and unsound in evaluating argument.
The Tests of Deductive Arguments: Validity and Soundness
A deductive argument is one in which the claim is made that some proposition
(the conclusion) follows with strict necessity from some other propositions (the
premises), that is, that it would be inconsistent or self-contradictory to assert
the premises but deny the conclusion. And when the conclusion of an
argument follows, from its premises such that if the premises are true the
conclusion must of necessity also be true, then the argument is said to be
valid. Validity in this connection, and which is primary, is a property
predicated of arguments, which are such that if the premises are true, the
conclusion would have to be true. Validity thus means the same thing as
logically correct, that is, the conclusion follows logically from the premises;
an argument is logically correct because its conclusion cannot fail to be true
if its premises are true. To say that an argument is valid is to say that the
conclusion really does follow from the premises. That is, an argument is valid
precisely when it cannot possibly lead from true premises to a false
conclusion; validity describes the relationship between the premises and
conclusion, and it means that the premises imply the conclusion, whether or
not that conclusion is true. In fact, validity relates to how well the premises
support the conclusion and is the golden standard that every deductive
argument should aim for. An argument that is not valid is said to be
„‟invalid‟‟.
An example of a valid argument is given by the following well-known syllogism:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
What makes this a valid argument is not the mere fact that it has true
premises and a true conclusion, but the fact of the logical necessity of the
conclusion, given the two premises. No matter how the universe might be
constructed, it could never be the case that this argument should turn out to
have simultaneously true premises but a false conclusion. The above
argument may be contrasted with the following invalid one:
All men are mortal
Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.
In this case, the conclusion does not follow inescapably from the premises; a
universe is easily imagined in which ‗Socrates‘ is not a man but a woman, so

30
that in fact the above premises would be true but the conclusion false. This
possibility makes the argument invalid. If an argument is invalid, it will
always be possible to construct a counterexample to show that it is invalid. A
counterexample is simply a description of a scenario in which the premises of
the argument are all true while the conclusion of the argument is false.
Logic as the criteria for the evaluation of arguments has as its fundamental
task the provision of standards or criteria to judge whether an argument is
valid or invalid; that is, logically correct or not. This explains why we say that
logic is interested in the completed process of reasoning; the logician does not
and cannot tell us what to infer from available information, what he does
actually is to tell us whether our inference are logically correct (valid), given
available information. In the following example:
All acclaimed beautiful girls are promiscuous
All fair-complexioned girls are acclaimed beautiful
Therefore, fair-complexioned girls are promiscuous
The argument is adjudged valid because the conclusion is derived from the
premises; the information provided at the conclusion follows from the
information in the premises. The point is that validity is a relationship of
logical connection between the premises and the conclusion; the conclusion
is derived from the premises. Thus, for the purposes of validity, it doesn‘t
matter whether the premises are actually true or false. All that matters for
validity is whether the conclusion follows from the premises. You can see that
even though the premises and conclusion of the argument are all false, the
conclusion – fair complexioned girls are promiscuous – follows from the
premises – All acclaimed beautiful girls are promiscuous and all fair-
complexioned girls are acclaimed beautiful.
Yet the argument is clearly valid because if you assume that ―All acclaimed
beautiful girls are promiscuous‖ is true, then, since All fair-complexioned girls
are acclaimed beautiful, it follows that ―fair-complexioned girls are
promiscuous‖ must also be true.
Thus, whether an argument is valid has nothing to do with whether the
premises of the argument are actually true.
But an argument that is such that the information provided in the conclusion
could be true without the premises being so is said to be invalid. That is, in
an invalid argument, it is possible for the premises of an argument to be true
and the conclusion false; the premises of an invalid argument do not entail
the conclusion. The conclusion could contain some information not provided
in the premises; therefore, it is possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion false.
Although, it is generally said that a valid argument is one such that if the
premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true also, the point is
important that validity and truth are not co-extensive. In fact, arguments are
evaluated in terms of validity and invalidity, not in terms of truthfulness and
31
falsity; the attributes of truth and falsity are ascribable to propositions,
whereas the attributes of validity and invalidity are ascribable to arguments.
In real logic parlance, therefore, it is incorrect to say of an argument that it is
true or false as it is also incorrect to say of a proposition that it is valid or
invalid. This, however, is not to say that there is no relationship between the
truth or falsity of a proposition and the validity and invalidity of an argument.
A valid argument with all true premises and a true conclusion is called a
sound argument. A sound argument is one that is not only valid, but begins
with premises that are actually true. The example given about acclaimed
beautiful girls is valid, but not sound. However, the following argument is
both valid and sound:
No felons are eligible voters.
Some acclaimed politicians are felons.
Therefore, some acclaimed politicians are not eligible voters.
Here, not only do the premises provide the right sort of support for the
conclusion, but the premises are actually true. Therefore, so is the conclusion.
Although it is not part of the definition of a sound argument, because sound
arguments both start out with true premises and have a form that guarantees
that the conclusion must be true if the premises are, sound arguments always
end with true conclusions. For an argument to be sound it must be valid and
all the propositions (the premises and the conclusion) must also be true.
According to Susan Haack (1978: 14), “no argument can be sound unless it
is valid.”
It should be noted that both invalid, as well as valid but unsound, arguments
can nevertheless have true conclusions. One cannot reject the conclusion of
an argument simply by discovering a given argument for that conclusion to
be flawed.

The Tests of Inductive Arguments: Reliability and Strength

An inductive argument does not involve the claim that its premises entail the
conclusion; it only claims that the premises provide some evidence for the
conclusion.
Inductive arguments thus cannot guarantee the truth of the conclusion,
which means they will look like invalid deductive arguments. Indeed, they are
sometimes classified as such.
This is because, it always possible to produce counterexamples for all
inductive arguments; an inductive argument never promises absolute truth.
We measure inductive arguments by degrees of probability and plausibility
not absolute categories like validity and soundness. Validity and soundness
do not allow for a sliding scale of degrees. They are absolute conditions: There
is no such thing as being partially valid or somewhat sound.

32
Although, logic as the criteria for the evaluation of arguments is naturally
more inclined to deductive reasoning than inductive reasoning, more so, that
inductive arguments cannot guarantee truth, this, however, does not privilege
deductive reasoning and scorn inductive arguments. That is an unfair
measure, and it is not practical. The truth is that most arguments we create
and evaluate in life are inductive arguments. It might be helpful to think of
deductive arguments as those created in perfect lab conditions, where all the
ideal parameters can be met. Life is much more complicated than that, and
we rarely get ideal conditions. One main reason is that we rarely ever have all
the information we need to form an absolutely true conclusion. When new
information is discovered, a scientist or historian or psychologist or business
executive or a college student should investigate how it affects previous ideas
and arguments, knowing that those previous ideas may need to be adjusted
based on new information.
Inductive arguments can never lead to absolute certainty, which is one reason
science keep studying and trying to add to knowledge. This does not mean,
however, that any inductive argument will be a good one. Inductive arguments
must still be evaluated and tested, and the two main tests are reliability and
strength.
Test of reliability, much like that of validity for deductive arguments, tests an
inductive argument‘s reason, its internal logic. In other words, just because
an inductive argument cannot guarantee a true conclusion doesn‘t mean that
it should not be logically constructed. One cannot make just any sort of claim,
particularly one that does not have a reliable basis. Reliability, unlike validity,
can be measured by degree. More reliable arguments are ones that have a
more solid basis in reason. Consider this example:
Ninety-seven percent of politicians are wantonly corrupt (premise)
Norbert Mawa is politician (premise)
Therefore, Nobert Mawa is wantonly corrupt (conclusion)
This argument has a high degree of reliability. While it may well be true that
Nobert Mawa is one of the three percent of politicians that are not wantonly
corrupt, it is much more likely, given the initial premise that he is not. If the
initial premise changes, however, so does the reliability of the argument:
Thirty-three percent of politicians are wantonly corrupt (premise)
Nobert Mawa is politician (premise)
Therefore, Nobert Mawa is wantonly corrupt (conclusion)
Note how the degree of reliability has gone done dramatically. The argument
can now be considered unreliable since the conclusion that Nobert Mawa is
wantonly corrupt is improbable given the premises provided. The conclusion
still could be true, but it has tipped toward unlikely.

33
The second test of inductive arguments is strength. Strength, like reliability,
can be measured by degree. Strong arguments must have the following
conditions:
(1) They must be reliable arguments; (2) they draw upon multiple lines of
reasoning as support and/or a collection of data. Indeed, the more the data
and the more the reasons for a conclusion, the stronger the argument.
Consider the following argument:
Tom has been in the seminary for the past six months (premise)
Tom has never escaped from the seminary (premise)
Therefore, we have every reason to trust that Tom cannot escape from the
seminary (conclusion).
This argument is reasonable; we can see that the premises may logically lead
to the conclusion. However, the argument is not very strong as Tom has only
been in the seminary for the past six months. Is that enough information to
make the conclusion a likely one? What if we had more information, like:
Tom has been in the seminary for the past three years (premise)
Tom has never escaped from the seminary (premise)
Therefore, we have every reason to trust that Tom cannot escape from the
seminary (conclusion).
This argument, with more data to consider (three years of information instead
of just six months), is much stronger. An argument also gets stronger when
reasons are added:
Tom has been in the seminary for the past three years
Tom has never escaped from the seminary
Tom is generally known to be a good, responsible and serious seminarian
(additional premise)
Tom comes from a good and respectable family (additional premise)
Therefore, we every reason to trust that Tom cannot escape from the
seminary(conclusion)
This argument is even stronger. Not only does it have more data, but it also
has additional reasons for Tom’s serious and good nature.

Logical Form
With this we introduce ourselves now to the concept of logical form. It
elaborates the point that the validity of an argument is not dependent on the
truthfulness and falsity of the propositions that are embodied in the premises
and the conclusion. It thus focuses on the feature of an argument that
recommends its validity; that is, the feature of an argument that makes it

34
valid or otherwise invalid. It also exposes the learner to the fundamental
nature of logic

Our discourse on validity and invalidity on one hand, and soundness and
unsoundness on the other makes it clear that a valid or logically correct
argument is not necessarily one with true premises and a true conclusion. We
have valid arguments, otherwise called unsound arguments, that have false
or a mixture of false and true premises and conclusion. The point on relief,
therefore, is that the validity of an argument is not dependent on the
truthfulness and falsity of the propositions that are embodied in the premises
and the conclusion. The apposite question then is: what feature of an
argument recommends its validity? i.e, what is it that makes an argument
valid or otherwise invalid?
Simply, an argument by virtue of the form of the argument, the logical
relationship between the premises of an argument and its conclusion is a
relationship of form or structure, not of truth and falsity. The import here is
that validity depends not on the subject matter or material content of an
argument, but on the form or structure.
What is the Logical Form?
Whether or not the premises of an argument are true depends on their specific
content, but the validity or invalidity of an argument is determined entirely
by its logical form. The logical form of an argument is that which remains of
it when one abstracts away from the specific content of the premises and the
conclusion, i.e., words naming things, their properties and relations, leaving
only those elements that are common to discourse and reasoning about any
subject matter, i.e., words such as "all", "and", "not", "some", etc. One can
represent the logical form of an argument by replacing the specific content
words with letters used as place-holders or variables.
For example, consider these two arguments:
All humans are mammals.
No mammals are invertebrates.
Therefore, no humans are invertebrates
All mosquitoes are spiders.
No spiders are animals.
Therefore, no mosquitoes are animals.
These arguments share the same form:
All p is q;
No p is q ;
Therefore, No p is r.

35
All arguments with this form are valid. Because they have this form, the
examples above are valid. However, the first example is sound while the
second is unsound, because its premises are false. The schematic
representation of the arguments points out that any argument, which has the
form, will be valid irrespective of what is substituted for p, q and r. In this
connection, the schema in is called inference form and the arguments are
then instances of the inference form. The letters, p, q, r mark the places into
which expressions of a certain type may be inserted. The feature of the schema
that guarantees that every instance of it will be valid is its construction in
such a manner that every uniform way of replacing its variable to make the
premises true automatically makes the conclusion true, too; or in other
words, that no instance of it can have true premises but a false conclusion.
Now consider:
All humans are mortal
Elephants are mortal.
Therefore, elephants are humans.

All Presidents of Uganda reside at Entebbe.

M7 resides at Entebbe.
Therefore, M7 is a President.
These arguments also have the same form:
All p is q;
r is q;
Therefore, r is p.

Arguments with this form are invalid. This is easy to see with the first
example.
The second example may seem like a good argument because the premises
and the conclusion are all true, but note that the conclusion's truth isn't
guaranteed by the premises' truth. It could have been possible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion false. This argument is invalid, and
all invalid arguments are unsound.
The import here is that validity depends not on the subject matter or material
content of an argument, but on the form or structure. Accordingly, logic as a
study of the conditions of validity is a formal discipline. In other words,
because the formal structure of an argument determines the validity of an
argument, logic is a formal science and its subject matter is formal validity.
Logic studies the forms of arguments in order to classify argument forms into

36
two mutually exclusive exhaustive divisions; one division being reserved for
formally valid argument forms, the other for formally invalid forms.
The object of logic, as a formal science, is thus obtained when logical
techniques and methods are available by means of which it is possible, in
principle, to identify all formally valid arguments as formally valid, and
formally invalid arguments as formally invalid.
That the validity of an argument is a matter of it‘s logically form as opposed
to its content makes it evident that the test for validity and invalidity does not
depend on the truthfulness and falsity of the propositions that make up the
argument. “The attributes of validity and invalidity belong to arguments not
to propositions…., the attributes of truthfulness and falsity belong to
propositions, not to arguments”
This point is further buttressed by the following examples of valid arguments
with (i) False premises and False conclusion (ii) False premises and True
conclusion, and (iii) True premises and True conclusion:
(i) All black-complexioned individuals are hardworking
All girls are black-complexioned
Therefore, all girls are hard working
A valid argument with false premises and false conclusion
(ii) All Christians are Africans
Ugandans are all Christians
Therefore, Ugandans are Africans
A valid argument with false premises and a true conclusion
(iii) Nigeria is a member of the Economic Community of West African Countries.
Member-nations of Economic Community of West African Countries are
categorized as black nations
Therefore, Nigeria is categorized as a black-nation
A valid argument with true premises and true conclusion
But, it is not possible to have as valid, an argument with all true premises
and a false conclusion. The result thus is that any argument that has an all
true premises and a false conclusion is sure to be invalid; this is because the
conclusion of such an argument could not have been derived (deduced) from
the premises, the point is that the information in the conclusion cannot be
found in the premises, and in all valid arguments the conclusion cannot give
any information not already contained in the premises.
The point on relief here is that the test for validity and invalidity does not
depend on truthfulness and falsity. In this connection, questions revolving
around truth and validity make it necessary that we do not talk of the material

37
truth of propositions in talking about validity and invalidity; indeed, the
actual truth of the premises and its conclusion is irrelevant to logic. In talking
about the validity of an argument, we are not concerned with whether the
premises of an argument and the conclusion are actually true or not but only
in their logical form.
Logic: A Science of Formal Validity
The import of the suasion that logic isn‘t concerned whether the premises of
an argument and the conclusion are actually true or not but only in their
logical form is that logic, properly understood, is a science of formal validity,
meaning therefore that logical principles are purely formal. This is illustrated
by the example below:
. All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
What we mean to assert in this argument is only that the premises imply the
conclusion, not that the premises and the conclusion are actually true; the
actual truth of the premises is irrelevant to the validity of the argument. We
can note that this becomes clearer if instead of the categorical form of the
argument, we now have the same argument couched in propositional form as
follows: ―If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal‖.
In this form, the argument does not assert neither of the mortality of all men,
nor the humanity of
Socrates; the conclusion is thus a matter of implication. In effect, the
argument is valid in virtue of its form not in virtue of the particular terms
occurring in it.
The point is that if we omit ―Socrates is a man‖ from our premises, we would
have a non-formal argument, only admissible because Socrates is in fact a
man. In that case, we cannot generalize the argument. But when, as re-
formulated, the argument is formal, nothing depends upon the terms that
occur in it. What this comes to is that we may as well substituted a for men,
β for mortals, and x for Socrates, where a and β are any classes whatever,
and x is any individual, we then arrive at the statement: ―No matter
what possible values x and a and β may have, if all a ‗s and β‘s and x is an a,
then x is a β.
The gist of the foregoing is that if formal reasoning is what we are aiming at,
we shall always arrive ultimately at statements like the above, in which no
actual things or properties are mentioned. This will happen through the mere
desire not to waste our time proving in a particular case what can be proved
generally. If our argument is one (say) which holds for all men, we shall prove
concerning ―x with the hypothesis ―if x is a man. With this hypothesis, the
argument will retain its hypothetical validity even when ―x is not a man. But
now we shall find that our argument would still be valid if, instead of

38
supposing x to be a man we were to suppose him to be a monkey, or a goose
or a Prime Minister.
The importance of the above question is that the absence of all mention of
particular things or properties in logic is a necessary result of the fact that
logic is purely formal. In a sense, logic as a formal discipline is concerned with
inference forms rather than with particular instances of them. One of its tasks
is to discriminate between valid and invalid inference forms and to explore
and systematize the relations that hold among valid ones.
The insight that logic is interested in formal validity here means that logical
principles express the most general nature of things. Accordingly, since the
general nature of things is the ground for the correctness or incorrectness of
reasoning, general nature is also expressed in the principle of logic or
inference. In effect, logic studies the nature of anything that is, in Aristotelian
(metaphysical) parlance, ―it investigates being as being‖. It is differentiated
from other sciences because while the other disciplines examine the
properties which distinguish one subject matter from another, logic studies
those truths which hold for everything that is, and not for some special
subdivision of what is apart from the others.
As a consequence, logical principles must be formal – they represent the
common characters of any subject matter, and they cannot be employed to
differentiate one subject from another. Logic in this connection involves
abstracting to form, and in doing this we require knowledge of only the most
general characters of a subject matter, that is, that which it has in common
with everything else, in order to reasons upon it validly.

Propositions in Logic
The Proposition may be defined as a verbal expression in which we affirm or
deny an attribute of a subject. It is also sometimes defined as a verbal
expression enunciating a truth or falsity: for it is characteristic of every
proposition that it must be either true or false. The form of the proposition is
S is (or is not) P, e.g. 'The lion is vertebrate', 'Caesar is not alive'.
A proposition of the kind we have described, is commonly known as the
Categorical Proposition, to distinguish it from Conditional Propositions. In
these we do not assert the attribute of the subject absolutely: we merely affirm
that, given certain conditions, it belongs to it.
In regard to the Categorical proposition, the following points are to be noted:
i. It is always in the indicative mood. In the other grammatical moods, the
mind does not judge that the attribute belongs to the subject, but expresses
a wish that it may be so, or gives an injunction that it should be so. In the
indicative alone we affirm (or deny) the attribute of the subject. Thus we have,
"The messenger is speaking", "May the messenger speak?" "Speak,
messenger!" So too it is only when the attribute is affirmed of the subject that

39
the mind reaches truth or falsity. For truth is attained when the mind assigns
to the subject an attribute which belongs to it in the real order.
ii. The logical proposition is always stated in the present tense. Our purpose
in Logic, as we have seen, is to study the mode in which the mind represents
the real order. As regards this the question of present, past or future is purely
accidental. The time-determination does not affect the mental representation
as such. Hence differences of tense so necessary in the use of language for
practical ends have no place in Logic.
iii. The logical predicate is always separated from the copula. In the language
of common life, we frequently express them in one word, as for instance, 'The
bird flies'. In Logic we must say, 'The bird is flying.'
This same process must be performed whenever we get mutilated expressions,
such as 'Wolf!' 'Fire!' 'Rain!' For Logic demands that every sentence, whatever
its grammatical form, shall be so analysed and expressed, as to represent as
closely as possible the intellectual act. Sir W. Hamilton stated this in what is
sometimes termed Hamilton's Postulate, viz. 'Logic postulates to be allowed to
state explicitly in language, whatever is implicitly contained in thought.' Our
three mutilated expressions may be respectively resolved into, 'A wolf is near,'
'A fire is burning,' 'Rain is falling.'
We must carefully distinguish between the 'is' of the copula, and the same
word when it means 'to exist'. Here it will be sufficient to note that the copula
does not necessarily imply that the subject exists. Its office in affirmative
sentences is to denote the objective identity of the subject and predicate: that
they are expressions representing one and the same object. In negative
sentences the copula 'is not' signifies the objective diversity of the terms: the
predicate is not applicable to the object denoted by the subject. I may say,
'The lion is vertebrate,' because the term 'vertebrate' is rightly applied to the
same object as the term 'lion'. I cannot say 'The octopus is vertebrate'. This
relation between the subject and predicate of the proposition, arises
immediately from the nature of the mental act which the proposition
represents -- the judgment. In every affirmative judgment the two terms are
different mental expressions of the same object. The same object is expressed
in one concept as 'lion', in another as 'vertebrate'. But the object which I
conceive as 'octopus', I cannot conceive also as 'vertebrate'. Hence the
judgment, 'The octopus is vertebrate', is impossible.
Here we see how totally Scholastic Logic differs from Formal Logic. Strictly,
Formal Logic should take no account of the content of the subject and
predicate. To it every judgment is simply S is P. Scholastic Logic rejects any
judgments in which the concepts do not represent the same objective reality,
e.g. 'Men are circles', 'Cows are lions'. In these the two notions are repugnant
the one to the other. The judgment is impossible.
Analysis of the Judgment. Although as we have seen, the subject and
predicate of the judgment are different concepts of the same thing, it is
important to bear in mind that it is the subject which directly expresses the

40
thing, i.e. that to which attributes belong. The predicate expresses the thing
as qualified by a particular attribute or form. Whenever we fix our attention
on a thing, our mind immediately commences to abstract the attributes from
the object of thought, and affirm them of it one by one. It judges: 'The thing
is hard -- is black -- is brittle, etc.'. Here the predicate in each case is the
attribute or form —not indeed the attribute considered in separation from the
object in which it inheres, i.e. hardness, blackness, etc., but considered as
qualifying the thing. It is easy to see how such judgments develop into more
complex ones. The hard, brittle thing will be called 'coal': and the judgment
will take predicates of a less primary character.

A judgment is said to be true when the form expressed by the predicate is

really found in the object denoted by the subject. Thus, if I see some object,
e.g. Socrates, and I judge 'Socrates is walking,' my judgment is a true one if
the attribute 'walking', which I affirm of Socrates in thought, does in fact
belong to him in the real order. Hence truth is defined as the conformity
of the mind with its object. For in every true affirmative judgment the
mental concept expressed in the predicate is in conformity with a real
attribute belonging to the external object. As regards negative judgments the
case is somewhat different. In them we declare that the form expressed in the
predicate is not to be found in the object to which the judgment refers. Yet in
a somewhat wide sense we can say that in negative judgments also the mind
is conformed to its object. In judging a form not to belong to an object which
in fact does not possess it, my mind is in correspondence with reality. But
negation is a secondary and subsidiary form of truth. In affirmation there is
perfect correspondence between the mental form expressed in the predicate and
the objective reality..

Grammatically the subject does not always take the first place. It is the
meaning of the proposition, not the arrangement of the words, which tells us
which is the subject and which the predicate. The term which qualifies or
defines the other, whether it comes first or last, is the predicate. Thus in the
words, 'Blessed are the meek,' it is the meek who form the logical subject.
What has just been said will throw light on the nature of the third element of
the proposition -- the copula. While the predicate expresses one of the forms
which determine the subject, thus telling us what the thing is, the copula
expresses the being which is thus determined. Unless the subject were
conceived as possessed of being, we could not attribute any predicates to it:
for its predicates are so many determinations of its being. A thing which is
not cannot be determined. It is non ens - a nonentity.
These relative functions of copula and predicate are clearly seen, if we
consider the judgment in its primary form, viz, that in which the subject is a
concrete singular substance, and the predicate a form apprehended as
belonging to it, e.g. 'Socrates is a man', 'Anthony Nakaana is black'. In the

41
first of these propositions the being of Socrates is characterized as human; in
the second the being of Nakaana is determined by the accidental form of a
particular colour. Again, if we wish to affirm that the subject possesses real
being - that it exists - though without indicating how that being is determined,
we use the same verb 'to be', which is employed in the copula. We say,
'Socrates is'.
It will have been noticed that we said it was requisite that the subject should
be conceived as possessed of being. We did not say that it must actually
possess real being. In fact there are many true propositions in which the
subject has no real being: many in which the predicate is not a real form. Our
words, as we have often said, are the expression of our thoughts: they signify
things as mentally represented. Hence the being of which the copula is the
direct and immediate expression is being in the conceptual order: and the
forms signified by the predicate are forms as they conceived. In the
propositions 'Socrates is a man', 'Nakaana is black', there is correspondence
between the real order and the conceptual. But this is not always the case. We
can give conceptual existence to things which have never actually existed, and
many of our judgments relate, not to something which has really existed, but
to some creation of the mind. Thus, when speaking of Greek mythology, I may
say, 'A centaur is an animal half man and half horse'. The judgment is true
because it corresponds with the object of thought. But that object only existed
in the mind: it had no real existence. The same principle accounts for those
judgments in which the predicate is a second intention, e.g.'Man is a universal
nature.' The nature 'man' viewed as universal, exists only conceptually.
It is thus manifest that the copula does not necessarily affirm the existence
of the subject in rerum natura. Its essential function is to signify the objective
identity of subject and predicate. This it does in every proposition without
exception. For in every proposition its office is to declare that the term
employed in the predicate signifies the same object which is denoted by the
subject.
Just as the copula frequently expresses, not real being, but what is mentally
expressed as being, so the predicate is often not a real quality, but something
the mind expresses as a quality. We can see this when discussing Negative
terms in logic, that we are able to conceive as real entities things which are in
fact simply the negations of entities. Our predicates are often of this kind, as
e.g. in the proposition, 'The horse is riderless'. Sometimes both subject and
predicate are of this character: for instance, 'Blindness deprives men of much
happiness.' Here not merely is a privation conceived as if it were a real subject;
but a purely negative result is conceived as a positive action.
It remains to be noticed that a judgment is a single act of the mind. No mistake
could be greater than to represent it as three separate acts, corresponding
respectively to subject, copula and predicate. Such a view might seem to be
implied, when it is said that in affirmation we have the conjunction, in
negation the separation of two concepts. But it is manifest that a synthesis,

42
in which we recognize a relation of identity, and a separation in which we
judge that such a relation is absent, are alike single acts.
* St. Thomas frequently distinguishes between the 'being' of the real order and
the 'being 'of the copula. The latter (following Aristotle Met. V. c. 4) he terms
"the 'being' which signifies the 'truth of the synthesis contained in the
judgment." This phrase, perhaps, calls for explanation. Our mind only effects
the synthesis between predicate and subject, judging e.g. "The "horse is
riderless", when it is conscious that the attribute predicated belongs
objectively to the thing about which we are judging. We could not employ the
word is unless the synthesis really represented the object, in other words
unless the judgment were true. Nevertheless, although the 'being' of the
copula is constituted by a purely mental operation, it is always representative.
The esse which denotes the truth of the judgment corresponds with an esse
of existence. But this existence need not be real existence: we may make true
judgments about things which have existence only in the mind.

Quality of Propositions. In every proposition P must be either affirmed or

denied of S. This alternative determines the Quality of the proposition, which
must be either (I) affirmative, or (2) negative. This division is ultimate.

Quantity of Propositions. In any affirmation or negation, P may be affirmed

or denied, (1) of all the objects denoted by the subject-term, e.g. 'All men are
mortal'; or (2) of only some of these objects, e.g. 'Some men are negroes': or
(3) there may be no sign to mark whether the predicate refers to some only or
to all, e.g. 'Pleasure is not a good' : or (4) the subject may be a singular term,
e.g. 'Socrates is wise,' 'The highest of the Alps has been scaled.' These various
alternatives lead to the division of propositions according to quantity.
A Universal proposition is one, in which the predicate is affirmed (or denied)
of a subject, taken in its whole extension and distributively.
We have already explained that when a subject is employed distributively, the
predicate is affirmed of every individual denoted by the subject. When we say,
'All sparrows are winged,' we mean that every individual sparrow is possessed
of wings.
N.B A proposition in which the subject is understood collectively is not
universal. Thus the proposition, 'All the slates covered the roof,' is not a
universal proposition. The predicate is not affirmable of each individual
denoted by the subject, but of the individuals as forming one group. Hence,
whenever the word All (and not Every) is employed to qualify the subject, care
must be taken to observe whether it be understood collectively or
distributively.
It is plain that though the Affirmative Universal is of the form All S is P, the
Negative Universal will not be All S is not P, but No S is P. The form All S is

43
not P does not exclude P from each and every individual S, as at once appears
in the proposition 'All soldiers are not generals'. If, however, I say, 'No
Englishmen are negroes,' I deny the attribute of every Englishman.
The employment of the plural in a universal proposition, e.g. 'All men are
mortal,' may possibly mislead the student into supposing that in the subject
the intellect conceives a number of individuals. This is, of course, impossible.
Mentally the whole class is expressed by the universal concept 'man.' But the
grammatical form 'All men are mortal,' shows that we have under our
consideration, not the universal nature viewed in abstraction from
particulars, but the concrete individuals. Man is mortal' is the purely logical
form. 'All men are mortal' puts us in touch with concrete reality.

A Particular proposition is one in which the predicate is affirmed (or denied)

of a part only of the extension of the subject.
The form of the Particular proposition is Some S are (or are not) P; for
instance, 'Some soldiers are brave,' 'Some rich men are not generous'. The
sense, in which the word 'some' is here used, differs in certain respects from
that in which it is ordinarily employed. In ordinary use, when we speak, e.g.
of 'some' men, we are under stood to mean more than one, and also to exclude
the supposition that what we say may be true of all men. 'Some' means
'several but not all.' In Logic, the 'some' of a particular proposition, may be
used even where the predicate might be truly affirmed of all: and it may be
used also even if there be but one individual to whom it could be applied.
Thus I may say, 'Some birds have wings,' even though it be the case that all
birds possess them: and 'Some men are eight feet high,' though in fact there
be but one such man. 'Some' leaves the extension to which reference is made
indeterminate.

The essential distinction then between Universal and Particular

propositions lies in this, that Universals deal with the whole class,
Particulars with an indeterminate portion of the class.
And here it is well to call attention to the fact, that universal propositions are
of two sorts. The majority of them cannot be attained by mere enumeration of
instances. Some indeed can. I can arrive at the universal truth, that 'All the
apostles were Jews,' by a process of counting. But propositions of this
character are of minor moment. Enumeration will not serve me in regard to
such propositions as, 'All men are mortal.' Here, I refer not merely to an
incalculable number of past instances, but also to the future. All laws of
nature known to science are propositions of this character. The aim and
object of scientific enquiry is to establish such universal truths.
How is it that we can affirm a predicate of individuals, which have not come
within our experience? The explanation lies in the fact, that in these
propositions we know the predicate to be invariably connected with the

44
universal class-notion employed in the subject. It is sufficient here to observe
that to what ever individuals the notion 'man ' is applicable, the predicate
'mortal' is applicable also. In virtue of their being men, they possess the
attribute of mortality. The universality of these propositions rests not on
enumeration, but on our knowledge of the constant connection between the
concepts of the subject and predicate.

It remains to consider Indesignate and Singular pro positions.

Indesignate propositions are such as have no sign of quantity. As far as form
is concerned, they may be universal, or they may be particular. If I say, 'Old
men are melancholy,' it does not appear, whether I am speaking of all old
men, or of some only. Hence indesignate propositions have no place in Logic,
until a sign of quantity is affixed to them. In some cases indeed the
Indesignate is used to signify that the predicate is connected necessarily with
the subject, e.g. 'Man is mortal'. Here the proposition is of course equivalent
to a universal. For these judgments in which the Indesignate form stands not
for individuals, but for the class-nature, some authors employ the convenient
term Generic judgments. But it should be observed that we do not know their
universal character from the logical form, but from our previous acquaintance
with the matter under consideration. Very often the Indesignate is used for
what are termed moral universals, as in the example already given', Old men
are melancholy'. A moral universal admits exceptions, and hence is logically
a particular.
The Singular proposition is, as we have said, one whose subject is either a
significant Singular term or a proper name. These propositions present some
anomalies. On the one hand, the individual object is a member of a class, and
it appears incongruous to treat it as though it were itself a class. On the other,
the definition of a Universal proposition is applicable to them, for the predicate
is affirmed of the subject in its whole extension, the extension in this case
being restricted to a single individual.
Modern logicians have resolved to treat this proposition as a Universal, and it
will be convenient to adhere to that arrangement.
The older logicians classify the Singular proposition separately, and assign it
neither to the Universal nor to the Particular. This was, it would seem, the
more scientific course. For the Universal and Particular are distinguished by
the manner in which the concept employed as subject is understood in regard
to extension. But as we can see we have no singular concepts. Hence there is
a fundamental difference between such a proposition as, 'All men are mortal,'
and 'Socrates is a philosopher.'
Propositions whose subject is a Collective term are Singular propositions.
Thus if I say,' All the apples filled the bowl,' it is clear that I refer to this group
of apples considered as a single object.

45
The Fourfold Scheme of Propositions. The last paragraph has shown us
that the two fundamental forms of the proposition are the Universal and the
Particular. In one of these two, every known truth can be expressed. For the
assertion made is either known to hold good of the subject in its whole
extension, or not. If it is known to hold good, we use the Universal
proposition. If it does not hold good as regards the whole extension of the
subject, or if, though it holds good, we do not know this to be the case, we
use the Particular. This distinction, combined with that based on quality,
gives us the fourfold scheme, viz. Universal Affirmative, Particular Affirmative,
Universal Negative, Particular Negative. These are respectively given by the
letters, A.I.E.O. These letters are the vowels of the two Latin words, Affirmo (I
affirm) and Nego (I deny). The first vowel in each stands for the Universal, the
second vowel for the Particular. Another notation, which is found convenient,
is SaP, SiP, SeP, SoP: this notation has symbols for the subject and predicate,
as well as for quantity and quality. Hence, our four propositions may be thus
expressed.

All S are P. A. SaP.

Some S are P. I. SiP.

No S are P. E. SeP.

Some S are not P. 0. SoP.

Analytic and Synthetic Propositions. This distinction is based on the fact

that each of our Judgments is based on one or other of two very different
motives. The point will best be elucidated by a few examples. If we consider
the following propositions, 'The angles of every triangle are equal to two right
angles,' 'The whole is greater than its part,' 'Every square has four sides,' and
compare them with such propositions as 'Water freezes at 320o Fahrenheit,'
'Some cows are black,' we shall at once recognize that there is a difference
between the two classes. We are, indeed, certain of the truth of all these
propositions. But our certainty has a different motive in the first class, and in
the second. In the case of the first class of Judgments, as soon as we consider
the concepts of the subject and predicate, we see that they are necessarily
bound together. A triangle must have its angles equal to two right angles;
otherwise it would not be what we mean by a triangle. Were we told of any
figure that its interior angles were greater or less than two right angles, we
should be justified in affirming that it was not, and could not under any
circumstances be a rectilinear triangle. In the same way the intension of the
concepts 'whole' and 'part' excludes the supposition of a whole that is not

46
greater than its part; for the meaning of the term 'whole,' is 'that which
consists of parts.' In regard to the second class, the motive of our assent is
very different. It is experience that has led to my conviction that water freezes
at 320 F., and that certain cows are black. There is nothing in my notion of '
cows which prescribes 'blackness,' nor in my notion of' water,' which compels
me to think of it as possessing this particular freezing-point at the sea-level.
In neither of these propositions are the two concepts linked together in virtue
of their intension.

The former class of propositions is termed Analytic, the latter Synthetic.

The definition of Analytic and Synthetic propositions is differently given by
Scholastic philosophers on the one hand, and by the greater number of
Logicians since the days of Kant, on the other. The difference is of primary
importance in philosophy. We place the Scholastic definitions first.
An Analytic proposition is one, in which either the predicate is contained in the
intension of the subject, or the subject in the intension of the predicate.
A Synthetic proposition is one in which the connection of subject and predicate
is not involved in the intension of the terms.
It will be seen that Analytic propositions are of two kinds. The first kind
consists of those in which the predicate is a term signifying either the whole
intension, or part of the intension of the subject. Such is the proposition,
'Every square has four sides.' The second kind consists of those in which the
predicate is an attribute which results necessarily from the nature of the
subject. For where this is the case the subject is found in the intension of the
predicate. An example is furnished by the proposition, 'A triangle is a figure
having its interior angles equal to two right angles.' The predicate here is not
found in the intension or definition of 'triangle'. But it is an attribute which
necessarily results from and is involved in the characteristics of a triangle.
And if we desire to define the attribute 'having its interior angles equal to two
right angles,' we can only do so by stating that it is a quantitative measure
proper to the angles of a triangle.
It is not however necessary that the connection of the attribute with the
subject should be evident on the first consideration. Many steps may be
necessary. Every geometrical theorem gives us an Analytical proposition as
its conclusion. The connection between subject and predicate is involved in
the intension of the terms : but we must often take a long series of steps before
the necessity of that connection becomes manifest to us.

The modern definitions are as follows

An Analytic Proposition is one, in which the predicate is contained in the
definition of the subject.

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A Synthetic proposition is one, in which the predicate is not contained in the
notion of the subject.
So prevalent have these definitions become, that in any public examination
at the present day, a question, involving these terms, would certainly employ
them in this latter sense.

Complex Propositions. Complex propositions are such as have a complex

term for their subject or their predicate. By a complex term is understood a
many-worded term, consisting of two or more distinct parts, so that it
expresses, not merely the nature of the thing denoted, but also one or more
qualifications belonging to it, e.g. 'the white knight,' 'the roller which is in my
garden,' and the like. These qualifications are often (as in the second of the
instances just given), expressed by subordinate clauses, introduced by a
relative. Yet it is manifest that, even if a complex term involves two or three
such clauses, the term is but one, and constitutes a single subject or
predicate, as the case may be.
Two forms of complex propositions are ordinarily distinguished by logicians.
The distinction is grammatical, not logical, and is given in order to put us on
our guard against ambiguity.
(1) Propositions with an explicative qualification. In these the qualification
belongs to every individual signified by the general name, to which it belongs.
Thus in the, proposition, 'Whales, which are mammals, are aquatic animals,'
the relative clause is applicable to every individual, that is signified by the
general name 'whales.'
(2) Propositions with a restrictive (or determinative) qualification. In these, the
qualification restricts the signification of the general name to a certain part of
its denotation. Thus in the sentence, 'All nations, that have been civilized,
have cultivated philosophy,' the qualification does not belong to all the
members of the class indicated. Not all nations are civilized.
The time determination involved in the use of the past and future tenses of
the verb, is a special form of complexity in the proposition. This however, as
we have noted, Logic is enabled to disregard. Another constantly recurring
form is that produced by the employment of transitive verbs, followed by an
object, e.g. 'Brutus slew his benefactor,' which gives as the logical predicate,
the complex term 'a slayer of his benefactor.'

Compound Categorical Propositions. It often happens that what

grammatically is a single assertion, is resolvable into two or more
propositions, each with its own subject and predicate. In such cases, we have
the Compound Categorical Proposition. Propositions of this kind are divided
into two classes - those whose character is apparent from their grammatical
structure (aperté compositi), and those in which the grammatical form does

48
not manifest their composite nature (occulté compositi). These latter are
termed Exponibles.

(a) Propositions compound in form. Of these there are three classes: --

Copulative propositions.
These are affirmative propositions, in which there are two or more subjects
or predicates or both. Hence they are resolvable into a number of independent
affirmative propositions: e.g. 'Peter and Paul ended their days at Rome.' This
is equivalent to 'Peter ended his days at Rome. Paul ended his days at Rome.'

Remotive propositions.
These are negations similarly united. The conjunctions employed will be such
as the negative form demands. For example, 'Neither riches nor honours can
banish anxiety'; this sentence may be resolved, 'Riches cannot banish anxiety.
Honours cannot banish anxiety.' 'No Mohammedan will eat swine's flesh or
drink wine.' This, in its logical expression, becomes, 'No Mohammedan will
eat swine's flesh. No Mohammedan will drink wine.'
Discretive or Adversative propositions.
Here we have either two affirmative propositions, or an affirmative and a
negative proposition, connected by an adversative conjunction, such as but,
although, yet. Thus: 'William I. was brave but not magnanimous.' This gives
us the two propositions 'William I. was brave. William I. was not
magnanimous.'

Exponible propositions.
In these, as we have said, there is nothing in the grammatical structure of the
sentence to indicate that it is equivalent to more than one logical proposition.
Here also, three classes are ordinarily enumerated.

Exclusive Propositions.
These contain a word, such as 'alone,' attached to the subject, and thus
excluding the predicate from any other subject than this one. Hence two
propositions are necessary to declare the full meaning, one to affirm the
predicate of this subject, and another to deny it of all others. For instance,
'God alone is omnipotent.' This is equivalent to 'God is omnipotent. No other
is omnipotent.'

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Exceptive Propositions.
In these, the subject term is restricted in its application by a word such as
except - save, which excludes a portion of its denotation -e.g. 'All the crew
save one were drowned.' Here again, two exponent propositions are needed,
the one denying the predicate of the excepted part, the other affirming it of
the remainder. The example just given will become, 'One of the crew was not
drowned. The remaining members were drowned.'

If the order of the terms is altered, then both Exclusives and Exceptives may
be expressed by a single exponent. 'Only God is omnipotent,' will become 'All
that is omnipotent is God'; and 'All the crew save one were drowned,' will be
'The portion of the crew that was not drowned was one man.' But if the original
order is to be preserved, two propositions are necessary. The reasons which
justify a change of order will be dealt with in Ch. 5.

Inceptive and Desitive Propositions.

In these a statement is made as to the commencement or ending of something;
e.g. 'Printing became customary after 'the fifteenth century,' 'Paganism ceased
in England 'about the year 700 A D.' These are resolved by two propositions,
one relating to the state of things before the time indicated, and one relating
to what occurred subsequently. Thus the first example will become 'Printing
was not customary before the close of the fifteenth century. Printing was
customary after that date.'

Modal Propositions.
The Modal proposition affords us another case in which the traditional
terminology differs from that in vogue since the days of Kant. Here too we
shall first explain modality as understood by the Scholastic philosophers, and
then deal with the Kantian account.

The characteristic of the Modal, is that the copula undergoes modification, in

order to express the manner in which the predicate belongs to the subject.
There are propositions, in which the attribute affirmed belongs to the subject
by strict necessity. Thus 'mortality' is an attribute that is necessarily
connected with the subject 'man.' In other cases the element of necessity is
absent. 'To be learned' is affirmable of some men only. It is not an attribute
belonging necessarily to the nature 'man.' The pure categorical draws no
distinction between these cases. We employ the same copula 'is,' whether the
connection is necessary or contingent. But in the Modal proposition, the
nature of the connection between attribute and subject receives expression.

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It has been frequently objected, that this whole question belongs not to Logic
but to Metaphysics. Thus Sir W. Hamilton says, "Necessity, Possibility, etc.
do not relate to the connection of the subject and predicate . . . as terms in
thought, but as realities in existence: they are metaphysical, not logical
conditions." This objection rests on a misconception as to the province of
Logic. Necessity and Possibility as objective facts, belong to the real order. But
as mentally expressed by us, they belong to the logical order; and a treatise
on Logic would be incomplete without some mention of the manner in which
the mental judgment represents these metaphysical conditions.

The relation of the attribute to the subject is, objectively, determined by one
of three modes. These are (i) the Necessary, in which the attribute belongs
necessarily to the subject. This is expressed by a proposition of the form, 'Men
are necessarily mortal,' 'Equilateral triangles are necessarily equiangular.' (ii)
The Impossible: in this case the predicate is repugnant to the subject, e.g. 'It
is impossible for irrational creatures to exercise free will.' And (iii) the Possible
(or Contingent). In this case the predicate belongs to the subject in some
instances, while in other instances it is not found with it. Thus e.g. 'It is
possible for a man to be a grammarian.' The conjunction of the two attributes
involves no impossibility, but on the other hand is not necessary. This relation
may be asserted from two points of view. We may assert the possibility of the
connection between subject and predicate, and express the proposition as it
is expressed above. Or we may declare the possibility of their separation: and
in this case the proposition will take the form, 'It is possible for a man not to
be a grammarian.' Hence though there are but three modes, there are four
fundamental forms of Modal propositions, as there are four fundamental
forms of Categorical.

A difficulty is occasioned by the fact that ambiguity attaches to the word

'possible.' 'Possible' may have the sense in which we have just explained it.
It may however, include in its signification the Necessary also; for if a
predicate belongs necessarily to a subject, we can say with truth that that
subject is capable of receiving it [N12] . If all triangles must have three angles,
it is true to say that it is possible for a triangle to have three angles. And
similarly the assertion that it is possible for a subject not to have such and
such a predicate, may have a sense in which it includes the Impossible.

The Modal may be expressed in two forms. In the first of these, the mode itself
constitutes the predicate, having for its subject the proposition whose copula
it affects, e.g. 'That man should be mortal is necessary,' 'that a bird should
have gay plumage is possible.' Modals of this form are all singular, since the
subject is not a term, but a proposition taken as a whole. Nevertheless the
modes of necessity and impossibility are a sure sign that the proposition in
question is universal; while on the other hand the mode of possibility, in the

51
sense of merely possible (as distinguished from the case in which possibility
is predicated of a necessary judgment) is indicative of a particular proposition.
In the second forms of the Modal the mode qualifies the copula itself: e.g. All
triangles are necessarily three-angled. Modals of this form are not singular
but take their quantity from their subject.
Reduction of Propositions to Logical Form.
The sentences employed in literature and in ordinary conversation exhibit
considerable variety of form and complexity of structure. It is possible however
to analyse them and express them in the shape of A E 1 0 propositions. This
process is styled their reduction to logical form. By submitting sentences to
this analysis we reach the simple elements of thought, which are contained
in them. It is plain that this is very different from grammatical analysis into
parts of speech. That process is concerned not with thoughts but with words.
The preceding paragraphs should have rendered the task of reduction
comparatively easy. Its essential feature is to obtain propositions, consisting
of (1) a subject with the sign of quantity attached; (2) a copula, which must
be of the form is or are (or is not, are not), and (3) a predicate.

· We find the subject by putting to ourselves the question, Of what or of

whom is this statement made?

· We find the quantity of the subject by asking, Is the assertion made of

the whole extension of the subject, or of but part of it?

· We find the predicate by enquiring, What is it that is asserted of the

subject?

These three points must always be considered, whenever the analysis of a

sentence is attempted. Two other cautions may be added. First, that it is well,
whenever it is possible, to express the predicate as an attribute, i.e.
adjectivally, in order to bring out the true meaning of the proposition: e.g. the
form 'All flattery is to be avoided' is better than 'All flattery is a thing to be
avoided.' Secondly, that wherever it is necessary to introduce a time
determination, this must be done in the predicate as below. The copula must
always be in the present tense.

A few examples will illustrate the process: --

(1) 'Fools despise wisdom.'

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This will become, 'All fools are despisers of wisdom' (A).

(2) 'All's well that ends well.'

This will be, 'All that ends well is well' (A).

(3) 'Firm at his dangerous post he stood.'

This in logical form is, 'He is standing firm at his dangerous post' (A).

(4) 'As a man sows, so shall he reap.'

Here we have a relative sentence. The two clauses of these propositions give
us the terms of a relation. Where the words 'As . . . so' are employed to
introduce the clauses, the relation is one of likeness. The analysis gives us,
'In every instance, the character of a man's harvest is like the character of his
sowing' (A).

If the words 'Where . . . there' are used, we have a relation of place: if 'When .
. . then,' a relation of time.

(5) 'Where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also.'
Logically, this is, 'In every instance, the place of your treasure is the place of
your heart' (A).

(6) 'Love is akin to madness.'

Here the subject is used without any sign of quantity, but clearly stands for
the whole denotation of the term. The pro position becomes, 'All cases of love
are akin to madness.'

Where we have compound or exponible propositions, they need resolving into

their component parts, e.g.

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(7) 'Lions and tigers once lived wild in Europe, but not now.'

This gives us four propositions.

'Some lions are animals, that once lived wild in Europe' (I).

'Some tigers are animals, that once lived wild in Europe' (I).

'No lions are living wild in Europe now' (E).

'No tigers are living wild in Europe now' (E).

(8) 'Only the just enjoy peace of mind.'

This is resolved into:

'Some of the just are enjoying peace of mind' (I).

'None, who are not just, are enjoying peace of mind' (E).

(9) 'All save he had fled.'

Here we have a case, where the full force of the proposition cannot be brought
out in the analysis, since we have no universal term by which to designate all
the remainder. The reduction gives: --

'He is not fleeing' (E).

'Some (the rest) are fleeing' (I).

(10) 'The great is not good, but the good is great.'

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Notice should be taken of the 'reduplicative' use of the word 'great' in the first
clause. It signifies 'the great as such,' or 'the great, just in so far as it is great.'
This must be expressed in the analysis

'The great, merely in virtue of its greatness, is not good' (E).

'The good is great' (A).

Other Signs of Quantity. It will be useful to mention a few other modes of

expressing Quantity besides those we have already noticed.

A. The universal affirmative is occasionally denoted by the expressions, Any,

Whoever, He who, Always, In every case.

I may be denoted by A few, Certain, Often. Generally, Most.

E may be expressed by the word Never.

O has equivalents in A few . . . not, Not all . . . are, All are not, Few, Certain .
. . not.

The word Most has been placed as one of the equivalents of I. The proposition
'Most S's are P' signifies that 'Some (more than half) S's are P,' but does not
necessarily imply in addition that 'Some S's are not P.' It merely signifies that
the majority of instances have been examined, and found to possess the
attribute P. Thus we might say, 'Most English flowering-plants are
dicotyledonous,' without desiring to commit ourselves to any opinion as to the
whole flora: or again, after looking at seven cards out of a hand at whist, we
might say, 'Most of the cards in this hand are court-cards,' knowing that it
was possible they might all prove to be so. Similarly we might say, 'Few
English flowering-p]ants are monocotyledonous,' even if we were ignorant
whether there were any of that character. Hence Few is commonly reckoned
as merely a sign of the proposition O [N14]. The words Hardly any, Scarcely
any are also regarded as equivalent to O. The use of All with a negative to
signify O should be carefully noticed. 'Not all the crew were lost,' will be
expressed 'Some of the crew were not lost.'

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Special note should be taken as to whether the terms, to which words such
as All, A few, etc. etc. are attached, are used distributively or collectively (Ch.
2, § 15). Wherever the use is collective the proposition is singular. 'All the
men built a raft' is a case in point. The proposition may be expressed, 'The
whole body of men is building a raft.'

11. Hypothetical Propositions.

Besides the Categorical propositions which we have hitherto been
considering, there is another class of judgments called Conditional. These are
distinguished from Categoricals by the fact that in them the predicate is not
asserted absolutely of the subject. They are divided into two classes, termed
Hypothetical and Disjunctive. In the present section we are concerned with
the Hypothetical.

A Hypothetical Proposition is one in which the predication made in one

proposition, is asserted as a consequence from that made in another. The
proposition on which the truth of the other depends, is called the Antecedent:
that which follows on its admission, is called the Consequent. Thus in the
proposition, 'If the shepherd be negligent, the sheep go astray,' the antecedent
is ' If the shepherd be negligent ' ; the consequent is 'the sheep go astray.' It
will be seen that neither part of the proposition is independently asserted as
true. We do not affirm that 'the shepherd is negligent,' nor yet that ' the sheep
go astray.' It is the nexus between the two, the dependence of consequent on
antecedent, which is affirmed.

There are two forms in which the hypothetical sentence may be expressed.
These are (1) If A is B, C is D, and (2) If S is M, it is P. Judgments constructed
according to the first formula, may usually by a little manipulation be
expressed in the second form also. But it is incorrect to say that the latter is
a more fundamental type than the former.

Hypotheticals of the second form, can be expressed categorically, by

substituting in the place of 'If S is M, it is P,' the form 'All S that is M is P,' or
'All SM is P.' Similarly for the categorical 'All S is P,' we may write, ' If anything
is S. it is P.'

Some writers on Logic have maintained that the categorical and hypothetical
propositions are in fact equivalent. There can be no doubt that this opinion is
erroneous. In the categorical we state unconditionally that S is P. In the
hypothetical we state that S is P, if certain conditions are fulfilled. The
constituent parts of the categorical are related as subject and attribute: the

56
parts of a hypothetical are related as reason and consequent. Nor is it only
the mental forms that are different. The fact to be expressed positively
demands one form to the exclusion of the other. Such propositions as 'Gold
is yellow,' and 'If the King comes, a salute will be fired,' are distorted when
they are expressed as 'If anything is gold, it is yellow,' and 'The case of the
King's arrival is a case of firing a salute.' In regard to the employment of the
one form in place of the other, Professor Case has well said: "Taking the
carelessly expressed propositions of ordinary life logicians do not perceive that
similar propositions are often differently expressed, e.g. ''I being a man am
mortal,' and 'If I am a man I am mortal': and conversely that different
judgments are often similarly expressed. In ordinary life we may say 'All men
are mortal, . 'All candidates arriving five minutes late are fined.' But of these
universal propositions, the first expresses a categorical belief . . . the other is
a slipshod expression of the 'hypothetical belief, 'If any candidates arrive late,
they are 'fined.'" Encycl. Brit. (10th ed.), vol. 30, p. 333, Art. Logic.

Quantity and Quality of Hypotheticals. All hypothetical propositions are

affirmative. If we desire to meet a hypothetical with its negation, we must deny
what it affirms. That is to say we must deny the nexus between the antecedent
and consequent. This is done by the form 'Although S is M, it need not be P.'
The negative of 'If he is poor, he is uneducated,' is 'Although he is poor, he
may not be uneducated.' These negative forms, however, are not themselves
hypotheticals: for they do not assert the dependence of consequent on
antecedent.

There can be no differences of quantity in hypotheticals, because there is no

question of extension. The affirmation, as we have seen, relates solely to the
nexus between the two members of the proposition. Hence every hypothetical
is singular.

12. Disjunctive Propositions.

A Disjunctive Proposition is one which makes an alternative predication.

Disjunctives like Hypotheticals are of two forms: (1) Either A is B, or C is D;

and (2) S is either P or Q, e.g. 'Either the general was incompetent or his
subordinates were disobedient,' 'Religions are either false or true.'

It has been much disputed whether the alternatives in a disjunctive are

mutually exclusive or not in other words, whether we not only know that one
must be true, but also that if the one is true, the other is certainly false. Thus

57
supposing we are aware that 'S is either P or Q,' and are then informed that
'S is P,' can we conclude that S is not Q? We shall consider this point in a
subsequent chapter (see below, Ch. 14, §4).

The Disjunctive can be expressed by means of Hypothetical propositions. If it

be maintained that the disjunction is exclusive, we need two hypothetical
propositions to represent a disjunctive, viz., (1) If S is P, it is not Q. (2) If S is
not P, it is Q. If the mutual exclusiveness be denied, a single hypothetical will
suffice. viz., ' If S is not P, it is Q.'

Quantity and Quality of Disjunctives. By virtue of their form all disjunctives

are affirmative. The alternative is necessarily asserted. However, a difference
in quantity is possible. The proposition may be of the form 'All S are P or Q';
or it may be particular, as, 'Some S are P or Q'.

A form of proposition termed by the Scholastics Conjunctive gives us what is

practically the negative form of the Disjunctive. Its formula is 'S is not both
P and Q,' 'The King is not both at London and Windsor.'

The whole terminology of Conditionals is in confusion. We have followed that

preferred by Hamilton (Logic, I. 236) and subsequently by several other
authors. Some logicians make hypothetical the genus, and give the name
conditional to those we have called hypothetical. This division is found in
Whately and is accepted by Mill (I. 91). Perhaps the most satisfactory division
is that of Boethius. He terms the genus conditionalis or hypothetica
indifferently, and calls the species respectively conjuncta (connexa) and
disjuncta.

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