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Development of Flood Hazards Policy in the Indus River

Basin of Pakistan, 1947–1996
a a
Daanish Mustafa & James L. Wescoat Jr.
a
Department of Geography , University of Colorado , BOULDER, CO, 80309, U.S.A.
Published online: 22 Jan 2009.

To cite this article: Daanish Mustafa & James L. Wescoat Jr. (1997) Development of Flood Hazards Policy in the Indus River
Basin of Pakistan, 1947–1996, Water International, 22:4, 238-244, DOI: 10.1080/02508069708686712

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 Development of Flood Hazards Policy in the
Indus River Basin of Pakistan, 1947-1996
by Daanish Mustafa and James L. Wescoat, Jr.
Department of Geography
University of Colorado
BOULDER CO 80309
U.S.A.

ABSTRACT

Since independence in 1947, floods in the Indus River Basin in Pakistan have claimed more than 7,000
lives and caused massive infrastructure and crop losses. To date, flood damage reduction has received
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limited attention relative to the irrigation and hydropower subsectors in the basin. Nonstructural
approaches to flood hazard mitigation have lagged behind engineering approaches. This article retraces
the development offlood policies in Pakistan, from an early situation of risk acceptance to more recent
strategies of risk management. It shows that an underlying problem, and future aim, for flood policy will
lie in giving greater attention to mitigating social vulnerability to flood hazards in the basin.

INTRODUCTION: FROM RISK
ACCEPTANCE TO VULNERABILITY
MITIGATION?
Riverine floods are one of the most devastating
environmental hazards in the Indus River Basin.
From ice dam outbursts in its glaciated headwaters,
to hill torrents in forested uplands, breached levees
in its broad arid alluvial plains, and coastal and
urban inundation in the delta near Karachi, flooding
the most exposed to flood hazard. Consequently, the
agricultural sector and the vast majority of the
Pakistani population associated with this sector are
highly vulnerable to flood hazards. Many villages
are located on eroding river terraces and in flood-
prone lowlands, and migrants to urban and
periurban areas are also concentrated in low-lying
high-risk areas.
Human management of any hazard must address
the three basic dimensions of the hazard risk, —

poses serious obstacles to river basin management.
The Indus River Basin is shared by several
countries. Although this article focuses on Pakistan,
which contains the largest portion of the Indus main
stem and five major tributaries (the Sutlej, Ravi,
Chenab, Jhelum, and Kabul), each riparian faces
serious flood hazards as well as challenges for
cooperative international flood management.
Pakistan and India, for example, have suffered
several major and minor riverine floods since
coming into being in 1947 [1,2]. Loss of life has
been significant (more than 7,000 fatalities in
Pakistan alone) though, as in other arid irrigated
basins of the world, economic and infrastructure
losses from household to national levels has been
especially devastating [3]. Some major floods, like
the one of 1992, cost the country about 3 per cent of
its total GDP.
Pakistan is an underdeveloped country with a per
capita GNP of approximately US$400. Seventy per
cent of its population lives in rural areas and is
dependent directly or indirectly upon irrigation
agriculture [4]. Highly productive irrigated lands
along the five rivers comprise about 82 per cent of
the total cropped area. These irrigated areas are also
0250-8060/97/$3.30 Water International, 22 (1997) 238-244
exposure, and vulnerability. Risk is defined here as
the physical probability of the event (i.e., the flood
recurrence interval, magnitude, duration, and
severity). Exposure is the number of people and
economic resources exposed to the flood event; and
vulnerability is defined as the conditions and
situations that render a society community or in-
dividual susceptible to damage [5,6]. Because
vulnerability is the joint product of the physical
hazard and social activities and situations that
increase or decrease potential losses, it is important
to consider the dimensions of human adjustment to
floods. In the hazards literature (e.g., Burton, Kates,
and White [7], and White [8]), three major modes of
human adjustment to floods have been identified:
(I) bear the loss; (2) manage the risk, either by
modifying the event through river engineering,
spreading the losses through insurance, or reducing
losses through warning, flood proofing, etc.; and (3)
mitigate vulnerability through wise settlement
planning and hazard preparedness.
It will be shown here that flood management
policy objectives in Pakistan have historically
evolved from risk acceptance to risk management
and exposure reduction.
© IWRA/Printed in the U.S.A.
 Vulnerability mitigation continues to be an elusive op- Number of Magnitude at
erational objective for flood management in the Indus Villages Sukkur in
River Basin, as in other regions, despite growing recog- Year Affected Lives Lost 1,000 ft3/sec
nition that it is the only long-term “solution” to flood 1950 10,000 2,910 776
hazards. 1955 6,945 679 805
Flood management policy is not formulated in an 1956 11,609 160 998
1957 4,498 83 661
ideological or institutional vacuum. The internal cultures 1958 2,459 90 1,098
of policy-making institutions shape the perception of the 1959 3,903 88 972
problem and thereby proposed solutions and adjustments 1973 9,719 474 1,076
to perceived problems [9]. Institutional and intergovern- 1975 8,628 126 1,024
mental relations are a common source of conificting 1976 18,390 425 1,161
perceptions and approaches. In the Indus River Basin, it 1978 NA NA 1,093
is useful to consider the following policy levels: 1988 16,816 396 1,118
International (India, Pakistan, international 1992 13,185 1,332 1,030
organizations); National (Government of Pakistan and ihe ahnve data are frnm: Nanvi Has~in Mehdi and Abdur Rathid
various ministries); Provincial; Municipal; and, Village Ruralistics of Pakistan: Figures Speak Facts, Pakistan A’ademy of
Rural Development, Peshawai 1992; National Engineering Services
and Household. Pakistan Ltd. (NESPAK) and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of
The Government of Pakistan (GOP) is the primary Water and Power, Office of the Chief Engineering Advisor/Chairman
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institution formulating flood policy at a national level,
so the article concentrates on describing the
government’s concept and practice of flood management
from a historical perspective. At the same time, the
GOP must coordinate its national role with international
relations, provincial responsibilities, and local realities.
The GOP has had to accommodate the external
pressures of international donors and public opinion in
formulating a wide range of water policies. Flood
policy has been neglected relative to other water and
natural resource policies, and it continues to suffer
problems of institutional coordination [101.
The first section of this article outlines the recent
history of floods in the Indus River Basin of Pakistan.
That is followed by a description of two major periods
of flood policy development: 1947-1973, a period of
risk acceptance and limited risk management; and 1973
to the present, a period of more comprehensive risk
management. The final section of the article appraises
the prospects for moving from risk management to
mitigating vulnerability.
HISTORICAL FLOODS IN THE INDUS
RIVER BASIN OF PAKISTAN
Since independence in 1947 Pakistan has suffered about
twenty major and many more minor flood events.
Table 1 lists eleven intense flooding events and the
damages suffered. It also lists discharges for those
floods at Sukkur Barrage, which is just downstream
from the confluence of the Indus River main stem and
its major tributaries (Fig. 1). Low, medium, high,
very high, and exceptionally high flood discharges for
the Indus River at Sukkur Barrage are given in Table 2.
The “exceptionally high” flood discharge value has been
exceeded nine times in the past 48 years, or about 19
per cent of the time.
Most riverine floods in Pakistan are caused by heavy
monsoon precipitation in catchment areas of the five
major rivers of the Indus River Basin. Occasionally,
the Indus River experiences ice dam floods that occur
when
Federal Flood Commission, 1988— Flood Damage Restoration
Project, Lahore, Pakistan, 1988; and NESPAK and Government of
Pakistan,Ministry of Water and Power, Office of the Chief
Engineeiing Advisor!Chainnan Federal Flood Commission, 1992—
Flood/Rains Damage Restoration Project, Lahore, Pakistan, 1992.
the waters impounded behind glacial dams are released,
causing flash floods, as in 1929. Snowmelt can cause
minor flooding problems early in the monsoon season.
Dam and reservoir operations can aggravate or alleviate
flood problems. The official flood season in Pakistan is
from June 15 to October 15 during which time agencies
for flood forecasting, control, and relief are in a
heightened state of alert. The most likely time for floods
is from late July to late August, but the peak floods of
1988 and 1992 occurred on September 25 and September
10.
For analytical purposes flood management in
Pakistan can be divided into two discrete phases: the pre-
Indus Basin Development Program phase from 1947 to
1973; and the post-Indus Basin Development Program
phase from 1973 to the present. The Indus Basin
Development Program (IBDP) was a massive program of
canal and reservoir construction initiated in 1960 by
the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty between India
and Pakistan. The program was officially completed
in 1970 with financial assistance from The World Bank
and a consortium of countries [11,12]. The disastrous
floods of 1973 indicated the program’s implications for
flood management. In the pre-IBDP phase, Pakistani
flood managers did not have the human or technical
resources to conduct flood management on a basin-
wide basis. In the post-IBDP phase flood managers
gained human and technical resources; nevertheless,
major flood losses occurred in 1975, 1976, 1978,
1988, and 1992. To understand this continuing record
of flood losses, it is useful to reassess the two phases
of flood policy
RISK ACCEFFANCE AND LIMITED RISK
MANAGEMENT: PRE-1947 TO 1973
Flood irrigation has been practiced in the indus Basin since
prehistoric times, particularly through the inunda-

Vol. 22, No. 4 (1997) 239

 Irrigation Structures in Pakistan
7
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Balochistan
Kilometers
Figure 1. Irrigation structures and Indus River Basin in Pakistan.
tion canals of Sindh Province in the lower basin. The
British colonial government laid the foundations for the
present system of perennial canal irrigation, beginning
with the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) in 1859. The
irrigation system was expanded in a system of barrages
and canals. On the eve of independence in 1947 the
system had about 150 canals [ 1 I]. The colonial govern-
ment also undertook massive, but discontinuous, repairs
of natural levees and bunds (linear levees along rivers and
ring levees near cities). In flood events, primary protection
was given to barrages and to cities protected by bunds.
The army usually breached bunds in rural areas to protect
those priorities; and areas not protected by bunds expe-
rience extensive flooding.
Table 2. Low to exceptionally high flood magnitudes on the Indus
River at Sukkur Barrage (1,000 f t
Exceptionally
$
Low Medium High High
200 350 500 700 900
Source: NESPAK and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and
Power, Office of the Chief Engineering Advisor/Chairman Fedral
Flood Commission, 1988 - Flood Damage Restoration Project, La-
hore, Pakistan, 1988.
240
- Barrage (Headworks)
Treatment of Flood Hazards in The Indus Water Treaty
of 1960
The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 between
India and Pakistan. The treaty awarded the entire flow
of the three western rivers of Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab
to Pakistan, and the entire flow of the three eastern rivers
of Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas to India. Flood hazards received
little attention in the eight years of international negoti-
ation for the Indus Water Treaty (1952-60). The emphasis
in the treaty was on irrigation management and water
allocation between the two countries; flood hazard re-
ceived cursory treatment [ 13]. General provisions were P
made to avoid international flood damages, and to co-
ordinate drainage requirements.
Flood Forecasting and Protection
Flood protection in Pakistan was based on a series of
bunds along the course of the rivers in the basin. The
lower reaches of Indus River in Sindh Province flowed
within bunds. Punjab Province had local level protective
bunds and spillways along barrages and major urban
Water International
 centers like Lahore, Multan, and Sialkot. During a flood
it was the responsibility of the provincial Public Works
Departments (PWD), provincial irrigation departments,
and military to take emergency measures to reinforce
bunds to keep them from collapsing. There was some
coordination among provincial departments but limited
coordination with the national government or military.
The magnitude of the floods and poor maintenance of
levees led to breaches that have caused significant
losses of life and property in surrounding areas [14].
The general public had minimal influence on
government flood management approaches. The
government’s flood management policy focused on
protection of major urban centers and major irrigation
structures; it assumed damage acceptance in rural areas
and smaller urban localities. The general public’s
opinion on the subject, however, was decidedly not one
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of damage acceptance [13,15].
Despite a lack of major long-term capital investment in
the flood protection sector, the need for a flood fore-
casting system was realized early. In the aftermath of
the 1950 flood, a Flood Computation Section was
established in the Regional Meteorological Center in
Lahore; its mandate was to devise flood forecasting
procedures. The Center was hampered in the beginning
by a lack of data and observation stations. As the data
collection network improved in the 1960s, the
Hydrometeorological Section conducted studies of
probable maximum precipitation and flood routing at
the control points below the rim stations, establishing a
database for flood management in the future [16]. The
Center also sought to coordinate federal and provincial
government agencies responsible for flood control.
The influx of financing, reservoir construction, and
institutional development increased the scientific and
technical capabilities of flood managers. As a result of
the IBDP, the Indus Basin became one of the most
regulated and controlled basins in the world, enabling
policy makers to begin to manage floods on a system-
wide basis. However, these developments had the unan-
ticipated effect of diminishing provincial water resource
management capabilities while maintaining their level
of responsibility The problems of coordinating national
and provincial irrigation and flood control programs
became more difficult. The historic floods of 1973 came
as a wake-up call to policy makers at the national and
provincial levels; they had to start in earnest to devise
ways and means to manage the flood problems with this
new pattern of capability and intergovernmental
relations.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RISK
MANAGEMENT: 1973-PRESENT
In the aftermath of the 1973 flood, the federal govern-
ment assumed an expanding role in the hitherto
provincial responsibility for nverine flood management.
Toward that end, a Federal Flood Commission was
formed in 1978; it drafted the first
VoL 22, No. 4 (1997)
National Flood Protection Plan that was, in effect, the
first attempt at a national flood management strategy
That document is the main policy reference for flood
managers in Pakistan. It identifies reservoir operations,
bund breaching and reinforcing, and flood forecasting
and warning as the major tools for flood management.
The following sections briefly describe each of these
tools.
Flood Forecasting and Warning
In the aftermath of the devastating 1973 floods a
separate directorate of Flood Forecasting and Warning
Center at Lahore was established. The World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO) and United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) initiated a project for the
“Improvement of River and Flood Forecasting and
Warning System” in 1975 (WMO/TJNDP PAK-027).
The project identified three priorities which continue to
guide national policy [17]:
1. Expansion and modernization of meteorological and
hydrological data collection.
2. Establishment of a radar station at Sialkot to monitor
river catchments in India, with a satellite readout
station at Lahore.
3. Development of river flow and flood forecasting
models. To carry out the first component, The federal
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA),
Meteorological Department, and provincial Irrigation
Departments set up a coordinated network of rainfall
and stream gauges. Each site conveys data directly or
indirectly to the Flood Forecasting and Warning Center
at Lahore. The Center also monitors weather broadcasts
and special bulletins from Radio Jammu in Indian-
controlled Kashmir. The warning center functions from
the beginning of the official flood season on June 15,
goes on a round-the-clock routine from July 1 until
September 15, and closes at the end of the official flood
season on October 15. It is the Center’s responsibility to
notify the general public and civil and military
administration of any impending flood emergency [17].
For the second component, a 5.7-cm Quantitative Pre-
cipitation Radar (QPR) was installed at Sialkot in 1979,
with a satellite readout station at Lahore. Every three
hours the station transmits sateffite imagery of northern
South Asia and southern Central Asia to the Flood
Warning Center.
The third component includes a rainfall-runoff model
for catchment areas above the rim stations and a flood-
routing model for areas downstream of the rim stations.
A WMO/UNDP/PMD flood forecasting model based on
real time data for the Indus Basin was developed [17].
Although government documents describe these as im-
portant tools for decision-making [17,18], their opera-
tional status and effectiveness are uncertain [3]. For the
historic floods of 1988, for example, radar information,
flood routing models, and warning systems proved in-
adequate in the face of the rapid onset of flooding in the
three eastern rivers.
241
 Reservoir Operation
There were three reservoirs completed as a result of the
IBDP: Tarbela Dam on the Indus in the late l970s; Mangla
Dam on the Jhelum in 1967; and Chashma Reservoir on the
Indus in 1971. The Water Resources Management Directorate
(WRMD) of WAPDA establishes criteria for reservoir
operations at the beginning of each filling and withdrawal
period. The criteria are based on anticipated inflows of water,
an anticipated canal withdrawal schedule, and an operational
schedule of repairs, inspections, etc. for reservoir structures.
The reservoir operation schedules, or “rule curves:’ are
officially geared toward fulfilling irrigation demands, with
power generation and flood control as second and third
priorities, respectively [17]. The reservoir operation schedule
aims for a full reservoir at the end of the filling season [17].
Actual reservoir operation can deviate from the planned
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schedule for a variety of reasons, including unanticipated flood
control. Mangla Dam, for example, is supposed to be operated
in such a way that the sum of flows from Mangla and Marala
does not exceed 500,000 ft3/sec, a flow that marks the safe
capacity of Trimmu Barrage at the confluence of the Jhelum
and Chenab rivers. Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs are
supposed to be operated in such a way that the sum of
discharges at Suleimanki, Jassar, Marala, Mangla, and Tarbela
does not exceed 900,000 ft3/sec. Efforts are made to operate
Chashma Reservoir in such a way that the sum of Chashma,
Trimmu, Sidhnai, and Islam releases does not exceed 800,000
ft3/sec [17]. All of these rules are contingent upon the
condition that flood levels do not endanger the integrity of the
reservoirs.
In practice, it is very difficult for reservoir, operators to
make timely decisions. Many floodplains belOw dams are
used for grazing and contain settlements that are difficult to
evacuate. Reservoir operators depend upon All India Radio
broadcast information about streamfiows in India. In the case
of Mangla Reservoir, there is only a six-hour lag between a
flood peak entering Pakistani temtory and its arrival at Mangla.
Delayed or faulty transmission of information can lead to
reservoir operating decisions with catastrophic consequences,
as occurred in the floods of 1992. Reservoir operation was
estimated to reduce flood discharge at Gudu Barrage by
134,000 ft3/sec during the floods of 1973, 1975, 1976, and
1978; but in 1992, disastrous miscalculation on the part of the
operating staff at Mangla Dam led to filling the reservoir
beyond its safe capacity and subsequently releasing two
massive waves of water to relieve pressure on the dam. The
discharge from the second wave was one million ft3/sec. In
that particular case, faulty reservoir operation, coupled with
inadequate information from upstream gauging sites ac-
centuated a flood of historic proportions.
Bund Breaching or Reinforcement
Flood protection bunds are a key element of flood
protection in Pakistan. A comprehensive bund construc
tion and operation manual has been developed by the Sindh
242
Irrigation Department; it serves as a standard manual for
other provincial irrigation departments. An engineering
study to coordinate provincial bund planning,
maintenance, and operations was carried out in the I 990s
with Asian Development Bank support, but field inspec-
tion and maintenance are less consistent and reliable than
project planning.
Bunds have been frequently breached, naturally or
deliberately, but rarely overtopped. Natural breaches
occur due to poor maintenance of the bund. Bunds have
also been deliberately breached by the military with
dynamite to relieve pressure on barrages along the rivers
when flood discharges exceed the design capacity of the
barrages. A flood frequency analysis by Mustafa [19]
comparing the design capacity of selected barrages on the
Indus Basin with flood flows indicated that the majority
of the barrages have insufficient safe-design capacities
(Table 3). Those structures need to be upgraded to lessen
the requirement for breaching sections on marginal bunds,
thereby causing significant damages in rural areas.
Limitations of Present Flood Management Techniques
Some limitations of flood management in Pakistan
have been pointed out, and may be summarized as
follows:
1. Flood protection should be commensurate with defined
flood thresholds at key locations, e.g., low, medium,
high, very high, and exceptionally high flood levels for
Sukkur Barrage as shown in Table 2. But these limits
are often out of date due to aggradation of river
channels in the system, which reduces water and
sediment transport capacity Thus, low, medium, and
higher level flood hazards need to be reviewed.
2. The flood warning system fails in part because the staff
at the gauging stations are not able to report readings
in a timely or accurate fashion, e.g., in the 1992 flood
many staff were isolated from gauges due to high
water levels and kept reporting the last reading they
took. When good data is received, computer modeling
is not always as rapid or reliable as it needs to be for
real-time forecasting and management. There is a
continuing need to improve transfer of flood
information between managers in India and Pakistan.
3. Even when accurate information is available to gov-
ernment agencies, public warning, evacuation, and
safety are unreliable. Residents living opposite the city
of Lahore received almost no warning before the bunds
were breached in 1988. Industrialists received conflict-
ing information from different agencies and sometimes
from the same agency. Some flood officials described
rural warning as consisting of little more than local
police giving information to occasional passersby.
4. Although flood emergency procedures have been for-
mulated, water managers and relief agencies are not
properly drilled in emergency procedures to work
under time schedules where split-second decisions are
Water International
 Table 3. Comparison of the design capacities of several barrages with floods of various duration.Maximum flood flows are given in100 ft3/sec
Barrages: Sulemanki Sidhnai
Data points 64 70
(years)
25-yr. 403 186
flood
50-yt 460 217
flood
100-yr. 518 249
flood
Design 325 175
capacity
required to stave off disaster. Reservoir operations
sometimes accentuate flood peaks.
5. In the wake of flooding, relief funds are unevenly
distributed, with the largest amounts reportedly going
to areas nearest to large cities. Relief distribution
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needs to be made more socially and spatially
equitable. In the aftermath of the 1988 and 1992
floods, funds from international agencies were used
to reconstruct damaged infrastructure. Little
investment focused on human resources and
nonstructural methods to mitigate flood damages.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A POLICY OF
MITIGATING VULNERABILITY?
As mentioned at the beginning, flood management
involves more than risk and exposure mitigation it also
involves vulnerability reduction. Flood management in
Pakistan has evolved from damage acceptance to risk
mitigation and exposure reduction. Although some prog-
ress has been made, the above sections indicate the key
limitations in achieving these objectives.
The more far-reaching goal of vulnerability reduction
requires an understanding of the driving forces that
induce people to live in known hazard areas, and that
cause the most disadvantaged sections of the society to
suffer the maximum damage [18,19]. When bunds
(levees) are breached to relieve pressure on the barrages
and other irrigation structures, for example, it is the
poorest of the poor and most helpless segments of the
society that most often get flooded. There is thus a social
geography of flood damages in Pakistan as well as a
technocratically defined geography of irrigation
agriculture and leveed floodplains. Popular perception of
flood hazard as an act of God has undergone changes in
the aftermath of recent floods, with heightened
awareness of the social factors that determine hazard
vulnerability [20].
Government emphasis on physical flood control faces
major technological and financial obstacles, as the
recent flood sector projects reveal. Although nominally
concerned with nonstructural approaches, government
programs have made little progress in putting those ap-
proaches to work among flood managers and floodplain
residents at the local and regional levels.
Some practical lessons may be drawn from
vulnerability reduction debates and experiments in other
large river basins of Asia, including the Ganges-
VoL 22, No. 4 (1997)
Kalabagh/
Trimniu Panjnad Rasul Attock Kotn
53 70 70 126 91
752 667 700 699 775
867 759 825 750 863
977 848 950 800 948
650 850 700 900 900
Brahmaputra, Mekong, Yangtze, and Huang Ho basins
[31. Work by the Mekong Committee, Asian Disaster
Preparedness Centre, Duryog Nivaran, and the Water
Resources Division of the UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific deserves particular
attention [2 1-23]. In light of these findings, we conclude
that the national flood protection plans for the Indus River
Basin of Pakistan must be coupled with a long-term
commitment to vulnerability reduction that begins at the
local level and that seeks effective coordination of
provincial, national, and international activities.
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Internet home page at: http://www.adpc.org.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP
Water International is edited and published quarterly by the International Water
Resources Association, with general business offices at The University of New
Mexico, 19 15 Roma NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87 13 1-1436, U.S.A. The
Executive Director is F.. Lee Brown Water International is owned wholly by the
International Water Resources Association, a nonprofit, educational, interdisci-
plinary, professional organization with about 1,200 members. There are no
individual owners or stockholders.
Average No.
Copies Each
Issue During Single Issue
Preceding 12 Nearest To
Months Filing Date
Total no. copies printed (net press run) 1,475 1,500
Paid mail circulation 1,320 1,295
Sales through dealers and counter sales None None
Free distribution 62 58
Left over (extra for new orders, office use, 93 147
etc.)
Total 1,475 1,500

I certify that the statements made by me are correct and complete.

F. Lee Brown, Executive Director

244