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The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in

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a
Kim Yong Cheol
a
Chonnam National University
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 New Political Science, Volume 25, Number 2, June 2003

The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in the

Democratization of Korean Politics

Kim Yong Cheol

Chonnam National University

Abstract The political legacies the Gwangju Uprising produced played a pivotal role
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in checking military intervention in politics during the democratic transition as well as

in establishing the principle of civilian supremacy during the democratic transition
period. By fostering a counter-ideology against the military regime, by expanding
democratic forces, and by creating a new political structure that limited the choice of the
authoritarian elites and the United States, the Gwangju Uprising had a decisive
influence on democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea.

Introduction
The so-called ‘praetorian problem’ is one of the single major challenges that
“third wave” democracies face.1 Democratic leaders often make radical efforts to
curtail the military’s power and influence. Such measures, however, are likely to
precipitate new democracies into a “sudden death” by antagonizing the military
officers and motivating them to intervene in politics or to reverse the advance
toward democracy via a military coup. In contrast, if democratic elites are
indecisive in regard to the ‘praetorian problem,’ new democracies are likely to
slip into a “slow death” scenario in which there is a progressive diminution of
existing possibilities for the exercise of civilian power and effective liberal
constitutionalism. It is very difficult for democratic elites to accomplish military
reforms in order to consolidate their fledgling democracies.
In this regard, South Korea was very successful. Its process of subordinating
the military to the civil government was relatively smooth and peaceful.2 Behind
Korea’s success, there is the brave, yet sad, story of the Gwangju Massacre of
May 1980, following a 10-day uprising against a military coup. Though it ended
in failure at that time, the political legacies the Gwangju Uprising (GU) pro-
duced played a pivotal role in checking military intervention in politics during
the democratic transition (June 1987–April 1988), as well as in establishing the
principle of civilian supremacy during the democratic transition period. By
1
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions,
Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel
Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in
Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame University Press,
1992), p. 19.
2
Carolina G. Hernandez, “Controlling Asia’s Armed forces,” in Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 66–79.

ISSN 0739-3148 print/ISSN 1469-9931 online/03/020225–16  2003 Caucus for a New Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/0739314032000081586
 226 Kim Yong Cheol

fostering “counter-hegemony” against the military regime, and by creating a

historical legacy reducing the possibility of military intervention, the Gwangju
Uprising had a decisive influence on democratic transition and consolidation in
South Korea

Analytical Perspective
The structure–agent debate has long intrigued students of regime change.
Scholars emphasizing structural factors in regime change believe that the likeli-
hood of political change is embedded in the structure of a given system. From
this perspective, democratic transition and consolidation are the political conse-
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quences of the social order of modern industrial societies.3 In other words,

socioeconomic preconditions determine the type of social class relations and
political culture, which in turn determine the nature of the polity.
By contrast, scholars emphasizing political agents see political change as a
contingent outcome from a generic process led by human parameters. From this
perspective, democratic change is the consequence of political leaders’ strategic
choices. The human transactions to craft democracy are complex and uncertain
because political choice creates a cascading chain reaction of trade-off, confron-
tation, and compromise among the agents.4 The success, therefore, of crafting
democracy depends on the extent of elite coalescence that makes bargaining and
negotiation easy.5
Both of these perspectives have their own merits. The structure-oriented
approach is useful to explain the long-term change of politics on a macro level,
and it is true that a change of society leads to a change in politics. However, an
obvious insufficiency of structural analysis is that preconditions do not deter-
mine political life in an automatic manner. In this regard, the advantage of an
elite-oriented approach lies in its overcoming the deterministic characteristic of
the structure-oriented approach. Nevertheless, this contingency-based approach
excessively emphasizes voluntarism, ignoring the structural scaffolding that
imparts a motif to political choice and action.
“Structure” can be understood as props that condition, constrain, and induce
perception, choice, and the behavior of the elites (agents) who have a limited
degree of freedom. That is, structural factors, including socioeconomic
configuration and historically inherited conditions, play a significant role in
constraining agents’ actions. In this sense, the model of “critical junctures,”
which places emphasis on the embedded interactions between structure and
agent, seems desirable for the study of political change.
3
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966);
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963).
4
Guillermo O’Donell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986).
5
Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990); John Higley and Richard Gunther (ed.), Elites and
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 227
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Figure 1

Collier and Collier focus on major watersheds in political life, arguing that a
“critical juncture,” which is defined as a period of significant change, establishes
certain directions of change and forecloses others in a way that shapes politics
for years to come by producing distinct historical legacies.6 The critical juncture
is generated by some kind of social tension or cleavage, which not only creates
new actors (or groups) against the old order, but also raises political issues
against antecedent conditions. Though a cleavage leads up a critical juncture, the
juncture is triggered by abnormal circumstances, such as an economic crisis or
war. Thus, a critical juncture occurs in a limited period of time, while a cleavage
tends to exist for a long time.
Critical junctures may produce dramatic political changes, but such cases are
rare. Even in a revolution, political systems are never completely transformed.
After the occurrence of a critical juncture, continuity and discontinuity usually
coexist for a certain period of time. During this period, legacies that a critical
juncture has produced constrain agents’ choices and actions, while at the same
time, activating social reorientation and political realignment. Consequently,
conflicts between old and new actors take place repeatedly up until the time that
the new order displaces the old one.
Following this structural contingency model, this paper describes the rising
and consolidating of the praetorianism in the 1960s and 1970s as an antecedent
condition, the subsequent development of political tension toward democratiza-
tion as a social cleavage, and the GU of 1980 as a critical juncture, and it analyzes
how the GU played a role as a critical juncture in the Korean process of the
termination of military intervention in politics, by examining some significant
political confrontations between old elites and new actors that occurred in the
process of democratization (see Figure 1).
6
Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Area: Critical Junctures, the
Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1991).
 228 Kim Yong Cheol

Military Authoritarianism and Social Cleavage

The military coup in 1961 was an important watershed in the modern political
history of Korea. The coup destroyed the political order of civilian ascendancy,
and also politicized the military elites. The military leaders tried to justify their
administration by enhancing economic growth. The result, however, was the
appearance of a social cleavage between the security-developmental coalition,
which stressed social stability and economical efficiency, and the democratic
coalition that stressed the justice of economic distribution and democratic
values.

Antecedent Conditions: Growth of “New Professionalism”

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The nature of the military provides an important clue to why it intervened in

civilian politics. The prevalence of “old professionalism” among the military
officers, which limited the role of the army to national defense and war, was
viewed as a strong deterrent against military intervention in governmental
power. The growth, however, of “new professionalism,” which defined internal
security and national development as the military’s societal function, facilitated
the army’s attempt to take over power.7
The Korean military on the whole maintained a firm attitude against any
intervention in the political process until 1960. It was in May 1961, when the
military took charge of political power for the first time in Korea, that a coup
was led by the “new professionalism.” The coup leaders, General Bak Jeong-hee
and his colonels, justified their actions both by invoking the grandiose task of
national development and the urgent need for safeguarding the nation from
ineffective politicians. The two-and-half years of the military junta’s direct rule
quickly changed the military’s beliefs about their role in politics. “New profes-
sionalism” grew among the Korean military officers.8 Consequently, a significant
change began to occur in the arena of the civilian-military relationship.
The military government became a more-or-less civilian system in December,
1963. Bak retired from active service and launched his electoral campaign for
president. Soon after being elected, Bak inaugurated a government led by a
mixture of civilian bureaucrats and retired military coup participants, leaving
the active military answerable to the elected government that he headed. The
Third Republic (1963–72), though taking the form of a civilian government in
appearance, was inherently a military regime in that its political power was
based on the armed forces. Bak, while exercising strong control over the military,
emphasized the military’s role in the regime’s stability and maintenance. He did
not hesitate to call the troops into the streets when he faced strong political
opposition from society.
Nonetheless, Bak did not solely depend on the coercive power of the
military. He attempted to increase his popular legitimacy through economic
performance and was intensely committed to a rapid economic development,
7
Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role
Expansion,” in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
8
Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1971).
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 229

based upon export-led industrialization. His effort was successful. The overall
growth rate of the Korean GNP during the period between 1963 and 1970
averaged 9.6% per year, and per capita income rose from $100 in 1963 to $243
in 1970. The unemployment rate declined from 8.6% in 1963 to 4.4% in 1970.9
This positive economic performance helped boost Bak’s popularity. In the
presidential election of 1967, Bak was re-elected by a near landslide and in the
subsequent National Assembly elections, his Republican Party also defeated the
opposition party by a wide margin.
Yet the political effect of this economic development did not last long. In the
early 1970s, the side effects of the rapid industrialization began to appear.
Increasing economic disparities between sectors, between regions, and between
classes cultivated a popular feeling of an unfair distribution of wealth and
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income. Various negative signals, including growing labor unrest, the increasing
discontent of the urban poor, and the rising popularity of the opposition party,
appeared in the early 1970s. Though these signs of discontent were neither
strong enough nor active enough to threaten the Bak regime, Bak and his ruling
elites needed a preemptive measure for regime stability.

Cleavage: Democratic Coalitions Against Yushin Authoritarianism

Facing growing opposition, Bak ultimately created a stronger authoritarian
regime (1972–80), which became known as the Yushin regime in 1972. The
Fourth Republic or Yushin overtly rejected all the democratic rules and proce-
dures that existed under the Third Republic. It institutionally enabled Bak to
remain president permanently and severely restricted political pluralism, con-
centrating political power in the president himself.
As control over the coercive instruments of the state became a crucial factor
in maintaining Bak’s power, an important development occurred in the military-
security apparatus. The coercive state apparatus, including the Defense Security
Command, the Capital Garrison Corps, the Presidential Security Guard, and the
Airborne Corps, emerged as core groups supporting his regime. In order to
control them effectively, Bak fostered a group of politically oriented elite officers
with absolute loyalty to himself. He operated a patron–client mechanism by
offering privileges to his followers and thus, in turn, ensuring loyalty from them.
The prime example was the Hanahoe. This secret fraternity was formed by select
leaders from among the elite army officers graduated in the 11th class and
several later classes of the Korean Military Academy. Through Bak’s strategic
need, the Hanahoe members were privileged in promotions and appointments.
Boasting of being as the political sons of Bak, they further developed the
mentality of “new professionalism.”
After the imposition of the Yushin regime, political protests decreased
sharply for a time. The decline of the visible protests, however, never meant the
reduction of popular discontent. Industrial development produced socio-
economic contradictions, while the elimination of the democratic institutions and
procedures expanded political opposition. Anti-regime organizations and dissi-
dents began to emerge, demanding the “restoration of democracy.” This political
9
National Income in Korea (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1982), p. 13; Social Indicators in Korea
(Seoul: Korean Statistical Association, 1992), p. 119.
 230 Kim Yong Cheol

confrontation divided social forces in two: one stressed the efficiency of policies
and security, both domestic and international, while the other valued distri-
bution and democratic values. The division developed into a social cleavage
where the security-developmental coalition, which consisted of the military
authorities, technical bureaucrats, and jaebeols (financial conglomerates), was
confronted by the democratic coalition, composed of opposition parties, intellec-
tuals and religious personages. The confrontation between the two grew more
serious as time went by.10

Crisis of Military Authoritarianism and the Gwangju Uprising

Military authoritarianism faced collapse with the sudden death of Bak Jeong-hee
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in 1979. The two military coups of 1979 and 1980 were the new military’s
attempt to restore their authoritarianism. The GU was a straightforward resist-
ance against the new military’s efforts.

Crisis of Military Authoritarianism and “New Military”

In the midst of rising popular protest, the seemingly invincible president Bak
was abruptly cut down by an assassin on October 26, 1979. The death of Bak
created a sudden power vacuum, partly because all the power of the Bak regime
had been concentrated on Bak himself, and partly because there was no
institutional succession mechanism or strong second-in-command. The assassi-
nation also meant the end of the military authoritarian system. Most of the
ruling elites realized that so unbalanced a political system as that of the Yushin
must come to an end with the death of Bak. Acting president Choi Gyu-ha
declared that he supported the abolition of the Yushin Constitution, and the
Martial Law Commander Jeong Seong-hwa and several senior generals in charge
of higher offices announced that they would maintain political neutrality, which
foreshadowed a natural change of the political system. Accordingly, the abol-
ition of military authoritarianism seemed likely to be achieved without
difficulty.
Yet not all the military leaders supported the termination of military author-
itarianism. Leading members of the Hanahoe (who were called “new military” in
South Korea) led by the Major General Jeon Doo-hwan, the Defense Security
Commander and Head of the ad hoc Joint Investigation of Bak’s death, were
indignant and worried about losing their political power and privileges. They
defied the Martial Law Commander, who emphasized the neutral position of the
army. On December 12, 1979, they executed a coup. It was a revolt within the
army itself, carried out by the new military, which were inclined to believe in the
“new professionalism,” as opposed to the camp of the Martial Law Commander,
who were inclined to stick to the “old professionalism.”11
Upon obtaining military power in December 1979, General Jeon did not
attempt to extend his power within the government. At that time, Jeon’s group
10
Chung-in Moon and Yong-Cheol Kim, “A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and
Democracy in South Korea,” in Adrian Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and Development: Theory
and Practice (London: Polity Press, 1996).
11
Byong-ki Yang, “Hanguk Gunbu ui Chikupjuui wa Min-Gun Gwangye“ [Military
Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in South Korea], Jeongchi Owegyosa Nonchong
14 (1996), p. 342.
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 231

was not ready to take over because the coup was really just a mutiny by a
faction of officers against the military hierarchy, and the coup leaders needed
time to consolidate their power within the armed forces. The first thing the coup
leaders did was to reform the higher officers and ranks in the barracks. They
removed the senior military officers and filled their positions with participants
in the coup.
While securing military control and preparing for a plan of government,
General Jeon carefully watched the unfolding of the political process and
calculated the best way to enter it. For that purpose, he needed more intelligence
instruments that promised both expertise and maneuverability in the civilian
realm. On April 14, 1980, after applying persuasion and pressure on the interim
government, Jeon was appointed as the acting head of the Korean Central
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Intelligence Agency. This enabled him to monopolize virtually all the military
and intelligence powers in Korea.
Unlike the new military, which moved promptly and with unity, the demo-
cratic camp was highly divided. The interim government and political parties
were unable to reach a consensus on a strategy or schedule on how to proceed
with the transition to democracy, though they agreed on the need for democra-
tization. The Choi government did not cooperate with the ruling Democratic
Republican Party that tried to transform itself into a leader of democratic reform.
President Choi wanted the process of democratization to be led by the govern-
ment and to be completed in a gradual manner. With competitive elections
envisioned, the opposition New Democratic Party was divided because of the
factional strife between the two powerful presidential hopefuls, Kim Yong-sam
and Kim Dae-jung. Taking advantage of the liberalized atmosphere, workers
began to stage demonstrations at an unprecedented level. Students took to the
streets, calling for the prompt lifting of martial law and the removal of remnants
of the Yushin regime. On May 14 and 15, 1980, student movements mobilized
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets of major cities.
The new military did not miss their chance. They began actions to seize
political power under the pretext of restoring political stability and social order.
On May 17, the new military, with the consent of the entire military force,
moved to put an end to the transition process. The Choi government, which had
already become a puppet of the military, swiftly sanctioned the decision of the
new military. The military prohibited all political activities, temporarily closed
universities, shut down the National Assembly, banned strikes, and imposed
censorship on the national media. They also arrested major politicians.

Bloody Uprising in Gwangju

The military repression of the democratic forces on May 17 and 18 was fairly
successful and bloodless. With thousands of arrests and the deployment of
armed soldiers, organized protests were immediately quelled. Only in the South
Cholla region, the dissident politician Kim Dae-jung’s hometown, citizens and
students alike fought back against the Martial Law troops, demanding the lifting
of the martial law, the release of Kim Dae-jung, and the resignation of Jeon
Doo-hwan. Particularly in the city of Gwangju, the capital of South Cholla
province, the street struggle turned quickly into a bloody incident. Largely
sparked by the initial military brutality in cracking down on protesters, the city’s
 232 Kim Yong Cheol

demonstrations erupted into a stand against military encroachment. From May

18–21 a military massacre took place and an armed uprising by students and
citizens followed. The troops retreated from Gwangju at 5⬊30 p.m. on May 21,
and began to encircle and blockade the city.
As the military massacre took place and the civil uprising broke out in
Gwangju, the United States faced the dilemma of making a choice between
military security on one hand, or democracy and human rights on the other,
both goals of its foreign policy. Given the continual threat of North Korea, South
Korea’s security was vital to the East Asian region and the United States. At that
time, the United States obviously gave more weight to security. Although
Washington verbally criticized the coup leaders through official statements, it
allowed the redeployment of the ROK 20th Infantry Division to Gwangju.12
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The uprising ended on May 27 after the reinforced army troops moved into
the city, quickly defeating the civilian militia. According to government figures,
approximately 200 people were killed, more than 1,000 were wounded, and
thousands of participants were incarcerated.
Shortly after the bloody suppression of the Gwangju Uprising, the military
set up the Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) to aid in
the military’s direct rule. Effectively utilizing the crisis spurred by the Uprising,
the SCNSM used its tight control of the media to portray the Uprising as an
armed insurrection by “red elements,” showing the dangers of a liberalized
state. At the same time, the SCNSM inaugurated widespread purges and
“clean-up” campaigns under the catchword of “purification of society.” Thou-
sands of state officials, public school teachers, and state employees were dis-
missed, more than 40,000 “hoodlums and gang members” were arrested, and
approximately 170 periodicals were abolished. After imposing this state of
terror, the military began to coerce president Choi into stepping down. When
President Choi resigned his position without completing his term on August 16,
1980, Jeon Doo-hwan and his new military launched their official government.
The Gwangju Uprising was a democratization movement against the politi-
cized military officers who were eager to restore military authoritarianism.
Although it was a “lonesome” struggle, the Uprising was never a historically
isolated incident. During the period of the Yushin regime, a number of incidents
of resistance occurred against the military authoritarianism. In this respect, the
Uprising can be understood as an incident in the extended process of the social
cleavage of democracy versus authoritarianism.

Continuing the Process of Demilitarization

The Gwangju Uprising did not simply fade away after revealing the brutality of
the military government. Afterward, its memory continuously created new
political circumstances in relation to the issue of anti-military dictatorship, while
conditioning political actors.

12
Sam-sung Lee, Miguk ui Dae-Han Jeongchaek gwa Hanguk Minjokjuui [American Foreign
Policy Toward South Korea and Korean Nationalism] (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1993), pp. 169–176.
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 233

The June Uprising and Democratic Opening

The Gwangju Uprising, by creating a new structure that conditioned political
actors, influenced the political process in three ways. First, it became an indelible
“birth-defect” of the Jeon regime. The savage murder of innocent people by the
soldiers at the military junta’s orders and the heroic struggle by the Gwangju
citizens inspired students and others to make firm commitments to sacrifice in
order to tear down the “murderers’ regime.”
Second, for Koreans, the Gwangju Uprising became a turning point to
seriously reconsider the meaning of the United States to South Korea. The
tragedy of Gwangju made students and anti-government activists believe that
social justice could not be achieved so long as the United States government
backed up the military government in South Korea.13 The pro-Americanism that
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had been predominant until the 1970s began to rapidly dissolve, and the new
anti-Americanism found an increasing audience. In turn, this growing anti-
Americanism exerted a great influence on American foreign policy concerning
South Korean politics in the 1980s.
Third, the Gwangju Uprising made the democratic forces realize that they
must overcome the limitations of the pro-democracy movements of the 1970s.
The democratic forces came to believe that they must maintain strong and
extensive ties among themselves. They also recognized that they had to organize
the power of “Minjung” (grass-roots people), including workers and the urban
poor, and to help them become politically active.
These new perceptions during the Uprising were expressed with concepts of
“nation, democracy, and Minjung,” and these did not end in mere superficial
slogans. The ideology of “nation, democracy, and people” came to be planted in
the minds of many workers and citizens through the secret circulation of
documentary films about the Gwangju Uprising, as well as through the street
demonstrations of students. Many university students, concealing their identities
and educational backgrounds, voluntarily went to work in factories as menial
workers in order to spread the ideology of resistance.
This emergence and diffusion of an ideology of resistance among the citizens
influenced many sectors of the society. First of all, the student movement
became more ideologically radical, and extended its organizational capacity by
enhancing solidarity between universities and by the systematization of each
organization. Based on these changes, the student movement began to develop
active democratization struggles as well as anti-US activities. Second, dissident
groups (Jaeya) also began to adopt this radical ideology and a more militant
attitude. Their thrust for a democratic movement, unlike the democratic move-
ment of the 1970s which demanded political reform, was directed toward a
radical struggle that demanded drastic social reform.
13
The major accusation was that the US approval of the deployment of troops in the
Gwangju area helped enable the military junta to opt for bloody suppression, since the US
commander stationed in South Korea held the military operational command power over
the majority of the Korean armed forces through the Combined Forces Command structure.
This allegation created the primary empirical grounds for the rise of the anti-Americanism
that had not surfaced publicly in the three decades since the Korean War. After the Gwangju
massacre, radicals among anti-government forces named the US as a collaborator in the
installation of the Jeon regime and a structural impediment to South Korea’s democratiza-
tion.
 234 Kim Yong Cheol

As the organizational capacity for resistance of the civil society intensified,

the democratic forces inside the political society, which in the meantime had
been rather moribund, started to reorganize themselves. Kim Dae-jung and Kim
Young-sam, the prominent political opposition leaders, launched the Committee
for Promoting Democracy in May 1984. On the basis of this committee, they
organized the New Korean Democratic Party in January 1985, and participated
in the general election in February of the same year. The outcome of the election
was far from what was generally expected. The New Korean Democratic Party
won a landslide victory in the larger cities and became the leading opposition
party. The result was not only a token of the people’s aspiration for democratiza-
tion, but also a result of the active support of students and opposition forces.
With the appearance of a combative opposition party, the democratic forces now
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were able to form a cohesive body in the polity.

This confrontation between the military dictatorship and the democratic
forces did not last long. The so-called “Torture Death of Student Bak Jong-cheol
Incident” caused the conflict between the authoritarian force in power and the
democratic forces to erupt in physical clashes. On May 27 the opposition party
and democratic civil forces organized the Headquarters of National Struggle to
Acquire a Democratic Constitution, subsuming almost all the democratic forces.
Despite oppression by the government, they held nationwide rallies for democ-
ratization in Seoul and some larger cities. The rallies drew a groundswell of
response from citizens, foreshadowing the June Uprising. As time passed, the
demonstrations spread into middle-sized and smaller cities, becoming more and
more dramatic. When the urban middle class began to participate in the protests,
the June Uprising reached its peak.
Facing the opposition’s intransigence, as well as a great degree of mass
mobilization in which demonstrators overwhelmed police forces in many places,
President Jeon envisioned a military solution. He convened a meeting at 10⬊30
a.m. on June 19 at the Blue House that was attended by all chiefs of the armed
forces, intelligence and coercive apparatuses. At the meeting, President Jeon
gave the military leaders secret orders to move military regiments and divisions
that evening into major cities to quell the demonstrations. He also noted that the
military mobilization was a process to implement a presidential emergency
measure that surpassed the extent of the martial law in terms of intensity.14
Insofar as the presidential order would not be canceled, another head-on
collision between the army and citizens seemed inevitable, just as it did during
the Gwangju Uprising.
Yet the plan to suppress the demonstrations through the use of military force
failed, as it faced strong pressure both from within and from abroad. President
Jeon abruptly reversed the order of military mobilization at 4⬊30 p.m. on June
19. This decision to cancel military mobilization was made for various reasons.
First, diplomatic pressure from the US government worked. As the enthusiasm
for democratization was growing more fervent, the US Department of State
announced on June 16 that they hoped for “a solution of the Korean situation
through conversation.” On June 19, when the mobilization of the army was

14
Sung-ik Kim, “Jeon Doo-hwan, Yeoksa reul weehan Yukseong Zeungeon” [Jeon
Doo-hwan’s Real Voice Testimony for History], Wolgan Chosun [Chosun Monthly] (January
1992), pp. 360–377.
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 235

decided at the Blue House meeting, President Reagan delivered a message

through the US Ambassador to Korea, James Lilley, saying that he was “anxious
about the recent situations in Korea.” On June 23, the US Assistant Secretary of
State, Gaston Sigur, visited Korea, conveying a message of opposition to the
mobilization of the army and stressing democratic development through a
peaceful settlement.15
This attitude of the United States contrasted with what was shown during
the Gwangju Uprising in 1980. This strong pressure of the United States
opposing the mobilization of the army is thought to be due to the impact of the
anti-Americanism that appeared after the Gwangju Uprising. That is, the United
States must have come to the conclusion that, if it was to support Jeon
Doo-hwan’s government, which had lost the people’s support, it would increase
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the anti-Americanism, which would be against the United States’ national

interests.
Second, the experience of the Gwangju Uprising stopped the military leaders
from supporting the suppression of demonstrations through use of the armed
forces, fearing another large-scale loss of life. Early in June, as the demonstra-
tions intensified, seriously dissenting opinions arose among the military leaders.
Some of them insisted on using the armed forces, while other leaders, including
the security commander, expressed an opposing opinion, i.e., “no mobilization
of the army.”16 This atmosphere inside the military made it difficult for President
Jeon to mobilize the army to suppress the demonstrations.
As the mobilization of the army became impracticable, President Jeon had to
devise another solution. This solution was the so-called June 29th Declaration,
which accepted procedural democracy, including a constitutional revision for
direct elections, and included a pardon for Kim Dae-jung. The June Uprising
created a democratic opening in a relatively short period of time, without the
sacrifice of life. Through these events it can be seen that the Gwangju Uprising
of 1980 worked as a core driving force of the June Uprising, bringing together
the forces of resistance against the Jeon Doo-hwan administration. It also worked
to restrain elements in the actions of the New Military Authorities and of the
United States, and forced Jeon’s administration to give up the idea of suppress-
ing demonstrations through the use of the army.

Gwangju Hearings in the National Assembly

The June 29th Declaration was basically presented by the forces in power due to
the pressure of the democratization forces, but it was also an outcome of the
government’s political calculation that they could continue ruling by allowing
limited democratization. In other words, the June 29th Declaration was an
expression of their will to weaken the people’s resistance by guaranteeing direct
presidential elections, and to strengthen the military government by provoking
splits inside the democratization forces. The ruling party’s will to strengthen the

15
Godo Dakao, Je 5 Gonghwaguk, Gu Gunbu Inmaek [The 5th Republic, Its Military
Connection], (Seoul: Jiyangsa, 1987), p. 224
16
Young-ki Kwon, Dong H. Kim, and Hae B. Jee, “Documentary: Gun Samgae Sandan
eul Tuiphara!” [Documentary: Dispatch Three Army Divisions!], Wolgan Chosun [Chosun
Monthly] (January 1992).
 236 Kim Yong Cheol

military government was actually expressed openly during the process of the
presidential election in December 1987. Some military generals warned, “if
candidate Kim Dae-jung wins the election, something unhappy might happen.”17
The defense strategy of the military authoritarian government toward the
June Uprising was successful. After the June 29th Declaration, with the presiden-
tial elections in December ahead of them, the democratization forces became
split along ideological, strategic, and local lines. In the end, this split inside the
democratic forces contributed greatly to Roh Tae-woo, a former military man,
winning the presidential election. As the candidate from the ruling party was
elected to the presidency, no overt military action was undertaken, but the
nation’s expectation for a civilian government, expressed through the June
Uprising, was frustrated.
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Although Roh Tae-woo became president through a direct election, it did not
mean that he was free from the shadow of the Gwangju Uprising and the move
toward democratization. Roh’s administration was little different from the prior
one, especially in terms of having the military’s support as its political base. Roh
Tae-woo himself was one of the core members of the military coup from 1979 to
1980, and was deeply involved in the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising. For
these reasons, the Roh administration had to take preemptive political measures
to silence any political criticism related to the Gwangju Uprising in order to
ensure a smooth start for the Sixth Republic. In January 1988, Roh Tae-woo, the
elected presidential candidate, formed the Committee for Promoting National
Reconciliation (CPNR), raised the status of the Gwangju massacre, which had
been described as a “riot” provoked by some impure elements, to the status of
the “Gwangju Uprising,” a democratization movement, and allowed compen-
sation for those killed and injured during the Uprising.
Despite the Roh administration’s lukewarm gesture of the CPNR, the
Gwangju Uprising began once again to amplify the government’s improprieties.
In the general elections of April 1988, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) failed
to maintain a majority in the National Assembly, leading to a new political
situation, one with a smaller ruling party and larger opposition parties. Three
opposition parties, including the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP), the Re-
unification and Democracy Party (RDP), and the New Democratic Republican
Party (NDRP), formed a coalition and began to attack the Roh administration.
During an extraordinary session in June 1988 the National Assembly organized
the “Special Committee for the Investigation of the Truth of the May 18 Gwangju
Democratization Movement.” The Committee began its full operation in Novem-
ber 1988, and hearings on the Gwangju Uprising were held in the National
Assembly. The Gwangju hearings were broadcast live, attracting the entire
nation’s attention. As the hearings proceeded, the true picture of the Gwangju
Uprising became increasingly evident. The democratization forces and student
groups demanded Jeon Doo-hwan’s arrest and punishment for his responsibility
for the Gwangju incident. Some students even organized a group called the
“Arrest Jeon Doo-hwan Band.”
Unable to shake itself free from the Gwangju issue, the Roh Tae-woo
administration held a closed-door negotiation with Jeon Doo-hwan in order to
conclude the Gwangju hearings early. The major contents of the negotiation

17
Godo Dakao, Je 5 Gonghwaguk, Gu Gunbu Inmaek, p. 239.
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 237

included: Jeon Doo-hwan should make an apology to the nation, donate his
property to the nation, and retire and seclude himself at Baekdam-sa Temple,
while the DJP, the ruling party, should end Jeon’s testimony in the National
Assembly despite the opposition’s demands. As a result, Jeon Doo-hwan issued
a statement of apology to the people on November 23 in 1988, and began his
political exile at the remote Baekdam-sa temple. The Gwangju hearings did not
make any further progress because of the DJP members’ refusal to participate.
Though the Gwangju hearings failed to bring to light the whole truth of the
Gwangju Uprising, they aroused the nation’s interest in the Uprising, and
informed the nation of the truth, to a certain degree. As things turned out,
President Roh Tae-woo could not help but sense an impending crisis, as one of
those responsible for the Gwangju incident. He was not able to predict how the
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Gwangju matter would put pressure on him and he became anxious about his
life after retirement. The culmination of this crisis was the “three parties merger”
in January 1990. In order to overcome their numerical inferiority in the National
Assembly, Roh Tae-woo and the DJP merged with Kim Young-sam and the
RDP, who wished to hold Kim Dae-jung and the PDP in check and gain an
advantage over his presidential competitor, and Kim Jong-pil and the NDRP,
who needed to overcome the numerical inferiority of being the fourth party.
With this merger arranged, the Roh administration avoided the politically
sensitive and critical Gwangju issue.

Purge Drive of the Hanahoe

Through the events of the June Uprising and the Gwangju hearings, the political
status of the military authorities had considerably weakened, but the possibility
of the military’s intervention in politics, which could have been a serious threat
to the newly emerging democracy, was not eliminated completely. After the
beginning of democratization, some democratic formalities and regulations were
introduced to the nation, though Hanahoe, the military officers’ group, with its
strong political inclination, was still thriving. Their influence inside the military
was believed to be considerable.18
It was the Kim Young-sam administration that cut off the possibility of the
military’s intervention in politics by purging the Hanahoe officers. Beginning in
February 1993, the Kim Young-sam administration tried to de-politicize the
military authorities under the slogan of “cleaning out military authoritarianism.”
On March 8, 1992, President Kim dismissed the two most important Hanahoe
leaders, Kim Jin-young (Army Chief of Staff) and Seo Wan-soo (Military Security
Commander). Two weeks later, he also dismissed the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs-of-Staff, General Lee Phil-sup, and three other senior generals on charges
related to their connections with the “December 12 Coup” in 1979. Following
this action, the government announced that it had uncovered the Hanahoe, and
forced the retirement of a number of member officers. After the dismissal of First
Army Commander General Cho Nam-pung on July 13, no Hanahoe officers
remained among the nation’s general staff.

18
Yoo-sung Hwang, “Bihwa Munmin Jeongboo: Sukgun ui Baegyoung” [Hidden Story
of Civil Government: Background of the Purging Military], Dong-a Ilbo [Dong-a Daily] (June
7, 1998)
 238 Kim Yong Cheol

Together with the purge of the military, President Kim also tried institutional
reforms of the armed forces with a view toward de-politicization. Distinctive
among his reforms were the consolidation of civilian supremacy over the
military and the reduction of the power of military intelligence. First, the relative
powers of the civiianl government’s defense minister vis-á-vis the active military
chief were greatly strengthened. Second, the Military Security Command, which
had been the most powerful military sector under previous presidents, under-
went a great deal of restructuring and reduction in organization and power.
There were various complex motives in the background of this sudden purge
of the military authorities. First, it was necessary for the Kim Young-sam
administration to establish its difference from former administrations. Kim’s
administration was the first civilian government in 31 years, since the May 16
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Coup in 1961. At the same time, it had come into being with the Roh Tae-woo
administration and the “three parties’ merger” as its cradle. Stressing that it was
a “civilian government,” the Kim Young-sam administration had to deal with its
stigma as “a civilian government based on a military regime.” At the beginning,
the Kim Young-sam administration was criticized as a civilian government that
was “in the fetters of its birth from the three parties merger.” For this reason, its
decisive cutting off of the “political” soldiers, who had been instrumental in the
army’s political intervention, was the best opportunity for the administration to
improve its image in one fell swoop.
Second, the Kim Young-sam administration also had to eliminate any poten-
tial resistance from the military authorities that could become a threat. Right
after its inauguration, the Kim administration advocated a no-holds-barred
“reformative politics,” insisting on “clean politics” and “correcting history.” The
practice of the “reformative politics,” however, was expected to confront strong
resistance from forces with vested interests from the Fifth and Sixth Republics.
Among the opponents of the new administration’s reforms, the most threatening
group was the Hanahoe of the military authorities, whose organized resistance
could bring about tremendous political turmoil. Accordingly, the administration
tried to prevent Hanahoe’s organized resistance against the reforms, by eliminat-
ing the Hanahoe generals in a decisive manner.
President Kim Young-sam’s Hanahoe purge and the reform of the military
were closely related to the historical events of the Gwangju Uprising. As
Gwangju’s tragic incident was now widely understood throughout the nation as
an unforgivable crime of the New Military Authorities, led by Jeon Doo-hwan
and Roh Tae-woo, it was quite clear that the administration’s establishment on
the basis of the Fifth and Sixth Republic could have a negative effect on the
civilian government both politically and morally.

Judicial Punishment of Jeon and Roh

Although President Kim implemented the most intensive and widespread
purges, until November 1995 he consistently ruled out the option of putting on
trial those responsible for the coups of 1979 and 1980 and the May 1980 Gwangju
massacre. When president Kim designated the December 12 incident as a
“coup-like incident by insubordination” in July 1993, the former Army Chief-of-
Staff Jeong Sung-wha and 37 others filed criminal complaints to the Seoul
District Prosecutor’s Office. They requested that the prosecution indict Jeon
 The Gwangju Uprising and Democratization 239

Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo and 32 others on charges of military mutiny and

insurrection for the December 1979 coup. The investigation and deliberation
took more than 14 months. On October 29, 1994, prosecutors announced that
they found the case to be a premeditated mutiny, but decided not to indict in the
interests of social stability and national progress. On the charge of insurrection,
the prosecutors said that there was not enough evidence to conclude that Jeon
and his collaborators intended to take over control of the country at the time of
the coup. The society in general and dissident politicians were upset about the
prosecutors’ decision. The accusers filed appeals to high-level officers of pros-
ecution, but these appeals were promptly dismissed.
The controversy over legal retribution exploded when the prosecution took
the next step on a separate legal suit that carried charges related to the May 1980
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Gwangju massacre. The criminal complaint, originally filed in May 1994 to the
Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office, accused Jeon, Roh and 56 others of treason,
insurrection and murder in relation to the May 17 coup of 1980 and the ensuing
Gwangju massacre. This investigation also lasted more than 14 months. On July
18, 1995, the prosecutors announced that they would give up the right to indict
the accused and decided to “let history be the judge.”
The timing of the prosecutor’s conclusions on both legal complaints clearly
showed the direction the Kim government wanted to go. The government’s
actions to grant immunity to the former military junta faced strong opposition
from the society, which argued for legal justice, as well as opposition political
parties that called for a thorough investigation. Shortly after the prosecutor’s
decision not to indict, President Kim and his party experienced a serious
deterioration in their popularity. University students and dissident politicians
began mobilizing protests, while university professors and civic organizations
launched a highly publicized series of petition drives.
What forced President Kim to finally change his position was the revelation
of a secret political slush fund amassed by the former president, Roh Tae-woo.
In October 1995, an opposition Democratic Party assemblyman revealed a copy
of bank records that indicated the existence of a previously much-rumored Roh
Tae-woo fund, hidden in borrowed-name bank accounts. National outcry imme-
diately erupted demanding a thorough investigation. The state prosecution was
compelled to begin an investigation of Roh and his entourage. On October 27,
Roh admitted that he, as president, had collected as much as 500 billion won
(equivalent to about $650 million) from business corporations for his “governing
fund” to use in political activities, and that 187.5 billion won (about $245 million)
from the fund were left unused and still in his possession.19
The day-by-day unfolding of Roh’s slush fund scandal led to a dramatic
escalation of demands that called for punishment of the past authoritarian
regime leaders. As many as 297 civic organizations participated in forming the
“National Emergency Committee on Enacting a Special Law for Punishing the
Perpetrators of the Gwangju Massacre” on October 26. The Committee alone
was able to obtain more than 700,000 signatures by November of 1995. Including
the number of signatures collected by other organizations, it was estimated that
more than one million people participated in the signature drive.
Faced with this explosion of popular outrage, President Kim turned his

19
Hankyeoreh, October 28, 1995.
 240 Kim Yong Cheol

policy on legal retribution upside down on November 24, 1995. He ordered his
ruling party to enact a special law to unearth the truth about the bloody
suppression in Gwangju in 1980 and to bring those responsible for the incident
before justice. In response to President Kim’s decision, the National Assembly
passed two special laws on December 19, 1995,20 and prosecutors reopened the
case. After about 15 months of investigation and deliberation, the Supreme
Court announced its judgment concerning Jeon and Roh on April 17, 1997.
According to the judgment, the December 12 incident of 1979 was “a military
revolt” and the Gwangju incident was “an insurrection and murder for the
insurrection.”21 Jeon was sentenced to penal servitude for life, Roh to 17 years of
imprisonment, and others concerned from three-and-half years to 8 years of
imprisonment. This judicial judgment effectively blocked the possibility of
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intervention by the military in the politics of South Korea by setting a precedent

that “even a successful coup is punishable.”

Conclusion
The Gwangju Uprising has continued to influence the process of democratiza-
tion and the stabilization of Korean politics. Its historical influences are as
follows: (1) it provided the democratization of Korean politics with a new
ideology, (2) it has been the source of new agents for the nation’s democratiza-
tion movement, and (3) it also created a new political structure that limited the
choices of the authoritarian elites and the United States. In terms of the
“praetorian problem” that a newly born democracy often has to face, the
Gwangju Uprising has helped to restrain and reduce the possibility of the
military’s political intervention in the process of Korean democratization. That
is, through their self-sacrifice, the citizens of the Gwangju Uprising have con-
tributed to the organization of the democratization movement of the civil
society, disclosed the violence and immorality of the military authorities, and
expanded the ideology of resistance against the military authorities. The direct
outcome of the Gwangju Uprising was the June Uprising in 1987. Since the
transition to democracy in Korea, the inheritance of the Gwangju Uprising
restrained and dissipated continuous attempts by the Roh Tae-woo administra-
tion and the military elites to retain their vested rights and to stay in power. The
Uprising’s inheritance, finally, brought about a juridical precedent that “a
successful coup d’etat can be punished,” and completely excluded the possibility
of the military’s intervention in Korean politics. Seeing all that it accomplished,
the Gwangju Uprising should not be seen as merely a simple 10-day-long
democratization outburst that took place in May 1980, but should be evaluated
as a historical force and a critical juncture that stabilized civil democracy and
helped greatly to realize the possibility of “civilian-first” politics in the nation of
Korea.

20
They are the Act on Non-Applicability of Status of Limitation to Crimes Destructive
of the Constitutional Order and the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement.
21
Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], April 18, 1997.