Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235

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Technology in Society
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc

Blocking blockchain: Examining the social, cultural, and institutional

factors causing innovation resistance to digital technology in seafood
supply chains
Benjamin S. Thompson a, *, Sascha Rust b, c
a
School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Victoria, Australia
b
Faculty of Science, Monash University, Victoria, Australia
c
TwoHands (Caromel Ltd), Victoria, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Digital technologies such as blockchain, smart contracts, QR codes, and fintech are forecast to improve the
Blockchain transparency, sustainability, and efficiency of supply-chains in numerous sectors. However, such innovations may
Supply chain face greater resistance and implementation challenges in some sectors more than others. Here, we conduct 24
Disruption
interviews with fishers, aquaculturists, restaurants, and industry experts around existing blockchain applications
Food
Sustainable transformation
seeking to enhance seafood traceability and trackability in Australia. We combine innovation resistance theory,
Digital transformation principal-agent theory, and the theory of planned behaviour to reveal how institutional norms and socio-cultural
dynamics are deterring blockchain adoption. For example, the seafood industry exhibits limited digitization and
automation, and an oligopoly of wholesalers with the power and networks to control the supply chain – against a
backdrop of food fraud claims. Results suggest blockchain could threaten the competitive advantage of wholesalers,
since it would reverse existing asymmetries around trade, price, and provenance information. Furthermore, despite
favouring the decentralisation and information sharing that blockchain provides, other supply chain actors were
hesitant to adopt it through fear of jeopardising relationships with these wholesalers upon which their business
models rely. We assert that blockchain will only drive transformative change if the most influential supply chain
actors see value in using it.

1. Introduction
Digital technologies such as blockchain, smart contracts, and QR
codes are increasingly being developed to improve transparency, trust,
and sustainability in food supply chains [1–9]. In this regard, they have
been framed as innovations that are ‘disruptive’ in a positive sense – as
though these improvements will be viewed as such by all supply chain
actors [10,11]. Yet, digital technologies may face greater resistance from
some actors, and in some sectors, than others. Here, we focus on
blockchain since scholars have recently suggested that some supply
chain actors may be resistant to this technology to maintain competitive
advantages, information confidentiality, and/or undesirable behaviours
[1,2].
The literature on blockchain and food supply chains is dominated by
conceptual commentaries and descriptive reviews that overview certain
applications and developments [3–5,8,12,13]. Methodologically,
Frizzo-Barker et al. [11] found that 83% of published blockchain articles
are entirely conceptual, and only 17% are empirical – of which only 1%
conducted interviews with supply chain actors. As such, Jutel [14]
advocate conducting “interviews and fieldwork with blockchain de­
velopers and participants” – something that we do in this study. Such an
approach is essential since supply chains are complex adaptive systems,
composed of myriad actors, embroiled in an array of social, cultural, and
institutional relations and dynamics [7,15,16]. This highlights a major
knowledge gap in the literature that needs to be addressed: to under­
stand how social, cultural, and institutional factors can lead to the
promotion or resistance of digital technology. This is important because
despite the escalating hype around how blockchain could lead to sus­
tainable transformations in supply chains, the reality is that this will
only occur if the actors within those supply chains see value in adopting
it [17,18]. For example, Dwivedi et al. [19] found retailers in India to be
resisting blockchain due to concerns over data ownership and

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: benjamin.thompson@monash.edu (B.S. Thompson).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102235
Received 1 December 2022; Received in revised form 5 March 2023; Accepted 20 March 2023
Available online 29 March 2023
0160-791X/© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
confidentiality.
Blockchain and related technologies form part of the rapid digital
transformation of industries toward data-centric innovation at the
intersection of the digital and physical worlds commonly categorised as
Industry 4.0 [20]. Significant consideration has been given to the
effective innovation strategies of organisations adopting such technol­
ogies to improve their success [21–23]. In food production, this digital
transformation is often promoted as a panacea to address operational,
social, and environmental challenges [24,25]. However, a singular focus
on the success of innovation adoption ignores potential resistance to
digital innovations, particularly amongst smaller operators [24–27].
This remains important when considering the potential uptake and
scalability of any new technology in a particular industry or supply
chain.
A critical food supply chain – globally, nationally, and locally – is
that of seafood [28,29], which could be wild-caught, or farmed via
aquaculture. The seafood industry is characterised by competition [30],
undesirable behaviours such as mislabelling [31,32], and “scepticism
around the trustworthiness of competitors and trading partners” [33].
Blockchain applications within seafood supply chains targeting im­
provements to traceability and ethical behaviour are broadly accepted
and have been thoroughly discussed at a global policy level [34] and
within media. While organisations such as IBM Food Trust, Fish Coin,
Two Hands and the WWF-Australia/BCG Digital Ventures collaboration
OpenSc have made attempts to achieve broad scale implementation,
commercial traction to the market remains limited. In this regard, the
seafood industry represents an excellent unit of focus to explore these
factors which could be contributing to innovation resistance and
creating implementation challenges for digital technology developers.
Additionally, in a recent review of 171 publications on blockchain and
food supply chains by Niknejad et al. [35]; the authors noted that none
of the ‘key influential articles’ focused on seafood – representing a clear
thematic gap. That said, a more recent contribution from Tsolakis et al.
[9] has identified issues in implementing blockchain in the Thai seafood
industry, but did not focus on social, cultural, and institutional factors.
These factors, as we will argue, are far more nuanced than oft-reported
technical factors such as interoperability and a lack of technological
knowhow [36].
This article aims to understand the social, cultural, and institutional
factors that create innovation resistance towards digital technology in
seafood supply chains. We focus on the seafood industry in Australia,
particularly actors operating in Victoria and New South Wales that are
using, or considering using, new digital technology platforms. This
setting was chosen due to the Australian context being relatively
favourable to concepts of sustainability, and the opportunity of existing
end-to-end blockchain platforms currently operating within what is a
centralised multi-actor seafood market lacking in innovative digital
infrastructure. We contribute to the literature through a novel
combination of innovation resistance theory, principal-agent theory,
and the theory of planned behaviour (Section 2) that reveals how
institutional norms and socio-cultural dynamics can deter blockchain
adoption.
2. Theoretical framework
This article primarily draws on innovation resistance theory [37],
plus two related theories that help explain pre-existing behavioural
norms and social dynamics within traditional seafood supply chains: the
theory of planned behaviour [38], and principal-agent theory [39].
2.1. Innovation resistance theory
Innovation resistance theory regards the behaviours of individuals
and organisations that inhibit the adoption or uptake of an innovation,
in order to maintain the status quo [2,37,40]. Innovation resistance is
most often split into passive and active forms. Passive innovation
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Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
resistance is being averse to change in general due to a deep satisfaction
with the status quo – and is independent of any specific innovation that
may emerge [41]. Active innovation resistance is the negative evalua­
tion of a specific innovation based on ones pre-existing attitudes, be­
haviours, intentions, or perceptions [37]. Active innovation resistance is
typically split into two subcategories: functional resistance and psycho­
logical resistance [40]. These are further spilt into subcategories,
although the categorization and terminology of these can differ between
scholars. The most widely used categorization is that initially proposed
by Ram & Sheth [37] – and that is used here.
Ram & Sheth [37] divide functional resistance into three categories:
usage barriers, value barriers, and risk barriers. Usage barriers occur
when an innovation is perceived to be difficult to understand or use; for
example, Kuisma et al. [42] identified that usage barriers were respon­
sible for resistance of Internet banking in Finland because of technical
illiteracy with computers compared to using ATMs. Value barriers occur
when it cannot easily be forseen how an innovation will lead to a
significant improvement compared to existing practices; for instance, for
instance, Sadiq et al. [43] identified that value barriers were responsible
for resistance towards eco-friendly cosmetics in India because such
products are not perceived to be of higher quality than conventional
products. Risk barriers occur due to uncertainty that an innovation may
be unsecure, unreliable, or perform unsatisfactorily; for example, Kaur
et al. [44] identified that risk barriers were responsible for resistance of
mobile phone payments by Indian consumers over concerns around
privacy and money theft.
Ram & Sheth [37] divide psychological resistance into two cate­
gories: tradition barriers and image barriers. Tradition barriers occur
when an innovation is not compatible with pre-existing traditions or
routines practiced by a particular group of actors; for instance, Ma & Lee
[45] identified that tradition barriers were responsible for resistance of
Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) in China because Chinese stu­
dents are used to having content ‘spoon fed’ to them by lecturers,
whereas MOOCs require self-directed active learning. Image barriers
occur when the innovation has an unfavorable impression within a
society such as being associated with negative stereotypes; for example,
Oktavianus et al. [46] identified that image barriers were responsible for
resistance of the augmented reality game, Pokémon Go, in Taiwan over
widespread concerns that players became too addicted and so distracted
that they were disregarding their own safety and that of others.
Friedman & Ormiston [2] argue that the hype around blockchain as a
solution for sustainability and transparency in food supply chains is
“unrealistic” because it ignores types of active innovation resistance that
will need to be overcome. Although these authors do not focus on a
specific supply chain, they advocate the type of study that we seek to
provide here. Innovation resistance theory is central to the current study
because it helped in framing interview questions with supply chain
actors, and in evaluating the empirical data to determine how the uptake
of digital technology may be being resisted in the seafood industries of
Victoria and New South Wales, by which actors, and why.
2.2. Theory of planned behaviour
The theory of planned behaviour is a psychological theory that links
beliefs to behaviour [38]. It maintains that three components together
shape a subject’s ‘behavioural intentions’ (the possibility that the sub­
ject can and/or will perform a given behaviour): attitudes, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioural control [38,47]. Attitudes reflect the
subject’s positive or negative expectations regarding the outcomes of a
particular behaviour; for example, a traveller’s positive expectations
towards a vacation destination can be decisive in them deciding to visit
[48]. Subjective norms regard the degree to which others believe the
subject should (or should not) use an innovation; for instance, apartment
owners in Kuala Lumpur took up waste separation practices through fear
of social exclusion from friends and family if they did not conform to
what is widely deemed to be good sustainable practice [49]. Perceived
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
behavioural control refers to a subject’s degree of control over per­
forming, and their prior experience of performing, a particular behav­
iour; for example, farmers in Ireland adopted new nutrient management
plans primarily because they were confident enough and given auton­
omy to administer one [50].
Queiroz & Wamba [7] note insufficient research on blockchain
adoption behaviour at the individual supply chain level. While these
authors use a quantitative methodology that partly incorporates the
theory of planned behaviour, we use a qualitative methodology and
apply this theory specifically to explain why certain actors in the seafood
supply chain may behave a certain way at present (i.e., based on the
pre-existing culture), and why they may or may not wish to behave
differently in the future; for example, in deciding whether to use digital
technologies based on their perceived expectations of such platforms,
how doing so might be viewed by others, and their ability to use them
and manage any potential consequences.
2.3. Principal-agent theory
Principal-agent theory regards the relationship between actors when
one delegates decision-making authority to the other [39]. In this re­
gard, the principal is someone who delegates, and the agent is someone
to whom authority is delegated. It is often used to explain the problem
that occurs when agents are motivated to act in their own best interests,
in a manner that could negatively impact the principal [51]. This
motivation typically occurs because of what is termed ‘information
asymmetry’ – when an agent has more information than a principal,
meaning the latter cannot ensure the former is being completely truth­
ful. For example, principal-agent theory has been used to show that
landlords (agents) don’t make expensive energy-efficient retrofits to
their properties (e.g., insulation) because tenants (principals) do not
know the energy performance of the property and are unwilling to pay
higher rents; yet, this is inefficient as tenants will pay higher electricity
bills while the property will have a higher climate change impact [52].
Having more information can mean the agent develops greater power
and influence over the principal or principals. While this situation is
most discussed, the reverse is also theoretically possible, i.e., for the
principal to acquire more information than the agent and subsequently
start acting in their best interests, rather than those of their agent.
While Tsolakis et al. [9] use principal-agent theory to interpret
structural and management changes in seafood supply chains as a result
of digital technologies, we use the theory to help explain innovation
resistance. Principal-agent theory is important to this study because it
helps explain pre-existing social dynamics, actor relations, and potential
discontentment held by some actors towards others within the seafood
supply chain. As will be shown, in helping address pre-existing infor­
mation asymmetries, digital technology could instigate a shift in the
principal-agent problem, from one where agents are able to act in their
self-interest, to one where principals are able to act in their self-interest.
3. Methods and study context
The research used an inductive methodology [53], which involved
synthesising interview data across different groups of respondents, and
linking these to the theories explained in Section 2. Details on the data
collection and analysis follows an overview of the study context.
3.1. Study location and context
3.1.1. Australian seafood industry: status and issues
The geographical area of focus is the seafood industry of the State of
Victoria, Australia, although this supply chain extends to other states –
particularly neighbouring New South Wales (NSW) – and internation­
ally. The seafood industry in Victoria is small by global standards but
remains significant in Australia. Annually, around 18,000 tons of sea­
food (aquaculture and wild capture) is harvested and produced, across
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Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
at least 67 species [54]. The State’s 589 wild-capture and 104 aqua­
culture licenses contribute more than $323 million to the Victorian
economy [54]. Structurally, the seafood supply chain in Victoria is
characterised by numerous intermediaries or ‘middle people’ that sit
between those who fish and farm seafood, and end consumers (Fig. 1).
Some intermediaries such as Logistics Agents, Market Agents, and Sec­
ondary Wholesalers/Processors provide physical services to the supply
chain such as transport, transactions, and inventory. Others, such as
Quota Owners, Seafood Corporations, and Digital Technology Platforms
provide relatively passive roles such as financing and administrative
services.
Trade between actors within this supply chain exhibits a strong
reliance on paper-based chain-of-custody processes, which leave open
opportunities for food fraud (defined as the negligent or intentional
mislabelling of product). While studies of food fraud in the global fish­
eries sector range widely between 20% and 50%, and as high as 90% for
some items [34,55], there is limited review of the Australian context
beyond McLeod [56] suggesting a cost to exporters of $189 M annually.
Lobbying by environmental and industry groups over seafood ‘country
of origin labelling’ (CoOL) laws is ongoing [57]. There is broad agree­
ment amongst environmentalists and seafood industry proponents that
CoOL laws protect the value of Australian seafood against imported
product and thus improve traceability. Yet, progress remains stalled due
to cost-benefit analysis of the high cost of implementation within the
foodservice sector [58,59]. Under current requirements, products pro­
duced for immediate consumption (i.e., in restaurants or food vendors)
remain exempt from providing point of origin information to consumers,
while supermarkets must comply. Significantly, while a naming stan­
dard exists for seafood species (under Australian Standard 5300–2015)
there is no mandatory requirement for it to be applied, allowing species
to be marketed under multiple commonly used names. Relatedly, some
surveys have suggested that 90% of Victorians favour Victorian and
Australian seafood, despite 60% of that which is consumed in Victoria
being imported [60,61].
The inconsistency in naming conventions, and loss of chain-of-
custody information through the supply chain can limit the decision-
making power of consumers seeking particular value, quality, or sus­
tainability characteristics – while enabling the trade and substitution of
at-risk species [62]. Knowledge platforms have been developed in order
to assist consumers in making seafood choices, such as the
advocacy-group-led GoodFish: Australia’s Sustainable Seafood Guide.
However different methodologies behind these assessments mean they
can present countering representations of the sustainability of species.
3.1.2. Emergence of digital technology platforms
The above issues illustrate that consumers would benefit from solu­
tions that can improve traceability and promote local sustainable sea­
food. Indeed, several digital technology platforms have been developed
in Australia to improve transparency in the trade of seafood. Some of
these involve blockchain, whereby ‘blocks’ of data are electronically
stored immutably along a ‘chain’, by verifying the new data with pre-
existing data in the chain. Blockchain can be used to track seafood as
it passes along supply chains; with customers able to scan a QR code on
the packaging and receive verified information about the product, and
its journey from its point of capture at sea to the supermarket shelf or
restaurant plate. Blockchain could in theory be utilized by all actors
within the supply chain, but could also – coupled with new logistical
arrangements – enable seafood to be traded more directly. For example,
some actors in Australia use permissioned blockchain platforms with
consensus mechanisms based on Proof-of-Reputation [63]. These plat­
forms broadly seek to disrupt tightly held power dynamics in order to
achieve more egalitarian outcomes for supply chain actors, and capture
trade volume through automated mechanisms.
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
Fig. 1. The typical structure of trading relationships in the seafood sector in Victoria. These actors all stand to benefit from the sale of seafood and hold a level of
responsibility for its chain of custody. Many digital technology platforms seek to capture data at point of harvest, and at each subsequent point of custody change, to
ensure products are verifiable to the end consumer. Some seek direct trade models between fisher and end consumer, minimising changes in product ownership to
achieve greater certainty.
3.2. Data collection and analysis
Some 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Purposive
sampling was used whereby respondents were selected that were most
able to speak to the aim of the study; for example, those who were
currently using the new digital technology platforms, and those that had
knowledge of such platforms and longstanding experience operating in
the seafood industry. Respondents were identified and targeted through
existing contacts, cold and warm calling, and snowball sampling. Re­
spondents included fishers, representatives from aquaculture companies
such as those that held positions in sales, marketing, and operations,
restaurant owners and/or head chefs, and key figures in the seafood
industry such as those representing advocacy groups, governing
agencies, and affiliates of wholesalers.1 Data collection coincided with
covid-related lockdowns in Australia meaning interviews were con­
ducted through Zoom or the telephone. Interviews lasted 40–80 min and
were audio-recorded and transcribed manually. All respondents were
assured of their anonymity; and indeed, given the sensitivity of the topic,
respondent details are necessarily vague throughout this article
(Table 1).
Interview questions drew on the study’s theoretical underpinning
(Section 2) and geographical context (Section 3.1). Interview topics
1
The term ‘wholesaler’ is used throughout this article to refer to processors,
distributors, seafood centres, and seafood markets – terms that respondents
used but all of which mean the same oligopoly of entities in the seafood supply
chains of Victoria and New South Wales.
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Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
covered (i) observations, opinions, and experiences of the culture of the
seafood industry and the actors within it; (ii) traditional means of
trading seafood, with a focus on pricing, provenance, and competition;
and (iii) social and institutional factors that contributed to deciding
whether to start using new digital technology platforms. Thematic
content analysis was performed in the online qualitative data package,
Dedoose, whereby key quotes from each transcribed interview under­
went open and selective manual coding based on a range of (sub)topics
[53]. Primary code topics were largely informed by the theories (e.g.,
barriers/challenges, attitudes/motivations, traditions/norms). Sub­
topics were selected based on common words and terms used during the
interviews (e.g., food fraud, price, trust, level of information, whole­
saler). The coding process meant the data could then be reorganized
according to these topics, enabling identification of generalisable trends
in terms of the sentiments that respondents shared on each topic.
4. Results
This section covers the key findings from the interviews. The first
subsection outlines respondents’ current perspectives and experiences of
the seafood industry in Victoria and New South Wales. It provides in­
sights on the institutional norms of the industry, which sets the scene in
helping explain the limited uptake of digital technology. The subsequent
subsections then focus on specific aspects of this. The second subsection
highlights how information confidentiality is high amid rife competi­
tion. The third and fourth subsections scrutinise perceptions on price
and provenance information, respectively. The fifth subsection reveals
the power relations that exist in the industry, and the concentration of
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
Table 1
Respondent information.
Respondent Description Number Codes
type
Restaurants Owners and/or head chefs of restaurants 12 R1-
currently using one or more digital R12
technology platform(s) to source seafood.
Restaurants range in capacity from 14 to
180 patrons. Many respondents had
worked in multiple restaurants of varying
sizes, cuisines, and philosophies and were
able to speak across the food industry.
Fishers Fishers currently using one or more digital 3 F1–F3
technology platform(s) to sell a portion of
their catch. Two fishers operate out of
Corner Inlet, a multi-species fishery in
Gippsland, Victoria. One specialised in
collecting a specific species from Port
Philip Bay, adjacent to Melbourne, in
Victoria.
Aquaculturists Managers involved in the marketing, sales, 3 A1-A3
and operations of some major aquaculture
companies with farms based in Australia
and New Zealand. All are currently using
one or more digital technology platform(s)
to sell a portion of their harvest. The
farmed species are: oysters, salmon, and
seabass (known as barramundi in
Australia).
Industry These respondents hold managerial 6 I1–I6
experts positions with either marine conservation
advocacy groups, seafood industry
advocacy groups, state agencies
responsible for governing fisheries
management, seafood consultancies, and
digital technology developers, most with
strong affiliations to some major
wholesalers. All based in Victoria or NSW.
that power with wholesalers.
4.1. Behavioural norms and social dynamics in the seafood industry
Findings suggest the seafood industry is particularly resistant to
digitalization and automation. The sales representative for a major
aquaculture company noted, “It is the truth that seafood is quite a
backward industry. There’s very little digitalization, there’s very little
traceability” (A2). Another remarked, “The industry seems to be quite
behind. We are traditionally stuck with the same distributors, stuck with
the same model that they [wholesalers] wanted” (A3). An industry
representative stated, “There is a massive uphill battle to transition the
existing industry out of the current manual transaction system” (I6).
This respondent identified that this was largely because traders at the
major seafood wholesalers “love the hustle and bustle of an auction …
it’s the culture of the industry … they still rely on that interpersonal
direct engagement” (I6). This highlights how the long-standing culture
of interpersonal and transactional practices among actors in the seafood
supply chain are misaligned with digital technology that can reduce the
need for physical interactions between traders. Importantly, while these
cultural norms could be recognised as merely an effort to preserve long-
standing traditions (related to passive innovation resistance), re­
spondents asserted that there were strong ulterior motives for main­
taining these – as the next subsections reveal.
4.2. Trade information: A culture of confidentiality and high competition
A major motive for wholesalers to resist innovation is to maintain
their competitive advantage through information confidentiality. One
fisherman noted that wholesalers are “pretty quiet on where [the catch]
ends up … they don’t tell you who they sell the fish to” (F1). This was
corroborated by another fisher, “we lose control of the supply chain once
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Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
they head off to the [wholesalers]. We’ve got no idea where they go
[afterwards] or anything like that.” (F2). The aquaculture sales repre­
sentative agreed, “It’s almost impossible to keep track of any of it” (A3).
Indeed, it was clear that most wholesalers were against information
sharing, as this anecdote testifies, “I sat there with the entire board of [a
major wholesaler] … I showed them through [a digital technology]
platform … And [one of them] said, ‘This is great, completely trans­
parent, but we don’t want our consumers to know that information’"
(I5).
Confidentiality was important to prevent wholesalers being bypassed
by fishers, aquaculturists, and other market entrants selling direct to
restaurants, as this quote demonstrates, “They don’t want to give us all
the information on their restaurants [customers] because they are scared
that a third party could also pass that sensitive information onto their
competitors – there’s not a lot of trust in this industry” (A3). This was
corroborated by another aquaculture respondent who said, “the reason
why there isn’t transparency is not just because of the lack of digitiza­
tion, it’s also the fear that we as a producer will go and steal their
customer from them by going direct” (A2). An industry representative
agreed that wholesalers could be disadvantaged, “It would be seen
negatively by them – increasing that transparency. If they’re competing
against someone else, and someone else doesn’t know where [the fish]
go or how much they’re taking [in commission], [blockchain] might be
a mechanism that’s actually detrimental to them in that information
space” (I3). Indeed, through using such a platform, an aquaculturist
admitted, “we would be targeting their end-user customers at a cheaper
price point”. Certainly, from a business perspective, it is understandable
that wholesalers are concerned, having established and maintained re­
lationships between those at the start and end of the seafood supply
chain over many decades.
4.3. Price information: A culture of price takers, price payers, and paper
cash
Another motive regards the control that wholesalers can exert over
prices in the market. One restaurant owner exclaimed that the seafood
market is “dominated by the three or four main fishmongers [whole­
salers], and they seem to have monopoly over the industry, and deter­
mining the price of [seafood]” (R9). A fisher bemoaned, “People are
getting sick of the old, send them to the market, and get the price back,
and settle for the price … When you’re selling all your fish to the
[wholesalers] you’re a price taker, you’re not a price maker, and that’s
the biggest issue” (F1). They recalled several anecdotes of misinforma­
tion around pricing, in this case referring to a species called King George
whiting, “there’s certainly been times when [contacts] that I know have
been in the market, and we’ve been told [by wholesalers] that whiting is
[selling at] $16. Yet, [those contacts] bought whiting on the same
morning for $18” (F1). Another fisher explained that wholesalers only
pay the fishers for what they can sell, meaning that, “if no one buys it,
they don’t cop it [suffer] – I cop it or the fisherman cops it [suffers]”
(F3). In this way, the current system protects wholesalers from losses,
with this risk residing with the fishers.
There is clearly resentment towards wholesalers around untrans­
parent and untrustworthy price information. Even some of the larger
aquaculture firms acknowledged this feeling as evidenced by this quote,
“the large seafood processors would [be] very predatory about ‘you have
to buy yourself into the market’, and invoice charges and claims [were
awkward] because you didn’t really have the resource to go and double
check [sales prices]” (A1). Industry representatives were also aware of
this clarifying that, “[wholesalers] will change the price of something
depending on how they feel and how well they know that person [they
are selling it to]” (I4), and that “the margin those guys [wholesalers] are
making is large – they’re squeezing the fishers” (I5). Another claimed it
was difficult for wholesalers to justify this rate of commission: “It’s not
uncommon for a wholesaler to take between 17% and 25% margin [for]
effectively just counting pallets and administrating an account … I am
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
not denying anyone to make a money, [I’m] just saying they are actually
not adding value to the transaction … The relevance of their service
provision is getting less and less” (I6). One aspect where the value is
captured, at least partly, is around processing. However, these actions (i.
e., gutting, scaling, filleting) can exacerbate other issues related to food
fraud discussed below (Section 4.3); for example, a respondent
remarked, “the problem with seafood is with traceability is once it’s
filleted … it’s almost impossible to trace.” (A2).
Finally, and linking back to the transactional nature of the seafood
industry, one well-connected respondent alluded to how this system
create opportunities for unethical financial practices. Speaking of their
interactions with several wholesalers, they revealed, “I’ve opened the
books of [some of] them … Cash is being pulled off the table. This in­
dustry is still paper cash. It’s massively corrupt” (I5). Thus, while a
discussion around the ethics of this possibility are beyond the scope of
this article, this is ultimately another possible motivation that could be
driving resistance against digitization and financial information sharing
in the sector.
4.4. Provenance information: A culture lacking transparency
Another motive for innovation resistance was the perceived culture
of food fraud in the seafood industry, supported by recent studies around
the world (e.g., Ref. [32]). While Australian fisheries are widely regar­
ded as being among the most sustainably managed in the world, the
interviews yielded many anecdotes and concerns that, for example,
imported species were being passed-off as being Australian, and that
wild caught species were being passed-off as being farmed. Importantly,
a respondent from the Victorian Fisheries Authority (VFA) explained,
“We’re interested in the management and sustainability of the fishery by
the people that are legally entitled to take the public resource. We’re
then interested in the first transaction process, and if there are additional
transactions after that, then that’s no longer a VFA matter” (I2, emphasis
added). This is reasonable since VFA are first-and-foremost concerned
with the sustainability and regulation of fishing practices. Yet, it alludes
to a regulatory gap in the supply chain. Indeed, there is extremely little
data reported in the scientific literature on food fraud in these fisheries,
but again the interview data suggests that this issue is significantly
contributing to the reluctance of wholesalers to adopt digital technology
and embrace the information transparency that it offers, as the following
paragraphs elucidate.
Traceability was regarded by most in the industry as “very low” (I1).
Mislabelling was viewed as a “fairly significant issue, that has never
been a strong category” (I6). In particular, respondents noted a reluc­
tance by wholesalers to proactively reveal the provenance of much of the
seafood that passes through them. One chef regularly asked wholesalers
for details but conceded, “it makes me feel a bit uncomfortable …
sometimes they don’t know, and it comes across that you’re trying to
show them up or second guess them and it gets a bit awkward” (R6). A
restaurant owner had had similar experiences, “I would speak to the reps
[at the wholesalers] quite regularly, trying to find out where the fish
would be from. And it often baffled me how they wouldn’t really care
too much for that sort of information … They [also] dismissed that
[some of] these animals are endangered” (R9). This latter point was
supported by this comment from an industry advocate, “A lot of the
seafood that they are sourcing does happen to be on the [GoodFish] red
list” (I4).
More evidence comes from the fact that some fishers and chefs were
able to identify fraud through their observations and knowledge of the
species and fishing methods. One fisher explained, “There is no doubt in
my mind … there’s a couple of fish markets that I follow on social media,
and they’ve got, oh, King George whiting at a price. And I’ve looked at
them, and I know that they’re not King George whiting that have come
from Corner Inlet [his nearshore fishing grounds]. I can see the noses are
all red, some of the scales are bumped off … but they say, ‘Corner Inlet
whiting’ but they’re not, they’ve been caught far offshore by a trawler”
6
Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
(F1). Regarding differences between wild and farm-reared seafood, one
restaurant owner remarked, “I rely on my own ability to tell the dif­
ference if they do send in a farmed one and just claim it as a wild one … I
look at flesh colour … the snouts … scratches and damaging from being
in closed confines [in an aquaculture pond/pen]” (R11). Another
restaurant owner (R8) said “I do my research” and explained that they
have seen fish labelled as ‘local’ when they’re out of season in Victorian
waters, or when they are not even a cold-water fish, acknowledging
these as “outrageous claims” that are “flabbergasting”. Another said,
“There have been multiple occasions where we’ve been very aware that
fisherman haven’t been going [out to sea] because of the weather, but
somehow, they still have some of their fish in the [wholesale markets]”
(R9).
Aquaculturists were also concerned about this issue. A representative
from a barramundi farm explained, “A huge issue we face is substitution
and it honestly really frustrates and upsets me because you do all this
work and your barramundi is happily substituted … by our wholesale
customers. There’s certain wholesalers we wouldn’t work with; you
know there’s fresh barramundi that’s brought in from overseas and …
there is a saying that, ‘as soon as it hits the market floor, it’s all
Australian’” (A2). The same respondent spoke of their partnership with
the provenance verification organisation Source Certain who “do a
chemical analysis on the fish and they can tell you from which pond it
came from, let alone which farm … and they can tell us the level of
substitution and the level we got on our first test was 23% … Now that’s
a horrendous number [i.e., 23% of barramundi was labelled as ours
when it was not ours]” (A2). Combined, these observations and abilities
of other actors in the supply chain, and their accounts herein, certainly
suggest that some fraudulent behaviour is occurring in at least some of
the wholesalers in this industry.
4.5. The power of wholesalers creates apprehension among other actors
A strong theme of the interviews was the feeling that wholesalers
held considerable power and influence over other actors in the seafood
supply chain – something common across many food supply chains (e.g.,
Ref. [16]). An industry respondent advocating for greater transparency
and sustainability in Australian seafood noted that, “we do work with
fishers, but there’s that massive gap in the middle [the wholesalers] and
that’s such a crucial gap and they have so much power” (I4). Indeed,
some respondents gave damning verdicts on the extent of this power,
citing experiences of “bullying, cajoling, and threatening” (I6), “cartel
behaviour” (I5), and a need to be “very careful” when dealing with them
(A3). Furthermore, one restaurant owner lamented, “there’s a little bit of
mafia element within the fish world … The reason why they’re doing
what they’re doing is because they’ve been in the industry a long time
and they’ve got connections” (R5). This situation creates apprehension
among fishers, aquaculturists, and restaurants when considering
whether to start trading fish through digital technology platforms, either
instead of, or in addition to, trading through wholesalers. One aqua­
culturists exclaimed that if they did use a new blockchain platform,
“there would a backlash straight away for us, and some very challenging
conversations around that. I know that these guys [wholesalers], right or
wrong, can hold me to ransom. If they don’t buy my fish, we don’t have
ability to send [high volumes] to anyone else” (A3). Indeed, this
apprehension could create innovation resistance among these other
actors in the seafood industry – beyond, but ultimately because of,
wholesalers.
The final part of the prior quote signals the reliance on wholesalers
from those positioned at the start and end of the supply chain given their
business models. This reliance boils down to needing to sell volume, and
needing guaranteed availability to uphold restaurant menus, as these
quotes testify.
• “We know that at the end of the day, the [wholesalers] sell our fish
every single time” (F1)
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
• “They can move a lot of volume … it’s pretty reliable” (F3)
• “In terms of sales, yes, we need the wholesalers” (A1)
• “They’re our safety net and they make up the bulk of what we’re able
to get when we need it” (R4)
• “You always need that backup … chefs need security of getting the
produce” (R5)
An industry representative summarised the present situation, “Most
of the seafood wholesalers still live in the palaeolithic age. They haven’t
got a clue. They’ve been abusing the fact that they have a little black
book of contacts, be they catchers or customers, tight to their chest as a
means by which to manage and manipulate the market for way too long”
(I6).
5. Discussion
5.1. Theoretical contributions
Our results fulfil calls to scrutinise the full spectrum of social actors
engaged in innovation resistance, beyond end consumers [41,64]. The
findings demonstrate that for wholesalers, blockchain is incompatible
with their longstanding internal practices and ways of doing, involving
face-to-face trade, paper cash transactions, and large pre-existing net­
works (Section 4.1). Based on innovation resistance theory, this
constitutes a tradition barrier (Fig. 2). Sentiments and anecdotes shared
Fig. 2. Synthesis of the main results highlighting how the three theories have been combined to explain them: Innovation resistance theory (purple text and wide-
dashed lines); Theory of planned behaviour (pink text and dotted lines); Principal-agent theory (teal text and narrow-dashed lines).
7
Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
by respondents also inferred that digital technology may create limited
value for wholesalers, reducing their control over information (Section
4.2), exposing price asymmetries and high commissions (Section 4.3),
and opaque seafood labelling practices (Section 4.4) – constituting a
value barrier (Fig. 2). Besides this, the extent to which usage barriers, risk
barriers, and image barriers exist will vary between individual whole­
salers due to their differing technological literacies, risk tolerances, and
general perceptions of blockchain, respectively. However, it is
conceivable based on the evidence above, that tradition barriers and
value barriers are likely to apply to most wholesalers in the seafood
industry.
Conversely, fishers, aquaculturists, and restaurateurs appear to face
minimal innovation resistance. For example, respondents explained that
the innovations in question are compatible with their pre-existing in­
ternal practices – those related to their fishing operations, aquaculture
farms, and restaurant management – meaning minimal tradition barriers.
For example, fishers spoke of vessel monitoring systems and electronic
logbooks, consistent with standard technologies used in most developed
world fisheries [30]. None of these actors alluded to any image barriers
regarding blockchain as a technology, either. Two types of functional
barriers are also unlikely among these actors since these blockchain
platforms (i) are expected to improve performance in the supply chain e.
g., through overcoming opaque pricing (i.e., few value barriers), (ii) are
reasonably easy to understand and use (i.e., few usage barriers). One main
risk barrier was identified, mainly around concerns that blockchain
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
platforms may not be able to guarantee the sales volumes (fishers and
aquaculturists) and species preferences (restaurants) upon which they
rely (Fig. 2). Hence, we contribute to the literature by revealing how the
root cause of innovation resistance on the part of these actors, is more
subtle than – and arguably beyond – what innovation resistance theory
can explain.
This is why it is critical to scrutinise the social dynamics and culture
of the seafood industry through the theory of planned behaviour.
Aligning the empirics with this theory initially corroborates the findings
in the paragraph above; namely, that fishers, aquaculturists, and res­
taurateurs would have positive attitudes on digital technology, and
optimistic expectations regarding the supply chain improvements it
could deliver. However, some reasons for innovation resistance stem
from subjective norms, i.e., the degree to which others within the supply
chain believe that fishers, aquaculturists, and restaurateurs should use a
digital technology innovation. In this case, these ‘others’ are the
wholesalers who wield considerable sway over these actors. Evidence
suggests that wholesalers could pressure them to not use such technol­
ogy through fear of losing the wholesaler’s guaranteed sales volumes
and species availability, upon which they rely (Section 4.5). While re­
spondents conveyed a high level of perceived behavioural control over
deciding whether to join a blockchain platform – since its use was not, or
did not seem, overly difficult to them – this degree of control is ulti­
mately weakened by the risk of jeopardising relationships with whole­
salers (Fig. 2). These are highly nuanced and complex social dynamics
and actor relations that reveal seldom-reported reasons why digital
technology could be resisted, with wholesalers essentially trying to
block other supply chain actors from using blockchain to serve their own
means, such as controlling prices so that they can take a hefty com­
mission, or enabling the accidental or deliberate mislabelling of seafood
species and their origin.
This then leads into a discussion on principal-agent theory. In the
context of Section 4.3, the principals in this scenario are the fishers and
aquaculturists (price takers) and restaurants (price payers), while the
agents are the wholesalers (price makers). Since the former actors are
seldom present in the wholesale markets to check prices, and since they
seldom know who their seafood comes from, or goes to, they are at a
major informational disadvantage. Restaurants seldom know how much
wholesalers paid for the catch or farmed fish, while fishers and aqua­
culturists seldom know how much restaurants paid for it. However, the
anecdotes shared through the interviews demonstrate that through so­
cial media and the occasional presence of contacts in the market, these
actors consider the prices to be unfair, untransparent, and uncertain –
given the dynamics of supply and demand. Friedman & Ormiston [2]
heard of similar cases of exploitation by “unscrupulous middlemen” in
their study with food supply chain experts. The same is true in the
context of Section 4.4, with restaurants unsure whether the species, its
origin, and its sustainability credentials are truthfully conveyed, and
with fishers and aquaculturists unsure whether produce that is not theirs
is being passed off as coming from their reputable fishing grounds or
farm. It is in this context that Friedman & Ormiston [2] report digital
technologies such as blockchain as being a “lie detector” against po­
tential fraudulent behaviour. These information asymmetries ensure
that wholesalers maintain control of, and profit the most from, the
seafood supply chain. Their competitive advantage is maintained
through harnessing more information than the fishers, aquaculturists,
and restaurateurs that make up their agent-base (Fig. 2).
Digital technology, however, could rapidly reverse this situation.
Wholesalers are understandably protective of their suppliers and buyers
so that each is unable to trade directly with the other (Section 4.2). Were
wholesalers to use digital technology such as a permissionless block­
chain, this would mean that trade information either became public, or
in the case of a permissioned blockchain, became known to those that
were permitted to use the same platform (i.e., other fishers, aquacul­
turists, restaurants, and indeed, other wholesalers, in the sector). This
disclosure would mean that agents now had the same amount of
8
Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
information on trade data (volumes, prices), and verified product data
(species, origin, freshness), and indeed knowledge of who is providing/
buying their seafood products. It either (1) allows agents to act in their
self-interest by bypassing wholesalers altogether, or (2) means that
wholesalers will be unable to conceal such trade and product informa­
tion, potentially reducing their commissions and revenues (and reducing
the potential to substitute cheaper products for more expensive ones).
This resonates with Koshy et al. [16]; who argue that digital technolo­
gies reorganise not just food supply chains, “but also the agency of actors
within these chains and relationships between them”.
Actors have different traceability needs and face different challenges
based on where they are in the supply chain [30]. Frizzo-Barker et al.
[11] state that, “disruptive technologies, like the Internet, are rarely
‘positive’ or ‘negative,’ but productive of and produced in contexts of
social change”. While this may be true in a very general sense, we argue
that the disruption will almost always be viewed positively or negatively
by certain actors within a social or economic system such as a seafood
supply chain. Wholesalers do not want their longstanding practices to be
disrupted – not in a passive or general sense, but because specific digital
technology innovations threaten their ways of doing that maintain their
competitive advantage. Yet, while it may be economically rational for
wholesalers to resist digital technology, most other actors in this supply
chain want to see longstanding “backward” (A2) practices disrupted, for
the good of businesses and entrepreneurs at the start and end of the
supply chain, and for the marine environment more broadly.
5.2. Practical considerations
Kshetri [65] state that in practice, actors “can exert normative
pressures on other supply chain members to influence their blockchain
adoption”. However, our results suggest that this would be optimistic
when those ‘other members’ wish to resist such innovation and simul­
taneously hold greater influence than anyone else in the supply chain.
We also show that while it is true that “due to the requirement of high
degree of computerization, not all countries are ready to participate in
blockchain-based solutions” [65], this is also true of entire industries,
including those situated in developed countries.
Although Friedman & Ormiston [2] argue that egalitarian access to
trade and product data can lead to fairer supply chains, Behnke &
Janssen [1] caution that scrutiny of the appropriate level of information
sharing is needed to ensure the competitive power of some actors is not
undermined. Based on the current study, we argue that it is optimistic to
expect that the “level of detail of traceability should be agreeable to all
actors in the chain” [1]. Increasing competition by decreasing infor­
mation asymmetries will inevitably reduce the competitiveness of the
dominant actors in markets that wish to maintain a culture of infor­
mation confidentiality. We argue that those levels of detail need not be
agreeable to all, and that those that pursue a path of information de­
centralisation should be protected through laws related to fair compe­
tition, such as Australia’s Competition and Consumer Act 2010, which
governs how all businesses in Australia must deal with their customers,
competitors, and suppliers. Yet, in the highly networked and interper­
sonal world of seafood trading, this could be easier said than done.
It is conceivable that a platform could be developed for wholesalers
to use digital technology innovations in ways that maintain their
competitive edge, whilst strengthening their provenance credentials and
potentially making their pricing more transparent. Indeed, it could be
argued that such uptake of digital technology could lead wholesalers to
be viewed as industry leaders, improving their consumer’s confidence,
and potentially granting them a new competitive edge. One way to do
this could be for all buyers and suppliers (including wholesalers) to
remain anonymous on a permissioned blockchain [1]; although, while
theoretically and technically possible, we caution whether intentional
anonymity can be trusted. Indeed, such an option could create a false
impression of trust. On this point, Kshetri [65] state that “it is important
for [digital technology] organisations to understand the problem[s] they
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust
want to solve” – be that inter alia an oligopolistic market, and/or an
untransparent supply chain in terms of pricing, provenance, and/or
environmental behaviour. It is possible that some platforms may merely
be interested in data accumulation and transfer to help digitise the
seafood industry and reduce transaction costs. While digitization can
also help improve transparency and trust, some developers may be
motivated to go beyond this to explicate accountability, build direct
communication between actors, making the supply chain more collab­
orative. Indeed, as Frizzo-Barker et al. [11] state, “scholars of technol­
ogy and society have shown that innovations do not consist solely of new
technical devices, but also of new social and organizational
arrangements”.
Digital platforms do not necessarily need to, nor always seek to,
remove wholesalers or other intermediaries from the supply chain to
achieve their goals. For example, some platforms could work with
wholesalers to digitise paper-based and auction-floor transactional
processes, whilst maintaining or increasing current levels of participa­
tion and collaboration between existing supply chain actors. This
approach may ultimately prove less disruptive, with less scrutiny on
traceability (i.e., no blockchain) and a more inclusive approach
involving existing actors that is likely to achieve broader immediate
appeal and lower resistance. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by this
study, it conceivable that human process failures and greed could still
erode the integrity of the same supply chain merely retrofitted with
digital technology. Hence, some platforms may well seek to remove
actors that are deemed unnecessary or untrustworthy and/or that are
replaceable by such technologies. This approach has a higher barrier to
market entry due to the cost of technology development and a
requirement to shift the socio-cultural status quo [66]. Yet, it could be
argued that high levels of pressure to disrupt the supply chain (as
repeatedly expressed by respondents) could instigate a change in market
demand motivating actors (and end consumers) to adopt heightened
goals of traceability, sustainability, and product integrity.
6. Conclusion
Through a novel analysis combining innovation resistance theory,
principal-agent theory, and the theory of planned behaviour, this study
has developed and challenged emerging understandings of digital
technology uptake and usage in supply chains [1,2,11,65]. Innovation
resistance theory was used to demonstrate that wholesalers face tradi­
tion barriers (Section 4.1) and value barriers to blockchain adoption.
The reasons why value barriers exist were examined more deeply using
principal-agent theory which revealed how ‘information is power’ for
wholesalers (agents) enabling them to orchestrate the supply chain from
its centre, with those at the start and end (principals) insufficiently
informed on trade (Section 4.2), price (Section 4.3), and provenance
(Section 4.4). Hence, blockchain threatens to undermine what is
currently a favourable principal-agent relationship for wholesalers and
is the main reason that this innovation is being resisted.
Innovation resistance theory was also used to demonstrate that for
the other supply chain actors, risk barriers were evident, since – unlike
wholesalers – blockchain platforms may not yet be able to guarantee
desired sales volume and species preferences. Despite this, many fishers,
aquaculturists, and restaurateurs remained keen to adopt blockchain
platforms in anticipation that they would scale to sufficiently mitigate
this risk barrier eventually. There was however, one overshadowing
problem that required the use of the theory of planned behaviour to
reveal: that fishers, aquaculturists, and restauranteurs – despite having
pro-sustainability attitudes – were hesitant to adopt blockchain since the
wholesalers upon which their business models rely would view such
behaviour unfavourably (subjective norms), and this fear weakened the
perceived behaviour control of these other actors when deliberating
whether and how greatly to adopt blockchain (Section 4.5).
It is necessary to mention some limitations of this study. Our inter­
view participants, while largely representative across the value chain,
9
Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235
excluded the managers of wholesale intermediaries. Many of these ac­
tors were approached to participate, but response rates were low, and
arranging interviews proved unsuccessful. This could in its own right
provide some conclusions toward their perspective toward disruptive
technologies, and is not unexpected given their reputation amongst
other actors. Yet, we do acknowledge that some wholesalers will be
more progressive on matters of information transparency than others.
Additionally, since the geographical focus of the study is two states in
Australia, it cannot be said with total certainty how applicable these
conclusions could be within different regions and markets. Nevertheless,
the supply chain infrastructures and actors included and discussed in
this study are typical and representative, certainly across Western
developed nations.
Future comparative studies could be undertaken in other regions and
markets to provide further support to our findings and arguments here.
Beyond this, there is an opportunity for future research to move beyond
a consideration of potential resistance toward digital technologies, to
consider more closely the value the technology has on certain supply
chain stakeholders. The empirical evidence from this study could pro­
vide significant insight towards the underlying merit of these technol­
ogies, and may in the future provide a stronger case for their
implementation. Importantly, this could lead onto a data driven exam­
ination of the outcomes of digital technologies on sustainability, and
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) systems, to provide a truer
indication as to whether the technologies align with their commonly
accepted narrative.
Ultimately, while academics, disruptors, and the media often laud
blockchain – implying it will inevitably drive sustainable trans­
formations in multiple industries – we stress that blockchain will only
spur transformative change if the most influential supply chain actors
can see value in using it. We advocate similar research on supply chains
beyond seafood, to add to the evidence base established here – to further
scrutinise how the social, cultural, and institutional behaviours and
dynamics of supply chain actors can lead to the resistance of
innovations.
Credit author statement
Benjamin S. Thompson: Conceptualization; Data curation; Formal
analysis; Funding acquisition; Investigation; Methodology; Project
administration; Visualisation; Writing – original draft; Writing – review
& editing. Sascha Rust: Conceptualization; Visualisation; Writing –
original draft; Writing – review & editing.
Declaration of competing interest
SR is currently affiliated with a digital technology developer oper­
ating in the Australian seafood industry. SR did not participate in data
collection or analysis, which was performed entirely by BST. SR did not
see or hear any interview data from any respondents except for the
specific quotes featured in this article, which were selected by BST.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Josh Solomonsz for research assistance, and to all
respondents who made time for interview. Funding support was pro­
vided by Monash University’s School of Social Sciences and Faculty of
Arts. The research conformed to Monash University’s Human Research
Ethics Protocols (Project ID: 29671).
B.S. Thompson and S. Rust Technology in Society 73 (2023) 102235

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