LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
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4 july 22, 2023
Rising Waters, Recurrent
Challenges
D espite the historical occurrence of
flooding in Delhi, the recent inun-
dation has shed light on the reactive ap-
proach of government bodies to managing
such events. On 13 July 2023, the water
levels in the Yamuna river surged to an
unprecedented height, surpassing 208
metres and resulting in the flooding of
low-lying areas near the banks. This sit-
uation broke a record set 45 years ago in
1978 when similar flooding occurred in
parts of Delhi. The recurrence of such
events raises concerns about the factors
contributing to the escalating water levels
in the river. Data from the Central Water
Commission (CWC) reveals that over 8 lakh
cusecs of water were discharged from
Hathnikund Barrage this year, which
reached Delhi in a shorter period com-
pared to previous years. This phenome-
non can be attributed to various factors,
including the construction of bridges,
encroachments on the river’s banks, and
siltation. The construction of bridges
and encroachments have narrowed the
cross-section through which the water
must pass, limiting its flow capacity. As
a result, the water from the barrage in
Yamunanagar, Haryana, approximately
180 kilometres from Delhi, now reaches
the capital in two to three days. This
heightened intensity of flooding, cou-
pled with the accelerated speed of the
rising waters, surpasses the experiences
of the 1978 flood event.
The experiences of the affected indi-
viduals belonging from Budaun, Bareilly,
and Patna highlight the need for better
risk perception and proactive measures.
Despite receiving multiple warnings from
authorities, including the police and in-
formation from various sources such as
news channels and social media platforms
like Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube,
people were hesitant to evacuate promptly.
Residents from low-lying areas tended
to wait until the water reached ankle
length before moving out without seeking
any external help, while those residing
in relatively higher areas evacuated
with their livestock when the water
reached mid-waist level, often relying
on boats and divers for support. Some of
them even reported to paying between
`3,000 and `5,000 to divers to seek help
in evacuating their livestock.
Years of experience and exposure to
recurrent flooding have led them to de-
velop their own coping mechanisms. One
such strategy involves tying items with a
cloth towards the ceiling of their houses.
By elevating their belongings, they aim
to protect them from being damaged or
submerged in floodwater. In addition to
safeguarding their possessions, flood-
affected individuals prioritise their per-
sonal safety and survival by leaving
behind heavier items like mattresses and
beds. These objects are often difficult to
transport during evacuation and may
hinder mobility or become waterlogged.
Instead, they opt to carry essential items
such as clothing and rations, ensuring
they have the necessary supplies for their
immediate needs. This approach reflects
their understanding of the potential risks
associated with flooding and their pro-
active efforts to mitigate those risks.
Recognising the severity of the situation,
relief efforts have been mobilised to pro-
vide support and assistance to those
affected by the floods. Shelter is a primary
concern, and two types of support have
been provided: self-support through tar-
paulin sheets and government-provided
tents. These measures aim to ensure that
individuals have a safe and dry place to
seek refuge during the flood crisis.
The provision of clean water is another
essential aspect of relief efforts. The Delhi
Jal Board has been supplying water to
affected areas twice a day; to address
sanitation needs, mobile/van toilets have
been provided, but, in some places, the
people reported practising open defeca-
tion. In terms of food distribution, dry
ration is being distributed through the
government to those staying in govern-
ment-provided tents, whereas cooked food
is being provided by charitable organi-
sations, religious institutions, etc.
While these relief efforts provide im-
mediate support and assistance, they are
not without limitations. Efforts should
be made to enhance coordination, ensure
sustainability, and prioritise long-term
recovery and resilience-building measures.
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The coping mechanisms developed by
individuals living in flood-prone areas
reflect their resilience and adaptive
capacity in the face of recurrent flood-
ing. Their strategies, such as tying items
with a cloth towards the ceiling, demon-
strate their understanding of the risks
and their proactive efforts to protect
their belongings.
In conclusion, the recurrence of these
destructive floods underscores the need
for a more proactive approach in manag-
ing and mitigating the risks associated
with flooding in Delhi. A more compre-
hensive approach is required, focusing
on long-term solutions and effective
communication strategies and commu-
nity awareness programmes to address
the root causes of the floods and reduce
vulnerability. It is imperative for policy-
makers, urban planners, and communi-
ties to adopt a proactive approach that
not only anticipates and addresses the
challenges posed by increasing flood risk
and urbanisation but also integrates
climate resilience, sustainable infrastruc-
ture development, and robust disaster
management strategies to mitigate the
risks posed by future floods.
Sidharth Verma, Aditi Madan
New Delhi
Understanding a
Preventable Tragedy
[This is an abridged version of a press release of
the Ganatantrik Adhikar Surakhya Sangathan,
Bhubaneswar.]
T he country will remember the tragic
train crash of 2 June 2023 at Bahanaga
in Balasore district of Odisha. Judging by
the number of people killed in the acci-
dent, it is one of the biggest disasters of
the Indian Railways. The railway depart-
ment’s slogan of “safety of passengers is
our sacred duty” has come under question.
Two flagship trains of the Indian Rail-
ways, Coromandel Express and Banga-
lore–Howrah Superfast Express, connect
with the three major cities of the coun-
try (Kolkata, Chennai, and Bengaluru).
However, there were neither any high-
ranking railway official nor any wealthy
person travelling in both the trains on that
fateful day. Had it been the case, it would
have been published in newspapers,
flashed time and again on the electronic
Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 22,
july 17, 2023
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media. In the last few years, passenger
trains have become exclusive carriers
meant for migrant workers, students from
lower-middle-class families, artisans, ordi-
nary patients and their relatives, pilgrims,
and daily travellers like office clerks,
petty hawkers, etc. Thus, trains are meant
for carrying these passengers just like
ordinary luggage from one city to anoth-
er, and these common passengers have
no power to influence the government.
The government also feels that the people
of the country should be grateful to them
for providing low-cost transportation
facilities and thus should not demand
the protection of their lives.
The Annual Statistical Statements
report prepared by the Railway Board
shows that in 2021–22, there were 8,747
failures of railway equipment, out of
which the number of failures of signal-
ling apparatus is 2,592. One of the rea-
sons for this is that 14,850 posts in the
signal section of the railway depart-
ment of the country are lying vacant.
Further, the English Daily, Hindu, has
reported on 9 January 2023 that accord-
ing to a minister’s reply to a starred
question in the Rajya Sabha, the Indian
Railways has 3.12 lakh non-gazetted
posts lying vacant across the country,
spread across 18 zones, as on 1 December
2022. Official data reveals the staggering
understaffing in Indian Railways, which
is putting a stress on the system and
its current employees. Nonetheless, on
8 February 2023, due to the presence of
mind of the locopilot, the Sampark Kranti
train survived an impending accident
(due to signal failure).
According to data obtained through
the internet, between 2010 and 2019,
the safest train system was in place in
countries like Finland, Canada, Sweden,
Ukraine, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico,
Russia, China, Greece, etc. They have
focused on three main systems, which
the Indian Railways is not ready to
accept. They have a system of sensors in
case a fire breaks out in the train com-
partment. However, the Indian Railways
EPW Engage
The following article has been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).
(1) Modern Challenges to the Dravidian Movement: The Question of Access and Quality of Higher Education in
Tamil Nadu — Vishal Vasanthakumar
vol lViii no 24
29
LETTERS
is negligent on this issue, showing that it
will cost `35 lakh per train in India. In those
countries, there are railway track-sensor
systems in place. If there is overloading,
this system will stop the train. This has
prevented the problem of derailment of
goods trains. However, it is speculated
that this is not being implemented in India,
thanks to the lobby of mining companies.
The Shah Commission’s report has already
pointed out that there is a lot of smug-
gling of minerals in goods trains.
Many countries of the world have
adopted the “Japanese safe system” in rail-
way interlocking. Earlier, railway engi-
neers used to monitor the working condi-
tion of machineries and equipment at every
level. Now, after the private company sup-
plies the machineries and equipment, it is
not clear who is monitoring it and who is
responsible for any failures. More and
more trains are rolling on the track day by
day, but neither are they being properly
maintained nor monitored. There are sev-
eral issues that can arise due to poor main-
tenance and monitoring, such as accidents,
delays, and breakdowns. The railway
department has handed over many tasks
from manufacturing to services that pro-
vide convenience to passengers in the
hands of private companies.
The Indian Railways’ main slogan is
“Lifeline of the Nation.” It is a symbol of
development of the country. Without
ensuring that railway systems meet the
requirements for reliability, availability,
maintainability, and safety, the Indian
Railways puts forth useless arguments to
cover up its weaknesses. Like many other
ministries and departments of the country,
the railways has become a moneymak-
ing machine for a few private companies
and corporate houses instead of catering
to the needs of the common people of
the country. To materialise the slogan
that “Indian Railways is in the service of
the people” in the real sense, it needs a
radical change, more regarding the safety
of the passengers.
Deba Ranjan, Golak Bihari Nath
Bhubaneswar
5
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6 july
june 22,
17, 2023 vol lViii no 29
24 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK
From 50 Years Ago ownership in 1969. There is no doubt about the
legal position. The ‘existing banks’ received
their compensations, though these may not have
been distributed among the shareholders. The
‘corresponding new banks’ are all governed by
Vol VIII, No 29 JuLY 21, 1973
Boards appointed by the government and head-
Commercial Banks: Four Years ed by Chairmen-Managing Directors also ap-
after Nationalisation pointed by the government after consulting the
Bhabatosh Datta Reserve Bank. Even the appointment of work-
Four years after the major commercial banks men’s representatives is made by the Govern-
were acquired by the Government of India, the ment from out of a panel of three names selected
primary question one is tempted to ask is wheth- by the workmen. In addition, two officials —
er these banks really came under government one from the Central Government and the other
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JULY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29
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from the Reserve Bank of India — are included
on each of the Boards. The government has wide
powers to give directions to the Boards. The gov-
ernment has all the rights of ownership and con-
trol. If, nevertheless, these rights have not been
exercised with a view to attaining the objectives
of nationalisation, it is necessary to find out
what have been the inhibiting factors.
Strictly speaking, the 14 banks which were
acquired in 1969 are more nationalised than
the State Bank of India which still has a small
percentage of private shareholders. The spe-
cial role of the State Bank, however, continues.
9
 JULY 22, 2023
Papering over the Cracks
The multidimensional poverty index conceals more than it reveals.
T
he second edition of the multidimensional poverty index
(MPI) titled “National Multidimensional Poverty Index:
A Progress Review 2023” indicates a significant decline
in deprivation levels. The report, authored by the NITI Aayog,
shows that the headcount poverty ratio, or the proportion of the
multidimensionally poor, has declined from 24.85% in 2015–16
to 14.96% in 2019–21. That is almost a 10 percentage point decline
over a five-year period. It estimates that 135 million people have
exited from multidimensional poverty during these years.
However, what is surprising is that despite the significant
decline in multidimensional poverty levels, the intensity of pover-
ty, or the average proportion of deprivations, has remained al-
most unchanged. The ratio only fell from 47.14% in 2015–16 to
44.39% in 2019–21, a decline of less than 3 percentage points.
This indicates that the people exiting from poverty are those
who are relatively better off among the poor and that the condi-
tions of life of the poorest largely remains unchanged.
The MPI also shows large differences in the headcount poverty
ratio across regions and states. The numbers on the levels of rural
and urban multidimensionally poor show that while the rural MPI
has come down by more than 13 percentage points to 19.28%,
the urban levels have declined by around 3 percentage points to
5.27%. This indicates that the rural–urban disparities remain
largely unchanged with the multidimensional poverty levels in
the former remaining almost four times larger than in the latter.
In contrast, the disparities in the intensity of multidimensional
poverty in the rural and urban areas seems to be converging. This
was because the decline in the intensity of poverty was marginally
higher in the rural areas where it fell by 2.83 percentage points
to 44.55%. In the urban areas, the intensity dropped by 2.17 per-
centage points to 43.1%. Thus, the disparities in the intensity of
poverty in rural and urban areas seems to be slowly dissipating.
The broad MPI numbers, which are made up of 12 indicators
on health (three), education (two) and standard of living (sev-
en), however, seem to conceal more than they reveal. This is
because despite the decline in the headcount numbers, many of
the core multidimensional poverty indicators remain at dis-
tressingly high levels. For instance, if one looks at the share of
the undernourished in the population—an indicator of the
health standards—the numbers remain substantially high despite
the increase in food production during this period.
Between 2015–16 and 2019–20, the share of the undernourished
population has only gone down by 6.1 percentage points and it
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JULY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29
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continues to be close to a disturbing high one-third of the total
population. Similarly, in the case of maternal health, another
health indicator that measures the share of women deprived of
proper antenatal care and childbirth assistance, the numbers
have gone down by only 3.4 percentage points. Consequently, the
share of pregnant women still not receiving proper maternal
healthcare also remains inordinately high at close to one-fifth.
Similarly, some of the indicators on the standard of living not
only show continuing privation but also put a big question mark
over the tall claims made by the government regarding the suc-
cess of various government flagship programmes to provide
subsidised cooking fuel, toilet facilities, and proper housing.
Though the government claims that around 10 crore domestic gas
supply connections have been given under the Pradhan Mantri
Ujjwala Yojana, the MPI numbers show that around 45% of the
households still use wood, coal, dung, and other local materials
as their primary cooking fuel.
It is also seen that the share of households with no toilets or
those depending on shared toilets still remains a sizeable one-third
of the total. This runs contrary to the government claims of the
country having achieved open-defecation-free status a couple of
years back. Similarly, the government claims that the programmes
to provide proper housing for all by constructing almost three
crore houses by March 2024 have gained traction and are on the
way to achieving great success. But the MPI indicators show that
the share of the poor with inadequate or proper housing facilities
has only declined marginally by 4.4 percentage points to 41.3%
during this period. This means that almost half of the population
still lacks decent housing. Clearly, the MPI headcount numbers not
only refute the much-touted claims of the welfare programmes but
also obscure the real levels of deprivation and distress.
The other interesting highlight of the report is the substantial
interstate variation in the MPI. The headcount poverty ratios
show that Kerala retained the top spot with the least headcount
numbers of multidimensional poor in both years: 0.7% in 2015–16
to 0.55% in 2019–21. At the other extreme was Bihar with the
highest levels of multidimensional poverty. The only consolation is
that the share of the multidimensionally poor in Bihar dipped
sharply by around 18 percentage points to 33.76% during the peri-
od. Consequently, the interstate disparities in multidimensional
poverty levels slid down marginally during these years.
Another big gain is that as many as 10 states registered a
double-digit fall in the MPI numbers during the period. It fell
7
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 EDITORIALS

between 5 percentage points and 10 percentage points in an- one-third in 15 states and between 5% and 10% in another
other eight states. However, the fall in multidimensional pov- eight states. The remaining five states where the multidimen-
erty levels was less than 5% in the remaining 10 states. Conse- sional poverty level was the least were Punjab, Sikkim, Tamil
quently, the headcount ratio ranged between one-tenth and Nadu, Goa, and Kerala.

8 JULY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK
Politics in a Desperate Need for Dialogue
I
t seems like an irony to plead for a politics with dialogue in the
current moment, especially such a dialogue that is internally
democratic. It is equally needless to mention that a politics
based on dialogue requires transparency within which debates
about certain core issues can take place and judgments having a
bearing on the common good or welfare of the people are shared
publicly. But this has become increasingly difficult, especially in
the context where defections have followed secretive roots rather
than the ones of open debate to defect from one party to another.
Politicians often show an extraordinary caution in speaking less
in private conversations, even with those who are relatively harm-
less. Everyone is turned into a potential suspect who can be a dan-
ger to one’s personal reputation, thanks to digital media, which has
created this “art of suspicion” among the brand of current politi-
cians. One could characterise this facet of contemporary politics in
a post facto manner—that dialogue is impossible, and that strong
decisions should be taken at the very moment when suffocation is
detected in the party structures. But such confidence was not evi-
dent in most of the cases. And yet, one might argue that the asso-
ciation and assimilation in some parties with resources indicate
the violence that occurred within the politicians’ self as much as it
disrupts the moral consistency within the peoples’ representatives.
Such association or assimilation of politicians, particularly from
one party to another, also speaks of the unhappy existence that
becomes unhappy for those who still have some sense of self-worth
that pricks their conscience even after their defection, for example,
from the parent party to the patronising party. It is also an act of
violence against the aspirations of the people.
Politics, which lacks the atmosphere and even culture of open
dialogue and debate, necessarily ends up promoting acts of de-
fection, which are the result of the internal limits of dialogue on
the one hand and an inability of dialogue to accommodate the
oversized interests of those who are vulnerable to defection, on
the other. Politicians become compelled both by their unwill-
ingness to dialogue or by political pressure from outside.
The future of a healthy pro-people dialogue depends on the twin
but imperative condition that the political class and the vigilance
of the people keep the former on continuous probation, so that the
former does not make its personal interests override the common
interest. Since this urgency or vigilance seems absent, the elected
representatives and those who engineered such defections feel
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encouraged to involve themselves in nefarious activities, which,
due to the absence of dialogical transparency, make their politics
slanderous, if not scandalous. Dialogue needs to take place within
a particular political framework of our own making. The democ-
racy principle in general and parliamentary democracy in particu-
lar offered us a unique opportunity to produce morally decent and
politically attentive leaders who would care for the problems of
the people, who are morally responsible to the electoral mandate
given by the people. Those who, with a humble background, surge
ahead in terms of individual mobility but subsequently lose the
moral advantage that they got in the first instance fail to build on
this advantage that democracy has offered them. They do not
seem to be morally rattled by the act of ethically unwarranted de-
fections and feel bold enough to claim that they still continue to
represent the poor and the needy from their respective constitu-
encies. Albeit, they speak from the position of the super-rich.
The defectors do work on the assumption that the communica-
tion between them and the common people is devoid of any cogni-
tive element, which helps the people to differentiate between, for
example, what is wrong and what is right. Any redemptive process of
communication involving core public issues cannot occur without
deploying one’s cognitive ability to put thought into the sequence
of sound arguments. Arguably, common people and even party
workers have the political need to furnish sound arguments that
often come to them in a short-circuited form, such as bullet points
that are promoted by digital media, Facebook, WhatsApp, messag-
es, etc. The digital platforms are driven by their urgency to post the
content from the impatient digitalised entities, rather than patient
debaters who take time in the mode of restive communication.
Of course, in some rare cases, some of the public intellectuals
do write for the common people; thus seeking departure from
the exegetical language that is understandable only to a few. But
the common people reduce values to attitudes and prejudices.
So, the intellectual who has the promise to involve the people in
a serious dialogue faces a tough challenge, which is why the de-
fectors and the communalists feel assured that they do not have
to face any challenge from the intellectuals. This is a denial of
deliberative abilities that can undoubtedly be harnessed within
a robust democratic framework.
9
 EDITORIALS
Reforming the Goods and Services Tax
Simplification of the GST structure does not necessarily mean harmonisation of rates between the union and states.
T
he goods and services tax (GST) implemented in 2017
continues to be a “work in progress” when it comes to its
basic design and structure. The 50th GST Council meet-
ing held on 11 July 2023 realigned the rates of certain products
from a higher rate category to a lower rate category, exempted
certain essential imported drugs from GST, and also applied a
28% tax rate on the full value of online gaming, casinos, and
horse-trading. It is true that GST, when introduced in 2017, had a
high element of selectivity in taxation. The rate differentiations
were more actuate then compared to what it is today. However,
to derive the full benefit of GST, it is important to minimise se-
lectivity in taxation. It is also important to preserve the fiscal
autonomy of the states. The GST should try to achieve the right
balance between tax harmonisation and fiscal autonomy.
In a GST regime, selectivity introduces subjectivity and per-
ception in determining tax policy and is contrary to the basic
principle of GST. This makes the GST system non-neutral to eco-
nomic activity and is highly distortionary. The basic principle of
modern-day taxation is to adopt a “broad-based and low-rate
approach” to taxation. Though the current GST regime is an im-
provement on the earlier tax regime, it is still far from an ideal
GST structure. It is based on rate harmonisation across levels of
governments but highly differentiated across commodities and
services. What is required is just the reverse.
In India, we have observed significant convergence in commodity-
specific tax rates during the last six years. This convergence in
rate accompanied by procedural simplification seems to have
helped in revenue generation. Central GST increased by 22.45%
between 2021–22 (accounts) and 2022–23 (revised estimates).
The monthly GST collection growth rate during the first quarter
of the current fiscal year has also been impressive. Though the
monthly date reflects the gross GST collection, the increase in
the volume of tax indicates an enhancement in the revenue
buoyancy of the tax. Given that the tax is buoyant, and expect-
ed to remain so in the medium term, it is also time to introduce
structural reforms in GST to make it more broad-based, less dis-
tortionary, and to ensure fiscal autonomy of the states.
What are the key areas of reform that could be considered for a
better GST? A comprehensive rate restructuring would be important
to improve the design. This rate restructuring should have three ele-
ments: (i) a reduction in the number of rates, (ii) a reduction of the
standard rate of taxation from its current level of 18% to a level
that reduces overall tax incidence and promotes business and trade,
and (iii) a comprehensive review of the rate structure and the
schedule of rates to move a large number of commodities from
8 JULY 22, 2023
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the lowest rate category to the higher rate category. All these,
particularly the third exercise, will significantly improve the base
and create space for the reduction of the standard rate.
Given the experience of GST during the last six years, it can be
said that the flexibility in GST design to accommodate differential
needs of revenues of the union and states requires active consid-
eration of all the stakeholders. The available evidence would show
that the revenue base conceded by the states to the GST pool is
much higher than that by the union government. However, the
GST rate structure, as adopted, has equally shared this base, and this
has resulted in further accentuation of the vertical fiscal imbal-
ance between the union and states. In many GST regimes, dif-
ferential tax rates between the federal and provincial govern-
ment is not uncommon. For example, in Canada, the federal GST
rate is 5%, while the provincial GST rate varies across provinces.
In other words, simplification of the GST structure does not nec-
essarily mean harmonisation of rates. It is more about harmonisa-
tion of processes. Though 28 states with 28 different rates in the
Indian context may not be possible and has the potential to com-
plicate the tax system, a higher rate for state GST would certainly
enhance state autonomy and reduce the increase in the vertical
fiscal imbalance induced by the introduction of GST. This change in
the rate structure will not complicate the tax system. In a complex
federal system, the idea of simplicity should not be pushed too
hard that it compromises fiscal autonomy and creates a func-
tional deficit not backed by the own-revenue power of states.
Going forward, the petroleum sector, if brought under GST, will
eliminate its cascading effect and improve economic efficiency. In
the non-GST pool of revenues, the share of petroleum revenue is
significant. But bringing it under GST will also eliminate the inde-
pendent power to tax this sector and will result in a disproportion-
ate loss of fiscal autonomy to the states. The critical issue is to have
a comprehensive understanding of the cost of the loss of fiscal au-
tonomy and the benefits of economic efficiency gained by bringing
petroleum under GST. Any reform of the petroleum sector should
also be based on the principle of preserving fiscal autonomy and
revenue needs and the energy policy of the government.
Finally, the GST process in a federal system is complex, and it
is not easy to accommodate all the different priorities, including
a number of redistributive considerations, through the indirect
tax system. Though the purest form of GST is difficult to achieve,
there is a need to work towards the objective of having a GST that
strikes a fine balance between fiscal harmonisation and auto-
nomy. In the name of simplicity, GST should not make revenue
collection only an agency function of state governments.
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 LAW & SOCIETY
Amid a Legal Conundrum
The Fate of Platform Workers in India
Areesha Khan, Rahul Suresh Sapkal
Platform economy promotes
flexibility and assures autonomy to
the workers. With a rapid increase
in digitally mediated platforms to
govern the world of work, we
often overlook the legal existence
of workers’ employment status.
Around the world, the highest
courts are making concerted
efforts to re-evaluate the core
aspects of the criteria traditionally
used to distinguish between
employees and the self-employed.
However, the judicially
interpreted test for employee
status determination often
provides mixed results. This
article, while providing an
overview, advocates for using
organisational integration tests
instead of supervision and control
tests to determine the legal
employment status of
platform workers.
The authors would like to express sincere
thanks to the anonymous reviewer for the
constructive comments, which greatly
improved the earlier version of this column.
Areesha Khan (areesha.khan@monash.edu) is
pursuing PhD from IITB-Monash Academy and
Ashank Desai Centre for Policy Studies, Indian
Institute of Technology Bombay. Rahul Suresh
Sapkal (rahuls@iitb.ac.in) teaches at the Ashank
Desai Centre for Policy Studies, IIT Bombay.
10
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O
ver the last decade, the intensity
of online platforms using digital
technologies, including algori-
thms, to match labour demand and supply
has rapidly gained ground worldwide.
Given their disruptive nature, rapid
growth, high visibility and concentration
in labour-intensive sectors that are tradi-
tionally strictly regulated, digital labour
platforms quickly came on the radar of
the policy and stakeholder communities
as they sparked lively debates on issues
such as (unfair) competition, taxation, and
inducing precarity and perilous working
conditions of platform workers (Lenaerts
et al 2017). According to the ILO (2021),
the number of digital labour platforms
worldwide has increased fivefold during
the last decade. In the Group of Twenty
(G20) countries, the number of platforms
grew from 128 to 611 in the past decade.
This represents 79% of the platforms
operating worldwide in 2021. Within the
G20 countries, platforms are largely
concentrated in the United States (37%),
followed by the European Union (22%),
India (10%), and the United Kingdom
(uk) (6%). Among these countries, India
deserves special attention. Coupled with
its demographic dividend, rapid urbanisa-
tion, widespread adoption of smartphones,
and associated technology have enabled
India to emerge as the new frontier of
platform revolution by promoting inde-
cent jobs and intensifying occupational
health hazards. According to NITI Aayog
(2022), approximately 6.8 million plat-
form workers in 2019–20 engaged in
web- and location-based platforms, con-
stituting 1.3% of the total workforce in
India. It is further projected that the size of
this workforce will grow by 4.1% of the
total Indian workforce by 2029–30.
So, on the one hand, the higher
employment elasticity for these workers
indicates the nature of economic growth
july 22, 2023
and employment potentials, which created
greater demand for low- and medium-
skill gig and platform workers in India.
On the other hand, such employment
growth is replete with the challenges of
nature and quality of these jobs, as this
growth has brought in the structural
changes that further strive away from
standard employment relationships as
well as legal protections and expect
these modern workers to function as
“independent and atomised workers”
(Stanford 2017). So, the natural questions
arise: What is the legal employment
status of this ever-growing workforce in
India? Are they independent contractors
or employees of the platform?
Platform Workers Autonomy:
Blessing or Curse?
The official website of the Uber (nd)
company asks drivers to join Uber as
partners and earn as per their own
convenience (Drive with Uber—Be Your
Own Boss). It is claimed that the platform
economy promotes flexibility and assures
autonomy to the workers (Cramer and
Krueger 2016). More autonomy is associ-
ated with more satisfaction with working
conditions. We should bear in mind that
this economy is heterogeneous in various
sectors so also in the nature of work and
the workers engaged in it. The autonomy
of the worker varies across platforms with
their skill and mobility. Nonetheless,
platform work can be broadly categorised
into “crowd work” or web-based work
and “app-based work ” or location-based
work in the form of local service-ori-
ented tasks such as driving, delivery, or
cleaning houses. The latter is the focus
of our analysis.
At present, about 47% of the gig work
is in medium-skilled jobs, about 22% in
high skilled, and about 31% in low-skilled
jobs working in transport, retail, and
domestic industries (NITI Aayog 2022). It
is, however, expected that this trend
will reduce the concentration of workers
in medium-skill occupations and will
shift to low-skill and high-skill occupa-
tions in the next decade. Location-based
platform workers are more visible run-
ning on the roads round the clock. It is
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

characterised as relatively low-skilled
work in India. In the case of on-location
platform work, the worker appears to
have agency to decide over their time,
place, work intensity, and engagement
with the customer. However, workers’
subordinated agency is embedded within
the platform’s reputation, rating, and
task allocation mechanism (Graham et al
2018; Rosenblat and Stark 2016). Hence,
the categorisation of workers as self-
employed has come to be termed as “fake”
or “bogus” self-employment (Behling and
Harvey 2015; Wright et al 2019).
In the legal context, employment con-
tract becomes a “platform” that decides
the workers’ status and establishes the
entitlements and benefits extended to
them (Langille 2002). Along with the
contract, the legal construction of what
constitutes an employee or a contract
worker and what benefits extend to
whom are decided by the law. In the gig
economy as well, the contract becomes
the instrument of an engagement in work,
which is scrutinised by the courts to
decide whether the worker is an employee
or an independent contractor. The real
nature of the relationship can go hidden
and unnoticed, and there it becomes
necessary to understand whether the
relationship that is represented by their
contract does or does not align with how
both the parties—the worker and the
platform (company)—work.
In the famous cases of Uber in California
and the UK and Deliveroo in Australia,
courts went beyond the service contract
to look at the nature of the work in
which the workers were engaged. In the
former case, Uber and Others v Aslam
and Others (2021), Uber drivers were
held to be “dependent contractors” of the
company by the Supreme Court of the
UK using an intergration test of employ-
ment. In the latter, Klooger v Foodora
Australia Pty Ltd (2018), a terminated
food delivery worker was held to be an
employee of Foodora by the Fairwork
Commission of Australia through apply-
ing the degree of work control and
supervision test based on the principle
of employment common law. However,
in Europe, a combination of elements of
direction and control and indicators of
organisational integration has been used
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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LAW & SOCIETY
to determine the employee–employer under the Factories Act, 1948; Industrial
relationship (Hießl 2022). In the common Disputes Act, 1947; Minimum Wages
employment law principles, employment Act, 1948; and Industrial Employment
status is largely determined by the degree (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Thus, the
of autonomy and control that employers formal sector, in which the employer–
have on workers’ efforts. Now, countries employee relationship is clearly defined,
like Sweden, the Netherlands, France, is governed by these labour laws that
and Italy have been using organisational cover not only the employment protec-
integration as a precondition for apply- tive provisions and legal definitions but
ing a presumption of employment with also expand it to cover to occupational
regard to contract tenure, working hours, safety, provident fund, gratuity, pen-
and work performance due to intermit- sion, and other social security schemes.
tent character of work performed in the On the contrary, as many industrial/
platform economy. In India too, in production units are home-based or
Dhrangadhara Chemical Works Ltd v the small that fall outside the purview of
State of Saurashtra (1957), the Supreme industrial relation laws, which define
Court has devised the twin tests of the legal status of establishment or nature
“supervision and control.” Under this of work/type of employment, it leaves out
doctrine, a relationship of employer– millions of workers as informal workers
employee will be established where the without any recourse to employment
employer not only will exercise control protection or social security laws. In this
and direct what work has to be done but case, these informal workers are left at
will also control the manner in which it the hands of the state for regulation on
has to be done. However, this was in the minimum wage or different social secu-
case of the contractual employment. rity as prescribed under the Unorganised
Given the pretext of high informality Workers’ Social Security (UWSS) Act, 2008,
of the workforce in India, it is difficult to provided they fulfil the eligibility criteria
see the platform workers through the lens under the said act. Recently, the Indian
of the standard employment relations. Federation of App-based Transport Work-
There are parallel laws for formal and ers (WP [C] 1068/2021) has filed a writ
informal sectors. There is a clear defini- petition in the Supreme Court and has
tion of what constitute formal employment prayed to recognise the gig and platform
Review of Urban Affairs
January 29, 2022
Pandemic and the City —Karen Coelho, Vinay Gidwani,
Anant Maringanti, Partha Mukhopadhyay
Recovery as Resilience: Domestic Work and Workers —Kinjal Sampat, Antara Rai Chowdhury,
in the Aftermath of COVID-19 Gautam Bhan
Pandemic Precarity: Life, Livelihood, and Death in
the Time of the Pandemic —Aseem Prakash, Hem Borker
Intensifying Urbanities in Karachi: A South Asian City —Adam Abdullah, Soha Macktoom,
in the Time of COVID-19 Nausheen H Anwar, Noman Ahmed
COVID-19 and the State of Exception: Urban Mobility under the Epidemic State —Gaurav Mittal
How Places Matter: Understanding Workers’ Responses to Garment Factory
Closures during the Pandemic in Bengaluru and Srirangapatna —Swathi Shivanand, R Prathibha
COVID-19 and the Women at Work: —Vanshika Singh, Syeda Asia, Shivangi Gupta,
An Ethnographic Account of Sanjay Colony, Bhatti Mines Lakshay Talwar, Aashna Gutgutia, Pushpa
Closure of Schools and Migration of Adolescent Tribal Girls:
A Case Study of Surat —Shilajit Sengupta
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email: circulation@epw.in
vol lViii no 29 11
 LAW & SOCIETY

workers under the “unorganised workers”
so that at least the unorganised sector
social security schemes are extended to
them. Through this petition, the platform
workers could be covered under the UWSS
Act by making the state responsible to
provide social security to them.
Through looking into the evolution of
labour jurisprudence in India, it was
noted that the Supreme Court, in many
instances, is reluctant to apply the clause
of automatic absorption of contract worker
in the absence of any explicit notification
under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) (CLRA) Act,
1970 and has prohibited employment of
contract labour (SAIL v National Union
Waterfront Workers [2001] 7 SCC 1). In
such a situation, when it becomes diffi-
cult to establish the employer–employee
relationship and to hold the principal
employer accountable, a newly risen
worker-driven collective, Indian Federa-
tion of App-based Transport Workers, has
filed a writ petition seeking to include
platform workers, under the Unorganised
Workers Social Security Act, 2008, and
is an alternative strategy to reclaim the
status of workers in the highly unregu-
lated platform economy. Second, due to
growing employment concerns of platform
workers and lack of legal entitlements,
the declaration of Rajasthan government
to form a welfare board for this segment
of workers is a first step towards recog-
nising them as workers. In this initiative,
the state government has come forward
to take the responsibility to provide the
safety net to the workers against the
flexible and uncertain market conditions.
Nonetheless, these attempts of the state
are devoid of making the employer equally
responsible for providing decent work-
ing conditions and legal entitlements to
its workers, are largely the outcome of the
codification in the form of the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020, and has given
more centralised power to the union
than state governments.
Thus, Indian labour laws also need to
go beyond the binaries of supervision
and control approach to define the employ-
ment status for platform workers, as
they are largely driven by third-party
contractors. Moreover, there is a need to
re-conceptualise how the nature of work
is integrated within the organisation’s
business-to-customer relationships using
the organisational integration test as an
alternative to grant the employment status.
Platforms: A Modern Driver of
Economic Growth
In India, globalisation and fragmentation
of supply chains coupled with techno-
logy has led to an ever-growing platform
economy that is leveraging on the large
pool of unorganised workers in an infor-
mal urban sphere of labour (Dhar 2022).
This makes it important for us to trace
and understand what are “precarious work
conditions” and how is platform work pre-
carious. Precarious work can be attributed
to changing employment relations and
conditions held or aspired for (Hewison
and Kalleberg 2013). In the case of the
developing countries in Asia, precarious
work has been the norm where being
locked into precarious work and fewer
better opportunities for work are also
seen as a loss (Hewison and Kalleberg
2013). The use of technology and capital
with the motive of reduction in costs by
reducing wage cost and other social
benefits to the workers had resulted in
lean business models on which the on-
location service platforms are based.
The union government sees huge
potential in the booming gig and plat-
form economy for employment genera-
tion as is evident from the NITI Aayog
report (2022). It makes the economic
agenda clear regarding why is platform
economy ideal for both the economy and
businesses, and hence, all the government
has to do is to make grounds for the gig
and platform economy to flourish as it is
creating employment opportunities. The
question then arises over the policy

BUDGET 2023–24
March 25, 2023
An Introduction and Overview —Pinaki Chakraborty
Independent Fiscal Councils: Lapdogs or Watchdogs? —Y V Reddy, Pinaki Chakraborty
Electoral Cycle and the Union Budget 2023–24: Some Departures from the Past? —Ashok K Lahiri
Concerns about Balancing Growth and Stability —M Govinda Rao
Union Budget 2023–24: The Long View —Ashima Goyal
Massive Capital Expenditure, Modest Fiscal Consolidation, and Cut in Pillars of Social Safety Net —Sudipto Mundle, Ajaya Sahu
Balancing Growth with Fiscal Consolidation —D K Srivastava
The Union Budget 2023–24 and the Financial Sector: The Devil May Lie in the Details —Partha Ray
Agriculture and Rural Areas in Budget 2023–24: A Need for Comprehensive Approach for Transformation —S Mahendra Dev

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priorities for quantity over quality of jobs.
Voluminous studies assessing the effects
of perceived job quality on worker per-
formance, productivity, and organisa-
tional behaviour have largely been
carried out both in the global North and
South; however, due to lack of legal
clarity on the nature of the platform as
the employer and then the workers as
the employees and legal uncertainty in
the global South, it becomes a convo-
luted task to measure the performance
of platform economy.
The NITI Aayog report (2022) acknow-
ledges the occupational safety and health
risks, including those of road safety, theft
and physical assault, income and job
insecurity, and limited bargaining power
due to isolated work arrangements; how-
ever, these challenges are not addressed
in their report. Income insecurity also
has been considered to be the main
bottleneck in the report that has failed
to provide any further direction either
through the Code on Social Security, 2020
or through any productivity link schemes
of the Government of India. It is further
noted that the claims of platform econ-
omy formalising the informal workforce
(Sehrawat et al 2021; Surie 2017), taking
the specific case of transport sector, were
also criticised. Not until the Motor Vehicle
Aggregator Act and Guidelines came out
in 2019 were the operations of platforms
like Ola and Uber legalised under the
Road Transport Authority (Sharma 2018).
The operations of a motorbike ride-hailing
platform called Rapido were closed in
Maharashtra in 2023 since the motorbikes
are not covered or extended as commer-
cial vehicles under the Motor Vehicle
Aggregators Act, thereby making its oper-
ation illegal, thus affecting the livelihood
of 2,00,000 workers that Rapido calls
“bike captains” (Economic Times 2023).
Notwithstanding that Rapido continues
to operate in other states in the country.
In the present legal framework, plat-
form and gig work are separately defined
under the Code on Social Security, 2020
from the unorganised sector workers.
If we closely look at the legal definition
of wage worker under the UWSS Act,
2008 and now the Social Security Code,
there is coincidence in the nature of
on-location platform work and the
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definition of wage worker. Similarly, it
coincides with the definition of contrac-
tual labour under the CLRA Act, 1970.
The Indian labour courts echo this confu-
sion, as the definitional consistency across
different sections of laws that applied to
different types of workers could over-
look the sector/industry-specific hetero-
geneity among different classes of work-
ers. There are complaints registered by
the on-location platform workers but
the labour courts are not sure on how
to deal with these complaints in the
absence of a clear employment relation
and a legal definition.
This legal picture, in a nutshell, is
called a legal vacuum that is created by
the interruption of the new business model
of the platform economy. First, instead
of a legal vacuum, we term it as a legal
uncertainty, which is carefully created
by the platforms and the Indian legal
infrastructure. This uncertainty is created
on account of the platform’s confidence
to venture into illegal operations and
camouflaging contracts. We find legal
definition of platform work, though sep-
arated in the Social Security Code, but is
similar in nature with other categories
of work that are defined concretely in the
Indian labour laws. Second, under the
Factories Act, 1948 and Industrial Dis-
putes Act, 1947—the core of statutory
labour laws—application of varied nature
of control–supervision tests and integra-
tion tests also instil great legal complex-
ity to determine their legal employment
status in the present context. This makes
already precarious work more precari-
ous by exposing workers to health and
safety hazards sans legal protection. Thus,
there is a need to apply a two-pronged
approach to address the decent work
deficit crisis of platform workers in India.
First, the court should treat the platform/
gig economy as a singular entity with a
feature of two-sided markets—an inter-
mediary economic platform having two
distinct user groups that provide each
other with network benefits. And third,
due to a lower coverage of social safety
nets for informal and platform workers,
the court must attempt to harmonise
the employment determination tests for
all segments of workers to ensure not
only access to the employment rights but
vol lViii no 29
LAW & SOCIETY
also protect their fundamental rights as
enshrined in the Constitution.
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Behling, F and M Harvey (2015): “The Evolution of
False Self-employment in the British Construc-
tion Industry: A Neo-Polanyian Account of
Labour Market Formation,” Work, Employment
and Society, Vol 29, No 6, pp 969–88.
Cramer, J and A B Krueger (2016): “Disruptive
Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber,”
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pp 177–82.
Dhar, D (2022): “Organising the Unorganised,”
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 16 August, https://
www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/46886/organiz-
ing-the-unorganized-1.
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Ban on Bike Aggregators, May Challenge It,”
21 January, https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/tech/startups/rapido-flays-maharashtra-
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Graham, M, V Lehdonvirta, A Wood, H Barnard
and I Hjorth (2018): “Could Online Gig Work
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doi.org/10.6092/issn.1561-8048/15210.
ILO (2021): “Digital Platforms and the World of
Work in G20 Countries: Status and Policy
Action,” International Labour Organization.
Langille, B A (2002): “Labour Policy in Canada:
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Lenaerts, K, M Beblavý and Z Kilhoffer (2017):
“Government Responses to the Platform Econ-
omy: Where Do We Stand?”
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form Economy.”
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Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case
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Sehrawat, U, N Sawhney, T Yeleswarapu and
N Rangaswamy (2021): “The Everyday HCI of
Uber Drivers in India: A Developing Country
Perspective,” Proceedings of the ACM on
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Employment Protections,” Employee Relations:
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pp 313–30.
13

In Search of a More Innovative
Innovation Index for India
K J Joseph, Kiran Kumar Kakarlapudi
The construction of the India
Innovation Index, following the
Global Innovation Index, by the
NITI Aayog and the Institute
for Competitiveness, is a timely
initiative that gained significant
traction in academic and policy
circles. However, it is shown that
III could be made more robust
by strengthening its analytical
foundations by characterising
India’s innovation system from a
southern perspective and locating
more appropriate indicators that
capture the process of innovation
at the national and subnational
levels in India.
K J Joseph (director@gift.res.in) and Kiran
Kumar Kakarlapudi (kiran@gift.res.in) are
with the Gulati Institute of Finance and
Taxation, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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I
ndices are, indeed, interesting inno-
vations in representing complicated
economic and social processes. While
they provide new avenues of enquiry for
the analysts, it enables the policymakers
to easily capture complex situations. No
wonder we live in a world of indices at
the global, national, and subnational
levels. The more popular indices include,
but are not limited to, the human devel-
opment index (HDI), entrepreneurship
index, ease of doing business index, gov-
ernance index, and hunger index.
Ever since Joseph Schumpeter discov-
ered the bearing of innovation in the devel-
opment of capitalist economies, numerous
scholars have highlighted the role of sci-
ence, technology, and innovation (STI) in
shaping economic growth and develop-
ment outcomes. Over the decades, concep-
tualising and measuring innovation has
undergone substantial changes from inno-
vation being narrowly understood as re-
search and development (R&D) investment
and patents to a broader approach in-
corporating non-R&D measures (Smith
2005; OECD 2005, 2010). Especially nota-
ble is the contribution by scholars using the
innovation system approach that concep-
tualised innovation as an outcome of an
interactive learning process among differ-
ent actors at the global, national, subna-
tional, and sectoral levels (Lundvall 1992;
Nelson 1993; Edquist 1997). Regardless of
the approach used in understanding inno-
vation, the relevance of appropriate indica-
tors of innovation performance cannot be
overemphasised in devising innovation
policies. Drawing insights from different
perspectives in innovation studies, the
Global Innovation Index (GII) places differ-
ent countries across the world with respect
to their performance in innovation.
India in the GII
The GII is perhaps the latest contribution
in the tradition of innovation indicators,
brought out by the world’s business
vol lViii no 29
COMMENTARY
school, INSEAD, in collaboration with
India’s leading industry and business as-
sociation, the Confederation of Indian
Industry (CII). Initiated in 2007 and cov-
ering 107 countries, this is a composite
measure of innovation by considering
various dimensions of the innovation
process and is published annually. The
latest publication of the GII in 2022 is the
15th edition, covering about 132 countries.
The GII comprises an input sub-index
and an output sub-index. The input sub-
index is based on five pillars: institutions
that capture political, regulatory, and
business climate. The second pillar is
human capital and research, which cap-
tures the general education level, higher
education, and R&D expenditure. The
infrastructure pillar captures informa-
tion and communications technology
infrastructure, general infrastructure,
and ecological sustainability. Market so-
phistication, the fourth pillar of the in-
put sub-index, measures credit, invest-
ment, and trade. The fifth pillar is busi-
ness sophistication which measures know-
ledge workers, innovation linkages and
knowledge absorption. The innovation
output sub-index entails two pillars.
One is knowledge and technology out-
puts, and the other is creative outputs.
The first pillar measures three compo-
nents; knowledge creation, knowledge
diffusion and knowledge impact. The
second pillar measures intangible as-
sets, creative goods and services and on-
line creativity. The index presents the
country’s rank with respect to each pil-
lar, enabling the country concerned to
locate its positioning in the global inno-
vation landscape.
From the GII, it is evident that there
are two phases with respect to the trend
in India’s rank. During the first phase
(2007–15), India’s rank declined from 41
to 81, whereas in the second phase (2015
to 2022), the rank improved consistently
to reach the 40th position in 2022. Since
the number of countries included inc-
reased during the first phase, compared
to the second phase, which remained
almost constant, the observed decline
must be viewed cautiously. Nonetheless,
India’s significant improvement in GII
rank during the second phase could be
perceived as a return to the strategy of
25
 COMMENTARY

the Government of India to achieve Figure Innovation

Figure 1: India’s Rank in the Global 1: India's Rank in Global Innovation Index
Index
innovation-driven growth as manifested 90
141 142 143 141
160
80 130 132 131 132 132
in the STI policy 2013, along with declar- 81 128 127 126 129 140
70 76
ing the previous decade as the decade 107 62 64 66 120
60 66
of innovation. The second phase also 56 60 100
50 57
52 48 80
witnessed a vigorous innovation-driven 40 41
46 40
60
growth agenda manifested in policy ini- 30
20 40
tiatives such as “Make in India” that in-
10 20
tend to make India the most attractive 0 0
global destination for foreign direct in-

2008–09

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022
2008-09

2009-10
2009–10
vestment (FDI) and develop India into a
“global manufacturing hub” by facilitat- Number of countries India’s
India'srank
RankinGlobal
the Global Innovation
Innovation Index
Index
ing investment and integration with the Source: Authors compilation from Global Innovation Index reports, various years.

global innovation network. Another no- pillars—human capital, investment, total number of indicators included in
table initiative has been the Atal Innova- knowledge employment, business envi- constructing the latest version of the III
tion Mission (AIM), the flagship project ronment, and safety and legal environ- for 2021 is only 66 compared to 80 in the
of NITI Aayog, to promote innovation and ment—indicate innovation inputs at the case of GII. As is evident from Table 1,
entrepreneurship in the country. The lat- subnational (states and union territo- while the total number of input indica-
est effort in this regard is Atmanirbhar ries) economies. Two performance pil- tors of III is almost at par with GII, the
Bharat. This aims to further strengthen lars include knowledge output and know- output indicators are significantly lower;
our national, regional, and sectoral in- ledge diffusion. These two pillars are 16 as compared to 27 in GII. All the indi-
novation system to hasten the transfor- akin to the input sub-index and output cators are normalised, and the aggre-
mation of India into an innovation-driven sub-index of the GII. Over the past three gate index is estimated using the princi-
economic superpower. Other policy initia- years, considerable progress has been made pal component analysis (PCA). The III
tives like the “Digital India programme” in identifying the appropriate indicators covers all 28 states and eight union ter-
and “Skill India programme” are also towards building the two pillars. Yet, the ritories, subdivided into districts, cities,
aimed at facilitating the strategy of in- Table 1: Number of Indicators Included in India and towns.
novation-driven growth. Innovation Index and Global Innovation Index
Dimension 2019 2020 2021 State-level
India Innovation Index India Innovation Index Innovation Performance
Enablers 23 25 50
Although the GII places different coun- Performance 10 11 16
The index shows that among the major
tries with respect to their innovation Total 33 36 66 Indian states, Karnataka tops in innova-
performance based on certain globally Global Innovation Index tion performance, followed by Telanga-
applicable indicators, when it comes to a Input sub-index 54 53 53 na, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Tamil
developing country like India, which is Output sub-index 27 27 27 Nadu. Chhattisgarh scored the lowest
known to be diversified with its own Total 81 80 80 rank, followed by Odisha, Bihar, Guja-
Source: NITI Aayog (2022) and Dutta et al (2022).
development dynamics, the index for rat, and Madhya Pradesh (MP) (Table 2).
India at the subnational level assumes Table 2: Innovation Performance of Major States
much importance. To the extent that the in 2021
States III 2021 Enablers Rank Performers Rank
performance at the national level is con- EPW Index
Karnataka 18.01 1 22 2 14.02 2
tingent on the subnational level, the India Telangana 17.66 2 20.08 4 15.24 1
Innovation Index (III) highlights the inn- An author-title index for EPW has been
Haryana 16.35 3 22.68 1 10.02 8
ovation readiness of Indian states and prepared for the years from 1968 to
Maharashtra 16.06 4 19.97 5 12.16 4
union territories. Such an exercise could Tamil Nadu 15.69 5 18.93 6 12.45 3 2012. The PDFs of the Index have been
help the central and state governments Punjab 15.35 6 20.41 3 10.3 7 uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW website.
influence the innovation process at the Uttar Pradesh 14.22 7 16.54 11 11.9 5 Visitors can download the Index for all the
national, subnational, and sectoral lev- Kerala 13.67 8 18.17 9 9.17 11 years from the site. (The Index for a few
els. In this context, the construction of Andhra Pradesh 13.32 9 18.66 8 7.99 14 years is yet to be prepared and will be
Jharkhand 13.1 10 16.38 12 9.81 9
the III at the instance of NITI Aayog and uploaded when ready.)
West Bengal 12.98 11 15.37 15 10.6 6
the Institute for Competitiveness deser-
Rajasthan 12.88 12 18.68 7 7.09 16 EPW would like to acknowledge the help
ves much appreciation. Started in 2019,
Madhya Pradesh 12.74 13 16.2 13 9.29 10 of the staff of the library of the Indira
the third edition is for 2021. Gujarat 12.41 14 16.05 14 8.78 13
Following the conceptual and metho- Gandhi Institute for Development Research,
Bihar 11.58 15 14.21 17 8.95 12
dological approach of GII, the III measures Mumbai, in preparing the index under a
Odisha 11.42 16 15.19 16 7.64 15
innovation inputs through “enablers” Chhattisgarh 10.97 17 17.72 10 4.22 17
project supported by the RD Tata Trust.
and output as “performers.” Five enabler Source: Compiled from NITI Aayog (2022).

26 juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 COMMENTARY
Figure 2: Global Innovation Index the system. On the contrary, the rela-
Panel A: Innovation Input Sub-index and Output Sub-index tively low value of innovation input indi-
150

cators coincides with higher innovation

Input sub-index rank

outcomes, which could be viewed as

100

high innovation efficiency. In both cases,

the bearing of the observed outcome on
50

account of the poor representation of in-

0

dicators used in constructing the index

0 50 100 150
Output sub-index rank cannot be ruled out. These premises pro-
Panel B: Global Innovation Index and Human Development Index
vide one of the methods to check the
Human Development Index rank

robustness of the index in representing

1 1.2

the innovation process at work in the

country concerned.
Literature on innovation and develop-
.8

ment firmly upholds the direct bearing

.4 .6

of innovation on development outcomes

0 20 40 60 80
(Lundvall et al 2011). Hence, one could
Global Innovation Index rank expect a strong positive correlation bet-
Source: Complied by authors from Dutta et al (2022) and UNDP (2022).
ween the innovation index and the pop-
Figure 3: Correlation between Ranks of Enablers and Performers ularly used index of developmental out-
Panel A: India Innovation Index 2019 comes like the HDI. This could be yet an-
other method to check the robustness of
20

JH the index.
BR
15

UP
CH
MP
Enablers

RJ
WB
Robustness of GII
10

OD
TS
AP
PB
GJ Let us begin with the robustness check
TN
5

KL
KA
HR
MH for the GII. We have estimated the rank
0

correlation coefficient between the inn-

0 5 10 15 20
Performers ovation input sub-index and innovation
Panel B: India Innovation Index 2021
output sub-index of GII. We have also
estimated the rank correlation between
20

BR the global innovation and human devel-

OD
WB
15

MP
GJ opment indexes at the country level.
JH
Enablers

UP Similar estimates of rank correlation

CH
10

KL
AP
TN
RJ have been made using the India innova-
MH
5

TS tion index at the state level.

PB
KA
HR
The estimated rank correlation coef-
0

0 5 10 15 20 ficient between the innovation input

Source: NITI Aayog (2022).
Although the index is generally high
among the states with higher per capita
income and vice versa, there are two no-
table exceptions. Despite having a per
capita income much higher than West
Bengal and MP, Gujarat ranks only 14 out
of 17 major states. Similarly, Uttar Pradesh
(UP) ranks seven, although its per capita
income is among the bottom five states.
Overall, there is reason to believe that
while the construction of the innovation
index for India is an attempt in the right
direction, a careful look at the estimated
values of the index presented across
states tend to highlight certain apparent
inconsistencies.
Economic & Political Weekly
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Performers
Robustness of Innovation Indices
As indicated, GII draws its analytical
foundations from the innovation system
perspective. Analytically, it is perceived
that innovation inputs have a crucial
bearing on innovation outputs. Hence,
one could postulate different scenarios
based on the relative performance of
innovation inputs and outputs. To begin
with, both indicators could move in sync
with each other, which manifests the
theoretically articulated positive rela-
tion between them. However, it is possi-
ble that a relatively high value of innova-
tion inputs could result in low innova-
tive outcomes, indicating inefficiency in
EPW juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29
sub-index and innovation output sub-
index of GII for 2021 is 0.89, which is
statically significant at 1% level. This
estimate corroborates the perceived re-
lationship bet ween innovation inputs
and outputs, as Panel A in Figure 2
shows. With a view to ascertaining the
relationship between innovation and
development, we have plotted the scores
of GII and HDI (Figure 2). It is evident
that they move in tandem with each
other at the global level. This is further
reinforced by the estimated value of
rank correlation coefficient 0.90, which
is found to be positive and statistically
significant. With respect to GII, the
higher innovation input leads to higher
innovation output and higher innovation
27
 COMMENTARY

Figure 4: India Innovation Index and HDI to enablers. On the contrary, in uP, West
Bengal, and Bihar, the performance
.8

KL score is five points higher than the ena-

blers. Analytically, these states could be
.75

seen as cases of extreme innovation effi-

Human Development Index rank

PB ciency. Yet, considering their position

TN HR
among the Indian states with respect to
.7

MH
K
KA development, one is inclined to raise
GJ TS
concerns about the relevance of the indi-
AP
.65

WB cators used.
RJ
CH
The analysis of the relationship be-
OD MP
JH tween the III and HDI reveals a positive
.6

UP

BR association (Figure 4). The rank correla-

tion coefficient is 0.5, with a statistical
.55

10 12 14 16 18 significance of 5%, which suggests weak

India Innovation Index links between innovation and develop-
Source: NITI Aayog (2022).
ment. This finding contrasts with the
work towards a higher level of develop- coefficient innovation inputs and out- estimated rank correlation coefficient
ment, as indicated by HDI. puts are as high as 0.89 and statistically between the GII and HDI, which is 0.9,
significant at a 1% level. This clearly in- with a statistical significance of 1%. The
Robustness of III dicates the scope for improving the in- weak relationship observed in the Indian
Following the same approach, we checked dex by carefully selecting indicators for context could be attributed to Gujarat’s
for the robustness of the III, and the out- enablers and performers. low ranking in the innovation index de-
come has not been encouraging. The es- In 2021, the relative contribution of spite being one of the developed states in
timated rank correlation coefficient be- enablers in innovation performance was the country. Conversely, Kerala ranks
tween innovation inputs and outputs for higher than performers in all the states. first in terms of HDI, Sustainable Devel-
India for 2019 is found to be negative This could be indicative of the ineffi- opment Goals (SDGs), and several other
(-.70) and statistically significant. Such a ciency in translating innovation input indicators and is ranked eighth in the III
relationship is untenable and points to- into output. For instance, in states like (Figure 4). Moreover, states such as uP
wards weak empirical and analytical Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Hary- and West Bengal, which have low levels
foundations of the maiden index. Spe- ana, and Rajasthan, the rank in terms of of human development, exhibit high III
cifically, we found that states such as UP, performance is at least six points lower ranks. These findings raise questions about
West Bengal, and Telangana performed than the corresponding rank with respect the possibility of development without
poorly in the enablers index. Yet, they
ranked much higher in the performance
index, with ranks of 15, 9, and 9, respec-
tively (Figure 3, Panel A, p 27). This indi-
cates that these states had high innova-
tion efficiency, which is puzzling given
their level of economic development.
In contrast, states such as Maharash-
tra, Haryana, Kerala, and Gujarat ranked
high in the enablers index but performed
poorly in the performance index. Thus,
Panel A in Figure 3 illustrates a negative
relationship between enablers and per-
formance ranks, which is untenable.
However, with the inclusion of addition-
al indicators for 2021, the relationship
becomes positive (0.45) and statistically
significant only at a 5% level. This sug-
gests an improvement in the accuracy of
the index (refer to Figure 3, Panel B).
Nevertheless, the credibility of India’s
innovation index still lags far behind the
GII, where the estimated rank correlation
28 juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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innovation, which contradicts current
understandings of the issue. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to investigate
the reasons behind the III’s shortcom-
ings and identify strategies to improve
its future editions.
Creating a Robust Innovation
Index: Plausible Directions
The maiden attempt by the NITI Aayog
to construct an innovation index for In-
dia is a timely and laudable initiative.
However, we observed that although
the III is based on the methodology of
the GII, the estimated index of India
appears to lack robustness, suggesting
that there is scope for improving the in-
dex to which the innovation scholars
need to contribute.
The plausible directions of improve-
ment could be both in terms of analytics
and empirics. Analytically, the innova-
tion system perspective, the most widely
used approach in innovation studies,
provides a comprehensive framework
for understanding the innovation pro-
cess. The innovation system perspective
considers innovation as a process of in-
teractive learning among different ac-
tors in the innovation system resulting
in the creation and diffusion of knowl-
edge, which is governed by the institu-
tional framework in which the actors
operate (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993;
Edquist 1997). The nature of interactions
could be in STI and doing, using and in-
teracting (DUI) modes (Jensen et al
2007). While the former contributes
mainly to scientific knowledge in the
form of patents, trademarks, etc, the lat-
ter leads to synthetic- or experience-
based knowledge like non-technological
innovations (Parrilli and Heras 2016).
Finally, the institutions govern the over-
all interactions.
The conceptual foundations of the GII
are drawn from the Oslo Manual of
Innovation, which heavily relies on the
insights from the innovation system ap-
proach. Hence, the index has several in-
dicators capturing key characteristics of
both interactive learning modes of ac-
tors within and across countries (for ex-
ample, university–industry R&D collabo-
rations; gross expenditure on R&D fi-
nanced abroad). Similarly, institution
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framework (regulatory quality; the rule
of law) and generation of science-based
and experience-based knowledge (pat-
ents, for example, cluster strength, firms
training and exports) are captured by
the GII. The appropriate choice of indica-
tors representing interactive learning,
innovation inputs, innovation outputs,
and the institutional context seems to
have made GII a robust index.
Since the III deals with a developing
country, the innovation system ap-
proach needs to be adapted to a develop-
ing country context. Using firm-level
data in the Indian context, Joseph et al
(2021) showed that experience-based
learning arising mainly through the DUI
mode plays a significant role in innova-
tion performance. Hence, adopting the
GII methodology for III calls for incorpo-
rating country-specificities in the inno-
vation process. Though the III has cap-
tured some of the key aspects of differ-
ent kinds of knowledge and the institu-
tional context, the innovation character-
istics of a developing country are weakly
represented in input and output pillars.
For example, university–industry inter-
action in R&D, the percentage of firms
with foreign technology collaborations,
and R&D financed abroad are key ele-
ments within the STI mode governing
the nature of innovation and have not
been considered for the III. The latter
becomes even more important when in-
novation systems in the global South,
including India, are increasingly getting
integrated with the global innovation
network, inter alia, through foreign in-
vestment in R&D and foreign technology
licensing. Though the interactions in STI
mode and the resultant knowledge are
relatively well captured in the construc-
tion of the index, interactions in the
form of DUI and the outcomes therein
leave much scope for improvement, es-
pecially when the DUI mode is the pre-
dominant learning strategy for many
firms in developing countries. Including
key indicators of DUI, such as private
firms offering training, the proportion
of firms participating in global value
chains, knowledge parks, special eco-
nomic zones, export processing zones,
and interactions with input dealers and
customers, would enhance the robustness
vol lViii no 29
COMMENTARY
of III. Similarly, since innovation out-
comes in developing countries are non-
technological in nature, the inclusion of
organisational and marketing innova-
tions and innovations in the informal
sector (apart from grassroots innova-
tions) would help in capturing innova-
tion outputs better. The World Bank
Economic Survey for India 2021 will
help capture many of the interactions
discussed above.
Overall, the III could be made more
robust by strengthening its analytical
foundations by characterising India’s
innovation system from a southern per-
spective on the one hand and locating
more appropriate indicators that capture
the process of innovation in a develop-
ing country like India.
References
Dutta, S, B Lanvin, S Wunsch-Vincent and L R León
(eds) (2022): Global Innovation Index 2022:
What is the Future of Innovation-driven Growth?
Vol 200, WIPO.
Edquist, C (ed) (1997): Systems of Innovation: Tech-
nologies, Institutions, and Organizations, Psy-
chology Press.
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“Reconciling Higher Productivity with Innova-
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29
 COMMENTARY
Public Funding for Research in
Higher Education
The Perspective of Equity and Diversity
C M Malish
Recent government policies for
promoting research are aimed at
making India globally competitive
in an era of knowledge economy.
Against the backdrop of the
National Education Policy 2020
and the draft National Science,
Technology and Innovation Policy
2020 for enhanced public funding
for developing the research
ecosystem in higher education
institutions, this article discusses
how public funding can be better
utilised for the promotion of
research and inclusive expansion
of higher education.
C M Malish (malishcm@niepa.ac.in) teaches
at the Centre for Policy Research in Higher
Education, National Institute of Educational
Planning and Administration, New Delhi.
14
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K
nowledge and human capital
produced by the higher educa-
tion sector is a crucial determi-
nant of growth of the national economy.
It is not surprising that concerted efforts
have been made by the union govern-
ment to leverage the advantages of the
knowledge economy and reap the bene-
fits of India’s demographic dividend. The
National Education Policy (NEP) 2020
(MHRD 2020) and the draft National
Science, Technology and Innovation Pol-
icy (NSTIP) 2020 (DST 2020) place a major
emphasis on research in higher educa-
tion institutions (HEIs) and propose new
funding mechanisms to promote rese-
arch and innovation. The National Re-
search Foundation (NRF) is a new fund-
ing mechanism proposed by the NEP
2020. It is argued that inclusion of equity
and diversity perspectives in matters of
research funding can be an important
strategy to maintain the accountability
of public funding and channelise funds
to those HEIs that serve students and
teachers drawn from diverse socio-eco-
nomic, regional, linguistic, and cultural
backgrounds, reflecting the diversity of
the country.
The Global Knowledge Economy
Higher education has become a necessary
level of education to participate and take
advantage of the opportunities opened
up by the knowledge economy. There-
fore, the level of enrolment in higher ed-
ucation in general and that in doctoral
studies in particular are indicators of
improving national capacities and glob-
al competitiveness. Since the 1960s, de-
veloped regions of the world witnessed a
massive expansion of higher education,
and many of those countries reached the
advanced stage of “universalisation”
juLY 22, 2023
(Trow 1973) by the last decades of the
20th century (Altbach et al 2009). By the
turn of the century, a larger part of the
world entered the stage of massification,
except for some of the countries in Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa.
During the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury, India entered a stage of massifica-
tion of higher education. According to
the All-India Survey of Higher Education
(AISHE) 2018–19, the gross enrolment
ratio (GER) in India stood at 26.3% with
37 million students enrolled in close to
993 universities, 40,000 colleges and
10,725 stand-alone institutions (MHRD
2019). However, the GER in higher edu-
cation in India stands below developed
countries and is lower than the world
average. For instance, in 2013, while the
GER in India was 21.1% (MHRD 2013), that
for the world, North America and Western
Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe
was 32.9%, 76.6%, and 71.4%, respec-
tively (Marginson 2016).
As previous education policies were
not in favour of the expansion of higher
education (Varghese 2015), the proposal
of NEP 2020 to expand higher education
to reach a GER up to 50% by 2035 could
be seen as a major deviation from the
past policies. Currently, the private sec-
tor is a major player in higher education
in India. Around 78% of colleges are in
the private sector in India, contributing
to 66% of the enrolment (MHRD 2019).
Persisting social inequality and widening
regional and income inequalities in ac-
cessing higher education are major ob-
stacles for envisaging an inclusive sys-
tem of higher education and hence an
inclusive society in the future (Varghese
et al 2018; Tilak and Choudhury 2019).
While the advantaged strata largely occu-
py “elite institutions” and most sought-
after subjects such as engineering, medi-
cine, and management, the larger share
of disadvantaged students are enrolled
in arts, sciences, and social science disci-
plines of “non-elite” public universities
and affiliated colleges (Sabharwal and
Malish 2018). This has serious implica-
tions on inclusive growth.
Despite the commendable growth in
overall enrolment, the share of students
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

enrolled in PhD programmes is low in
India. Total number of students enrolled
in research degree programmes such as
PhD (1,69,170), MPhil (30,692), and inte-
grated PhD (3,880) is 2,03,742 which is
equivalent to 0.54% of the total enrol-
ment (MHRD 2019). In 2018–19, the total
number of PhDs awarded was 40,813.
The share of student enrolment in PhD
programmes in science, engineering and
technology, social sciences, languages,
and medicine are 26%, 24.8%, 09.9%,
6.7%, and 4%, respectively. Poor enrol-
ment in PhD programmes is not favour-
able for developing a strong and vibrant
research and development (R&D) system.
It is noteworthy that 97.5% of the PhD
enrolment is in universities, particularly
public universities. As Varghese (2020:
303) notes, “Private universities have yet
to establish their presence in the area of
doctoral programmes.” In 2018, only 13%
of doctoral studies were carried out in
private universities (Varghese 2020). In
other words, despite the inexorable pres-
ence of private players in higher educa-
tion, public universities make the most
significant contributions in developing
the pool of researchers in India.
Research in Higher
Education Institutions
R&D spending as a share of the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) is an important
indicator of growth of research and
innovation. According to the United
Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural
Organization’s Institute of Statistics (UIS
2021), India’s R&D spending stands at 0.7%
of the GDP, compared to that of South
Africa (0.8%), Brazil (1.3%), China (2%),
the United States (US) (2.7%), Germany
(2.9%), Japan (3.4%), South Korea (4.2%),
and Israel (4.3%). India’s position is at
the bottom of the list in terms of R&D
spending among the BRICS countries.
R&D in India takes place in universi-
ties, stand-alone government-funded
research organisations and industrial
research laboratories (Bhargava 2016).
Much of the public spending on R&D is in
non-university sectors such as govern-
ment-owned research organisations and
laboratories such as the Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
and Defence Research and Development
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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Organisation (DRDO). In social sciences,
establishment of research organisations,
for instance, the Indian Council of Social
Science Research (ICSSR), further accel-
erated the growth of research outside
the university sector. The R&D spending
by universities remains very low in India.
Contribution of the university sector to
total R&D spending in India is only 6.3%
as compared to other countries such
as Russia (9.8%), the US (13%), France
(22.1%), and the United Kingdom (25.8%)
(UIS 2021). All of these insights point
towards the need to promote research
in HEIs.
Mechanisms for Funding
Research in HEIs
Research is part of the core activities of
HEIs, although the thrust for research is
not uniform across HEIs. In addition to
research carried out by students for the
fulfilment of degrees, teachers in univer-
sities and colleges are also engaged in
research activities. Research is conduc-
ted independently or as a collaborating
team involving teachers and researchers
from own institutions and other HEIs.
Research-related outcomes are a major
determinant of career progression for
faculty members. Compared to research
in humanities and social science disci-
plines, research in science and techno-
logy disciplines is expensive due to high-
er costs of latest equipment, materials,
and setting up of laboratories. Research
collaboration is more dominant in sci-
ence and technology disciplines than
humanities and social sciences.
Funding sources for research carried
out in HEIs can be government and non-
government agencies. In addition to
ministries and departments at the union
and state governments such as the DST,
there are a number of autonomous and
independent public-funding agencies
such as the Indian Council of Medical
Research, ICSSR, CSIR, Indian Council of
Agricultural Research, Indian Council of
Historical Research, and Indian Council
of Philosophical Research, to list a few.
Many of them have a narrowly defined
disciplinary focus. Moreover, not all HEIs
are eligible to receive public funding
from these agencies. For instance, re-
search funding by the University Grants
vol lViii no 29
COMMENTARY
Commission (UGC) for minor and major
projects is confined to those HEIs (both
government and government aided)
which are included under Sections 2(f)
and 12(B) of the UGC Act, 1956. Accord-
ing to AISHE 2018–19, only 9,755 colleges
are eligible to receive research funds from
the UGC, which are less than one-fourth of
the colleges in the country (MHRD 2019).
A few of the public entities such as the
Department of Science and Technology,
however, fund public as well as private
HEIs for carrying out research.
The NEP and the NSTIP propose new
funding mechanisms for promoting rese-
arch in HEIs. According to the NEP, the
NRF is an autonomous agency which
would work in coordination with the
existing funding agencies and follow a
competitive and peer-reviewed process
of funding. It aims to transform “quality
and quantity of research” across the dis-
ciplines and streams and enable a “culture
of research” in HEIs. The union budget
for FY 2021–22 allocated `50,000 crore
to the NRF to spend for a period of five
years (MoF 2021). Some of the commen-
tators, particularly those who belong to
the private sector, tend to visualise the
NRF as a means to bring parity in re-
search funding for the public and pri-
vate sector. However, as the call for app-
lications has not yet been announced,
we need to wait to know more about the
process and eligibility criteria for dis-
bursing funds.
Similarly, the major goals of NSTIP are
to double the number of full-time equiv-
alent researchers and gross expenditure
on R&D in five years. The NSTIP proposes
a new collaborative funding model
called advanced missions in innovative
research ecosystem (ADMIRE). This hy-
brid funding model would support pub-
lic and private enterprises, academic
institutions, and the non-governmental
sector. Creation of higher education
research centres and collaborative rese-
arch centres, as joint initiatives of HEIs,
R&D institutions, and industry sectors,
are among the other strategies to promote
research and innovation in HEIs. Teach-
ing–learning centres would also be cre-
ated in HEIs to provide research-based
capacity building for faculty members
of HEIs. ADMIRE also envisages HEIs to
15
 COMMENTARY
engage with non-higher education sectors
for research and innovation activities.
Research and Social
Accountability
The nature of higher education and
knowledge produced as a public good is
the major rationale for continued public
investment in research. Social accounta-
bility can be seen as an important con-
cept here. As Trow (1996: 310) notes,
“Accountability is the obligation to re-
port to others, to explain, to justify, to
answer questions about how resources
have been used, and to what effect.” As
autonomy in teaching and research is
the foundational feature of higher edu-
cation, who is the “other” to whom HEIs
are obliged to report is a big question.
Accountability can be, on the one hand,
classified into external and internal
accountability, and on the other, legal/
financial and academic accountability
(Trow 1996).
At the level of fund disbursal, prioriti-
sation of research areas is an important
measure of social accountability. For ins-
tance, the ICSSR had a list of priority
areas of research such as gender, caste,
and social exclusion. Similarly, a recently
launched scheme called Impactful Policy
Research in Social Sciences (IMPRESS)
promotes policy-relevant research in
certain identified domains. In this pro-
cess, funds are allocated to promote res-
earch in those areas. This prioritisation
can be progressive when funds are ade-
quately pumped into research that dire-
ctly contributes to the welfare of disad-
vantaged groups and the overall socio-
economic development in the country.
The very act of prioritisation involves
some inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Therefore, the negative aspect of prior-
itisation is exclusion of certain domains.
It can also adversely affect the autonomy
of researchers to expand the knowledge
in preferred domains.
Research funding has a major spillo-
ver effect on institutions and its clien-
tele. Funding for research projects pro-
vides many benefits to HEIs. In addition
to direct financial benefits in the form of
overhead charges, equipment purchased
such as machines and computers and
other facilities developed for research
16
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would remain as assets for the institu-
tions. Academic benefits from research
studies directly contribute to the profes-
sional growth of faculty members and
thereby student learning. Research would
also contribute to ranking and accredita-
tion scores and thereby the academic
prestige of HEIs. This, in turn, will posi-
tively impact student admissions. In a
nutshell, research funding is attached
with many direct and indirect benefits
to HEIs and their clientele. Therefore,
which institutions would receive public
funds is very important.
Many commentators have cited exam-
ples of the system for liberal public fund-
ing for research as followed in the US. In
the US, private HEIs are also eligible to
receive funding from the NSF, an inde-
pendent federal agency for the promo-
tion of research in science and engineer-
ing. It is very important to note that
private institutions in the US such as
Harvard University, California Institute
of Technology, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, etc, are committed to the
policy of equity and diversity in student
admissions and faculty recruitment. They
make efforts to ensure that their student
and faculty profiles reflect social diver-
sity. For instance, according to Forbes
(2020) America’s Best Employers for Di-
versity Survey 2020, in the education
category, five out of the top 10 employers
are private universities.
On the contrary, elite private HEIs in
India predominantly serve the elite
socio-economic strata. Most of them are
not committed to equity, inclusion, and
diversity, adding to the widening of ine-
quality in accessing higher education, a
major hindrance to envisage an inclu-
sive society. Therefore, bringing in the
US case to support liberal research
funding in India needs to be seen with
adequate caution.
A New Paradigm for
Public Funding
The composition of students in public
institutions, particularly state universi-
ties and affiliated colleges, reflects the
diversity of the country. It is mainly due
to the policy of reservation followed in
public colleges and universities and other
supportive government schemes and
juLY 22, 2023
programmes such as post-matric schol-
arships, stipends, and hostel schemes.
Public universities produce a major share
of PhDs in India and make a substantial
contribution to the national research ca-
pacity. Against the backdrop of the pro-
posed new funding mechanisms for re-
search in HEIs, it is argued that the inc-
lusion of the perspective of equity and
diversity in research funding should be
an important policy strategy for main-
taining the public accountability of pub-
lic funding for research. Espousing and
enacting values of diversity and equity
are critical for breaking the vicious circle
of educational inequalities in HEIs, there-
by reducing inequalities in development.
Moreover, an equity and diversity per-
spective would enable funding agencies
to incentivise those institutions that
serve the masses and the deprived sec-
tions of the society. Quality research in
those institutions can also lead to an im-
provement in teaching–learning and
overall quality, public funding for re-
search needs to be located in a larger
context of institutional reforms for equi-
ty and quality in HEIs. Perhaps, more re-
search-based capacity development may
be required to promote research in those
institutions admitting students from di-
verse and underprivileged backgrounds.
In a nutshell, the inclusion of the per-
spective of equity and diversity in public
funding for research in HEIs would act as
a measure of social accountability and
uphold the vision and foundational prin-
ciples of NEP and NSTIP aiming to build
an inclusive society.
References
Altbach, Philip G, Liz Reisberg and Laura E Rum-
bley (2009): Trends in Global Higher Education:
Tracking an Academic Revolution, a report pre-
pared for the UNESCO World Conference on
Higher Education.
Bhargava, Pushpa M (2016): “Scientific Research
and Economic Development,” Social Change,
Vol 46, No 2, pp 260–66.
DST (2020): “Draft National Science, Technology
and Innovation Policy (NSTIP) 2020,” Depart-
ment of Science and Technology, New Delhi.
Forbes (2020): “America’s Best Employers for Div-
ersity 2020,” https://www.forbes.com/best-
employers-diversity/#401e5bad9b9e.
Marginson, Simon (2016): “High Participation Sys-
tems of Higher Education,” Journal of Higher
Education, Vol 87, No 2, pp 243–71.
MoF (2021): “Union Budget 2020–21,” Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, New Delhi.
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MHRD (2013): “All India Survey of Higher Educa-
tion 2012–13,” Ministry of Human Resource
Development, Government of India, New Delhi.
— (2019): “All India Survey of Higher Education
2018–19,” Ministry of Human Resource Devel-
opment, Government of India, New Delhi.
— (2020): “National Education Policy 2020,” Min-
istry of Human Resource Development, Gov-
ernment of India, New Delhi.
Sabharwal, Nidhi S and C M Malish (2018): “Stu-
dent Diversity and Social Inclusion: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Higher Education Institutions in
India,” CPRHE Research Papers, Centre for
Policy Research in Higher Education, National
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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Institute of Educational Planning and Adminis-
tration, New Delhi.
Tilak, Jandhyala B G and Pradeep Kumar Choud-
hury (2019): “Inequality in Access to Higher
Education in India between the Poor and Rich:
An Analysis of the 64th and 71st Rounds of
NSSO Data (2007–08 and 2013–14),” Working
Paper, CSD-2/2019, Centre for Social Develop-
ment, New Delhi.
Trow, Martin (1973): Problems in the Transition
from Elite to Mass Higher Education, California,
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— (1996): “Trust, Markets and Accountability in
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UIS (2021): “UIS.Stat,” http://data.uis.unesco.org/.
Varghese, N V (2015): “Challenges of Massification
of Higher Education in India,” CPRHE Re-
search Papers 1, Centre for Policy Research in
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— (2020): “The Role of Doctoral Education in De-
veloping Research Capacities in India,” Trends
and Issues in Doctoral Education: A Global Per-
spective, M Yudkevich, Philip Altbach and Hans
De Wit (eds), New Delhi: Sage, pp 295–315.
Varghese, N V, Nidhi S Sabharwal and C M Malish
(eds) (2018): Indian Higher Education Report
2016: Equity, New Delhi: Sage.
17
 COMMENTARY
Assessing India’s Energy Balances
Climate and SDGs
Manisha Jain
Comparison of the data from
the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation and
the International Energy Agency
for 2019–20 shows that the two
energy balance estimates are
different owing to the adoption
of different calorific values and
incomplete disaggregation of
energy use by end-users.
The author is grateful to the anonymous
referee of this article. It has greatly benefited
from the comments.
Manisha Jain (manishajain@igidr.ac.in)
is assistant professor at the Indira Gandhi
Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
30
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units in the 2012 edition. The other source
of India’s energy balance is the Interna-
tional Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy
Balance. Most of the estimates of India’s
CO2 emissions use the IEA energy bal-
ances. It collects energy statistics from
various countries through annual ques-
tionnaires or national publications and
N
ational energy statistics are es- reports (IEA 2020).
sential to track a country’s pro- The MOSPI’s energy statistics is rarely
gress in its human development used in research or government reports
goals (Vera and Langlois 2007). Energy despite being national data. For exam-
data is also crucial to estimating carbon ple, in the chapter on sustainable energy,
dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy use India’s Economic Survey 2018–19 refers
(Bruckner et al 2015). CO2 emission from to data from the World Bank and British
energy use is the key driver of the cli- Petroleum on India’s per capita energy
mate change crisis. Most countries have consumption (ES 2019). Similarly, most
pledged reductions in CO2 emissions or research studies on energy supply obtain
emissions intensity under the United data from international organisations
Nations Framework Convention on Cli- (Karstensen et al 2020). Few studies have
mate Change (UNFCCC) framework. CO2 compiled national energy statistics using
emissions data is critical for monitoring data from different energy ministries
the progress in meeting the emission re- (Das and Roy 2020).
duction targets. Energy statistics-related issues in India
Countries collate their energy statis- have been raised several times (Andrew
tics and present them in energy balances 2020; Rai et al 2017; Dukkipati et al
(UN 2017). An energy balance is an ac- 2015). The problems pertain to either
counting framework for the compilation the sufficiency of the data or errors in it.
and reconciliation of data on all energy To develop a national energy data set
products entering, exiting, and used within and provide single-window access to it,
the national territory of a given country NITI Aayog, in collaboration with Prayas,
during a reference period. Energy bal- launched the “India Energy Dashboard
ances are essential to calculate energy (IED)” in 2017. A comparison of India’s
indicators of development and estimate primary energy supply by fuels from
CO2 emissions from energy use. Figure 1 the three data sources is shown in
shows a few energy indicators of human Figure 2 (p 31).
development and the required data. It is evident from Figure 2 that the
The official source of India’s energy estimates of primary energy from IED
statistics is the annual publication by the are the same as IEA data. The primary
Ministry of Statistics and Programme energy supply estimated from MOSPI is
Implementation (MOSPI). Given the im- somewhat similar to IEA and IED esti-
portance of the energy balance, MOSPI mates for 2013 and 2015 but not for other
(2010, 2012) began publishing energy years. As per MOSPI’s energy balances,
commodity balance in the 2010 edition India’s primary energy supply increased
and energy balance in standard energy at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
Figure 1: Energy Data Used to Calculate Key Indicators of Development
Total primary energy supply,
Energy use per capita, energy use per
total final consumption and
unit of GDP; CO2 emissions
electricity use
Sustainable
Efficiency of energy conversion and development
Energy Losses in transformation
distributin; CO2 emissions and
data systems
climate-change
indicators
Energy intensity of industry,
Energy use by end-use
agriculture, service/commercial,
sectors
household, transport; CO2 emissions
Source: Compiled from Vera and Langlois (2007).
juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 2: India’s Primary Energy Supply by Fuel from Three Data Sets
MOSPI
1,000
800
600
400
200
0 0
-200
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
C&L
PP
Electricity
Primary energy supply in MOSPI data is around 26% higher than in IEA and IED for all years except 2013 and 2015.
Source: Compiled by the author from MOSPI (2021) energy statistics, IEA (2021) energy balances, and IED (2021) energy balances.
of 5.1% during 2010–19. However, the cor-
responding values from IEA and IED data
are much lower at 3%. It is also evident
from Figure 2 that the difference across
the three data sets is mainly due to esti-
mates of energy from coal. The share of
coal in the primary energy supply in the
MOSPI’s data is around 63%–65% in all
the years except 2015. On the other hand,
the share of coal in IEA and IED data sets
is less than 60% for all the years.
The IED addresses the issue of incor-
rect estimates of primary energy supply
from coal in the MOSPI data. However,
while the IED offers statewise production
and consumption of all energy sources,
it does not provide fuel-wise consump-
tion of energy products in the end-use
consumer category in the internationally
recommended format. Research on India’s
development and climate goals requires
sector- and subsector-level estimates of
energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
Hence, both the national energy data
sources, MOSPI and IED have limitations
that must be addressed for effective
monitoring and implementation of India’s
energy and climate goals.
This article aims to advance the dis-
cussion on India’s national energy statis-
tics to track its energy and climate goals
effectively. Keeping the focus on energy
balance tables, I compile energy balances
from MOSPI’s data for 2019–20 and com-
pare them with IEA energy balances.
Then I estimate energy indicators of
development and CO2 emissions using
the two sources for 2019–20 and com-
pare them. I find that energy balances
Economic & Political Weekly EPW
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COMMENTARY
IEA IED
1,000 1,000
800 800
600 600
400 400
200 200
0
-200 -200
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2017
2018
2019
Crude C&L Crude C&L Crude
NG PP NG PP NG
PES Electricity PES Electricity PES
reported in the MOSPI’s energy statistics Ministries and various organisations
have errors and are inadequate. These provide data on the flow of energy prod-
energy balances, if used, can provide in- ucts in physical quantities. The energy
correct estimates of key statistics, such as equivalent is estimated using the energy
energy intensity, the efficiency of energy content of different products.
conversion and transmission, and energy Most countries follow the International
intensities of industry and agriculture. Recommendations for Energy Statistics
After elaborating on MOSPI’s energy (IRES) adopted by the United Nations
statistics reports followed by a compari- Statistical Commission in 2011 to develop
son on India’s energy balances, I present national energy statistics (UN 2017). The
the results on energy and environmental IRES recommended the compilation of
indicator estimates from India’s energy energy balances to enhance the rele-
balances. Key conclusions and policy rec- vance of energy statistics and serve as a
ommendations are presented in the end. quality tool to ensure completeness, con-
sistency, and comparability of basic sta-
Energy Statistics Reports tistics. An energy balance is an account-
Energy statistics facilitate reliable and ing framework for the compilation and
timely monitoring of the supply and use reconciliation of data on all energy prod-
of energy. It is a collated database of the ucts entering, exiting, and used within
flow of energy sources in an economy. It the national territory of a given country
provides data on energy flows, including during a reference period.
production, import, exports, bunkering, The MOSPI publishes India’s national en-
stock changes, transformation, its use by ergy data. Its Energy Statistics India is an
energy industries, losses during conver- annual publication and contains the pre-
sion, and final consumption of energy vious financial year’s data. For example,
products within the national territory. the edition published in 2021 includes
Table 1: List of Indicators Tracked in MOSPI’s Energy Statistics
S No Theme Indicator
1 Overall use Energy use per capita
2 Overall productivity Energy use per unit of GDP
3 Supply efficiency The efficiency of energy conversion and distribution
4 The ratio of TPC and TPES
5 End use Sectoral energy intensities
6 Sectoral electricity intensities
7 Diversification (fuel mix) Fuel shares in TPES
8 Fuel shares in TPC
9 Fuel shares in electricity
10 Imports Net energy import dependency
TPES = total primary energy supply; TFC = total final consumption.
Source: MOSPI (2021).
juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 31
 COMMENTARY

data for 2019–20. Each issue collects en- commodity balance and energy balance development indicators and CO2 emis-
ergy statistics for the past 10 years. The in standard energy units are available sions are production, imports and ex-
MOSPI sources data on energy products from government data since 2007 and ports, fuel transformation, and final con-
from various ministries dealing with dif- 2010. Since the 2017 edition of its energy sumption by end-use sectors. According
ferent energy products and compiles them. statistics, the MOSPI began reporting a to the IRES, an energy balance matrix
The MOSPI’s energy statistics have sections few of the energy indicators of sustainable shows the relationships between energy
such as energy production, energy avail- development. It estimates 10 indicators products (represented in columns) and
ability, and energy consumption. These under the use, production pattern, and flows (represented in rows). The rows are
tables give energy data in both physical security (Table 1, p 31). It utilises the sequenced such that there are three main
quantities and energy equivalents. data reported in its energy balance tables blocks of rows. The top block shows en-
The MOSPI follows IRES recommenda- to calculate the indicators. ergy entering and leaving the national
tions to prepare the energy balances. Given territory and stock changes to provide
the importance of the energy balance Energy Balance Tables information on the total primary energy
table, the MOSPI began publishing energy The energy balance tables record the supply (TPES). The middle block shows
commodity balance in the 2010 edition flow of all the energy sources from pro- how energy is transformed, transferred,
and energy balance in standard energy duction and imports to final consump- used by energy industries, and lost in
unit in the 2012 edition. Hence, the energy tion. The significant flows for estimating transmission and distribution. The bot-
tom block shows the final energy con-
Table 2: India’s Primary Energy Supply Flow in 2019–20 from MOSPI and IEA Energy Balance Table
Energy Flow (in Mtoe) Coal and Lignite Crude Oil Oil Products Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Renewables Electricity Total
sumption and non-energy use of energy
MOSPI
products. In the following sections, I
Production 433 33 29 12 13 12 533 compare the three blocks of MOSPI’s and
Imports 161 232 45 31 0.5 469 IEA’s energy balances for 2019–20.
Exports -1 -69 -1 -69
Stock change 14 14 Energy supply: The primary energy
Primary energy 607 265 -23 60 12 13 12 -0.27 946 supply in the top block of the energy bal-
IEA
ance is calculated as energy production
Production 289 38 25 12 15 12 391
Imports 133 233 43 30 1 440
plus energy imports, minus energy exp-
Exports -1 -71 -1 -72 orts, minus international bunkers, and
Bunker -6 -6 then plus or minus stock changes. The
Stock change -1 -1 0.3 -2 top block of MOSPI’s and IEA’s energy bal-
Primary energy 420 270 -34 56 12 15 12 0 751 ance for 2019–20 is shown in Table 2. As
Primary energy supply is calculated as production plus imports minus exports plus stock changes. The positive values per MOSPI’s data, India’s primary energy
indicate inflows and negative values indicate outflows. Primary energy supply from nuclear, hydro and renewables is
estimates by applying an assumed conversion efficiency to the electricity generated from these sources. All values are supply in 2019 was 946 metric tonnes of
energy equivalent estimated by multplying the physical quantities of fuels with their energy content (net calorific value). oil equivalent (mtoe), 26% higher than
Source: MOSPI (2021), IEA (2021).
IEA data. Primary energy from coal in
Table 3: Energy Transfers, Transformation, Energy Industry Own Use, and Losses in India, 2019–20 the MOSPI’s data is 607 mtoe compared
All Value in Mtoe Energy Flow Coal and Lignite Crude Oil Oil Products Natural Gas Nuclear Hydro Renewables Electricity Total to 420 mtoe in the IEA data. However,
MOSPI the two data sets’ primary energy esti-
Primary energy 607 265 -23 60 12 13 12 -0.3 946
mates of the other sources are similar.
Statistical differences 37 19 -26 -2 21 49
A possible reason behind the differ-
Electricity plants -420 -1 -10 -12 -13 -12 121 -362
Oil refineries -260 271 -7 4
ence in the estimates of energy derived
Energy industry own use -9 -7 -17 from coal in the MOSPI’s energy balance
Losses -24 0 -23 -47 table is the choice of calorific value of
Total final consumption 224 221 31 111 587 coal. The energy derived from coal in
IEA other tables of MOSPI’s energy statistics
Primary energy supply 420 270 -34 56 12 15 12 -0.3 751 also differ from that of the energy balance
Transfers 3 -3 0 table. For example, 731 metric tonnes (MT)
Statistical differences -4 -4 -6 0 8 -5
of coal produced in 2019 is 264 mtoe
Electricity plants -286 -3 -14 -12 -15 -10 138 -202
(11,058 TJ) in coal production data and
Oil refineries -269 272 3
Coal transformation -21 -21
433 mtoe in the energy balance table. It
Energy industry own use -2 -18 -7 -12 -39 implies that the average calorific value
Losses -23 -23 of domestic coal in 2017, calculated from
Total final consumption 107 209 34 1 113 465 MOSPI’s energy balance table, is 5,956
Primary energy supply from coal is converted to electricity in electricity plants and that from crude oil to oil products in kilocalorie (kcal)/kilogram (kg) and from
refineries; energy is lost in tranformation from coal to electricity in electricity plants; energy used in electricity plants and
refineries reported in own use; energy lost in distribution is reported under losses.
its coal production data, it is 3,616 kcal/
Source: MOSPI (2021), IEA (2021). kg. The difference in the assumption of
32 juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 COMMENTARY

the calorific value of coal increased India’s data. On the other hand, the IEA esti- (similar to thermal power plants). There
primary energy supply estimate. It also mates of electricity generation match the are few differences in the assumptions
changed the shares of energy sources in CEA data. It is found that MOSPI’s energy on the conversion efficiency of renewa-
the primary energy supply. balance has a much larger value under bles; few assume that it equals the effi-
statistical difference than IEA, resulting ciency of thermal power plants (British
Energy conversion, transformation, in a discrepancy. Petroleum), and others take it as 100%
and distribution: The primary energy The energy balance tables give infor- (IEA). These assumptions are essential to
from coal is converted to electricity in mation on primary energy sources and arrive at the primary energy equivalent
power plants, and that from crude oil is the total electricity generated from all of the electricity generated from non-
converted to oil products in oil refiner- energy sources. For example, the energy thermal energy sources.
ies. Energy transformation is carried out supply for electricity generation from In both the IEA and MOSPI energy sta-
to convert an energy product to another thermal energy sources, as per MOSPI’s tistics, the efficiency of transforming
more suitable for specific use. Most pri- and IEA’s energy statistics is 431 mtOe primary energy to final energy is as-
mary energy sources, such as coal and and 303 mtOe, respectively. The primary sumed to be 33% for nuclear and 100%
crude oil, are transformed into electricity energy supplied by nuclear is 12 mtOe in for hydro. Thus, the electricity generat-
and oil products for final use. Some of both energy statistics, but hydro and re- ed from non-thermal energy sources in
the coal and natural gas are used direct- newable differ. both data sets is 29 mtoe. The electricity
ly by end-users. The energy lost in con- In thermal power plants, electricity is generated from thermal energy sources
version, transformation, and distribu- generated using coal or natural gas is 92 mtoe in MOSPI’s data and 111 mtoe
tion is reported in the middle part of the where they are the primary energy in the IEA data.
energy balance table. Table 3 (p 32) source, and electricity is considered the
shows the central block of India’s energy final energy form. The efficiency of con- Final energy consumption: The bot-
balance table for 2019–20 from MOSPI’s version in coal power plants is in the tom block of the energy balance table
and IEA’s energy balances. range of 30%–35%. In nuclear, hydro, provides information on fuel-wise ener-
The total electricity generated from and other renewables, the electricity is gy used by various end-users. The ener-
all energy sources is given under elec- generated using primary sources such as gy not specified under any consumer
tricity plants. The gross electricity gen- nuclear fuel, energy stored in the dam, category and the energy sources used for
erated is 1,407 terra-watt hour (TWh) or solar, or wind power. The primary energy non-energy uses are reported separately.
121 mtoe in MOSPI’s energy balance and equivalent of the electricity generated The energy used by the consumer cate-
1,604 TWh (138 mtoe) in IEA’s energy from these sources is estimated based gory is required for estimating energy
balance. As per the Central Electricity on the assumptions about conversion intensities of economic production from
Authority (CEA), the electricity generated efficiency. For example, the efficiency agriculture, industry, services, and tran-
in 2019–20 was 1,623 TWh (140 mtOe), 13% of energy conversion from nuclear fu- sport. India’s final energy consumption
higher than the MOSPI energy balance els to electricity is considered as 33% in 2019–20, reported in MOSPI’s and IEA
energy statistics, is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Final Energy Consumption by End-users and Fuel in 2019–20 The estimates of final consumption in
All Values in Mtoe Energy Flow Coal and Lignite Oil Products Natural gas Electricity Total
IEA energy statistics differ from MOSPI’s
MOSPI
Total final consumption 224 221 31 111 587
energy statistics. As shown in Table 4,
Industry 224 56 1 47 328 the final energy consumption in MOSPI’s
Transport 48 10 1.68 60 statistics is 26% higher than in IEA. Due
Residential 28 27 55 to the higher value estimated in the final
Commercial and public services 0 9 9 energy consumption, the energy con-
Agriculture/forestry 1 20 21 sumed by industry is 83% more in MOS-
Non-specified (other) 89 7 95 PI’s energy balance than IEA estimates.
Non-energy use 31 20 52 Industries consume coal, oil products,
IEA
natural gas, and electricity. As per IRES
Total final consumption 107 209 34 113 465
Industry 95 31 7 47 180
recommendations, an energy balance
Transport 99 3 1.69 104 table gives data on energy consumed by
Residential 3 28 1 27 61 various industrial sectors such as iron
Commercial and public services 5 3 2 10 20 and steel, chemical and petrochemical,
Agriculture/forestry 11 0 20 31 non-ferrous metals machinery, etc, MOS-
Fishing 0 PI’s energy statistics list all the sub-sec-
Non-specified 5 5 7 18 tors but report two-thirds of the energy
Non-energy use 31 20 52 consumption under non-specified. The
Most of the coal available for final consumption is used by industry; some energy is used for non-energy purpose such a
feedback stock in industry energy not categorised under any end-use is reported in non-specified.
disaggregation is also incomplete for oil
Source: IEA (2021), MOSPI (2021). products, as 40% of the consumption is
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 33
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 COMMENTARY

reported under non-specified. Most of the ratio of energy and economic output. added by the industry. As mentioned
the oil products are used in industry The gross domestic product is taken to above, the estimates of industry, agricul-
and transport. In the MOSPI’s data, in- estimate the economy’s energy intensity. ture, and transport energy intensities
dustry consumption is overestimated, The estimated values are shown in Table widely differ in the two datasets (Table 6).
and transportation and agriculture are 5. Due to the higher estimates of TPES Further, in MOSPI statistics, transport in-
underestimated. and TFC, the per capita energy consump- tensity is estimated as the ratio of energy
tion and energy intensity are 26% higher consumed in the transport sector and the
Results in the MOSPI data than in the IEA data. value added by the transport sector. How-
The indicators of sustainable develop- The electricity consumption is the same ever, this is not an appropriate measure
ment reported in the MOSPI’s energy bal- in the two data sets; hence, the electrici- of transport energy intensity as the
ance tables are compared with that of ty indicators are identical. transport sector adds value to the entire
the IEA. The CO2 emissions from fossil activity. The value added by the trans-
fuel combustion from the two data The efficiency of energy conversion port sector is not an accurate indicator of
sources are also calculated and com- and distribution: Energy is lost in con- activity in the sector. The preferred indi-
pared. As discussed above, the differ- version from coal to electricity and its cator for activity in transport is the vehicle
ences in the energy balance tables of the transmission and distribution. It is cal- miles travelled or GDP.
two data sources adversely affect the es- culated as the ratio of electricity availa-
timates of the indicators. ble for final consumption and the primary Diversification in the fuel mix: The in-
energy supplied. As shown in Table 3, dicators under the fuel mix are used to
Indicators of sustainable development: the electricity available for final con- track improvements in the growth of
The indicators of sustainable develop- sumption is 111 mtoe in MOSPI and 113 renewable energy sources in the supply
ment reported in MOSPI’s energy statis- mtoe in IEA. The statistical differences of energy. The difference in the estimates
tics are divided into the themes of use, are subtracted from these values to of energy from coal distorts the estimates
Table 5: Indicators of Overall Energy Use in India, 2019–20 arrive at the electricity of the share of different energy sources
MOSPI IEA Per Cent Difference available from the gener- in the fuel mix. The percentage of coal is
Per capita TPES (kgoe/capita) 706 560 26 ated units. The statistical 64% in MoSPI and 56% in IEA. The share
Per capita TFC (kgoe/capita) 438 347 26 differences in MOSPI and of renewable and nuclear in the primary
Per capita electricity (kWh/person) 963 960 0 IEA are 21 mtoe and 8 energy supply is 4% in MoSPI and 5% in
Energy intensity TPES (kgoe/'000 ` ) 6 5 26 mtoe, respectively. The IEA. Although the difference between
Energy intensity TFC (kgoe/000' ` ) 4 3 26 electricity available for the IEA and MOSPI data is minor, it is sig-
Energy intensity electricity (kWh/'000 ` ) 9 9 -2
consumption from the nificant considering the small share of
Source: MOSPI (2021) and IEA results estimated from IEA (2021).
generated electricity is non-fossil fuel energy sources.
Table 6: Sectoral Energy Intensities, 2019–20 90 mtoe in MoSPI and 105
Value Added (` crore) Energy (Mtoe) Energy Intensity (kgoe/'000 `) mtoe in IEA. The primary Carbon Dioxide Emissions
MOSPI IEA MOSPI IEA % Difference
energy supplied to the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combus-
Industry 36,27,074 328 180 9.0 5.0 83
Agriculture 19,68,571 21 31 1.0 1.6 -33
electricity plants is 469 tion are estimated using the primary en-
Transport 639,779 60 104 9.4 16.3 -43 mtoe in MoSPI and 340 ergy supply or activity-wise energy con-
Fuel share in TPES MOSPI (%) IEA (%) mtoe in IEA. The ratio of sumption. A few organisations, such as
Crude Oil 28 36 output electricity of 90 British Petroleum, use the primary ener-
Natural Gas 6 7 mtoe and input of 469 gy supply data to estimate CO2 emis-
Coal 64 56 mtoe gives 19%. Similar- sions. The IEA uses its energy balances to
RE and others 4.0 5.1
ly, the ratio of the output make the estimates of CO2 emissions us-
Source: IEA (2021), MOSPI (2021).
of 105 mtoe and input of ing sector-wise energy use data. The de-
production patterns, and security of ene- 340 mtoe is 31%. Hence, while energy fault emission factors from IPCC are 73.3
rgy supply: I discuss the per capita ener- conversion and distribution efficiency is tonnes (t)/terajoule (TJ) for crude oil,
gy use and intensity indicators, energy 31% as per IEA data, it is much lower at 96.1 t/TJ for coal, and 56.1 t/TJ for natu-
conversion and distribution efficiency, 19% in the MOSPI data. ral gas. The estimate of CO2 emissions
intensities of end-use energy consump- from IEA energy statistics is 2.5 giga-
tion, and diversification in the fuel mix. Intensities of end-use energy con- tonnes (Gt) of CO2, whereas that from
sumption: Intensities of end-use con- MoSPI is 3.3 Gt. The MoSPI estimates are
Per capita energy use and intensity: sumption are helpful indicators for ana- 31% higher than IEA estimates.
Per capita energy consumption and en- lysing the effects of efficiency improve-
ergy intensity are calculated using pri- ments in the sectors. The intensity of Conclusions and Policy Implications
mary and final energy supply. Per capita economic production sectors such as Energy balances are essential to track a
energy consumption is the ratio of ener- agriculture and industry is the ratio of country’s development and climate-
gy and population. Energy intensity is energy used in the sector and the value related goals. The IEA’s energy balance is
34 juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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the widely used energy balance data
source to analyse India’s energy transi-
tion and progress in meeting climate
goals. Most currently used estimates of
CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are calcu-
lated using the IEA’s energy balances.
The MoSPI publishes the only free-of-
charge source of India’s energy balance
in its energy statistics report. The issues
in India’s energy data and MoSPI’s energy
statistics have been raised in the past.
However, there is little discussion on the
shortcomings of India’s energy balance
reported in the MoSPI’s energy statistics.
As the research on tracking progress in
meeting climate targets and policy ef-
fectiveness is growing, it is crucial to
identify the gaps and errors in the nation-
al energy balances and develop them to
meet international standards.
This article compares the energy bal-
ances from MOSPI’s energy statistics and
IEA energy balances and finds significant
differences between them. There are two
key issues in the MoSPI’s energy balances.
First, an incorrect calorific value of coal
and, second, an incomplete disaggrega-
tion of energy use by end-users. These
issues lead to substantial differences in
energy indicators and CO2 emissions.
The calorific value of coal: The prima-
ry energy from coal in the MoSPI data is
higher than IEA due to the assumption of
a higher calorific value of coal. It results
in a 26% higher estimate of primary
energy supply in the MoSPI data than
IEA. It further translates to a 26% higher
estimate of per capita energy consump-
tion and intensity. The efficiency of en-
ergy conversion, transmission, and dis-
tribution is reported to be 19% in the
MoSPI statistics but 31% in the IEA data.
In the MOSPI statistics, the energy inten-
sity of the industry is 83% higher than in
the IEA data. The estimate of energy–CO2
emissions from MoSPI differs from IEA
and gives a 31% higher estimate than IEA.
Calorific value is crucial to converting
physical values into a standard energy
unit. The energy balance tables in the
MOSPI likely use the default calorific val-
ues given in the IRES. This error in the
assumption leads to a higher estimate of
energy use, the intensity of energy use,
and CO2 emissions. Many countries use
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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COMMENTARY
default calorific values due to limited the transport sector are reported in the
data. The calorific value of Indian coal is non-specified category.
much lower than the global average. The issue of incomplete disaggrega-
India’s coal is divided into several cate- tion of final energy use by sectors should
gories based on calorific values. The also be resolved. Decomposing energy
quantity used in each grade is available intensities into energy efficiency and
in national statistics and should be used structure effects is a valuable way to es-
to determine the weighted average timate the impact of energy efficiency
calorific value of coal at the national lev- improvement in different sectors. Such
el. IEA computes the weighted average analysis requires energy use data at the
calorific value of Indian coal. The MoSPI sector level. Further, the estimates of CO2
energy statistics should estimate and emissions by activity are also needed to
report the calorific value of coal for each track climate goals better and design
year using grade-wise data on produc- mitigation strategies for different eco-
tion and imports. nomic sectors.
The methodologies and standards to
Disaggregation of energy consump- collect final energy use data from sec-
tion by end-users: Energy balances pro- tors have been developed and are being
vide data on fuels used by end-use sec- used by developed economies and inter-
tors. The energy sources used by differ- national organisations. The availability
ent sectors are essential to track their of reliable energy balance tables from a
energy intensities and quantify savings country’s official sources is essential for
from energy efficiency improvements. research on tracking improvements in
The disaggregation of final energy use to energy efficiency and fuel diversifica-
end-users is complete in the IEA energy tion to meet its development and climate
balance but incomplete in MoSPIs energy goals. Hence, MoSPI must correct its ene-
balance. Due to the incomplete disaggre- rgy balance tables and provide a reliable
gation, the estimate of agriculture and source for national energy statistics.
transport energy intensity is much lower One of the challenges in adopting better
in the MoSPI data than in the IEA data. energy data management in India is that
The method used to estimate transport the dissemination of energy data is not in-
energy intensity in MoSPI does not fol- stitutionalised under legislation (Rai et al
low international practices. More impor- 2017). While legislation can provide the
tantly, the transport energy intensity is push for better data management, it is
incorrect as many oil products used in not essential. There is evidence that India
EPWRF India Time Series
Expansion of Banking Statistics Module
(State-wise Data)
The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF) has added state-wise
data to the existing Banking Statistics module of its online India Time Series (ITS)
database.
State-wise and region-wise (north, north-east, east, central, west and south) time series
data are provided for deposits, credit (sanction and utilisation), credit-deposit (CD) ratio,
and number of bank offices and employees.
Data on bank credit are given for a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors (occupation)
such as agriculture, industry, transport operators, professional services, personal loans
(housing, vehicle, education, etc), trade and finance. These state-wise data are also
presented by bank group and by population group (rural, semi-urban, urban and
metropolitan).
The data series are available from December 1972; half-yearly basis till June 1989 and
annual basis thereafter. These data have been sourced from the Reserve Bank of India’s
publication, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India.
Including the Banking Statistics module, the EPWRF ITS has 32 modules covering a
range of macroeconomic and financial data on the Indian economy. For more details,
visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
vol lViii no 29 35
 COMMENTARY
has responded to the global action on
climate change and sustainable deve-
lopment goals without any legislation.
The action on climate change is not cov-
ered under legislation in India. It is still
at the forefront of international efforts to
contribute to meeting the climate change
challenge. Similarly, India is actively
tracking its sustainable development
goals following international efforts to
meet them. Hence, it may not be neces-
sary to wait for a new law or institution
or duplicate the efforts through other or-
ganisations to meet the energy data
challenge. The MOSPI energy statistics
are published under a well-established
process. Efforts to improve it can pro-
vide the necessary support for tracking
India’s development and climate goals.
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vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY
Lahori Ram Balley (1930–2023)
A Reputed Ambedkarite and Social Activist
Ronki Ram
As a committed follower of
B R Ambedkar’s vision, Lahori
Ram Balley (1930–2023) devoted
his life to advancing the cause
of social justice and equality.
He passed away at 93, leaving
behind a legacy of activism and
leadership that inspired many in
Punjab and beyond.
Ronki Ram (ronkiram@yahoo.co.in) is the
Shaheed Bhagat Singh Chair Professor at
Panjab University, Chandigarh.
36
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L
ahori Ram Balley (also known as
L R Balley), a veteran Ambedkarite
and social activist, passed away
on 6 July 2023. He was a household name
among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) of
Punjab, a state known for its largest con-
centration of SC population in India. He
was held in high regard in several other
states as well as among the SC diaspora.
Born on 20 July 1930, to Premi Devi
(mother) and Bhagwan Dass (father) at
Nawanshahr, Balley inherited political
activism from his grandfather, Chaud-
hary Inder Ram, who was associated
with Babu Mangu Ram Mugowalia, the
founder of the historic Ad Dharm move-
ment, in generating social and political
consciousness among the so-called lower
castes in Punjab in the late 1920s. Balley
traced the Ad Dharm Mandal report, a
rare primary document, from the scat-
tered papers of his grandfather and gave
juLY 22, 2023
it to Mark Juergensmeyer, a reputed
American academic and pioneer of Dalit
studies, who visited him in the early
1970s during his doctoral research on
the formation of Dalit consciousness in
Punjab. Eventually, the Ad Dharm Man-
dal report became the forte of Juergens-
meyer’s classic entitled Religion as Social
Vision: The Movement against Untoucha-
bility in 20th Century Punjab, published
by the University of California Press,
Berkeley, CA, in 1982. However, Balley’s
interest in B R Ambedkar’s mission was
ignited by his paternal uncle, Hakim
Gurcharan Dass, an adept admirer of
Ambedkar, who was also closely associ-
ated with Seth Kishan Dass, the main
financer of the Ad Dharm Mandal and
the founder president of the Punjab
Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) in 1942
—the maiden Ambedkarite political par-
ty in Punjab.
Transformative Meeting
with Ambedkar
Balley had shifted to Delhi in 1947 in
search of a job after passing his matricu-
lation examination. On 8 December
1948, he landed the job of “copy holder”
in the government office of the state
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

press at Delhi. It was here in Delhi that
he got the opportunity to meet Ambed-
kar at his residence, Bungalow No 1,
Harding Road (currently called Tilak
Road) in New Delhi. He used to frequent
this road during his routine daily visits
to his office. He was also present during
the occasion of the stone laying ceremony
of the Ambedkar Bhawan at Rani Jhansi
Road, New Delhi in 1951, by Ambedkar
himself. In the words of Balley: “Though
I got the opportunity to meet Dr Ambed-
kar only thrice, and to see and listen to
him many times, but 30 September 1951
proved to be an historic day of my life.” It
was on this very day that Balley prom-
ised Ambedkar: “I will dedicate my en-
tire life for the fulfillment of his mis-
sion.” In fact, it was the time when the
Ambedkarite mission had almost come
to a standstill in Punjab. Many leaders of
the SCF deserted the mission and joined
the Indian National Congress. Seth Kishan
Dass, the founder of the Ambedkar Mis-
sion in Punjab distanced himself from
active politics and got settled in Calcutta
(Kolkata). Another veteran Ambedkarite,
K C Sulekh, general secretary, SCF, who
just a month later had the honour of con-
ducting the stage at Ramdaspura (Boota
Mandi, Jalandhar) during Ambedkar’s
visit to Jalandhar on 27 October 1951,
became absorbed in a full-time job in
1952, which prevented him from devot-
ing quality time to the mission.
Balley kept his promise. After the
parinirvan of Ambedkar on 6 December
1956, he resigned from his job. Since
then, he never looked back. He got the
SCF reorganised with the support of
Charan Dass Nidharak, another veteran
Ambedkarite, and soon after established
the Punjab unit of the Republican Party
of India (RPI) as envisioned by Ambed-
kar. He got the Ambedkar Bhawan con-
structed at a place where Ambedkar
delivered his historic address on the
evening of 27 October 1951. He also
founded Ambedkar Bhawan Trust,
Ambedkar Mission Society, the Punjab
wing of All India Samata Sainik Dal,
Buddhist Society of India, among others,
and led them all from the front till his
last breath. He took Yashwant Ambed-
kar, son of B R Ambedkar, on a whirl-
wind tour of Punjab during the second
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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general election in 1957, and persuaded
him to contest in the 1962 parliamentary
election from Hoshiarpur constituency.
Balley himself contested in the parlia-
mentary election of 1957 against Swaran
Singh, the then cabinet minister in the
Congress government. To spread Dhamma
and further streamline the Ambedkar
Mission in Punjab, he embraced Bud-
dhism in 1963.
Organiser and Institution-builder
In the next year, Balley organised two
major agitations for the acquisition and
distribution of evacuee land among the
landless SC communities in Punjab. The
agitations were launched under the ban-
ner of RPI on 15 June and 6 December
1964 in collaboration with Charan Dass
Nidharak. During this struggle, Bihari
Lal Khaar, the elder brother of Balley,
provided free cycle repair service to a
group of 101 cycle-borne activists who
began their cycle march to Delhi from
Chak Hakim Ravidass Mandir near
Phagwara on 15 June 1964. Before the
second round of this agitation, that took
place on 6 December 1964, Balley and
many more male leaders of the RPI were
arrested. To keep the agitation alive,
women leaders of the RPI took over the
command. On 26 December 1964, they
protested vehemently against the then
chief minister of Punjab who was visiting
Jalandhar. Subsequently, many women
were arrested. Among them was Bibi Ajit
Balley, wife of L R Balley, who was also
sent to jail along with her two small chil-
dren: son Rahul and daughter Sujata.
From among the many noteworthy
contributions made by Balley, the estab-
lishment of Bheem Patrika in 1958, a
monthly Urdu and Punjabi publication,
is the most significant. Its first issue was
published in May 1959. Since 1965, it has
been published in Hindi and also carried
articles in English. Apart from the
monthly journal, Bheem Patrika also be-
gan publishing writings and speeches of
Ambedkar much before the arrival of his
collective works published by the Gov-
ernment of Maharashtra. It also pub-
lished numerous booklets on Ambedka-
rite literature, including books authored
by Balley. Ambedkar Bhawan and Bheem
Patrika publication office, meticulously
vol lViii no 29
COMMENTARY
nurtured by Balley over the years, have
become the most sought-after academic
space in Jalandhar where scholars, po-
litical activists, researchers, and leaders
of varied pursuits and journalists from
within the country and abroad have
been visiting regularly.
A Lasting Memory of Hope
Balley was a prolific writer and an elo-
quent orator with equal fluency in Pun-
jabi, Hindi, Urdu, Persian, and English.
He did not mince words, and was known
for his hard-hitting blunt speeches and
writings, so much so that several cases
had been lodged against him and some
of his booklets were banned. I have had
the honour and privilege to interact with
him many times, including an occasion
to spend an entire week with him during
our participation in an international
conference on the birth celebration of
Ambedkar, held in Lahore in June 2008.
I found in him a cordial and at the same
time a never-to-compromise personality,
and a thoroughly dedicated activist tow-
ards the mission of Ambedkar.
He was a true person of action who
had lived a meaningful life with an
uncommon dedication. During his long
journey, he had inspired, and continues
to inspire, millions with his forceful
views and interpretations, giving hope
to those who had sometimes lost all
hope. This grand old man, deeply dedi-
cated to Ambedkar’s mission of social
justice and equality, had stayed the
course until the age of 93 years.
Permission for
Reproduction of Articles
Published in EPW
No article published in EPW or part
thereof should be reproduced in any
form without prior permission of the
author(s).
A soft/hard copy of the author(s)’s
approval should be sent to EPW.
In cases where the email address of
the author has not been published
along with the articles, EPW can be
contacted for help.
37

Unconventional Monetary Policy
in Japan and the United States
New Perception and Different Learnings?
Surobhi Mukherjee
When most of the advanced
countries are on the recourse to
exit the path of unconventional
monetary policy, it is time to look
at a new perspective and review
the unconventional monetary
policy from the lens of tool
purchase by central banks under
quantitative easing. The purchase
of government treasuries affects
risk premia and yields more
compared to the purchase of
private assets by central banks.
But the purchase of private
exchange traded funds/mortgage
backed securities are important
for cash-starved entrepreneurs
and real-estate developers
compared to government bond
purchase. How India was different
in practising the unconventional
monetary policy is also discussed.
Figure 1 referred in the text is available online.
Surobhi Mukherjee (007surobhi@gmail.com) is
with the Indian Economic Service.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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COMMENTARY
or both. The QE undertaken has resulted
into central bank expansion of range of
securities like outright purchase of asset-
backed securities, exchange traded funds
(ETFs), gilt purchase mainly to facilitate
smooth financing through adequate
quantum of liquidity supply. These tools
of QE often have policy commitments
tied to the real sector like consumer
price index (CPI), index of industrial
T
he unconventional monetary poli- production (IIP), etc, and are aimed to
cies have been in use to give stim- compress the risk premiums.
ulus to the economies of the ad- The aim of this article is to analyse the
vanced countries because the conven- effectiveness of the tools (that is, which
tional measures of monetary policies of the following central bank purchase/
ceased to be effective or large fiscal tool was more effective and how?) used
stimulus led to questions of unsustaina- in unconventional monetary policy as
bility of the debt. Post the financial crisis well as how they are transmitted to the
of 2007–08, the Federal Reserve System concerned variable of interest, therefore
introduced the large-scale asset purchase underlying the importance of channels
programme, Bank of Japan undertook of transmission as well as the tool. The
comprehensive monetary easing1 from tools are essentially the purchase of cen-
October 2010, Bank of England intro- tral bank assets through which liquidity
duced asset purchase programme since provision is happening in the economy.
March 2009 and European Central Bank This is explained in Table 2 (p 18).
undertook long-term refinancing opera-
tions since May 2009—all measures were Underlying Theory
part of unconventional monetary policy The QE is undertaken in the economy to
or popularly known as quantitative easing provide a boost and the overnight call
(QE), mentioned in Table 1. rate is one of the important target rates.
In the conventional measures of mon- However, overnight call rate is a short-
etary policy, the central bank in general term rate and in order to substitute in-
is not engaged in direct buying of public vestment from long-term bonds (which,
or private assets, but the use of uncon- in turn, depend on some idea of a long-
ventional monetary policy means a di- term rate) to short-term bonds, risk pre-
rect intervention by the central bank in mium has to be changed, which is con-
purchase of either public or private assets sistent with preferred habitat theory. It
Table 1: Quantitative Easing Programmes Undertaken by Central Banks of Advanced Countries
Central Bank Programme
Federal Reserve System Large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programme
Bank of Japan Quantitative easing programme (QEP), comprehensive monetary easing (CME)
Bank of England Asset purchase programme (APP)
European Central Bank Longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO)
Source: Compiled by the author.
vol lViii no 29 17
 COMMENTARY

Table 2: Unconventional Monetary Policy Tools under Various The capital-inadequacy ap- scenario where operating target in nor-
Programmes
proach could give us an insight mal circumstances could be affected by
Programme Tool/Central Bank Purchase
into why the Bank of Japan various measures, the operating target
LSAP-Federal Reserve (i) Mortgage backed securities (MBS)
(ii) Treasuries
never had call rate as an oper- under recessionary times is only impact-
(iii) Municipal bonds ating target during QE March ed by unconventional monetary policy
CME, QEP-Bank of Japan (i) Japanese government bonds 2001–March 2006. One of the tool. There exists a bilateral relation bet-
(ii) Corporate bonds main reasons why the Bank of ween QE tool and the operating target.
(iii) Exchange traded funds Japan undertook QE was to Two, since the policy tool is also tied
APP-Bank of England (i) Long-term government bonds increase inflation in the econ- with real economy indicators, it makes
(ii) Private assets omy. As stated by Friedman sense to analyse this relationship as well,
LTRO-European Central Bank Mostly government bonds
(1963), the statement that “In- although paucity in monthly availability
is to be noted that if short-term bonds fl ation is always and everywhere a mon- of certain data (like fiscal deficit) could be
are a perfect substitute for long-term etary phenomenon” holds true as long as a constraint. But literature evidences in
bonds, then ex ante term premium would there is private demand for funds in the support of argument could be provided.
be zero and signalling could serve as an economy, which simply may not be the In the case of Japan, the quantitative
active transmission channel. But since case due to weak balance sheets. Liquid- easing programme (QEP) (March 2001)
long- and short-term bonds are imper- ity frictions does impact entrepreneurs was undertaken prior to the 2008 crisis
fect substitute, the unconventional mon- and households, in words of Paul Krug- where the main QE policy tool was the
etary policy can impact term premium man (2007), “an expansionary monetary purchase of Japanese government bonds
(also called risk premium) through port- policy may not lower effective interest (JGBs) and the operating target chosen
folio balance channel (Tobin 1958). rates very much but may simply spend it- was outstanding current account bal-
Therefore, the real question is, what self in making everybody more liquid.” ances. The purchase of JGBs was tied to
could impact the term premium more, It is also essential to pinpoint about consumer price index (CPI), given Japan
private purchase or gilt/government pur- the role of expectations in monetary pol- was facing deflationary situation. The
chase? Which of the following tools of li- icy, which becomes extremely important zero or negative rates in the call market
quidity provision were influential and in times of liquidity trap according to were not explicitly targeted in this QE,
how they are influential would beg an J M Keynes. Hicks also talks about the though it had implications for the QEP
analysis of the transmission mechanisms. importance of central bank announcement which made the cost of funding yen
The QE policy is meant to increase the and how it can result into shift in expec- practically zero.
nominal demand for goods and services. tations (Scazzieri et al 2008), which is In the case of the US, the federal fund
This is done by lowering the interest now popularly known as “Forward Guid- rate was chosen as the operating target.
rates, overnight call rate (fund rate) for ance.” This was based on the assumption The Federal Open Market Committee
instance, which represents the marginal of extreme rationality and central bank’s (FOMC) maintained its target in the
cost at which banks can fund themselves. policy stance on future price stability range of 0%–0.25% following the non-
Banks can in turn pass on the lower cost was an important factor working on these traditional policy actions. The labour
of funds to their loan customers, which expectations, so any minor changes in market was weak and the industrial pro-
increases bank demand for credit and policy creates ripple effect in expectations. duction was declining, thus non-tradi-
nominal spending increases. It is impor- To sum up, theory provides an insight tional policies should aim to correct
tant to emphasise here that banking sys- into the important aspects of unconven- these real indicators. The US conducted
tem should possess capital adequacy tional monetary policy—(i) compres- its QE in three phases, the tool during
which enables them to increase the sup- sion of risk premia and long-term yield, the first phase (QE1), that is November
ply of credit, but if a bank is constrained (ii) capital adequacy of banks, (iii) pri- 2008 onwards, and the second phase
in supply of credit due to capital inade- vate demand for funds in the economy, (QE2), that is November 2010 onwards
quacy (say because of growing non-per- and (iv) role of expectations. of operation, was largely purchase of
forming assets), then stimulation in the mortgage backed securities (MBS) and
economy shall be less even if low policy Model: A Case Study on Japan treasuries, respectively.
rates prevail. This was also one of the and US Keeping in perspective the importance
reasons why the Federal Reserve Bank Two kinds of relationship could be analys- of capital adequacy and risk premia that
of the United States (US) undertook the ed in the article. One, concerns the im- guides the expansion of liquidity further
second round of quantitative easing. In pact of policy tool on the operating target. by commercial banks (lowering rates by
fact Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), Unlike the conventional monetary policy authority might not be passed on), the QE1
Europe, all these countries had balance
Table 3: Tools and Operating Targets
sheet recession and as a result capital
Country Tool Operating Target Real Sector
inadequacy, as the collapse of debt- Japan JGBs Outstanding current account balances CPI
financed bubbles left them with a huge United States Treasuries, MBS Federal fund rate (call rate) Unemployment rate, inflation rate
debt overhang. Source: Compiled by the author.

18 juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 COMMENTARY

Figure 2: Call Rate (Less Than 24-hour Rate) in Japan Figure 3: Long-term Government Bond Yield in Japan,
April 2001–March 2006 g
60 2
50
1.5
40
Count

30 1

20
0.5
10
0
0

2003M08

2003M12

2004M04

2004M08
2001M04
2001M06
2001M08
2001M10
2001M12
2002M02
2002M04
2002M06
2002M08
2002M10
2002M12
2003M02
2003M04
2003M06

2003M10

2004M02

2004M06

2004M10
2004M12
2005M02
2005M04
2005M06
2005M08
2005M10
2005M12
2006M02
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 More
Call Rate

(which was mainly the purchase of pri-
vate assets) although had small impact
on yield (risk premia therefore), but had
considerable impact on restoring capital
adequacy of banks. The implications of
these purchase were different on the
economy, the analysis for which is sub-
sequently undertaken in the article.
Although Japan undertook such un-
conventional policy measures prior to
the 2007–08 crisis, the operating target
and tool of conducting the monetary
policy were different vis-à-vis the US.
The US, for instance, did not have any
real indicator tied to its policy tool ex-
plicitly, unlike Japan which had CPI.
Likewise, the tool for QE2 in the US and
QE in Japan (2001–06) was similar in na-
ture but the implications on yield and real
targets were pretty different. It is essential
to point out the different time periods
under which such policies were under-
taken pre- and post-crisis but the two
economies were largely in a similar situ-
ation during the onset of the policy like
worsening bank balance sheets, collaps-
ing stock market, poor real indicators,
lower-bound (near zero) rates as a con-
sequence of easy liquidity itself.
It is to be pointed out that irrespective
of the operating target chosen, (impact-
ing risk premia—through alteration of
government bond yields), capital ade-
quacy of banks was extremely important
for stimulation of growth from a mone-
tarist perspective.
The tools used for QE (that is, purchase
of different bonds) might have varied
impacts on operating target or yield for
countries; for instance, a 3D image with
QE, yield and call rate is shown in Figure
1 for US and Japan. A priori, one would
expect QE to have an impact on call rate
and yield, but in the case of Japan—call
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rate hovers around 0–0.005, that is, max-
imum data points are coloured blue with
very few red dots depicting the range of
0.015–0.02. It is as if QE is having the no
impact on call rate at all compared to the
US which has a contrasting distribution
compared to Japan.
In the case of Japan, time series varia-
ble like QE, less than 24-hour rate, yield,
CPI, and current account balances are
subjected to time series analysis, result-
ing in all the time series variables show-
ing seasonal or trend components (non-
stationary), except for call rate which
hardly shows any variability. This call
rate is essentially the interbank rate in
Japan, the benchmark lending rate bet-
ween banks in Japan. The call rates were
already prevailing low in Japan prior to
QEP undertaken since March 2001. It
reduced to 0.001 in February 2002 and
the histogram (Figure 2) shows an ex-
tremely concentrated count of call rate
in Japan.
Expectedly, with little or no variation
in the call rate as a result of QE in Japan,
the data is stationary which should not
come as a surprise. Notice that the gov-
ernment bond yields are very low, but
they are not consistently falling as it
should be the case. What could explain
such unexpected behaviour? The long-
term government bond yield increased
from June 2003 to August 2003 and
thereafter from June 2005. The reason is
because of the large debt incurred by the
government, which practically makes
the impact of tool purchase of JGB on
yield less. The impact of tool on IIP and
CPI is also muted; however, one must ac-
knowledge that real indicators are af-
fected by variables like fiscal deficit,
growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP) itself, among others.
vol lViii no 29
The effective fund rate or the call rate
is the operating target for the US, which,
unlike Japan, does show some variabili-
ty and therefore is non-stationary as
shown in the Hodrick–Prescott filter de-
composition in Figure 4 (p 20). Federal
funds rate is highly influential because it
serves as a base for interest rates for var-
ious credit and financial institutions to
business and consumers. It is also worth-
while to note that despite interest rates
approaching zero-lower bound, it worked
effectively as an operating target, some-
thing that the FOMC can control on a
day-to-day basis.
While Fed defines its federal fund rate
target explicitly, Bank of England and
European Central Bank only target it im-
plicitly; interestingly, Bank of Japan cre-
ates excess reserves and explicitly tar-
geted current account balances (2001
March onwards). In this context, it could
have been argued that why reserve posi-
tions are not target of interest and why
only short-term interest rates are targeted
especially in the US, when QE through
central bank balance sheet expansion is
happening at such a massive scale. The
debate has been dealt with in several
papers, one of them being Bindseil (2004).
The frequency of interventions is another
crucial factor.
The histogram for effective fund rate
for the US is not as concentrated as Japan’s
call rate (Figure 2).
Unlike Japan, it is to be noticed that
the fall in yield is consistent for the US
from January 2009–April 2013, but
thereafter it rises.
To sum up the model, concerned
variable(s) of interest in the case of
Japan include purchase of JGB (QE, denot-
ed in million yen), yield, call rate (inter-
bank rate), current account balances
19
 COMMENTARY
Figure 4: Hodrick–Prescott Filter Decomposition for Fund Rate in the US Figure 5: Call Rate (Effective Fund Rate) in the US
(Operating Target) 18
Hodrick–Prescott Filter (lambda=14400)
.24
16
14
.20
12
.16
10

Count
.06
.12
.04 8
.08
.02 6
.00 .04 4
-.02
-.04
2
-.06 0
-.08 0.07 0.08875 0.1075 0.12625 0.145 0.16375 0.1825 0.20125 More
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Effective Fund Rate
Effective fund rate
effective fund rate
Trend
Trend Figure 7: H–P Filter Decomposition for Outstanding Current Account Balances
CycleCycle in Japan (Operating Target)
Hodrick–Prescott Filter (lambda=14400)
Figure 6: Average Yield Rate in the US, January 2009–October 2014
100,000

3.00 80,000
2.50 60,000
2.00 40,000
40,000
1.50 30,000
20,000
1.00 20,000
0.50 10,000 0

0.00 0

-0.50 -10,000
July 2009

July 2010

July 2011

July 2012

July 2013

July 2014
January 2009
April 2009

October 2009
January 2010
April 2010

October 2010
January 2011
April 2011

October 2011
January 2012
April 2012

October 2012
January 2013
April 2013

October 2013
January 2014
April 2014

October 2014

-20,000
II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Current account
current accoutbalances
balances
Trend
Trend
Long-term inflation indexed average US treasury fund rate/yield Cycle
Cycle

(operating target), IIP and CPI (real indi- This is nothing but mainly creation of affected by variables which could be
cators). Similarly, the concerned vari- excess reserves. outside the control of unconventional
able(s) of interest in the case of US in- The data also shows a shock and monetary policy. Out of the two real in-
clude purchase of MBS and treasuries change of intercept in outstanding cur- dicators (CPI and IIP) in Japan, CPI was
(QE, denoted in million dollars), yield, rent account balances from March 2003 tied to the policy tool explicitly during
fund rate (call rate also the operating onwards. The central bank of Japan the QEP, but the results show no impact
target), CPI and unemployment rate stepped up the QEP from early 2003 on- of purchase of government bonds on CPI.
(real indicators). wards, which justifies the shock. Moreover, the change in QE could not alter
It indicates the amount of money that the deflationary tendencies in Japan at all.
Short- and Long-run the financial institutions can use freely The density plot2 between QE in Japan
Relationship(s) to loan, by increasing the amount of and CPI is extremely concentrated in the
The time series variables undertaken funds; the Bank of Japan promotes the south-east corner of the Figure 9 (p 21)
for interpretation of unconventional QE policy of finance. A long-run relation indicating high easing and low CPI.
monetary policy tool in Japan show that between QE and yield also exists, but Moreover, in the construct of the
the purchase of JGB impacts the operat- there is something odd with the Japa- model when a shock was given to change
ing target that is outstanding current nese long-term government bond yields. in QE, it had a muted impact on the
account balances (tested for causality). It is not consistently falling (thus risk change in CPI, confirming the ineffec-
It is essential to point out that Japanese premia would also not fall consistently). tiveness of unconventional monetary
economy never had call rate (interbank) This oddity could be explained by the policy on the explicit CPI target. But the
as an operating target as there was no huge general government debt-to-GDP impact of QE on IIP exists in the short
variation in call rate at all and specifi- ratio of Japan. It is to be noticed how the run, which is why IIP increases post
cally it could not have fallen below fur- level of this debt-to-GDP ratio is also October 2003.
ther and stimulated borrowing. There- higher in Japan compared to the US from
fore, outstanding current account bal- 2003 to 2006, given the US was also in-
ances were chosen as an operating curring fiscal expenditure and the long-
available at
target which means the “amount of term gilt-yields rose from mid-2003 on-
funds of checking accounts which the wards in Japan.
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal Chowk,
financial institutions open with the The impact of this policy tool on real
Ranchi 834 001, Jharkhand
Bank of Japan for the purpose of settle- economy is ambiguous. It is to be em-
Ph: 09470564686
ment with other financial institutions.” phasised that real indicators might be
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 COMMENTARY
Figure 8: General Government Debt/GDP of Japan and US, 2003–06 Figure 9: Density Plot between Quantitative Easing and CPI in Japan
200
102.0
150
101.5

CPI
Level
6e–06
100 4e–06
101.0 2e–06

50
100.5

0
2003 2004 2005 2006 100.0
4,50,000 5,00,000 5,50,000 6,00,000 6,50,000
General govt
General govtdebt/GDP
debt/GDPJapan General govt
General govtdebt/GDP
debt/GDPUSUSA QE

Figure 10: IIP Data for Japan, April 2001–March 2006 Figure 11: QE, Fund Rate and Long-term Yield in US from January 2009–
p October 2014
100 6,00,000 3.00
98 5,00,000 2.50
96 2.00
4,00,000
94 1.50
3,00,000
92 1.00
90 2,00,000 0.50
88 1,00,000 0.00
86 0 -0.50

October 2011
January 2009

January 2010

January 2011

January 2012

January 2013

January 2014
July 2009

July 2010

July 2011

July 2012

July 2013

July 2014
April 2009

October 2009

April 2010

October 2010

April 2011

April 2012

October 2012

April 2013

October 2013

April 2014

October 2014
84
82
80
1
4
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006

QE in millions of dollars fund

Fundrate
rate long termaverage
Long-term averageUS
us treasury fund rate

Figure 12: Inflation Rate in US, 2009–14 Figure 13: Government Expenditure in US, 2009–15
5 6,400
4 6,200
3 6,000
2 5,800
1
5,600
0
-1 5,400
-2 5,200
-3 5,000
January 2011
January 2009

January 2010

January 2012

January 2013

January 2014
July 2009

July 2010

July 2011

July 2012

July 2013

July 2014
April 2009

October 2009

April 2010

October 2010

April 2011

October 2011

April 2012

October 2012

April 2013

October 2013

April 2014

October 2014

1/1/2009
1/5/2009
1/9/2009
1/1/2010
1/5/2010
1/9/2010
1/1/2011
1/5/2011
1/9/2011
1/1/2012
1/5/2012
1/9/2012
1/1/2013
1/5/2013
1/9/2013
1/1/2014
1/5/2014
1/9/2014
1/1/2015
1/5/2015
1/9/2015
governmentexpenditure
Government expenditure(in(in Billion
billion dollars)
dollars)

The Federal Reserve pursued its QE
programme, and the impact on yield, fund
rate (call rate) and real variables could
be judged based upon the nature of as-
sets purchased; for instance, the MBS
purchase under QE1 (initiated in Novem-
ber 2008) not only lowered long-term
yields but also reduced corporate credit
risk and helped in restoring capital ade-
quacy of banks. The QE1 had a dispro-
portionate effect on the yield compared
to QE2 where treasury bonds were pur-
chased and the latter was more influen-
tial in changing the market’s anticipa-
tion regarding future federal funds rate.
Lower variation in the supply of treas-
uries also helped minimise the “duration
risk” factor as noted by Vayanos (2014)
under QE2; on the other hand, the “de-
fault risk premia” was reduced in QE1 for
Economic & Political Weekly EPW juLY 22, 2023
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corporate. The overall impact on the yield the creation of money but on consump-
as well as risk premia is also dispropor- tion and insufficient demand may con-
tionate. Therefore, it could be interpret- strain output and prices. As Krugman
ed further that the signalling effect could points out:
have been larger under QE2 than QE1. In
Money becomes irrelevant at the margin
the same breath, the forward guidance and it is a credibility problem regarding gen-
or signalling channel should have a larg- eration of inflationary expectations, espe-
er impact on bonds with intermediate cially for a country like United States or Ja-
maturity than on long-maturity rate bonds, pan, as they are not irresponsible country
(Zimbabwe creates inflation easily).
since the commitment to keep rates low
lasts only until the economy recovers, Moreover, the implicit 2% inflation tar-
post which Federal Reserve can sell the get was maintained (shown in Figure 12)
accumulated assets—both treasuries and in the US for most of the period under-
MBS at market rates, earning windfall taken for analysis and generating expec-
profits. This is perhaps the reason why a tations beyond this 2% target would
short-run relation only exists between mean that the public belief had to be al-
QE, call rate and yields when time series tered towards long-run sustenance of the
analysis was carried out. ongoing monetary policy, which clearly
From the perspective of real indica- was not the goal. It is to be emphasised
tors, the price index not only depends on here that achieving the 2% target was
vol lViii no 29 21
 COMMENTARY
Figure 14: Unemployment Rate in US, 2009–14
12
10
8 structure Leasing & Financial Services
6
4 2.0 allowed the central bank to lend
2
0 collateralised government assets with a
1/10/2009
1/1/2009
1/4/2009
1/7/2009
Table 4: Comparison of US and Japan wrt Tool Purchase under Quantitative Easing
US
Both private and treasuries were purchased
Interest rate targeting
Impact of treasury on yield is more
2% target already achieved
Unemployment fell, gradually
Table 5: Comparison of Tool Purchase under Quantitative Easing in Japan (2001–06) and Japan (2010)
Japan (2001–06)
Mostly Japanese government bonds were purchased Both equity and Japanese government bonds were
Impact on yield is less
Less impact on inflation
itself not a small task; huge fiscal stimu-
lus was provided in the form of rebates
in taxes to investment in business that
was able to spur the inflation.
Employment or unemployment is a
lagging indicator; it typically recovers
after a period of significant recession and
the impact of QE on labour market was less
documented. Although, unemployment
did fall post the QE in the US but workers
in the labour market were believed to be
underemployed or working below their
skill levels due to lack of availability of
higher paying jobs. Even though the
cash flows and profits of the corporate
improved, it does not mean that the job
market became efficient as real wages
were low as well as the productivity.
India’s Unconventional Policies
Post the Fed’s announcement and inten-
tion of tapering the QE in mid-2013, vola-
tility in the financial markets returned in
India. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
twisted the yield of government securi-
ties to bring liquidity into the markets, by
simultaneous buying and selling govern-
ment securities—both short and long term
—through open market operations (OMOs)
22
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especially TLTRO 2.0. It may be noted
that the COVID-19 circumstances creat-
ed an altogether different reason for ac-
quiring liquidity unlike the normal
business/economic cycles. The Infra-
Limited (IL&FS) default left the NBFCs
lurking for liquidity. Both TLTRO 1.0 and
money to banks for one to three years at
the current repo rate in exchange for
1/10/2010
1/10/2011
1/10/2012
1/10/2013
1/10/2014
1/1/2010
1/4/2010
1/7/2010
1/1/2011
1/4/2011
1/7/2011
1/1/2012
1/4/2012
1/7/2012
1/1/2013
1/4/2013
1/7/2013
1/1/2014
1/4/2014
1/7/2014
similar or longer term. It is to be seen
that how the unconventional monetary
policy of India impacted G-sec of dif-
ferent maturity buckets, is a study for a
Japan later date.
Mostly government bonds were purchased
Reserve targeting
Conclusions
Impact on yield is less: reason fiscal deficit
No visibly large impact on CPI, muted effect The major channels through which un-
IIP increased, gradually conventional monetary policies impacts
the economy are through furnishing ad-
Japan (2010) equate quantum of liquidity and com-
pressing risk premium as argued in this
purchased article. The QE is carried out using vari-
Impact on yield and risk premia is more ous tools or asset purchase that has im-
Equity prices have risen, so is food and energy.
plications for overall yield, risk premia,
which came to be known as Operation operating target as well as real indica-
Twist and was an unconventional meas- tors. This article brings about an impor-
ure in this sense (without expanding the tant conclusion.
balance sheet). The tool moderated the There is a disproportionate impact on
yields of government securities and re- the yield (especially) of policy tool un-
duced the cost of borrowing. By pur- der QE, the MBS purchase (QE1) in the US
chasing longer-term bonds, the RBI can as a part of QE brought down the yield
help drive the bond prices up and yields and risk premia less compared to treas-
down (since prices and yields move in ury purchase (QE2). This premise is not
opposite directions). At the same time, only true for MBS purchase by the Feder-
selling shorter-term bonds should cause al Reserve Bank but also holds true
their yields to go up (since their prices when the Bank of Japan purchases the
would fall)—a befitting action as sur- corporate bonds and exchange traded
plus liquidity often chases shorter-dated funds and the Bank of England purchas-
assets and subsequently leads to cross- es private assets. One could dig deeper
country arbitrage, investment in gold, to argue that there are re-saleability
etc. Lower longer-term yields help by constraints in private equity purchase
making loans less expensive for those vis-à-vis government bonds, and the
looking to buy homes, purchase cars, household liquidity might improve much
and finance projects, while saving be- more in the latter case.
comes less desirable because it does not There exists liquidity crisis in private
pay as much interest. financial assets, and liquidity frictions of
The targeted long-term repo operations such large scale cannot be neglected for
(TLTRO) was another tool at the disposal revival of the economy because it impacts
of RBI, which to a certain extent meant the ability to invest in capital. When cen-
financing the non-bank financiers post tral banks purchase private assets, some
COVID-19 and easing the liquidity for non- portfolio rebalancing occurs and the pri-
banking financial companies (NBFCs) vate investors sell their assets to the cen-
and microfinance institutions (MFIs)— tral bank and are forced to find new
juLY 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

places to park their money. In fact, li-
quidity holdings of households and
business could be affected by these tools,
as some of these tools/asset purchases
also allow credit-starved entrepreneurs
to increase investment and households
to demand more loans. To put it in a
nutshell, QE is not only concerned with
quantity, but it is also concerned with
the composition of assets purchased by
central banks.
The disproportionate impact on yield
from the purchase of private assets un-
der QE1 compared to QE2 where the
treasury bonds were purchased is anoth-
er point to emphasise on tools, where
the latter was more influential in chang-
ing the market’s anticipation regarding
future federal funds rate, under Japan’s
second round of QE—comprehensive
monetary easing from October 2010,
central bank purchased ETFs. This tool is
resaleable and carries higher default risk
unlike JGB, but is important for the liquid-
ity constrained and cash-starved entities
like entrepreneurs and real-estate devel-
opers who sold ETFs.
During recession, economy is far away
from price stability and optimal output,
owing to negative investment shocks
and if these shocks are persistent in na-
ture then it escalates the level of crisis. A
positive shock similarly is assumed to
have an opposite impact. Thus, practising
unconventional monetary policy by for-
ward guidance (which is not in nature of
shock or is more anticipatory in nature)
makes the pace of recovery slower, espe-
cially of the real indicators.
One of the limitations of this article
has been less focus on the channels
through which real indicators are im-
pacted; say, the impact of QE on unem-
ployment rate and CPI would be less di-
rect compared to the impact of call rate
and yield, yet the process of recovery
would be gradual in nature. Empirical
evidence from the Bank of England also
shows gradual employment recovery
post the asset purchase programme (QE),
so there is not really a case for job-rich
recovery. Most importantly, in the US and
Europe, the inequality worsened post
these unconventional policy measures
because the wages at the lower end of
income distribution were not boosted;
low interest rates favoured the borrow-
ers and if skilled workers were working
in relatively unskilled, low-paying jobs,
then underemployment phenomena also
crops up, as happened in the US.
Notes
1 Bank of Japan also practised “Quantitative
Easing Programme—QEP” from March 2001–
March 2006.
2 Density plot estimated from Kernel Density.
References
Bindseil, U (2004): The Operational Target of Mon-
etary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Posi-
tion Doctrine, Germany: European Central Bank.
Friedman, M (1963): A Monetary History of the
United States, 1867–1960, New Jersey: Prince-
ton University Press.
Krugman, P (2007): Conscience of a Liberal, United
States: W W Norton.
Scazzieri, Roberto, Amartya Sen and Stefano Zamag-
ni (2008): Markets, Money and Capital: Hick-
sian Economics for the Twenty First Century,
Cambridge University Press.
Tobin (1958): “Liquidity Preference as Behavior
Towards Risk,” Review of Economic Studies,
Vol 25, No 2, pp 65–86.
Vayanos, R G (2014): “Bond Supply and Excess
Bond Returns,” Review of Financial Studies,
Vol 27, No 3, pp 663–713.

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 SPECIAL ARTICLE
COMMENTARY

$QRQOLQHGDWDEDVHRQ,QGLDQHFRQRP\VWUXFWXUHGLQGLIIHUHQWPRGXOHV

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 PERSPECTIVES
Monetary Policy Debates in
the Age of Deglobalisation
The Turkish Experiment—III
Hasan Cömert, T Sabri Öncü
This article is the third and the
last in a series on monetary
policy debates in the age in
which deglobalisation became a
buzzword. Here, we continue the
discussion of the ongoing Turkish
monetary policy experiment by
focusing on the macro-prudential
measures, capital controls, and
central bank independence, as
promised in the first article, as an
example of these debates.
This article is third in the series of HT Parekh
Columns published in Vol 57, No 46,
12 November 2022 and Vol 58, No 11, 18 March
2023 issues.
Hasan Cömert (hasan.comert@trincoll.edu)
teaches economics at Trinity College,
Hartford Connecticut, US. T Sabri Öncü
(sabri.oncu@gmail.com) is an economist based
in İstanbul, Turkey.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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I
n the second article of this series,
“The Turkish Experiment—II,” we
went back to 1980 and summarised
what happened along the way to the on-
going monetary experiment that started
after the currency crisis of August 2018.
Now, we shift our focus to central bank-
ing in Turkey and briefly analyse how it
evolved under the ongoing 20-years’ reign
of the Justice and Development Party
(AKP), the governing political party in
Turkey, from November 2002 to April
2016. In April 2016, Murat Çetinkaya as-
sumed the position of chair, leading the
central bank until he was dismissed in
July 2019. It was during his tenure that
the currency crisis of August 2018 took
place. We then analyse the ongoing
monetary experiment that started in his
term in detail. This is preceded by the
ongoing monetary policy debates in the
age in which deglobalisation became
a buzzword.
Monetary Policy Debates
Although the monetary policy debates
on central bank’s independence, macro-
prudential measures (MPMs), and capital
controls have intensified after the global
financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–08 (Haldane
2021), each can be traced back to dec-
ades earlier.
The world’s first legally independent
central bank is probably the central bank
of the United States (US), the Federal
Reserve (Fed). The Fed gained its inde-
pendence from the treasury with the
Treasury–Fed Accord of 4 March 1951
(Hetzel and Leach 2001). However, the
widespread adoption of central bank
independence was born out of the Great
Inflation of the 1970s (Haldane 2021), and
its academic roots go back to the seminal
articles by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
vol lViII no 29
and Barro and Gordon (1983). They
argued that policymakers should follow
rules rather than have discretion because
discretion would result in time-inconsistent
outcomes as politicians may seek short-
term political gains. Then, central bank
independence became the mantra in the
1980s, and by the end of the 20th centu-
ry, about 80%–90% of the world’s central
banks were independent, at least, opera-
tionally (Haldane 2021). Pioneered by
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in
1989, inflation targeting became the
game in town, and the independent cen-
tral banks focused on price stability (that
is, low inflation) by employing a single
tool, namely a short-term interest rate,
usually overnight.
Not that no one had questioned central
bank independence, inflation targeting,
a single monetary policy tool consisting
of a short-term interest rate, and the
single objective of price stability before
the GFC (see, for example, Forder [1998]
and the references therein). However,
the GFC changed all of that. The central
banking practices underwent significant
changes in both developed and develop-
ing countries, as a result. The obsession
with single-digit inflation targeting weak-
ened, and the concerns about financial
stability and MPMs gained importance
(Benlialper and Cömert 2016).
While the term macro-prudential
gained popularity following the GFC, its
precise meaning remained ambiguous
(Clement 2010). Clement traced the term’s
origins to a subsection titled “the ‘macro-
prudential’ risks inherent in maturity
transformation in banks’ international
business” in a Bank of International Set-
tlements (BIS) report (BS/79/44, dated
November 1979). The use of quotation
marks in the title indicated to him that
the term was regarded as somewhat new
or novel. What was referred to as macro-
prudential risk in that report is now com-
monly known as systemic risk, which
can be broadly defined as the expected
losses resulting from the failure of a sig-
nificant portion of the financial sector,
leading to a reduction in credit availa-
bility and potential adverse effects on the
real economy (Acharya and Öncü 2013).
43
 PERSPECTIVES
The European Central Bank (ECB 2023)
defines MPMs as those aimed at enhanc-
ing the financial system’s resilience to
identified systemic risks, a definition broad
enough to encompass a multitude of
measures, potentially leading to a wide
range of approaches being called macro-
prudential. So, the ambiguity that Clement
identified remains true to this day.
We discussed the liberalisation of capital
accounts that started in the 1980s in the
previous articles of the series (Öncü and
Öncü 2022; Cömert and Öncü 2023a).
This liberalisation resulted in the re-
moval of capital controls in most coun-
tries, developed and developing alike.
According to the trilemma—a cornerstone
of international finance theory and mone-
tary economics—under a fixed exchange
rate regime, domestic interest rates can
be determined independently of world
interest rates only through capital con-
trols. In other words, the effectiveness
of monetary policy can only be achieved
by either abandoning capital mobility or
giving up the fixed exchange rate re-
gime. Here, by effectiveness, we refer to
the ability to reach the stated goals.
Although many unorthodox economists,
such as Palley (2003), Grabel (2003),
and Vernango (2006), focused on the
adverse effects of capital flows in devel-
oping countries to argue that even under
floating exchange rate regimes, develop-
ing countries would have limited monetary
policy manoeuvrability without capital
controls even before the GFC. And after
the GFC, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) took action in 2012. In a policy
paper titled “The Liberalisation and
Management of Capital Flows: An Insti-
tutional View,” the IMF claimed that
although capital flows are desirable
because they can bring substantial bene-
fits to recipient countries, they can also
result in macroeconomic challenges and
financial stability risks (IMF 2012). The
policy paper hesitantly proposed the
inclusion of capital flow management
(CFMs) measures, MPMs, and CFMs that
are also MPMs (CFM/MPMs) into the policy
toolkit, albeit in a limited manner (during
inflow surges and disruptive outflows),
and outlined the circumstances in which
they might be useful. However, it stressed
that these measures should not be seen
44
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as a substitute for necessary macro-
economic adjustments (IMF nd).
Shortly after the publication of the
IMF’s institutional view, Hélène Rey (2013)
presented an article titled “Dilemma Not
Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle
and Monetary Policy Independence” at the
Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve of Kansas
City Economic Symposium in August 2013.
In her article, Rey argued that whenever
capital is freely mobile, the global finan-
cial cycle constrains the national monetary
policies regardless of the exchange rate
regime and that the global financial cycle
has transformed the well-known trilemma
into a “dilemma.” Cömert (2016, 2019),
following an evolutionary/institutional/
structural framework and, partly inspired
by Rey (2013), has argued that develop-
ments since the 1980s have progressively
reduced central banks’ capacity to imple-
ment effective monetary policies, result-
ing in the progressive transformation of
post-Bretton Woods central banking from
a trilemma to dilemma. In contrast to
Rey (2013), Cömert (2013, 2016, 2019)
also emphasises the role of central banks’
policy choices and changes in local mar-
kets as factors influencing the effective-
ness of national monetary policy.
Scholarship on the dilemma rightly
argues that financial flows can signifi-
cantly influence the macro variables of
developing countries through various
channels. However, as demonstrated by
the example of Turkey, even in the
absence of capital outflows, a sudden in-
crease in domestic investors’ demand for
foreign currencies and precious metals,
such as gold, resulting from flight to safety
(Cömert and Öncü 2023b), constantly
threatens the effectiveness of central bank
policies in developing countries. With this
understanding, let us now focus on the
Turkish example.1
Monetary Policy before Çetinkaya
The Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey (CBRT) conducts its monetary
policy not only through open market
operations (OMOs) but also occasionally
utilises the “lender of last resort” role,
although it stopped using the latter since
1 June 2018. The foundation of the OMOs
infrastructure was established with the
initiation of Government Domestic Debt
july 22, 2023
Securities (GDDS) auctions on 29 May
1985. After launching the interbank money
market within its own structure on 2 April
1986, the CBRT started conducting OMOs
on 4 February 1987.
Initially, the CBRT relied on the fol-
lowing three main tools: (i) direct pur-
chases and sales; (ii) sale and repurchase
agreements (repos) and purchase and
resale agreements (reverse repos); and
(iii) required reserve ratios for deposits.
As discussed in the second article of
the series, the partial trade liberalisation
in 1984 allowed for holding foreign cur-
rency (FX) accounts at domestic banks.
This was facilitated through Decree Num-
ber 30 on the Protection of the Value of
Turkish Currency, issued on 7 July 1984.
With a significant increase in FX deposits
following the implementation of Decree
Number 30, starting from 1 January
1986, the CBRT extended the reserve re-
quirements to cover FX deposits in addi-
tion to Turkish lira (TRY) deposits, which
had been subject to reserve require-
ments since the CBRT’s establishment on
30 May 1933.
These initial tools were later comple-
mented by additional tools as the CBRT’s
OMOs evolved. On 5 July 1999, the CBRT
introduced intra-day liquidity facility
(IDLF) as the first lender of last resort
facility to address urgent funding needs
in the banking system and alleviate
congestion in payment systems. When
the 2001 crisis arrived shortly after, it had
significant effects on central banking in
Turkey. On the night of 21 February 2001,
a decision was made to transition from a
crawling-pegged to a flexible exchange
rate regime, following the outbreak of
the currency crisis. Furthermore, start-
ing from 29 March 2001, the CBRT initiat-
ed FX purchase and sale auctions to sup-
port the banks in meeting their short-
term foreign exchange liabilities. As part
of the IMF-supported structural reform
programme, the direct financing of the
government by the CBRT was prohibited,
and in April 2001, the bank achieved
instrument independence.
On 28 March 2002, the CBRT intro-
duced another innovation by adding de-
posit purchase and sale instruments—
known as depos—to repos and reverse
repos. Additionally, from 1 July 2002,
vol lViII no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the CBRT implemented the late liquidity
window (LLW/LON)2 as an overnight depo
facility, operating within the framework
of its function as the lender of last resort.
Repos and depos are essentially collater-
alised borrowing and lending instru-
ments,3 and apart from certain legal
details, accepted collaterals, and usages,
they do not have significant operational
differences. The significance of depos
was that they broadened the set of ac-
ceptable collaterals beyond GDDS, which
were the only acceptable collaterals for
repos. This expansion aimed to address
the increased funding needs of banks
during the banking crisis that erupted
on 19 February 2001.
From 2002 to 2005, the CBRT, in colla-
boration with the government, embraced
an implicit inflation targeting policy. This
policy involved setting inflation targets
and maintaining instrument independ-
ence to attain those targets. After some
minor changes in 2006, the implicit in-
flation targeting regime took an explicit
form of announcing inflation targets for
the next three years and determining
the overnight interest rate in monthly
monetary policy committee meetings.
Similar to other inflation targeting prac-
tices, the CBRT relied on overnight inter-
est rates and commitment to a flexible
exchange rate regime as the fundamental
components of this policy framework.
Within this framework, the CBRT began
implementing an interest rate corridor
in a narrow band. The corridor consisted
of the lower bound represented by the
overnight reverse repo borrowing rate
and the upper bound represented by the
overnight repo lending rate. Effectively,
the lower bound became the policy rate.
During the implementation of the
inflation targeting regime under the su-
pervision of the IMF, significant reforms
were implemented in the financial sec-
tor. Additionally, new independent reg-
ulatory bodies, including the Banking
Regulation and Supervision Authority
(BRSA), were established.
Further, through a regulation published
in the Official Gazette on 5 October 2006,
the legal framework for issuing and
redeeming liquidity securities was estab-
lished. However, except for four issu-
ances made between 19 July 2007 and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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15 November 2007, the CBRT did not uti-
lise this instrument.
At that time, due to the substantial
liquidity generated through the bank
rescue operations guided by the IMF fol-
lowing the 2001 banking crisis, and the
purchase of FX as capital flows redirected
inward in 2002 due to monetary expan-
sion in the United States (US), Europe
and other advanced economies, the CBRT
was a net borrower. To manage the excess
liquidity, liquidity securities were intro-
duced as additional instruments to with-
draw it. However, the onset of the GFC
and the subsequent reversal in capital
flows reduced the necessity for their uti-
lisation. Indeed, with the substantial in-
crease in the size and volatility of capital
flows into developing economies follow-
ing the GFC, the CBRT transitioned into a
net lender position starting from 2010,
which it continues to maintain to this
day. Consequently, the overnight reverse
repo borrowing rate, which served as
the lower bound of the corridor, lost its
effectiveness as the policy rate.
Following that, on 18 May 2010, the
CBRT introduced one-week term repo
quantity auctions using the quotation
method and adopted the interest rate of
one-week term repos as the policy rate.
Subsequently, on 18 September 2010, the
CBRT transitioned to a wide interest rate
corridor encompassing the previous lower
and upper bounds, with the new policy
rate positioned somewhere in the middle.
The core concept of this framework in-
volved asymmetrically setting the width
of the interest rate corridor around the
policy rate to attain a desired weighted
average funding rate. This was achieved
by actively managing funding through
one-week repo and overnight repo facili-
ties. This rate is called the CBRT weighted
average funding rate.
The reserve option mechanism (ROM)
invented by the CBRT was the last mone-
tary policy tool inherited by Çetinkaya
from his predecessors. While the CBRT
referred to it as a monetary policy tool,
it can also be regarded as an MPM, as it
was designed to enhance the economy’s
resilience against the volatility of capital
flows and external financial shocks
(Aslaner et al 2015). Effective 16 Septem-
ber 2011, the ROM was introduced through
vol lViII no 29
PERSPECTIVES
an amendment to the Regulation on
Required Reserves, which was published
in the Official Gazette on 12 September
2011. The ROM gave the banks the option
to hold a fraction of their required re-
serves for TRY liabilities in dollar, euro,
and standard gold, and on 4 November
2016, the option of maintaining required
reserves with scrap gold was also added
to the mechanism. The assumption
was that the banks would react to the
volatility in capital flows by adjusting
their ROM utilisation so that it would
act as an automatic stabiliser to smooth
the impact of capital flows on the
domestic economy. Unfortunately, his-
tory has shown that the ROM has not
behaved as expected during capital
outflows; rather than decreasing their
ROM utilisation, banks did the opposite
(Aslaner et al 2015).
The diversification of the tools we have
summarised above was a natural conse-
quence of the CBRT adding financial sta-
bility (and growth) as an objective to its
price stability goal, in line with similar
examples worldwide. The CBRT had no
choice but to diversify its monetary pol-
icy tools to cope with the increased vol-
atility in financial flows caused by the
monetary expansion policies associated
with the GFC, such as the quantitative
easing policy of the Fed in developed
countries. Although the CBRT planned to
return to the inflation targeting regime
after 2010, it has not been able to realise
this transition until today.
Monetary Policy from Çetinkaya
to Kavcıoğlu
The AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, adopted a policy of reducing
interest rates from the early days of their
rule. This stance resulted in tensions
between president Erdoğan and the CBRT
chairs, except for Şahap Kavcıoğlu, who
served as the CBRT chair from 20 March
2021 to 9 June 2023. Çetinkaya was
no exception. The reason why Kavcıoğlu
did not have any conflicts with president
Erdoğan should be evident from Figure 1
(p 46), which illustrates the CBRT weighted
average funding rate in comparison to the
Fed effective funding rate. While all the
other CBRT chairs responded and aligned
with the monetary policy decisions of
45
 PERSPECTIVES
Figure 1: CBRT Weighted Average and Fed Effective Funding Rates
27
24
21
18
15
CBRT weighted average funding rates (left axis)
12
9 weighted average funding rate from 8.74%
6 2018. Of course, this did not go unno-
3 0
1/2011 1/2013 1/2015
Source: CBRT and Fed.
the Fed, including its decisions on the
quantitative easing programme, which
are not shown in the figure, Kavcıoğlu
was the only CBRT chair who consistently
lowered the CBRT policy rate even as the
Fed was raising theirs. How Kavcıoğlu
was able to accomplish this is part and
parcel of the monetary policy experi-
ment that has been ongoing since the
August 2018 currency crisis.
We should mention also that a year
after Çetinkaya became the chair of the
CBRT on 19 April 2016, with the 16 April
2017 referendum, Turkey transitioned from
a parliamentarian regime to a presidential
one. Then, Erdoğan won the presidency in
the presidential and general elections on
25 June 2018, and gave himself the legal
right to appoint and dismiss a long list of
high-ranking civil servants, including
the high-ranking officers of the CBRT.
Çetinkaya’s period: It is difficult to
describe Çetinkaya’s tenure, as the chair
of the CBRT, as fortunate. In addition to
the referendum and general elections
mentioned above, the March 2019 local
elections took place during his tenure,
all of which resulted in significant pres-
sure from Erdoğan to lower the rates in
order to ensure high economic growth
and low unemployment. In the mean-
time, the Fed continued to raise its own
interest rate corridor by 25 basis points
that it started on 16 December 2015 from
0%–0.25% to reach 2.25%–2.50% by
20 December 2018 through a series of
46
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(daily data; %)
6 quantitative tightening in October 2017.
Fed effective funding rate (right axis)
5
4 until 31 May 2018. Through this approach,
3 repo lending rate into the policy rate
2 As depicted in Figure 1, it increased the
1 on 16 January 2017 to 16.50% on 24 May
1/2017 1/2019 1/2021 1/2023
nine moves, and initiated its quantita-
tive tightening in October 2017, which
continued until 31 July 2019 when it was
brought to an end due to the repo mini-
crisis that occurred in the US in the sum-
mer of 2019.
In the absence of capital controls, with
the ensuing capital outflows, Çetinkaya
had no choice but to respond to the Fed.
And so he did, as can be seen in Figure 1.
However, he did it in a convoluted way
to partially satisfy Erdoğan. Shortly after
the beginning of Çetinkaya’s tenure,
on 3 August 2016, the CBRT added the
late liquidity window (LLW) repo facility
to its lender of last resort facilities.
Although debates on simplifying the wide
interest rate corridor, introduced in 2010,
started in 2015 in earnest because of the
communication problems it created, and
Çetinkaya was in favour of simplification,
he further complicated it, at least at
first glance.
On 16 January 2017, the CBRT initiated
funding through the LLW repo facility,
which had an interest rate higher than
the overnight repo lending rate and
served as the fourth rate in the expand-
ed wide interest-rate corridor. This move
seems to be an effort to meet Erdoğan’s
expectations regarding interest rates, as
it enabled the CBRT to align with the Fed’s
interest rate hikes through its weighted
average funding rate. By shifting most of
the funding to the LLW repo facility, the
CBRT avoided raising the official policy
rate, the one-week repo rate.
july 22, 2023
This continued until the Fed initiated its
Subsequently, on 22 November 2017, the
CBRT transitioned to conducting all its
funding operations through the LLW
repo, a practice that remained in effect
the CBRT effectively transformed the LLW
without an explicit acknowledgement,
simplifying the wide interest-rate corridor.
ticed. In response to criticisms regarding
the clarity, predictability, and effective-
ness of its monetary policy implementa-
tion, the CBRT announced the formalisa-
tion of the simplification on 28 May 2018
through a press release. As of 1 June 2018,
the CBRT switched to a symmetric narrow
corridor of a 300 basis point width, with
the original lower and upper bounds, and
the official policy rate—the one-week
repo lending rate—in the middle. The
CBRT set the official policy rate to
16.50%. Shortly after, a crisis between
Turkey and the US flared up over an
American pastor imprisoned in Turkey
since 2016. On 9 August 2018, the then
US President Trump announced eco-
nomic sanctions against Turkey, leading
to the exchange rate shock illustrated
in Figure 2 (p 47), a 28% surge in the
USD/TRY exchange rate from 9 August
2018 to 14 August 2018.
In response to the exchange rate shock,
the CBRT raised the policy rate from 17.75%
on 9 August 2018 to 19.25% on 17 August
2018. However, primarily due to persistent
capital outflows by both non-residents
and residents, and initially to a lesser
extent, a transition of residents from TRY
deposit accounts to FX deposit accounts in
local banks (deposit dollarisation), about
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vol lViII no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 PERSPECTIVES

Figure 2: Percent Change in the USD/TRY Exchange Rate from a Month Ago Figure 3: Foreign Currency Deposits in Local Banks (monthly data)
and the CBRT Weighted Average Funding Rate (monthly data) 275
30 25.000
August December 250
2018 2021 Total
25 Exchange 21.875 225
Exchange
Rate Shock Rate
20 18.750 200
Shock
Weighted average funding rate (right axis) 175

Billions of dollars
15 15.625
Percent change in the USD/TRY exchange 150
rate from a month ago (left axis)
10 12.500 125
Residents
5 9.375 100
75
0 6.250 Resident and non-resident banks
50
Non-residents
-5 3.125 25

-10 0.000 0
1/2011 1/2013 1/2015 1/2017 1/2019 1/2021 1/2023 12/2010 12/2012 12/2014 12/2016 12/2018 12/2020 12/2022
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT and BRSA.

a month later, on 14 September 2018,
the rate was further increased to 24% in
order to stabilise the exchange rate
(Figures 2 and 3).
A significant event that occurred at
the peak of the August 2018 currency
crisis was the announcement of a deriva-
tives transaction restriction on domestic
banks by the BRSA on 13 August 2018,
which the BRSA called an MPM. On that
day, the BRSA announced that the total
notional principal amount of banks’ cur-
rency swaps and other similar products
(spot + forward FX transactions) with
foreign counterparties, where local banks
pay TRY and receive FX at the initial date,
should not exceed 50% of the bank’s
most recent regulatory capital. Two days
later, the BRSA reduced this percentage
to 25%. While the BRSA did not provide
an explicit explanation for the measure,
it is evident that it limits the amount of
TRY that non-resident speculators could
borrow for short selling, thus reducing
the exchange rate volatility. Therefore, this
measure can be categorised as both an
MPM and a CFM measure according to the
taxonomy of the IMF (nd). Whether this
Table 1: BRSA Imposed Daily Derivative
Transaction Limits with Foreign Counterparties
on Local Banks
TRY Sale at
Initial Date
(%)
Remaining Maturity – 7 Days
13 August 2018 50
15 August 2018 25
9 February 2020 10
12 April 2020 1 1
25 September 2020 10
11 November 2020 10
Source: BRSA.
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measure should be labelled CFM/MPM or
MPM/CFM in the IMF’s taxonomy is, of
course, debateable. Let us call it the
BRSA swap measure. After the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic and the accom-
panying financial instability in early
2020, the BRSA swap measure was broad-
ened and tightened to become even more
restrictive to the extent that it effectively
shut down the offshore TRY currency
swap market. Table 1 illustrates the evo-
lution of the measure over time.
Uysal replaces Çetinkaya: Given that
president Erdoğan’s expectations from
Çetinkaya were to maintain control over
the exchange rate and avoid raising in-
terest rates, Çetinkaya, despite success-
fully meeting the expectation of control-
ling the exchange rate, failed to fulfil
the expectation of not raising interest
rates. As a result, he was dismissed by
presidential Decree Number 2019/159,
published in the Official Gazette on 6
July 2019, citing his “failure to achieve
institutional goals.” On the same day,
the decree appointed Murat Uysal, one
of the deputy chairs of the CBRT, as his
replacement. We should mention that
during Çetinkaya’s tenure, the debates
on central bank independence in Turkey,
TRY Purchase at Initial
Date (%) which have been ongoing since the begin-
ning of the AKP reign, gained momentum,
30 Days 1 Year
and his dismissal through a presidential
– – –
decree citing “failure to achieve institu-
– – –
tional goals” played a significant role in
– – –
2 10
shaping these debates.
2 5 20
Before delving into the Uysal period,
5 10 30 it is noteworthy to mention four new
instruments that were incorporated into
july 22, 2023 vol lViII no 29
the CBRT’s toolkit during Çetinkaya’s
tenure. The first instrument is the foreign
exchange deposits against TRY deposits,
introduced on 18 January 2017. The
second instrument is the TRY-settled
foreign exchange forwards, added on
18 November 2017. Lastly, the third
instrument is the TRY currency swaps,
implemented on 1 November 2018. TRY
currency swaps play a significant role in
the ongoing monetary experiment, as
we will discuss later. Additionally, it is
worth noting that banks can create
foreign exchange forwards to manage
their currency risks by combining a spot
currency transaction with a currency swap
transaction, both with the CBRT, if they
choose to do so. The fourth instrument,
introduced on 18 June 2019, has been
the liquidity facility provided to primary
dealer banks through overnight repo
transactions at 100 basis points below
the policy rate, aimed at supporting the
primary dealer system. This instrument
was used during Uysal’s tenure and was
discontinued immediately after his re-
moval from office.
Since it was known that Uysal, who
assumed the CBRT chair on 6 July 2019,
worked in harmony with president
Erdoğan, no tension regarding interest
rates was expected between them. More-
over, a few weeks after the beginning
of Uysal’s term, on 31 July 2019, the Fed
ended its quantitative tightening and
initiated rate cuts. Furthermore, whether
viewed as a curse or a blessing, the arrival
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the accom-
panying economic sudden stop in March
2020 led the Fed to lower its policy rate to
47
 PERSPECTIVES
Figure 4: Evolution of the USD/TRY Exchange Rate from the Beginning of
2020 until Uysal’s Dismissal
8.5
8.2
7.9
7.6
USD/TRY
7.3
7.0
6.7
6.4
6.1
5.8
1/2020 3/2020 5/2020 7/2020
0% and implement a massive quantitative
easing programme. As a result, starting
from 25 July 2019, Uysal gradually
reduced the inherited policy rate from
Çetinkaya, which stood at 24%, to 8.25%
by 21 May 2020 in nine consecutive steps
without encountering significant criti-
cism, at least initially. Indeed, by intro-
ducing the above-mentioned primary
dealer overnight repo facility interest
rate into the interest rate corridor that
Çetinkaya simplified, Uysal even reduced
the CBRT weighted average funding rate
to 7.34% by 16 July 2020. Therefore, the
COVID-19 pandemic can be viewed as a
blessing for Uysal in this regard.
However, the pandemic can also be
viewed as a curse for him. Alongside
the economic instabilities and financial
risks accompanying the pandemic, there
was a continued decline in non-resident
ownership of TRY-denominated domestic
financial assets (both bonds and equities),
an intensified deposit dollarisation that
began after the August 2018 crisis, as well
as a migration of deposits from local banks
to offshore ones. Moreover, the rollover
of short-term foreign debts became in-
creasingly challenging, adding to the dif-
ficulties faced by Uysal. Consequently,
his grip on the exchange rate eroded,
ultimately losing control over it. Figure 3
illustrates the evolution of the USD/TRY
exchange rate from the beginning of
2020 until president Erdoğan removed
Uysal on 7 November 2020 with another
presidential decree. What we refer to as
the CBRT–BRSA–State Banks Complex,
that is, the firm coordination among
these institutions in the conduct of the
monetary policy, which is still operational
48
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Figure 5: CBRT FX Assets and Positions
(daily data)
Billions of US dollars
9/2020 11/2020
today in the ongoing monetary experi-
ment, was born during this period.
In the establishment of the CBRT–
BRSA–State Banks Complex, the BRSA
took the lead as the first mover. Shortly
after the World Health Organization
(WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a
public health emergency of international
concern on 30 January 2020, the BRSA
implemented a tightening of the swap
measure on 9 February 2020, as shown in
Table 1. Subsequently, on 11 March 2020,
when the WHO declared COVID-19 a pan-
demic, global financial markets experi-
enced significant turmoil (Öncü 2020).
During this period, the TRY depreciated
by approximately 9% against the USD
from 11 March 2020 to 10 April 2020.
Responding to the volatility, the BRSA
took further action on 12 April 2020 by
implementing its most substantial tight-
ening of the swap measure, effectively
closing down the offshore TRY swap
market, as highlighted in Table 1.
However, the TRY depreciation contin-
ued, reaching about 13% by 5 May 2020.
On that day, the BRSA moved again to
limit the total amount of TRY place-
ments, depos, repos, and loans that
banks extend to financial institutions lo-
cated abroad, including their overseas
consolidated credit and financial institu-
tion affiliates, and branches, to 0.5% of
the banks’ latest calculated regulatory
capital. These measures, along with the
aforementioned tightened swap measure,
effectively made the CBRT the FX dealer
of the last (and almost only) resort for the
local banks. As a result of these MPMs,
which also serve as capital flow manage-
ment measures imposed by the BRSA,
(monthly data)
140
120
100
FX assets
80
On balance sheet FX position
60
40
20
Net FX position
0
1/2011 1/2013 1/2015 1/2017 1/2019 1/2021 1/2023
-20
-40
-60
local banks were unable to fulfil their
reserve requirements, hedge their ex-
change rate risks, and meet their liquidity
needs through transactions with banks
and other institutions located abroad.
Consequently, during Uysal’s tenure, they
resorted to meeting these needs through
CBRT swaps and spot transactions with
the CBRT. It is noteworthy to mention
that, to replenish its FX assets, the CBRT
signed a swap contract worth $10 billion
with the Central Bank of Qatar during
this period, on 20 May 2020.4
It was after these events, the fact that
the USD/TRY exchange rate remained al-
most fixed at the level of 6.85 lira for a
period of 42 days between 18 June 2020
and 28 July 2020, and the deteriorations
illustrated in Figure 5 in FX assets and
positions of the CBRT, because of the
rumours about their selling of FX from
the “back door” through state banks,
started. Although neither the CBRT nor the
state banks or the Ministry of Treasury
and Finance (MTF) have ever publicly
acknowledged this, it is public knowledge
that there is a protocol between the MTF
and the CBRT that allows the CBRT to
direct the state banks to sell foreign
exchange (Bloomberg 2023).
Eventually, due to these rumours and
the rapid deterioration of the on-balance
sheet and net FX positions, Uysal, under
heavy political pressure from the oppo-
sition, foreign observers, and president
Erdoğan, abandoned the 42-day-long
hard currency peg depicted in Figure 4.
And as of 24 September 2020, he began
to raise the policy rate, perhaps uninten-
tionally, signing his own demise. Before
his dismissal, Uysal not only raised the
july 22, 2023 vol lViII no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

policy rate from 8.25% to 10.25% but
also introduced further complexity to
the simplified interest rate corridor in-
herited from Çetinkaya. He accom-
plished this by reintroducing the LLW
overnight repo interest rate into the cor-
ridor and shifting a majority of the fund-
ing to the LLW overnight repo facility. As
a result, he raised the weighted average
CBRT funding rate to 14% in a disguised
manner.5 And failing to meet president
Erdoğan’s expectations of maintaining
control over the exchange rate and
avoiding raising the policy rate, he was
removed from his post by a presidential
decree and replaced by Naci Ağbal on
7 November 2020.
Ağbal’s short tenure: Ağbal was the last
finance minister during the first presi-
dency of Erdoğan, prior to the transfor-
mation of the finance ministry into the
MTF in his second term following Tur-
key’s transition from a parliamentary
system to a presidential one in 2017. As
of the latest presidential election held on
28 May 2023, Erdoğan has won three
presidential terms and is currently serv-
ing his third term. Notably, Ağbal is a
well-known advocate of the free market,
and observers anticipated a return to
orthodox policies under his leadership,
contrasting the unorthodox approach
adopted by the CBRT under Uysal’s lead-
ership and Erdoğan’s pivot towards con-
ventional policies.
And Ağbal returned to orthodox poli-
cies. First, he reinstated the interest rate
corridor that had been simplified under
the previous leadership of Çetinkaya.
Second, he implemented significant policy
rate hikes, raising it from 10.5% to 15%
on 19 November 2020, and further to 17%
on 24 December 2020. These rate hikes
led to a decline in the USD/TRY exchange
rate, bringing it down to around 6.90
liras from the inherited level of about
8.50 liras. However, the USD/TRY ex-
change rate started to climb again in late
February 2021. In response, Ağbal raised
the policy rate to 19% on 18 March 2021,
marking the end of his tenure as the
CBRT chair. On 20 March 2021, by a pres-
idential decree similar to the one that
appointed him, he was dismissed and
replaced by Kavcıoğlu. Ağbal’s tenure
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lasted just 132 days, the second shortest
in the history of the CBRT.
Monetary Policy under Kavcıoğlu
On 20 March 2021, Kavcıoğlu started his
term as the CBRT chair. As mentioned
earlier, Kavcıoğlu is the only chair among
former CBRT chairs during the AKP reign
who managed to persistently lower the
policy interest rate without increasing
it ever. Perhaps due to the increased
vulnerabilities in global financial markets
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and
the volatility in exchange rates following
Ağbal’s dismissal, president Erdoğan did
not insist on a rate cut during the ongoing
COVID-19 lockdown period. Kavcıoğlu
adhered to the simplified interest rate
corridor during his time as the CBRT
chair and maintained the policy interest
rate at 19%, inherited from Ağbal, until
August 2021.
As the transition from the COVID-19
lockdown period to normalisation ap-
proached its end, on 5 August 2021, pres-
ident Erdoğan’s expected message ar-
rived. Although Kavcıoğlu did not lower
the interest rate in the policy meeting on
12 August 2021, he initiated a marathon
of interest rate cuts starting from the
meeting on 23 September 2021. The in-
terest rate decisions taken by the CBRT
under Kavcıoğlu’s leadership from Sep-
tember 2021 to May 2023 are shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Interest Rate Decisions of the CBRT
under Kavcıoğlu
Before December 2021 FX shock
3 September 2021
21 October 2021
18 November 2021
16 December 2021
After December 2021 FX shock
18 August 2022
22 September 2022
20 October 2022
24 November 2022
23 February 2023
Before the September 2021 meeting,
the USD/TRY exchange rate, which was
around 8.50 liras, surpassed 10 liras
prior to the November meeting, and
reached as high as 14.50 liras before the
December meeting. One day after the
meeting, on Friday, 17 December 2021, the
USD/TRY exchange rate exceeded 17 liras
vol lViII no 29
PERSPECTIVES
but closed the week around 16.80 liras
after the intervention of the CBRT. How-
ever, on Monday, 20 December 2021, it
reached another historical record, hitting
its highest level at 18.36 liras. As depicted
in Figure 1, the monthly percentage
change in the USD/TRY exchange rate
was 21.9% in August 2018, while it esca-
lated to 28.6% in December 2021, indi-
cating that the FX shock in December
2021 was more severe than the one in
August 2018.
The response of the CBRT–BRSA–State
Banks Complex to this shock was the
much-debated conversion to TRY FX
Protected Deposit (FXPD) accounts from
FX deposit accounts. On 20 December
2021, after the conclusion of the cabinet
meeting, president Erdoğan announced
the FXPDs, which were promptly an-
nounced to the press by the CBRT on 21
December 2021. The FXPDs that the CBRT
announced were for conversion from
USD, EUR, GBP, or gold to TRY. Three days
later, on 24 December 2021, the MTF
announced the introduction of treasury
FXPD accounts, designed to prevent the
conversion of TRY deposits into FX de-
posits by residents. Lastly, on 31 Decem-
ber 2022, the MTF moved again and is-
sued a directive as an amendment to the
CBRT export circular requiring that, ef-
fective 3 February 2022, at least 25% of
the export proceeds attached to the ex-
port proceeds acceptance certificate
(EPAC) or the foreign exchange purchase
certificate (FEPC) must be sold to the bank
Percent
that issued the EPAC or FEPC.6 Hence,
18.0
the CBRT–BRSA–State Banks Complex
16.0 transformed into the CBRT–BRSA–State
15.0 Banks–MTF complex.
14.0 Before proceeding further, let us com-
pare the August 2018 and December 2021
13.0 crises first. In 2018, non-resident owner-
12.0 ship of domestic government bonds
10.5 (although significantly lower than its
9.0
peak of 23.2% in 2012) remained at 14%,
8.5
relatively high compared to other devel-
oping countries during that period. Non-
resident ownership of equities had not
deviated from its peak of 65.6% in 2014
and was still around 65%. Therefore,
non-resident investors holding TRY assets
had not yet left. Additionally, prior to
the August 2018 crisis, the BRSA had not
yet imposed its derivatives trading and
49
 PERSPECTIVES

FX lending restrictions that ease the
speculative attacks by non-residents on
TRY. Non-residents who were able to
obtain TRY, by the means we just
described, started selling it to buy FX.
Simultaneously, the residents started
buying FX assets, leading to a deposit
migration from local banks to the offshore
banks. Due to this heavy selling pressure
on TRY, although the transition of the
residents from TRY deposit accounts to
FX deposit accounts (in hard currencies
and gold) within local banks also played
a role in the August 2018 crisis, this as-
pect went unnoticed.
By 2021, non-resident equity owner-
ship had fallen below 40%, and it was
known that a significant portion of this
remaining 40% actually belonged to
non-resident Turkish nationals. Non-res-
ident ownership of government bonds
dropped below 4% in 2020 and, towards
the end of 2021, was around 3%. In other
words, there were no significant num-
bers of non-resident portfolio investors
who could create a crisis by selling their
TRY assets to buy FX. Additionally, by
2021, the BRSA had closed the offshore
swap market and restricted domestic
bank lending to the non-residents. As a
result, the CBRT had become the sole FX
dealer for domestic banks, with the state
banks also involved. Therefore, it was
not possible for non-residents to obtain
sufficient amounts of TRY for a specula-
tive attack on the domestic currency.
Furthermore, through amendments to
Decree Number 32 on the Protection of
the Value of Turkish Currency mentioned
in Cömert and Öncü (2023a), which also
regulates foreign payments and offshore
money transfers, as well as through
official verbal intimidation, the migra-
tion of FX deposits from local banks to
offshore ones was taken under control.
So, what could have been the culprit for
the December 2021 FX shock?
The answer to this question lies in
the intensified transition of residents
from TRY deposit accounts to FX deposit
accounts. As detailed in Cömert and
Öncü (2023b), when a local bank converts
a deposit account in the local currency to
a deposit account in an FX at the request
of a customer, it creates FX risk because
the liabilities on FX are generated without
any corresponding assets. However, if
the FX deposits are created through the
extension of FX credits or the purchase
of FX assets, there is no FX risk involved.
The FX risk arises only when the liabili-
ties are created without corresponding
assets, and vice versa.
When the transition of residents from
TRY deposit accounts to FX deposit ac-
counts intensified after the 16 December
2021 rate hike by the CBRT, it resulted in
a rapid increase in demand by local
banks for FX to hedge their FX risk. How-
ever, the CBRT–BRSA–State Banks com-
plex failed to meet the demand quickly
enough. As the banks turned to other FX
sellers, the USD/TRY exchange rate sky-
rocketed, leading to the occurrence of a
shock. Subsequently, the FXPD interven-
tion took place on 20 December 2021.
We discussed the FXPD accounts in
detail in Cömert and Öncü (2023b). Let

Money, Banking & Finance

June 3, 2023

Some Contemporary and Classical Issues of Money and Finance —Partha Ray
Monetary Growth, Financial Structure, and Inflation: The Post-Pandemic New Normal — C Rangarajan, Dilip Nachane, Partha Ray
Taming Inflation by Anchoring Inflation Expectations — Sitikantha Pattanaik, G V Nadhanael, Silu Muduli
Monetary Policy in the Midst of Cost-push Inflation — Zico Dasgupta, Indranil Chowdhury
Credit Portfolio Assessment of Domestic Systemically Important Banks — Richa Verma Bajaj, Sagarika Rastogi,
Rhythm Kumar
Do Foreign Banks Affect Market Power, Efficiency, or Stability in India? — Pradyot Kumar Das
RBI’s ‘Financial Stability Reports’ and Stress Testing Methodologies: A Commentary — Amulya Neelam
Retail Investment in India: During and after the Pandemic — Tirthankar Patnaik
Understanding Sovereign Ratings and Their Implications for Emerging Economies — Rahul S Chauhan, Ilisa Goenka,
Kaushalendra Kishore, Nirupama Kulkarni,
Kavya Ravindranath, Gautham Udupa
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us conclude this section by mentioning
the last important tool introduced by the
CBRT–BRSA–State Banks–MTF complex,
along with the previously discussed
tools, which enabled Kavcıoğlu to con-
tinue lowering the policy rate after the
December 2021 FX shock, without trig-
gering another FX shock before the 14
May 2023 presidential and parliamenta-
ry general elections. Termed as another
macro-prudential measure, the CBRT
implemented this tool in three stages.
First, on 23 April 2022, the CBRT extend-
ed reserve requirements, which were
previously applicable only to the liability
side of the balance sheets, to also
include the asset side for some loans.
Second, on 10 June 2022, in line with the
BIS (2013) liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
proposal, which ensures that banks
maintain sufficient unencumbered high-
quality liquid assets that can be easily
and immediately converted into cash in
private markets, banks were required to
establish high-quality long-term fixed-rate
TRY-denominated government securities
as additional collateral for FX reserves
to support its deposits. Last, on 20 August
2022, the CBRT replaced the reserve
requirement for loans it imposed on
23 April 2022, with the establishment of
long-term fi xed-rate TRY-denominated
government securities as collateral.
Conclusions
It was with all these bells and whistles,
consisting of some MPMs and some CFM
measures that are also MPM in the
taxonomy of the IMF (nd), that the CBRT,
under the leadership of Kavcıoğlu, was
able to maintain control over the exchange
rate and lower the policy rate to meet
president Erdoğan’s expectations until the
14 May 2023 presidential and parlia-
mentary general elections. The AKP and
its associated coalition won the parlia-
mentary general election on 14 May 2023
with a majority in parliament, and on
28 May 2023, Erdoğan won the second
round of the presidential election to serve
his third term as the president of Turkey.
Although whether these bells and whistles
can solve Turkey’s structural problems,
which we discussed in the second article
of the series at length, is debatable.
Whether the CBRT is independent or not
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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is also debatable. What happens during
the third presidential term of Erdoğan
that started just a few weeks ago, only
time will tell. However, it is our firm be-
lief that the Turkish monetary policy ex-
periment we tried to outline in this se-
ries, an almost controlled laboratory ex-
periment that could not have been con-
ducted without an authoritarian regime,
would help policymakers and ordinary
people alike in both developed and devel-
oping countries to better evaluate the
ongoing monetary policy debates in the
age in which deglobalisation has be-
come a buzzword.
Notes
1 Since the rest of the article will mainly rely on
the information from Cömert and Öncü
(2023b), we will continue without repeatedly
referencing it and the references therein to
maintain a smoother flow.
2 LON is the abbreviation of “Late Overnight.”
3 According to the law, the CBRT cannot engage
in borrowing or lending transactions with a
maturity longer than 91 days.
4 The CBRT had also signed swap contracts with
the central banks of China, the United Arab
Emirates, and South Korea, and opened a
depo account with the Development Fund of
Saudi Arabia to replenish its FX assets as time
progressed.
5 The CBRT interest rate corridor became the
most complex towards the end of his tenure,
consisting of five interest rates.
6 Effective 18 April 2022, the MTF raised this
requirement to 40%.
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Cömert, Hasan (2013): Central Banks and Financial
Markets: The Declining Power of US Monetary
Policy, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward
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Bretton Woods Dönemi ve Sonrası Para
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İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol 34, No 1,
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spectives, Louis-Philippe Rochon and Virginie
Monvoisin (eds), Cheltenham and Northampton:
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51
 BOOK REVIEW
in simple, direct and often ‘coarse’
Tamil. His speeches were in ordinary
language, and were often noted for
their kochaithanam, or ‘vulgar quality’”
(p 23). This speech was calculated in
many cases to enrage the targets he
wanted his audience to share. This was
an effective tactic, especially when
mixed with his very understandable
style of argument. “What made Periyar
popular,” Manoharan judges, “was his
ability to provoke controversy. What is
even more likely is that his simple and
direct language, his ability to deliver his
speeches in a lively and dialogic man-
ner in public forums, and his sense of
humour and acerbic wit, drew more
Contradictions within the Practices
of a People’s Party
Raj Sekhar Basu
I
n the 1950s and 1960s, the growing
popularity of Dravidian movement
evoked a series of public responses,
which still continue to find favour among
a section of the population. The authors
of this particular book are also a part
of a generation that had witnessed the
successes and failures of the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in the elec-
toral politics of Tamil Nadu. The seeds of
this emotive aspect of Tamil nationalism
had been sown in the decades between the
1920s and 1940s, when E V Ramaswamy
Naicker, popularly referred to as Periyar,
emphasised on the racial divide be-
tween Tamils and the Hindi-speaking
people from the north. The difference
between these two linguistic or social
groups was couched in the terminology
of Aryan and non-Aryan races. The
ubiquitous spirit of non-Brahminism
expressed through an alliance between
the so-called non-Brahmin privileged
castes and the underprivileged castes,
actually coalesced to create a new
politico-cultural community. In course
of nearly a century, debates on “Dra-
vidianism” had hinged around several
issues and possibilities, provoking debates
40
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people to him” (p 81). Periyar was, in
other words, a skilled rhetor adept at
reaching a range of audiences for a
range of different purposes.
In Conclusion
This book is an excellent starting point
for the complex activist and intellectual
that was Periyar. Manoharan has done
an effective job showing the contours—
and tensions—in Periyar’s thought, in-
troducing just enough unity and system-
aticity through the concept of “political
atheism” to allow one to place a useful
framework around this nuanced thinker
with which to begin further engage-
ment. Periyar’s work, activism, and life
Rule of the Commoner: DMK and the Formations
of the Political in Tamil Nadu, 1949–1967
by Rajan Kurai Krishnan, Ravindran Sriramachandran and
V M S Subagunarajan, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2022; pp xviii + 299, `895.
on the intersectionalities of caste, class,
gender, and nation.
The Tamil case has always remained
an enigma because it resonates through
a cultural renaissance that was represented
through countless numbers of literary texts
and through a zeal to combine the “real”
and the “unreal” through films. Between
1949 and 1975, non-Brahmin scriptwriters
like Karunanidhi and matinee idols like
M G Ramachandran, through their creativ-
ity, reminded the Tamil masses of their pri-
mordial belonging. The authors need to be
complimented for bringing out the story of
the DMK, particularly in the initial decades,
when the “former lieutenants” of Periyar
were able to decentre the very notions of
the Indian nation state.
Raising the Curtain
The split within the Dravida Kazhagam
in September 1949 was indeed a painful
affair. The bonding between Annadurai
july 22, 2023
all deserve more attention than we have
given them. We should embrace the
roles and positions he encumbered in all
the different persuasive forums and con-
texts that he found himself in and not be
afraid of looking at Periyar as a rhetori-
cal figure well-versed in persuasive sen-
sitivity, and see in all of these threads
and themes as a new contribution to the
political and philosophical discourses of
modern India.
Scott R Stroud (sstroud@austin.utexas.edu)
is an associate professor of communication
studies at the University of Texas at Austin,
where he also serves as programme director
of media ethics for the Center for Media
Engagement.
and Periyar had been a very deep one,
belying the artificiality that often charac-
terises political relationships. It was that
of a son and a father (Thanthai) and the
rift between them was seen as a rupture
within the familial traditions. The split
evoked a lot of tear drops (Kanneer thu-
ligal) and Periyar himself derided the
DMK as the Tear Drop Party (Kanneer
thuli katchi) (p 2). The real reason
might not have been Periyar’s marriage
but something more to do with his
efforts to find a partner who would not
only be a trustworthy successor, but
would help in streamlining the organi-
sation and leading the movement. Per-
haps, it shocked Annadurai more, since
he had all along represented himself as
the foster son of Periyar, who would be
the carrier of his legacy and a crusader
for the Dravida Kazhagam.
Periyar and Annadurai, despite their
closeness, did have some political dif-
ferences. Periyar described the day of
Indian independence as thukkanal (a day
of mourning) affirming North India’s
supremacy over South India. On the other
hand, Annadurai preferred to take a
“moderate” if not a softer stand on the
issue. Violence and the communal con-
flagrations emerging from the anti-
Hindustani upsurges and the public flog-
ging of Hindu popular idols might have
convinced to opt for a more thought-out
strategy for establishing Tamil identity
vis-à-vis the Brahmin casteist hegemony.
As a political pragmatist and a gifted
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

orator, Annadurai was vitriolic in his
criticism against Brahmin hegemony.
But this hardly reifies his stature as a
radical anti-nationalist favouring sepa-
ration of Tamil Nadu from the Indian un-
ion. While the Dravida Kazhagam and
the DMK were political opponents, Anna-
durai and his political followers refrained
from using strong words against Periyar
and instead dedicated their electoral
successes to him. Annadurai was equally
at ease with K Kamaraj, whom was
described by him as a leader who could
satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil mass-
es and also convey their feelings to the
Congress leadership in Delhi.
The authors have meticulously un-
earthed the political dynamics that
emerged from DMK’s politics in the
years between 1949 and 1967. There
has been an attempt to resolve the
differences emanating from the question
of self-governance and that of sover-
eignty. This distinction has been very
pithily depicted in terms such as
becoming “sovereign” and that of “be-
coming of people.” From a theoretical
standpoint, the DMK was a replica of
the people, especially by favouring
a left-of-the-centre approach. But, it
could only sell its dream of a sover-
eign when the public support for the
M Bhaktavatsalam-led Congress min-
istry waned beyond all imagination.
The most important question that has
been raised is how the DMK, which
claimed itself to be a party of the people,
could dismantle the Indian National
Congress enjoying the support and
patronage of the privileged sections
of the society.
The DMK’s success has been attributed
to several factors. The party leadership
was quick in comprehending that despite
their anathema for a unified civilisational
history of India, the espousal of a distinct
Dravidian–Tamil cultural history would
lead to tremors within the nascent Indian
nation state. Moreover, mobilisation based
simply on caste lines would ruin the pos-
sibilities of governance, since it would
guarantee the ascent of the “uneducated
and uncultured” to positions of power
and authority. In its quest to gain political
acceptability, the DMK adopted a range
of rhetorical strategies not only replete
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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BOOK REVIEW
with emotions, but also harboured “rabble order based on Vedic texts, Dharma-
rousing tendencies.” The DMK’s “cultural shastras, and Sanskrit Puranas was fre-
politics” led to the assimilation of play- quently raised by Periyar and later by
wrights, film scriptwriters and actors Annadurai to rally the non-Brahmin
within its organisational fold. This castes who had been marginalised, be-
helped the party to intrude into the pop- cause of their Dravidian lineage. Peri-
ular level, where the subaltern masses, yar and his lieutenants like Ramana-
by actively consuming cinema on the than, who provided the ideological mu-
big screen, could relate their quotidian nitions for the Self-Respect Movement,
experiences with the sufferings of the found the negative imagery of the Brah-
characters enacted by charismatic Tamil min civilisation to be a useful tool in
film actors. sustaining their counter hegemonic
This does not mean that the DMK was struggles against a blatantly casteist/
totally devoid of the political wisdom racist order. Annadurai’s Aryan Allure
and ideology required for mobilising the consciously or unconsciously borrowed
poor and the underprivileged. Despite ideas from the writings of men like
the communist party’s attempts to build Rev T B Pandian, Iyothee Thoss,
mass movements, by focusing solely on M Masilamani and Maraimalai Adigal.
class inequalities, the DMK could easily This tract questioned the rationale of
stave off their challenge. The DMK the Hindu zealots to posit their religio-
and the communists occasionally came cultural traditions over the Dravidian
closer to one and another, something population. Drawing heavily from court
dictated by their mutual dislike for the judgments, Annadurai succeeded in
Congress. But, such alliances proved to establishing the point that Brahmins
be too short-lived. The authors believe and non-Brahmins lived afar in terms
that the DMK never ideologically allied of their belief systems, norms and
with the poor, because its populist style world views.
of politics was overtly responsible for The term Dravidian was something
making compromises with the capitalist synonymous to a subnationalism that
class and the exploitative relationships would insulate the Tamils from the for-
of production. cible imposition of Hindu dharma and
Hindu nationalism. Annadurai’s concept
The Past Recreated of a Dravidian republic was not an ex-
In Tamil Nadu, the term “Dravidanadu” pression of secession from the Indian
was used in a rather emotive spirit to Republic. But, it was a reiteration of the
mean a federation of four South Indian view that Andhra, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala,
linguistic states that supposedly shared historically, culturally and geographically
a common Dravidian identity. The story different from the territories lying north
of Aryan migration and that of the forci- of the Vindhyas, should be “independent
ble imposition of a Hindu hierarchical units” within the Indian federal structure.
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vol lViii no 29 41
 BOOK REVIEW
The authors believe that backing out
of the separatist line possibly might
have been dictated by populist concerns,
premising more on the political task
of construction of the Dravidian–Tamil
people. Such a constructed homogeneous
non-Brahmin identity was part of a
deliberate strategy for hiding caste and
class divisions.
The trajectories of non-Brahmin poli-
tics alongside their penchant criticism of
caste hegemony could barely be kept
separate from the emotive sensibilities
centring on devotion to Tamil. In fact,
throughout the early 20th century, Tamil
publicists, whether Neo-Saivites or the
Self-Respecters, had tried to reconcile
the apparent differences and common-
alities between language and caste hier-
archies in the region. Visualisation of
Tamil as mother was not the only factor
that sustained the DMK’s support base
overwhelmingly petty bourgeois in terms
of its social orientation. Indeed, had it
been so, the marginalised social catego-
ries would not have voted for it over a
period of more than six decades. Taking
a cue from the authors, it could be argued
that DMK’s political philosophy repre-
sented a cacophony where socialism,
communism and revolution could be in
the same melting pot, thereby erasing
the separate existence of all castes and
classes. Influenced by Laclau, the authors
profess that DMK’s populism, emphasising
the need for a collective political entity,
was contingent on those very discursive
processes through which “a people”
could be constructed for political pur-
poses (p 58). In this imagined casteless/
classless Tamil social order, all men and
women who spoke in Tamil were believed
to be one and the same, constituting
the “public.”
Search for a New Path
The intrusive character of the Indian
nation state intensified debates within the
Dravidian political circles in the 1940s
and 1950s. The despair and uncertainty
led to the revival of the anti-Hindustani
movement and attacks on North Indian
business establishments. Annadurai and
Karunanidhi were keen on utilising this
antagonism for the construction of a
new Tamil/Dravidian identity, capable
42
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of addressing issues related to cultural
subordination and material inequalities.
Subsequently, the new Tamil cinema acted
as a bridge between the petty bourgeois
urban classes and the vast mass of under-
privileged and unemployed rural popu-
lation. Karunanidhi as a scriptwriter
sought to create an imagined cultural
space where issues of caste, class and that
of linguistic identity could all be recon-
ciled. M G Ramachandran (MGR) who
acted as the hero in most of these films
played subaltern characters engaged in
less respectable occupations, but con-
stantly challenging the hegemony of the
rich and the propertied classes. The ma-
jority of women cinemagoers visualised
MGR as a messiah of the poor and the de-
fender of women’s chastity. The huge
dose of socialist rhetoric with the lustrous
symbolism of the DMK flag made many
wonder whether the DMK was veering
towards communism.
The alliance between the DMK and the
communists looked imminent in the ear-
ly years of India’s nationhood. Anna-
durai also indicated that the DMK would
be well-contented to adopt a left-of-the-
centre approach. But, the communists,
despite their short-term electoral alli-
ances, misjudged the political appeal of
the DMK. The communist myopia towards
political realities was responsible for the
depiction of Nehru as the representative
of the Baniya–Parsi capital very much
like Rajagopalachari and Periyar who
supposedly represented the interests of
the Chettiar capital. While the Marxists
viewed DMK as a political outfit heavily
dependent on the petty bourgeois lead-
ership and the support from a minuscule
section of the rich, there is little to deny
that it was better suited to represent the
interests of the poor, underprivileged
and the commoner.
Fictions and Counter Narratives
Annadurai sought to liberate the Tamil
mind from the influence of the Sangam
literature, alleging that it was a cultural
imposition that virtually had no
resonance in the south. Taking a dig at
Kamban, the author of the southern ver-
sion of Ramayana, he found that there
were not only inappropriate references
but lewd depictions of the female body.
july 22, 2023
Annadurai took to literature to mobilise
the people on the basis of their common
Tamil ancestry, which was opposed to
both Aryanism and Brahminism. This
very aspect of cultural politics led to the
reinterpretation of classics at the popu-
lar level, thereby raising the political
credentials of the DMK.
The authors of this book have quite
candidly argued that this new literary
tradition did not have much place for
Brahmins and their cultural traditions.
They rich–poor divide was not only dis-
cussed within a non-Brahmin space, but
there was also a disenchantment over the
prevailing status quo. But, it is doubtful
whether issues of economic deprivation or
social inequalities were really addressed
by the DMK leadership.
In Conclusion
While it is true that Annadurai, Karunani-
dhi, and MGR carried forward the socially
radical gospel of non-Brahminism through
an overdose of Tamil rhetorics, the ques-
tion remains whether the constructed
category of the people had remained
unhindered by the changes in time and
space. The constant ideological/political
dissensions between the non-Brahmin
and Adi Dravida ideologues vindicate
that the imagery of the “people” is
too often beset with fissures. The DMK
leadership had always been put to test in
reconciling the dichotomies that existed
in the relationships between the power
elites and those in the subordinate posi-
tions. Politics in Tamil Nadu privileges
itself on generic caste identities, thereby
preventing the chances of dismantling
this constructed non-Brahmin identity
through the ballot box. The assumption
that DMK’s political existence has been
made possible by the redefinition of
the political by the social represented
through the “passive revolution of the
capital” requires a bit more of introspec-
tion. However, this book will definitely
have a long life in the shelf, prompting
researchers to look into Tamil politics
through a much more intense reading of
the not-too-distant past.
Raj Sekhar Basu (rajsekharbasu2001@gmail.
com) teaches at the Department of History,
University of Calcutta, Kolkata.
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 Revealing the Complexities
of Periyar
Scott R Stroud
I
t takes a certain courage to envision
and compose a book on E V Ramasamy,
or Periyar, as he is most commonly
known. This is undoubtedly due to the
reformer’s courage, perhaps more ac-
curately captured as a mix of icono-
clasm and enigmatic assertiveness dis-
tributed unevenly through a myriad of
printed and spoken texts, and over the
course of so many years of life. Periyar
(1879–1973) is one of the most well-
known reformers to emerge from mod-
ern Tamil Nadu, and one of the most
difficult to fully grasp. In Periyar: A
Study in Political Atheism, Karthick Ram
Manoharan engages this important but
challenging project of giving a system-
atic account of a thinker who was often
less-than-systematic about his causes,
arguments, and positions. The resulting
work is a concise but very usable inves-
tigation of a leading voice in the non-
Brahmin movement in India. Periyar’s
ideas are often described in partial
form for argumentative engagement by
a critic, Manoharan does an admirable
job presenting them here in a fairly
unified fashion so readers can construct
a picture, albeit imperfect, of this mer-
curial thinker. For its scope amid its
brevity, this book serves as a reward-
ing read into what he calls Periyar’s
“political atheism.”
Contextualising Periyar
Manoharan’s book begins by contextual-
ising Periyar as an activist and a thinker.
It does this by tracing what the author
calls the “formation of a blasphemer,” an
apt characterisation of Periyar’s rather
atavistic rhetoric aimed at sacred reli-
gious ideals of Hinduism throughout
his life. Manoharan starts with Periyar’s
early activism, especially the formative
role he played in the Vaikom temple-
entry struggle that aimed at ending caste
38
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book reviewS
Periyar: A Study in Political Atheism by Karthick
Ram Manoharan, Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2022;
pp xi + 133, `225.
discrimination. While many note the
tense relationship, soon to fray, between
Periyar and Gandhi and the Congress,
Manoharan’s prescient account notes
the accompanying development of
Periyar as a compelling and powerful
speaker during the 1920s. As he puts it,
Periyar’s “speeches were filled with opti-
mism, pathos when required, and most
importantly, humour” (p 7).
I will return to this aspect of Periyar
as a persuasive speaker—as a rhetor, as
those in my area of study call eloquent
speakers—in a bit, but here it is enough
to note that this book is unique insofar
as it gives a significant amount of its fo-
cus to Periyar’s ability to construct and
deliver powerful statements of critique.
In the 1920s, Periyar begins his habit of
making pointed, and some might say in-
flammatory, comments about religious
icons and deities; in the Vaikom strug-
gle, it involved him turning against the
worthiness of the god in the temple giv-
en the location’s conditions of discrimi-
nation against would-be “untouchable”
worshippers. Such trenchant religious
critique put him at odds with other Con-
gress leaders, thus starting the split with
the party that would be largely finalised
when he walked away from that organi-
sation in 1925.
In surveying his newspaper and speak-
ing activity, the first portion of this book
begins to make its general point: Periyar
is not simply a reformer from Tamil
Nadu, but, instead, he is a figure with a
larger, more universal message of equality
and self-respect. Accordingly, Manoharan
places Periyar amid other members of the
july 22, 2023
non-Brahmin movement to demonstrate
his still-coalescing thoughts on self-
respect and equality. Beyond this con-
textualisation, Periyar is compared to
Socrates and Rousseau in an effort to
engage him as more than a historical
figure that no longer speaks to us, or
that cannot transcend the regional poli-
tics he is enmeshed in. Reading these
pages, we start to see the contours of
the point of the book—as Manoharan
puts it, Periyar is an “anti-philosopher
who can be philosophically read, a non-
theoretician from whose thoughts a
theory can emerge” (p 31).
Periyar as a Political Theorist
Periyar: A Study in Political Atheism is
a brave book precisely because it an-
nounces that it will try to extract a phi-
losophy and a theory out of a thinker
who seemed to explicitly or implicitly
resist producing such unified or hermet-
ically sealed intellectual products. Over
the course of the middle chapters of this
work, Manoharan constructs a vision of
Periyar’s political theory: “Periyar’s anti-
brahminism was a political atheism that
sought to critique, demystify and dis-
mantle the political theology of Brah-
minism” (p 32). For Periyar, Brahminism
was the predominant interpretation of
Hinduism that led to caste inequality
and the oppression of so many catego-
ries of people around him and all over
India. Social hierarchy was the root of
the problem, and it only became more
pernicious as it was internalised as a
form of self-depreciation. Self-respect
became the sustained bass note of his
life, a value that became inflected in
different ways as Periyar explored vari-
ous courses of advocacy in his activism
against Brahminism.
Manoharan brings out these tensions
in his thought—different emphases or
even directions, depending on what
Periyar was engaging—by comparing
Periyar’s political atheism to that of
the anarchist critic of religion, Mikhail
Bakunin, in addition to comparing his
thought to that of classical Marxist cri-
tiques of theology. While Manoharan
points out the moments of interest in
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Marxism evinced by Periyar, he describes
the reformer as closer to Bakunin’s anar-
chism insofar as both placed more faith
in the erosion of religious oppression
than its replacement by any quasi-state
power like the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat. The relationship of Periyar to
Marxism will surely not be settled by
this book, but that is part of the inherit-
ance of a richly complex thinker like
Periyar who eschewed mindless and
doctrinal consistency in all utterances
for more nuanced, even if bombastic,
appeals to the needs of the situation.
Periyar, like Bakunin, emphasised the
power to think and to rebel as the most
valuable human traits. Periyar’s ration-
alism becomes more than mere reaction,
however, insofar as he constructively
pairs it with projects such as women’s
liberation and social equality. For Periyar,
“rationalism” was “intertwined with revo-
lution” (p 55). This was a personified
rationalism, though, as Periyar was
addressing his readers and audience
members as agents who could, like him,
be part of this reformist blow against
Brahminism. While Manoharan acknow-
ledges that others will read Periyar’s
relationship to Marxism differently, he
does an admirable job of providing a clear
picture of what sense could be made of
Periyar as a revolutionary figure outside
of constraints and commitments to an
overwrought allegiance to theory. Periyar
was a man of this world, and this world
held concrete problems which demanded
different actions often in tension with
the solutions to other situations.
Periyar as Rhetor
Manoharan’s book does an admirable
job in providing a straightforward open-
ing into the complex figure that Periyar
represents. It does this while also ack-
nowledging the existing interpretative
disputes surrounding this important
thinker, but without getting mired in the
details of such debates. Its mission is to
make a difficult-to-understand thinker
accessible to us in a way that facilitates
our own processes of sense-making. One
of the important domains that Mano-
haran’s concise work excels at doing all
of this concerns Periyar’s confl icting
and often difficult-to-discern views on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023
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religions he was inclined towards, namely
Islam and Buddhism.
The book concludes by surveying
Periyar’s engagement with Islam, an
engagement that seems motivated by its
political usefulness for groups such as
the Tamils primarily because of its force-
fulness and equality. Periyar criticised
the religion, according to Manoharan,
on its prevailing treatment of women.
Beyond the political efficacy of Islam for
restoring self-respect and resisting caste
hierarchies, rested Periyar’s interest in
Buddhism. As Manoharan’s book discusses,
Periyar and Bhimrao Ambedkar, both
fellow travellers in the battle against
caste and Brahminical orientations, met
at the third conference of the World Fel-
lowship of Buddhists, held in Burma in
December 1954. Ambedkar was said to
have tried to convince Periyar to convert
to Buddhism, but Periyar indicated that
it would blunt too much of his political
force in his reform efforts. He did, how-
ever, fully support Buddhism insofar as
it was a “religion” that resisted the
harmful things associated with most
religions—certainty in dogma, valuing of
the divine over the human, and an inevi-
table tendency towards differential val-
uing of classes and groups. Manoharan
places Buddhism closer to the heart of
Periyar’s “political atheism” than Islam,
but reserves a role for the appeals to
convert to Islam as an efficacious politi-
cal manoeuvre itself. Periyar conceptu-
alised, according to Manoharan, “the
‘Muslim’ identity primarily as a political
identity that was casteless and different
from, and opposed to, a ‘Hindu’ identity
that valorised caste hierarchy” (p 108).
By the end of the book, we are still left
with a tension—why did Periyar engage
Islam if he was a political atheist as
Manoharan maintains? Indeed, some
might wonder about the problems of
using any religion in Periyar’s thought,
given some of his virulent attacks on
religion per se and Brahminical Hinduism
in particular. Manoharan is not at fault
for these remaining tensions, of course,
since these contradictions and different
directions seem built into the corpus of
writings and speeches that we use now
to gain access to Periyar the thinker.
And this is one of the biggest lessons
vol lViii no 29
BOOK REVIEW
that I have learned when dealing with
anti-caste activists and intellectuals like
Ambedkar and Periyar: they are highly
rhetorical figures, and ignoring this fact
renders their thought tougher to grasp
than need be. What do I mean by rhe-
torical? With this term, I harken back to
the sense bandied about in the Western
rhetorical tradition, from the sophists
through Cicero and Quintilian, of human
political agents artfully adapting and
contextualising their utterances to fit
specific audiences and persuasive needs.
This need not be a sense of “mere soph-
istry,” as common (and unread) dismiss-
als of the term “rhetoric” might lead us
to believe.
Seeing Periyar as a rhetor, or an agent
practising the art of rhetoric, would
attune us to how certain arguments or
styles of argument function in light of
specific audiences. Manoharan’s analy-
sis, while not drawing on the concept or
tradition of rhetoric, does get some mile-
age out of reflecting on how and why
Periyar spoke in different ways to differ-
ent audiences. Whether this makes his
positive statements towards Islam and
his negative critiques of religion coher-
ent is a debate that will not be settled in
this book. The point we must sense here
is that taking Periyar as a rhetorical fig-
ure relieves us of the assumption that
every utterance of a thinker must fit to-
gether into some contradiction-free men-
tal tapestry resident in their head. Instead,
we ought to engage him, and figures like
Ambedkar, as thinkers with some sus-
tained commitments threading through-
out much of their advocacy, but as prac-
tical agents trying to get things done
with words in often different situations.
Manoharan does a decent job pointing
us to the power of communication and
rhetoric in Periyar. For instance, he notes
that “What made Periyar more popular
was both the message and the medium.
Periyar’s deceptively simple anti-brah-
minism … appealed to diverse audiences
in his time and retains relevance even
today” (p 23). The book engages Peri-
yar’s harsh treatment of the Hindu epic
Ramayana, and frames it with this same
evocative style that is shared by much of
his rhetorical practice. Periyar, Mano-
haran explains, “conveyed his message
39
 BOOK REVIEW
in simple, direct and often ‘coarse’
Tamil. His speeches were in ordinary
language, and were often noted for
their kochaithanam, or ‘vulgar quality’”
(p 23). This speech was calculated in
many cases to enrage the targets he
wanted his audience to share. This was
an effective tactic, especially when
mixed with his very understandable
style of argument. “What made Periyar
popular,” Manoharan judges, “was his
ability to provoke controversy. What is
even more likely is that his simple and
direct language, his ability to deliver his
speeches in a lively and dialogic man-
ner in public forums, and his sense of
humour and acerbic wit, drew more
Contradictions within the Practices
of a People’s Party
Raj Sekhar Basu
I
n the 1950s and 1960s, the growing
popularity of Dravidian movement
evoked a series of public responses,
which still continue to find favour among
a section of the population. The authors
of this particular book are also a part
of a generation that had witnessed the
successes and failures of the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in the elec-
toral politics of Tamil Nadu. The seeds of
this emotive aspect of Tamil nationalism
had been sown in the decades between the
1920s and 1940s, when E V Ramaswamy
Naicker, popularly referred to as Periyar,
emphasised on the racial divide be-
tween Tamils and the Hindi-speaking
people from the north. The difference
between these two linguistic or social
groups was couched in the terminology
of Aryan and non-Aryan races. The
ubiquitous spirit of non-Brahminism
expressed through an alliance between
the so-called non-Brahmin privileged
castes and the underprivileged castes,
actually coalesced to create a new
politico-cultural community. In course
of nearly a century, debates on “Dra-
vidianism” had hinged around several
issues and possibilities, provoking debates
40
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people to him” (p 81). Periyar was, in
other words, a skilled rhetor adept at
reaching a range of audiences for a
range of different purposes.
In Conclusion
This book is an excellent starting point
for the complex activist and intellectual
that was Periyar. Manoharan has done
an effective job showing the contours—
and tensions—in Periyar’s thought, in-
troducing just enough unity and system-
aticity through the concept of “political
atheism” to allow one to place a useful
framework around this nuanced thinker
with which to begin further engage-
ment. Periyar’s work, activism, and life
Rule of the Commoner: DMK and the Formations
of the Political in Tamil Nadu, 1949–1967
by Rajan Kurai Krishnan, Ravindran Sriramachandran and
V M S Subagunarajan, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2022; pp xviii + 299, `895.
on the intersectionalities of caste, class,
gender, and nation.
The Tamil case has always remained
an enigma because it resonates through
a cultural renaissance that was represented
through countless numbers of literary texts
and through a zeal to combine the “real”
and the “unreal” through films. Between
1949 and 1975, non-Brahmin scriptwriters
like Karunanidhi and matinee idols like
M G Ramachandran, through their creativ-
ity, reminded the Tamil masses of their pri-
mordial belonging. The authors need to be
complimented for bringing out the story of
the DMK, particularly in the initial decades,
when the “former lieutenants” of Periyar
were able to decentre the very notions of
the Indian nation state.
Raising the Curtain
The split within the Dravida Kazhagam
in September 1949 was indeed a painful
affair. The bonding between Annadurai
july 22, 2023
all deserve more attention than we have
given them. We should embrace the
roles and positions he encumbered in all
the different persuasive forums and con-
texts that he found himself in and not be
afraid of looking at Periyar as a rhetori-
cal figure well-versed in persuasive sen-
sitivity, and see in all of these threads
and themes as a new contribution to the
political and philosophical discourses of
modern India.
Scott R Stroud (sstroud@austin.utexas.edu)
is an associate professor of communication
studies at the University of Texas at Austin,
where he also serves as programme director
of media ethics for the Center for Media
Engagement.
and Periyar had been a very deep one,
belying the artificiality that often charac-
terises political relationships. It was that
of a son and a father (Thanthai) and the
rift between them was seen as a rupture
within the familial traditions. The split
evoked a lot of tear drops (Kanneer thu-
ligal) and Periyar himself derided the
DMK as the Tear Drop Party (Kanneer
thuli katchi) (p 2). The real reason
might not have been Periyar’s marriage
but something more to do with his
efforts to find a partner who would not
only be a trustworthy successor, but
would help in streamlining the organi-
sation and leading the movement. Per-
haps, it shocked Annadurai more, since
he had all along represented himself as
the foster son of Periyar, who would be
the carrier of his legacy and a crusader
for the Dravida Kazhagam.
Periyar and Annadurai, despite their
closeness, did have some political dif-
ferences. Periyar described the day of
Indian independence as thukkanal (a day
of mourning) affirming North India’s
supremacy over South India. On the other
hand, Annadurai preferred to take a
“moderate” if not a softer stand on the
issue. Violence and the communal con-
flagrations emerging from the anti-
Hindustani upsurges and the public flog-
ging of Hindu popular idols might have
convinced to opt for a more thought-out
strategy for establishing Tamil identity
vis-à-vis the Brahmin casteist hegemony.
As a political pragmatist and a gifted
vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Overlapping Marginalities
Digital Education and Muslim Female Students in Bhiwandi
Abdul Shaban, Ayona Datta, Sheema Fatima
The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic shows that
excessive reliance on digital technologies for delivery of
education can sharpen the inequalities in learning. In
Bhiwandi, both a metropolitan and a digital periphery in
Maharashtra, such unequal learning opportunities
further marginalised the citizens of the locality. Female
students additionally faced several challenges. Among
the many freedoms upended during the pandemic was
the spatial mobility, offered by the physical access to the
colleges. Where educational institutions failed to
effectively adapt to the situation, undergraduate Muslim
women experienced a lack of digital access and poor
quality of learning.
The authors express their gratitude and appreciation for the time and
effort of our respondents in completing the survey as well as
participating in the face-to-face workshop. They also wish to thank the
different colleges in Bhiwandi (especially Oneza Farid, principal at Aqsa
Women’s Degree College), which supported this research. Funding for
this research was provided by the British Academy Tackling Global
Challenges programme.
Abdul Shaban (shaban@tiss.edu) teaches at the School of
Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
Ayona Datta (a.datta@ucl.ac.uk) teaches at the Department of Geography,
University College London. Sheema Fatima (fatimasheema@gmail.com)
is a postdoctoral fellow at the School of Development Studies, Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
52
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OVID-19 is arguably the most significant global devel-
C opment that revealed the uneven access to digital in-
frastructures across a number of scales and diverse
social groups. Several authors (Bailey et al 2021; Datta 2020a,
2020b; Milan et al 2021) have now written about the margin-
alising effects of lack of access to or absence of digital infra-
structures that led to socio-economic and health crises across
families and social groups during and after COVID-19. In India,
a large part of this discussion was concerned with the migrant
crisis, which emerged as soon as the lockdown was announced,
while another significant aspect of the literature was the feminist
critique of the resultant rise in gender-based violence at home
and increasing domestic burdens imposed upon women
through the impossibilities of “work from home” guidelines.
Within these discussions was the impact that the pandemic
had on access to education, particularly for young women in
low-income households. Their limited access to technology
combined with increased surveillance of their space and time
produced multiple marginalisations that were largely hidden
within the confines of the home (Datta 2022).
This study takes an intersectional approach to the gender-
ing of education during COVID-19. It aims to understand not
just the uneven access to education produced by the pandemic,
rather how this affected specific groups of women differently,
when their social location is defined by geography, class,
religion, generation, and gender. The focus of the study is
primarily on Muslim women living in the low-income housing
area in Bhiwandi—one of the most deprived industrial spaces
in the peripheries of Mumbai. Based on the survey of 302 female
Muslim students pursuing undergraduate college education,
we argue that the COVID-19 lockdown and the subsequent shift
to online classes exposed Bhiwandi’s student population to an
unprecedented crisis. The systemic marginalisation historically
experienced in the town was reinforced by social and cultural
marginalisation faced by Muslim female students. Following
Ticktin (2021), the study argues for feminising the inter-
sectional understanding of the crisis for appropriate policies
and effective initiatives.
Muslim Women’s Education and Digital Technologies
The fourth industrial revolution powered by information tech-
nology (IT) is rapidly transforming not only how one acquires
information and consumes it, but also altering the ways of
governance and access to education, health, and life-support
services. Many argue that IT-enabled services (ITes) are leading
july 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

to the death of geographies (Bates 1996; O’brien 1992; Kolko
2000; Cairncross 2001) and giving birth to a distanciated
society (Henning 2007). One does not deny the socio-spatial
transformative impact of the ITes and the massive advantage
they have generated with regard to information flows; however,
like any technology, the social impact is also patterned as per
the class, caste, religion, and geography. Studies have shown
that the use of the ITs and ITes varies as per the economic af-
fordability, social acceptability, adaptability, and educational
levels or skills of individuals and communities, even in the
areas where there may be ubiquitously developed IT infra-
structure. Gender and generational access to technology also
shapes how it is used. In other words, despite rapidly decreas-
ing the cost of IT and ITes, there are a number of factors
that determine their use. At the individual level, the inter-
sectionality of class, gender, education, age, caste, and religion
have a determining role, while at the community level, space
and culture does reshape access. This creates a digital core
and periphery both at the social and spatial levels.
The educational institutions around the world were forced
to shift to an online mode of instruction that had its own stress
and strains. It had adverse consequences on the learning out-
comes of the students. While it also affected the financial
health of educational institutions resulting in reduced salaries
to teachers and related staff, this was much more acute in the
metropolitan peripheries in India where educational access
was already very limited. Economically poor institutions could
not swiftly transition to the online mode, thereby having
adverse consequences for the students enrolled. In India, while
we do not have any public estimates of losses incurred by such
institutions, the first-hand interaction with local colleges in
Bhiwandi highlight that they suffered massive losses due to
lack of government subsidies, non-payment of fees by students,
and increased expenses on digital technologies.
In India, though internet coverage is now growing, sharp
geographic, class, and gender divides exist. Niti Aayog data
shows that in 2020–21, out of every 100 people, 55 had access
to the internet (Krishnan 2021). A similar situation prevails in
other countries of South Asia. Chandasiri (2020) shows that in
Sri Lanka, about 60% of the undergraduate students had no
access to the internet, and the pandemic had an adverse im-
pact on their mental health due to lack of the required educa-
tional support system.
Rashid and Yadav (2020) argue that the pandemic exposed
the shortcoming of the current higher education system, which
was even less equipped to handle such a crisis because of the
lower technological adaptation, and the low share of informa-
tion technology-trained teachers and staff. The move to online
platforms of teaching had a negative impact on the psychology
of both teachers and students. The adaptation for a majority of
teachers and students was not easy (Khan 2021). The online
mode also increased the disparities in learning among students
(Zianuddin et al 2020).
Several studies have vividly shown that a number of
socio-economic factors undermine access to higher education
for women. Hasan and Menon (2004) argue that access to
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
education is further undermined among Muslims and often
give low priority to the education of women with a logic that
it may not be beneficial for the family because they may not
effectively enter the labour market and earn. And, given that
men discontinue their education early, it would be difficult to
find suitable grooms for relatively higher-educated women. In
fact, several independent public committees (Sachar Committee
2006; Mahmoodur Rahman Committee 2013; Sudhir Com-
mission 2016) which investigated the socio-economic status
of the Muslims in India have, among others, pointed out the
lack of education in the community and especially among
women. This is largely due to economic constraints, conserv-
ative attitudes of the parents, poor geographical access, early
marriages, and no expectation of economic returns from edu-
cation. Many studies have also pointed out that education
among Muslim women varies as per their community identity
and geographical location. In many states, women are out-
performing men in the educational field (Shaban 2018, 2016).
A study by Ram and Yadav (2021) shows that due to the
dominance of informal sector employment in the country, the
impact of the lockdown on the income of the families was
large. They estimate that about 150–199 million additional
people fell back to poverty due to the pandemic, especially the
marginalised groups like the religious minorities, Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Their computation shows that
because of the social and economic marginalisation, 61% of
the Muslims are at the risk of poverty in urban areas
compared to 39% Hindus, and 30% Christians (Ram and Ya-
dav 2021: 8).
The Context: Bhiwandi
In India, metropolitan areas remain at the core of the deve-
lopment related to IT and ITes, while the satellite cities around
them show enormous dualities in use and access to such
infrastructure. Bhiwandi is one of the seven municipal corpo-
rations included within the Mumbai Metropolitan Region but
is often considered a peripheral town. Historically, significant
for its power looms and textile mills, today it faces rapid
transformations in its industrial base and population. The
power loom and small-scale factories, which have provided
employment to mig rants from other regional states in India,
now face increased threats of survival due to the withdrawal
of state subsidies and an increase in electricity tariffs
(Dalvi 2016). Today, most power loom owners find it difficult
to run their looms at profit and this has affected the workers’
wages and livelihoods.
Bhiwandi, however, has remained a significant site for the
development of industries and godowns since the 1990s. As a
peri-urban space to the megacity of Mumbai, it has experi-
enced both physical and institutional peripheralisation. The
city is dominated by migrant workers who have very little
stake in its development planning and growth. The downfall
and moving out of power looms from the municipal boundaries
of Bhiwandi to adjacent villages has affected the financial
capacity of the urban local body. On the other hand, since
the last decade, there has been an emergence of large-scale
53
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

warehouses catering to the storage of Figure 1: Distribution of per Capita Annual Income and Expenditure per Month on the Internet
goods of global e-commerce businesses by Respondents (`)
× 10 -5
such as Amazon, Flipkart, and Nykaa 8
in the adjacent villages. It has provided 6

Density
another possibility for employment to 4
town dwellers and nearby villagers, 2
though largely in the informal sector. 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
The town suffers from enormous ine- Per capita annual income (`) × 10 4
qualities and lack of access to IT and × 10 -3
ITes and also underdevelopment of the 8

related digital infrastructure. 6

Density
If we look at the educational history 4

of the city, the native Konkani commu- 2

nity, which is better educated and com- 0

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
prised about one-fourth of the Muslim
Data recharge expenses (`) per month
population in the town in the 1970s Source: Authors' calculation.
(Momin 1978), has played a crucial role
in establishing several schools, junior colleges and institutions with the first phase of lockdown relaxation rules and one
in Bhiwandi. The Konkan Muslim Education Society (KMES), could meet in small numbers, with COVID-19 protocols followed.
established in 1927, has been running most of these education- The workshop helped us capture the participant’s excitement
al institutions in the city. Interestingly, the number of schools for being able to come out of their houses and have a day-long
and colleges run by KMES for women is more in number in discussion about their struggles with online education. A
comparison to those for men, because Konkani Muslims, second workshop was conducted a few months later in April
being a trading community, recognised the importance of 2022 when students were requested to write their perception
women’s education. However over the years, the number of of the city of Bhiwandi and how did they interact and partici-
educational institutions has not multiplied as has the increas- pate in the public spaces. In these sessions, it was observed
ing migrant population in the town. Female access to educa- how digital mediums are being used to break spatial barriers
tion was exacerbated during COVID-19 due to economic, infra- for interactions.
structural, and cultural factors. The majority of those living
in Bhiwandi were employed in the informal sector jobs and Social Background of the Students
hence suffered from lockdown and the resulting crash of Bhiwandi is a city of migrants with a large floating population,
income. There were several cases of migrants returning back which became more evident in the lockdown. We find the
to their native villages, which disrupted the education of their average family size is relatively larger here. The 302 families of
children, and it was difficult for colleges to trace them due to the respondents had 3,201 individuals, corresponding to mean
the poor digital connectivity. and median sizes of the family of 6.96 and 6.0, respectively.
Cumulatively, 14.2% of the total families in the sample had
Data and Methodology four or fewer members, 57.6% of the families had six or fewer
This paper is based on a sample survey of 302 female Muslim members, 78.1% of the families had eight or fewer members
students in the age group of 17 to 20 years, belonging to different and the remaining had more than eight members. The family
castes and communities (within the Muslims), enrolled in the size is higher not because of the higher number of children per
local colleges of Bhiwandi. The survey was conducted from family but because the majority of them live in extended and
October 2021 to November 2021 through the use of Google joint families. If we look at the general socio-economic profile
forms online. The study mainly relied on online forms for the of the communities in the city, they are engaged in informal
survey, which meant that only those students who had access business set-ups related to the power loom or ancillary sectors
to the internet and the required gadgets, like a mobile, laptop, or are working as informal labourers. Therefore, given the pre-
desktop or tablet, could participate. Therefore, it is not an ab- carious nature of the labour market, and low earnings, espe-
solute representation of the situation but is well representative cially for lower-income socio-economic groups, it makes eco-
of the given cohort. The questionnaire was structured under nomic sense to live in joint families and hence share the kitch-
three broad headings. The first was the basic socio-economic en and the burden of daily expenses.
profile, the second was related to access to gadgets and internet The yearly per capita income based on surveyed families is
connection, and the third was related to the monetary aspect also skewed towards the lower end with a long tail (Figure 1)
of the digital interface in terms of average expenditure on showing that a large number of individuals fall into income
phone recharge and other modes of access to internet data. lower than `10,000 per capita per annum. In 2011–12, the
Apart from the survey, we also conducted two face-to-face urban poverty line income was `1,134 per month, and the
workshops with the respondents in the local colleges. It same, when adjusted to the consumer price index for 2021–22
was conducted with select participants in December 2021, (RBI 2021), would be `1,863 per month or `22,356 per capita
54 july 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

per annum. This means 88.4% of the persons belonged to poor belong to them, while 32.5% respondents used phones that
families in the town. belonged to other family members. They had to often share it
Though all the surveyed families had access to electricity, with their siblings, and it was also used even during the classes
toilet, and piped water, the ownership of other assets is moderate to receive and make calls by parents, thus interrupting the
to poor. Only 13.6% of the families owned a car, 55.0% had a period of instruction.
motorcycle or a scooty, 41.4% had a television, 63.2% had a
washing machine, and 77.2% used a gas stove. These assets Quality of the Mobile Phone
were not always new but also included second-hand purchase Out of the total students interviewed, 93.7% had android
(Table 1). phones while 3.3% had no phones (Table 2). Further, 50% of the
Table 1: Percentage of Surveyed Families Owning Major Assets in Bhiwandi respondents had phones with a storage capacity of less than 32
Annual Per Capita Income Categories Total gigabyte (GB), while another 33.8% had a 64 GB storage cap-
<=2,500 2,501– 5,001– 7,501– 10,001– 15,001– 20,001– >=25,001
5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
acity. Only 2.3% of the respondents had smartphones with a
Television 4.0 5.0 4.0 8.3 8.3 4.3 1.0 6.6 41.4
256 GB storage capacity. This shows that there is an over-
Gas stove 5.0 8.9 11.3 15.9 16.2 9.3 3.0 7.6 77.2 whelming use of cheaper version of android mobile phones with
Motorcycle/scooty 4.6 4.0 7.6 12.6 10.6 6.6 1.7 7.3 55.0 lower storage capacities. It is important to note that as the pan-
Car 1.3 1.7 0.7 2.0 2.6 2.6 0.7 2.0 13.6 demic emerged and classes shifted to online mode, 30.1% of
Washing machine 5.6 6.6 8.6 13.9 11.3 7.6 2.3 7.3 63.2 the students were given new phones for attending classes by
All surveyed families had access to piped water, electricity, and toilet within the house. their families.
Source: The sample survey by authors.
In terms of the quality of the phone, which meant at least a
Bhiwandi is a historic town famous for its handloom from as functioning camera and microphone, only 14% of the students
early as the 19th century. In the later decades, it evolved into a reported that they had a mobile phone, but they did not have a
power loom centre. These looms were part of the everyday life functioning camera. It hindered their overall participation in
of a majority of families in the early 20th century. Traditionally, the online classes.
the structural design of the looms was such that the ground
floor was used for the manufacturing purpose while the side Networks and Connectivity
rooms or the first or second floors were used to house labou- In a city like Bhiwandi, peripheral to Mumbai, regular supply
rers and their families. Over the years, many neighbourhoods of electricity and lack of uninterrupted internet availability are
with such mixed-land use have remained the same. As a result, major hindrances to the digitalisation process. The settlement
we see very few only residential apartments, except in new pattern in most of the neighbourhoods is dense with many be-
extensions of Bhiwandi city like Millat Nagar and other ing categorised as slums or slum-like habitation, which makes
upcoming areas on the Bhiwandi–Nashik Highway. it difficult to lay down cables in many areas. Further, given the
networks of mobile towers are also not dense, there are many
Digital Access places that remain in a mobile signal shadow. The survey data
The study reveals that out of 302 students interviewed, 95.0% shows that 71.9% of the students are dependent on mobile
were using only mobile phones for their classes, presentation, networks for internet, while 20.5% have access to cable networks
and assignments; 1.3% (four students) used a laptop; one student and Wi-Fi. Some of those using Wi-Fi also use their neighbours’
had a desktop, and 1.7% (five students) used both laptops, connection and they constitute 7.6% of the sample. This
desktops along with mobile phones (Table 2). A total number shows that a sense of cooperation to help those without inter-
of five-students (1.7%) had no access to any of the devices. net also exists in the town, and it did help a sizeable share of
Some of the students reported that the phone they use did not the students to access online classes during the COVID-19
Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Ownership of Phones and Its Type by Income Category lockdown. The Wi-Fi sharing becomes possible
Per Capita Income Possession of Android Mobile with New Size of Mobile Phone Storage (GB) because of families living in a close proximity to
Category Mobile Phone Phone Camera Phone 32 64 128 256 Do Not each other. In several cases, this sharing of data is
Personal Using But Not Know/Do done with mutual consent, and some of the stu-
Phone a Personal Not Have
dents also shared the cost of Wi-Fi. There were
Phone
also several instances where students used Wi-Fi
<=2,500 6.6 0.7 6.6 5.6 2.3 4.3 1.7 0.3 0.0 1.1
without the consent of the owners.
2,501–5,000 5.7 5.8 10.3 10.6 1.3 6.3 3.0 1.2 0.0 1.0
Only about 58.3% of the total students remain
5,001–7,500 9.9 2.7 14.6 10.9 2.6 10.7 2.5 0 1.0 0.7
satisfied with the quality of internet speed on
7,501–10,000 14.8 6.4 19.5 19.9 7.6 11.3 7.0 2 0.3 0.7 their mobile, while the rest categorise it as bad or
10,001–15,000 12.8 7.6 19.5 17.2 7.0 7.9 9.5 2.3 0.0 0.7 irregular. About 45.7% of the student used Jio
15,001–20,000 6.6 4.9 11.6 11.6 5.3 4.0 6.3 1.3 0.7 0.0 network, followed by Airtel (that is, 37.1% of the
20,001–25,000 2.9 0.7 3.0 2.6 0.7 1.7 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 students), while the rest used Vodafone–Idea. To
>=25,001 3.9 4.7 8.6 7.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 1.6 0.3 0.3 safeguard themselves from the weaker mobile
Total 63.2 33.5 93.7 85.8 30.1 49.7 33.8 9.6 2.3 4.6 networks, families kept the alternative of Wi-Fi or
Source: Sample survey by authors. cable connections. But in the case of the student
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

respondents in the study, it was not the case. As discussed that the access was interrupted because they needed to share
above, a large number of them came from economically weak- the same phone with their siblings who also had to attend
er sections and the average monthly income made expenditure their classes.
on internet and Wi-Fi unaffordable. Students mainly used Only 47.7% students had access to phones at any time of the
phones as a learning device. However, the small screens made day to listen the recorded lectures. The rest reported access
reading and typing assignments very difficult. Additionally, the when the younger or the elder siblings did not have their
quality of internet created challenging situations for students. classes. About 22.2% of the respondents said it was only during
The monthly expenditure and usage of data increased for the early morning hours when they could use the phone. This
each family during the pandemic. The data consumption shows that they had to adjust their study hours as per the
during online classes was generally very high, which meant availability of the device, and hence it was impossible for a
that the students could not attend all the classes and had to majority of them to follow the college schedule regularly and
make a choice of excluding a few. Further, they also had to attend all the classes.
share the same device and internet with their siblings, thereby As they were not able to attend all the classes, the students
bringing down their share of data. The internet expenses for had to borrow the lecture notes from their classmates. A
each student was `232.5 per month. More than 88% of the majority of the students—86% of them—borrowed class
users spent less than `300 per month on data. Even though notes on mobile phones when they missed attending. Many
the data cost was cheaper—about `200 for a 28 days’ pack of teachers during the discussion informed about providing
1.5 GB data per day—students had to ensure a modest use to class notes regularly to the students who were not able to at-
be able to extend it for one month of classes. A large number tend the classes. Given the grim situation, there were some
of students were from the economically weaker sections and parents, around 5% of them, who felt that their daughters will
had larger families. Therefore, it was not possible to attend be better off quitting education.
all the classes, and had to make a judicious use of data-pack Although there was lower access to the internet in the loca-
sharing with other siblings. lity, mobile phones are being increasingly used for booking
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Internet Expenses by Income cooking gas cylinders (60.3%), tickets (22.2%), recharging/
Annual Per Capita Internet Data Expenses (`) paying telephone bills (18.2%), paying property taxes (20.9%),
Income (`) <=100 101–200 201–300 301–400 401–500 >=501 Total (%) applying for a passport (11.3%), applying for voter card
<=2,500 0.3 5.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.0 7.6 (24.2%), applying for admission in school and colleges
2,501–5,000 1.7 5.6 3.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 11.3 (56.6%), and searching employment opportunities (19.9%).
5,001–7,500 1.3 9.6 2.0 1.3 0.3 0.7 15.2 About 7.3% used the internet and mobiles to promote their
7,501–10,000 2.6 10.9 5.0 1.3 0.3 1.0 21.2 business, while 27.2% and 26.5% used them for shopping on-
10,001–15,000 1.3 11.9 4.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 20.2 line for non-food and food items, respectively.
15,001–20,000 1.3 5.6 4.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 12.3 Lack of access became more acute during university exams
20,001–25,000 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 when students needed unhindered network and mobiles or
>=25,001 0.3 4.3 3.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 8.9 laptops. The colleges had to make special arrangements for
Total (%) 8.9 55.3 23.5 6.3 2.6 3.3 100.0 the students to visit the campus in small groups to write their
Source: Sample survey by authors.
exams. The institutions were flexible enough to conduct the
Apart from attending classes, phones were also used for exams on different dates and also provided a longer time
recreation purposes like watching web series and videos frame for writing the exam through the day. As one of the col-
(about 11%) as well as for making videos (about 1%). Some lege teachers said,
reported to have taken to baking, cooking, or doing other But students didn’t understand this earlier, so we had to run after
crafts during the lockdown, or watching other such content them. University gave these students a second and third chance to
on the internet. They learned many skills through YouTube write their exams. The office and teachers were individually persuad-
and other online videos. ing the students. Here in Bhiwandi, people are laid back, their parents
are from the labour and working class, and they don’t have any idea
Only in 47.7% of the cases, families allowed their children to
about what is happening with the ward. Only 30% of parents keep
use mobiles whenever they wanted. While 22.2% of female track of their children’s’ education. Students keep changing phone
students used it in the morning and 25.2% in the afternoons, numbers so quickly that keeping a track was also becoming difficult.
mainly for classes and 5% used it at night when other family
members were not using the phone. Many of the students Women’s College as Safe Spaces
shared their father’s or brother’s phones when they were not It was observed that in some families, Muslim females were
going out for work. This meant that the women could have discouraged to use phones as it is widely assumed that it leads
access only at the early morning or late night when the working to moral corruption. One of the respondent said, “If a woman
members of the families were at home. When asked whether is seen speaking on the phone people will stop and ask,
they were able to attend all the classes online, only 38.1% ‘Are you speaking to your boyfriend?’” These narratives rein-
responded affirmatively. Around 27.2% of them could only force the idea of gender segregation and marginalisation of
attend important classes because of the data saving and the women through stereotypes. Another respondent stated that
phone sharing, and about 35% of the total respondents said “In Bhiwandi, these are males who are considered knowledgeable
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

but that is because females don’t come forward and express
their feelings and ideas.”
In such a context, the colleges in the city act as an important
safe space for education and socialisation. It is the only public
space where women were allowed to travel on their own
every day and without strict controls. One of the students
highlighted, “College is the only place where I can go alone.”
During the pandemic, they lost this little independence to
meet their friends. As one student shared, “When the lockdown
started I was very happy that I will rest at home but soon I
was frustrated being because college was the only place we
would go.” Many expressed their concern that the new rou-
tine of living in the household created challenges for their
physical movements and they would have to renegotiation
their mobility and social activities.
A respondent, enrolled in the science stream, wrote about
the patriarchal nature of the city (Bhiwandi) wherein a girl or
a boy cannot be imagined as anything beyond siblings and
friendship is seen with a suspicious gaze. She found this norm
very derogatory to her existence as it suffocated her independ-
ence. It is also true that digital platforms have redrawn these
boundaries, making interactions fluid between people.
However, access to the mobile phone did not necessarily
translate into freedom to use it as women wished. The biggest
hindrance was the limited financial support for purchasing
data. Only 24.8% of the women said their phones were regu-
larly recharged as required, while the rest had to bargain and
negotiate with their parents every time. Many reported it
to be a big hurdle and often parents would ask them to wait
for a few days.
They also complained that though their parents can afford
to install a Wi-Fi connection, they avoided doing so because
they did not want them to have unrestricted and continuous
access to the internet. The number of students who said they
do not have the freedom to use the internet whenever they
wanted was 35.4%. On the other hand, during the discussion,
many women reported that this was not the case with respect
to their brothers who had comparatively free access to use the
internet. Women, whether teachers or students, also expressed
the anxiety of using cameras for the fear of coming in contact
with some unwanted person.
Apart from parental monitoring of women and associating
the same with the notion of their security, the other reason for
restricted use of the internet was the added responsibility of
household chores. During the lockdown, when the entire fam-
ily was confined to their home, it increased the amount of
cooking, cleaning and washing chores for women. And invari-
ably, it was the female members who were expected to share
the workload. As discussed earlier, several of these students
reported managing household work along with their online

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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

classes. These women shared that their parents at home did
not give much importance to class attendance and rather
expected them to prioritise household work. This experience
of managing all the housework and education at the same time
was described by a student as, “The class lectures were like
background music, we would be cooking, cleaning, or sweep-
ing while listening to the teacher.”
It also meant that the additional burden of home-based
work and domestic labour increased not only for the mothers
or wives but equally burdened the daughters. The gender divi-
sion of labour, especially among the working class women,
was bearing the whole burden of household work and attend-
ing classes as a side activity. While the women in normal cir-
cumstances also finished household work before they went to
school or college, giving them the much-needed respite, during
the pandemic they were trapped in the monotonous and
unending cycle of housework.
In Conclusion
The paper studies the limited access of Muslim female stu-
dents from the marginalised sections of the society to the
technology-driven education. It further shows the importance
of intersectionalities in determining access to IT and ITes. The
poorer sections are pushed towards online education without
appropriate digital infrastructures and technological support,
which is, in turn, producing new social and material inequali-
ties. Further, it emerges that not only the aspects of network
and connectivity, and access to devices, but average monthly
expenditure on data packs was also the defining factor in
online access to higher education during the pandemic. The
cooperation among the students in crisis situation was very
high and they used various modes of “sharing”—of class re-
cordings, notes and data packs—as a coping mechanism.
Notwithstanding all the challenges, the pandemic also pro-
vided an opportunity for students to access higher education
through the internet. With all its limitations, online education
may prove very beneficial in the long run, especially for stu-
dents from the marginalised groups, as the internet penetra-
tion grows and the technology cost comes down with growing
usage (Jena 2020). This may bridge the asymmetries of infor-
mation within society that drive inequities in wealth creation
and accumulation of knowledge. However, in the short run,
the digital divide and gender gaps may further intensify the
existing socio-economic inequalities.

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Ticktin, Miriam (2021): “Building a Feminist Com-
mons in the Time of COVID-19,” Signs: Journal
of Women in Culture and Society (blog), http://
signsjournal.org/covid/ticktin/.
Zainuddin, Zamzami, Corinne Jacqueline Perera,
Hussein Haruna and H Habiburrahim (2020):
“Literacy in the New Norm: Stay-Home Game
Plan for Parents,” Information and Learning
Sciences, Vol 121, pp 645–53.
available at
Skandaa Distributors
30-265/25/19, Flat No. S-1,
Sai Enclave, Geetha Nagar,
Near Sai Vidya Vihar,
RK Puram Post, Malkajgiri,
Hyderabad 500 056,
Telangana
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Exploring Abortion Laws
A Case Study of Bangladesh, India, Russia, and the United States
Pooja Kapoor
Abortion has long been a divisive issue in the rights
debate particularly when it is presented as a conflict
between a woman’s right to choose and an unborn
child’s right to live. Unsafe abortion can lead to
long-term issues detrimental to woman’s health and
psychological well-being, in addition to acute health
risks and even fatality. This paper offers a comprehensive
overview of current abortion laws and practices in
Bangladesh, India, Russia, and the US. While restrictive
laws are often violated, few of them are appropriate for
their intended purpose. It is important
to acknowledge that the right to make independent
decisions about her own body and reproductive
functions is at the very core of the fundamental
rights of women.
Pooja Kapoor (pooja.kapoor@bennett.edu.in) teaches at the School of
Liberal Arts, Bennett University, Greater Noida.
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R
eproductive rights need to be understood through the
lens of human rights approach. They are based on the
idea that everyone has the right to access healthcare
and women should have the autonomy to make their own
decisions. Unwanted and forced pregnancies due to lack of
family planning, fatalities during pregnancy and delivery,
complications from unsafe abortions, early marriages, and
coercive unsafe sex are examples of the abuse of reproductive
rights. Women’s intrinsic dignity and independence are denied
because of the societal undervaluing of their fundamental
existence. Family members often make the most important
decisions impacting women’s health, education, property, and
marriage. In many cases they are arbitrarily denied the freedom
to make their own decisions, thereby rejecting their personhood
and autonomy, especially in the private domain.
In such a context, some women access abortion services
covertly. But the enforcement of societal and legal restrictions
has hindered their right to safety and health. The ethical
standards regulating abortion have undergone change to
accommodate the historical and social situations in which
they were established. These standards have consistently been
aimed at satisfying societal requirements that do not acknowl-
edge women’s freedom to choose their sexuality, fertility, and
reproduction. Due to the moral and ethical questions it raised,
abortion has therefore occasionally been a contentious topic in
many countries. Abortion legislation and regulation are also
influenced by factors like the state’s pro- or anti-natalist policies,
concerns of inheritance, and patriarchy. Although it has frequently
been outlawed or otherwise restricted, it remains widespread
in many countries.
The ancient and early modern texts from Egypt, like the
Ebers Papyrus (1550 BC) and Kahun Papyrus (1850 BC), both
carry information on the contraceptive prescription. In the
Hindu Upanishads dating 1500 BC and in the ancient Chinese
medical literature, many methods of contraception are men-
tioned. This shows that the practice was widely prevalent in
every society (Mutneja and Arti 2023). Abortion was also
supported by the Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle
under certain conditions.
According to the English Common Law, abortion was illegal
if the foetus was already formed but not yet quickened. Opting
for abortion after foetal movement or “quickening” was penal-
ised as homicide. With the adoption of liberalising laws in
Colorado in the United States (US), the abortion reform move-
ment had its first success in 1967 in the country. The Model
59
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Penal Code (MPC) served as the foundation for the law. The
provisions of the MPC, permitting abortion in situations other
than those where only the mother’s life was in danger, were
accepted in whole or in part by around one-third of the states
between 1967 and 1973 (Conger 1973).
In the Roe v Doe judgment in 1973, the court noted that Texas
and Georgia’s abortion-related laws interfered with a woman’s
right to decide termination of pregnancy. The judgments were
based on the conclusion that a woman’s right to personal privacy
under the 14th Amendment protected her decision to carry a
pregnancy to term. In Roe v Wade (1973), the US Supreme
Court ruled that all state laws prohibiting abortion in the
first trimester were unconstitutional. Additionally, it permit-
ted states to strictly prohibit third-trimester abortions unless
doing so would be in the woman’s best interests in terms of her
bodily or psychological health. It also allowed states to control
abortion in the second trimester without outrightly forbidding
it (Conger 1973).
Global Legislative Practices
Abortion in medical terminology means ending of pregnancy.
In 2021, there were around 24 countries where abortion was
banned. Around 90 million women, which is about 5% of the
total world population, of reproductive age reside in Asia,
America, and Africa. According to the Centre for Reproductive
Rights (Washington, US), there are five categories of abortion
laws that we find across the globe.
In the first category are countries that totally prohibit abor-
tions. These include Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt in Africa,
Laos and Philippines in Asia, El Salvador and Honduras in
Central America, and Poland and Malta in Central Europe.
The second category consist of 42 countries where abortion is
permitted if the woman’s life is in danger. Countries like Syria
and UAE permit abortion on the grounds of spousal and paren-
tal authorisation or notification. Whereas in Chile, Mexico
and Indonesia, rape or fetal impairment are accepted as rea-
sons to abort. There are 51 countries in the third category that
permit abortion based on health or therapeutic grounds. The
more accommodating is the fourth category which includes
13 countries that allow abortion on social or economic grounds
and some of them are Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Japan,
Taiwan, Zambia, etc. Lastly, there are countries where abor-
tion is permitted on request (gestational limits vary). Despite a
broad range of limits on its use, abortion is legal in majority of
the European nations. With Vatican City, Liechtenstein, San
Marino, Malta, Andorra, and Poland being the only exceptions,
abortion is either outlawed or severely restricted in these places.
Country-wise Look at the Policies
Bangladesh: Criminalising abortion means making it illegal by
levying legal constraints. The Penal Code of Bangladesh, how-
ever, forbids abortion even when the mother’s life is in danger.
Healthcare providers are not permitted to treat those who do
not meet the legal standards if the limits are imposed. Women
experience distressful procedures with such restrictions.
60
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According to the Bangladesh Penal Code 1860 (Sections 312 to
316), an induced abortion is not permitted unless it is necessary
to save a woman’s life. But since 1979, Bangladesh’s national
family planning programme has included menstrual regulation
(MR), which is a method to normalise the menstrual cycle in its
absence for a short interval of time. Even though MR services
are accessible, many women choose to have illegal abortions,
some of which are perilous (Nasrin 2020).
The constitutional provisions of the Bangladesh under
Article 15 (a) says that it is the chief obligation of the state to
guarantee medical treatment or care as a rudimentary need of
life. Further, Article 18 of Bangladesh’s superlative law remarks
the state’s responsibility to improve nutrition, public health
and well-being of its citizens. The primary component of the
right to life is accessibility to healthcare and medical care.
These requirements must be met to ensure another basic
right that is stated in Article 32—right to life and individual
liberty—even if they are not considered fundamental rights. In
addition to being a signatory to international declarations like
the Beijing Declarations, Alma Ata, the International Conference
on Population and Development, and the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, Bangladesh has ratified numerous regional and
international agreements and obligations. These include the
International Covenants relating to political, civil, economic,
and social rights. Even after signing these conventions, the
implementation of governmental plans and programmes for the
betterment of health of pregnant women are still underrated.
The Hussain Muhammad Ershad v Bangladesh (2005) case is
notable because the court was of the opinion that the interna-
tional human rights obligations cannot be overlooked. It stated,
“if the domestic laws are ambiguous or if there is nothing
therein, the national [Court] should draw upon the principles
in the international instruments” and that when the local laws
are clearly unreliable with the international human rights prin-
ciples, the court will draw the attention of the lawmakers to
such discrepancy. On 18 August 2020, the high court panel
led by judges Tariq-ul-Hakim and S M Kuddus Zaman issued
a ruling in which they questioned why the Penal Code of 1860’s
abortion-related sections should not be declared unlawful be-
cause they conflict with fundamental rights guaranteed by the
constitution of Bangladesh in 1972. The unlawful route to abor-
tion results in a wide range of problems that endanger both the
woman and the unborn foetus, leading to suicide, societal shame,
and many forms of physical and emotional traumas in some
cases. The archaic Penal Code’s provisions date back to the
colonial era (Sedgh 2016).
India: Even though India was one of the first nations in the
world to develop legal and policy frameworks conferring
access to abortion and contraception, women still face many
barriers in the decision-making process and access to health-
care services. Abortion is permitted, till 20 weeks of pregnancy
to married women. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy
(MTP) Act went into effect in 1971, allowing for the termination
of a pregnancy. The conditions for exercising this right could
be reasons such as therapeutic or medical termination for
july 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

protecting the life of the mother or if she is suffering from car-
diac diseases with a history of decomposition in the previous
pregnancy. Other reasons include hypertensive crisis, cervical
cancer or ductal carcinoma, diabetes, eye disease, down syn-
drome, adult onset of Huntington’s disease, and so on. Unin-
tended pregnancies brought on by the failure of any kind of
contraception also come under this category since they may
result in major health problems for the woman if denied access
to abortion.
The MTP Act, 1971 is deemed to be a progressive statute.
The features can be categorised by numerous sections like
the Section 3 of this act created authorised pregnancy termi-
nation. A registered doctor may end a pregnancy up to
20 weeks along with a pregnancy up to 24 weeks with the
help of at least two other doctors, if there is a threat to the
mother’s health. Moreover, the failure of birth control meth-
ods and rape as a source of conception have been linked to
mental trauma. It further states that if the unborn child is
going to be born with a severe disability, abortion can be
performed under Section 3(4), which requires the woman’s
consent in all other cases and the guardian’s approval in
cases where a minor is involved. However, it is pertinent to
mention here that Section 3 of the MTP Act, 1971 is silent
about the conditions which will be considered as substantial
risk. Section 3(20) of the amended law, which took effect in
2020, adds a medical board made up of a gynaecologist, a
paediatrician, a sonologist or radiologist, and more members,
which the official gazette notifies. Section 5(A) holds the right
to privacy of the information of abortion.
The new Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment)
Act, 2021 allows the access to safe and legal abortion services
on therapeutic, genetic, humanitarian, and social grounds,
protecting universal access to all-inclusive treatment. The act
permits the medical termination of pregnancy at 22 weeks if
she suffers from numerous abnormalities. It thus reiterated the
commitment to the sustainable development goals that aims to
bring down the maternal mortality rate as well as provide uni-
versal access to sexual and reproductive health rights. A mar-
ried woman can undergo an abortion without the consent of
her husband. The husband cannot force a woman to endure an
abortion. In the case of coercion, a case for domestic violence
can be filed under IPC Sections 312/313, for causing miscar-
riage. The new act permits the time period of abortion up to 20
weeks of pregnancy upon the advice of one doctor and in the
case of certain special categories of women (rape survivors,
victims of incest, the differently abled and minors) between
20 and 24 weeks with two doctors as advisors. No medical
professional can reveal the name of any woman who wishes to
terminate according to the provisions of the 2021 act.
One cannot deny the existence of several problems in the act
after carefully examining its provisions. With the legal and
medical support, women who do find out about foetal abnor-
malities after the 20th week of pregnancy, had the right to end
their pregnancy. This gestational restriction, however, is only
applicable to rape victims, incest victims, and women who
have serious medical or mental illnesses including physical
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
disabilities, or lunacy. The Bombay High Court’s decision in
Nikhil D Datar and Others v Union of India (2008) on disability-
linked abortion has a bearing on the right to life of person
with disabilities.
On 29 September 2022, India took a giant leap in abortion
rights. India’s top judiciary gave a landmark judgment ensur-
ing the right to safe abortion. The bench headed by Justice
D Y Chandrachud noted that the marital status of a woman is no
ground for depriving her right to abort an unwanted pregnancy.
The new judgment permits abortion to all women till 24 weeks
of pregnancy. Importantly, marital rape will also be consid-
ered as a ground similar to rape and assault to terminate the
unwanted pregnancy (Datta 2022). This is a huge develop-
ment because this means that India’s top court has given primacy
to constitutional rights and right to health of women in drafting
the judgment (Stillman 2014). The liberal understanding of
the abortion laws would be pertinent not just to cis-women but
also other gender identities, including the LGBTQ+ community
and gender-diverse people. Moreover, the courts noted that
inequality in access to abortion violates the right to equality
before the law.
In the tragic case of the death of Savita Halappanavar, a
31-year-old Indian dentist living in Ireland, was 17 weeks preg-
nant when she faced a medical emergency. When her husband
rushed her to the hospital and requested for an abortion, the
hospital administration categorically told them that being a
Catholic country abortion was not a possibility. After waiting
for six days in pain, her condition had worsened, and she was
diagnosed with sepsis, suffering major multiorgan failure. The
case generated a lot of debate around the abortion laws in India
and Ireland (Suroor 2012).
Other landmark judgments: The Supreme Court of India in
the Justice K S Puttaswamy (Rtd) v Union of India and Ors
(2017) case considered that the right to privacy is absolute un-
der fundamental rights of the Constitution. There is no sepa-
rate provision for abortion rights, hence it is only the Right to
Privacy and Liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
which says that “no person shall be deprived of his life or per-
sonal liberty except according to procedure established by
law.” In the B K Parthasarathi v State of Andhra Pradesh (2000),
the court observed that
The right to make a decision about reproduction is essentially a very
personal decision either on the part of the man or woman. Necessarily,
such a right includes the right not to reproduce. The intrusion of the
state into such a decision-making process of the individual is scruti-
nized by the Constitutional Courts both in this country and in America
with great care.
Live-in relationship was legalised in India after the verdict
of the Supreme Court in D Velusamy v D Patchaiammal (2014)
and Indra Sarma v V K V Sarma (2014) wherein it stated, “live
in relationship is allowed if the couples are major, unmarried
and also they should be heterogeneous sex.” Though live-in rela-
tionship was not legal when the MTP Act, 1971 was enacted, the
court has now accepted this relationship. Hence, the MTP Act
needs to be amended considering this new development.
61
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Murugan Nayakkar v Union of India (2017) tried to push for-
ward the upper limit for termination to 24 weeks of pregnancy,
in critical situations like rape of a minor girl.
Russia: Every time a political head of the state has changed in
Russia, the legal system has oscillated between being permis-
sive and being restrictive. In 1920, the Bolshevik government
permitted women the right to abortion. This right was then
limited under Stalin’s regime in the early 1930s, and eradicated in
1936, mainly in the name of advocating population growth.
The abortion was again legalised after Stalin’s death in 1955
and has remained legal since (Agadjanian 2002). Soviet Russia
had one of the most liberal abortion laws in the world prior to
its fall. Abortion was lawful under any situation in the first
trimester, and for all medical and certain non-medical grounds
in the second trimester. Bill No 567, which established 13
“social conditions” in which a woman might have an abortion
between the 12th and 22nd week of pregnancy, was enacted by
the Russian government in 1996. Abortions were permitted
under this bill in some instances, such as when one parent was
unemployed, or the family already had three or more chil-
dren (Stewart 2004). The first serious abortion restrictions in
Russia were put in place after 2003, when late-term abortions
performed for social reasons other than medical ones, such as
homelessness and poverty, were made illegal. In January 2016,
a bill in parliament attempted to “outrule the habit of unre-
stricted use of pharmacological drugs designed for pregnancy
termination.” It would have prohibited retail sales and re-
stricted the groups that could purchase medical abortion pills
in bulk. Moreover, it would have prohibited abortions in for-
profit facilities and barred public insurance programmes from
covering their cost (International Campaign for Women’s
Right to Safe Abortion 2016).
Today, abortions in Russia are legal and are part of compulsory
medical insurance coverage. Until twelve weeks, pregnancy
can be aborted at will. Late-term abortions are allowed only in
cases of abuse like rape or for medical reasons. The present
government is of the opinion that it is better to provide safe
abortions to avoid illegal abortions.
United States: Today, abortion is one of the most contentious
topics in the US. A democracy must view itself as being in
grave danger when it repeals a constitutional right that has
been in force for over 50 years. When Jane Roe, then 22 years
old, filed a lawsuit against the state of Texas in 1970 she
believed the state had violated her constitutional right to
abort her pregnancy. One of the most divisive Supreme Court
rulings in the US, Roe v Wade, was won by Roe (Sharma
2022). The court concluded by a 7:2 margin in 1973 that “a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”
is protected by the “right of privacy ... founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment’s idea of personal liberty and constraints
upon state intervention.”
However, today there are a much higher number of state
laws restricting abortion in a wide range of ways, and the
trend towards restrictive legislation seems to be accelerating.
62
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Existing restrictive laws include gestational limits, targeted
regulation of abortion provider (TRAP) laws that enforce many
conditions on abortion and limitations on the coverage under
private insurance policies (Guttmacher Institute 2015). The
differences in access to this crucial reproductive health treat-
ment are a troubling part of the present situation in the US.
Where a woman resides should not affect her right to abortion.
Women from more affluent origins have easier access to abor-
tion treatment. In addition to having the social and financial
resources to take time off from their work, locate and pay for
quality day care, and travel to another state if required, they
are likely to have more complete health insurance (Connell
1987). Access limitations, particularly TRAP laws that might
force clinics or whole clinic systems to close, are especially
pernicious in the burden they inflict on women from the eco-
nomically weaker section of society.
The Roe v Wade decision on abortion, which was overturned
by the US Supreme Court in a 6:3 vote on 24 June 2022, is ex-
pected to have a significant impact on the nation. The court
said that when Roe and the 1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood
v Casey, which supported Roe, was overturned, “the subject of
abortion must be before the people’s elected representatives.”
States can now determine whether to outlaw abortion, when
to do so, and in what situations (Lakshman 2022). “Trigger
laws” that take effect once the Roe v Wade is overturned have
been passed by 13 states. Others, including Arkansas, Idaho, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming, have ancient laws still on the books that prohibited
abortion before 1973; these laws might again be reinstated
(Jiménez and Bogel-Burroughs 2022).
Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court, has split the country between states
who grant the right to abortions and those who do not. Women
with unintended or undesired pregnancies, particularly ones
that can jeopardise the mother’s life or are the consequence of
rape or incest in certain jurisdictions, may have little choice
but to seek medical care in other states. Many women will be
forced to resort to illegal, risky abortions closer to home due to
a lack of services and support systems (Luna 2020).
In Conclusion
Since sex determination tests are forbidden in India, many
women opt for diagnostic testing, which is executed unlaw-
fully by sex selective rackets. The only way to stop the issue
of female feticide in the garb of abortion, which is so complicated,
is to address its core causes. Besides, men should also receive
health education on safe sex practices and prevention of
domestic abuse.
The regressive anti-abortion laws not only violate women’s
constitutional and reproductive rights, but also have detri-
mental effects on their physical and emotional health. Making
them go through a full-term pregnancy against their choice is
unethical in a greater majority of catastrophic circumstances.
Due to unsafe abortion methods which are illegal, major life-
threatening complications can arise. Legalising abortion
will make safe abortion practices possible and allow for the
july 22, 2023 vol lViii no 29 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

appropriate training of medical professionals, which will even-
tually help to decrease or even halt these maternal fatalities.
Political will and policy commitment in the form of proper
budget allocation, training, and infrastructural support,
followed with social inputs based on women’s needs, are
essential prerequisites for effective programme implementa-
tion on abortion rights. Decriminalising abortion includes
amending laws or any related policies and rules to achieve
safe health services and sociocultural shift in the attitude
towards abortion. Moreover, it is important to treat it as any
other form of medical care. The primary necessity is a
ground-based strategy in India. Abortion access must be pro-
tected by law. It must be equally accessible and everyone
should have full access to effective contraception. It is impor-
tant to have medical professionals with culturally competent
care training.

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W EPWRF India Time Series

NE
(www.epwrfits.in)
Wage Rates in Rural India
The EPW Research Foundation has added a module on Wage Rates in Rural India to its online database, EPWRF India Time Series
(EPWRFITS).
This module provides average daily wage rates, month-wise, in rupees, for various agricultural and non-agricultural occupations in
Rural India for 20 states starting from July 1998 (also available, data for agricultural year July 1995–June 1996). Additionally, it presents
quarterly and annual series (calendar year, financial year and agricultural year), derived as averages of the monthly data.
The wage rates for agricultural occupations are provided for ploughing/tilling, sowing, harvesting, winnowing, threshing, picking,
horticulture, fishing (inland, coastal/deep-sea), logging and wood cutting, animal husbandry, packaging (agriculture), general agricultural
segment and plant protection.
The non-agricultural occupation segment presents wage rates for carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, weavers, beedi makers, bamboo/cane
basket weavers, handicraft workers, plumbers, electricians, construction workers, LMV and tractor drivers, porters, loaders, and sweeping/
cleaning workers.
The data have been sourced from Wage Rates in Rural India, regularly published by the Labour Bureau, Shimla (Ministry of Labour
and Employment, Government of India).
With this addition, the EPWRFITS now has 32 modules covering both economic (real and financial sectors) and social sectors.
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Wholesale Price Index Foreign Trade

The year-on-year (y-o-y) WPI-based infl ation rate declined to -4.1% in June
2023 from 16.2% reported a year ago and -3.5% a month ago. The index
for primary articles decreased by (-)2.8% against 18.6% registered a year
ago and -1.8% a month ago. The rate of inflation for food articles reduced
to 1.3% from 13.7% a year ago. The index for fuel and power declined by
(-)12.6% against 51.0% a year ago and the index for manufactured products
was down by (-)2.7% compared to 9.4%.
The trade deficit narrowed down to $20.1 bn in June 2023 compared to $22.1 bn
registered a year ago. Exports contracted by (-)22.0% to $33.0 bn from $42.3 bn a
year ago and imports by (-)17.5% to $53.1 bn from $64.4 bn. Oil imports stood lower
at $12.5 bn and non-oil imports at $40.6 bn compared to $18.9 bn and $45.4 bn,
respectively, reported a year ago. During April–June 2022–23, cumulative exports
declined by (-)15.1% to $102.7 bn and imports by (-)12.7% to $160.3 bn from their
respective values of $121.0 bn and $183.5 bn registered a year ago.

Consumer Price Index Index of Eight Core Industries

The CPI-inflation rate decreased to 4.8% in June 2023 from 7.0% reported a
year ago but was higher than 4.3% a month ago. The consumer food price
index grew by 4.5% compared to 7.8% a year ago. The CPI-rural inflation rate
reduced to 4.7% and the urban inflation rate to 5.0% from 7.1% and 6.9%,
respectively. According to Labour Bureau data, the CPI for agricultural
labourers (CPI–AL) stood at 6.0% in May 2023 compared to 6.7% a year ago and
the CPI for industrial workers (CPI–IW) at 4.4% against 7.0%.
The ICI grew by 4.3% in May 2023 compared to 19.3% registered a year ago.
Growth in electricity generation declined to -0.3%, coal segment to 7.2%,
crude oil to -1.9% and natural gas to -0.3% from their respective growth rates
of 23.5%, 33.5%, 4.6% and 7.0% a year ago. Production of petroleum refi nery
products grew by 2.8%, steel by 9.2% and cement by 15.5% against 16.7%,
15.1%, 26.2%, respectively. Growth in the fertiliser segment stood at 9.7%
compared to 22.9% a year ago.

Movement of WPI-Inflation Rate January 2022–June 2023 Merchandise Trade June 2023
Year-on-Year in % June 2023 Over Month Over Year April–June
($ bn) (%) (%) (2022–23 over 2021–22) (%)
60
Exports 33.0 -5.7 -22.0 -15.1
Imports 53.1 -7.0 -17.5 -12.7
40 Trade Balance -20.1 -9.0 -8.8 -7.9
Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Fuel and Power Primary Articles
20 Trade Balance January 2022–June 2023
$ billion

0 7
Manufactured -2.7%
Products -2.9%
0
-12.6%
-20
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M June* Non-oil Oil -$7.0 bn
2022 2023 -7
* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12 = 100.
-14
-$13.2 bn
Trends in WPI and Its Components June 2023* (%)
Financial Year (Averages) -21
Weights Over Month Over Year 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23 -$20.1 bn
All commodities 100 -0.4 -4.1 1.3 13.0 9.4 -28

Primary articles 22.6 0.6 -2.9 1.7 10.2 10.0 Total Trade Balance
-35
Food articles 15.3 2.1 1.3 3.2 4.1 7.3 Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M June
Fuel and power 13.2 -1.7 -12.6 -8.0 32.5 28.1 2022 2023
Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
Manufactured products 64.2 -0.5 -2.7 2.8 11.1 5.6
*Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12=100. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of Index Values of Components of IIP January 2022–May 2023
Index Value
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2022–June 2023
210
Year-on-Year in % Electricity
201.6
15 168
142.3

12 126
128.1
Consumer Food 84
9 Manufacturing Mining
5.2% 42
6
CPI Miscellaneous 0
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A May*
3 2022 2023
4.8% * May 2023 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.
4.5%
0
Index for Eight Core Industries May 2023* (%)
-3
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M* June* Weights Over Over Financial Year (Avgs) in %
2022 2023 Month Year 2021–22 2022–23
* Data is provisional. Source: National Statistical Office (NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation,
Base: 2012=100. Infrastructure industries 40.27@ 3.5 4.3 10.4 7.7
Coal 10.3 3.9 7.2 8.5 14.9
CPI: Rural and Urban June 2023* (%)
Latest Over Over Financial Year (Avgs) Crude oil 9.0 5.0 -1.9 -2.6 -1.7
Month Index Month Year 2021–22 2022–23 Natural gas 6.9 6.3 -0.3 19.2 1.6
CPI Combined 179.0 0.51 4.25 5.5 6.7 Petroleum refinery products 28.0 6.3 2.8 8.9 4.8
Rural (2012 = 100) 179.7 0.50 4.17 5.4 6.8 Fertilisers 2.6 16.4 9.7 0.7 11.3
Urban (2012 = 100) 178.1 0.39 4.27 5.6 6.4 Steel 17.9 -0.7 9.2 16.9 8.9
CPI: Occupation-wise# Cement 5.4 -0.2 15.5 20.8 8.7
Industrial workers (2016 = 100) 134.7 0.4 4.4 5.1 6.1 Electricity 19.9 3.6 -0.3 8.0 8.9
Agricultural labourers (1986–87 = 100) 1186.0 0.5 6.0 4.0 6.8 (Base: 2011–12=100); *Data is provisional; @ The revised eight core industries have a combined weight of 40.27% in the IIP.
* Provisional; # May 203; Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL). Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

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India’s Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
` Crore | At 2011–12 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Private final consumption expenditure 1548901 (-22.9) 1857460 (-7.4) 2188868 (1.5) 2229267 (6.7) 1822102 (17.6) 2121839 (14.2) 2426098 (10.8) 2333501 (4.7) 2182357 (19.8) 2298123 (8.3) 2478700 (2.2) 2399515 (2.8)
Government final consumption expenditure 412664 (9.2) 310074 (-25.9) 331300 (-4.2) 424184 (24.0) 403808 (-2.1) 346501 (11.7) 350565 (5.8) 474406 (11.8) 411243 (1.8) 332450 (-4.1) 348329 (-0.6) 485284 (2.3)
Gross fixed capital formation 669321 (-44.1) 1075997 (-1.6) 1164824 (2.6) 1345547 (13.6) 1077836 (61.0) 1209609 (12.4) 1179221 (1.2) 1412108 (4.9) 1297588 (20.4) 1325580 (9.6) 1273453 (8.0) 1538071 (8.9)
Change in stocks 2689 (-90.1) 4154 (-84.6) 4159 (-84.1) 4758 (-83.1) 28895 (974.6) 31402 (655.9) 29902 (618.9) 33964 (613.8) 31050 (7.5) 30591 (-2.6) 29868 (-0.1) 35954 (5.9)
Valuables 3791 (-91.4) 52366 (18.4) 50926 (37.2) 100936 (157.0) 22035 (481.3) 134378 (156.6) 73595 (44.5) 48751 (-51.7) 34959 (58.7) 108206 (-19.5) 45595 (-38.0) 37330 (-23.4)
Net trade (Export–Import) 6136 -28799 -120133 -167871 15631 -46285 -91258 -65580 -86460 -146624 -97506 -6264
Exports 523787 (-25.5) 660856 (-6.3) 646358 (-8.5) 725835 (3.9) 765031 (46.1) 826729 (25.1) 825929 (27.8) 888144 (22.4) 915111 (19.6) 927872 (12.2) 917492 (11.1) 994047 (11.9)
Less imports 517651 (-41.0) 689655 (-17.7) 766491 (-5.0) 893707 (12.0) 749401 (44.8) 873014 (26.6) 917188 (19.7) 953723 (6.7) 1001571 (33.6) 1074495 (23.1) 1014998 (10.7) 1000311 (4.9)
Discrepancies 80521 (18.2) 75478 (-17.0) 40637 (-5061.5) 18963 (-92.0) -59256 (-173.6) -145787 (-293.2) -117350 (-388.8) -124790 (-758.1) -126452 (113.4) -70326 (-51.8) -55812 (-52.4) -128375 (2.9)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2724023 (-23.2) 3346731 (-5.6) 3660581 (1.7) 3955784 (3.5) 3311050 (21.6) 3651659 (9.1) 3850772 (5.2) 4112360 (4.0) 3744285 (13.1) 3878000 (6.2) 4022625 (4.5) 4361515 (6.1)

India’s Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

2021–22 ($ mn) 2022–23 ($ mn) 2021–22 (` bn) 2022–23 (` bn)
Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 04 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Current account 6559 -9734 -22167 -13424 -17964 -30902 -16832 -1356 484 [0.9] -721 [-1.3] -1661 [-2.6] -1010 [-1.5] -1387 [-2.1] -2466 [-3.8] -1384 [-2.0] -111.6 [-0.2]
Merchandise -30715 -44511 -59750 -54483 -63054 -78313 -71337 -52587 -2266 -3298 -4477 -4099 -4867 -6249 -5864 -4326.1
Invisibles 37275 34777 37583 41059 45090 47411 54505 51231 2750 2577 2816 3089 3480 3783 4481 4214.5
Services 25808 25579 27809 28319 31069 34426 38713 39075 1904 1895 2084 2130 2398 2747 3182 3214.5
of which: Software services 25136 26781 28356 29266 30692 32681 33541 34370 1854 1984 2125 2202 2369 2608 2757 2827.4
Transfers 19013 18991 21312 21132 22874 24773 28467 24762 1403 1407 1597 1590 1766 1977 2340 2037.1
of which: Private 19222 19212 21447 21350 23065 24991 28641 25080 1418 1423 1607 1606 1780 1994 2354 2063.2
Income -7547 -9792 -11538 -8392 -8853 -11788 -12675 -12606 -557 -726 -865 -631 -683 -941 -1042 -1037.1
Capital account 25392 39622 22500 -1707 22055 1461 28887 6540 1873 [3.7] 2936 [5.2] 1686 [2.7] -128 [-0.2] 1702 [2.6] 117 [0.2] 2375 [3.4] 538.0 [0.7]
of which: Foreign investment 11956 12575 -1283 -1439 -1238 12741 6641 4691 882 932 -96 -108 -96 1017 546 385.9
Overall balance 31870 31189 465 -16024 4595 -30379 11069 5579 2351 [4.6] 2311 [4.1] 35 [0.1] -1205 [-1.8] 355 [0.5] -2424 [-3.7] 910 [1.3] 459.0 [0.6]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

7 July 8 July 31 March Month Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2023 2022 2023 Ago Ago 2022–23 2023–24 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
` crore 4527619 4250651 4340297 47800 276968 13034 187322 68050 668976 590416 302585 102680
$ mn 547203 536101 528083 3943 11102 -23514 19119 -14168 56831 94535 21435 -31532

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` Crore 2023 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Money supply (M3) as on 30 June 23428425 415298 (1.8) 2387849 (11.3) 546847 (2.7) 1084665 (4.9) 2044615 (12.2) 1649151 (8.8) 1850031 (9.0)
Components
Currency with public 3234403 -53750 (-1.6) 152308 (4.9) 46406 (1.5) -42033 (-1.3) 402080 (17.1) 283860 (10.3) 240747 (7.9)
Demand deposits 2590448 268315 (11.6) 399440 (18.2) -21984 (-1.0) 269850 (11.6) 257428 (14.8) 217872 (10.9) 107606 (4.9)
Time deposits 17524894 191222 (1.1) 1816488 (11.6) 521802 (3.4) 855928 (5.1) 1376262 (10.9) 1136326 (8.1) 1482362 (9.8)
Other deposits with RBI 78680 9512 (13.8) 19613 (33.2) 623 (1.1) 919 (1.2) 8844 (23.0) 11093 (23.4) 19317 (33.1)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 7193043 -121535 (-1.7) 791265 (12.4) -75852 (-1.2) 27510 (0.4) 890012 (17.9) 627256 (10.7) 687903 (10.6)
Bank credit to commercial sector 15131378 384894 (2.6) 2000730 (15.2) 514128 (4.1) 701742 (4.9) 629822 (5.7) 948054 (8.1) 1813116 (14.4)
Net foreign exchange assets 4975197 -14371 (-0.3) 231791 (4.9) -110656 (-2.3) 129891 (2.7) 777810 (20.5) 275216 (6.0) -8756 (-0.2)
Banking sector’s net non-monetary liabilities 3901885 -166100 (-4.1) 638179 (19.6) -218790 (-6.3) -225115 (-5.5) 253594 (8.4) 202475 (6.2) 644504 (18.5)
Reserve Money as on 7 July 4363556 -21545 (-0.5) 268774 (6.6) 25896 (0.6) -23203 (-0.5) 570276 (18.8) 468904 (13.0) 317873 (7.8)
Components
Currency in circulation 3365805 -42841 (-1.3) 140833 (4.4) 91256 (2.9) -12715 (-0.4) 406451 (16.6) 279953 (9.8) 244804 (7.8)
Bankers’ deposits with RBI 923629 15520 (1.7) 110448 (13.6) -63545 (-7.2) -6848 (-0.7) 154979 (28.5) 177859 (25.4) 53751 (6.1)
Other deposits with RBI 74121 5775 (8.4) 17493 (30.9) -1816 (-3.1) -3640 (-4.7) 8844 (23.0) 11093 (23.4) 19317 (33.1)
Sources
Net RBI credit to Government 1249527 -72780 (-5.5) 122840 (10.9) -323909 (-22.3) -201599 (-13.9) 107495 (10.8) 350910 (31.9) 530 (0.0)
of which: Centre 1224123 -79959 (-6.1) 115017 (10.4) -339867 (-23.5) -226253 (-15.6) 106606 (10.8) 352627 (32.2) 1403 (0.1)
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector -170685 -11800 (7.4) 61601 (-26.5) 311415 (-57.3) -76242 (80.7) -168464 (83.9) -174344 (0.0) 449258 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 4767660 37337 (0.8) 323161 (7.3) 2020 (0.0) 180305 (3.9) 608998 (17.0) 243079 (5.8) 144876 (3.3)
Govt’s currency liabilities to the public 30925 443 (1.5) 2474 (7.1) 438 (1.6) 639 (2.1) 565 (2.1) 1100 (4.1) 2273 (8.1)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 1513871 -25254 (-1.6) 241302 (19.0) -35931 (-2.7) -73694 (-4.6) -21682 (-1.6) -48160 (-3.5) 279065 (21.3)

Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Indicators ( ` Crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 30 June) 2023 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Aggregate deposits 19159901 457362 (2.4) 2198730 (13.0) 495858 (3.0) 1115987 (6.2) 1546019 (11.4) 1351801 (8.9) 1578601 (9.6)
Demand 2449123 267163 (12.2) 397801 (19.4) -21425 (-1.0) 268692 (12.3) 244190 (15.1) 211554 (11.4) 107684 (5.2)
Time 16710778 190199 (1.2) 1800928 (12.1) 517283 (3.6) 847295 (5.3) 1301831 (10.9) 1140247 (8.6) 1470916 (10.2)
Cash in hand 113854 -453 (-0.4) 5907 (5.5) 22021 (25.6) 23591 (26.1) 3487 (4.0) -4822 (-5.3) 4337 (5.0)
Balance with RBI 871167 18924 (2.2) 77450 (9.8) 110280 (16.1) 61260 (7.6) 6507 (1.2) 140744 (25.9) 126470 (18.5)
Investments 5673323 65573 (1.2) 713522 (14.4) 230853 (4.9) 258175 (4.8) 715177 (19.1) 266422 (6.0) 686200 (14.5)
of which: Government securities 5672567 65632 (1.2) 713569 (14.4) 230819 (4.9) 258245 (4.8) 722935 (19.3) 266547 (6.0) 686143 (14.5)
Bank credit 14391693 383096 (2.7) 2008901 (16.2) 491477 (4.1) 716458 (5.2) 578649 (5.6) 1044027 (9.6) 1783920 (15.0)
of which: Non-food credit 14363787 391943 (2.8) 2018412 (16.3) 509071 (4.3) 708457 (5.2) 569159 (5.6) 1050270 (9.7) 1819026 (15.4)

Capital Markets 14 July Month Year Financial Year So Far 2022–23 End of Financial Year
2023 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 1978–79 = 100) 66060.90 (23.7) 63228.51 53416.15 (1.0) 59106.44 66060.90 51360.42 63284.19 49009 (63.7) 57362 (18.4) 58992 (0.7)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 1983–84 = 100) 19941.55 (22.3) 19177.33 16305.97 (0.9) 17644.91 19941.55 15562.65 19137.18 14689 (68.2) 17423 (20.1) 17602 (-0.7)
S&P BSE-200 (1989–90 = 100) 8433.42 (21.1) 8103.55 6965.58 (1.1) 7406.09 8433.42 6602.62 8144.55 6211 (71.1) 7412 (20.9) 7389 (-2.0)
CNX Nifty-50 (Base: 3 November 1995 = 1000) 19564.50 (22.7) 18755.90 15938.65 (0.5) 17398.05 19564.50 15293.50 18812.50 14507 (67.9) 17153 (19.7) 17360 (-0.6)
CNX Nifty-500 16765.45 (22.4) 16084.05 13702.65 (0.3) 14601.95 16765.45 12950.75 16003.95 12149 (73.7) 14652 (22.2) 14558 (-2.3)
Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

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Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities and the Forex Market—Weeks Ending 7 and 14 July 2023
1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities (G-Sec) Transactions (Amount in ` Crore)
Week Ended 14 July 2023 7 July 2023 15 July 2022 2023–24* 2022–23**
Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume
of Trades of Trades of Trades of Trades of Trades
Outright 23028 302225 17535 263679 17234 196812 306005 4350327 231017 3006713
Repo 5646 803080 5235 774851 4091 673074 73981 12400550 54577 9016538
TREP 4680 1510886 4800 1551000 6403 1791955 66930 21179381 93746 27042406
Total 33354 2616192 27570 2589530 27728 2661840 446916 37930258 379340 39065656
Daily Avg Outright 4606 60445 3507 52736 3447 39362 4435 63048 3254 42348
Daily Avg Repo 1129 160616 873 129142 818 134615 973 163165 700 115597
Daily Avg TREP 936 302177 800 258500 1281 358391 881 278676 1202 346698

2 Instrument-wise Outright and Repo Details (Amount in ` Crore) 3 Top 7 Traded Central Govt Dated Securities (14 July 2023)
Security Description Trades Value (` Crore) % Value to Total
Outright Repo Outright Repo Outright Repo
7.26% GS 2033 13270 136945 51.26
Central Government 267151 615503 192411 584539 163898 422284
7.41% GS 2036 3524 41875 15.67
State Government 7638 158859 9717 152469 8648 122463 7.06% GS 2028 1252 17477 6.54
Treasury Bills 27435 28718 61550 37843 24266 128326 7.38% GS 2027 1061 12592 4.71
Total 302225 803080 263679 774851 196812 673074 7.17% GS 2030 582 9334 3.49

4 Category-wise Buying/Selling Activity (Market Share %) (14 July 2023)

Outright Reverse Repo Repo TREP Lending TREP Borrowing NDS-Call Lending NDS-Call Borrowing Forex
Category Buy Side Sell Side Buy Side Sell Side Buy Side Sell Side Buy Side Sell Side Buy Side Sell Side
Cooperative Banks 2.17 2.23 0.18 0.89 0.28 1.52 47.17** 3.05** 0.35 0.36
Financial Institutions 1.13 0.00 0.23 0.00 3.93 5.08 - - 0.29 0.30
Foreign Banks 21.40 19.45 29.93 29.43 1.19 8.22 0.96 0.88 40.94 41.45
Insurance Companies 3.88 2.16 1.66 0.00 13.06 0.00 - - - -
Mutual Funds 8.03 6.46 43.39 0.00 69.95 1.55 - - - -
Others 6.05 5.62 0.03 1.44 9.45 2.97 - - - -
Primary Dealers 15.48 22.92 6.19 45.78 0.00 6.57 0.00 71.93 - -
Private Sector Banks 24.83 26.13 8.73 11.74 0.91 22.44 27.37 6.52 32.54 32.95
Public Sector Banks 17.04 15.04 9.67 10.73 1.21 51.66 24.50 17.61 25.88 24.94

5 Trading Platform Analysis—Trading Value (Amount in ` Crore) (14 July 2023)

Week Ended OTC NDS-OM Brokered Deals
Number Volume Market Number Volume Market Number Volume Market
of Trades Share (%) of Trades Share (%) of Trades Share (%)
Central Government 879 41827 16.16 20575 216942 83.84 90 6010 2.32
State Government 217 4690 67.32 231 2277 32.68 42 1874 26.90
Treasury Bills 157 12844 40.99 463 18494 59.01 37 4390 14.01
Total 1253 59361 19.98 21269 237714 80.02 169 12274 4.13

6 Settlement Volume of Forex Segment

Segment 14 July 2023 7 July 2023 15 July 2022 2023–24* 2022–23**
Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume
of Deals ($ mn) of Deals ($ mn) of Deals ($ mn) of Deals ($ mn) of Deals ($ mn)
Cash 1452 21869 1528 27236 1686 24896 23104 367288 25030 380663
Tom 1932 27439 1590 23689 2176 29544 29742 422905 32796 459052
Spot 100630 87544 93322 94419 79166 81356 1324515 1301150 1243277 1372793
Forward 500 5043 500 6292 794 8853 63517 574085 55584 578771
Total 104514 141894 96940 151636 83822 144649 1440878 2665427 1356687 2791279
Average 20903 28379 24235 37909 16764 28930 21831 40385 19951 41048

7 Tenor-wise Forward Trades

Tenor 14 July 2023 7 July 2023 15 July 2022

Number Value % to Total Number Value % to Total Number Value % to Total
of Deals ($ mn) Value of Deals ($ mn) Value of Deals ($ mn) Value
< 30 days 61 1498 30 124 4674 74 66 1777 24
> = 30 Days & <= 90 Days 87 1817 36 38 621 10 169 4136 27
> 90 Days & <= 180 Days 34 644 13 37 318 5 78 1146 18
> 180 Days & <= 360 Days 46 960 19 28 435 7 68 1677 25
> 1 year 22 124 2 23 244 4 16 117 6
Total 250 5043 100 250 6292 100 397 8853 100
* Data pertain to 1 April 2022–14 July 2023; ** Data pertain to 1 April 2021–15 July 2022.
(i) Tables 1 to 5 relate to Securities Segment, and (ii) Tables 6 and 7 relate to Forex Segment.
Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).

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Hindustan Times, Business Standard, First India, Mint, Greater Kashmir, Greater Jammu, The Himalayan,
The Tribune, Brill Express, The Sikh Times, Avenue Mail, Western Times, Millennium Post, The Statesman,
State Times, The Pioneer, Hans India, Free Press, Orissa Post, Mumbai Mirror, Mid-Day, Deccan Chronicle,
Deccan Herald, Telangana Today, Financial Times, The Asian Age, The Telegraph, Oheraldo, Gulf of Times,
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal,
The Guardian, The Times

Hindi Newspapers»»
दै निक जागरण, राजस्थाि पत्रिका, दै निक भास्कर, ह द
िं स्
ु ताि, िवभारत टाइम्स, त्रिज़िस स्टैंडडड, अमर उजाला,पिंजाि
केसरी, उत्तम ह न्द,ू जिसत्ता, लोकसत्ता, ररभूमम, द पायिीयर,जागरूक टाइम्स, राष्ट्रीय स ारा, दै निक हरब्यूि, युवा
गोरव, भारतीय स ारा, स्विंतिंि वाताड, सीमा सिंदेश, दै निक सवेरा,एक्शि इिंडडया, मदरलैंड वॉइस, दे शििंध,ु ह माचल दस्तक,

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