CCPL Memorial

TEAMCODE: M-
3RD MNLU NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION,TEAMCODE:TC

2024 MAGNUS
108
3RD AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

3rd MNLU NAGPUR NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
LAW MOOT COMPETITION, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRAVIA

W.P. No.__ / 2018
W.P. No. of 2024

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR WOMEN …………..Petitioner 1
j
CRYPTOCORP PRIVATE LIMITED (CCPL)

versus
…………………….……….. Petitioner
UNION OF INDIA ..
………….Respondent versus
W.P. No.__/
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE (ED) 2018
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU)
.………………….……….Respondents
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR PROTECTION OF CHILD …………..Petitioner 2
versus
UNION OF INDIA ...…………Respondent

-WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS-
3RD MNLU NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION, 2024
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...............................................................................................III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................X
ISSUES RAISED..................................................................................................................XII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.......................................................................................XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED............................................................................................XIII
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE

CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA........................................................................................XIII
A. ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA GIVES AN AGGRIEVED

PARTY THE POWER TO APPROACH THE SUPREME COURT WHEN A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED..........................................................XIII
B. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE ANY

PROFESSION OR TO CARRY ON ANY OCCUPATION, TRADE OR BUSINESS OF
CCPL UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA.................XIV
C. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY

UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA.....................................XVI
II. WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED UNDER

THE LAWS OF BRAVIA.................................................................................................XVIII
D. THERE EXIST NO LEGISLATIONS OR LAWS EXPLICITLY COVERING

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND SIMILAR SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL...........XVIII
E. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 7TH MARCH, 2023 DOESN’T REGULATE

VIRTUAL DIGITAL ASSETS..............................................................................................XX
F. COUNTRIES WHERE SIMILAR SERVICES ARE REGULATED HAVE CLEAR

LAWS AND LEGISLATION ON CRYPTOCURRENCIES.............................................XXII
III. WHETHER THE ED HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FREEZE FUNDS

HELD IN THE WALLETS PROVIDED BY CCPL....................................................XXIII
Page | I
G. DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO SECTION 17

OF THE PMLA, 2002.......................................................................................................XXIII
H. THE ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 17 ARE NOT FULFILLED IN ORDER TO

FREEZE ACCOUNTS OF CCPL.......................................................................................XXV
I. FREEZING FUNDS LEADS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

CCPL AND ITS USERS..................................................................................................XXVII
IV. WHETHER THE FIU CAN ASK FOR THE PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S
CLIENTS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
ACT, 2023, PURSUANT TO THIS INVESTIGATION?.............................................XXVIII
J. THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED UNDER §17 OF THE DPDP ACT, INFRINGES THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY, FORMING THE GENESIS OF THE DPDP
ACT, 2023..........................................................................................................................XXIX
K. US LAWS WILL REGULATE THE PERSONAL DATA OF THE CLIENTS, SINCE

CCPL IS AN INTERMEDIARY........................................................................................XXX
L. ACCESSING PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS WOULD VIOLATE

THE PRINCIPLE OF DATA MINIMIZATION, RENDERING IT ARBITRARY AND
UNREASONABLE.........................................................................................................XXXII
PRAYER..........................................................................................................................XXXV
Page | II
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S.No FULL FORM

ABBREVIATION
.
1 § Section
2 ¶ Paragraph
3 AIR All India Report
4 Anr. Another
5 Art. Article
6 Cal Calcutta
7 CCPA Central Consumer Protection Authority
8 Co. Company
9 Comm. Committee
10 CPA Consumer Protection Act
11 Crl. Criminal
12 CSJN Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
13 E-commerce Electronic Commerce
14 HC High Court
15 Hon’ble Honourable
16 IPC Indian Penal Code
17 IT Information Technology
18 Ltd. Limited
19 M.C. Miscellaneous
20 Mad. Madras
21 NGO Non-Governmental organisation
22 NMHP National mental health programme
Page | III
23 NHRC National Human Rights Commission
24 No. . Number
25 Ors Others
26 OTC Over-the-Counter
27 PIL Public Interest Litigation
28 Punj. Punjab
29 Pvt. Private
30 PWD Persons with Disabilities
31 SC Supreme Court
32 SCC Supreme Court Cases
33 SCR Supreme Court Reports
34 Sd Submitted
35 UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
36 UN United Nations
37 UNGA United Nations General Assembly
38 USA United States of America
39 v. Versus
40 W.P. Writ Petition
Geneva Academy of International
41 GAIHLHR
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.
Page | IV
INDEX OF Statutes
Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961, §132 cl (3)..............................................................................XXV

Indian Penal Code,1860, § 26............................................................................................XXIII
Indian Penal Code,1860, § 93............................................................................................XXIV
Narcotics Drugs Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985,§ 68F.................................................XXV
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 2..............................................................XXIII
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 3..............................................................XXIII
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17(1A)......................................................XXV
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17..................................................XXIII, XXV
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §2 cl(u).......................................................XXV
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act,2002, §2 cl.(da).....................................................XXIII
Shri L.R. Gupta v. Union of India (1992) 22 DRJ 1...........................................................XXV
Cases
AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27..........................................................XXVIII

Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority, (2008) 14 SCC 186......................XXV
Chandra Kishor Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad, MANU/SC/0594/1999......................................XXIV
Excel Powmin Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) SCC OnLine Cal 384................................XXIV
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Sindri and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0010/1980......................................................................................................XIII
HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, (2021) SCC OnLine Pat 4222...................................XXV
ITO Vs Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) (3) SCC 757..........................................................XXIV
Joti Parshad v. State of Haryana, (1993) Supp (2) SCC 497.............................................XXIV
Kumud Mitra v. Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) SCC OnLine ATPMLA
19....................................................................................................................................XXIV
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.......................................................XXIII
Musaddilal Gems and Jewels (India) Private Limited v Union of India
MANU/TL/0119/2023...................................................................................................XXIV
OPTO Circuit India Limited vs. Axis Bank 2021 6 SCC 707...........................................XXIII
Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank, (2021) 6 SCC 707...............................................XXIII
Vinit Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 3155..........XXIX
Page | V
Page | VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS HON’BLE HIGH COURT HAS BEEN INVOKED

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHALVAK, WHICH READS:
Page | VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
The Republic of Bravia, much like its legal counterpart India, regulates its financial
system through the Reserve Bank of Bravia (herein after RBB). At first, the RBB
expressed caution and raised issues with virtual currencies' decentralized structure.
But in 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a crucial decision that nullified RBB's ban
circular, drastically altering Bravia's financial situation. This decision not only made
virtual currency companies like CryptoCorp Private Limited (herein after CCPL)
legitimate, but it also made it easier for Bravia to enter the rapidly expanding world of
digital finance.
REGULATORY EVOLUTION
Despite early misgivings, the Supreme Court of Bravia (herein after SCB) verdict
caused a paradigm shift in the legal landscape, allowing organizations like CCPL to
receive regulatory approval to provide full virtual currency services. Simultaneously,
the American company Jems Aurora Inc. (herein after JAI) unveiled GILT tokens that
are backed by gold, providing investors in Bravia with an additional digital asset
option. Bravia's progressive approach to adopting digital banking and promoting
innovation within its financial ecosystem is highlighted by this regulatory
progression.
EMERGENCE OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY ENTITIES
CCPL emerged as a trailblazer in Bravia's digital finance sector, offering a diverse

range of services including virtual asset exchange, wallet provision, and portfolio
management. Complementing CCPL's offerings, JAI's issuance of gold-backed GILT
tokens garnered substantial attention among Bravian investors, augmenting digital
asset transactions within the country. The strategic partnership forged between CCPL
and JAI further exemplifies Bravia's commitment to fostering collaborations that
enhance accessibility and usability within the digital finance landscape.
GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
Page | VIII
Governmental organizations including the Financial Intelligence Unit (herein after

FIU) and the Directorate of Enforcement (herein after ED) moved proactively to look
into possible regulatory violations as virtual currency activity increased. First, the FIU
demanded that CCPL reveal the identities of the users and the specifics of the
transactions in a comprehensive show cause notice. Then, armed with authority
granted by the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, (herein after PML Act,
2002) the ED implemented steps to freeze funds from CCPL wallets, sparking heated
legal discussions about regulatory authority and constitutionality. The aforementioned
governmental initiatives highlight the intricate equilibrium that exists between market
innovation and regulatory control in Bravia's dynamic financial sector.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Legal experts scrutinized government actions, particularly ED's freezing of funds and
the Ministry of Finance's notification under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002. Questions arise regarding the constitutionality of these measures and whether
they align with statutory mandates.
RELIEFS SOUGHT AND REMEDIAL MEASURES
CCPL took legal action by submitting a Writ Petition to the SCB in response to ED's
regulatory proceedings. The petition highlights the more important need to protect
virtual currency users' rights and promote a well-balanced regulatory environment
that supports innovation and expansion in addition to calling for urgent relief and the
restoration of operational continuity. The proposed corrective actions are intended to
strengthen Bravia's digital banking ecosystem for long-term resilience and prosperity
by addressing systemic weaknesses and advancing increased regulatory clarity.
Page | IX
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

BRAVIA.
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED UNDER THE LAWS OF
BRAVIA.
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE ED HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FREEZE FUNDS HELD IN THE
WALLETS PROVIDED BY CCPL.
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE FIU CAN ASK FOR THE PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS, UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023, PURSUANT TO THIS
INVESTIGATION.
Page | X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the present petition is
maintainable under the Constitution of Bravia because, [A] Article 32 of the Constitution of
Bravia gives an aggrieved party the power to approach the Supreme Court when a
Fundamental Right has been violated, [B] there has been a violation of the right to practice
any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business of CCPL under Article 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of Bravia, and [C] there has been a violation of the right to personal
liberty under of CCPL Article 21 of the Constitution of Bravia.
II. WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED UNDER THE
LAWS OF BRAVIA.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the services provided by
CCPL are not regulated under the laws of Bravia as, [A] there exist no legislations or laws
explicitly covering virtual currencies and similar services provided by CCPL, [B] The
notification dated 7th March, 2023 doesn’t regulate Virtual Digital Assets, and [C] Countries
where similar services are regulated have clear laws and legislation on cryptocurrencies.
III. WHETHER THE THE ED HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FREEZE FUNDS HELD
IN THE WALLETS PROVIDED BY CCPL.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that ED has exceeded the legal authority to
freeze funds held in the wallets provided by CCPL. The submission is made in a three-fold
manner. [A] Due process of law was not followed according to Section 17 of the PMLA,
2002. [B] The pre requisite conditions essential to freeze funds under Section 17 of PMLA
were not fulfilled. [C] Freezing funds leads to violation of fundamental rights of CCPL and
its users.
Page | XI
IV. WHETHER THE FIU CAN ASK FOR THE PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS,
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT,
2023, PURSUANT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.
It is humbly submitted that FIU does not hold the authority to access personal data of CCPL’s
clients, under the provisions of Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, pursuant to this
investigation. The submission is made in a two- fold manner. [A] The exemption provided
under §17 of the DPDP Act, infringes the fundamental right to privacy enshrined in Article
21 of the Constitution, forming the genesis of the DPDP Act, 2023. [B] Processing personal
data of CCPL’s clients would breach the Principle of Data Minimization, rendering it
arbitrary and unreasonable.[C] US law will govern the personal data of clients, since CCPL is
an intermediary.
Page | XII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the present petition is
maintainable under the Constitution of Bravia because, [A] Article 32 of the Constitution of
Bravia gives an aggrieved party the power to approach the Supreme Court when a
Fundamental Right has been violated, [B] there has been a violation of the right to practice
any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business of CCPL under Article 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of Bravia, and [C] there has been a violation of the right to personal
liberty under of CCPL Article 21 of the Constitution of Bravia.
A. ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA GIVES AN AGGRIEVED

PARTY THE POWER TO APPROACH THE SUPREME COURT WHEN A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED
1. A right without a remedy is not a right, as it would have no value. It is a legal conundrum
of the most grotesque kind1. The maxim of Ubi Jus ibi Remedium2 states that there can be
no wrong without a remedy3, and the maxim of Lex Samper dabit Remedium 4states that if
a person has a right, they must have a means to vindicate or maintain it5.
2. Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the right to constitutional remedies, is a
fundamental right which gives every individual the right to move the Supreme Court for
the enforcement of their fundamental rights 6. Article 32 gives the Supreme Court the
power to enforce the Fundamental Rights, and the Supreme Court has held its role as a
sentinel on the qui vive in regards to enforcement of Fundamental Rights7.
1
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Sindri and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0010/1980.
2
Ashby v. White (1703) 14 St Tr 695, 92 ER 126.
3
Brooms, Broom’s Legal Maxims 118-119 (Lexis Nexis 2019).
4
Aaron X. Fellmeth & Maurice Horwitz, Lex Semper Dabit Remedium, in Guide to Latin in International Law
(2011), https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-
9780195369380-e-1298 (last visited Feb 8, 2024).
5
Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria, MANU/KE/0012/2004.
6
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
7
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 : (1952) SCR 597.
XIII
-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
3. In the present case, the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) blocked access to wallets
provided by CCPL8. This prevented the citizens of Bravia from accessing their lawfully
earned money.
4. By blocking the access to wallet services provided by CCPL, the fundamental rights of
the citizens of Bravia and CCPL have been violated, namely, the right to free practice any
profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business under article 19(1)(g) 9, and the
right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of Bravia.10
5. It has been held that it is the duty and the privilege of the Supreme Court to uphold the
liberty of the individual and the protection of Fundamental Rights as they form the very
essence of the democratic way of life adopted by the Constitution 11. In the case of
Romesh Thappar12, the Supreme Court emphasized that it has been constituted the
protector and guarantor of Fundamental Rights, and that it cannot refuse to entertain
applications seeking protection against infringement of such rights.
6. The purpose for which article 32 can be invoked is for the enforcement of fundamental
rights, and a violation of a fundamental right is sine qua non13 of the exercise of the right
conferred to it by article 3214. The Supreme Court has a solemn duty to protect the
fundamental rights zealously and vigilantly15.
7. It is thus submitted that the present suit is maintainable as there have been violations of
Fundamental Rights and the Supreme Court of Bravia has the jurisdiction to hear the case
as per the powers granted to it under Article 32 of the Constitution of Bravia.
B. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE ANY

PROFESSION OR TO CARRY ON ANY OCCUPATION, TRADE OR BUSINESS OF
CCPL UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA
8. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of Bravia is a fundamental right which gives the
citizens of Bravia the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business 16. It is one of the
six freedoms enshrined under article 19.
8
Moot Proposition, ¶XI.
9
INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(g).
10
INDIA CONST. art 21.
11
Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457 at 1461 : (1962) 1 SCR 574.
12
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : 1950 SCR 594.
13
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Copyright © 2010 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. All
rights reserved.
14
Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 2544 : (2000) 6 SCC 715.
15
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., AIR 1963 SC 996 : 1963 Supp(1) SCR 885.
16
XIV
9. This fundamental right to trade under article 19(1)(g) is subject to restrictions under
article 19(1)(6)17. However, the Apex court has established that all clauses of article 19
are subjected to a test of reasonableness 18. A limitation imposed on the imposed on a
person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond
what is required in the interest of the public 19. A Legislation cannot be said to contain the
quality of reasonableness when it arbitrarily or excessively invades the right and unless it
strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1)(g) and the social
control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19.
10. In the recent landmark case of Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank
of India., the Supreme Court struck down what could be called a complete prohibition of
crypto currency by the RBB, and held that the circular passed by RBB had effectively
almost wiped out the virtual currency exchanges and that it infringed article 19(1)(g) of
the citizens of the country20. In the present case, there have been similar circumstances
where virtual currency exchanges have been completely wiped out due to the freezing of
the wallet services provided by CCPL. This prevents virtual currency exchanges and
infringes article 19(1)(g) of the wallet holders and CCPL.
11. The right under Article 19(1)(g) 21is affected when the impugned measures have in effect
and in substance brought about a total stoppage of business in both a commercial sense
and from a practical point of view 22. The Apex court has also held that the impact and not
the measure determines whether a fundamental right is violated 23. Freezing the wallets
provided by CCPL brings about a stoppage of business, as the wallet holders now cannot
access their earnings.
12. The criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of a restriction under article 19(1)(g) has been
held to be that the Court must take into account whether the law has struck a proper
balance between social control, on one hand, and the right of the individual, on the
other24.
13. The ED in the present case blocked access to wallets provided by CCPL, and this
prevented the citizens of Bravia from accessing their lawfully earned money 25. Instead of
17
INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(6).
18
Dharam Dutt and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0970/2003.
19
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 : 1950 SCR 759.
20
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India. MANU/SC/0264/2020.
21
Ibid.
22
Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee MANU/SC/0012/1952.
23
Bennett Coleman & Co. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0038/1972.
24
Sivani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 1770, at 1774 : (1995) 6 SCC 289.
25
ibid.
XV
a reasonable restriction, there has been a full-fledged prohibition on the use of crypto
currency.
14. This act clearly goes against the test of reasonableness established by the Supreme Court
in a line of precedents26, and proper balance between social control and the right of the
individual, was not set, as the right of the individual was violated. The limitation imposed
on the individuals is of an arbitrary and excessive nature, and it goes beyond the interests
of the general public.
15. In analysing an act of total prohibition on the carrying of a business or a profession, it has
been held that the court must attempt to evaluate its direct and immediate impact upon the
Fundamental Rights of the citizens affected, the larger public interest, the necessity to
restrict the citizen’s freedom and the tendency of the act to be harmful to general public 27.
A total prohibition by the ED resulted in prevention of individuals in accessing their
earning, hence restricting their freedom to an unreasonable degree and rendering them
harm.
16. It has been established by the Apex Court that the shareholders of a company can
complain of their infringement of the fundamental right under article 19(1)(g) 28. Since the
parties affected all have property stored with CCPL, they have the power to enforce their
right to trade under article 19(1)(g).
17. Hence, in light of the above submissions, it is contended that the right to carry on any
trade or business under article 19(1)(g) has been violated of CCPL and individuals using
CCPL’s services.
C. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY

UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA
18. Article 21 of the Constitution refers to the Right to Life and personal liberty 29. The rights
guaranteed under Article 21 have been broadening from precedent to precedent, and
several rights guaranteed in part III of the Constitution are no longer treated as water tight
compartments30. A right can only be restricted by a procedure established by law which
has to be ‘fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary’31.
26
Kaushal Kishore vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2023) 4 SCC 1.
27
Md. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 93 : (1969) 1 SCC 853.
28
Bennett Coleman & Co. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0038/1972.
29
30
All India Gaming Federation and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. MANU/KA/0345/2022
31
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
XVI
19. Individuals can find fulfilment or enjoyment in various activities such as stock market
trading, working as a river port pilot, serving as a barmaid, playing tennis, engaging in
price manipulation, or countless other pursuits32. Given the diverse means of expression
across different mediums, the rights outlined in Article 21 must be broadly interpreted to
safeguard all forms of activities that contribute to self-realization of value, and this
premise is implicitly embedded in these provisions33.
20. It has been held by the Apex court that every individual has dignity and liberty and he is
free to do what he will, consistent with the freedom of others and to develop his faculties
to the fullest measure to live in happiness and peace34.
21. Justice Anthony Kennedy in the case of United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group 35
observed that an initial impression of the constitution is that all ideas are equally valid
and objective standards of style, taste and decorum are considered by the constitution to
be inappropriate and even unattainable, and that this perception is incorrect, the
constitution does not endorse any specific perspective rather it asserts that opinions and
judgements are prerogatives of the individual, not to be dictated by the government. The
advent of technology broadens the ability to make choices and undermines the potential
of this revolution if the government is assumed to be better suited to make these decisions
in the citizens behalf.
22. The Supreme Court has made reference to the “market place of ideas” concept 36. When
individuals recognize that time has challenged entrenched beliefs, they may come to
prioritize the notion that the ultimate societal good is best achieved through the free
exchange of ideas. The validity of truth is tested by the ability of thoughts to gain
acceptance in the marketplace of competing ideas, and truth stands as the only basis on
which their desires can securely be realized.37
23. Justice Louis Brandies in Whitney v. California38 famously stated that the final end of the
state was to make individuals free to develop their faculties and liberty is valued both as
an end and as a means. Order cannot be merely secured through fear of punishment and it
would be hazardous to discourage thoughts and hope, as fear is the precursor to
repression, which in turn creates hate, and hate menaces a stable government.
32
Neutral Principles and some first Amendment Problems, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 47: Issue 1 (1971)
33
Ibid.
34
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. MANU/SC/1054/2018
35
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group MANU/USSC/0049/2000
36
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India MANU/SC/0329/2015
37
Abrams et al. v. United States MANU/USSC/0180/1919.
38
Whitney v. People of State of California MANU/USSC/0176/1927.
XVII
24. Freezing the wallet services provided by CCPL was an unreasonable and an arbitrary
action on behalf of the ED. This action infringes CCPL and the wallet holders’ right to
personal liberty under article 21 and prevents them to be free to do what they will and
from developing their faculties to the fullest measure to live in happiness and peace. Their
ability to make choices is unreasonably restricted.
25. As for alternate remedies, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law,
and that there have been many instances where writes had been issued in spite of the fact
that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies39.
26. In light of the above contentions, it is humbly submitted that the right to liberty under
Article 21 of CCPL and its wallet holders has been infringed, and thus, due to the
infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21, and under the right to
constitutional remedies under Article 32, this suit is maintainable in the Supreme Court of
Bravia.
II. WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED

UNDER THE LAWS OF BRAVIA.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the services provided by
CCPL are not regulated under the laws of Bravia as, [A] there exist no legislations or laws
explicitly covering virtual currencies and similar services provided by CCPL, [B] The
notification dated 7th March, 2023 doesn’t regulate Virtual Digital Assets, and [C] Countries
where similar services are regulated have clear laws and legislation on cryptocurrencies.
D. THERE EXIST NO LEGISLATIONS OR LAWS EXPLICITLY COVERING

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND SIMILAR SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL
27. Presently, Cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies have not been recognized as currencies
by the RBB, and no specific laws or laws related to cryptocurrencies have been
introduced in India till date40. There lies heavy uncertainty in the cryptocurrency
environment.
39
State of Uttar Pradesh. v. Mohd. Nooh [1958]1SCR595.
40
Deshant Singh Thakur, Prof Raj A. Varma & Prof Damodar Mayappa Hake, Regulation of Cryptocurrency in
India: Issues and Challenges, Journal of Positive School Psychology 8921 (2022).
XVIII
28. In the Union Budget of 202241, under Section 115BH of the Income Tax Act, 1961 42, all
cryptocurrencies were declared to be taxable at the rate of 30% 43. While tax has been
imposed on cryptocurrencies, it has been clarified that the government has only taxed the
profits emerging from the cryptocurrency transactions and has not done anything to
regulate, legalize or ban it 44. This government statement, in itself proves that
cryptocurrencies are not regulated.
29. Very recently in 2023, the Supreme Court asked the Union government why there still
isn’t yet any law on cryptocurrencies, and that it is “unfortunate” that the centre still has
neither a law regulating cryptocurrencies nor any expert agency in place to probe in such
matters45.
30. In the landmark case of Internet Mobile Association46, the Supreme Court set aside the
circular by RBB, published in 2018, which completely prohibited cryptocurrencies and
essentially put a blanket ban on them. The Court, stating the doctrine of proportionality,
stated that the action was not proportionate and while there is room for regulation, a
complete ban is unconstitutional, and infringes article 19(1)(g), the right to trade.
31. Recently, the Union Government discussed a ban on private cryptocurrencies in a new
bill, "Cryptocurrency and Official Digital Currency Bill Regulations,
2021(Cryptocurrency Bill 2021)47". The bill proposed that all private cryptocurrencies,
including Bitcoin, will be banned in India if this bill is implemented 48. According to the
Committee's report alongside the report, virtual currencies will not be able to act as a
41
Bill No. 18 of 2022. THE FINANCE BILL, 2022.
42
S. 115H, The Income Tax Act, 1962.
43
Sanjay Notani and Akash Manwani, The Legal Anatomy of Cryptocurrency Regulation in India, MediaNama
(Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.medianama.com/2022/03/223-cryptocurrency-regulation-india-legal-anatomy/
(last visited Jan 29, 2024).
44
FM Sitharaman says taxing cryptos doesn’t mean it has been legalised, The Economic Times, Feb. 12, 2022,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/fm-sitharaman-says-taxing-cryptos-doesnt-mean-
it-has-been-legalised/articleshow/89496281.cms (last visited Jan 29, 2024).
45
Why still no law on crypto, Supreme Court asks Union government, Hindustan Times (2023),
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/supreme-court-terms-absence-of-law-on-crypto-unfortunate-
101690516129783.html (last visited Feb 5, 2024).
46
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India. MANU/SC/0264/2020.
47
Sobhana K. Nair, New Cryptocurrency Bill Seeks to Ban Private Players, The Hindu, Nov. 23, 2021,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/new-cryptocurrency-bill-seeks-to-ban-private-players/
article37649790.ece (last visited Jan 31, 2024).
48
Resmi C S, Analysis on Crypto- currency Bill 2021, Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative
Technologies, 2022 JETIR March 2022, Volume 9, Issue 3 p. 141-153.
XIX
currency since they are not consistent with the essential features of currency 49. However,
it is yet to be passed, and thus there is no regulation of cryptocurrency.
32. CCPL offers services such as trading, transaction, storage of virtual digital assets and
cryptocurrencies and liquidity services50. There exists no legislation regulating the storage
and other services CCPL offers which are related to cryptocurrencies, let alone any law
on cryptocurrencies.
33. It is thus submitted that there are no existing legislations on cryptocurrencies and the
services provided by CCPL and hence cryptocurrencies are not regulated under the laws
of Bravia.
E. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 7TH MARCH, 2023 DOESN’T REGULATE VIRTUAL

DIGITAL ASSETS
34. Black’s Law Dictionary defines regulation as “the act or process of controlling by rule or
restriction.”51. The Oxford English Dictionary similarly defines regulation as “the action
or fact of regulating” and “to regulate” as “to control, govern or direct” 52. A common
perception of regulation is that the concept is similar to laws that serve interest groups 53.
Economist George Stigler stated that” regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit”54.
35. On 7th March, 2023, a notification in the official gazette was issued by the Central
Government in which the term “Virtual Digital Asset” was defined as having the same
meaning as assigned to it in clause (47A) of section 2 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 55. The
section gives meaning to the term “Virtual Digital Asset”, and defines it as an information
code or token generated through cryptographic means, a non-fungible token, any other
digital asset, among other things 56. However, it merely defines it, and doesn’t state any
laws or rules to be followed. Regulation enables, facilitates, adjusts and often, restricts
activities57. In the notification only the definition is given, and no form of regulation
exists.
49
Cryptocurrency Bill 2021: The Road Ahead - Fin Tech - India,
https://www.mondaq.com/india/fin-tech/1145012/cryptocurrency-bill-2021-the-road-ahead (last visited Jan 31,
2024).
50
Moot Proposition, Point 6.
51
Black’s Law Dictionary(CITATION NEEDED)
52
Oxford English Dictionary(CITATION NEEDED)
53
Barak Orbach, Invisible Lawmaking, 79 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogues 1 (2012).
54
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgm’t Sci. 3, 3 (1971)
55
Moot Proposition, Annexure A.
56
The Income Tax, 1962,§ 2(47A),
XX
36. Through this notification, the government has retained the facility to to classify or
declassify any cryptocurrency or any NFT and the saving provision was inserted to keep
away from India's Digital Rupee or Central Based Digital Currency ("CBDC") 58. This
main purpose of the notification was not to regulate but to separate cryptocurrencies and
the government’s own new digital currency.
37. Baldwin et al. propose three main conceptions of regulation: first, as the establishment of
authoritative rules with mechanisms for ensuring compliance; second, as all state agency
efforts to guide the economy; and third, as all forms of social control, including
unintentional and non-state processes59. None of the three points are met in the current
scenario. There exist no authoritative rules, and the state agency efforts and forms of
social control, which was brought about by RBB in the form of a circular, was struck
down by the apex court in 202060.
38. In terms of regulation, all the notification paved way for was further ambiguity and
uncertainness. Regulations are meant to be straightforward rules and laws which lay
down clear lines on the directions as well as restrictions on the subject matter, and not
ambiguity. It has also been contended with many legal experts that the said notification is
ultra vires to the constitution and the government has exceeded its power61.
39. It is thus submitted that the notification dated 7 th March, 2023 does not regulate virtual
digital assets and hence the services provided by CCPL are not regulated under the laws
of Bravia.
F. COUNTRIES WHERE SIMILAR SERVICES ARE REGULATED HAVE CLEAR

LAWS AND LEGISLATION ON CRYPTOCURRENCIES.
40. In the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 62, in the absence of any domestic law or
legislation occupying the subject matter, international norms and guidelines were deemed
necessary to be looked into and applied to the case to fulfil the obligation of the Supreme
Court to administer the right of constitutional remedies under Article 32. Article 51(c)
57
What is Regulation?, Yale Journal on Regulation, https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/what-is-regulation/ (last
visited Jan 30, 2024).
58
Deshant Singh Thakur, Prof Raj A. Varma & Prof Damodar Mayappa Hake, Regulation of Cryptocurrency in
India: Issues and Challenges, Journal of Positive School Psychology 8921 (2022).
59
Baldwin et al. 1998, pp. 3–4; cf. Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004, pp. 2–4; Baldwin et al. 2012, Ch. 1
60
Moot Proposition,
61
Moot Proposition, ¶XII
62
Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. MANU/SC/0786/1997
XXI
states that India should strive to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations
in respect to organized people dealing with one another63.
41. The European Union has in June, 2023, to regulate crypto assets which were not regulated
by legislation, passed a regulatory framework on cryptocurrencies, called the Markets in
Crypto Assets(MiCA) regulatory framework64. Germany has clear laws of
cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrencies, which are classified as financial instruments, are
regulated by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority65.
42. In Mexico, La Ley Fintech, a complete legal framework, governs the ownership,
exchange, and acquisition of Bitcoin in Mexico66. There exists a complete legal
framework to regulate cryptocurrencies.
43. Cryptocurrencies have achieved legal status in Australia since 2017 and are treated as
property67. It is legal to trade, store, and receive cryptocurrencies and they are an accepted
means of payment.
44. In South Africa, cryptocurrencies are legal and are regulated and recognized as a financial
product by the FSCA68. There exist clear laws like Financial Advisory and Intermediary
Services Act under which virtual assets are regulated.
45. In Japan, cryptocurrencies are regulated by the Japanese Financial Services Agency
(FSA),69 which collaborates with the Japan Virtual Currency Exchange Association
(JVCEA) and the Japan Security Token Offering Association (JSTOA) 70. The JVCEA is
responsible for establishing rules and legislations for providers of crypto exchange
services. Here, apart from legislations, there are specific organizations which regulate
cryptocurrencies.
63
64
Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), https://www.esma.europa.eu/esmas-activities/digital-finance-
and-innovation/markets-crypto-assets-regulation-mica (last visited Feb 3, 2024).
65
Cryptocurrency in Germany: Is it regulated and safe?, (2023), https://www.idnow.io/blog/cryptocurrency-
germany-regulations/ (last visited Feb 3, 2024).
66
FREDRICK KWESI DICKSON, An Overview of Cryptocurrency Regulation around the World.
67
An overview of the cryptocurrency regulations in Australia, Cointelegraph,
https://cointelegraph.com/learn/an-overview-of-the-cryptocurrency-regulations-in-australia (last visited Feb 3,
2024).
68
An overview of the cryptocurrency regulations in South Africa, Cointelegraph,
https://cointelegraph.com/learn/cryptocurrency-regulations-in-south-africa (last visited Feb 3, 2024).
69
Reuters. "Japan's FSA Orders Two Cryptocurrency Exchanges to Halt Business."
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currencies-japan-fsa/japans-fsa-orders-two-cryptocurrency-
exchanges-to-halt-business-id Accessed April 30, 2021.
70
An overview of the cryptocurrency regulations in Japan, Cointelegraph,
https://cointelegraph.com/learn/crypto-regulations-in-japan (last visited Feb 3, 2024).
XXII
46. All of the countries mentioned are independent democracies like Bravia and unlike
Bravia, they all have clear laws and regulation on Cryptocurrencies. There is no scope of
ambiguity regarding cryptocurrency regulation, unlike Bravia, where ambiguity is
rampant and there are no clear existing laws on cryptocurrencies.
47. It is thus submitted that countries where similar services are regulated have clear laws and
legislation on cryptocurrencies unlike Bravia, and hence the services offered by CCPL are
not regulated under the laws Bravia as there are no clear laws regarding them and there
exists ambiguity.
III. WHETHER THE ED HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FREEZE FUNDS HELD IN THE
WALLETS PROVIDED BY CCPL.
48. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that ED has exceeded the legal authority
to freeze funds held in the wallets provided by CCPL. The submission is made in a three-
fold manner. [G] Due process of law was not followed according to Section 17 of the
PMLA, 2002. [H] The pre requisite conditions essential to freeze funds under Section 17
of PMLA were not fulfilled. [I] Freezing funds leads to violation of fundamental rights of
CCPL and its users.
G. DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO SECTION 17

OF THE PMLA, 2002.
49. It is respectfully submitted that power of ED to freeze funds is subjected to some

compliance71 since due process of law72 was not followed thus ED does not have authority
under section 17 of PMLA, 2002 to freeze CCPL's account.
50. Furthermore, Section 2(w) of the PMLA, 2002 explicitly defines “records” as the
73
documents maintained in the form of books or stored in a computer and Section 2(v)
defines the term "property" as any assets, regardless of their nature. 74 The freezing of
the account will also require the same procedure since a bank account having
alleged proceeds of crime75 would fall both under the ambit “property” and “records.”76
51. It is asserted that according to Section 17 of the PMLA, there is a pre requisite that the
71
Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank, (2021) 6 SCC 707.
72
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
73
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 2.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
OPTO Circuit India Limited vs. Axis Bank 2021 6 SCC 707.
XXIII
authorized officer77 must, based on information in their possession, which must be

documented in writing, having reasons to believe 78 that the individual is engaged in
activities related to the offence of money laundering 79, and that there is a necessity to
seize any records or assets discovered during the search.80
52. The Telangana High Court in the case of Musaddilal Gems and Jewels (India) Private
Limited v Union of India81 held that issuance of search warrant 82 without recording the
reasons to believe83 is a violation of the provisions of section 17 of the PMLA, 2002 and
accordingly the same is liable to be set aside. Further, the court in the case of Chandra
Kishor Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad and Ors84 held that it is a well settled salutary principle
that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be
done in that manner and in no other manner. Hence, in accordance with this principle, the
failure of the ED to comply with due process, as required by Section 17 of the PMLA,
2002, would undermine the legality of their actions.
53. In the instant case, the ED did not provide the ‘reasons to believe’,85under the PMLA.
Additionally, even, while issuing the show cause notice 86 the ED did not provide
its ‘reason to believe’, the details of the suspect transactions, to be able to reply to the
same. Therefore, there is a notable absence of concrete evidence or documentation
indicating their complicity in money laundering. Without such evidence, the ED's
decision to freeze CCPL's account lacks the necessary legal foundation, raising questions
about the validity and legality of their actions.
54. Hence, the directives issued by the ED87 blatantly violate the requirements outlined in
Section 17 of the PMLA, 2002. These directives lack any rationale for freezing, let alone
compelling reasons to believe justifying the necessity to freeze the bank account. 88
Instead, they appear to be generic and mechanically issued without proper legal
consideration.89 This failure to adhere to legal standards undermines the integrity of the
freezing process and raises concerns regarding procedural fairness. It is imperative that
77
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act,2002, §2 cl.(da).
78
Indian Penal Code,1860, § 26.
79
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 3.
80
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17.
81
Musaddilal Gems and Jewels (India) Private Limited v Union of India, MANU/TL/0119/2023.
82
Indian Penal Code,1860, § 93.
83
Supra note, 78.
84
Chandra Kishor Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad, MANU/SC/0594/1999.
85
ITO Vs Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) (3) SCC 757.
86
Moot Proposition, ¶X.
87
88
Joti Parshad v. State of Haryana, (1993) Supp (2) SCC 497.
89
Kumud Mitra v. Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) SCC OnLine ATPMLA 19.
XXIV
ED's actions align with the legal framework established by the PMLA to ensure
accountability and safeguard the rights of the individuals or entities affected by such
directives.
55. Therefore, the freezing of funds belonging to CCPL held in the wallets should be deemed
unlawful90 due to the failure to adhere to due process. Such disregard for procedural
requirements raises serious doubts about the legality and fairness of the freezing process.
Since, it is essential to uphold the principles of due process to ensure that individuals and
entities are afforded their rights and protections under the law. Thus, in the light of
arguments advanced and authorities cited, ED does not have authority to abruptly freeze
funds held in the wallets of CCPL.
H. THE ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 17 ARE NOT FULFILLED IN ORDER TO

FREEZE ACCOUNTS OF CCPL.
56. It is humbly submitted that under Section 17 of the PMLA, 200291 the authorized officers
can search, seize and freeze the property when they have reason to believe that such
person has committed acts relating to money laundering and there is a need to seize. 92
Such “reason to believe” presupposes material in the possession of the authority
concerned for such belief and the reason is to be recorded in writing.93
57. Similar provision of seizure or freezing of illegally acquired property has been provided
under the Narcotics Drugs Psychotropic Substance Act, 198594 and the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in reference to NDPS Act observed that for complying with the conditions of
reason to believe, there must be direct nexus between the property sought to be forfeited
with the income etc.95
58. In the instant case, the bank accounts96 were not a part of proceeds of crime97 as
defined under the PMLA, 2002 nor did the impugned order 98 reveal that there was a direct
nexus between the property in question and the proceeds of crime. Therefore, evidently,
there was no material before the authority concerned to have “reason to believe” that the
property in question was proceeds of crime. Accordingly, there does not exist any
90
Excel Powmin Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) SCC OnLine Cal 384.
91
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17.
92
Supra note, 71. Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank, (2021) 6 SCC 707.
93
HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, (2021) SCC OnLine Pat 4222.
94
Narcotics Drugs Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985,§ 68F.
95
Aslam Mohammad Merchant v. Competent Authority, (2008) 14 SCC 186.
96
Moot Proposition, ¶X.
97
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §2 cl(u).
98
XXV
proceeds of crime. Hence, the funds do not come within the

mischief of “proceeds of crime”.
59. In the case of Shri L.R. Gupta v. Union of India 99, where Section 132(3) of the Income
Tax (IT) Act, 1961100 was under consideration, having resemblance in intent and function
to Section 17(1A) of PMLA, 2002.101 It was established that for forming reasons to
102
believe under Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act to be formed, there must be
existing facts and circumstances, including relevant information with the Department that
a person is not likely to produce the documents voluntarily.
60. The impugned orders of freezing in the present case, therefore, fails to fulfil the
obligation of providing any justified reasons to believe for the necessity of issuing such
orders under Section 17(1-A) of the PMLA, 2002 103. This lack of clarity regarding the
basis for freezing accounts thus, undermines the transparency and accountability of the
actions. It is imperative that when exercising powers granted by Section 17(1-A) of the
PMLA, the authorities articulate the specific grounds and circumstances warranting the
freezing of accounts. Without such explicit reasoning, individuals or entities affected by
these orders are left unaware of the justification behind the freezing actions, impeding
their ability to challenge the orders effectively. Therefore, the failure to provide adequate
reasons for the freezing orders constitutes a serious procedural flaw and raises concerns
about the validity and fairness of the actions taken by the authorities under the PMLA.
61. Hence, in the light of principles and authorities cited, since the essentials of Section 17
are not fulfilled thus, ED does not hold power to freeze funds of CCPL provided in the
wallet by CCPL since essentials mentioned under section 17 of PMLA, 2002, were not
fulfilled.
I. FREEZING FUNDS LEADS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

CCPL AND ITS USERS.
62. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that freezing of funds held in the wallets
offered by CCPL104 has led to the violation of fundamental right to practice trade or
business of CCPL and its users as enshrined in Article 19(1)(g)105 of the Constitution.
99
Shri L.R. Gupta v. Union of India (1992) 22 DRJ 1.
100
Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961, §132 cl (3).
101
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17(1A).
102
Income Tax Act,1961, §132 cl (1).
103
Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002, §17(1-A).
104
Moot proposition, ¶ X.
105
XXVI
63. It was held by this Hon’ble court in Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee106, that the right
under Article 19(1)(g)107 is affected when “in effect and in substance”, the impugned
measures brought about a total stoppage of business, both, in a commercial sense and
from a practical point of view also the impact and not the object of the measure will
determine whether or not, a fundamental right is violated108.
64. It was held in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,109 that any order which is
against fundamental rights has to pass the test of reasonability 110, non-arbitrariness111,
natural justice112 and also be subjected to proportionality test 113, which states (i) that the
measure adopted should have a proper purpose, (ii) that the measures are rationally
connected to the fulfilment of the purpose, (iii) that there are no alternative less invasive
measures114, and (iv) that there is a proper relation between the importance of achieving
the aim and the importance of limiting the right115, for it to be held lawful.
65. In the instant case, the freezing of funds held in the wallets offered by CCPL had
impaired CCPL's ability to carry out its commercial activities 116 and infringes upon the
rights of its users to engage in transactions through CCPL's platform. Therefore, “in effect
and in substance”, the impugned orders to freeze the funds held in CCPL’s wallets has
brought about a total stoppage of business, since CCPL provides an exchange platform
for users to engage with VDAs,117 and blocking access to the wallet services provided by
CCPL118 had led to total stoppage of business.
66. Further, Freezing CCPL's funds without concrete evidence or due process lacks
reasonableness. Since without sufficient justification or evidence linking CCPL's funds to
criminal activities, the freezing of funds cannot be considered as justified and reasonable.
Additionally, the act is disproportionate to the aim of combating financial crimes because
freezing the funds of an entire business entity affects not only CCPL but also its users,
without demonstrating a proportional response to the alleged offense.
67. Therefore, in the light of arguments advanced and authorities cited, the ED's decision to
106
Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee, (1952) SCR 572.
107
Ibid.
108
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.
109
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
110
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy vs State Of Jammu And Kashmir & Another (1980) AIR 1992.
111
Ajay Hasia Vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardhi (1981) 1 SCC 722.
112
Srikrishna v. State of M.P, AIR 1977 SC 1691.
113
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (2006) 65 (1) CLJ 174, p. 175.
114
K.S. Puttaswamy v the Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1.
115
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353.
116
Moot proposition, ¶ XI.
117
Moot proposition, ¶ VI.
118
Moot proposition, ¶ XI.
XXVII
freeze CCPL's funds does not meet the standards of reasonableness, proportionality, and
natural justice and thus clearly violates fundamental rights of CCPL and its users, hence
should be declared unlawful.
IV. WHETHER THE FIU CAN ASK FOR THE PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S
CLIENTS, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA
PROTECTION ACT, 2023, PURSUANT TO THIS INVESTIGATION?
68. It is humbly submitted that FIU does not hold the authority to access personal data of
CCPL’s clients, under the provisions of Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023,
pursuant to this investigation. The submission is made in a two- fold manner. [J] The
exemption provided under §17 of the DPDP Act, infringes the fundamental right to
privacy enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, forming the genesis of the DPDP Act,
2023. [K] Processing personal data of CCPL’s clients would breach the Principle of Data
Minimization, rendering it arbitrary and unreasonable.[L] US law will govern the
personal data of clients, since CCPL is an intermediary.
J. THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED UNDER §17 OF THE DPDP ACT, INFRINGES THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY, FORMING THE GENESIS OF THE DPDP
ACT, 2023.
69. It is respectfully submitted that the blanket exemption granted to the state under §17 of
the DPDP, 2023119 violates the fundamental right120 to privacy enshrined under Article 21
of the Constitution121 as emphasized in the landmark K.S. Puttaswamy v the Union of
India122 which highlighted on the significance of data privacy 123 in this digital era and led
to the formation of Digital Data Protection Act, 2023.
70. In the case of R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu 124 the court granted constitutional
status to right to privacy considering it as an independent and distinctive concept. The
Supreme Court extensively engaged with privacy as a basic human right for the first
time.125
119
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, §17.
120
Profile - Fundamental Rights - Know India: National Portal of India,
https://knowindia.india.gov.in/profile/fundamental-rights.php (last visited Feb 8, 2024).
121
INDIA CONST. art.21.
122
Supra note, 114. K.S. Puttaswamy v the Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1.
123
Princess U. Alafaa, Data Privacy and Data Protection: The Right of User’s and the Responsibility of
Companies in the Digital World., (2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4005750 (last visited Feb 8, 2024).
124
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
125
Gobind v. State of MP, (1975) SCR (3) 946.
XXVIII
71. The Hon’ble Court in Puttaswamy case devised a three-fold test for measures restricting
the right to privacy126 encompassing legality, aim and proportionality127. There must be a
law in existence to justify that an encroachment on privacy is an express requirement of
Article 21 of the Constitution.128 The requirement of legitimate state aim ensures that the
nature and content of the law which imposes the restriction falls within the zone of
reasonableness.129 The third requirement of the test is the proportionality of the object and
need of the law.
72. This test was further adopted in Vinit Kumar130 case the court struck down the
interception order when it failed the three-fold test and observed that the ‘ends justify the
means’ in violation of fundamental right would amount to manifest arbitrariness. In the
case of District Registrar and Collector v. Canara bank131, the Hon'ble Court observed
that without laying down the guidelines for exercising the powers and recording the
availability of the grounds on which the basis of power can be exercised, the entire
exercise would be unreasonable.
73. The court further laid down the test for privacy claims which deserve the "highest
standard of scrutiny" and held that privacy invasions can be justified only in case of a
"compelling state interest".132 In Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, accepted the right to
privacy as an emanation from Art. 19(a), (d) and 21and held it could be subjected to
restriction only on the basis of compelling public interest.133
74. Further, to determine the proportionality, the Supreme Court of India in Puttaswamy
I, adopted David Bilchitz’s analysis which proposes to evaluate the range of possible
alternative measures that could be employed by the state to achieve the legitimate aim.
Therefore, there is no proportionality in the present case since there are various other
measures that could be employed by FIU instead of accessing personal data of the clients
in order to assess the financial condition of CCPL.
75. In the present case, § 17 of the DPDP Act, 2023 provides excessive power 134 that
encroaches upon the privacy of an individual. The FIU does not fulfil the requirement of
126
127
Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 869 (2009).
128
129
AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
130
Vinit Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2019) SCC ONLINE BOM 3155.
131
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara bank, (2004) 2004/INSC/631.
132
Virendra Kumar, Dynamics of the “Right to Privacy”: Its Characterization Under the Indian Constitution, 61
J. of the Indian Law Institute, 68 (2019).
133
Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (1975) MANU/SC/0119/1975.
134
Raghav Saha, The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill: A Move Towards an Orwellian State, TECH LAW
FORUM NALSAR (Mar. 10, 2023, 9:20 PM), https://techlawforum. nalsar.ac.in/the-digital-personal-data-
protection-bill-a-move-towards-an-orwellian-state/.
XXIX
the reasonableness of the legitimate state aim since, FIU lacks concrete evidence, for
processing personal data of clients based on mere suspicion is arbitrary and unreasonable.
76. Additionally, the FIU seeks to access personal data of CCPL’s clients solely to determine
the company's financial condition. However, such access is unnecessary as there are
various alternative measures available to the FIU such as instead of blanket access, FIU
can request specific data points linked to identified suspicious transactions. This
minimizes data collection and focuses on potentially problematic areas. Therefore, the
FIU lacks any compelling state interest to access the personal data of CCPL’s clients.
77. Therefore, in the light of authorities cited and arguments advanced, the petitioner asserts
that the processing personal data of CCPL and its clients would infringe fundamental
right to privacy as enshrined under Article 21 of the Bravian Constitution which forms the
genesis of the Digital Data Protection Act, 2023.
K. US LAWS WILL REGULATE THE PERSONAL DATA OF THE CLIENTS, SINCE

CCPL IS AN INTERMEDIARY.
78. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the personal data of the clients will
be regulated by the US laws on data protection 135, since CCPL is just an intermediary136
between the Bravian subscribers and JAI.
79. In the present case, JAI, is an entity incorporated under the laws of Delaware, USA, it
falls under US jurisdiction. JAI issues GILT a gold-backed token to individuals located
across the world137, including Bravia. In order to fulfil this purpose, JAI engaged CCPL to
provide Bravian subscribers access to wallets where they may hold their GILT tokens.
Therefore, CCPL acts merely as an intermediary facilitating the provision of services
related to digital assets issued by JAI. CCPL's role is primarily to provide Bravian
subscribers with access to wallets for holding their GILT tokens, as engaged by JAI.
80. According to the provision of DPDP, 2023 a data fiduciary 138 is any person determines
the purpose and means of processing of personal data. JAI, holds the primary authority
and responsibility for determining the purpose and means of processing personal data
associated with the use of these tokens. CCPL, on the other hand, serves as an
intermediary engaged by JAI to provide access to wallets for individuals holding GILT
135
136
137
Moot proposition, ¶ VIII.
138
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, § 2.
XXX
tokens, thus operating within the parameters set by JAI.

81. Therefore, CCPL is not directly responsible for regulating the personal data of its clients,
as this responsibility falls under JAI's purview. With JAI operating within the regulatory
framework provided by US laws, including the robust provisions of the US SAFE WEB
Act139, the processing and protection of personal data associated with GILT tokens are
effectively governed by US legislation.
82. The US Safe Web Act provides the Federal Trade Commission 140 (herein after FTC) with
a broad range of powerful tools and strengthens the FTC’s authority in five key areas: (1)
information sharing; (2) investigative assistance; (3) confidentiality; (4) enhanced
investigative and litigating tools; and (5) enforcement relationships. The Act authorizes
the FTC, in appropriate consumer protection matters, to share compelled and confidential
information with foreign law enforcement agencies.141
83. Further, Sections 4(a) and 6(a) of the Act grants FTC authority to share certain
confidential and compelled information in consumer protection investigations with
foreign law enforcement agencies.142 If the FTC determines that the requested cooperation
is consistent with the requirements in the Act, it can issue compulsory process for
documents and testimony to an entity located in the United States and share the
information with the foreign agency.143
84. Hence, in the light of these regulations, it would be appropriate for ED to approach FTC
to obtain access to personal data belonging to CCPL's clients, since it is within the
jurisdiction of the FTC to assess whether the request aligns with the stipulations outlined
in the Act.
85. Therefore, in the light of arguments advanced and authorities cited, FIU is not entitled to
request personal data from CCPL under the DPDP Act, 2023, as the FTC holds the
jurisdiction under the US SAFE WEB Act to transfer such personal information to
foreign investigative agencies.
139
Undertaking Spam, Spyware, And Fraud Enforcement With Enforcers beyond Borders Act, 2006.
140
141
United States: Federal Trade Commission & United States: Federal Trade Commission., U.S. Safe Web Act:
The First Three Years : A Report to Congress (2009), https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo6277 (last visited Feb 8,
2024).
142
US SAFE WEB ACT,2006,§4(a) and 6(a)
143
Ibid 67.
XXXI
L. ACCESSING PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS WOULD VIOLATE THE

PRINCIPLE OF DATA MINIMIZATION, RENDERING IT ARBITRARY AND
UNREASONABLE.
86. The principle of “data minimisation” means that a data controller should limit the
collection of personal information to what is directly relevant and necessary to
accomplish a specified purpose. In other words, data controllers should collect only the
personal data they really need, and should keep it only for as long as they need it.144
87. The data minimisation principle is expressed in Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR and Article
4(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, which provide that personal data must be
"adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which
they are processed".145
88. Additionally, Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that “No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence nor to attack upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 146
89. Furthermore, Article 17 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which
India is a party) also states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home and correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks
on his honor and reputation.”147
90. In its General Comment 16, the Human Rights Committee has stated that Art 17 requires
legal implementation of essential data protection guarantees in both the public and private
sectors. In the words of the Committee: The competent public authorities should only be
able to call for such information relating to an individual's private life the knowledge of
which is essential in the interests of society as understood under the Covenant.148
91. Furthermore, The DPDP Act,2023 is also based on the principle of purpose limitation
(use of personal data only for the purpose specified at the time of obtaining consent of the
Data Principal); The principle of data minimisation (collection of only as much personal
data as is necessary to serve the specified purpose).
92. Additionally, The Apex Court, while examining the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016
144
European Data Protection Supervisor, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/glossary/d_en
(last visited Feb 8, 2024).
145
Ibid.
146
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, art.12.
147
Article 17 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1976, art.17.
148
Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties, 6 INT'l J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 247 (1998).
XXXII
in the Puttaswamy judgment, upheld the principle of data minimisation as Section 2(k) of
the 2016 Act put a restriction on the collection of sensitive information such as race,
religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical
history.149
93. Similarly, in Ramesh Chennithala v. State Of Kerala150 the data protection principles such
as confidentiality of the CDR details collected, restriction on third party access, and
limitation on use of data for any other purpose, were recognised and the Court did not
grant the petitioner the permission to implead the service providers.
94. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Manohar Lal v. Union of India151 elaborated
upon the right to privacy in the information age and upheld privacy to be a “sacrosanct”
right in consonance with the Puttaswamy judgment.
95. In the present case, data sought by FIU should be directly pertinent to the investigation at
hand. It should be narrowly tailored to exclude any extraneous or unnecessary
information that does not directly contribute to the legitimate objectives of the
investigation. Data protection requires not only the minimization of data but also a
consideration of less intrusive means to achieve the intended purpose.
96. Therefore, in the light of arguments advanced and authorities cited, accessing personal
data of CCPL’s clients violated the principle of Data Minimization, rendering it arbitrary
and unreasonable.
97.
149
Supra
150
Ramesh Chennithala v. State Of Kerala, WP(C).No.17028 OF 2020.
151
Manohar Lal v. Union of India, (2010) 11 SCC 557.
XXXIII
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the facts presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Petitioners humbly submit that the Hon’ble Court of Bhanu Pradesh may be pleased to
adjudge and:
I. HOLD that the petition is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution of Bravia.
II. HOLD that the Services provided by CCPL are regulated under the laws of Bravia.
III. HOLD that the ED has no legal authority to freeze funds held in the wallets provided
by CCPL.
IV. HOLD that the FIU cannot ask for the personal data of CCPL’s clients, under the
provisions of digital personal data protection act, 2023, pursuant to this investigation.
AND
ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO GRANT
IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Sd /-
COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONERS
PLACE: SUPREME COURT OF BRAVIA
XXXIV

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TEAMCODE: M-

3RD MNLU NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION,TEAMCODE:TC

3RD AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

LAW MOOT COMPETITION, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRAVIA

W.P. No. of 2024

CRYPTOCORP PRIVATE LIMITED (CCPL)

FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU)

UNION OF INDIA ...…………Respondent

3RD MNLU NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COMPETITION, 2024

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE

A. ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA GIVES AN AGGRIEVED

B. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE ANY

C. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY

II. WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED UNDER

D. THERE EXIST NO LEGISLATIONS OR LAWS EXPLICITLY COVERING

E. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 7TH MARCH, 2023 DOESN’T REGULATE

F. COUNTRIES WHERE SIMILAR SERVICES ARE REGULATED HAVE CLEAR

III. WHETHER THE ED HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FREEZE FUNDS

G. DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO SECTION 17

H. THE ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 17 ARE NOT FULFILLED IN ORDER TO

I. FREEZING FUNDS LEADS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

K. US LAWS WILL REGULATE THE PERSONAL DATA OF THE CLIENTS, SINCE

L. ACCESSING PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS WOULD VIOLATE

S.No FULL FORM

3 AIR All India Report

7 CCPA Central Consumer Protection Authority

10 CPA Consumer Protection Act

13 E-commerce Electronic Commerce

16 IPC Indian Penal Code

21 NGO Non-Governmental organisation

22 NMHP National mental health programme

23 NHRC National Human Rights Commission

Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961, §132 cl (3)..............................................................................XXV

AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27..........................................................XXVIII

THE JURISDICTION OF THIS HON’BLE HIGH COURT HAS BEEN INVOKED

EMERGENCE OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY ENTITIES

CCPL emerged as a trailblazer in Bravia's digital finance sector, offering a diverse

GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES

Governmental organizations including the Financial Intelligence Unit (herein after

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS

RELIEFS SOUGHT AND REMEDIAL MEASURES

WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE

A. ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAVIA GIVES AN AGGRIEVED

B. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE ANY

C. THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY

II. WHETHER THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY CCPL ARE REGULATED

D. THERE EXIST NO LEGISLATIONS OR LAWS EXPLICITLY COVERING

E. THE NOTIFICATION DATED 7TH MARCH, 2023 DOESN’T REGULATE VIRTUAL

F. COUNTRIES WHERE SIMILAR SERVICES ARE REGULATED HAVE CLEAR

G. DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS NOT FOLLOWED ACCORDING TO SECTION 17

49. It is respectfully submitted that power of ED to freeze funds is subjected to some

authorized officer77 must, based on information in their possession, which must be

H. THE ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 17 ARE NOT FULFILLED IN ORDER TO

proceeds of crime. Hence, the funds do not come within the

I. FREEZING FUNDS LEADS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

K. US LAWS WILL REGULATE THE PERSONAL DATA OF THE CLIENTS, SINCE

tokens, thus operating within the parameters set by JAI.

L. ACCESSING PERSONAL DATA OF CCPL’S CLIENTS WOULD VIOLATE THE

ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

PLACE: SUPREME COURT OF BRAVIA